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The EU’s implementation of the human rights and democracy clause in the
Cotonou-agreement: questioning the status quo.
Johanne Døhlie Saltnes
PhD Fellow, Institute for Advanced Studies
Paper presented at the ECPR Graduate Conference, 4-6 July 2012, Bremen
Draft - please do not quote. Comments are welcome [email protected]
Abstract
This paper suggests that the literature on political conditionality, more specifically the use of the
human rights and democracy clause by the European Union (EU) is misleading. Most studies are
carried out with an implicit theoretical expectation of interest governing the choice of behaviour. It is
argued that there is a need for applying a better suited conceptual apparatus in order to formulate
more nuanced hypotheses that allows for the possibility of normative considerations influencing
decisions and processes. The paper also provides empirical research on the implementation of the
human rights and democracy clause towards states from the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific group of
states (ACP). In previous studies, only strategically important states have been used as examples for
cases where the clause is not implemented, leading to the conclusion that it is strategic interest that
governs the choice of behaviour. This article proves that a broader universe of cases exist, including
many non-cases of minimal strategic interest to the EU.
I. Introduction
Conventional, rationalist theories of international relations argue that foreign policy
outcomes are linked to the state’s strategic interests (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009).
According to such an understanding, foreign policy decisions adhering to norms such as
human rights and democratic principles are simple rhetoric, hiding the “real” objectives of
national interest (Schimmelfennig, 2001; Walt, 1987; Waltz, 1979). Foreign policy is
traditionally considered to be the key domain of the nation state, however, European Union
(EU) member states have also chosen to integrate in this policy area. Contrary to
conventional theories it has been argued that the EU acts in a principled way towards other
states because it is a “normative” (Manners, 2002) or “ethical” power (Aggestram, 2008).
The theoretical robustness and empirical relevance of these conceptions have, however,
2
been questioned (Börzel & Risse, 2009; Diez, 2005; Sjursen, 2006a, 2006b). In 1995 the EU
decided to include a human rights and democracy clause1 in all its external agreements. The
EU was then quickly criticised for acting inconsistently, as the clause was mostly
implemented for countries with minimal strategic interest (Smith, 1998). The body of
literature assessing the use of sanctions due to human rights and democracy breaches has
largely followed the realist approach arguing that the EU’s foreign policy decisions are driven
by economic interests or security considerations. Keeping in mind the normative goals of the
policy, it is a paradox that most of the contributions are based on theoretical tools that
refute the possibility of normative considerations influencing decisions and processes.
This article argues that there is a need to further develop the theoretical tools that dominate
the current state of literature. It does not seek to develop an alternative theoretical
approach as such, but contributes to the debate by showing that the field is in need of
complementary explanations. The viability of the dominant understanding of the
implementation of the human rights and democracy clause is questioned as follows: Is the
human rights and democracy clause implemented in an inconsistent manner for ACP states?
If so, why?
The article has five sections. Section two provides a critical review of contributions and a
systematization of hypotheses put forward by the literature. Section three runs a systematic
empirical test of the EU’s implementation of the human rights and democracy clause in ACP
countries in its first 17 years of existence. It is argued that the lack of a systematic
identification of non-cases in the literature has resulted in a selection bias which in turn
supports the hypotheses of interest-based explanations. The relative strength of existing
hypotheses for the implementation of the clause in light of the new universe of cases
proposed in this article is discussed in section four. Finally, section five provides a discussion
that adds nuances to the debate on the use of the clause.
1 Conditionality and human rights and democracy clause is used as a collective term for the combination of an
essential elements clause (art. 9 Cotonou) and a suspension clause (art. 96 and 97 Cotonou). Suspension clause and non-execution clause will be used interchangeably throughout the paper.
3
II. The conditionality debate: domination of the interest-driven
perspective
EU political conditionality policy has been subjected to academic scrutiny since it was first
introduced in the beginning of the 1990s. It has been criticized for being “selective and
inconsistent” (Crawford, 2000, p. 240) or being executed with “the use of double-standards”
(Fierro, 2003, p. 378). Looking at the literature, three weaknesses can be discerned: First, the
field lacks explicit theoretical foundations. The majority of studies are conducted without
stating the theoretical assumptions that lay the ground for their hypotheses. In addition, the
majority of these studies show an implicit expectation of actors behaving according to
strategic interest. There is also a noticeable absence of alternative hypotheses being
formulated, something one would expect particularly from the positivist point of view on
which most of these studies are based. Without further specification of a theoretical
perspective that may account for the impact of norms, it is not possible to assess what drives
the EU to act according to interest, or more importantly if there is something more to the
behaviour of the EU than the lowest common denominator policy.
The second weakness concerns questions of methodology. When comparing cases where
sanctions have been implemented with non-cases that are exempt from punitive measures
putatively because of strategic interest, only the strategically important cases are empirically
tested. Would the universe of cases look different if a systematic identification of such non-
cases was established? Would existing hypotheses still be valid on a broader selection of
cases? A biased selection of case-studies raises doubt about the external validity of the
literature.
Finally, there is a need for further specification of the concept of sanctioning. The
implementation of the human rights clause can entail both a political and an economic stick
at the same time: however, both of these measures can also be adopted without referring to
the clause at all. In addition, the clause is not always executed as a direct consequence to
breaches of the essential elements. There are three main ways of reacting to breaches of
conditionality: political dialogue, the use of a suspension clause and sanctions taken outside
the conditionality framework. Thus, there is a need for clearer definitions of the different
procedures of aid-conditionality before the hypotheses can be further tested. I proceed by
4
discussing the literature in sections according to the main explanatory variable forwarded in
the contributions.
Economic interest
The conditionality clause is included in broad cooperation agreements which regulate the
trading rules between the EU and third states. In the literature it is often asserted that
possible economic gains through trade can trump normative foreign policy objectives, such
as the promotion of the respect for democracy and human rights, and that this in turn can
explain the variance we find in the implementation of political conditionality. Several
contributions argue that poorer and smaller states are more likely to be targeted with
sanctions than bigger and richer states, by using data showing that political conditionality is
more often implemented in countries from Sub-Saharan Africa than countries from other
regions (Crawford, 1997, 2000; Smith, 1998; Uvin, 2004). Sub-Saharan countries are overall
poorer than countries from other regions of the world; however this is not sufficient
information to establish a causal relationship between the economic interest in a target
state and the likelihood of implementing conditionality. The fact that it is the poorer
countries that are targeted with sanctions could also be explained by the underlying variable
of democratization or human rights violations taking place to a greater extent in these states.
It must be questioned whether economic interest can be measured simply by the dichotomy
of poorer versus richer states, as these contributions propose. The implicit expectation of
interest governing the choice of sanctions leads the above studies to conclude on an
assumption rather than hypotheses deduced from theory.
Furthermore, quantitative and qualitative studies present conflicting results on the
importance of economic interest. The hypothesis is only found to be valid in research based
on case-studies (Crawford, 2000; Smith, 1998) and not in studies testing a wider set of cases
(Warkotsch, 2010)2. One example of where economic interest is found to be valid is Nigeria.
It is argued that the EU’s economic interest accounted for the absence of hard sanctions
such as an oil-embargo in the beginning of the 1990s (Crawford, 1997, 2000; Smith, 1998;
Tomaševski, 1997) or the absence of the implementation of the human rights clause after
fraudulent elections in 2003 and 2007 (del Biondo, 2011; Meyer-Resende, 2008)3. However,
2 Warkotsch uses a more complex operationalization of economic interest based export linkage, FDI and
dependence on energy produced in receiving state. 3 Complemented by E-Mail correspondence with Meyer-Resende 05.10.2011
5
although the human rights and democracy clause has not been implemented in Nigeria, the
EU has not refrained from implementing unilateral sanctions against the country. After the
execution of Ken Sara-Wiwa in 1995, the Council released a common position based on
Article J.2 of the Treaty of the European Union containing the simple statement
“Development cooperation with Nigeria is suspended” (Council 1995). The sanctions were
not lifted until Nigeria’s return to a democratically elected government in 1999 (Council
1999). Thus, the empirical relevance of the hypothesis must also be questioned.
Security considerations
A second strand of hypotheses is tied to the argument of security interests governing the
choice of sanctions. First it is hypothesized that countries situated in the neighbourhood of
the sender are more likely to be targeted with sanctions than countries that are further
away (Warkotsch, 2008, 2010). Empirically, however, as none of the ACP states are situated
in the European neighbourhood, the distance hypothesis has only limited relevance for the
understanding of the use of the conditionality clause. Moreover, the clause has been
implemented in ACP countries that are relatively close to the EU, as in the case of Niger, and
in countries that are geographically further away, as in the cases of Haiti and Fiji.
The second hypothesis states that the security risk assessment of the donor state towards
the target state influences the donor’s choice of response. It builds on the results of a
comprehensive study about the use of economic sanctions as used by the EU and US
towards third states. In this study Drezner (1999) develops the “conflict expectations model”,
arguing that senders will calculate the likelihood of future conflict expectations when
deciding on imposing sanctions against a target. The conclusion drawn from the model is
that adversaries will sanction each other more often but with fewer efficacies because the
sender and target are concerned with relative gains and reputation. Allies on the other hand
will sanction each other less often and with greater success because of their concern for
economic losses. In the literature on political conditionality, Drezner’s (1999) model is
adopted by several authors operationalizing his concept of “adversaries” into illiberal
regimes (Hazelzet, 2001) or threat-posing regimes (Warkotsch, 2010). The studies applying
this model are based on specific theoretical expectations which are clearly spelled out. Also,
the hypothesis is tested on a broader set of cases than contributions testing other
hypotheses. However, these studies do not necessarily teach us anything about the use of
6
the human rights and conditionality clause in particular, as they do not distinguish between
an economic and a political sanction treating all aid reductions as sticks regardless of
whether they are taken within the conditionality clause or not.
The third hypothesis concerns a donor’s reluctance to sanction a state because of its
putatively important position towards other states. A stable country in an unstable region
can, for example, become an ally to donors because of its position vis-à-vis its neighbours.
Ethiopia is often mentioned as an example of such a country, being the only stable country
in the Horn of Africa and specifically an ally of the US in the fight against terror (Brüne, 2007;
Jünemann & Knodt, 2007; Meyer-Resende, 2008). Del Biondo (2011, p. 386) argues that
security interest accounts for the lack of implementation of the human rights and democracy
clause in Nigeria, Ethiopia and Kenya, as they are countries that are considered key partners
of the West in the fight against terrorism and are key to maintaining peace in their
respective regions. Yet again, the conclusions are based on an implicit expectation of
interest-based behaviour without explicitly accounting for the theoretical mechanisms that
supposedly trigger specific behaviour. In addition, these studies are based only on specific
case-studies where the alleged relationship is found to present an empirical challenge.
Biased selection of such cases results in the explanation being given too much weight in the
literature.
In addition to the above hypotheses, various contributions argue that variation in the use of
conditionality can be explained by the colliding foreign policy objectives of security versus
democracy promotion (Crawford, 2000; Olsen, 1998, 2000, 2002a, 2002b). The claim
reminds us of the hypothesis forwarded by structural realists stating that, due to structural
constraints in the international system, normative ideas stop determining policy when in
conflict with vital national or common interests (Hyde-Price, 2008; Mearsheimer, 2005).
Nevertheless, the contributions to the political conditionality literature lack substantiation of
the causal mechanism claimed to explain variation. In addition, the articles are based only on
the identification of specific security concerns in a selection of case-studies. The biased
selection of cases questions the empirical relevance of the contributions. Furthermore,
conclusions lack specificity. In Olsen’s words:
“(…) if there is a conflict between democracy promotion and security, the EU will
always give higher priority to security. Only in those cases where other, more important
7
issues are not at stake will the EU seek to promote democracy with considerable consistency
and vigor” (2002a, p. 133) .
Special relationships
Another category of arguments hypothesize the reduction of negative measures towards
countries with a special relationship with donors. Close bilateral relations combined with the
lack of negative measures has been labelled the “foreign-policy paradox” (Feliu, 2003)
suggesting that the closer the relations between a sender and receiver state the bigger the
possibility for influence, yet equally less the chance of the donor state adopting punitive
measures. In the literature there is, however, no attempt to specify when or under what
conditions this paradox occurs. Explicit theoretical foundations are missing. First, the types
of special relationships that are argued to trigger the mechanism remain broad: Smith (1998,
p. 273) holds that sanctions following the violations of democratic principles in Cameroon
have been blocked by France explaining the outcome with the target state being in France’s
“sphere of influence”. Seen in an historical context, it has been argued that colonial powers
would be more reluctant to punish their former colonies with sanctions than other
countries, especially in the case of France (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Stokke, 1995; Warkotsch,
2008). Second, the alleged special relationships are not sufficiently specified and defined in
order to account for inconsistent behaviour. Two questions arise: Who must perceive the
relationship as special? When is it strong enough to account for the alleged behaviour? The
empirical record shows conflicting results: Jünemann & Knodt (2007, p. 354) find the
paradox to be of importance in the EU’s relations with northern Africa but not with sub-
Saharan Africa whereas Warkotsch (2010) finds no support for the hypothesis at all.
Furthermore, contrary to the hypothesis, Hazelzet (2001) finds that the EU punishes former
colonies in a harsher way than other countries but at the same time that they are rewarded
more than others.
A recent contribution to the debate proposes that the so-called “democratisation-
development dilemma” can partially explain lack of donor sanctions. Del Biondo (2011)
argues that high economic growth, significant progress towards reaching the Millennium
Development Goals and technocratic good governance of aid programmes can account for
the absence of Article 96 consultations in Rwanda and Ethiopia in the aftermath of
fraudulent elections in 2003 and 2005. In this study, it is argued that the EU refrains from
using the conditionality clause because it prioritizes the foreign policy goal of promotion of
8
development over democratization. Del Biondo’s hypothesis is an interesting and novel
contribution to the debate. However, with limited empirical evidence the hypothesis must
be subjected to further testing before it can be confirmed.
Weaknesses of interest-driven perspectives
The literature on aid-conditionality is dominated by studies that rely almost exclusively on an
interest-based perspective, either implicitly or explicitly. The adoption of such a perspective
assumes that actors are rational only if they act according to their own interest (Moravcsik &
Schimmelfennig, 2009). This conception does not allow for the possibility of normative
considerations influencing actor’s decision-making. This is a paradox, since the goal of the
policy the literature studies, is normative. The literature is lacking a conceptual apparatus
where actors can be perceived as rationally competent to assess not only what is in their
interest but also what is appropriate behaviour (Eriksen, 2006; Sjursen, 2003b). Only in that
way can we assess the relative strength of the interest-based accounts.
In the following sections, I will argue that the explanatory importance of strategic interest in
target states is given too much weight in the literature, and that this explanation is
accentuated by the selection bias in existing studies. By only attempting to explain the non-
use of the suspension clause in target countries where the EU has an obvious strategic
interest and not in the universe of target states, the literature has been over-emphasizing
this explanation. As a retort to the weaknesses in the literature I propose to create a more
precise study of the EU’s use of the human rights and democracy clause. The first step
towards a more nuanced understanding of conditionality is carried out below by
reconsidering the empirical record of the human rights and democracy clause.
III. Implementation of aid conditionality: establishing variance
The method applied in carrying out this study is a systematic empirical tracing of the record
of use and non-use of the human rights and democracy clause by the EU towards ACP states.
In total, a population of 39 cases were constructed for the aim of testing variance in the
implementation of the clause: 23 cases of Article 366a/96 consultations and 16 non-cases
where the EU has refrained from using the clause. In the assessment of the cases where the
clause is implemented, I have used the official EU documents released by the Council and a
Commission proposal. The identification of non-cases is carried out with the help of existing
9
datasets on events of coup d’états and election observation reports from international
organisations (see below in each section).
Two caveats apply. First, the identification of the latter sixteen non-cases is solely based on
the assessment of first-hand documents and cannot be regarded as a constant population. It
has been strived to apply parsimonious criteria in identifying cases. The record in respect to
democratic principles has for example been created according to the EU’s earlier record of
implementation. This includes a most narrow definition of democratic quality based on
holding elections and non-interruption of power. In addition, the fact that the election
reports assessed are developed by eight different organizations, normally only one per
election, increases the possibility of systematic inconsistencies in the selection process.
Second, there are several borderline cases that could have been included in the dataset that
have been excluded. In Somalia there has been an absence of elections and effective
government since 1991. Because of the lack of a governmental counterpart to consult with,
Somalia is taken out of the dataset. A second strand of countries, with a substantial
democratic deficit in the form of a lack of organizing elections, has been excluded due to the
absence of concrete instances triggering consultations. These include Angola, Eritrea,
Gambia, Swaziland, Gabon and Malawi. Other types of cases could have been countries
where de-facto fraudulent elections are not being addressed as fraudulent by international
election reports. The 1997 general elections in Kenya constitute such an example, where
several EU countries “voiced concern about the widespread irregularities, but, as in 1992,
stopped short of denouncing the result of the elections” (Ajulu (98) quoted in Olsen p. 144).
Invoked conditionality
Table 1 below indicates the 23 instances of official consultations initiated by the EU
according to article 366a of the Lomé-agreement and Article 96 and 97 of the Cotonou-
agreement, together with the reason referred to in the EU documents for the triggering of
the consultations. The suspension clauses were, in fifteen out of twenty-three cases,
initiated due to a coup d’état in the ACP state while the remaining eight cases were initiated
following a deterioration of the respect for democratic principles, human rights or the rule of
law. In one occasion, Article 97, referring to serious cases of corruption, was invoked.
10
Table 1 Consultations according to the human rights and democracy clause with ACP countries
Year, Country Coup d’état Flawed Elections Human Rights
Rule of Law
2011 Guinea-Bissau X X
2010 Niger X
2009 Niger X
2009 Madagascar X
2009 Guinea X
2008 Mauritania X
2007 Fiji X
2005 Mauritania X
2004 Guinea X
2004 Togo X X
2003 Guinea-Bissau X
2003 Central African Republic X
2001 Zimbabwe X X X
2001 Liberia** X X X
2001 Cote d’Ivoire X
2000 Fiji X
2000 Haiti X
2000 Cote d’Ivoire* X
1999 Guinea-Bissau* X
1999 Comoros* X
1999 Niger* X
1998 Togo* X
1996 Niger* X Source: Council (2010), the documents which are not provided at the website were provided by the General Secretariat, DG F, Press Communication and Transparency. * Article 366a Lomé – although the Cotonou-agreement did not enter into force until 2003, all consultations beginning with Haiti in 2000 were carried out within the Article 96 framework **Article 97 Cotonou
The data clearly shows a tendency to implement the clause where there are breaches of
democratic norms, with a coup d’état being the single most important trigger. Second, there
are breaches consisting of irregularities in elections. Human rights and good governance are
only rarely an important reason for the initiation of the clause. As pointed out by earlier
studies of political conditionality, this pattern suggests a minimalist conception of
democracy, focusing on clear-cut breaches such as coups and elections (del Biondo, 2011;
Diamond, 1999; Tomaševski, 1997). Such sharply defined breaches are considered “easier”
to react to than human rights breaches, the latter being more problematic to judge in terms
11
of “cut-off points” for reaction (Smith, 2001). Moreover, human rights and rule of law
breaches are less quantifiable in terms of gravity.
The Non-Cases
When moving on to exploring the variance in the implementation of the clause, that is
identifying non-cases, breaches of democratic norms have been the focus. As seen in table 1,
the two main reasons for Article 96 consultations are either a coup d’état or flawed elections.
Consequently, an assessment of a narrowly defined democratic quality, here operationalized
in terms of electoral record and interruption of power, was conducted of all ACP states for
the years 1995-2010, in order to identify non-cases. First, five cases of coup d’états, not
subject to Article 96 consultations were identified by a search in the CSP dataset “Coup
d’état events 1946-2010”4 and cross-checked with the Conflict Barometer, developed by the
Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research5. Second, all elections, which had
taken place in ACP countries in the time-span 1995-2011, were identified (169 elections)
followed by an assessment of election reports (118 reports).6 The 51 elections that were not
observed by an international team were checked for irregularities by Keesing’s World News
Archive7. The latter search did not result in the identification of any major irregularities. The
former assessment resulted in the identification of ten non-cases being reported as majorly
flawed elections according to the election observation reports8. In addition, Cote d’Ivoire in
2004 has been included due to a Commission proposal for the opening of consultations
under Article 96 of the Cotonou-agreement which was not followed up by the Council. The
proposal was put forward due to the deteriorating human rights situation, delays in
preparations for elections and “obstacles put in the way for an EU financed audit in the
cocoa-sector” (Commission 2004). Table 2 below lists the total of sixteen non-cases
identified and a qualification of the breach of the essential elements outlined in Article 9 of
the Cotonou-agreement.
4 Marshall, M.G., & Marshall, D. R. (2011) Coup d’état events, 1946-2010: Centre for Systemic Peace
5 Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research. Conflict Barometer. Retrieved January 2012 from
http://hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/index.html 6 The reports were accessed through the website of ACE - Electoral Knowledge Network. Electoral Materials :
Reports and Assessments. Retrieved October - November, 2011 from http://aceproject.org/ero-en/index_html?filter&topic=&country=&type=Reports%20and%20Assessments. 7 Keesing’s World News Archive. http://www.keesings.com/
12
Table 2 Identified breaches, not subject to Article366a/96 consultations
Year, Country Coup d’état Flawed Elections Human Rights
Rule of Law
2010 Cote d’Ivoire X
2007 Nigeria X
2007 Kenya X X
2005 Ethiopia X X
2004 Cote d’Ivoire X X X
2003 Nigeria X
2002 Papua New Guinea X
2002 Equatorial Guinea X
2000 Solomon Islands X
2001 Chad X
2000 Mauritania X
2000 Tanzania X X
1997 Sierra Leone X
1997 Congo-Brazzaville X
1996 Burundi X
1996 Sierra Leone X
Two interesting observations can immediately be drawn from the data. First, it challenges
the current consensus in the literature claiming that the EU has acted coherently by
implementing Article 96 consultations in all cases of a coup d’état in an ACP country (del
Biondo, 2011; Laakso, Kivimaki, & Seppanen, 2007, p. 50). Four coups in 1996-97 and one in
2000 were not followed by Article 366a/96 consultations. Second, as many as ten cases of
flawed elections without being followed by Article 96 consultations were identified. In
earlier studies, only a few such non-cases have been identified which were normally
countries with a relatively strong link to the EU through development cooperation or trade,
for instance Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria. The systematic assessment in this study, however,
also pins down cases where there are no such strong links between the EU and the non-
cases, Papua New Guinea, Equatorial Guinea and Solomon Islands being examples of the
latter.
The historical development of the clause is also relevant. In the beginning of its existence the
human rights and democracy clause was contested at the European level. In 1994, Portugal
had challenged the legal basis of the human rights clause included in the EU’s external
cooperation agreement with India. Portugal argued that such a clause should contain a
8 When assessing the reports, elections were considered flawed if the report stated serious doubts about the
13
reference to Article 235 TEC which would require unanimous decisions in cases of
suspension of development cooperation. The Council, on the other hand, argued that the
EU could include such a provision on specific matters without recurring to other legal bases.
The ECJ gave its judgement in December 1996 (European Court of Justice, 1996), finding that
the there was sufficient legal basis for the inclusion of a human rights clause without
referring to Article 235. It has been argued that the process of questioning the legal basis of
human rights clauses put the implementation of the clause “on hold”. This may well
contribute to the lack of implementation following the coups in Sierra Leone in January 1996
and Burundi in July 1996. Niger was, however, subjected to Article 366a after a coup in
January 1996. Furthermore, the mid-term review of the Cotonou-agreement in 2005 led to
some minor changes in the procedure of the human rights and democracy clause. The ACP
states had proposed that the decision to start Article 96 consultations could only be done if
both parties to the treaty agreed. The EU refused to accept this proposal, but agreed on
intensified dialogue under Article 8, meaning that all possible options for dialogue must be
exhausted before Article 96 can be invoked.
IV. Testing explanations
Operationalization of interest-based hypotheses has proved to be challenging. “Interest” as
such is not easy to conceptualize. Can one describe the economic interest as perceived by
the EU, and can it be measured objectively? Even more so, how is security interest
conceptualized? These questions do not have a clear-cut answer. Most contributions in the
field of political conditionality use existing datasets as proxies for economic and security
importance, for example energy production (oil or equivalent) and trade statistics for
economic interest and geographic location measured in distance to donor or to conflict
areas for security interest. Although I believe there are several weaknesses with existing
operationalizations, I have replicated data from these sources, with the aim of testing the
relevance of status quo explanations in light of the new proposed universe of cases.
The most frequent proxies used for assessing economic importance in the literature is
energy production and trade link with the EU (Crawford, 1997; del Biondo, 2011; Smith,
1998). Replicated data for this study is provided in Annex 1. Comparing energy production,
only Nigeria can be said to have an extensive production of oil (or equivalent), producing
result of the elections and/or that it had fallen short of key international standards.
14
over 200.000 kilotons per year. Other non-cases that produce energy are Kenya, Ethiopia,
Tanzania and Congo, however, all in low quantity. These are, therefore, not considered
countries of specific economic interest because of energy production. Within the sanction
cases Togo, Zimbabwe, Cote d’Ivoire and Haiti are producing energy, yet not in important
quantities. Import and export rates of the target state with the EU vary significantly across
groups. The countries represented in the non-sanction cases have an overall higher average
and median both for import and export with the EU than the sanction cases. Thus, in
assessing cases of the EU’s putative economic interest in target states, I only find evidence of
Nigeria being such a case, both because of its energy production and its pivotal role as the
biggest economy of sub-Saharan Africa. A trend of slight differences between the groups is
however detected, with the non-sanction cases ranking higher on economic performance
and trade links with the EU. However, if we control for Nigeria, an outlier case with high
values, the trend is strongly reduced.
When it comes to security interest, two hypotheses were relevant for the understanding of
political conditionality. First, that sanctions are more likely to be implemented towards
adversaries or threatening states (Drezner, 1999; Hazelzet, 2001; Warkotsch, 2010), is
relevant in the sense that the EU is reacting more systematically to cases of coups d’état
than to other breaches of political conditionality. However, this explanation does not
account for the variance found in reactions to fraudulent elections. Second, donors
reluctance to sanction a state, because of its important position towards another state or
region (Brüne, 2007; Jünemann & Knodt, 2007; Meyer-Resende, 2008), is relevant for several
cases in our universe. In accordance with del Biondo (2011), I argue that Nigeria, Ethiopia
and Kenya are cases of relatively stable countries in an unstable region. Nigeria, situated in
West Africa, is the main economic driver in the region and hosts the headquarters for the
regional integration organisation ECOWAS. Ethiopia and Kenya are situated in East Africa,
both bordering the notorious unstable Somalia and Ethiopia bordering Sudan, Djibouti and
Eritrea in the north. Furthermore, Ethiopia has been considered to be a key ally of the US in
the war against terror. One could argue that Chad and the Central African Republic have also
played an important role over the last years as cooperation partners for the EU in hosting
the protection forces for refugees fleeing from Darfur. However, apart from these
15
considerations I argue that none of the other non-cases can be regarded as being of key
strategic security interests of the EU.9
When it comes to hypothesis relating to special relationships between specific countries,
existing studies argue that sanctions are less likely to be used towards target states that are
in a political or historical way closely tied to the sender, be this either due to colonial
background or close political relations. The literature claims that this is most notably seen in
the case of France (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Stokke, 1995; Warkotsch, 2008). The dataset used
in this study strongly contradict the latter claim. 70 per cent of the cases where Article 96 is
implemented are towards French ex-colonies, while this is only true for 27 per cent of non-
cases. This means that there is a stronger correlation of negative measures being used
towards French ex-colonies than towards British ex-colonies. Furthermore, it must be
reiterated that such alleged special relationships are difficult to measure precisely. The
operationalizations of the hypothesis into mere dichotomies such as British or French ex-
colony or close political ties or not, have obvious weaknesses tied to validity for the former
and measurement error for the latter.
The last hypothesis evaluated concerned the reduction in the use of sanctions when
countries showed signs of democratization. Del Biondo (2011) argues that countries showing
stable signs of development are less likely to be punished for democratic wrong-doing by
looking at data on GDP growth (over 10 %), Millennium Development Goal (MDG) Monitor
(amount of goals achieved/expected to be achieved) and the World Bank’s governance
indicators. A replication of the same indicators for the dataset used in this study is provided
in Annex 2. Of the non-cases, only Ethiopia and Equatorial Guinea have growth rates over 10
per cent in the years leading up to the democratic breach. In addition, Chad, Kenya, Nigeria
and Cote d’Ivoire show almost only positive growth during the period, although below 10
per cent. Similarly, Ethiopia and Equatorial Guinea show a positive trend in the MDG
indicator, with 6 and 4 goals respectively, on track to be achieved by 2015. The remaining
countries in the non-sanction group are reporting poorly with respect to the MDGs on track
to be fulfilled before 2015. As for the indicators for worldwide governance, all non-sanction
cases score below the 50th percentile of world average. Most cases are situated in the lowest
9 Sierra Leone, Burundi, Congo, Tanzania, Mauritania, Solomon Islands, Equatorial Guinea, Papua New Guinea
and Cote d’Ivoire.
16
0-10th percentile. Thus, del Biondo’s hypothesis can only be confirmed in two out of sixteen
cases presented here.
V. Revisiting core concepts
Based on the data and literature assessment above, I argue that existing studies are carried
out with selection bias and that there is a substantial gap in the literature assessing the
human rights and democracy clause due to the implicit assumption in the literature that
foreign policy decisions are driven by interest-based cost-benefit calculations. The literature
first makes an implicit assumption that interest drives foreign policy and then fails to justify
this theoretically. I argue that this is a consequence of the exclusive adoption of models
based on a realist understanding of policy-outcomes. Such models reduce policy-decisions to
a maximizing of (national) interest. Empirical studies are often subject to the fallacy of over-
emphasizing material structures due to a focus on explaining outcome based solely on
national interest of the member states. Actors are conceived as monologic to whom “other
people are just external, objective facts of reality, on the line with material things, only with
the distinctive quality that they carry out strategic actions too” (Eriksen & Weigård, 1997, p.
221cited in; Sjursen, 2003a). In the following I will comment on two issues that I argue add
nuances to the debate on the implementation of the Human Rights and Democracy clause.
The first issue that is underspecified in the conditionality debate is the notion of sanctioning.
Article 96 consultations are considered to be a sanction in itself for ACP states (Hazelzet,
2005). On the other hand the EU has tried to promote Article 96 consultations as a form of
extended political dialogue where sanctions are first introduced when “restrictive measures”
are adopted at the end of the 120 day consultation period. The theoretical debate on
conditionality policies has failed to specify this discrepancy sufficiently. There is an evident
difference between an economic stick applied to a state, in the form of a reduction of aid or
direct budget-support, and a political stick in the form of a public critique and opening of
official consultation due to flawed elections or a specific human rights situation. Article 96
consultations should be considered as the latter type because aid cuts are being carried out
independently of the Article being invoked. Looking at the EU’s record of aid cuts to the set
of countries identified earlier, we find similar patterns in the sanction and non-sanction
groups. The EU has cut aid as response to human rights and democracy breaches regardless
of the activation of Article 96 consultations. For example aid from EU institutions to Nigeria
17
was cut from 150 million dollars in 2006 to 78 million dollars in 2007. Similarly, we can
detect a reduction of aid disbursement in the aftermath of the breach identified above in
Kenya, Papua New Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Solomon Islands, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Congo,
Burundi and Sierra Leone as shown in Annex 3. Only in Mauritania, Tanzania and Ethiopia are
aid disbursements increased after the year of the breach. In turn, this also suggests that EU
policy in the form of economic sticks towards ACP states is more coherent than presented in
the literature. Hazelzet (2001) shows that western liberal democracies adhere to their
human rights ideals even where the targets are considered to be of economic and/or
security interest. One of her main conclusions is that: “Interests, as defined by Neorealism,
were not useful in determining which countries are or are not sanctioned for violating
human rights” (p. 231). This does indeed contradict the argument that the relative strategic
interest of the EU in target states, governs the choice of policy towards the respective
countries.
The second dimension that is necessary to clarify, is the decision to implement the political
stick. If we keep the economic sanctions constant, and consider the opening of Article 96
consultations as simply a political stick, we are presented with the same pattern of
incoherent policy as described earlier. In turn I also argue that this pattern of
implementation cannot be explained only by the relative strategic interest in the target
states. I suggest here that the process of political dialogue is overlooked in the debate on the
implementation of political conditionality. The results of the already on-going Article 8
dialogue between the EU and the target country must be counted as an important factor in
deciding whether or not to open Article 96 consultations.
Political dialogue is intrinsically tied to the promotion of human rights and democracy. The
objective of Article 8 dialogue as stated in the Cotonou agreement is:
“to exchange information, to foster mutual understanding, and to facilitate the establishment of agreed priorities and shared agendas. (…) The objective of the dialogue shall also include preventing situations arising in which one Party might deem it necessary to have recourse to the non-execution clause” (Cotonou-agreement, 2010)
Two stages of dialogue are passed before negative measures in form of aid-cuts under
Article 96 can be made. When a breach of a democratic principle occurs, Article 8 of the
Cotonou-agreement is first intensified. There is already a considerable effort made to find a
solution to the infringing situation at this stage. If Article 8 dialogue fails to produce positive
18
change, the consultation procedure as laid out in Article 96 can be launched. The
government of the infringing state is invited to official consultations with representatives
from the EU to discuss the situation. Only after a negative outcome of these consultations
are negative measures potentially adopted. The following statement from the US diplomatic
mission to the EU in Brussels illustrates the situation:
“O’Brien stated that the EU was considering engaging Guinea in an “Article 96” dialogue (of
the Cotonou agreement) in which the GoG (Government of Guinea) would come to Brussels
and lay out their reform agenda. The dialogue would continue for three months and at the
end, the EU would decide whether to expand it to a regular, on-going “Article 8” dialogue or
end it for lack of substantive progress in Guinea” (US Embassy 2004)
Political dialogue in general, and Article 96 consultations specifically is a forum where
solutions can be discussed and tangible commitments, on behalf of both parties, can be
made to improve a certain situation. Moreover, it was not always the EU who initiated
Article 96 consultations. Consultations with Guinea Bissau in 2003, Togo in 2004 and
Mauritania in 2005 were conducted under the countries own initiatives (Laakso, et al., 2007,
p. 130). The lessons learned from consultations with Zimbabwe must also be highlighted.
The EU opened consultations with Zimbabwe in 2001 after a long lasting deterioration of the
human rights situation. Ever since the first meeting the consultations have been
characterised by difficulties and poor understanding. This has resulted in continuous
renewals of appropriate measures in the aftermath of the concluded 120 day consultation
period. As several authors have pointed out, the difficult record of Article 96 consultations
with Zimbabwe have influenced the EU to be more cautious before implementing the clause
at a later stage (Fierro, 2003; Laakso, et al., 2007; Mackie & Zinke, 2005). The Commission’s
proposal for the opening of consultations with Cote d’Ivoire in 2004, and the fact that the
Council turned down this proposal, strengthens the hypothesis of the importance of political
dialogue as a trigger for Article 96.
Relative strategic interest might still explain the lack of consultations in certain countries, as
for example Ethiopia and Nigeria, however, if we look at a broader selection of cases we find
that there are several instances where the EU has refrained from implementing Article 96 in
countries that cannot be considered of key strategic interest. Moreover, there seems to be
something more to the decision of implementing Article 96 consultations than mere
economic and security interests or a strategic special relationship.
19
VI. Conclusion
EU political conditionality has been subject to public and academic scrutiny since it was first
adopted as a policy in the 1990s. It has been used to qualify the EU as a “force of good” and
as a normative or ethical power. Conversely, it has been used to argue that the EU acts
arbitrarily and that policy outcome is a result of the relative strategic interests in a particular
country. This article suggests that the current understanding of the EU’s use of the human
rights and democracy clause is misleading. This is so because it claims unanimously that non-
cases of implementation can be accounted for by the strategic interest of the sender in the
target state. The studies are carried out with an implicit theoretical expectation of interests
governing the choice of behaviour. However, I have argued that there is a need for applying
a better suited conceptual apparatus allowing for the perception of actors as rationally
competent in order to assess what is right or appropriate behaviour – not only what is of
interest to them. At least, in order to formulate and test alternative hypotheses to the
interest-driven ones. It is necessary for the conditionality-literature to renew its relevance
for the wider debate on what characterizes the EU as a foreign policy actor. More concretely
if, why and how norms can influence foreign policy as such. The human rights and
democracy clause being incorporated in all EU’s external relations since 1995 provide us with
an excellent opportunity for hypothesis testing.
The empirical research presented in this article has contributed to the literature by
identifying a different universe of cases to be used in studies of aid conditionality. By
providing systematic data on the implementation of Article 96 Cotonou and 366a Lomé, this
study has shown that the pattern of implementation of the human rights and democracy
clause varies to a larger extent than previously stated. I then suggested that the current
understanding of the implementation of the clause is biased due to a lack of including all
potential target states in previous analyses. A systematic assessment shows that both
strategically important and not-important states have been exempted from Article 96
consultations in the aftermath of a breach of the essential elements in the Cotonou-
agreement. In previous studies, only strategically important states such as Ethiopia and
Nigeria have been used as examples, leading to the conclusion that it is the strategic interest
that governs the choice of implementation of the Article.
20
In addition, I have shown that the discussion of the EUs conditionality policy must be further
nuanced by separating the economic and political sticks in use. As the human rights and
democracy clause is a mixture of both a political stick (public criticism and an invitation for
official consultations), and an economic stick (the possibility to adopt restrictive measures),
the actions included in the Article 96 procedure must be analysed independently. I have
further shown that an economic stick is applied to most of the cases in the dataset while the
political stick of inviting a country to Article 96 consultations is not. Finally, I suggest that the
process of political dialogue between the EU and the respective target can provide an
additional explanation to the incoherent use of Article 96. Preliminary data, as shown in the
last section, proposes that successful political dialogue between the EU and the infringing
state more often lead to Article 96 consultations, because it is perceived as a forum where
tangible commitments, on behalf of both parties, can be made to solve the breach of human
right or democratic principles. This hypothesis must, however, be subject to further research
before it can be confirmed.
21
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http://dazzlepod.com/cable/04BRUSSELS1274/?q=guinea%20EU%20political%20dialogue%2 0article%208%2096
Annex 1: Economic indicators Year, Country Energy
production (Kt)* Export to the EU (mill €)**
Import from EU (mill €)**
Non-sanction cases
2010 Cote d’Ivoire 11891 3217 1744
2007 Nigeria 231339 10199 8459
2007 Kenya 14677 1060 1324
2005 Ethiopia 19853 284 593
2004 Cote d’Ivoire 9547 2201 1175
2003 Nigeria 216175 6164 5010
2002 Papua New Guinea 261 46
2002 Equatorial Guinea 744 217
2000 Solomon Islands 13 3
2001 Chad 58 162
2000 Mauritania 346 377
2000 Tanzania 12691 412 339
1997 Sierra Leone 143 98
1997 Congo-Brazzaville 12463 715 420
1996 Burundi 59 52
1996 Sierra Leone 106 107
Sanction-cases
2011 Guinea-Bissau 6 72
2010 Niger 196 384
2009 Niger 219 356
2009 Madagascar 452 418
2009 Guinea 384 571
2008 Mauritania 372 609
2007 Fiji 100 36
2005 Mauritania 458 482
2004 Guinea 367 335
2004 Togo 1942 69 379
2003 Guinea-Bissau 8 44
2003 Central African Rep 92 43
2001 Zimbabwe 8605 784 226
2001 Liberia 737 1555
2001 Cote d’Ivoire 5973 2057 1330
2000 Fiji 131 28
2000 Haiti 1542 21 106
2000 Cote d’Ivoire 6012 1959 1425
1999 Guinea-Bissau 9 30
1999 Comoros 7 25
1999 Niger 121 129
1998 Togo 1553 45 254
1996 Niger 11 122
*World Bank (2012) Energy production (kt of oil equivalent) Retrieved November 2011 from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
**Eurostat, “Comext EU27 trade since 1988 by CN8” Retrieved January 2012 from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/external_trade/data/database
24
Annex 2: Democracy-development Indicators, non-sanction cases
GDP Growth* MDG on Track**
MDG not on track**
Government effectiveness***
Rule of law***
Regulatory quality***
Control of Corruption***
2010 Cote d’Ivoire 0,68 1,71 2,33 3,75 3,01 0 2 7.2 9.5 19.6 9.6
2007 Nigeria 10,60 5,40 6,20 6,45 1 3 16 12 18 16
2007 Kenya 0,80 3,50 7,80 6,14 -1,59 1 1 32 16.7 41.3 17.5
2005 Ethiopia 8,30 1,51 -2,16 13,57 11,82 6 0 20 23 13.7 24.4
2004 Cote d’Ivoire 7.3 9.3 16.2 9.3
2003 Nigeria 1,10 5,40 3,10 1,55 10,30 1 3 18 4.3 10.3 4.9
2002 Papua New Guinea -3,77 1,86 -2,49 -0,12 -0,16 0 7 37.6 13.9 27.9 23.4
2002 Equatorial Guinea 21,91 41,45 13,48 61,90 19,46 4 0 6.3 7.2 6.4 1
2000 Solomon Islands 1,61 -1,44 1,78 -0,48 -14,27 13.7 1.9 7.4 25.4
2001 Chad 5,65 6,95 -0,68 -0,88 11,66 1 5 23.9 20.6 20.1 22.9
2000 Mauritania 5,82 -4,04 2,78 6,67 1,85 2 4 48.8 43.1 32.8 49.3
2000 Tanzania 4,54 3,53 3,71 4,84 4,93 1 1 40 40.7 40.2 14.6
1997 Sierra Leone 1,38 -1,95 -8,00 5,00 -16,74 3 1
1997 Congo -1,00 -5,50 4,00 4,30 -0,60 1 1 8.3 6.7 10.3 10.2
1996 Burundi 1,01 -6,24 -3,83 -7,92 -8,00 2.9 4.3 4.4 4.9
1996 Sierra Leone 1,38 -1,95 -8,00 5,00 3 1 4.4 5.3 4.9 26.3
*The World Bank Indicators: GDP Growth (%) in the 5 years up to breach. Retrieved November 2011 from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator **Millennium Development Goals Monitor (2012). Retrieved January 2012 from http://www.mdgmonitor.org/country_progress.cfm?c=BHR&cd= ***Worldwide Governance Indicators (2012). Measured in percentile rank (0-100) of country out of all countries in the world. Retrieved April 2012 from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.asp
25
Annex 3: Official Development Assistance from EU institutions to selected countries (in USD, million) Non-sanction cases 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Nigeria 11,38 7,95 18,46 76,06 137,9 150 78,51 91,55 81,86
Kenya 113,5 57,4 138,5 93,54 84,34 101,6 Ethiopia 149,1 112,7 163,5 194,4 364,8
Papua New G 0,57 4,3 4,86 3,27 7,8
Equatorial G 2,08 2,63 4,08 1,56 3,75
Chad 17,81 38,35 44,14 41,42 52,82
Solomon Islands 2,17 5,96 44,1 31,51 4,01 Tanzania 43,2 70,95 32,44 96,66 70,15
Sierra Leone 41,12 20,58 21,16 16,01 7,24
Congo 16,18 10,22 4,15 0,73 2,2
Burundi 36,48 23,86 8,89 2,85 -,63
Sanction cases
Mauritania* 75,64 87 63,8 115,1 121,4 47,68 48,08 14,8 26,19 80,59 45,27 35,68 25,27 Cote d'Ivoire* 42,37 8,07 2,96 71,77 4,99 6,45 22,69 20,75 76,54 145,5 71,85 66,93
Madagascar 169,7 141,4 55,6 40,09
Guinea 42,16 46,02 37,57 15,22 21,34 30,9 36,56 41,19 72,36
Central African R 15,39 5,88 4,78 34,47 11,27
Zimbabwe 4,2 -1,48 5,46 6,47 14,19 Liberia 9,76 12,71 8,82 9,24 14,92
Fiji -0,85 -7,2 -2,8 -1,26 -0,77 19,77 8,96 10,74 6,03 12,8
Haiti 47,52 35,4 11,17 15,79 15,39
Guinea-Bissau 25,85 9,11 16,25 17,36 17,95 22,27 19,79 14,12 16,26
Comoros 3,14 10,33 6,81 3,85 3,54 Togo 8,72 4,76 5,07 3,3 3,09 3,65 4,57 5,25 8,16 10,37
Niger 43,81 40,73 38,66 40,46 46,01 19,22 13,31 38,92 114,7 152,9 64,44 150,8
OECD. DAC2a ODA Disbursements. Retrieved January 2012 from http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=TABLE2A Year of infringement in bold. *Countries belonging to both the “non-sanction” and the “sanction” group