The evolution of the financing of ballet companies in the United States

THE EVOLUTION OF THE FINANCING OF BALLET COMPANIES IN THE UNITED STATES

Karen Nelson

There is common a g r e e m e n t tha t pluralism is an essen- t ial f e a t u r e of United S ta t e s cu l tu re . In some areas~ such as urban cr imej the h e t e r o g e n e i t y of Amer ican soc ie ty has been v iewed nega t ive ly because it seems to encourage a pa tho logica l sense of a l iena t ion in some groups. In o ther areas~ such as the arts9 Americals pluralism can seem a v i r tue because it encourages the d ivers i ty which under l ies dynamism and progress ivism. Paradoxically~ a l though cul- tura l d ivers i ty undermines a t t e m p t s to pull t o g e t h e r a finite~ but sti l l comprehensive~ summary of what the dis- t inguishing f ea tu r e s of Amer ican cu l tu re are~ t he r e are enough such d i s t i nc t ive f ea tu r e s recogn ized and imi ta t ed e l sewhere to cause the U.S. to be a c c u s e d regular ly of cu l tu re imperial ism.

In the high arts9 including ballet~ the d i rec t ion of in f luence for a long t ime was c lear ly in the opposi te d i rec t ion- from the senior cu l tu res of Europe to the junior cu l tu re of the United S ta tes . In fact~ the process by which bal le t was impor ted into the United S ta tes i l lus t ra tes how plura l i s t ic inf luences on Amer ican cu l tu re asser t themselves~ how the p lura l i s t ic na tu re of Amer ican cu l tu re de t e rmines the ra te at which and the manner in which an ar t form like ba l le t can p e n e t r a t e the United States~ how~ as t ime passes~ t he immigrant ar t becomes n a t u r a l i z e d and even begins to exe r t an in f luence abroad. There are both pos i t ive and normat ive quest ions to be cons idered . The cen t r a l pos i t ive ques t ion t aken up here is how much conscious deve lopmen t of cu l tu re is possible and how much the deve lopmen t is an u n c o n s c i o u s (which is not to say an inexplicable) process . How much conscious deve lopmen t is possible and how it occurs depend on the pol i t ical e c o n - omy of a pa r t i cu la r coun t ry . The United S ta tes is a f ree en t e rp r i s e democracy lacking a feudal or a r i s t oc r a t i c past~ U.S. ba l le t companies have all begun under pr iva te auspices and have had to compe t e w!th a widening range of a l t e r n a t e diversions for the favor of the public. The

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central normative question, which can only be touched on here, is how much conscious manipulation of culture by private actors, including businesses, or public actors, or both, is desirable in a country like the United States.

Both the positive and the normative questions concerning development of American culture have a financial dimension, and that is the immediate focus of this paper. The particular instance of ballet is especially instructive because this art form and its financing so clearly illus- t ra te the pluralistic process through which American culture has matured. Ballet has become an essential component of American culture while capitalizing on both native and immigrant talents. One must hasten to note that most Americans remain indifferent to ballet and that the place of dance in American culture is largely based on the work of individuals who repudiated ballet.

Legitimizing the Stage

Ballet's origins in the sixteenth century are basically aristocratic - hence its character is t ic costliness - so preserving its essential qualities while adhering to a progressive artist ic policy, broadening ballet 's appeal, and remaining solvent is a complex problem for a contemporary ballet company, especially in a country like the United States whose traditions in high art tend more to the pro- vincial than the aristocratic. With provincialism comes confusion over the purpose of high art and over what type of art reflects commendable refinement and what alien preciousness. In the United States the theatre was the art form for which this confusion had the most retarding effects . At first, theatre performances, including dance acts, were virtually or in fact outlaw activities. (l) By the start of the eighteenth century, native professionals had begun to make careers for themselves. The public's at tention to dance was reinforced by a craze for learning social dances, mostly imported from France. (2) Such amateur study developed some appreciation of refined movement and of the difficulty of achieving technical mastery of dance movements. However, there was no question of anything approaching institutionalized theatr ical dance until late in the century. At that time, opera

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became very popular, and the dance troupes associated with opera companies shared in the benefits of patronage by wealthy Americans who undertook to purchase expen- sive boxes by the season and to cover losses. Note that the relatively heavy prices of boxes should be taken as evidence of successful price discrimination rather than as evidence of disguised philanthropy since impresarios con- sidered such income earned and aimed to run in the black on the basis of earned income.

Financing of ballet as an adjunct to opera being pre- sented on a commercial basis entailed a number of problems. The quality of the dancing9 especially of the mem- bers of the corps~ was poor. Hiring was on a season to season basis, which meant training was f i t ful . On a broader level, ballet came to be viewed either as show dancing (when incorporated into non-operatic spectacles) or~ in its classical [orm~ as a component of opera, an Old World art form geared to the extravagant tastes of the wealthy. While show dancing soon diversified to encompass a variety of forms appealing to a broad portion of the public~ the early financing of classical ballet in the United States encouraged its inherent tendency to serve as a socio-economic shibboleth. Aside from isolated instances in which foreign stars achieved popular renown (such as Fanny Elssler's two-year tour of the U.S. in the mid- 1800's), classical ballet enjoyed only limited appeal in the U.S. In the absence of a conscious decision to invest pub- l ic monies in the development of native bailet~ the cultural infrastructure remained inadequate to support stable companies. (3)

The extended period of free enterprise in U.S. dance, whatever waste of undeveloped and unappreciated talents i t entailed, was in retrospect very valuable for allowing a variety of dance forms to seek U.S. audiences on a broadly equal footing. The U.S. dance tradition has encompassed the "classic" dance of Duncan~ "aesthetic" dance, ethnic (and pseudo-ethnic) dance, jazz dance (including tap)~ adagio dancing~ and modern danc% all in addition to ballet. Europe's long tradition of focusing subsidies on ballet retarded diversified development of dance there. (4)

Even in Europe~ where the court origins of ballet make it possible to argue that there has been public sup-

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port of the art from its inception) the history of the financing of ballet has varied both geographically and over time. A few examples wil l serve to indicate the role that private financing has played and the manner in which the spirit of public beneficence has been tempered by changes in the terms and sizes of subsidies. Many cities in Europe, including Moscow into the nineteenth century and London into the twentieth) have depended for their ballet on commercial productions) though those of better quality could attract some backing from wealthy individuals. Diaghilev's Ballet Russe) the company doing the most consistently progressive work during its twenty years of existence (1909-1929)) was almost entirely privately financed. There has been nerve-wracking haggling at various times over the amount of subsidy to be provided to the major companies in France, Italy and Denmark. (5) In France)public support did not prevent a serious deterioration in quality~ in Italy) the dominant position of opera impeded development and maintenance of artistry in the ballet companies, which were attached to the opera houses (though astonish- ing virtuose were trained and their services exported).

Exploring Every Avenue of Support

In part, the changing structure of the financing of U.S. ballet companies has been a function of their own maturation) which has led to better quality of both output and management~ but it also reflects growing public interest in ballet and an overall evolution of the structure of support of nonprofit activities in the U.S. As evidence for the latter proposition) one need only look to the financial experience of the younger generation of U.S. ballet companies. They have been able to avail themselves of support from sources which simply were not part of the financial picture for pioneering companies in their early years.

The thought underlying all discussions of how to reg- ularize the financing of ballet companies (and of performing arts organizations in general) is that there is an inev- itable and growing gap between costs and earnings which must be filled through donations of one sort or another. This "income gap" hypothesis rapidly gained currency once featured by Baumol and Bowen in their study of the per-

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~orming arts in the U.S. However, as we have seen, that such a gap might exist has not always been a premise in the presentation of ballet in the U.S. Through 19#0 or so , ballet was, in effect, a branch of the commercial theatre, employing in its soloist and principal ranks mostly imported performers. As efforts to form permanent American companies got underway in the 130%, the diff icult ies en- countered were viewed on infant industry grounds as simply the temporary financial strains to be expected in the period before reputations had been established. Man- agers held out hope of eventually running in the black on the basis of earned income, with a system of loss guaran- tees funded by a reasonably large number of backers . (6)

Sol Hurok was able, by insisting on ce r ta in commercial standards, to act as impresario to his own profit, but since he was not accountable for any of a company% costs when i t was not performing under his aegis, his experience was misleading. (7) Nonetheless, for a while, from 19#1 to 19#6, the in teres ts of Hurok and Ballet Thea t re seemed to overlap, so the l a t t e r contracted i t se l f as a Hurok presentation. Earlier, during the years 1935-1935, Balanchine and his company had experimented with linking themselves to the Metropolitan Opera Company. Both the tturok commercial approach, with its emphasis on crowd pleasing performers and productions, and the approach of serving as an auxil iary to an opera company proved unsuitable for a native ballet company with serious and long term artistic aspirations. From a financial standpoint, the lesson learned was that autonomy and steady backing by willing philan- thropists were indispensable for an American company. Just as 13aumol and Bowen argued some twenty years later, losses had turned out to be a structural feature of the business, and the question became one of making fund raising as routine and productive as possible while pro- ceeding with the central task of building repertory, re- hearsing dancers and penetrating the public consciousness.

At the broadest level, to arrive at an "ideal" financing mix, decisions must be reached concerning the proportion of total income to seek from ticket sales and performance fees and the proportion of unearned income to be provided through government subsidy. Since the factors influencing the costs and revenues of ballet companies

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tend to change over time) not only do companies at any given moment need to be working toward approaching more closely the ideal financing mix) but they will have to be anticipating changes in what constitutes the ideal mix. What constitutes the ideal mix will depend on the level of demand for ballet performances of the type a company produces) the degree of competition from other companies) the current cost structure) the attitude of private donors (individuals,foundations and corporations)) toward support of the arts in general and of ballet in particular) and the amount of public monies available from each level of government.

The two basic possibilities available to a ballet company itself for adjusting its financial mix are modifications in artistic policy and improvements in management. Changes in artistic policy can range from reorienting a company)s repertory to signing substantially different contracts with dancers and other employees. Improvements in management can include more effective marketing) more stringent control of costs) and more systematic and ener- getic cultivation of benefactors. With regard to benefactors) i t must be recognized that both the variability and the rates of growth of the amounts contributed by the different categories of donor differ because their determin- ants differ. A recent Chemical Bank study found that foundation support of nonprofit institutions was falling off) while individual support of charities (mostly religious institutions) remained strong. Corporate philanthropy was especially volatile because of its primary dependence on profits. (8) Such information, supplemented with more detailed information on the particular attractiveness of ballet to different categories of donors) must be taken into account by a ballet company's development staff in their design of fund raising strategy.

As a fledgling object of charity in the U.S., ballet enjoyed considerable scope for increasing its unearned income) but the pace at which this potential has been re- alized has been governed most importantly by the rate at which recognition of the legitmacy of dance as a component of America's high culture has spread among prospec- tive donors. A far from neutral breakthrough came on December [6) [963, when the Ford Foundation announced

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tha t it was under taking a t en -year $7.7 million program o£ aid to bal let companies associa ted with Balanchine and to his School of American Ballet . Not only was modern dance excluded from the Ford Foundationts program entirely~ but even the ballet to be supported seemed to represent only one wing of a he te rogeneous ar t form. The Ford Founda- tion was accused of misguidedly promoting an a r t i s t i c monopoly, of having )'stifled all other c r ea t ive effor t ." (9) Whereas Kirstein cha rac t e r i zed the s i tuat ion as one in which " thea t r ica l dancing has been legitimized~" Alien Hughes~ chief dance c r i t i c of the New York Times~ argued tha t )'the familiar checks and balances of our dance econ- omy, opportunity, possibility) and of training and performance realities were exploded." (10) The central issue was whether the Ford Foundation bad gone too far in con- sciously and deliberately feeding a large amount of resources into a single cultural stream.

Within a year of the Ford Foundation)s decision to provide major support to ballet) the Federal government allied itself with the efforts of private patrons of the arts. Creation of the NEA in 1965 added the final component to what is generally referred to as the "pluralistic" structure of financing of the arts in the U.S. Federal support is intended to be neutral" )'The Endowment does not set national policy for the arts themselves. It should never dictate taste. These matters are to be determined by the private sector." ( I I ) This normative principle of neutral i ty becomes equivocal as soon as i t is operationalized. The very decision on the size of the NEA budget constrains the extent and intensity of Federal endorsement of the arts as a valuable part of American culture, and~ for any given amount of funds~ the particular manner in which the funds are disbursed inevitably favors some organizations over others, especially when geographic criteria are in confl ict with considerations of quality. Furthermore, there is a learning curve to be traveled. For instance~ the Dance Program began with an arrangement whereby separate applications had to be submitted by a company for di f ferent categories of grants. Now, a dance company is able to define its own needs within certain guidelines and amalga- mate them in a single annual application.

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The greatest d i f f icul ty in designing a program of support lay in the NEA's Dance Touring Program, set up in 1968. The program was instituted with the thought that the dual goals of increasing employment and income of dance companies and of providing access to professional dance performances to localities previously neglected could be met by focusing a large fraction of the Dance Programls funds on touring activities. The necessity of controlling the number of companies eligible for funds led to imposition of quantitative standards (relating to number of performances given) in J972 and, amid considerable dissent, qualitative standards (established through "audits" of performance) in 1979. Now the NEA has recognized that the necessity of touring to obtain funds was undercutting growth of local audiences, so the Endowment is looking to promote more performances at home. At the same time, to try to make touring less of a drain on dance company administrators and creative personnel, the Dance Program is seeking ways of encouraging the formation of long-term relationships with presenters of tour performances.

In its f irst years, the Dance Program directed its assistance "at two immediately pressing emergencies: the lack of consistent financial support from the private sector for dance and the ever present threat of extinction facing even the best of companies." (12) After f i f teen years had elapsed, the director of the program could point to progress in expanding touring by companies, in sponsoring training for company managers, in encouraging fund raising self-help by having the NEA pay the salaries of newly hired directors of development, in developing chor- eographic talent, in increasing the use of television to bring dance performances before the public, and in stimulating corporate giving. The NEA quickly hit upon the device of "challenge grants" as a means of stimulating local support and of changing priorities of private donors. In fact, challenge grants have served to coordinate public and private giving, often in the direction of helping arts organizations eliminate existing debts and building up capital funds. Now, looking ahead, the staff of the Dance Program reports:

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During ~he 19$0~s we in the Dance Program expect dance to solidify its status and extend those roots in the form of longer home seasons in true dance theaters, cooperative growth efforts led by presenting organizations, a mutually bene- ficial connection between independent choreographers and repertory dance companies, and in- creasingly sophisticated dance management. (13)

ha line with these expectations, the 19gl-g5 priorities of the Dance Program are to improve creative opportunities for choreographers, to help stimulate local support for companies) and to attend to the needs of dancers, both while active and eLIter retirement /tom the stage. (14)

Although corporate giving to the arts has a much longer history than do government subsidies, the amount of corporate giving) especially for the performing arts, has only recently become substantial enough to comprise a major component of the financial package for arts organizations. In part, this increase in giving reflects an in= crease in the number of corporations undertaking programs of philanthropy) but it also reflects a shift in the priorities guiding corporate gifts.- the share of charitable budgets going to the arts has been rising, indicating that corporations,, for a variety of reasons are coming to view the conscious promotion of cultural organizations as in the best interests of American business. As the arts component of corporate giving has been rising, so has the share of dance in that arts component. (15) Contributing to these enhanced receipts has been the development of co- ordinated fund raising in the corporate sector. Examples are the Lincoln Center Consolidated Corporate Fund, es= tablished in 1970) and the National Corporate Fund for Dance, formed two years later. The idea is to match donors and donees at as l i t t l e administrat ive cost as possible.

Although arts organizations understandably will be inclined to view donations from all sources as complemen- tary) the Reagan administration is seeking to train both arts organizations and corporations to view Federal and corporate gifts as substitutes° At first blush) expanding the number of corporations committing themselves to sig-

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nJficant financial support of the arts might ~ to cot- respond better to the needs o~ a pturM cuIture tha~ f ~ - c~l involvement on the ~ r t o~ the Federa~ g o v ~ - ~ t , However~ ~ second t~ught i t is Fatd to ~ t v e ~ ¢ef,= porate ph~nthropy as unalloyed berte~icence, so o~e b le~t to wonder w ~ t busin~sl~e wedtsposit~o~ v~il~ skew not only the budgeting of donations to different t y ~ organizations, but also the. artistic ~ l i ~ of ~ g ~ t ~ . s bent on attracting corporate support. The latter p r ~ ~s more relevant to ballet comp~ies than the ~ O t ~ . would like to think that the current emp~slS ~ ~¢orpor~te giving, with its dubious implications for both co~sCiouS Unco~cious manipulation of American culture) i.S ~ tinu|ty in the evolution of financ|ng the arts i~ ~ U~,=

From Layered Sod to Bricks and Mortar

B~let: companies in the United States ~ve a d ~ with a g ~ deal of faltering, Irom ~ h= the shakiest sort to more or~ l ~ s y s t e ~ vat.us sources of earned and unearned reve av~iabie = to arts org~izat~ns in the U n i ~ $ ~ process ~ s been evolut~nary, but i t ~S ~ied~ ~- d e t ~ from case to case ~ d has:, in ~ e r y c ~ ~ continuous. This evo|utlon has ~oceeded in part t h t ~ . learn'rag by companies, in part ~rough c~ang~ ~ by the several categories of don~s, ~ ~n part ~ & suit of an increase in the number ~ peop|e ~ t e r e ~ atte~ing ballet performances. The mt~toneS '° route, aS traveled by George balan<:~ne, the Ci" princip~ choregrapher, have been marked oft by ~s ~||y Lincoln Kirstein:

From the beginning Baianc~ne's education and- early performance were: supported by centr~ authoritarian governments, ~irst by a czarist regime, briefly by the SoViets, followed by a ~ivate reduction of more or less id,enti~al principles by Diaghi|ev from 192# to 1929, although ~ s last governance was ~nurmus i~ its decline. In the United $ta~S, begi~ing in 1934, we managed to find ~lvate ~t ro~ge;

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later) the bounty of P~ockefeller and Ford Foundations; more recently New York City itself~ and the New York State Council on the Arts, and. the National Endowment for the Arts. In addition to fr iendly foundations and corporations there have been individuals who wished to see our work carried on, However lean a season, we have never exactly starved9 despite our history of earty bankruptcies and reorganizations. We came to gain stability; with it a modest freedom or independence, in part by financial luck or logic, (16)

The broadly similar path taken by the management of ABT can be chronicled in Charles Payne's account of that company's f i rst for ty years. (17)

The common motivation of all these efforts to aug- ment and to some extent to guarantee the income of ballet companies is the conviction that a secure financial base wil l ult imately be saving of resources in the production and performance of dance works, The history of American ballet companies has been one of chronic financial extremity ~nd associated waste. As recently as 1965, the year the New York state council was made permanent and the legislation creating the NEA was passed, the Rockefeller panel was reporting that~ "From the standpoint of financ% administration and organization) the dance world is close to chaos." (18) "Waste arises because of the peculiar features of ballet production. The creation of a dance involves substantial payroll and overhead expense because both dancers and rehearsal space must be ~fired. FurtheG these resources are committed without knowing how valuable the final product will be, a problem in other art forms but to a lesser degree. (I9) As far as existing repertory is concerned, there are substantial costs associated with shutting a company down because dancers' familiarity with the repertory becomes rusty; dances may even be lost) though this is less likely today than before electronic recording media became available.

Focusing on the financial side of the picture, there are several basic features of a stable company which may be enumerated, Such a company is in a position each year

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to set a realistic and timely budget for itself within which the artistic director goes about arranging for new productions, for revivals, and for maintenance of the active repertory. In general, i t is desirable to maximize the fraction of earned revenues from subscription ticket sales. Sub- scciptions provide the basic features of a futures market: a company can sell at least some of its product in advance and to that extent gauge the amount of earned revenue its season's work wil l bring in. A subscription system also encourages a higher average number of tickets bought per patron and allows a company to earn interest on short term notes purchased from subscription proceeds. With unearned income~ some donors, including the NEAr provide grants only for specific projects, and even they may re- str ict the total size of the grant to a part of the total cost of a project. To preserve f lexibi l i ty, a company must identify donors willing to give unrestricted funds. A stable company's balance sheet will show sufficient reserves to protect it the company from unexpected expenses or from unexpected losses from unsuccessful productions or even strikes. A major reason for the NEA setting up the challenge grant system was to enhance the planning capabili- ties of companies and helping them unload accumulated debt and to build up precautionary reserves.

In Actual Practice

Consideration of the financial and artistic histories of ABT and NYCB, the largest ballet companies, illustrates the process and nature of the growing institutionalism described in the previous section, an instituionalism which has depended upon the manner in which ballet companies have been financed.

After about forty years of e~fort, ABT, which gave its first performance on 3anuary Jl, 19#0) and NYCB which gave its first performance on October 11, 1945, have established themselves as the preeminent U.S. companies. In the early days, when dance audiences were small and erratic in attendance, there was some thought that the efforts of Lucia Chase to get Ballet Theatre off the ground and Lincoln Kirstein to do the same for Balan- chinets dancers should be consolidated) but the unwilling-

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ness of either producer to cede uitimate authority to the other, and differences in the basic principles of artistic policy to which they adhered~ meant tha t the organizat ion of separa te companies would proceed. (20)

By the end of the for ty 's each company had made some progress in regularizing its own financial a r range- ments. Bailer Society, Kirstein)s first sponsoring group, hired a business manager in t9#6; the Ballet Thea t re Foundation was establ ished in 19#7 so tha t donors might obtain tax deductions for contr ibut ions to Ballet Thea t re . Despite Kirs te in 's avowed wariness of e f f ic iency in any form and as apparent ly confirmed by a NYCB general manager , who reported, "Nominally, l 'm responsible for fiscal planning. Actually, things just happen," (21) City Ballet has s tayed in business now for some th i r ty- f ive years. Kir- s tein gives major c redi t for stabilizing the company's f inances in its f irst twen ty years to Morton Baum, who headed the City Cente r , the organizat ion under whose auspices the City B ~ l e t operates) until his death in I968. Since Baum did not publicize the detai ls of his f inancial management) we are lef t with Kirs te in 's simple report that somehow Baum c lea red the def ici ts from the books. (22) As for ABT~ Lucia Chase for many years took it upon her- self to cover residual def ic i t s each year .

In more r ecen t years ABT and NYCB have found it expedient to become more sys temat ic in their budgeting and planning in order to manage risks they face more ef- fec t ive ly and in order to a t t r a c t major pr ivate and public donors. In l gg0 - s I , ABT's budget was $9.6 million and NYCB's $12.9 million. (23) ABT had about 90 dancers on its roster and NYCB about l l 0 (some none too active). Both companies depend substantial ly on unearned income, but ABT more so than NYCB: the ratio of unearned income to total income for the former is 39%, while for the la t te r it is 30%. Note, however , tha t NYCB may depend more than ABT on indi rec t subsidies since NYCB tours on a simple fee for per formance basis, while ABT receives a minimum fee plus a pe rcen tage of the gross. In at least some cases, the fees are part ial ly f inanced by subsidies to the present ing organizat ions. Both companies have re- ceived regular support from the NEA. NYCB has recen t ly been feel ing secure enough about its ability to a t t r a c t

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contributions that it .has announced its intention of allow, ing its dependence on unearned income to increase in order to keep ticket prices down. Less that 6% of NYCB's revenue is in the form of restricted funds, and less than 2% of ABT's. Both companies have liquid reserves built up, but ABTfs are of quite recent vintage, the outgrowth of a $1 million grant from the NEA and of a concerted effort to increase contributions.

There is a substantial difference in prices charged by the two companies, at least in New York~ where NYCB performs 23 weeks of its 40 week season~ but ABT only 8. NYCB's top price for the 1980-81 season was $20 and ABT's $35. At those prices NYCB averaged 95% of capaci- ty in the 2792 seat New York State Theatre and ABT $7% in the 3928 seat Metropolitan Opera Theatre. Both companies push subscription sales. NYCB began its subscription system in 196% the year it moved into the New York State Theatre. Less than ten years ago, subscription sales accounted for less than 25% of tickets sold. Now the figure is around 70%. (2$) ABT has a subscription system for its New York season which accounts for about 55% of ticket sales~ and participates with other dance companies in a subscription arrangement at the Kennedy Center in Washington, where in the winter of 1980-81~ ABT appear- ed for 4 weeks. ABT is now looking to set up subscription sales for all road engagements of two weeks or more.

The planning efforts of the two companies involve attention to management of both sides of their budgets over a planning horizon d a few years. Kirstein attributes the City Ballet's latter day ability "to plan rather than improvise" to increased public and private support. (25) Since the changeover in management at ABT in September, 1980, that company has substantially increased its planning effort; a first three-year plan has been put together, setting out artistic and financial goals for the period through 1954. (26) A major change has been the decision to promote the ensemble concept by placing dancers of all ranks on regular 40-week contracts rather than allowing stars to drop by for a limited number of performances. The thought is that over the long haul the artistic quality of the company's work will be enhanced. ABT has also assembled a professional development staff to bring method to the

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sea~ch f.or and cu.hivation of contdbutorso Both !s~BT and ?~YCB are keepLag abreast oi the possibU.ities for earning income through pacdcipation in the production oi ~'soft- ware" for cabie and video systems.

OverMl~ Ci ty Ballet audiences, concen t r a t ed in ~4ew York, are about twice those of ABT. ABT would ].ike to extend the time it spends in New York~ which would re- quire locating .... . . ~" . ,~:o, ~ec t hea t r e for i tse i f~ and build up a touring schedule tha t allows :{or seasons of two weeks of more in as many "regional centers" as possible. The idea would be to spare dancers some of the strain of touring and to develop long term relationships with severai large metropol:ta.n area¢0 wMcb w:~, :d - " " aa <:, re~,rl ! ' ' '~,{! ~'{ g&i :S - , - ~ _ > . . . .

.......... .~a~i<. ca~a,k.~,~jo :(i~ ow;s .'@eno some time on the road, but iZs high Lee ¢eCers most ioca.t[ties from hiring

Cui..p¢~,q .. s.9v~ce= Both ABT and NYCB have schooi% but on a very dif-

f e r en t scale. The School of American Ballez, which an te - dates the Ci ty Ballet by four teen years, is the premier academy in the count ry for classical t~'aining. Unlit 19g0, ABT's school, was a m , . ~ey making venture which could not afford to maintain .~,~rictly professional M:anda:d~. As of 19gt, the school has become an academy for traE:i.ng a selec~ group of scholarship s tudents who display ~,rofes- sional promise. Once a s tudent has achieved the ' "~ *t~V c:: Oi

mastery necessary for public perfo: 'mance, he or she can serve an apt.~er, tlcesh:~, in ABT II or p_rnap.~ ~ " in the coros, of ABT [tse.,f. The especial ly t a len ted young dancers pre- pared at SAB are o f fe red apprent iceships with %e parent company.

ABT's e f fo r t to provide apprent iceship opportunit ies to choreographers takes the ~orm of a workshop. The ABT Workshop provides se lec ted rising choreographers with dancers from ABT II and with rehearsa l t ime. There is no par t icu lar expec ta t ion tha t the pieces produced will be t r i e d ou t b c , o r e the pub l i c . In some .~as=~, a c h o r e o - g rapher not ready to s tage a work at the Met ~':~:'' be commissioned to set a small scale work on ABT II. City Ballet, facing the c lear need to prepare for the post BaMnchine er% has been using SAB's annual Workshop

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Pe¢'formances as opportunit ies for aspiring choreographers within the company to try their hands.

The di f ferences be tween the ar t i s t ic policies of ABT and NYCB must be taken into account in considering the models these companies present for survival and development, The City Ballet has maintained a coheren t and respected profile by organizing its reper tory and deploying its resources in accordance with George Balanchine 's aes- the t ic and pract ical vision. On the other hand) ABT has been said to lack an ar t i s t ic profile) but to have instead a rather disjointed public image growing out of its eclectic reper tory and its (only recent ly muted) policy of playing up principal dancers and guest stars at the expense of the majority of the company's ensemble. In the late 1960~s, ABT commit ted i tself to production of the classics; in f a c h this move was an object of its first NEA grant . Lucia Chas% co-d i rec tor at the time~ fe l t the classics would a t t r a c t audiences and rel ieve some of the pressure to locate first rank choreographers . Meanwhil% at the City Ballet a concer ted ef for t is made to keep producing new ballets, including occasional fest ivals devoted to single composers for which the company's resources are mo- bilized in an effor t to produce a large body of new work.

Art is t ic tone is important for~ among other things, its inf luence on the type of audience and donors a t t r ac t ed , As recent ly as 1973~ NYCB was drawing only 55% of capaci ty . Netzer argued this was due to competi t ion from other companies during an over long New York season. (27) Others pointed to dryness in Balanchine 's choreography and spareness in his productions. In any cas% the company now enjoys virtually full houses. ABT's reper tory has seemed more accessible and its productions and cast ing more glamorous. At this point, so long as the companies maintain their overall reputat ions for quality~ it would be in their mutual in teres t to cont inue as less than per fec t subst i tutes in order to encourage g rea te r combined pat ronage by both t icket buyers and donors.

Conclusions

Financing of ballet in the U.5. has evolved from a dependence on box off ice revenues to enjoyment of a di-

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veralfied package of earned and unearned income. It has ~ecorne common to view this diversified package as "pluralistic" and thus in keeping with the pluralistic nature of U.S. culture° However, exploring every avenue of support is not identical with responding to pluralism in American society, i'~ is conceivable, especially in the case of business giving, that certain categories of culturally worthy arts organizations, namely the more innovative and the :nore aggressively anti-Establishment, will receive short shrift. Since respected ballet companies like ABT and NYCB are favorite objects of corporate support, the ef fect on them of bias in corporate giving would be in- direct: the rigor of the artistic competition they faced .~'ould be reduced, and they would have a harder time identifying innovative choreographers.

While excessive dependence by arts organizations on b~siaess for unearned income could actually undermine pluralistic ~J.ttural expression in the United States, a sig- nificant public component of financing is the key to ren- dering cultural pluralism effect ive. Without public invest- ment in the country's inirastructur% the ability oi a broad variety of arts organizations to function is impeded. Nevertheless, the onset of public support of the arts in the United States was delayed by the country's economic and political tradition of privatism m~d by the tack, especially for dance, of the informed critical and professional community necessaw for constructive and broad-minded disbursement of public funds.

Meanwhit% the country's two major ballet companies were contriving to establish themselves as stable businesses even as the mode of financing available to them was evolving. Since ballet is an example par excellence of ~:oundabout production, the institutionalization of companies tike ABT and NYCB can be said to be the most economical manner of maintaining excellent ballet in the U.So~ with two qualifications. The first is that mediocre art ist ic direction can cancel much of the value of careful training and rehearsal of dancers and of inspired steward- ship of a company's finances° The second is that inspired s~ewardship of a company's finances entails recognition that the company's "income gap" is in part endogenously determined.

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To those ,~ho describe diversified funding as pluralistic, the variety of :[und~ng sources is seen as a guarantee that conscious manipulation of cultural development can be avoided, In fact~ in the U.S. there is a grand tradition of business philanthropy aimed expl ici t ly at using the arts to mold the public psyche. (2Z) Furthermor% as we have seen, the Ford Foundation's success in providing a linan- cial buttress~ over the better part of two decades) for Balanchine's company and school represented a breakthrough for stab[Hzing and legitimizing ballet in the U.S. The ~act is t.hat culture develops through conscious decisions on the part of those who control resources. The out- come of ~hose decisions will be cultural pluralism so long as resources are not concentrated in a few hands and to the extent that unconsciously formed tastes constrain the types of art that can gain public acceptance. (Thus) the rate at which tastes develop will govern the rate at which conscious cultural innovations can take hold.)

At this point) the major U.S. ballet companies have arrived at reasonably secure financiM arrangements and have achieved a leve] o~ quality m their work which meets ~orld standards. As in other areas of cultural endeavor) the U.S. has even reached the point of playing a role in setting world s'candards.

Smith College

FOOTNOTES

I. Kenneth Silverman, A Cultural His'torx of the American Revolution~ New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1976, pp, 59, 51.t5-546.

3. Alan Trachtenberg, m e incornoratioa o~ America: Culture and Soc[ejet! in the Glided A ~ New York: Hill and Wang, 1982, p.6.

4, See, e.g,~ Dance S ~ (3une 196t~), p. 36, for Ted Shawn<s recollection of what Kurt Jooss said

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................. ~,; ~.;~, . ,~n~m~ e i i ec t on modern dance in

5o :~e:e, .-_o~.~. 2;~u2i.o Gatti-Casazza) Memories of +,he O ~ London: ~ohn Ca~der~ 1977 (orig. pub. 19gl), pp. gg-#9; and August BournonviJle~ ~ t r e L i ! ~ Middletown~ 2'onno~ Wesleyan Oniversity Press, 1979, p. 3#g.

6..3ee,-~_°~>.~. 3i~a%~s Payne~ American Ballet Theatr% New .: or~a .~lfi:ed A., KnooL 197g~ p. 3i.

2, ~ ' . >/.~ e

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ca.. ~aai,% £conomic Research Department, Gi._vinK :,,nd G e t t i n g . C h e m i c a l B~_ ank Stud_y_ of Charitable Contributions ~hrqouKh 19gg. New York: n.d.

9° , , , : ; a t : , ° ':~ .... ~va ~ .~ .~ . ,~ , .~ . , .... and Harold C. Schonberg, "Ballet in A m e r i c a a © n e - ~ a n Showe" t t a r p e ~ s M a g a z i n e o

d . 3ep~ember I96g)~ po 93.

!.0, ;"~.:~ ,~.',~ ~,~,~.,'~= (February 196#), p. 35; New York T:.me_~ December ~2) i963~ sect. 2, p, 11.

i~o Nai:ionai Endewme~.t _,~r the Arts, Annual R e ~ !;~79~ p. 30

~,2, !7,:ia :iona2 Endowment for the Arts) Annual Report - :'~v,_77~ '9" 17 . ~ t ,~ . . . . . . . .

~3. i:.ia':iona! Endowment for the Arts) Annual R e ~ ~!~ P° !3.

; o azine~ '<a,, ~ggl), p. 127.

De~,.e ~a~o~,=o (June I9gl)~ p. 70 (report on survey conducted by ,.he Business Committee for the Ar~s).

i~o Ls:o~n C . i ~ s , : e ~ b ~ Y e a r s ) The New York C i ~ ,:~ ~,;~,~ Alfred A, Knopf) 1978~ p. 236,

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ig. }kocke2eiler 9anet~ The Performin~ Arts: Problems and P r ~ e c t s , New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965) p. g3.

19. 5ee Roger Ao McCain, "Markets for Works oI Art and Markets for Lemons~" in William S. Hendon, James L. Shanahan and Alice 3. MacDonald (eds.), Economic Policy for the Art___ss, Cambridge, Mass.: Abt Books, [980~ pp. t22-13G for a discussion of a similar ?roblemo

20. Payne~ ppo [06-t07, !.62.

2I. Kirstein, p. 200.

2 2 . ~ pp. ~!9~ 262-263; 3oseph H. Mazo, Dance is a Contact 5 ~ New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 197#, p. 212.

23. Financial figures are taken from ABT's 1981 Annual Report and f rom NYCWs unpublished financial s ta te - ments for t98i°

2#, Figures on subscription sales were provided over the ~hone by ABT and NYCB staff.

25. Kirstei.n~ po 3#0o

26. ABT~ Annval Report. - 19811 p. 3.

27. Dick Netzer, The Subsidized Muse~ Public Sup.port for the Arts in the United States~ New York: Cambridge University Press~ 1978~ p. 13/4.

28. Se% e.og.~ Trachtenberg and Helen Lefkowitz Horowitz) Culture and the C i t ~ Cultural Philanthropy in Chicago from the 1880s to 1917,, Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press~ [976.

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Documents

The evolution of the financing of ballet companies in the United States