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The Discriminant Validity of Symbolic Racism
Abstract
Forty years of research has established that symbolic racism strongly predicts white oppo-
sition to policies to help blacks. But the full effect of symbolic racism cannot be attributed
to antiblack bias because symbolic racism has a racial component and a conservative val-
ues component; to address this conflation, researchers have attempted to isolate the racial
component with statistical control. However, analyses of the 2012 American National Elec-
tion Studies Time Series Study suggested that even an extensive battery of control varia-
bles is not always sufficient for eliminating the conservative values component of symbolic
racism. Moreover, the post-statistical control effect of symbolic racism sometimes predict-
ed black opposition to policies designed to help blacks, even among a subsample of blacks
who consistently reported positive views about their racial group. These analyses chal-
lenge two core assumptions of symbolic racism research: that statistical control isolates the
racial component of symbolic racism, and that this racial component is antiblack animosity.
Word count (manuscript only): 6220
Blacks have struggled throughout US history against antiblack bias in forms such as slavery,
Jim Crow laws, violence, and separate and unequal schools. Explicit antiblack bias has be-
come less common over the past few decades, measureable in the steep decrease in old-
fashioned racism among whites (Valentino and Sears 2005: 678). But blacks still face bias
that can be measured in laboratory, field, and survey experiments (Sigall and Page 1971,
Pager et al. 2009, Kuklinski et al. 1997).
Experiments provide strong evidence that blacks face racial bias because causal in-
ference from an experiment is strong. For example, in response to newspaper employment
advertisements, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) submitted more than 4,000 resumes in
which applicants were assigned a popular name among whites or a popular name among
blacks; resumes with a popular name among whites generated 50 percent more callbacks
than resumes with a popular name among blacks, suggesting the presence of employment
discrimination against black applicants. Experiments such as these reduce the number of
plausible explanations for an observed effect, such as the possibility that variation in
callback frequency was due to variation in applicant qualifications or variation in resume
formatting.
Detecting antiblack bias in non-experimental surveys is more difficult because non-
experimental surveys lack random assignment and thus lack the same strong level of causal
inference that experiments provide. Non-experimental surveys testing for antiblack bias
have the additional issue of social desirability in which direct survey measures of antiblack
bias underestimate the percent of the population that is biased against blacks (Kuklinski et
al. 1997). Many researchers have attempted to assess antiblack bias with survey questions
measuring a concept referred to as racial resentment or symbolic racism, which Sears and
Henry (2007: 963) called "the most influential form of racial prejudice in American political
life since the civil rights era of the 1960s." Symbolic racism is "a new expression of preju-
dice that has developed in the United States...based on the belief that blacks violate key
American values, particularly the idea of individualism" (Henry and Sears 2008: 111). Re-
search has established that symbolic racism predicts white opposition to policies designed
to help blacks (Tarman and Sears 2005), white opposition to black political candidates such
as Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential election (Ford et al. 2010), white support for pu-
nitive criminal punishment policies that negatively affect blacks at a disproportionate rate
(Green et al. 2006), and ostensibly non-racial behavior such as owning a gun (O'Brein et al.
2013).
But symbolic racism is not a pure measure of antiblack bias: symbolic racism is "the
conjunction of prejudice and values" (Kinder 1986: 156) that "[melds] ordinary conserva-
tism with some racial animosity" (Valentino and Sears 2005: 674); this conflation can be
seen in the following item that has been used with other items to measure symbolic racism:
It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if
blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as
whites.
Agreement with the above statement cannot be interpreted as revelation of antiblack bias
because someone who agreed with that statement might also agree that poor whites who
try harder could be just as well off as middle-class whites. Sniderman and Tetlock (1986:
181) noted that high symbolic racism scores can indicate pure racism or pure conservatism;
subsequent research involving factor analyses provided evidence for this conflation, indi-
cating that "symbolic racism is made up about equally of racial prejudice and general con-
servatism" (Sears and Henry 2003: 271).
Because symbolic racism is an impure measure, the effect of symbolic racism cannot
be assigned to antiblack bias without first eliminating the conservative values component
of symbolic racism. Researchers often use statistical control to attempt to eliminate the
conservative values component of symbolic racism: "...any analyses done with measures of
symbolic racism should be done controlling for political conservatism in order to minimize
the likelihood of spurious associations being misdiagnosed as effects of racism" (Pasek et al.
2009: 949). The typical symbolic racism research design has thus been to place symbolic
racism into a regression with measures of conservatism and then to interpret the residual
effect of symbolic racism as antiblack bias (e.g., Pasek et al. 2009; Rabinowitz et al. 2009;
Sears et al. 1997; Valentino and Sears 2005).
But there is no direct way for observational research to test whether a particular set
of control variables eliminates the conservative values component of symbolic racism: for
instance, the symbolic racism statement cited earlier might tap a generalized conservative
belief that hard work causes success, but if this particular belief does not sufficiently corre-
late with statistical controls included in a model, then that model will overestimate the ra-
cial component of symbolic racism and thus foster incorrect inferences about the presence
and/or strength of antiblack bias.
The Discriminant Validity of Symbolic Racism: Dependent Variables
Even though common or boutique measures of conservative values might not completely
nullify the conservative values component of symbolic racism, these measures might suffi-
ciently dilute the conservative values component enough so that the residual effect of sym-
bolic racism approximates the effect of symbolic racism's racial component. One way to as-
sess whether statistical control in a particular regression sufficiently dilutes the conserva-
tive values component of symbolic racism is to assess whether residual symbolic racism
correlates with dependent variables that tap conservatism but have no racial component:
for instance, if symbolic racism in the presence of statistical control were to predict the be-
lief that global warming is mostly due to natural causes, then that would be strong evidence
that statistical control did not sufficiently dilute symbolic racism's conservative component,
given that there is no apparent reason why antiblack bias should influence global warming
beliefs.
Rabinowitz et al. (2009) presented evidence from two studies for symbolic racism's
discriminant validity. Based on a sample of 77 white college students, the first study found
that the post-statistical control effect of symbolic racism positively correlated with opposi-
tion to government agencies setting aside contracts for businesses owned by blacks but did
not correlate with opposition to government agencies setting aside contracts for business-
es owned by women. The second study presented evidence from the 1990 and 2000 Amer-
ican National Election Studies (ANES) Time Series Studies that was largely consistent with
an interpretation of the residual effect of symbolic racism as antiblack bias: in the 1990 da-
ta, symbolic racism positively correlated with white opposition to preferential hiring and
promotion for blacks, and with white support for federal spending on Social Security, but
did not correlate with white opposition to federal spending on food stamps or with white
opposition to federal spending on aid to the homeless; in the 2000 data, symbolic racism
positively correlated with white opposition to preferential hiring and promotion for blacks,
white opposition to compulsory affirmative action hiring programs for private companies
that discriminated against blacks, white opposition to federal spending on food stamps, and
white support for federal spending on Social Security, but did not correlate with white op-
position to federal spending on aid to the poor.
Rabinowitz et al. (2009) noted that these results were consistent with a racial inter-
pretation: symbolic racism predicted white opposition to policies explicitly targeted at im-
proving outcomes for blacks, did not predict white opposition to policies not explicitly tar-
geted at improving outcomes for blacks, and predicted white support for a Social Security
program that Winter (2006) argued has been racialized as benefitting whites. But the Rab-
inowitz et al. (2009) analysis used only a small and ambiguous collection of dependent var-
iables, given that it would have been possible to construe as racialized each non-racial de-
pendent variable, such as federal spending on food stamps, the homeless, and the poor.
Kinder and Sanders (1996) provided another test of symbolic racism's discriminant
validity by predicting levels of dependent variables without an obvious racial dimension; in
regressions on 1986 and 1992 ANES data that included statistical control for social back-
ground, race of the interviewer, support for limited government, and attitudes about equal
opportunity (p. 121), symbolic racism correlated at a statistically significant level with atti-
tudes about family leave and childcare policies, parental consent and spousal notification
for abortion, gays in the military, gay adoption, military spending, military interventions in
Central America, and the U.S. stance toward the Soviet Union (p. 122). Kinder and Sanders
proposed that "[the effects of symbolic racism on these foreign policy attitudes] suggest,
once again, that resentment toward blacks is part of a broader system of beliefs and feel-
ings about social difference in general" (1996: 124). But an alternate explanation is that the
residual correlation of symbolic racism to these non-racial dependent variables resulted
from a research design in which statistical control did not sufficiently dilute the conserva-
tive values component of symbolic racism. Study 1 of the present manuscript therefore re-
ports a broader and more rigorous test of the discriminant validity of symbolic racism: the
test was broader in the sense that the test used a larger selection of non-racial dependent
variables, and the test was more rigorous in the sense that a larger collection of boutique
conservative values variables were used for statistical control.
Study 1
Responses from the ANES 2012 Time Series Study were analyzed. Data were weighted with
the Stata 11 command svyset [pweight=weight_full], strata(strata_full); the subpop option
was used for the 3,495 non-Hispanic white respondents who completed the pre- and post-
election surveys. Cases with missing data on a model variable were listwise deleted from
that model. The ANES 2012 Time Series Study was conducted for some respondents face-
to-face and other respondents online, between September 8, 2012, and January 24, 2013.
Response rates were 38 percent (face-to-face) and 2 percent (online) for the pre-election
survey; re-interview rates were 94 percent (face-to-face) and 93 percent (online) for the
post-election survey. The population of interest was adult U.S. citizens.
Symbolic racism
Respondents were presented four symbolic racism items with options of agree strongly,
agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, and disagree strongly:
1. Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked
their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
2. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it diffi-
cult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
3. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
4. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try
harder they could be just as well off as whites.
Each item was recoded to range from +2 for the option reflecting the highest level of sym-
bolic racism to -2 for the option reflecting the lowest level of symbolic racism: agree re-
sponses for items 1 and 4 and disagree responses for items 2 and 3 were coded as reflect-
ing higher levels of symbolic racism. Refusals were coded as missing data, and "don't know"
responses were coded as a response of neither agree nor disagree. Summation of the items
produced a symbolic racism scale that ranged from -8 to +8.
Non-racial dependent variables
Sixty-eight non-racial dependent variables were selected from the 2012 ANES Time Series
Study; variables were selected that were expected to correlate with conservatism but were
not explicitly racial or did not appear to reflect racialized topics; sample racialized issues
included capital punishment and immigration; also avoided were policies closely connected
with President Obama, such as health care reform (Knowles et al. 2010; Tesler 2012). The
non-racial dependent variables included items across 12 categories: gay rights, abortion,
women, the environment, fiscal policy, campaign finance regulations, the military, the War
on Terror, patriotism, religion, Iran, and China. Dependent variables were coded so that
higher values positively correlated with conservatism in a model that had controls only for
demographics. Dependent variable scales were created for seven sets of related variables
in which Cronbach's alpha (Cronbach 1951) was at least 0.60: gay rights, abortion, women,
the environment, fiscal policy, patriotism, and religion. See Appendix 1 for a description of
the measurement and coding of the non-racial dependent variables.
Control variables
The first set of models included controls for demographic characteristics of sex, marital sta-
tus, age, education level, family income, and employment status; the second set of models
also included a small set of controls for conservatism: Democratic Party membership, Re-
publican Party membership, self-placement on a liberal-conservative continuum, and a sin-
gle item measuring belief in self-reliance; the third set of models included the previous two
sets of controls plus boutique conservative values controls: a scale of four items measuring
attitudes about limited government, a scale of four items measuring moral traditionalism, a
scale of four items measuring authoritarianism, and a scale of six items measuring egalitar-
ianism. See Appendix 1 for a description of the measurement and coding of the control var-
iables.
Results
Models with a dichotomous dependent variable were estimated with logit; other models
were estimated with ordinary least squares regression. Each non-dichotomous model de-
pendent, explanatory, and control variable was standardized so that its mean and standard
deviation were respectively 0 and 1 based on sample respondents identified as white and
non-Hispanic. Table 1 presents three sets of results for each non-racial dependent variable:
the first numeric column presents the coefficient and standard error for the symbolic rac-
ism variable based on regressions that include controls only for demographics; the second
numeric column presents the coefficient and standard error for the symbolic racism varia-
ble based on regressions that include controls only for demographics, partisanship, ideolo-
gy, and belief in self-reliance; the third numeric column presents the coefficient and stand-
ard error for the symbolic racism variable based on regressions that include demographic
controls, partisanship and ideology controls, and all boutique conservative values controls.
The bottom number in each cell indicates the number of observations in the regression.
[Table 1 about here]
The first numeric column of Table 1 indicates that symbolic racism positively corre-
lated with 63 of the 68 non-racial dependent variables and with each of the seven depend-
ent variable scales with a two-tailed p-value of 0.05 or lower when models included con-
trols only for demographics. Given that the dependent variables were not explicitly racial
and did not appear racialized, these results corroborate research indicating that symbolic
racism is not a pure measure of antiblack bias.
The second numeric column of Table 1 represents a test whether the conservative
values component of symbolic racism can be nullified by the small set of controls so that
the residual effect of symbolic racism represents only the racial component of symbolic
racism. The small set of controls did sufficiently dilute the influence of the symbolic racism
variable in 23 of 63 non-racial dependent variables and two of the seven dependent varia-
ble scales for which the symbolic racism coefficient reached statistical significance in the
first numeric column, but positive and statistically significant coefficients for the influence
of symbolic racism on attitudes about gays and lesbians shown in rows 1 to 6 indicate that
the set of controls for partisanship, ideology, and belief in self-reliance did not sufficiently
dilute the conservative values component of symbolic racism for all dependent variables.
Each statistically significant coefficient from the first numeric column fell closer to zero in
the second numeric column, often substantially so, providing evidence that the small set of
controls did dilute the conservative values component of symbolic racism; however, it ap-
pears that a small set of controls does not permit researchers to interpret the residual ef-
fect of symbolic racism as antiblack bias, unless the researcher is willing to argue that an-
tiblack bias informs beliefs about gays and lesbians, women, global warming, and relations
with Iran and China.
It might be suggested that the residual effect of symbolic racism reflects bias against
marginalized groups, given that many of the rows in the second numeric column that have
statistically significant coefficients reflect responses opposing certain rights for gays and
lesbians, opposing certain rights for women, supporting modern sexism views, supporting
hawkish policy toward Iran, or perceiving China as a threat; but this alternate explanation
is not available for the positive correlation of symbolic racism to skepticism about global
warming and reluctance to support the environment when faced with a tradeoff. The more
straightforward interpretation is that the results from the second numeric column suggest
that a small set of controls often does not sufficiently nullify the conservative values com-
ponent of symbolic racism; therefore, the residual effect of symbolic racism in models with
only a small set of controls should not be interpreted as reflecting only the racial compo-
nent of symbolic racism.
The third numeric column of Table 1 represents a test whether an extensive set of
boutique conservative values controls sufficiently nullifies the conservative values compo-
nent of symbolic racism. This set of controls did sufficiently nullify the non-racial compo-
nent of symbolic racism for items 1 to 6 about attitudes towards gays and lesbians and for
items 28 to 34 about the environment; but the full set of controls did not sufficiently nullify
the conservative values component of symbolic racism for many dependent variables: the
residual effect of symbolic racism positively correlated on select dependent variables with
modern sexism (21, 23, 25, and 26), with deficit reduction (36, 40, 41, 42), with support for
the military and hawkish terrorism policies (49, 50, 54, 55), with patriotism (56, 58, 59),
with hawkish policy toward Iran (71, 72, 73), and with the perception that China is a threat
to the United States (74 and 75); in total, symbolic racism positively correlated at a statisti-
cally significant level with 25 of the 68 dependent variables and with two of the seven de-
pendent variable scales.
For the third numeric column, symbolic racism negatively correlated at a statistical-
ly significant level with 15 of the 68 dependent variables and with two of the seven de-
pendent variable scales. For many of these dependent variables, such as the abortion items,
it makes no sense to interpret the residual effect of symbolic racism as conservatism, since
it would not be expected for higher levels of conservatism to associate with lower levels of
support for prolife positions; it might make more sense to interpret negative statistically
significant coefficients for the abortion items as indicating an association of antiblack atti-
tudes with prochoice policy preferences. Generally, a coefficient that is positive and statis-
tically significant in the first numeric column and negative and statistically significant in
the third numeric column might indicate a dependent variable for which the two compo-
nents of symbolic racism have opposite correlations: for instance, for item 62, the con-
servative values component of symbolic racism might positively correlate with more fre-
quent prayer, and the racial component might negatively correlate with more frequent
prayer; then, for the first numeric column, the strength of the positive correlation out-
weighs the strength of the negative correlation, producing an overall positive correlation;
but in the third numeric column, the strength of the positive correlation is diluted by the
statistical control so that the strength of the negative correlation outweighs the strength of
the positive correlation, producing an overall negative correlation. If that is the case, then it
would be appropriate to credit statistical control for nullifying the conservative values
component of symbolic racism in these instances of negative statistically significant coeffi-
cients.
There appear to be two major takeaways from the results presented in Table 1. First,
it appears that a small set of control variables in this case, partisanship, ideology, and be-
lief in self-reliance often does not dilute the conservative values component of symbolic
racism enough to permit interpreting the residual effect of symbolic racism as antiblack
bias; this means that care should be taken when interpreting symbolic racism research that
lacks an extensive battery of conservative values controls. Second, even an extensive bat-
tery of conservative values control variables is not always sufficient to permit interpreting
the residual effect of symbolic racism as antiblack bias.
The Discriminant Validity of Symbolic Racism: Samples
The motivation for Study 1 was that symbolic racism's value as a survey measure tapping
race-based sentiment depends on the ability of researchers to isolate the racial component
of symbolic racism; the motivation for Study 2 is that symbolic racism's value as a survey
measure also depends on the ability of researchers to identify the nature of this racial com-
ponent. Research that has interpreted the effect of symbolic racism as reflecting the racial
component of symbolic racism has not been consistent in describing the nature of this ra-
cial component:
"[t]he mixture of the two, the blending of racist sentiment and such treasured values
as individualism and self-reliance, we call 'symbolic racism'" (Kinder 1986: 152,
emphasis added);
"...symbolic racism is conceptualized today as mostly expressing sincere beliefs,
melding ordinary conservatism with some racial animosity, rather than hypocritical
efforts to hide a deeper and pure racism." (Valentino and Sears 2005: 674, emphasis
added);
"...the results reported here suggest that much of the variance that explains opposi-
tion to explicitly racially targeted programs is due to antiblack antipathy blended
with perceptions of value violation..." (Rabinowitz et al. 2009: 825, emphasis added).
"[t]he theory, then, specifies that symbolic racism stems from some combination of
antiblack affect and traditional values (most notably individualism)" (Sears and
Henry 2003: 260, emphasis added).
"The finding that [symbolic racism] predicts attitudes toward affirmative action
more strongly than attitudes toward food stamps or aid to the poor is consistent
with the contention that symbolic racism is tapping some sort of race-based senti-
ment" (Rabinowitz et al. 2009: 818, emphasis added).
Inferences reflected in the language of "racist sentiment" and "racial animosity" are strong-
er than inferences reflected in the language of "antiblack affect" and "some sort of race-
based sentiment," so, even if the racial component of symbolic racism is isolated, it is still
necessary to cabin the interpretation of this racial component somewhere between racial
hatred and ingroup favoritism. Moore (2012) and Somersby (2012) suggested that the in-
terpretation of antiblack measures can potentially be cabined by observing black responses
to antiblack measures: the presumption is that antiblack measures lack validity if the
measures classify a large percentage of blacks as antiblack. This logic can be extended to a
test of symbolic racism's discriminant validity in terms of samples: if the post-statistical
control effect of symbolic racism reflects racist sentiment or antiblack animosity, symbolic
racism should have no effect among a sample of persons who lack racist sentiment and an-
tiblack animosity.
Several studies have reported the performance of symbolic racism measures among
black samples. Bobo and Johnson (2004) found that racial resentment positively correlated
with black support for capital punishment and with black support for harsher punishments
for possession and distribution of crack cocaine compared to possession and distribution of
powdered cocaine; but the models controlled for conservative values only with a variable
measuring self-placement on a 5-point liberal-conservative continuum. Buckler et al. (2009)
controlled for conservative values using self-placement on a 7-point liberal-conservative
continuum and scales for authoritarianism and egalitarianism: symbolic racism predicted
black support for addressing crime by catching, convicting, and punishing criminals rather
than by addressing the social problems that cause crime. But Johnson (2008) did not find a
correlation between racial resentment and scores on a punativeness index among a sample
of 649 blacks. Studying non-punitive policies, Orey et al. (2012) surveyed black college stu-
dents and found that racial resentment negatively correlated with support for slavery rep-
arations, support for federal spending on welfare, and support for policies designed to help
minorities. For candidate choice, Tesler and Sears (2010) reported that higher levels of ra-
cial resentment correlated with a lower probability of a black vote for Barack Obama in the
2008 Democratic primaries.
Each study described above lacked a large representative sample of blacks, a wide
range of dependent variables, and/or a broad battery of conservative values controls that
can help dilute the conservative values component of symbolic racism. Each of these three
elements were present in the 2012 ANES Time Series Study used in Study 2 below.
Study 2
Responses from the ANES 2012 Time Series Study were analyzed. Data were weighted with
the Stata 11 command svyset [pweight=weight_full], strata(strata_full); the subpop option
was used for the three samples described below. Cases with missing data on a model varia-
ble were listwise deleted from that model.
Samples
Three samples were used in Study 2. The first sample consisted of the 3,495 non-Hispanic
white respondents who completed the pre- and post-election surveys; the second sample
consisted of the 1,016 non-Hispanic black respondents who completed the pre- and post-
election surveys; the third sample consisted of the 424 non-Hispanic black respondents
who completed the pre- and post-election surveys and who rated blacks at least as posi-
tively as whites on a 0-to-100 feeling thermometer, who rated blacks at least as positively
as whites on a 1-to-7 stereotype scale for intelligence, who rated blacks at least as positive-
ly as whites on a 1-to-7 stereotype scale for being hardworking, who reported that their life
is affected by what happens to blacks, who reported feeling sympathy for blacks at least
some of the time, and who reported feeling admiration for blacks at least some of the time.
See Appendix 1 for further description of the measurement of variables used to construct
the restricted black sample.
Racial dependent variables
Six racial dependent variables were analyzed: the first five dependent variables respective-
ly measured attitudes about black hiring and promotion preferences, affirmative action in
universities, affirmative action in the workplace, federal oversight to ensure fair treatment
in jobs for blacks, and federal aid to blacks; the sixth dependent variable consisted of a
scale constructed from the first five racial dependent variables described above. See Ap-
pendix 1 for a description of the measurement and coding of the racial dependent variables.
Results
Models were estimated with ordinary least squares regression. Each non-dichotomous
model dependent, explanatory, and control variable was standardized so that its mean and
standard deviation were respectively 0 and 1 based on the entire sample of respondents.
Table 2 presents three sets of results for each racial dependent variable: the first numeric
column presents coefficients and standard errors for the regression on the subpopulation
of non-Hispanic whites; the second numeric column presents coefficients and standard er-
rors for the regression on the subpopulation of non-Hispanic blacks; and the third numeric
column presents coefficients and standard errors for the regression on the subpopulation
of non-Hispanic blacks who held consistent and positive views of their racial group as de-
scribed above. For both black samples, one stratum did not contain a subpopulation mem-
ber and was omitted in regression results.
[Table 2 about here]
The first numeric column of Table 2 indicates that, for non-Hispanic whites, symbol-
ic racism positively correlated with all five dependent variables and the dependent variable
scale with a two-tailed p-value of 0.05 or lower when models contained control variables
for demographics, partisanship, ideology, and the full battery of conservative values con-
trols. The second numeric column of Table 2 indicates that, for non-Hispanic blacks, sym-
bolic racism positively correlated with four of five dependent variables and the dependent
variable scale with a two-tailed p-value of 0.05 or lower when models contained control
variables for demographics, partisanship, ideology, and the full battery of conservative val-
ues controls. The third numeric column of Table 2 indicates that, for the subpopulation of
non-Hispanic blacks who held consistently positive views of their racial group, symbolic
racism positively correlated with two of five dependent variables and the dependent varia-
ble scale with a two-tailed p-value of 0.05 or lower, when models contained control varia-
bles for demographics, partisanship, ideology, and the full battery of conservative values
controls.
Results in Table 2 for the samples of non-Hispanic blacks present a possible avenue
by which to cabin the interpretation of symbolic racism: the residual effect of symbolic rac-
ism cannot be assigned to "racist sentiment" (Kinder 1986: 152) or to "racial animosity"
(Valentino and Sears 2005: 674) unless those terms are also used to describe the residual
effect of symbolic racism among these samples of non-Hispanic blacks, or unless research
indicates a way to differentiate the meaning and nature of symbolic racism between black
and white respondents. Study 3 reported below represents an effort to assess such possible
variation in the meaning and nature of symbolic racism among blacks and whites.
Possible Antecedents of Symbolic Racism
Tesler and Sears (2010) presented an attempt to assess such variation in the meaning and
nature of symbolic racism among different racial and ethnic groups; the authors presented
results from the 2008 ANES Time Series Study indicating that symbolic racism correlated
among whites but not among blacks with conservative values such as moral traditionalism
and authoritarianism or self-reported ideological conservatism, that education had a larger
correlation with symbolic racism among blacks than among whites, and that antiblack af-
fect had a smaller correlation with symbolic racism among blacks than among whites (p.
99). Tesler and Sears (2010) also reported results of an unweighted group consciousness
model to explain the origins of symbolic racism among black respondents to the 2004 Na-
tional Politics Study (p. 101), and provided evidence that Barack Obama gained more sup-
port over time in the 2008 Democratic primaries from whites low in racial resentment than
from whites high in racial resentment but gained support uniformly from blacks at all lev-
els of racial resentment (p. 101-104). Tesler and Sears suggested such trends can be better
understood if high levels of racial resentment are interpreted differently for blacks than for
whites: "reflecting weak racial solidarity [among blacks] more than racial animosity" (p.
104). Study 3 below reports a similar analysis of data from three subsamples in the 2012
ANES Time Series Study and of weighted data from respondents to the 2004 National Poli-
tics Study.
Study 3
Table 3 presents coefficients and standard errors for a regression predicting symbolic rac-
ism for the full sample of non-Hispanic whites, the full sample of non-Hispanic blacks, and
the restricted sample of non-Hispanic blacks. Models use the same variables from Study 2,
but with three additional variables: the difference between 0-to-100 feeling thermometer
ratings for whites and blacks, the difference between 1-to-7 "lazy" stereotype ratings for
whites and blacks, and the difference between 1-to-7 "unintelligent" stereotype ratings for
whites and blacks; each of these variables was coded so that higher values represent more
positive views of whites relative to blacks, and each of these variables were standardized
so that their mean and standard deviation were respectively 0 and 1 for the entire sample.
[Table 3 about here]
Results in Table 3 did not exactly match results in the Tesler and Sears (2010) anal-
ysis of 2008 ANES Time Series Study data. In the 2012 ANES data, symbolic racism corre-
lated for blacks and for whites with self-reported ideological conservatism and authoritari-
anism, along with an egalitarianism variable that was not included in the Tesler and Sears
(2010) analysis; moreover, among blacks, education did not have a statistically significant
correlation with symbolic racism; and antiblack affect, as measured with relative ratings on
the feeling thermometers, appeared to be as strong of a predictor for blacks as for whites.
Coefficients for limited government and for moral traditionalism reached statistical signifi-
cance among whites but not among blacks, which might due to sample size or to symbolic
racism being "more highly crystallized" (Tesler and Sears 2010: 101) among whites than
blacks; statistical significance tests at the 0.05 level for a two-tailed test indicated that the
coefficient for moral traditionalism but not the coefficient for limited government differed
between blacks and whites; coefficients differed at the 0.05 level for a two-tailed test only
for the lazy stereotype ratings, marital status, age group, and moral traditionalism.
Table 4 presents coefficients and standard errors from a regression predicting sym-
bolic racism for a weighted sample of non-Hispanic whites and a weighted sample of non-
Hispanic blacks, based on responses to the 2004 National Politics Study (Jackson et al.
2004); the symbolic racism scale contained a slightly different battery of variables than in
the 2012 ANES, due to the lack of inclusion of all four symbolic racism items in the 2004
NPS. Model specifications were designed to reflect the model specification in Table 5.3 of
Tesler and Sears (2010: 101). See Appendix 2 for detail on variable coding. The 2004 NPS
was fielded from September 3, 2004, to February 25, 2005, with a computer-assisted tele-
phone interview technique; response rates were 34 and 30 percent for whites and blacks,
respectively.
[Table 4 about here]
Only a few differences between blacks and whites emerge in Table 4: the influence
of conservatism and perceptions of black-white work ethics were both statistically signifi-
cant and in the same direction, but were of a higher magnitude for whites and blacks re-
spectively; moreover, the negative statistically significant coefficient for blacks on the per-
ception of black-white competition variable indicates lower levels of symbolic racism for
blacks who perceive more competition between blacks and whites, but the non-statistically
significant coefficient for whites indicates little to no effect on symbolic racism for whites
who perceive more competition between blacks and whites.
For the predictors of symbolic racism, Tables 3 and 4 indicate many similarities be-
tween blacks and whites, and a few important differences. These differences may be mean-
ingful enough to support the Tesler and Sears (2010) claim that "racial resentment has an
entirely different meaning for African Americans" (p. 101), but Table 3 and 4 results for
blacks and whites and the differences between them do not appear to require the inter-
pretation that symbolic racism among whites reflects harsher racial views than symbolic
racism among blacks; it is possible to speculate that symbolic racism should reflect harsher
racial views among whites than among blacks, but support for this speculation appears to
be absent in the results presented in Tables 3 and 4.
General Discussion
Symbolic racism is an impure measure "the conjunction of prejudice and values" (Kinder
1986: 156) so symbolic racism cannot be interpreted as reflecting antiblack bias without
first nullifying the conservative values component of symbolic racism. Some studies have
used "negative arguments" (Sniderman and Tetlock 1986: 146) to claim that statistical con-
trol isolates symbolic racism's conservative values component:
A third critique is that symbolic racism is "confounded" with
ideological conservatism and so does not cleanly assess the
unique effects of racism. Ours would seem to be quite persua-
sive data against that view: controls on ideology do not weaken
the effects of symbolic racism on policy references [sic], and
ideology itself has generally nonsignificant effects; symbolic
racism adds substantial unique explanatory variance even after
ideology and all other nonracial attitudes have been consid-
ered; and ideology is not a strong determinant of symbolic rac-
ism (Sears et al. 1997: 47, table references omitted).
But the studies reported in this manuscript invite reconsideration of this common interpre-
tation of the residual effect of symbolic racism. Study 1 indicated that a small set of ideolog-
ical controls often did not eliminate the positive correlation between symbolic racism and
conservative attitudes about gays and lesbians, women, global warming, and the military:
the lack of an obvious connection of these attitudes to race suggests that the post-statistical
control effect of symbolic racism tapped conservative values and thus did not "cleanly as-
sess the unique effects of racism," with an emphasis on "cleanly." Study 1 did find that an
extensive set of ideological controls was often sufficient for eliminating the positive corre-
lation between symbolic racism and conservative attitudes on non-racial dependent varia-
bles, but a few positive correlations retained statistical significance, suggesting caution for
researchers assigning the residual effect of symbolism racism to antiblack bias.
Study 2 indicated that ideological controls often failed to eliminate the correlation
between symbolic racism and black opposition to policies designed to benefit blacks; given
that this result held even when the sample of blacks was restricted to a subsample of blacks
who reported views of blacks that were at least as favorable as their views of whites, this
suggests that the post-statistical control effect of symbolic racism did not "cleanly assess
the unique effects of racism," with an emphasis on "racism." Study 3 examined predictors of
symbolic racism among blacks and whites but did not produce evidence that requires as-
signing the post-statistical control effect of symbolic racism to "racist sentiment" or "an-
tiblack animosity" among whites but not among blacks. It is likely that symbolic racism ag-
gregates heterogeneous attitudes among whites, blacks, and other racial or ethnic groups:
racial hatred among some members of these groups, racial distance among other members
of these groups, and ingroup favoritism among other members of these groups; if this is the
case, then it might be misleading or overly simplistic to assign only one interpretation to
the residual effect of symbolic racism.
None of the above analyses call into question the claim that racial resentment con-
tributes to white opposition to policies to help blacks or the claim that some Americans
think that blacks violate traditional values such as individualism. But the analyses did call
into question two core assumptions of symbolic racism research, namely, that statistical
control isolates the racial component of symbolic racism and that this racial component can
be accurately characterized as racist sentiment or antiblack animosity. The analyses pre-
sented above also provide support for the Moore (2012) and Somersby (2012) cautions in
assigning interpretations to the performance of measures of antiblack bias before assessing
the performance of these measures among blacks themselves. Researchers have more lati-
tude in assigning harsher interpretations to white racial attitudes when researchers con-
sider only white attitudes; but researchers must offer a more generalized interpretation of
attitudes when researchers also consider black attitudes about blacks, or, more generally,
attitudes of and about more than one racial group.
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Table 1. The influence of symbolic racism on white opposition to non-racial policies
Demographic Controls Only
Small Set of Controls
Full Set of Controls
1 Oppose laws against gay job discrimination
0.24 (0.02) 3068
0.10 (0.02) 3053
-0.01 (0.02) 3037
2 Oppose letting gays serve in the military
0.22 (0.02) 3078
0.10 (0.02) 3063
0.01 (0.02) 3047
3 Gays should not be permitted to marry
0.32 (0.02) 3103
0.14 (0.02) 3087
0.02 (0.02) 3070
4 Gays should not be allowed to adopt [0/1]
0.57 (0.06) 3069
0.26 (0.07) 3055
0.00 (0.08) 3039
5 Negative ratings on a gay and lesbian feeling thermometer
0.25 (0.02) 3096
0.12 (0.02) 3082
0.01 (0.03) 3067
6 SCALE [1-5]: Gay rights 0.31
(0.02) 3101
0.13 (0.02) 3085
0.01 (0.02) 3068
7 Four-part ANES abortion atti-tudes item
0.15 (0.02) 3109
-0.03 (0.02) 3092
-0.12 (0.02) 3075
8 Oppose abortion to save wom-an's life
0.07 (0.02) 3088
-0.05 (0.03) 3074
-0.14 (0.03) 3062
9 Oppose abortion b/c rape 0.09
(0.02) 3097
-0.08 (0.03) 3082
-0.15 (0.03) 3070
10 Oppose abortion b/c birth de-fect
0.12 (0.02) 3091
-0.05 (0.03) 3076
-0.12 (0.03) 3064
11 Oppose abortion b/c incest 0.16
(0.02) 3081
0.01 (0.03) 3066
-0.06 (0.03) 3054
12 Oppose abortion b/c woman's health
0.19 (0.02) 3095
0.03 (0.02) 3080
-0.04 (0.03) 3068
13 Oppose abortion b/c financial concerns
0.26 (0.02) 3095
0.10 (0.02) 3081
0.04 (0.02) 3070
14 Oppose abortion b/c fetal sex selection
0.19 (0.03)
0.10 (0.03)
0.05 (0.03)
3093 3079 3067
15 Oppose abortion b/c woman's choice
0.22 (0.02) 3091
0.03 (0.02) 3077
-0.06 (0.02) 3065
16 SCALE [7-15]: abortion 0.21
(0.02) 3102
0.01 (0.02) 3087
-0.09 (0.02) 3075
17 Negative ratings on a feminist feeling thermometer
0.30 (0.02) 3083
0.15 (0.02) 3068
0.06 (0.03) 3053
18 Harder for working mom to bond w/ child
0.10 (0.02) 3110
0.08 (0.03) 3092
0.05 (0.03) 3077
19 Better if man works, woman cares for home
0.17 (0.02) 3098
0.10 (0.03) 3080
0.04 (0.03) 3067
20 Bad if woman president in next 20 years
0.25 (0.02) 3091
0.12 (0.02) 3076
0.02 (0.03) 3060
21 Modern sexism: discrimination a problem
0.29 (0.03) 3105
0.19 (0.03) 3089
0.10 (0.03) 3073
22 Modern sexism: media should pay less attention
0.25 (0.02) 3091
0.12 (0.03) 3075
0.01 (0.03) 3062
23 Modern sexism: women seek special favors
0.28 (0.02) 3067
0.21 (0.03) 3053
0.10 (0.03) 3037
24 Modern sexism: work discrimi-nation
0.06 (0.03) 3072
0.01 (0.03) 3058
-0.03 (0.03) 3044
25 Modern sexism: women com-plaining more
0.26 (0.02) 3077
0.22 (0.03) 3060
0.14 (0.03) 3045
26 Modern sexism: opportunities for women
0.23 (0.02) 3102
0.14 (0.02) 3084
0.07 (0.03) 3068
27 SCALE [17-26]: women 0.40
(0.02) 3115
0.24 (0.02) 3097
0.11 (0.02) 3080
28 Environment vs jobs tradeoff 0.32
(0.02) 2742
0.08 (0.02) 2730
-0.01 (0.02) 2716
29 Federal spending on the envi-ronment
0.30 (0.02)
0.11 (0.02)
0.03 (0.02)
3105 3088 3072
30 U.S. should have more nuclear power plants
0.14 (0.02) 3068
0.03 (0.03) 3052
0.04 (0.03) 3037
31 Global warming is happening [0/1]
0.57 (0.06) 3086
0.27 (0.07) 3070
0.14 (0.08) 3054
32 Rising temperatures are good 0.19
(0.02) 3100
0.05 (0.02) 3083
0.00 (0.02) 3067
33 Global warming is mostly natu-ral
0.27 (0.02) 3100
0.10 (0.02) 3083
0.05 (0.03) 3067
34 SCALE [28-33]: environment 0.35
(0.02) 3106
0.11 (0.02) 3090
0.04 (0.02) 3074
35 Favor reducing the budget defi-cit
0.02 (0.02) 3099
-0.03 (0.03) 3083
-0.02 (0.03) 3068
36 Importance of reducing the budget deficit
0.21 (0.02) 3112
0.09 (0.03) 3096
0.08 (0.03) 3080
37 Reduce deficit by more taxes on high earners
0.24 (0.02) 3108
0.04 (0.02) 3092
-0.00 (0.03) 3077
38 Reduce deficit with Medicare voucher
0.16 (0.02) 3051
0.02 (0.02) 3035
-0.05 (0.03) 3025
39 Reduce deficit by more corpo-rate taxation
0.19 (0.02) 3096
0.00 (0.02) 3080
-0.05 (0.03) 3067
40 Reduce deficit by less military spending
0.31 (0.02) 3107
0.17 (0.02) 3091
0.14 (0.03) 3076
41 Reduce deficit by cutting federal employees
0.26 (0.02) 3102
0.14 (0.03) 3086
0.11 (0.03) 3070
42 Reduce deficit by cutting non-military stuff
0.29 (0.02) 3102
0.17 (0.03) 3086
0.12 (0.03) 3070
43 Millionaire tax 0.23
(0.02) 3104
0.07 (0.02) 3088
-0.05 (0.03) 3073
44 Encourage outsourcing 0.03
(0.02) -0.10
(0.03) -0.15
(0.03)
3096 3080 3068
45 Favor invest Social Security in stocks
0.22 (9.96) 3102
0.10 (0.02) 3085
0.07 (0.03) 3072
46 SCALE [35-45]: Fiscal policy 0.20
(0.02) 3113
0.06 (0.01) 3097
0.02 (0.01) 3081
47 Limit corporate campaign con-tributions
0.09 (0.01) 3089
0.01 (0.03) 3074
-0.03 (0.03) 3058
48 Ban corporate/union campaign ads
0.09 (0.02) 3086
0.02 (0.03) 3071
-0.00 (0.03) 3058
49 Defense spending 0.33
(0.02) 2881
0.19 (0.03) 2869
0.15 (0.03) 2853
50 Positive ratings on a military feeling thermometer
0.24 (0.02) 3108
0.16 (0.03) 3091
0.13 (0.03) 3075
51 War was worth it [0/1] 0.18
(0.05) 3049
0.02 (0.06) 3036
0.03 (0.07) 3020
52 War decreased terror threat 0.00
(0.02) 3100
-0.01 (0.03) 3087
0.00 (0.03) 3071
53 Court authorization for wiretaps 0.09
(0.02) 3104
0.04 (0.02) 3088
0.00 (0.03) 3074
54 Government wiretapping gone too far
0.14 (0.02) 3010
0.09 (0.03) 2996
0.07 (0.03) 2985
55 Favor torture for suspected ter-rorists
0.37 (0.02) 3094
0.28 (0.03) 3078
0.24 (0.03) 3062
56 Patriotism: Feel good seeing flag fly
0.19 (0.02) 3105
0.12 (0.03) 3091
0.12 (0.03) 3075
57 Patriotism: Love of country 0.06
(0.02) 3114
0.01 (0.03) 3098
0.02 (0.03) 3082
58 Patriotism: important being American
0.19 (0.03) 3112
0.12 (0.03) 3096
0.13 (0.03) 3080
59 SCALE [56-58]: Patriotism 0.17
(0.02) 0.09
(0.03) 0.10
(0.03)
3113 3097 3081
60 Religion important to respond-ent's life [0/1]
0.32 (0.05) 3113
0.03 (0.06) 3095
-0.11 (0.07) 3078
61 Religion provides day-to-day guidance
0.05 (0.03) 1960
-0.02 (0.03) 1950
-0.07 (0.03) 1939
62 Frequency of prayer 0.10
(0.02) 3105
-0.04 (0.03) 3088
-0.10 (0.03) 3072
63 Frequency of religious service attendance
0.06 (0.04) 3113
-0.18 (0.04) 3095
-0.30 (0.04) 3079
64 Belief about the Bible 0.19
(0.02) 3093
0.04 (0.02) 3076
-0.04 (0.02) 3062
65 Positive ratings on a Christian feeling thermometer
0.20 (0.02) 3109
0.06 (0.03) 3092
-0.00 (0.03) 3076
66 Negative ratings on an atheist feeling thermometer
0.27 (0.02) 3091
0.16 (0.03) 3075
0.08 (0.03) 3059
67 SCALE [60-66]: Christian religi-osity
0.19 (0.02) 3117
0.00 (0.02) 3099
-0.09 (0.02) 3082
68 Evangelical [0/1] 0.20
(0.06) 2233
0.04 (0.07) 2225
-0.08 (0.08) 2217
69 Iran trying to develop nuclear weapons [0/1]
0.40 (0.10) 3018
0.19 (0.12) 3007
0.32 (0.14) 2995
70 Oppose direct diplomatic talks with Iran
0.11 (0.02) 3095
0.04 (0.03) 3081
-0.04 (0.03) 3066
71 Increase sanctions on Iran 0.11
(0.03) 3061
0.10 (0.03) 3047
0.14 (0.03) 3034
72 Bomb nuclear development sites in Iran
0.23 (0.02) 3084
0.18 (0.02) 3069
0.16 (0.03) 3054
73 Invade Iran with U.S. troops 0.18
(0.02) 3084
0.15 (0.02) 3070
0.14 (0.03) 3057
74 China's economic expansion is bad for U.S.
0.14 (0.02)
0.13 (0.03)
0.11 (0.03)
3025 3009 2996
75 China is a major military threat 0.11
(0.02) 3059
0.10 (0.03) 3043
0.08 (0.03) 3034
Note: The top number in each cell indicates the coefficient on the symbolic racism variable
for a regression predicting the indicated dependent variable; the middle number in each
cell indicates the standard error; the bottom number indicates the number of observations
used in the regression. Bold type indicates coefficients that are statistically significant at
the 0.05 level with a two-tailed test. The sample was restricted to non-Hispanic white re-
spondents. Data were weighted. [0/1] indicates dichotomous dependent variables. See the
text and Appendix 1 for more detail on the model specifications, estimation techniques, and
variable measurements. Source: 2012 ANES Time Series Study.
Table 2. The influence of symbolic racism on black opposition to pro-black policies
Non-Hispanic
Whites Non-Hispanic
Blacks
Non-Hispanic Blacks
[Restricted]
Oppose workplace pref-erences for blacks
0.37 (0.02) 3018
0.26 (0.06)
829
0.44 (0.09)
365
Oppose affirmative action in universities
0.33 (0.03) 3062
0.10 (0.10)
862
0.04 (0.10)
379
Oppose affirmative action in workplace
0.33 (0.03) 3069
0.16 (0.06)
866
0.15 (0.10)
381
Oppose government en-suring fair jobs for blacks
0.41 (0.02) 2733
0.18 (0.05)
810
0.08 (0.07)
353
Government assistance to blacks
0.44 (0.02) 2797
0.29 (0.06)
775
0.11 (0.08)
348
SCALE: Assistance poli-cies for blacks
0.48 (0.02) 3076
0.26 (0.05)
872
0.22 (0.07)
383
Note: The top number in each cell indicates the coefficient on the symbolic racism variable
for a regression predicting the indicated dependent variable; the middle number in each
cell indicates the standard error; the bottom number indicates the number of observations
used in the regression. Bold type indicates coefficients that are statistically significant at
the 0.05 level with a two-tailed test. Data were weighted. See the text and Appendix 1 for
more detail on the model specifications, estimation techniques, and variable measurements.
Source: 2012 ANES Time Series Study.
Table 3. Predicting symbolic racism in the 2012 ANES
Non-Hispanic
Whites Non-Hispanic
Blacks
Non-Hispanic Blacks
[Restricted]
Feeling thermometer 0.07
(0.02) 0.12
(0.04) 0.11
(0.05)
Lazy stereotype 0.19† (0.03)
0.10 (0.05)
0.04 (0.09)
Unintelligent stereotype 0.06
(0.03) -0.04 (0.05)
-0.05 (-0.09)
Female 0.02
(0.03) 0.02
(0.08) -0.08
(0.10)
Married 0.18† (0.05)
0.05 (0.10)
0.26 (0.12)
Age group -0.04† (0.02)
-0.09 (0.04)
-0.19 (0.06)
Formal education level -0.11
(0.02) -0.06 (0.04)
-0.08 (0.05)
Family income -0.02
(0.02) -0.10
(0.04) -0.06
(0.07)
Unemployed 0.13
(0.07) -0.18 (0.10)
-0.03 (0.16)
Republican 0.01
(0.04) 0.43
(0.21) 0.16
(0.22)
Democrat -0.12
(0.05) 0.02
(0.09) 0.15
(0.13)
Conservatism 0.05
(0.02) 0.09
(0.04) 0.07
(0.06)
Self-reliance 0.04
(0.02) 0.08
(0.04) 0.12
(0.05)
Limited government 0.07
(0.02) 0.05
(0.05) 0.09
(0.07)
Moral traditionalism 0.08† (0.02)
-0.05 (0.05)
-0.13 (0.07)
Authoritarianism 0.12
(0.02) 0.14
(0.04) 0.08
(0.06)
Egalitarianism -0.26
(0.02) -0.32
(0.05) -0.40
(0.07)
Constant -0.05
(0.05) -0.58
(0.11) -0.86
(0.15) Number of unweighted subpopulation observations
3048 856 384
R2 0.44 0.28 0.31
Note: The top number in each cell indicates the coefficient on the indicated variable; the
bottom number in each cell indicates the standard error. Bold type indicates coefficients
that are statistically significant at the 0.05 level with a two-tailed test. Data were weighted.
See the text and Appendix 1 for more detail on the model specifications, estimation tech-
niques, and variable measurements. Daggers in the first numeric column indicates coeffi-
cients for which there is a statistically significant difference at the 0.05 level with a two-
tailed test between the non-Hispanic white and non-Hispanic black models. Source: 2012
ANES Time Series Study.
Table 4. Predicting symbolic racism in the 2004 National Politics Study
Non-Hispanic
Whites Non-Hispanic
Blacks
Closer to blacks than whites -0.12 (0.06)
-0.13 (0.04)
Blacks work harder than whites -0.23
(0.05) -0.07
(0.04)
Linked fate with own race -0.08 (0.04)
-0.18 (0.04)
Perceived amount of black-white competition 0.09
(0.05) -0.31
(0.04)
Conservatism 0.35
(0.04) 0.11
(0.04)
Education -0.28
(0.04) -0.21
(0.04)
Age -0.03 (0.03)
0.00 (0.04)
Male 0.04
(0.08) -0.03
(0.07)
South 0.16
(0.08) 0.12
(0.07)
Intercept 0.10
(0.07) -0.10
(0.07) Observations 703 625 R2 0.316 0.356
Note: The top number in each cell indicates the coefficient on the indicated variable; the
bottom number in each cell indicates the standard error. Bold type indicates coefficients
that are statistically significant at the 0.05 level with a two-tailed test. Data were weighted.
See the text and Appendix 2 for more detail on the model specifications, estimation tech-
niques, and variable measurements. Source: 2004 National Politics Study.
