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1
The End of Anti-Suffrage Movement in Britain:
the Failure of the National League for Opposing Woman Suffrage
in 1910-1913
Introduction
The first anti-suffrage organisation in Great Britain, the Women’s National
Anti-Suffrage League (WNASL), was founded in 1908. It was led by Lady Margaret
Jersey, Mary Ward and Violet Markham. The Men’s League for Opposing Women’s
Suffrage was founded later that year. It was presided over by Lord Cromer, Lord
Curzon and John Massie. In response to the growing suffrage movement, in June
1910, the two organisations decided to amalgamate. The National League for
Opposing Woman Suffrage (NLOWS) became the largest anti-suffrage organisation.
Lord Cromer and Lady Jersey were the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the
NLOWS respectively. Lord Curzon, Ward and Markham were important members.
The major pro-suffrage organisation was the National Union of Women’s Suffrage
Societies (NU) founded in 1897. This organisation was led by Millicent Fawcett.
Members of the NU were called moderate suffragists. The Women’s Social and
Political Union (WSPU), founded in 1903, was a smaller but more radical group of
suffragists. It was led by Emmeline Pankhurst and her daughters, Christabel and
Sylvia. Members of the WSPU were called militant suffragists or suffragettes. Their
campaigns consisted of hunger strikes, vandalism, arsons and other militant stunts.
Historians generally considered the WSPU as a hindrance to suffrage movement.1
An overview of suffrage movement in 1910-1913 helps to contextualise the failure of
the NLOWS. Prior to the establishment of the NLOWS in June 1910, the Conciliation
Bill was introduced. The Bill was drafted by the Conciliation Committee which
consisted of 36 MPs from different political parties. To secure the success of this Bill,
the WSPU agreed to call a halt to militant stunts.2 In July, the Bill won a majority of
109 votes.3 Because of the lack of follow-up actions by the government, the
Conciliation Bill was again introduced in 1911. It won an overwhelming majority of
1 See for example Mitzi Auchterlonie, Conservative Suffragists: the Women’s Vote and the Tory Party
(London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007); William O’Neill, The Woman Movement: Feminism in the United States and England (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969); Jo Vellacott, From Liberal to Labour with Women’s Suffrage: the Story of Catherine Marshall (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993). 2 Constance Rover, Women’s Suffrage and Party Politics in Britain, 1866-1914 (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1967), 129. 3 Brian Harrison, Separate Spheres: the Opposition to Women’s Suffrage in Britain (London: Croom
Helm, 1978), 28-29.
2
257 to 91.4
The year 1912 was however turbulent for suffragists. Despite the resumption of the
WSPU militancy, the suffrage movement enjoyed greater support from the
Conservative Party and the Labour Party.5 Yet, many pro-suffrage Irish Nationalists
voted against the 1912 Conciliation Bill because it might jeopardise the success of
the Irish Home Rule Bill. A group of Labour MPs was also absent from voting due to
miner unrest.6 The Bill was defeated by 14 votes.7
Female enfranchisement returned to the parliament in January 1913 in the form an
amendment bill. Despite the radicalisation of the WSPU, intensive parliamentary
lobbying organised by the NU was successful. Nonetheless, the Speaker unexpectedly
ruled the Reform Bill out of order. In May, ‘Dickinson’s Bill’ was introduced. It was
defeated by 48 votes due to the breadth of enfranchisement.8
British women were eventually enfranchised in 1918. Historians such as Brian
Harrison and Julia Bush take 1918 as the end of the anti-suffrage movement.9
Martin Pugh, however, suggests that the movement had been defeated before the
First World War. Building upon Pugh’s view, this paper argues that 1913, when the
NLOWS had lost its momentum, marked the effective end of the anti-suffrage
movement.10 This paper explores factors contributing to the failure of the NLOWS in
1913. It argues that the incompatibility of the leaders and the failure to reach a
compromise on a constructive policy served as in-built limitations of the league and
restricted its development. The inability to stir up public opinion and financial
insolvency weakened this already vulnerable organisation. However, the failure to
mobilise parliamentary support by 1913 was the decisive factor contributing to the
downfall of the league. Without public, financial and parliamentary support, the
league had lost much of its influence on the suffrage debate by 1913. Drawing upon
obscure primary manuscripts from archival collections, this paper argues that the
anti-suffrage movement had been defeated in 1913, not in 1918 as historians have
argued.
4 Ibid.
5 Rover, Women’s Suffrage, 150.
6 Sophia A. van Wingerden, The Women's Suffrage Movement in Britain, 1866-1928 (London:
MacMillan Press, 1999), 132. 7 Harrison, Separate Spheres, 28-29.
8 Auchterlonie, Conservative Suffragists, 87.
9 Harrison, Separate Spheres; Julia Bush, Women against the Vote: Female Anti-Suffragism in Britain
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 10
Martin Pugh, The March of the Women: A Revisionist Analysis of the Campaign for Women's Suffrage 1866-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
3
Incompatibility of the Leaders: Hostility within the Leadership
The first cause of the failure of the NLOWS was the incompatibility of the
anti-suffrage leaders. The NLOWS was founded upon the principle of ‘separate
spheres’ – the notion that ‘the spheres of men and women, owing to natural causes,
are essentially different.’11 Although male and female leaders shared this belief,
certain aspects of their views were in conflict.
To Cromer and Curzon, ‘separate spheres’ entailed female subservience. Since issues
within the domestic sphere were subjected to decisions made in the public sphere,
male leaders assumed that both spheres should submit to male dominance.12 Lady
Jersey, Mary Ward and Violet Markham, however, were far from their subservient
ideal. Whilst Cromer wished to ensure male dominance in the league, Lady Jersey
refused to concede on the principle of equal representations of the two sexes on the
Executive Committee. 13 The power struggle was so acrimonious that Cromer
lamented the decision to dissolve the Men’s League, which could have been a big
bargaining chip.14 Since female antis were anxious to secure the amalgamation, male
leaders could have pressurised them by threatening to dissolve the merger. As
explained in the introduction, the success of the 1910 Conciliation Bill injected
momentum into the suffrage movement. Yet, leaders were preoccupied by the
power struggle between the two sexes. For six months, no work had been done to
counter the initiative of the suffrage movement.15 This exemplifies how poor
relations between male and female leaders undermined the operation of the league.
In addition to the clash on female subservience, male and female leaders had
contrasting views on female citizenship. Cromer and Curzon considered women to be
second-class citizens. Curzon pointed out that women were relieved of national
duties such as enlisting, maintaining social order and paying taxes. They were
‘incapacitated from discharging the ultimate obligations of citizenships.’16 Due to
their exclusion from the public sphere, women’s national duty lay in the domestic
sphere only. Cromer wrote that men relied on women to be homemakers to
11
NLOWS, “No.52: Manifesto,” Women’s Library, PC/06/396-11/32. 12
NLOWS, “Nine Convincing Reasons against the Enfranchisement of Women,” Women’s Library, PC/06/396-11/32. 13
Cromer to Curzon, 18/7/1910, Curzon papers, British Library, MSS Eur F112/33A. 14
Cromer to Curzon, 28/9/1910, Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/33B. 15
Bush, Women against the Vote, 204. 16
NLOWS, “No.5: Lord Curzon’s Fifteen Good Reasons against the Grant of Female Suffrage,” Women’s Library, PC/06/396-11/32.
4
contribute to the prosperity of the state.17 These views reflect that male leaders
considered female citizenship to be inferior and incomplete. To them, the public role
of women was almost non-existent. Contrarily, Lady Jersey, Ward and Markham
believed that female citizenship was different from but parallel to male citizenship.
Markham wrote that ‘a woman’s citizenship is as great and as real as that of any
man’.18 Ward also believed in the ‘equal powers’ of the two sexes.19 She suggested
that women might fulfil the political aspect of their civic duties through local
government. The above indicates that female leaders believed that there was no
hierarchy between male and female citizenship.
These conflicting views over female citizenship exacerbated the hostility caused by
the clash over female subservience. They also resulted in significant debates in the
NLOWS (which will be explored in the next section). The incompatibility of the
leaders limited the growth of the NLOWS and served as a background cause to the
failure of the league.
The Inability to Compromise on a Constructive Policy: A Missed Opportunity
Because of conflicting beliefs over female citizenship, the league failed to reach an
agreement on any constructive policy which might have drawn the support of
moderate suffragists. To many moderate suffragists, female enfranchisement seemed
to be the only lawful way of achieving female political participation.20 In response to
this, female antis believed that moderate suffragists’ eagerness for political
participation could be diverted from enfranchisement to local government, thus
deterring them from suffragism.21 Although such a constructive policy seemed
feasible and useful, the league eventually abandoned this policy.
The first round of negotiations on a constructive policy was the debate over clause b
at the beginning of the merger. Clause b aimed ‘to maintain the principle of the
representation of women on Municipal and other bodies concerned with the
domestic and social affairs of the community’.22 As explained in the previous section,
17
Markham to Cromer, 24/10/1910, Cromer papers, National Archives, FO633/19. 18
Ibid; NLOWS, “Miss Violet Markham’s Great Speech in the Royal Albert Hall on February 28th
1912,” Women’s Library, PC/06/396-11/32. 19
“Against the Vote: Mrs Humphry Ward’s Address” in Eastern Morning News, No. 19330, Hull, 10/10/1913, Women’s Library, 2LSW/E/02/39. 20
Pugh, The March of the Women, 10. 21
Andrea Geddes Poole, Philanthropy and the Construction of Victorian Women's Citizenship: Lady Frederick Cavendish and Miss Emma Cons (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 53. 22
NLOWS, “Constitution of The National League for Opposing Woman Suffrage,” Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/33A.
5
male leaders were convinced that women belonged to homes and families only. In
their eyes, the expansion of women’s participation in local government violated the
principle of ‘separate spheres’.23 However, female antis insisted on the inclusion of
clause b. Cromer was concerned that the division caused by this clause would
terminate the amalgamation.24 The debate over clause b could not be resolved by
negotiations between male and female leaders. It was submitted to the meeting of
the General Council. Eventually, male leaders gave into the pressure from female
antis and other committee members. Clause b was included in the Constitution after
six months of negotiation.25 Despite their acknowledgement of the constructive
policy, male leaders remained against it. When Ward tried to implement clause b,
they were outraged.
The second round of negotiations was the controversy over the Local Government
Advancement Committee (LGAC) in 1912. The LGAC was established to execute
clause b. Ward decided that the LGAC would assist non-suffragist female candidates
to counter suffragist candidates supported by the NU. The controversy over the LGAC
began when the Committee publicly supported Dr Sophia Jevons, a West Marylebone
county council candidate.26 In January 1912, male leaders condemned the adoption
of a constructive strategy. Ward assured Curzon that ‘nothing alarms the suffragists
so much’ as a sophisticated local government committee.27 Markham also wrote
that the work of the LGAC might be able to cater for ‘a large body of centre opinion
which I feel it should be our object to conciliate and detach from the Suffragist
side’.28 However, male leaders were not persuaded. After rounds of antagonistic
negotiations, the LGAC broke away from the NLOWS in March, the same month as
voting on the 1912 Conciliation Bill began. The split greatly weakened the
anti-suffrage camp. First, the independence of the Committee revealed to the public
the internal divisions of the league. Founded upon the principle of mixed-sex
collaboration, this split discredited the NLOWS. Second, supporters of the NLOWS
were shared by the LGAC. Lucy Terry Lewis, for instance, joined the LGAC as a
member of the General Committee after she was sacked from the NLOWS.29 Lady
Jersey, Lady Wantage, Gertrude Bell and Gladys Pott were also members of the
23
Markham to Cromer, 11/8/1910, Cromer papers, FO633/19. 24
Cromer to Curzon, 3/11/1910, Cromer papers, FO633/19. 25
Bush, Women against the Vote, 204. 26
Julia Bush, “British Women’s Anti-Suffragism and the Forward Policy, 1908-14,” in Women’s History Review, 11/3 (2002), 443. 27
Ward to Curzon, 11/1/1911, Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/34. 28
Markham to Cromer, 10/2/1912, Cromer papers, FO633/21. 29
Bush, “British Women’s Anti-Suffragism,” 444.
6
LGAC. 30 The anti-suffrage camp returned to the state of separateness it had
occupied before the amalgamation.
The constructive policy had been intended to draw the support of moderate
suffragists. Yet, male leaders deemed it a violation of the ‘separate spheres’ ideology
and refused to adopt it. In the end, the league not only missed an opportunity to
attack moderate suffragists, but also injured itself through internal divisions.
The Inability to Stir Up Public Opinion: Weakening the Appeal of the League
One of the significant impacts of the absence of a constructive policy was that the
NLOWS lacked momentum. The NLOWS aimed to promote and facilitate the
expression of mass opinion.31 However, ineffective publicity methods prevented the
league from rallying supporters.32 By 1913, the NLOWS were unable to counter the
efforts of the suffragists.
The failure to rally the public owed much to problematic arguments. “Suffrage
Fallacies” was perhaps the most outrageous publicity material reprinted by the
NLOWS. Sir Almroth Wright was a notable physician. He explained that women could
not be trusted with political power because ‘the mind of woman is always
threatened with danger from the reverberations of her physiological emergencies’.33
Such a poorly justified argument immediately sparked public condemnation.
Representing the indignant female antis, Mary Ward wrote a public letter
denouncing the offensive remarks. Many female antis also wrote to Cromer
personally to express their fury.34 Not only did the NLOWS fail to mobilise men to
voice their view, the female antis were also dissatisfied with the league.
Apart from distributing flyers which contained counterproductive arguments, other
publicity methods deployed by the NLOWS were ‘unenterprising’.35 Public meetings
were perhaps the league’s most prized publicity method. The meetings in 1911, 1912
and 1913 brought new subscriptions and donations.36 However, because of high
costs (the meeting in Royal Albert Hall in 1912, for instance, cost GBP1000) and the
30
Bush, Women against the Vote, 246. 31
NLOWS, “Anti-Woman Suffrage Appeal,” Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/33A. 32
Pugh, The March of the Women, 145. 33
Almroth Wright, “Suffrage Fallacies,” Women’s Library, PC/06/396-11/32. 34
Pugh, The March of the Women, 157; Bush, Women against the Vote, 228. 35
Harrison, Separate Spheres, 152. 36
Gladys Pott, “Memorandum by Gladys Pott,” Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/36.
7
shortage of speakers, the league held few public meetings.37 In contrast, the
suffragists frequently held large meetings to demonstrate public support and boost
their morale. The Coronation Procession in 1911, for instance, gathered 40000
suffragists from different parts of the British Empire. 38 The NLOWS was less
successful than the suffragists in publishing literature too. The NLOWS ran a
periodical called the Anti-Suffrage Review. Its circulation was unsatisfactory. Even
Curzon commented that the Review was ‘an unpardonable waste of money’.39 The
suffragists performed much better in this aspect. The Common Cause, for instance,
had a circulation of 10000 by 1912.40 As a result, the literature published was as
much of a failure as organising public meetings.
Despite these unsuccessful publicity efforts, the league was able to maintain some
degree of public support until 1913 mainly because of militant suffragists. Their
militant stunts in 1912 and 1913 offended the public and were favourable to the
anti-suffrage cause. However, militancy led to a decline of the WSPU. Thus, the
impact of militancy on public opinion should not be overestimated.
The headquarters of the WSPU were raided by the police in 1912 and 1913. Their
funds were seized. The publishing of The Suffragette was hindered.41 In addition, the
WSPU was plagued by internal divisions from mid 1912 as the Pankhursts proposed
an escalation of militant acts. Many members did not agree with the escalation and
quit the organisation. Internal conflict occurred again in 1913. Sylvia Pankhurst
distanced herself from the WSPU and dedicated her efforts to the East London
Federation of Suffragettes (ELFS). The ELFS absorbed many working class members of
the WSPU and was officially expelled in early 1914.42 All these incidents led to a
drop in WSPU membership and funds in 1913. Although the militant suffragists’
actions provided favourable stimulus to the anti-suffragists, the influence of militancy
on public opinion should not be exaggerated.43
The above demonstrates that publicity methods used by the NLOWS were ineffective.
37
Curzon, “Note by Lord Curzon,” 27/11/1912, Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/37. 38
Maroula Joannou and June Purvis, “Introduction: The Writing of the Women’s Suffrage Movement,” in The Women’s Suffrage Movement: New Feminist Perspectives, edited by Maroula Joannou and June Purvis (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 5-6. 39
Quoted in Harrison, Separate Spheres, 151. 40
Harold Smith, The British Women's Suffrage Campaign, 1866-1928 (New York: Longman, 2010), 26. 41
June Purvis, “Emmeline Pankhurst (1858-1928) and Votes for Women,” in Votes for Women, edited by June Purvis and Sandra Stanley Holton (London: Routledge, 2000), 128. 42
Wingerden, The Women's Suffrage Movement, 149. 43
Ray Strachey, The Cause: A Short History of the Women's Movement in Great Britain (London: Virago, 1978), 329.
8
Since the league was unable to reach out to the public, mass mobilisation was
impossible. The NLOWS was left in the shade by suffragists in terms of public
support.
Financial Insolvency: Paralysing the League
Apart from rallying public support, another aspect in which the league could not
compete with the suffrage organisations was financial stability. The short-sighted
financial policy of the NLOWS led it into a financial crisis in summer 1912, which
would render the league immobile by 1913. This greatly hindered the league’s ability
to counter the Reform Bill and Dickinson’s Bill in 1913.
Cromer and Curzon relied heavily on one-off donations from the wealthy. Cromer
wrote that ‘it all depends upon what the big men give’.44 This statement concluded
their financial strategy – targeting the wealthy and neglecting the majority of the
middle-class NLOWS members. Many ‘big men’ donated under the persuasion of
Cromer and Curzon. Even though some of the donation amounts disappointed the
male leaders, they were relatively successful at the beginning.45 By the end of 1910,
the league had raised over GBP20000.46 However, amongst the ten pages of the
subscriptions, only seven donations were promised for two to five years.47 Cromer
and Curzon were apparently unaware that without renewed fundraising efforts, the
league would face a financial crisis in a few years.
By the time male leaders were aware of this impending financial crisis, funds were
already alarmingly few. In February 1912, Cromer suggested that they might need to
organise ‘a small meeting’ to determine whether to set up a committee to raise
funds.48 At the end of March, Curzon was informed that only GBP10000 was
available and half of it would be spent on wages.49 In April, Colonel Lewis reiterated
the necessity of immediate large-scale fundraising.50 Given the success in 1910,
Cromer and Curzon once again attempted to raise funds from the rich. However,
Curzon realised that ‘this time [they were met] with hardly the same success as
before’.51 By June 1912, the financial difficulty greatly undermined the operation of
44
Cromer to Curzon, 6/7/1910, Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/33A. 45
Cromer to Curzon, 11/7/1910, Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/33A. 46
NLOWS, “Subscriptions to the Anti Woman-Suffrage League,” Women’s Library, PC/06/396-11/32. 47
Ibid. 48
Cromer to Curzon, 8/2/1912, Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/35. 49
Unknown sender (possibly Colonel Lewis) to Curzon, 25/3/1912, Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/35. 50
Colonel Lewis to Curzon, 18/3/1912, Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/35. 51
Curzon, “Note by Lord Curzon,” 27/11/1912, Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/37.
9
the league. The league could not support the establishment of new branches,
organise meetings or publish propaganda materials. This paralysis was furthered by a
decision made in July. To bring down its expenses by GBP4500 per annum, the league
would greatly limit the scale of the Anti-Suffrage Review, hold fewer meetings and
invite only voluntary speakers.52 Since these were the major publicity events, public
support for the league was jeopardised.
By the end of 1912, the league survived mostly on the emergency fund of
GBP8300. 53 Fearful of the passing of the 1913 Reform Bill, many executive
committee members hoped that Curzon would release the emergency fund to
campaign against it. Curzon rejected the appeal. He explained that the emergency
fund should be retained for the two-year interval before the official legislation of
female enfranchisement.54 The strain on resources was exacerbated by Curzon’s and
Cromer’s refusal to engage in fundraising. Although members repeatedly appealed to
Curzon, his stance remained unchanged in 1913.55 The scale of activities could not
expand in response to the approaching Bill. Unless more funds were collected, the
league was paralysed.
On the other hand, the NU, who relied on continuous small-scale fundraising,
possessed GPD40000 (twice as much as in 1911).56 The financial status of the
NLOWS could not rival that of the NU. The inability to recognise the financial needs
or to respond to the insolvency immobilised the NLOWS since summer 1912.
The Failure to Rally Parliamentary Support: the Fatal Blow
The circumstances were unfavourable to the anti-suffrage movement, as
demonstrated in previous sections. Given the British political structure, parliament
was the ultimate decision-maker, and therefore a key player in the anti-suffrage
movement. This is especially important given that the NLOWS was not backed up by
active public opinion. The failure to garner loyal parliamentary support was the fatal
blow to the NLOWS. Cromer and Curzon encountered the indifference of the MPs.
The strategy of relying on Asquith also proved to be a fatal blunder.
52
NLOWS, “Notes of the Meeting,” 9/7/1912, Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/35. 53
Curzon, “Note by Lord Curzon,” 27/11/1912, Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/37. 54
Ibid. 55
Pugh, The March of the Women, 167. 56
Martin Pugh, Electoral Reform in War and Peace, 1906-18 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 22.
10
The MPs were indifferent to anti-suffrage debates owing to different political
concerns. Austen Chamberlain and Walter Long were contenders for Conservative
leadership. Although both of them were confirmed anti-suffragists, they refused to
associate with the league publicly because they feared a division within the
Conservative party.57 The conditions were also unfavourable to the NLOWS in the
Liberal Party. Leading anti-suffrage Liberals included Asquith, Lord Harcourt, Charles
Hobhouse and Lord Crewe.58 As members of the government, it would wound their
impartiality to openly commit to the anti-suffrage cause. Moreover, they did not wish
to aggravate the existing internal conflict.59 Again, leading anti-suffrage Liberals had
reservations in supporting the NLOWS. Anti-suffragists were preoccupied with
political concerns which were prioritised over anti-suffragism. The NLOWS was thus
compelled to rely heavily on Asquith.
Cromer and Curzon recognised both the importance and unreliability of Asquith’s
support. It was not until the end of 1911, when the mobilisation of other MPs failed,
that Asquith became the last and only resort of the male leaders. This was
demonstrated by Cromer’s distressed appeal to Asquith:
I have been hampered at every turn by the fact that almost all the
leading Anti-Suffragists politicians on both sides of the House, though
full of sympathy, have been unable, from one reason or another, to give
us any effective help. … I would therefore most earnestly beg of you to
give us your personal assistance [my italics].60
In his reply, Asquith assured Cromer that he was a convinced anti-suffragist. Yet, he
was still reluctant to commit to the NLOWS personally.61 Curiously, however, Cromer
was not at all deterred by Asquith’s unreliability. In January 1912, Cromer assured
Curzon that he ‘may depend upon it that Asquith and his friends will somehow or
other find a method for not passing the Conciliation Bill into law’.62 With all their
hopes riding on Asquith, and weak support in parliament, the NLOWS was in a
precarious position, especially after 1912.
The parliamentary support of suffragists grew and reached a climax in 1913. This
57
Ibid, 26. 58
Pugh, The March of the Women, 159; Harrison, Separate Spheres, 165. 59
Phillip Williamson, “The Conservative Party, 1900-1939: From Crisis to Ascendency,” in A Companion to Early Twentieth-century Britain, edited by Chris Wrigley (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 11. 60
Cromer to Asquith, 15/12/1911, Cromer papers, FO633/21. 61
Asquith to Cromer, ?/12/1911, Cromer papers, FO633/21. 62
Cromer to Curzon, 20/1/1912, Cromer papers, FO633/21.
11
trend was perhaps obscured by the defeat of Dickinson’s Bill in May 1913. Whereas
the Conciliation Bill aimed to enfranchise one million women, Dickinson’s Bill aimed
at approximately six million. Mitzi Auchterlonie suggests that the MPs, especially the
Conservatives, voted against this Bill primarily because of the large number but not
the gender of the new voters.63 In fact, in 1910-1913, over half of the Liberals voted
for each female enfranchisement measure. 64 Whilst the Liberals remained
predominantly pro-suffrage, the suffragists gained increasing support from Labour
and the Conservatives.
The relationship between suffragists and the Labour Party reached new heights in
1913. In June 1912, the NU reached an agreement with Labour. The endorsement of
female enfranchisement would become an integral part of the Labour policy. In
return, the NU would support Labour candidates in elections. The alliance benefited
the suffrage movement. By removing Liberals from their seats, the electoral alliance
successfully pressurised the Liberals.65 The Labour Party also consolidated their
stance for women’s suffrage in 1913.66 By 1913, suffragists had gained strong
support from the Labour Party.
The suffragists posed a threat to the anti-suffrage majority of the Conservatives in
1912-1913. Andrew Bonar Law, who was in favour of a limited female
enfranchisement, became the Conservative leader in November 1911. In addition,
the NU intensified the lobbying effort among the Conservatives.67 By 1913, the
NLOWS found it hard to counter the shifting opinion amongst the Conservatives.68
By 1913, suffragists had important allies in most of the political parties. The
Conservatives, Liberals and Labour members all proposed different versions of
female enfranchisement bill. The House of Commons was also overwhelmingly
pro-suffrage.69 The NLOWS could not counter the pro-suffrage tide in the parliament.
The fatal blow came when Asquith’s stance shifted in 1913. Indeed, up till 1913,
Asquith’s hostility was a major obstacle to the female enfranchisement.70 However,
in 1912, when the political climate shifted towards the suffragists, he was ready to
63
Auchterlonie, Conservative Suffragists, 187. 64
Harrison, Separate Spheres, 28-29. 65
Les Garner, Stepping Stones to Women’s Liberty: Feminist Ideas in the Women’s Suffrage Movement 1900-1918 (London: Heinemann, 1984), 99-100. 66
Sandra Stanley Holton, Feminism and Democracy: Female Suffrage and Reform Politics in Britain, 1900-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 90; Rover, Women’s Suffrage, 150. 67
Auchterlonie, Conservative Suffragists, 185. 68
Arnold Ward to Curzon, 5/2/1913, Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/36. 69
Pugh, The March of the Women, 166. 70
Sandra Stanley Holton, “The Making of Suffrage History,” in Votes for Women, 25.
12
‘retreat into the democratised woman suffrage’.71
After the ‘Summer Pilgrimage’, a large procession organised by suffragists in July
1913, the NU immediately arranged a meeting with Asquith. In August, when Asquith
met with the NU deputation, he reiterated his support for a democratised form of
female enfranchisement. He also repeatedly expressed his admiration for the mass
support shown in the Pilgrimage.72 This compliment was especially important since
Asquith demanded more concrete evidence of the prevalence of pro-suffrage
opinion. Millicent Fawcett wrote that ‘we felt that his education in the principles of
representative government was progressing’.73 Historian Jo Vellacott remarks on the
symbolic value of this deputation. She considers this event as the first instance of
Asquith’s changing stance.74 Asquith’s change of heart in 1913 was confirmed by the
ELFS deputation in June 1914. The deputation was followed by negotiations between
the ELFS and David Lloyd George which aimed to curb the militancy. Historian
William O’Neill believes that the elimination of militancy was Asquith’s first step to
make way for female enfranchisement.75 These friendly gestures indicate that
Asquith prepared to embrace female enfranchisement. The NLOWS was betrayed by
their most significant ally.
With the drive of the pro-suffrage MPs, and the lack of opposition from Asquith, the
prospect of female enfranchisement was hopeful. The conditions were ripe for
legislation but the progress was hindered by the outbreak of the First World War.76
With the turn of tide in the parliament by 1913, the NLOWS was already doomed.
The NLOWS lost much of its influence on both public opinion and parliamentary
debate. It was no longer an effective opposition. The anti-suffrage movement had
been defeated by 1913.
Conclusion
The failure of the NLOWS is an important aspect of the history of women’s suffrage.
This paper aims to challenge past perceptions of the failure of the NLOWS. Contrary
to historians Brian Harrison and Julia Bush, it argues that the anti-suffrage movement
had, to all intents, already been defeated in 1913. Martin Pugh shares the view that
71
Harrison, Separate Spheres, 50. 72
Vellacott, From Liberal to Labour, 241. 73
Quoted in ibid. 74
Ibid. 75
O’Neill, The Woman Movement, 86-87. 76
Ibid, 88; Garner, Stepping Stones.
13
the anti-suffrage movement had lost before the First World War. This paper
supplements his argument by specifying the time of its pre-war defeat. The failure of
the NLOWS in 1913 resulted from various factors.
The incompatibility of the leaders created hostility within the league and resulted in
fragmentation. Because of the failure to compromise on a constructive policy, the
league missed an opportunity to draw upon the support of moderate suffragists. The
failure of mass mobilisation further weakened the league. In addition, the NLOWS
was paralysed by financial insolvency from 1912. By 1913, the immobile league was
hardly a threat to the suffragists. The fatal blow, however, was the failure to mobilise
the parliamentary opinion. The NLOWS failed to convert the predominantly
pro-suffrage parliament or to organise the anti-suffrage MPs into a powerful
opposition. The betrayal of Asquith in 1913 devastated the anti-suffrage movement.
The NLOWS lost the parliament to the suffragists. They had no more strength or
bargaining chips to turn back the tide by 1913.
Although conditions were already ripe for female enfranchisement, the First World
War disrupted progress. In May 1917, the Representation of the People Bill, the first
female enfranchisement bill proposed after the outbreak of the war, won a majority
of 331. In February 1918, propertied women aged thirty or above were enfranchised.
In April 1918, the NLOWS was disbanded. This marked the official finale of the
anti-suffrage movement which had been effectively defeated by 1913.
14
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