The European Union and the Challenge of the Khilafah

From the Root to the Causes: the Case of Hizb ut-Tahrir

(DRAFT PAPER)

Elisa Orofino and Serena Timmoneri*

Homegrown radicalism stands as a serious and actual threat for the European Union (EU), which

appears in constant alarm for the activities of radical Islamist groups, especially within its territory.

Dangerous aggregations like ISIS, al-Muhajiroun, Boko Haram are well-known and feared throughout

the EU. Nevertheless, the idea of re-establishing the Khilafah (Caliphate or Islamic State), rejecting

the West as a whole (in terms of economic, political and social model) and going back to “pure Islam”

dates back to the early 1950s. Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT- the Liberation Party) can be considered as a

forefather of current Islamic radical movements. Founded in Palestine, in 1953 by the Islamic judge

and scholar Taqquiddin an-Nabhani, HT has been preaching for decades about the necessity to bring

the Caliphate back, to live abiding the shari‘ā and to reject what they define as the “Western system”.

The group is still very active and popular all over the world, Europe included, and it has inspired

several groups (also terror ones) the EU needs to deal with today. In spite of the normative efforts –

such as the 2005 Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism – the EU seems

quite far from achieving an effective strategy against this threat. This paper aims at contributing to the

debate on Islamist groups in the West, taking HT as Test Case, and focusing on how they challenge

the EU in the two macro areas of values and security.

Introduction

Relentlessly, the European Union (EU) needs to deal with a great variety of issues that threaten its

member states. Among them, homegrown terrorism stands out for its complexity. Mostly perpetrated

by second and third generation Muslims, these attacks are carried out by citizens of the EU who have

developed a harsh aversion towards their country and the so-called “western culture”. Several steps

lead the individual to this extremely violent approach and certainly radicalization is an essential one.

In fact, radicalization can be defined as “what happens before the bomb goes off” (Neumann 2008,

p.4), stressing how it is important to address this phenomenon first in order to fight terrorism. Well

aware of the current alarm, the EU is on the forefront to curb radicalization through a number of

initiatives, touching several fields and involving different actors. Notwithstanding EU’s efforts, recent

attacks in Paris (2015) and Brussels (2016) have stressed how the problem of violent extremism is still

* Elisa Orofino PhD Candidate - University of Melbourne - Asia Institute 2,3, Sidney Myer Asia Centre,

University of Melbourne, Swanston St & Monash Road, Parkville VIC 3010 Melbourne (Australia) - + 61

415035250 - eorofino@student.unimelb.edu.au

Serena Timmoneri PhD Candidate - University of Catania - Department of Social and Political Sciences, Via

Vittorio Emanuele II 8, 95131 Catania (Italy) - +39 3487105390 - serena.timmoneri@gmail.com

an emergency and radical Islamist groups play a pivotal role in pushing individuals towards a black

and white vision of the world where the “West” is the oppressor and the “Muslims” are the victims

(Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2016).

In order to analyse the challenge issued by Islamist groups to the EU, the authors decided to select

Hizb ut Tahrir as a Test Case. The choice of this particular movement appears to be very significant

for a number of reasons. Firstly, Hizb ut-Tahrir (literally “Liberation Party”) stands out as a brilliant

example of longevity and persistence. Founded in 1952 by Mohammed Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, an

Islamic scholar and judge, the group stood out as a response against western occupation of the Middle

East and the creation of the state of Israel after World War II. Therefore, Hizb ut-Tahrir (henceforth,

HT) is by nature against the political, economic and social models promoted by western states. The

group is one of the oldest movements still active not only in the Middle East but also in the West and

it was able to survive persecutions, bans and political-religious hostility, becoming stronger over the

years.

The second reason concerns the spectrum of HT’s activity. The Hizb has a massive presence both in

the virtual world (through the major social networks as well as by means of websites, blogs, chats,

fora, and videos) and in the real one. Activists and leaders constantly organize lectures, debates,

information sessions as well as spreading leaflets and fliers in several public spaces, such as mosques,

universities, and clubs. Thirdly, HT is a sui generis actor. Defined by the founder as a “party”, HT

combines a strong political rhetoric with radical religious ideas. Notwithstanding its being a party, HT

supports a resilient anti-integration agenda, which prevents its members from running in elections,

voting, and exercising any form of active citizenship in a non-Islamic system.

For the above-mentioned reasons, HT stands out as a very good example of Islamic revivalism in a

radical form. The group’s rejection of the so-called “western system” (an-Nabhani, 2002), the public

despise of western foreign policy as a tool of oppression and its vivid claim of bringing the Caliphate

(Khilafah or Islamic State) back are often considered as threats to the European Union (EU) and its

member states. The danger is often associated to HT’s ability to inspire jihadist ideas and to push

individuals towards terror groups, working as a conveyor belt to terrorism (Baran, 2004).

Is this argument real? Are HT and other intellectual Islamist groups in Europe dangerous? How do

Islamist groups challenge the EU? This paper aims at answering these questions, contributing to the

debate on Islamist groups in the West, focusing on how they challenge the EU in the two macro areas

of values and security. Data used for this study were gathered from a number of sources. Firstly,

through a six-months period fieldwork in London (the headquarters of HT in Europe) and Sydney.

Other relevant figures were collected through the analysis of the specific literature up-to-date, HT’s

media releases, along with EU’s official reports and normative sources.

1. Islamic Revivalism conquers Europe

It was not until the late 1970s and 1980s that Muslim communities around the world were impacted by

a significant wave of Islamic revivalism (Hamid, 2016). Several factors have contributed to this new

trend, such as international crises. Popular examples are the Gulf War (1991), the conflicts in Bosnia

(1993-95) and Chechnya (1994), along with the everlasting Palestinian struggle with Israel. In all

these contexts, a great number of Muslims was murdered and the international non-Muslim

community did not seem to devote much attention (Hamid, 2016). These episodes pushed a number of

young intellectuals to question what “being a Muslim” meant, developing a sense of solidarity towards

the suffering global ummah (Islamic religious community).

Being Islam a community-oriented religion, the will of acting in favour of “their people” started to

spread among Muslim communities in Europe, differentiating from the kind of Islam first generation

immigrants brought with them. In fact, Islamic revivalism comes along with a “politicized Islam,”

very opinionated on the hottest national and international main issues, wanting to act against a system

considered as oppressive to Muslims (Warner et al. 2012). Furthermore, the need for an accurate

religious education in the language of the host country and the will to raise an intellectual class who

could fight an intellectual battle led to a rupture with traditional mosques, where poor learning

methods accompanied by corporal punishments were very common (Hamid, 2016). As a result,

European Muslims living in the 1980s and 1990s were inclined in seeking a different religious identity

than the one of their parents, standing for their rights and speaking up for injustice (Vertovec &

Rogers, 1998; Ebaugh & Chafetz, 2000; Cesari 2002; Saint-Blancat, 2004; Peek, 2005; Hamid, 2011).

This process of revivalism and religious awakening was also fostered by the migration to Europe of a

number of young Middle Eastern intellectuals. They were usually persecuted in their home countries

and had to escape because their bold declarations against Arab rulers, mostly defined as apostates and

puppet rulers (Karagiannis & Mccauley, 2006). This is the case of Farid Kassim, Dr. Mohammed al-

Massari, Abu Mohammed and Omar Bakri Mohammed, who were the key-figures of Hizb ut-Tahrir

branch in Britain in the 1990s (Taji-Farouki, 1996). HT was not the only group operating in the UK at

that time. In fact, together with the Young Muslims (YM), Young Muslim Organization (YMO) and

the Jamiyya Ihya’ Minhaj as Sunnah (JIMAS), they were the main protagonists of Islamic activism in

the West (Hamid, 2011). A common characteristic among these groups was the necessity of re-

Islamising Muslim youth, liberating them from false belief and from the influences of kuffar

(unbelievers) concepts. Each of them claimed to have the truth, wanting to teach young Muslims their

religious duties, which appeared deeply intertwined with political action. With regard to HT, the

leadership of the movement embezzled the quranic verse 3:104 stating, "Let there be among you a

group that invites to the good, orders what is right and forbids what is evil, and they are those who are

successful" ("Hizb ut-Tahrir Official Website ", 2016).

Furthermore, slogans such as “Islam is the Solution” became quite popular in Europe during the 1990s

(Hamid, 2016). Islam was politicised and it started to be more of an ideology rather than a religion.

The political aspects of the faith became very popular and able to mobilize masses. An example is

Hizb ut-Tahrir “Khilafah Conference” at Wembley Arena in 1994, which attracted more than 10.000

participants from around the world. This event can be considered as one of the major rallies of

Muslims ever held outside the Middle East (Maher, 2013). Islamist groups also provided that sense of

family and belonging very significant to all those individuals who felt “disenfranchised” from the

main society and their relatives (Lynch, 2013). This term refers to those people who experience

marginalization, which is a feeling of alienation from both the parents’ culture and the host country

one (Culhane 2004). In providing a holistic ideology that encompasses all realms of life, Islamist

groups offer a “personal sense of safety, security and self-worth” (Costanza, 2012, p. 19). The new

awareness of belonging to worldwide community, based on the same faith and values works as a

catalyst for mobilisation and creates strong bonds encompassing nations and distances (Hamid, 2016).

In this context, being a Muslim is not a matter of concern – as it usually is when living in a Western

country – but it is something to be proud of. In fact, many Islamist groups point out the decline

pervading western societies (high rates of suicides, divorces, drug and alcohol addiction), highlighting

the strength of Islam as a deen (a way of life) promoting good moral values (such as parental respect)

and a healthy life-style (Geaves, 2010).

For these reasons, being a “western Muslim” sounds haram (forbidden) to the ears of Islamists, who

see the two worlds as clashing and never meeting. Nevertheless, many Muslim intellectuals have

spoken about the emergence of a new elite of western Muslims, who have managed to reconcile their

Islam with their western identity. That is the case of the reformist thinker Tariq Ramadan who

expressed powerful arguments in favour of an inclusive vision of Islam in Europe in his two books

“To be a European Muslim” (2013) and “Western Muslim and the Future of Islam” (2003).

Hizb ut-Tahrir, as all Islamist groups, promotes a simplistic black and white vision of the world,

which highlights the non-reconcilable relationship between Islam and the West based on a set of

arguments (Savage, 2014). The incompatibility of values stands out as a common topic in Islamist

rhetoric and it is often used as a way to challenge the EU, promoting the idea of western values as

dangerous (fostering moral decline) against the perfection of Islamic ones. This dichotomy will be

explored into details in the next paragraphs.

2. Challenging Values: Being Muslim vs Being European

2.1 Defining the Terms of the Challenge

Since the adoption of the European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to

Terrorism (2005), the EU assumed that the best way to fight terrorism was to prevent it in the first

place. Given the evident relationship between terrorism and radicalization, the EU started to elaborate

different plans and strategies to tackle this complex phenomenon. Major initiatives focused on

promoting a multicultural society and on welcoming the integration of immigrants. For instance, the

EU declared 2008 the Year of Intercultural Dialogue, working hard to establish a dialogue not only

between Europeans, but also with immigrants from third countries. This initiative has also encouraged

a closer contact among different cultural and ethnic backgrounds in order to demolish the idea of

clashing civilizations. In fact, the EU assumed that a direct interaction would help to dismantle the

inaccurate perception of Muslims as dangerous, emphasizing that the vast majority of European

Muslims do not accept extremist ideology; instead they espouse the values of peace and tolerance (EU

Commission 2008).

In 2015, the Commission and Education Ministers signed the Paris Declaration on promoting

citizenship and common values of freedom, tolerance, and non-discrimination through education. This

document called for renewed efforts to reinforce common core values within the EU to a more

inclusive society through education. Youth were identified as key actors, recipients of new educational

programs devoted to foster their growth as active and responsible members of a multicultural society.

One year later, the EU focus on values has also been re-stated as a priority by the recent Stronger EU

Action to better tackle violent radicalization leading to terrorism (2016), pointing out education and

the development of EU common values as two key areas of intervention.

As the EU works against the alleged incompatibility between the West and Islam, building a common

ground, Islamist groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir build much of their rhetoric on the binary construction of

concepts that are regarded as not compatible, such as “us vs them”; “right vs wrong”, “licit and

forbidden” (Tajfel, 1981). This narrow approach aims at enhancing the value of the in-group over the

out-group, fostering a bad image of the latter (Savage, Khan, & Liht, 2014). This monistic view is also

applied when assessing the concept of “Western Muslims.” In fact, HT argues that Muslims are

simply “Muslims” and cannot be refereed as “westerners” under any circumstance (Badar, 2016;

Hizbut-Tahrir, 2002a). Their belonging and identity are not linked to a territory but to a faith, a deen,

which is shared by the global ummah. Therefore, HT fosters the idea of Muslims as been exiled in the

West, in a context they do not belong to, constantly longing for the Caliphate as home (Sinclair,

2010).

2.2 Clashing Values

The analysis of Hizb ut-Tahrir discourses works as a perfect kaleidoscope to get into the main

arguments raised by Islamist groups on the alleged incompatibility between western values and

Islamic ones. In this paragraph, the authors will not only focus on democracy and personal freedoms

as values but also on western foreign policy, the War on Terror and western agenda as the direct

consequences of western values and as key arguments raised by Islamist groups to enhance the

existence of an unbridgeable gap between the West and the Muslims.

With regard to democracy, HT considers it as undoubtedly haram (forbidden). The reasons behind this

conception lie on the assumption that the sovereignty of people is per se a forbidden notion, colliding

with the main Islamic assumption of submission to Allah as the sole legislator. In fact, the word

“Islam” means submission to God alone. The submission to God is legitimate because He is just, His

law (shari‘ā) is perfect and pushes human beings to live a good life (an-Nabhani, 2007). At the same

time, HT highlights the perversion of human mind and desires, considering the submission to a system

based on people’s will as nothing but catastrophic. In fact, democratic systems allow the establishment

of parties that call for things that are forbidden by Islam, such as “drugs liberalization, abortion, use of

women as sexual objects”, pushing the whole society towards immorality and decay (Hizb ut-Tahrir,

1996, p.19).

Based on the above-mentioned premises, HT also criticizes the concept of “personal freedom”, very

important to European liberal countries. In HT’s view, personal freedom allows every person to live

his private life as he wishes, practising sexual perversion, eating and drinking whatever he wants as

long as he behaves lawfully, whose definition changes according to the specific historical period (Hizb

ut-Tahrir, 1996). Under the flag of personal freedom, several practices considered by HT as immoral

have spread in the West.

“Men and women live together without any legal relationship, and even men and

women have partners of the same sex and establish abnormal relationships amongst

themselves under the protection of the law. The personal and sexual perversions that

prevail in the Capitalist societies result from personal freedom, which has also led to

unbelievable conflicts. Pornographic magazines and movies, sex phone lines, and

nude bars are just a few examples of the abnormalities and perversions which the

Capitalist societies have degenerated to as a result of personal freedom.” (Hizb ut-

Tahrir 1996, p.32)

According to HT, these tolerated and encouraged libertarian haram behaviours are the origin of a

great number of social plagues in the West. HT’s activists often use official data – such as the

Eurostat’s ones – concerning the high-rate of suicides, divorces, drug use, alcoholism and mental

diseases affecting western countries, instilling in the minds of their interlocutors the desire to escape

the imminent collapse, through the implementation of an effective counter-model, based on HT’s

vision of the state and Islam (The Revival Production, 2013). For these reasons, HT calls its members

to vigorously hold on their Islamic life, their way of doing family, their division of roles between men

and women and their submission to shari‘ā to avoid a kuffar contamination and the following decline.

Another significant argument used by HT to challenge western and European states concerns the side

effects of their foreign policy. In fact, the Hizb fully shares the idea that “what governments call

extremism is to a large degree a product of their own wars” (Kundani, 2014, p. 35).

…“The long history of western violent occupations around the world, the support to

tyrant despots for economic reasons, the invention of arms of mass destruction and the

rise of a wealthy 1st World on the blood of a massacred 3

rd World are all examples of

western misconduct, affecting Muslims’ hearts and minds” (Badar, 2015).

Uthman Badar, HT Australia spokesperson, boldly pronounced these words mirroring the official

position of the group concerning western foreign policy. According to HT, the role played by western

states as exploiters and colonizers has left indelible marks together with the will to react against

western presence in the Arab world. For these reasons, HT links the tragic attacks in western states to

their misconduct rather than to religious extremism: “Political grievances and the continuous moral

outrage suffered by Muslims are the main triggers towards terrorism, rather than a radical vision of

Islam. Most of the terrorists are not regular with their prayers and have a scarce knowledge of Islam”

(Badar, 2015).

More recently, HT argued that the War on Terror has worsened the situation of Muslims living in the

West. After 9/11, Muslims have become the “dangerous other”, fostering new attitudes such as

Islamophobia, i.e. a growing anxiety and fear in the society towards Muslims, regarded as potential

terrorists (Satter, 2010). Also “securitization” stands out as a backlash of the War on Terror. In fact, it

is defined as “the process of state actors transforming subjects into matters of security: an extreme

version that enables extraordinary means to be used in the name of security” (Buzan, Wæver, and de

Wilde 1998, p. 25). With regard to Muslims, these extraordinary means imply a number of restricting

measures, such as having imams’ speeches controlled, banning religious groups presenting a more

textual approach to their religion and the demonization of the words radical and extreme. At the same

time, daily facts of new deaths in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan, along with “the rise of new alleged

peace missions in which more western states are involved do nothing but re-enforcing HT’s

propaganda of western efforts to spread its hegemony, subjugating Muslims, under the flag of peace

and security” (Woman 2, HT Britain, personal communication, December 2, 2015).

A further argument used by HT to challenge western states is the alleged “hidden agenda” behind

western foreign and immigration policies, aimed at forcing the assimilation of Muslims (Badar, 2015).

In fact, HT claims that the continuous alarm of terrorism has defined Muslims as the threat (Mustafa,

2016). This image, usually sponsored by western media, has led to a division of Muslims into two

broad categories, i.e. good Muslims and bad Muslims. The individuals belonging to the first category

are those who generally abide western laws without complaining, who are happy with the western life

style, who do not get involved in religious and political arguments, who mostly live their Islam in their

hearts at the spiritual level, embodying the perfect stereotype of the “moderate Muslim”. At the same

time, those Muslims who complain about western policies, who openly show their resentment towards

authorities, who are in favour of a radical vision of Islam (much more linked to Scriptures and to the

model of the Prophet) and want the application of shari‘ā are regarded as extremists and potential

terrorists. HT works hard to challenge this western-sponsored vision of good and bad Muslims,

presenting a number of reasons to de-construct this narrative.

Firstly, in HT’s view, the concept of “moderate Muslims” does not exist in Islam. In fact, “Islam is not

just a religion, but it is a deen, i.e. a way of life. Today, Islam is the same revealed to Prophet

Mohammed 1400 years ago and needs to be accepted in toto as it was at the beginning” (Uthman

Badar, HT Australia, personal communication, April 5, 2016). Those who accepts parts of it, those

“who pick and choose what it is confortable to put in practice are not real Muslims” (Man 3, HT

Britain, personal communication, 20 October, 2015). According to HT, being a Muslim means to go

back to the sources of Islam, to be educated on the system of Islam (mostly through an-Nabhani’s

writings) and to shape everyone’s life on the Prophet’s model (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2002). For this reason,

HT’s members are proud to be “radical” in the sense of being very linked to the roots of their religion,

accepting no compromise. For instance, they support the idea that western states are illegitimate for

Muslims and therefore they do not engage in any sort of political activity, such as voting or running in

elections (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 1996) . This attitude is widespread among HT’s acolytes also in countries

like Australia, where not voting involves sanctions.

Secondly, and related to the first argument, HT claims that European governments are using the terror

threat and the migrants crisis to induce fear among the population and push Muslims in the EU to

adopt a “state-sponsored version of Islam” (Bsis, 2015). In fact, on the one hand, European states

stand as alleged promoters of freedom of speech and religion; on the other hand they set the

boundaries of these freedoms by means of an indirect propaganda against Muslims. HT argues that it

is well known that activities in the main mosques are controlled, together with all the Islamic groups

and associations (Badar, 2015; Bsis, 2015; Mustafa, 2016). Furthermore, the great wave of

immigration from the Middle East, along with the growing presence of home-grown terrorists in the

West, has fostered a message conveyed by western media and governments that Muslims should be

less Islamic and more secular to be accepted as “good neighbours and friends.” They should be more

open to conform to western values and lifestyle, holding less to their heritage accepting the western

one as many other ethnic groups migrating into specific western countries have done. Through HT’s

lens, this narrative pushes Muslims away from Islam, inducing them to lose their Islamic identity in

favour of a mixed western one.

As a result, HT strongly supports an anti-integration agenda that sees being a Muslim as separate and

opposite to being European. For this reason, the Hizb continues to criticize European governments and

their policies; it continues to use the Khilafah flag (mostly associated with the violent Islamic State in

Syria and Iraq) regardless of any stereotype and it hardly condemns terroristic acts (as most

representatives of Muslim community in the EU do), rather focusing on the outcomes of European

colonial powers’ actions over the centuries. Again, the leitmotiv characterizing the whole process is

the dichotomy between the wickedness of West and the righteousness of Islam.

3. Challenging Security: A Conveyor Belt for Terrorists?

Islamist groups issue another remarkable challenge to the European Union in the field of security.

Over the last few decades, several prominent figures have attracted European Muslims, presenting the

West as the enemy of Muslims and calling them to a strong opposition.1 Even if some aggregations

have never promoted violent jihad, recent debates show how their anti-integration propaganda, filled

with anti-Western thoughts, might work as a catalyst towards violence acting as a conveyor belt for

terrorists (Bara, 2004, p.68)

Often, HT seems quite ambiguous in its positions and keeps itself in a sort of grey zone in relation to

the use of violence. As declared by Hadiyah Masieh, former HTB member: “HT says it does not

believe in violence, but the violence was never condemned; they just didn't think it would achieve

anything”. 2

At the same time, since its early stages HT has strongly supported jihad as a duty for every Muslim,

just in case of defence or to conquer the occupied territories:

1 Omar Bakri and the Californian convert Hamza Yusuf are two examples of charismatic characters with

extremist ideas mobilizing masses in the West. 2 Sarfraz Manzoor, “Hadiya Masieh: How 7 July bombings made me question my beliefs”, The Guardian, July

4, 2010. Accessed Feb 20th, 2016. http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/jul/04/hadiyah-masieh-7-july-

bombings

...“Jihad is a religious duty which is obligation for all Muslims, and military service

is compulsory. It is thus a religious duty for every male Muslim of 15 or more to

participate in military training in order to prepare himself for jihad.” 3

On the one hand, this ambiguous position has fostered anxiety from governments and public

authorities in the West, becoming more and more willing to ban the group. On the other hand, HT’s

non-violent official nature has brilliantly worked as a deterrent for several states to outlaw the

movement, fearing a harsh social backlash. In fact, the ban of a mere intellectual group could work as

a pretext for other Islamist groups to incite minorities to oppose a tyrant government, fostering

Islamist propaganda of an on-going conspiracy against Muslims from Western oppressors. For these

reasons, academia and think tanks, such as the anti-radicalism Quilliam Foundation (2014), advised

not to ban HT.

Nevertheless, while declaring itself the ideological vanguard among Islamist movements, HT has

inspired many jihadists who are now involved in violent movements (Baran, 2004). In fact, a person

exposed to HT’s lectures and study circles usually experiences a moral shock (Wiktorowicz, 2005)

due to the awareness of terrible atrocities affecting the ummah in the world. The group also instils in

the minds of its members the idea of an urgent need to act against the oppressors, mostly through an

intellectual fight to bring the Khilafah back. However, some people might consider HT’s approach too

soft or too static and once convinced of the unavoidable clash of civilizations between Muslims and

the West, they decide to join jihadist groups to get into the fight. This is the case of Oman Bakri, one

of the most prominent leaders of HT Britain. In 1996, Bakri abandoned the group because he started

considering it too moderate, despising HT’s new tendencies towards theological plurality, non-violent

attitudes towards jihad and the weak relationship between iman (faith) and action (Abedin, 2005). For

these reasons, Bakri left and founded al-Muhajiroun, a terror movement supporting al-Qaeda and

urging Muslims around the world to fight and destroy the wicked West.

Similarly, July 7/7 London bombers were identified as members of a HT splinter association of HT

Britain (Baran, 2004). Undoubtedly, they were exposed to continuous discourses depicting western

governments as exploiter oppressors against Islam and promoters a social model based on corruption

and moral perversity. The two episodes here mentioned are just popular examples over a number of

unknown ones. As a result, notwithstanding HT’s claim to be a mere intellectual group, fighting

concepts through debates and conferences, it seems to promote a radical ideology that might foster the

use of violence. The latter works as a catalyst to indoctrinate individuals towards extreme views,

making them an easy target for violent organizations, where they can actively fight.

3 “Proposed Constitution for the Islamic State”, Article 56. In Suha Taji-Farouki. A Fundamental Quest: Hizb

Al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate, p. 200.

Well aware of the potential threat of the group as a conveyor belt to terrorism, the EU seems very

committed to limit HT’s influence (along with other Islamist aggregations) within its borders. A set of

initiatives was implemented to spot suspicious behaviours by monitoring the travel to conflict zones

and by examining the issues around admittance and residence of individuals considered “leery”

(Bakker, 2015). The problem concerning the displacement of people in Middle Eastern territories

characterized by war, often used as training areas by jihadist, was also addressed by the European

Commission in its European Agenda on Security (2016), which stresses the importance of travel

prohibitions and the criminalization of travelling to third countries for terrorist purposes.

Bearing in mind the transnational nature of most Islamist groups, Internet monitoring has been the

focus of EU’s actions for a long time. A good example is the Check the Web initiative (2007) aimed at

intensifying EU cooperation on monitoring and analysing Internet sites in the context of counter-

terrorism to tackle online extremist material (EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator 2007). The EU has

also promoted cooperation with Imams and a toolkit to help those working most closely with young

people to detect and tackle violent radicalization. Furthermore, a proposal to criminalize public

provocation to commit terrorism (EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator , 2008) and a proposal to

counter terrorist propaganda and illegal hate speech online (Stronger EU Action to better tackle

violent radicalization leading to terrorism, 2016) were presented. The latter aims at working with the

IT industry to stop the spread of illegal content inciting to violence, supporting the development of

positive alternative narratives by civil society and develop media literacy so that young people asses

information critically.

Last but not least, the EU is also on the forefront to empower moderate Islamic voices by cooperating

with Muslim organizations and faith groups. The Union is also encouraging the improvement of

imam’s language and citizenship skills, along with the emergence of European imams.

Conclusions

This paper aimed at analysing the challenge posed by Islamist groups to the European Union in two

macro areas, i.e. values and security. The long living Islamist aggregation Hizb ut-Tahrir was chosen

as a case study and it worked as a kaleidoscope to unpack the common Islamist anti-European

narrative of an unbridgeable “clash of civilizations”. The idea of incompatibility between the West

and Islam, along with the group-constructed perception of a constant attack against Muslims, triggers

individuals towards action. The will to defend the global ummah and to change a wicked system can

be carried out as a “war of ideas”, as HT does, but it can also push Muslims towards violent

initiatives, culminating in the membership to jihadi-armed groups.

As a result, the challenge to values and the one to security seem to be strongly intertwined. Islamists’

despise towards western-European values of democracy and personal freedoms in the name of an

alleged irreconcilability with Islam drives Islamist sympathizers towards a progressive alienation from

the mainstream society. This status causes a sense of rejection towards the home country and society

that hinders the individual from experiencing any sort of belonging. Therefore, radical Muslim

identity appears related to a utopian Caliphate where social justice, equality, and accountability are

core characteristics. The EU has undeniably made remarkable efforts to address radicalization,

implementing initiatives covering a number of fields. In fact, normative interventions aimed at

developing a shared set of European values were supported by projects devoted to security and

internet monitoring. Notwithstanding the EU will to address radicalization on multiple fronts, the

communitarian approach seems to be quite weak considering the on-going alarming presence of

home-grown violent radicals within the EU borders.

As highlighted in the previous paragraphs, the battle Islamist groups fight to win young Muslims is

mostly a war of ideas, based on a narrow vision of the world. Most radical aggregations adopt a

monistic approach towards controversial issues, identifying one single set of actions, attitudes, and

ideas as “right”. This behaviour promotes a positive image of the in-group compared to the others,

based on a binary construction were the concepts of “us vs them” are linked with the idea of “halal vs

haram”. On this topic, recent studies by Sara Savage et al. (2014) have pointed out the existence of a

connection between Radicalisation and Involvement in Violent Extremism (RIVE) and low

complexity of thinking. This group of British scholars argue that high level of complexity in thinking

works as a means to prevent radicalization. In fact, Integrative Complexity (IC) can be considered as a

key element to fight radicalization. IC is related to our perception of the social world and tends to be

low in individuals who use dichotomous categories, moderate in subjects who are able to see some

good elements in viewpoints that differ from their own and high when individuals can perceive

connections between different perspectives and values (Savage et al., 2014).

Recent research has shown how people presenting a more complex view of the social world are less

attracted by radical or extreme positions. In fact, they are able to understand other people’s ideas

without perceiving their own as under attack. Increasing the complexity of thought reduces the vision

of contrasting values and the perception of an imminent threat by “the other,” pushing the individual

to a peaceful cohabitation with the out-group. Notwithstanding the need for further research on the

relationship between IC and radical mindsets, the authors acknowledge the validity of IC as a good

practice to address the problem of radicalization, focusing on the mind of the individual as the

essential ground where the battle takes place, suggesting that a possible way to tackle radicalization

might be to help individuals understanding that reality is a complex phenomenon and it is not possible

to reduce it in a simplistic dichotomy.

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