The ‘Dynamics of Contention’ in the

Islamic Republic of Iran Understanding the Origins and Failure of the

2009 Post-Election Protests

Amy Thomson

A year and a half prior to the Arab Spring post-election protests erupted in Iran spawning the

Green Movement. Although the protests initially showed revolutionary promise, they ultimately

failed to achieve widespread political change. Using the Dynamics of Contention model it is

possible to understand what the causes of these protests were and why the protestors failed to

achieve their aims. Broad change processes, interpretative processes and the attribution of a

political opportunity converged to spark the initial protests. Elite political factionalism and

fluctuating levels of political freedom were the main broad change processes. They led to an

interpretative process which was exacerbated by allegations of electoral fraud, loss of

legitimacy. Due to the singular national importance of an election, electoral fraud is highly

visible and shared by the largest group possible, facilitating the attribution of a political

opportunity. However, the Green Movement was unable to co-opt organisational space from

workers unions or military organisations such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. This

lack of organisational space combined with an increasing attribution of threat from ongoing and

increasing repression, led the protests to subside without political success.

Table of Contents

Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1

The Dynamics of Contention .............................................................................................. 2

Conceptual Clarification .................................................................................................................. 4

DOC in Historical and Intellectual Context ................................................................................... 5

DOC Components and Application................................................................................................ 7

DOC‟s Applicability to the 2009 Iranian Post-Election Protests ................................................ 9

Evaluation of the 2009 Post-election Protests .................................................................. 9

Future Possibilities ......................................................................................................................... 19

Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 21

Appendices ....................................................................................................................... 27

Appendix 1: The Islamic Republic of Iran: State structure (National Democratic Institution,

2010). ............................................................................................................................................... 27

Appendix 2: Who are Mousavi‟s supporters (Kull et al., 2010, p.30)? ................................... 28

1

Introduction

In 2009, protests throughout the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) occurred in response

to suspected fraud during the presidential election held on June 12th. The official

election results were: 63% to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the incumbent president, and

34% to Mir Hussein Mousavi, prime minister from 1981-1989 (Kamrava, 2010,

p.408). These results were disputed by Ahmadinejad‟s electoral opponents. There

have been a number of previous protest cycles in Iran; however the scale and

intensity of these protests surprised even the opposition leadership.

A framework for understanding this mobilisation is provided by the Dynamics of

Contention (DOC) model. Two DOC broad change processes preceding the

election, intensification of political factionalism and the restriction of political

freedoms, increased popular resentment and contributed to public questioning of

regime legitimacy both of which are interpretative processes. Ahmadinejad‟s

apparent fraud not only emphasised this loss of legitimacy, but also created a

political opportunity for protest. Subsequent repression, allegations of corruption,

and the death of Ayatollah Montazeri, an honoured opposition leader, at first fuelled

the regime opposition which became known as the Green Movement (GM).

However, by the end of January 2010, large scale protest aimed at reform or

revolution had ceased due to limited organisational space, the failure of the GM to

take advantage of economic hardship, and the exorbitant cost of protest due to

relentless repression. Even in light of the recent unrest across the Middle East and

North Africa (MENA), protest within Iran has been limited and quickly extinguished.

Part of the reason for this is that the 2009 post-election protests accelerated a broad

change process of militarisation which has increased the strength of the Iranian

Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) and its stake it the current regime. However,

increasing strength has also led to internal tension within the IRGC. If that tension

were to reach a critical level the opposition to the regime maybe able to form a

coalition with the IRGC dissenters, increasing the potential for successful protest.

This paper begins with an explanation of what the DOC is and why it is to be

preferred to more traditional approaches to social movements and revolutions. This

is followed by a more in depth look at the individual components of the DOC. The

2

model is then applied to the context of the 2009 post-election protests in an attempt

to determine what the causes of these protests were. Finally, I analyse what the

consequences of these protests have been and possible future outcomes.

The Dynamics of Contention

The „Dynamics of Contention‟ (DOC) was developed by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly

(2001) as a contemporary approach for analysing the mobilisation of society. It is a

mechanistic approach amenable to case study application because it focuses on „a

delimited class of events that alter relations among specified sets of elements in

identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations‟ (McAdam et al., 2001,

p.24). The general elements of the model, explained in the section on „DOC

Components and Application‟ are: broad change processes, interpretive processes,

attribution of threats and opportunities, appropriation of existing organisational space

and contingent collective identity, and innovative collective action (McAdam, 2004,

p.211). As is demonstrated in Figure 1, these elements affect both state and non-

state actors, and interact in a given scenario to create a unique political context.

It is this political context which determines the nature of the relationship between

state and challenger. There are four modes of political interaction: prescribed

politics, subterranean politics, elite contention and popular contention (McAdam,

2004, p.223). Figure 2 provides explanation for what they are and in what political

context they will arise. The figure demonstrates that if both state and challenger

become uncertain about the possibility of protecting/attaining their interests, then

sustained popular contention will ensue because they continue to perceive threats or

opportunities in the environment (McAdam, 2004, p.223). Popular contention will

disappear when the environment becomes certain either because the state

compromises due to the certainty of challenger success, or because the likelihood of

state success is such that the cost of protest is too high (Pierskalla, 2010). Figure 1

demonstrates that it is the interaction between processes which creates or

diminishes the perception of environmental uncertainty. It is the onset of popular

contention in 2009 within Iran which is the focus of this essay.

3

Figure 1

Figure 1: A Dynamic, Interactive, Framework for Analyzing the Emergence of

Contentious Politics1

1 McAdam, "Revisiting the U.S. Civil Rights Movement: Toward a More Synthetic Understanding of

the Origins of Contention ", 211.

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Figure 2: Modes of Political Interaction2

Nature of Mobilised

Actors

Perceptual Condition

Certain Uncertain

Institutionalized

Political groups

Prescribed Politics

(routine decision-making and

administration)

Elite Contention

(conflict between political

groups of a public and

collective nature)

Previously

unorganized non-

political collectives

Subterranean Politics

(unorganised or non-political

group mobilization confronting

a closed political system)

Popular Contention

(political activity of newly

mobilised actors of a

non-institutional nature)

Conceptual Clarification

Protest can be defined as political „collective action of individuals aimed at achieving

their goal or goals by influencing decisions of a target‟ (Opp, 2009, p.38). Under this

definition „wars, revolutions, rebellions, social movements, industrial conflict, feuds,

riots, banditry, shaming ceremonies and many more forms of collective struggle‟

which are identified as forms of contentious politics by Tarrow (1996, p.881), can

also be placed along a „protest continuum‟ from low intensity (non-violent) to high

intensity (violent) protest (Carey, 2006, p.2). Revolutions represent one of the most

high intensity forms of protest both because there are a large number of people

involved and because they represent „an effort to transform the political institutions

and the justifications for political authority in a society, accompanied by formal or

informal mass mobilization and non-institutionalized actions that undermine existing

authorities‟ (Goldstone, 2001, p.142). At the other end of the continuum is the social

movement, a „collective body distinguished by a high level of commitment and

political activism…acting within a loose organizational framework…with a level of

2 Ibid., 223.

5

intended and planned action in pursuit of a recognized [isolated] social goal‟

(Heywood, 2007, p.308, 458). Social movements may or may not involve a

substantial proportion of the population and they may originate in a distinct protest

episode. The larger they get and the more active, the more likely they will turn into a

rebellion or revolution, particularly when combined with other opposition activities

occurring simultaneously.

DOC in Historical and Intellectual Context

The DOC stands in historical and intellectual contrast to earlier approaches which

failed to adequately explain the causes of mobilisation. Goldstone identifies three

20th century „generations‟ in the study of revolution: description, behavioural analysis,

and structuralism (Goldstone, 1980). There is some chronological overlap, but the

first generation occurred between 1900 and 1940 and is represented by Brinton‟s

„The Anatomy of Revolution‟ (Goldstone, 1980, p.425). This generation identified

common features and stages of revolution, providing useful insights into

social/demographic changes emphasised in concepts such as the „desertion of the

intellectuals‟ (Goldstone, 1980).3 However, these concepts failed to consider the

underlying causes of revolution – for example, why did the intellectuals come to the

conclusion that radical alteration to the political system was necessary (Goldstone,

1980, p.427)? The second generation unfolded between 1940 and 1975, focusing on

behavioural and sociological analysis as conceived in Ted Gurr‟s „Why Men Rebel‟

(1970). This was an attempt to create broad theories about the „why‟ of revolutions.

However, this generation was critiqued for their focus on single factor analysis, only

explaining part of the phenomenon (Goldstone, 2001, p.140). For example, protest

and revolution are determined by more than just „relative deprivation‟.4

Thus, a third generation developed; the currently dominant structural approach

classically portrayed in Skocpol‟s comparison of the Russian, French and Chinese

3 „Desertion of the intellectuals‟ refers to the expression of ideas that are „at once more bitter and

more hopeful‟ than usual, by an absolute or comparative majority of writers, artists, musicians, actors, teachers, preachers etc. which reject the status quo, describing instead an alternate, utopian society with different political and/or production systems. Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution, 44-52.

4 Relative deprivation is the „actors‟ perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and

their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping.” Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 24.

6

revolutions (Goldstone, 2001, p.171). It emphasises the historical and structural

mechanisms underlying mobilisation and seeks general laws governing the causes

of mobilisation (Tilly, 2005, p.211). However, criticisms of structuralism are plentiful:

terminological confusion, the emphasis placed on political opportunity to the

detriment of the study of threat, the neglect of culture within structural studies, the

total absence of the study of emotion, dismissal of individual motivations, emphasis

on movement motivations, neglect of state actor motivations, neglect of the

international impact on internal relations, the static nature of the model without

reference to the interaction between various factors, and the search for universal

laws where none exist.5

A poststructuralist consensus emerged out of this critique (Kurzman, 2004). This

consensus includes tentative agreement on the relational characteristics of the

underlying causal mechanisms (Steinberg, 2004, p.122). McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly

built on this post-structural agreement to create the DOC. As former structuralists,

their model inevitably has structural roots, but combines rationalist,

phenomenological, and cultural epistemologies to create a dynamic, holistic model

(Kurzman, 2004, p.118; McAdam et al., 2001, p.23). It has the capacity to explain

the causal mechanisms for various episodes unsatisfactorily explained by any one of

the previous analytical traditions. It also explains why contention does not occur,

despite the predictions of other models. The DOC is therefore very flexible; it can be

conceived of in terms of a political science adjustable spanner.

However, this flexibility creates its own problems. Since the model might be used to

encompass any or all potential causes, it may not provide any real answers. Its very

flexibility potentially renders it meaningless. Thus, in the search for universal laws of

contention, it is useless. On the other hand, the creators suggest that is the beauty

of the model. They claim that there are no universal laws. In acknowledging this

fact, the model enables the user to understand one particular situation in all its

complexity, instead of generalising an ungeneralisable situation. Nevertheless, they

do suggest that it is possible to identify „partial parallel‟s‟ between situations in which

5 Goodwin and Jasper, 2004; Gould, 2004; McAdam, 2004; Rasler, 1996.

7

the same or similar mechanisms are at work, but which „combine differently and

therefore produce different outcomes‟ (McAdam et al., 2001, p.14).

The DOC also continues the tradition of neglecting trigger events, such as election

fraud (Kuntz and Thompson, 2009). However, they can be incorporated into the

framework during the analysis of the attribution of opportunity. If a change occurs in

the political context (broad change process), increasing resentment within the

population (interpretive process), innovative collective action will emerge if the

opposition is given the opportunity to frame (interpretive process) a potential trigger

event in such a way that previously disenchanted or moderate people are incited to

act, leading to an escalation in contention. This is important since the proximity of

the 2009 Iranian presidential elections to the protests suggests they acted as a

trigger event.

DOC Components and Application

Here I explain each component of the DOC, and illustrate with examples from

contemporary Iranian history. Broad change processes are sets of events which

trigger change in the economic, political and cultural dimensions of society,

undermining the assumptions upon which relations between state and non-state

actors are predicated (McAdam et al., 2001, p.42). Broad change processes include

„wars, industrialization, international political alignments, prolonged [economic woes],

and wide-spread demographic changes‟ (McAdam, 2004, p.213). For example, two

decades of petro-dollar fuelled modernisation from the early 1960s to 1979 radically

altered Iranian class structure, led to mass urbanisation, and increased economic

inequality, creating negative interpretative processes that were instrumental in the

emergence of popular contention during the Islamic Revolution of 1979

(Abrahamian, 2008).

Interpretative processes enable people to make sense of events collectively, sharing

and framing expectations and grievances (McAdam, 2004, p.215). They are a

crucial determinant in whether society will mobilize because a citizen needs to

believe action is necessary in order to become active (Meyer, 2004, p.50).

Interpretative processes automatically occur in response to broad change processes

and depend on the positive or negative perception of the changes. If positive, then

expectations will increase. If negative, than grievances will increase. Often they

8

occur unconsciously, however, leaders also strategically use symbols in order to

emotionally and culturally galvanise people into action through a specific rendering of

events (McAdam, 2004, p.215). In Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini utilized religious

symbols to effectively motivate the populace. In 1963, he framed opposition to the

Shah in terms of good versus evil by comparing the Shah to the historical-cultural

villain Yazid, and himself to the Shi‟i hero Imam Hoseyn (Brumberg, 2001, p.74).6

The third component of the DOC is the attribution of threat and opportunity. For

mobilization to occur not only are grievances needed, but also optimism that action

will be effective (Meyer, 2004, p.50) It is not the existence of a threat or opportunity

that is important in understanding why the behaviour of citizens changes; it is the

attribution of it (Kurzman, 2004, p.116). To explain: If an opportunity exists, but is

not perceived then the opportunity cannot be exploited. Conversely, if no

opportunity exists, but actors perceive one, they may act accordingly. The outcome

can go one of two ways. In 1963, an uprising occurred in Iran when the state

ostensibly revealed weakness in allowing Khomeini access to Feyziyeh seminary

after expressing the intention to prohibit such a visit.7 However, the protests were

brutally crushed (Brumberg, 2001, p.74). In contrast, during the Islamic Revolution,

by acting as if an opportunity existed, ordinary Iranians generated an opportunity

which did not previously exist: the state collapsed under the force of their belief,

despite the state‟s bureaucratic and military capacity to crush resistance (Kurzman,

1996, p.163).

The fourth component of the DOC, the appropriation of existing organisational space

and the contingent collective identity, is crucial if the perceived opportunity is to be

taken advantage of. This means utilizing communication networks and space that

are not ordinarily used for political action (McAdam, 2004, p.218). In utilizing them,

opposition leaders are able to tap into the already existing collective identity of

network members to frame their struggle in „us against them‟ terms (McAdam, 2004,

6 Yazid was a Sunni Caliph who had Imam Hoseyn killed in the year 680, martyring him in the

process. At the time Imam Hoseyn was attempting to restore „Alid rule at Karbala. His martyrdom is marked each year on the religious day, Ashura (Lazarus-Yafeh, 2006).

7 Feyziyeh seminary is located in Qom, and is the location from which Ayatollah Khomeini delivered

his public sermons, conveying his message of dissent.

9

p.219). For example, during the Islamic Revolution, Bazaaris appropriated space in

the mosques to protest against the state, tapping into a broader religious identity with

cross-class reach (Parsa, 2009a, p.13).8

Finally, innovative collective action is „action that departs from previous collective

routines‟ (McAdam, 2004, p.220). It occurs once the attribution of opportunity is

combined with the appropriation of social networks and space in order to express

resentment created by the interpretation of broad change processes (McAdam,

2004). When such action is taken by a significant proportion of the population that

was not previously politically active, popular contention has ensued. In Iran, such

innovative collective action is ideally demonstrated in the boycott of tobacco in 1891.

Boycotts had not previously been used as a form of protest against state actions.9

DOC’s Applicability to the 2009 Iranian Post-Election Protests

The five DOC dimensions readily gain traction on the empirical detail of the 2009

Iranian post-election protests due to the incorporation of emotion and culture into the

model through interpretative processes. The DOC also acknowledges the

importance of structures such as the economy in broad change processes. The

framing of opportunity/threat in terms of attribution is also of importance to Iran given

that that the state had not structurally weakened prior to the Islamic revolution

(Kurzman, 1996). Thus, the revolution only occurred because the people, perceiving

an existential opportunity, created it themselves. Furthermore, the ability of the

model to explain why popular contention may fail to arise or cease without success is

vital due to the apparent cessation of political protest since December 2009.

Evaluation of the 2009 Post-election Protests

The DOC provides insight into which causal mechanisms influenced the 2009 post-

election protests. Figure 3 chronicles the major protest events in this contentious

8 Bazaars or Persian markets are composed of a hierarchical mixture of “import–exporters,

wholesalers, retailers, brokers, and middlemen who make up the historic commercial class.”

Keshavarzian, 228.

9 The Tobacco boycott of 1891 was instigated by the Bazaars with the help of the Ulama in response

to a growing number of economic concessions to foreign interests, including a concession on the production and distribution of Tobacco.

10

episode. There are three groups of broad change processes: economic, political

freedoms, and factionalism. All may have had an influence on the outbreak, intensity

and protraction of popular contention as portrayed in Figure 3.

During the 1990s, the end of the Iran-Iraq war and economic liberalisation

contributed to a long period of economic growth and a marked decrease in poverty.

However, due to corruption and a lack of transparency in the oil economy, to the

poor, these gains may seem relatively small compared to the gains of the elite

(Salehi-Isfahani, 2009, p.26). This is exacerbated by the failure of the government to

make inroads into inequality as calculated by the Gini index (Salehi-Isfahani,

2009).10 The expectations of the poor in terms of the rise in their living standards

have not been met, even though they have materially increased, leading to

resentment and social envy (Salehi-Isfahani, 2009, p.26). In the middle-classes the

economic gains of the last two decades are overshadowed by the memory of the

desperate times in the 1980s. This leads many to overstate the differences in living

standards between the Shah‟s Iran and the Islamic Republic, another interpretative

process (Salehi-Isfahani, 2009, p.10). Furthermore, unemployment, particularly

among youth, and job insecurity have also increased over the last two decades,

despite increasing prosperity (Salehi-Isfahani, 2009, p.25). Even if a job is secure,

there is no guarantee that wages will be paid on time or at all (Mather, 2010, p.507).

Increasing unemployment and insecurity is accompanied by an interpretative

process of increasing public grievances blaming the government for the

predicament. These interpretative processes have increased the potential for

political instability. Worker‟s protests and strikes have been widespread during

Ahmadinejad‟s first presidency. In 2008 over 4000 workers actions took place

(Mather, 2010).

During Khatami‟s tenure as president, attempts were made to politically liberalise

society. In particular, political space was liberated in the media and universities for

the expression of free speech (Ashraf and Banuazizi, 2001, p.251). Local elections

were also set up which increased the potential for political participation and

grassroots mobilisation (Ehteshami and Zweri, 2007, p.35). For opposition forces this

10 Gini index is used to calculate the disparity in household income. The higher the coefficient, the

greater the level of inequality is within the country.

11

redirection was accompanied by the widespread attribution of opportunity and a

declining sense of threat due to the influence the president supposedly had to

prevent repression (Abrahamian, 2008, p.191).

Unfortunately, the high expectations of political freedom were disappointed. The

minimal organisational space opened for protest was closed again even before the

end of Khatami‟s presidency by a conservative crackdown which manifested in the

repression of student protests in 1999 and the forcible closure of the media by the

Judiciary in 2000 (Ashraf and Banuazizi, 2001, p.252). This policy intensified after

Ahmadinejad‟s election in 2005 with a mini „cultural revolution‟ in the universities

refusing politically active students admittance (Ehsani, 2006). The failure of political

liberalisation contributed to a feeling of disenchantment and resentment among the

public more potent for the increased expectations which preceded it.

Disenchantment manifested itself in the very low turnout for the 2003 municipal and

2004 Majlis (Iranian legislature) elections (Arjomand, 2005, p.51). In the 2004 Majlis

elections voter turnout was 51% and in the 2003 municipal elections only 39% voted

with the figure as low as 12% in Tehran. This compares with a high of 65% for the

1999 municipal elections and 71% for Majlis elections in 1996 (Parsons, 2010, p.11;

Takeyh, 2003).

However, this disenchantment and resentment led not to the elimination of protest,

but to the radicalization of students and worker who belonged to ready made

networks easily appropriated to protesting and which bypass conventional methods

of closing organisational space. In 2006 students burned pictures of Ahmadinejad at

a rally and some of the workers actions in 2008 took place involved the kidnap of

managers (Razavi, 2009, p.13; Mather, 2010, p.508). It is in this context of

radicalization and disenchantment that the 2009 post-election protests took place.

Factionalism has been present since the IRI formed. Throughout, there were

unspoken parameters within which the struggle was contained. The most important

was the concealment of the depth of factionalism from the electorate (Saikal, 2009,

p.95). Elections were part of the arsenal used to prevent the tension escalating.

Through them any faction could potentially gain a measure of institutional power. In

doing so elections prevented elite defection (Tezcür, 2009, p.13). So long as the

12

elite were united in their belief in the establishment, factional fighting remained

confined to a safe level (Kamrava, 2010, p.411).

Since Ahmadinejad‟s election in 2005, the landscape of factional politics has altered

radically. This constitutes a broad change process because the assumptions upon

which state and challenger acted were undermined. The balance of power has

shifted towards a new faction, the neoconservatives, who won a large swath of the

local council seats in 2003 and the Majlis seats in 2004 (Ehteshami and Zweri,

2007). A polarising effect also occurred during the 2005 election with the

neoconservatives and conservatives forming a coalition against the reformist camp,

hardening the stances of all (Kamrava, 2010, p.403). Institutional mechanisms were

then revised to maintain the neoconservative/conservative balance of power, leaving

the reformists without institutional recourse (Razavi, 2010, p.83). The measures

used include the vetting of reformists in elections from 2003, the politicisation of the

Faqih in favour of Ahmadinejad, and the militarisation of the regime in support of the

neoconservatives (Kamrava, 2010, p.402-403; Ehteshami and Zweri, 2007, p.46).

This broad change process strained the parameters agreed previously, because the

reformists were losing faith in their ability to affect change from within the system.

During the 2009 election campaign a public letter written by ex-president Rafsanjani

to the Faqih highlighted the increasing rift.11 During the course of a televised debate

between candidates, Ahmadinejad accused Rafsanjani and other elite figures of

corruption. In his letter, Rafsanjani claimed these allegations undermined the regime

and called on the Faqih to respond (Esfandiari, 2009). The heatedness of the

campaign had the consequence of not only solidifying factional rifts, but taking the

conflict beyond the unspoken parameters, into the public arena where it became

unmanageable (Kamrava, 2010, p.407). The campaign exposed the instability at the

heart of Iranian system, caused by factionalism. An interpretative process

accompanied this exposure as public frustration with elite contention increased. In

essence:

„…politics has become so polarized that factional differences simply cannot be

contained. Thus, the frustrations regarding the system and inability of

11 Rafsanjani was President from 1989 – 1997 and ran in the election as a reformist candidate in 2005

but did not 2009

13

factionalism to deliver coherent politics and what had been promised in 1979,

namely political freedom and social justice, spilled over onto the streets…‟

(Razavi, 2010, p.83)

The contention was framed by opposition leaders, like Montazeri, who questioned

the Faqih‟s legitimacy. They declared that he exacerbated elite contention by

aligning himself with the neoconservatives and in doing so stepped outside his

constitutional role as a neutral arbiter (Safshekan and Sabet, 2010, p.557; Razavi,

2010, p.84).

Other interpretative processes also increased the likelihood of post-election protest.

Prior to the election public expectations were heightened in regards to the reformists‟

potential electoral prospects (Kuntz and Thompson, 2009, p.257). This interpretative

process occurred because while elections in the past had not been fair due to

Council of Guardians (COG) vetting inconsistencies, they had been perceived to be

free of decisive fraud (see appendix 1 for detail on the COG‟s position) (Kamrava,

2010, p.410). The most potent symbol of this freedom was the reformist win in 1997,

with Khatami becoming President. Reformists also had success in municipal and

Majlis elections between Khatami‟s inauguration and 2003. In the context of these

events, previous accusations of fraud were less visible and/or less meaningful. This

process was further advanced when the COG decided to allow a reformist candidate

to run in the 2009 Presidential elections and by the historic openness of the 2009

election campaign illustrated by the four unique television debates by electoral

candidates (Tezcür, 2009, p.16). When expectations were not met and electoral

irregularities were so visible as to suggest the elections had been stolen, the

interpretative process deepened the legitimacy crisis already fermenting (Afshari,

2009, p.844). The loss of legitimacy is demonstrated by protestors‟ slogans: „death

to the dictator‟ (Sahliyeh, 2010, p.184). They were a challenge to the position of

Faqih, not just a call for Ahmadinejad‟s resignation or an election rerun.

The interpretative processes derived from factionalism and fraud not only created a

reason for rebellion, the loss of legitimacy, but also an attribution of opportunity. The

people believed success was likely because there was an „imagined community of

millions of robbed voters‟ which made them feel less isolated in their struggle (Kuntz

and Thompson, 2009, p.258). In the attribution of an opportunity it is not the actual

14

number of people who feel outraged that is important, but how many are imagined to

share those feelings. Polls conducted by World Public Opinion show a majority of

the public thought the elections free and fair (Kull et al., 2010, p.11).12 However,

crucially, Figure 4 also reveals that a majority of Mousavi supporters believed

Mousavi was going to win the election. It is not unreasonable to assume that these

supporters would believe a majority of the population would be outraged by the

results when he did not win. Sustained popular contention does not require that a

majority of the population be involved, so long as enough are involved to sustain the

belief in the possibility of success. After all, only 10% of the population took part in

the Islamic Revolution and less than 2% took part in the French revolution and the

overthrow of Soviet communism (Selbin, 2009, p.31).

Protests were further intensified by interpretative processes compromising

Khamenei‟s position. These processes were related to subsequent repressive

actions, journalists‟ corruption allegations, and Montazeri‟s death. The violent

repression allowed protestors to be martyred. This increased the perception of the

self-interestedness of the regime. Thus, the death of 27-year-old philosophy student

Neda Agha Soltan became an „icon of that permanent break with the regime‟

(Afshari, 2009, p.855).

Journalistic exposés alleging corruption, such as Mohsen Makhmalbaf‟s film,

impacted Ayatollah Khamenei‟s image of religiosity (Fischer, 2010, p.512). Similar

incidents were implicated in the French and Islamic Revolutions. For example, in

1977 the Iranian Writers Association organised ten nights of poetry reading that were

highly critical of the Shah and led to street demonstrations (Abrahamian, 2008,

p.158). In France thousands of cartoons and other artwork were produced which

were highly critical of the monarchy, and impacted the perceptions of the public

(Gretton, 1989).

Montazeri died on December 21st, seven days before Ashura in the month of

Muharram. This timing ensured that the story of Imam Hoseyn and Yazid would be

transposed onto Montazeri and Khamenei respectively, delegitimizing Khamenei

12 However, Ansari points to anomalies, and methodological and interpretative inconsistencies with

this polling data. Ansari, 2010, p.12.

15

(Fischer, 2010, p.500).13 At Montazeri‟s funeral and on Ashura, calls of „Mazlum‟

(wronged one) were heard. Traditionally, this term was reserved for Imam Hoseyn

(Fischer, 2010, p.502). The relationship between these events and the protests is

illustrated in Figure 3. This interpretative process was made more powerful by its

symbolic symmetry to Khomeini‟s struggle against the Shah which employed the

same story (Brumberg, 2001, p.73).

From the outset both the opposition and the regime have attempted to appropriate

religious symbolism, the story of Yazid and Hoseyn is just one example (Fischer,

2010, p.519). However, since the Islamic Revolution, religious symbolism has been

controlled by the state. This only changed after the 2009 election when the colour

green became the symbol of opposition to the regime, becoming incorporated into

the name of the new social movement, the Green Movement (GM). Green is a

symbol for Islam. By using it, the GM denied the establishment control of Islamic

symbolism. One did not have to be anti-Islamic to join opposition to the Islamic

Republic (Fischer, 2010, p.519). It also enabled the GM to use other Islamic

symbols, such as the Karbala Paradigm (social justice) (Fischer, 2010, p.513). In

this sense then, not only is the use of green an interpretative process, but it also

doubles as an appropriation of organisational space and routine collective identity

because Islam has become a part of the movement‟s identity, increasing the number

of potential supporters.

Cyberspace and the use of information and communication technologies were also

instrumental in making room for protest and the formation of a movement identity

(Haghighat and Mansouri, 2010). Even though the government managed to close

off traditional communication sources such as the newspapers and satellite

channels, these were circumvented by accessing the internet, a medium the

government finds much more difficult to control. It has the ability to choke off internet

speeds and block specific websites. However, despite slow internet speeds people

were uploading videos and photos, communicating through „Facebook, Twitter,

blogs, emails, online newsletters, Short Message Services (SMS) and Bluetooth‟ and

the widespread use of proxy servers prevents the government choking off access to

13 See footnote 4 for detail on this story

16

this information (Haghighat and Mansouri, 2010, p.30). Furthermore, the use of

Bluetooth technology allowed information to disseminate to a much broader sector of

society then traditional internet technologies because Iranian mobile users, who are

twice as numerous as internet users, are able to utilise the technology (Haghighat

and Mansouri, 2010, p.30). This ability to sidestep conventional methods of

communication, not only provided people with the space to organise, but enabled

them to build a collective identity because they could now successfully contest

establishment framing of their actions and goals (Haghighat and Mansouri, 2010,

p.33).

Nevertheless, it has become increasingly obvious that the internet is not the haven of

space that it was initially assumed to be (Fischer, 2010, p.518). The government

has not allowed protesters to use the internet freely. „Hacktivists‟ disrupted websites

of both sides, and the government used a name and shame internet campaign to

identify particular protesters (Haghighat and Mansouri, 2010, p.32). Also, the very

nature of the internet as a public sphere enabled the government to monitor

information about where and when protests would take place and who was involved,

providing them with the means to prepare counter-measures and arrest activists

(Morozov, 2009, p.12). Finally, a large proportion of the population was not using the

internet to gather information about the protests. The people who were using the

internet to find out what was going on were mostly outside of Iran and while they

were able to create international pressure to condemn the Iranian government

(Haghighat and Mansouri, 2010, p.31), there is a question over how much influence

they had domestically. Domestic internet users were generally already Mousavi

supporters (see Appendix 2), and thus inclined to protest (Kull et al., 2010, p.18).14

Therefore, by using the internet protestors received an inaccurate picture of the

amount of support for Mousavi, and the movement was not expanding its support

base.

The GM has also struggled to appropriate more tangible organisational structures.

The initial protests were a spontaneous outpouring of anger and frustration (Fischer,

2010, p.513). Such spontaneity led to a diverse number of goals within the social

14 Ansari (2010) makes the point that it is common for internet user to print off the dissident

information and circulate it through the community.

17

movement, the GM, evolving out of the protests. There is a particularly important

divide between followers and leaders. The GM leaders have been more circumspect

than the protestors in general, calling only for the annulment of election results

(Mather, 2010, p.510). However, the gap between the leadership and movement

may have narrowed with the publication of the GM Charter on June 15th 2010. This

charter aims to increase „coordination and sympathy and to strengthen a common

identity within the Green Movement‟ and offers evidence that Mousavi may be

becoming a stronger advocate for democracy (Mousavi, 2010, as cited in The Green

Voice of Freedom, 2010). However, the evidence is far from definitive and Mousavi

has shown little further inclination for regime change despite continuing to call for

reform (Tait, 2010b).

The GM also failed to appropriate the organisational space of other dissenting

networks, such as ethnic organisations and, more importantly, workers unions. The

importance of workers to opposition movements was demonstrated by the differing

success of the 1963 riots and the Islamic Revolution (Parsa, 2009b, p.163).15 Thus,

gaining the support of the working class is crucial if the GM is to be successful

(Maljoo, 2010). Unfortunately, independent, national labour unions have been

prohibited since the Islamic Revolution (Maljoo, 2010). It is only in the last few years

that the formation of organisations, like the Network of Iranian Labour Unions, has

begun in earnest (Maljoo, 2010). Yet, labour action remains isolated because these

networks operate underground without the permission of the state, making

communication difficult and the cost of action high (Maljoo, 2010). Thus, while

Figure 5 illustrated that a large number of workers actions and ethnic protests

occurred in 2010, they remain localised, scattered, and disconnected from the GM

(Maljoo, 2010).

Furthermore, it is unclear that their interests are best served by joining such a

coalition, despite suggestions that labour unions have begun allying with the GM.

Homayoun Pourzad (pseudonym), spokesperson for the Network of Iranian Labour

Unions, said in August of the GM „…our platform is not identical to his [Mousavi]‟

15 The 1963 riots were brutally crushed and workers did not participate at all; the opposition during the

Iranian Revolution succeeded and workers made a major contribution to that success.

18

(Homayoun Pourzad, 2010, as cited in Maljoo, 2010). This is despite the use of the

Karbala Paradigm by Mousavi and suggests the effectiveness of appropriating the

paradigm has been limited. The reason is that the GM is portrayed as a largely

middle class movement concentrated in „North Tehran‟ (Kamrava, 2010, p.409).16

The leaders were either proponents of Iran‟s economic liberalisation (Rafsanjani), or

appeared to ignore economic issues in pursuit of political reform (Khatami). Thus,

to the working class the GM leaders are analogous to the conservative

establishment (Maljoo, 2010). This suggests that the worsening economic climate

was not as significant a broad change process in the outbreak of post-election

protest as commentators, such as Mather (2010), suggest.

Along with the failure to appropriate organisational structures, individual protestors

now attribute a new threat. Although initially, due to the spontaneity of the action

and the hesitation of the government, protesters were able to appropriate space on

the streets to protest, once the choice was made to repress opposition it became life-

risking to protest. Protestors were beaten, put in jail, tortured, executed, and

assassinated by members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps‟ (IRGC) Al-

Qods (Jerusalem) force and the Basij (Tait, 2010a). Since Ashura, on major

anniversaries and religious holidays the government security apparatus has had a

heightened presence. This was particularly so on the anniversary of the 2009

elections, June 12th 2010 (Aljazeera, 2010).

In consequence, despite the interpretative and broad change processes that

occurred and led to popular contention, the GM has failed to realise its goals or

sustain popular contention. There have been no broad-based political protests since

December 2009 (see Figure 5), and no compromises from the government. Even the

unrest in the MENA that broke out in December 2010 did not significantly affect

internal Iranian politics. Two demonstrations in support of the rebellions in Tunisia

and Egypt did take place involving tens of thousands of people, one on February 14th

and one on February 20th, despite the Ministry of Interior‟s refusal to authorise those

16 Ansari (2010) rejects the label „North Tehran‟ as an absurdity because the term was used to

suggest the protestors were Shah Sympathisers. In reality North Tehran is home not only to the western-educated intellectuals and middle-class, but also to a „new elite‟, including members of the IRGC, who are becoming powerful individuals with a more modest educational background to the intellectuals.

19

protests (Esfandiari, 2011a; Tait, 2011a). However, those protests were ruthlessly

crushed with a couple of protesters shot dead and the house arrest of Mousavi and

Karrubi (Tait, 2011b; Esfandiari, 2011b). No further mass political protests have

taken place since.

Future Possibilities

Iran‟s political environment has been permanently marked by the protests. While

protests have died down for now, the GM may yet achieve its aims. There are two

significant features to consider: accelerated militarisation and ongoing factionalism.

Militarisation was occurring before the 2009 election due to the connection between

the neoconservatives in the Majlis and the IRGC, and the increasing domination of

the IRGC in the economy. However, this broad change process consolidated after

Ahmadinejad‟s election (Clinton, 2010, as cited in Mather, 2010, p.506). By crushing

the protests, Ahmadinejad became obligated to the IRGC (Kamrava, 2010, p.404).

Khamenei has also become increasingly reliant on the IRGC for stability due to his

delegitimisation in the wake of his actions (Safshekan and Sabet, 2010, p.557). This

has allowed the IRGC to interfere even further into domestic politics at the expense

of more democratic institutions, such as the Majlis (Kamrava, 2010, p.410-411).

They have also infiltrated those democratic institutions; currently all cabinet ministers

bar one are strongly connected to the IRGC (Safshekan and Sabet, 2010, p.553). In

consequence, Iran has moved a step toward a military dictatorship, albeit with a

democratic veneer. If Presidential candidates with IRGC ties, like Ahmadinejad,

continue to win the elections (whether through fraud, COG manipulation, or popular

consent) this process will deepen (Kamrava, 2010, p.410). In such a case, the GM‟s

goals of democratic reform are unlikely to be realised, because unlike the Shah‟s

army, the IRGC is ideologically motivated to protect the status quo (Ward, 2009).

Where the Shah‟s army allowed revolutionary protests to proceed, the IRGC will not

due to the potential threat they pose to the regime.

However, at the same time as the IRGC is externally strengthening, internal division

is apparently increasing. One ex-IRGC officer claims that up to a third of the force is

supportive of the GM (Stickler and O'Kane, 2010). It was the al-Qods force,

composed of Lebanese and Palestinians, not Iranians, who took the leading role

during the crackdown, acting as snipers like the one that shot Neda Soltan.

20

However, the Basij also did not hesitate to arrest, beat, and occasionally kill

protestors (Stickler and O'Kane, 2010). Furthermore, tension is increasing within the

guards because Ahmadinejad is replacing many experienced members with young

men with less knowledge of Islam and the Islamic Revolution (Ansari, 2010). If this

trend continues, then the GM may succeed. It would require the formation of a

coalition between the movement and the IRGC. This is unlikely at the moment

because individuals within the IRGC remain dependent upon the current regime

(Stickler and O'Kane, 2010). Yet it is imaginable in the future.

While the protests have died down, contention within the elite has not. The

reformists have not yet given up, despite their current impotence. The institutional

failings which led to factionalism have also not yet been resolved. Furthermore, the

conservatives and neoconservatives are vying for institutional power now that the

reformists have been neutralised (Yong and Worth, 2010). Since factional politics

seems unlikely to normalise, elite contention will continue and may once again

evolve into popular contention if the interaction of DOC processes becomes

favourable. This is possible if a coalition between the GM and the economically

significant sectors of society (Bazaar and workers) forms due to the continuing

inability of the factional system to resolve the political and economic problems

assailing society (Razavi, 2010, p.92). In that scenario the organisational space for

the GM will increase significantly, potentially overriding the threat attributed to state

repression. There are two possible outcomes: the neoconservatives and

conservatives negotiate with the reformists who regain access to the of power, or the

stability of the regime will be tested.

This does not mean the GM is finished. Since the protests failed to resolve the

original factional conflict, elite contention is ongoing. Furthermore, the economic

environment is worsening, a broad change process which may yet allow the

movement to appropriate organisational space from the workers‟ unions and the

Bazaar. If this happens the dominant forces within the regime may be forced to

negotiate with the other elite factions, or watch their regime collapse. This will

particularly be the case if militarisation, a broad change process which accelerated

after the 2009 election, increases tension within the IRGC to the point that a

significant proportion of the organisation begins collaborating with the GM.

21

Conclusion

Using the DOC it has been possible to understand the evolution of the 2009 post-

election protests. Their roots lie in the public resentment created during broad

change processes over the past two decades. These processes were primarily

political liberalisation and factionalism. The prolonged economic recovery and failure

to narrow the income gap may also have contributed.

These broad changes led to interpretative processes. On the surface political

liberalisation would appear to have a positive affect on society‟s interpretative

processes. It generates feelings of hope and freedom. However, when it is followed

by a subsequent crackdown, as it was in Iran, resentment is created from the ruins of

their expectations. This increases a perception of regime illegitimacy within society.

These feelings were enhanced by the failure of the elections to meet society‟s

expectations of freedom due to the overt nature of the fraud.

Factional realignment which increased the tension within the elite also became a

significant factor during the 2009 election campaign because the reformists began to

lose faith in their ability to change the system from within and prevented the regime

from developing a coherent set of policies with which to target society‟s ills. This

elite contention was then framed by opposition leaders as illegitimate.

Economic liberalisation was also ongoing at the time of the protests. While, this

liberalisation has contributed to a reduction in poverty, the high rates of

unemployment and inequality had not been affected. The lack of transparency and

corruption within the oil economy also led to a perception amongst the public that

their expectations were reasonable and therefore increased resentment among the

poor. However, the impact these emotions had on the protests is uncertain since

workers‟ protests have remained largely disconnected from the GM.

The resentment that had been created by these broad change processes was given

an outlet after the election because the electoral fraud provided the political

opportunity for opposition forces to protest. Such a visible instance of fraud not only

increased the perception of illegitimacy within the population, but increased the

perception that the rest of society shared the feelings of illegitimacy. This meant

22

people were more likely to perceive an opportunity of success because they thought

they would not be alone in their protests.

Interpretative processes also increased the popularity of the protests, once they had

begun. These processes were a result of actions and events like repression,

corruption allegations, and Montazeri‟s death. The GM was also adept in exploiting

Islamic symbolism, an interpretative process which the Islamic state had previously

controlled. The most important example of this is in their appropriation of the colour

green.

However, there was a major problem for the GM. The post-election protests began

almost in the absence of organisational space due to their spontaneity. When space

failed to be appropriated, protest subsided due to the attribution of threat from a

regime clearly ready to use relentless repression. Given this analysis, revolution,

seemingly a distinct possibility in June 2009 now looks highly unlikely. This is

despite the regional unrest which has so far led to the unseating of three dictators in

Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.

Aside from the immediate loss of life, there have been a couple of other significant

consequences from this period of popular contention. Firstly, relations between elite

factions have not yet normalised with the reformist leaders under house arrest.

Unless this elite contention is resolved the potential for popular contention will

remain. Secondly, the reliance of the regime on repression has accelerated a

process of militarisation that had begun prior to the 2009 election. This would

generally decrease the chances of opposition success. However, the success of the

IRGC has also increased tensions within the organisation. If these tensions reach

breaking point, then an opportunity may exist for the opposition to form a coalition

with defected IRGC elements, increasing the chances of successful protest and

therefore the likelihood of protests occurring. This will be particularly the case if

perceptions of a worsening economic environment and increasing insecurity in the

job market are exacerbated.

23

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Appendices

Appendix 1: The Islamic Republic of Iran: State structure (National Democratic

Institution, 2010).

28

Appendix 2: Who are Mousavi’s supporters (Kull et al., 2010, p.30)?

Mousavi’s Relative Strong Points of Support

Average % across polls

Age < age25 7points above >age45

Gender Men 5points above women

Education Tertiary education 19points above primary education

Urban/Rural Urban residents 11points above rural residents

Internet use Daily internet users 21points above complete non-users

29