THE DEVELOPMENT RESPONSE TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND INSURGENCY USAID POLICY BUREAU FOR POLICY, PLANNING AND LEARNING SEPTEMBER 2011 Putting Principles into Practice

8/2/2019 THE DEVELOPMENT RESPONSE TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND INSURGENCY USAID POLICY BUREAU FOR POLICY, PLA

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BUREAU FOR POLICYPLANNINGANDLEARNING

THEDEVELOPMENTRESPONSE

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VIOLENTEXTREMISMANDINSURGENCY

PuttingPrinciplesintoPractice

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MessagefromtheAdministrator USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgenc

MESSAGEFROMTHEADMINISTRATORPresidentObamasNationalSecurityStrategyandGlobalDevelopmentPolicybothstressthatsuccessfuldevelopmentisessentialtoadvancingournationalsecurityobjectives.Consistentwiththesebroaderstrategicframeworks,thispol-icyprovidesUSAIDwithaclearmandateandspecificguidanceonthedevelopmentresponsetoviolentextremismandinsurgency.Thispolicycomesatacriticaltime;develop-mentassistanceisincreasinglycalleduponasanintegralcomponentoftheinteragencyresponsetocomplexnationalsecurityanddevelopmentchallenges.InlinewithourUSAIDForwardreformeffort,thispolicyrep-resentsanongoingdrivetouseourlongexperienceandvastknowledgebasetoprovidecrucialthoughtleadershiptothedevelopmentfield.ThepolicyisnotdefinedsimplybyourinvolvementinrecentconflictslikeAfghanistanandIraq.ItbuildsupontheAgencysexperienceincountriesseizedwithviolentextremismandinsurgencyinotherpartsofAsiaand

theMiddleEast,aswellasAfricaandLatinAmerica.ClarifyingUSAIDsroleinthecontextofviolentextremismandinsurgencydoesnotcomewithoutcontroversy. Someholdstrongviewsonwhetherdevelopmentagenciesgener-allyandUSAIDinparticularshouldengageontheseissues.Programmingresourcestorespondtoviolentextrem-ismandinsurgencyrequirestheAgencytoassumegreaterinstitutionalandoperationalrisk.ButastheWorldBanksrecent2011WorldDevelopmentReportmadeclear,thecostsofconflictdevelopmentally,economicandhumanaresimplytoocostlytoignore.Bynotconfrontingwherewecanthosedevelopmentrelatedfactorsthatdriveconflictand,specifictothispolicy,violentextremismandinsurgency,wewillignoretheplightofmanyaroundtheworldingreatneed.

Alreadytoday,closeto60percentofStateandUSAIDsfor-eignassistancegoesto50countriesthatareinthemidstof,ortryingtopreventconflictorstatefailure.Thispolicyiscriticaltosupportingourstaffonthefrontlinesofourgreatestnationalsecurityanddevelopmentchallenges.OurAgencysrenewedemphasisonlearning,innovationandrisk-takingmeanswewillstudyandimproveourworkinexactlythoseareasthathaveprovenmostdifficult.

Withthispolicy,theAgencyanditsfieldMissionscannowrelyonaclearsetofcommonconceptsanddefinitions,engagementcriteria,andprogrammingprinciplestosupportandguideourwork,enhanceitsimpactandensurewedeliversustainableresults.Mostimportantly,itsimplementa-

tionwillbecharacterizedbyclosecooperationwithinteragency,international,andlocalpartnersaswecontinue

toaddressthesepressingglobalchallengeswhilelearningfromongoingefforts.

RajivShahAdministratorU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment

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USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency Acknowledgements

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

APolicyTask Team(PTT), chairedbyMelissaBrownfromtheBureauofPolicy,PlanningandLearning(PPL),producedUSAIDsPolicyonTheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtrem-ismandInsurgency.ThePTTconsistedofsevenindividualsselectedfromacrosstheAgencyfortheirrecognizedknowl-edgeandexpertiseontheseissues:

BrianBacon(BureauofPolicy,PlanningandLearning), LisaChandonnet-Bedoya(BureauforDemocracy,Con-

flictandHumanitarianAssistance(DCHA)/OfficeofConflictMitigationandManagement),

StaciaGeorge(DCHA/OfficeofTransitionInitiatives), AngelaMartin(AfricaBureau), CraigMullaney(OfficeofAfghanistanandPakistan

Affairs), Leah Werchick(DCHA/OfficeofTransitionInitiatives),

and OliverWilcox(MiddleEastandAsiaBureaus).

TheseUSAIDstaffworkedintensivelyandcollaborativelyinservicetothiscriticalpolicywork,andwillcontinuetoserveasimportantresourcesinthepolicysimplementation.ThePTTwaslaunchedinSeptember2010withaUSAIDEvi-denceSummitthatbroughttogetherrepresentativesfromtheinteragency,donor,andacademiccommunitieswhospecializeinviolentextremismandinsurgency-related researchandevalua-

tion.ThePTTconsultedwithUSAIDexpertsservingbothinWashingtonandthefield. OutsideofUSAID,thePTTcon-ductedconsultationsandbriefingswithkeyinteragencypartners, interestedCongressionalstaff, andexternalexperts.Theircontributionssubstantiallyimprovedandinformedthefinalpolicy.

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ExecutiveSummary USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency

EXECUTIVESUMMARY

ThispolicyonTheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgencyisthefirstofitskindproducedbyUSAID. Itspur-poseistoprovideapolicyframeworkthatUSAIDcanusetoimprovetheeffectivenessofitsdevelopmenttoolsinresponding

toviolentextremismandinsurgency,aswellasitscapacitytointeractconstructivelywithitsinteragencyandotherpartnersin

thesechallengingenvironments.ThepolicywillalsohelpUSAIDfocusmoretightlyoncapacitybuildingandsustainabilitywhicharecriticaltoourlong-termsecurityanddevelopmentgoals.ThepolicydefinestermsnecessaryforasharedunderstandingwithinUSAIDofthesechallengesanddifferentiatesatagenerallevelbetweenadevelopmentresponsetoviolentextremismandadevelopmentresponsetoinsurgency.Atthesametime,itacknowledgesthateachsituationisdifferentandthatthese

termsandthedevelopmentresponsewillneedtobedefinedandunderstoodintheirparticularcontextandguidedbyU.S.foreignpolicy.Buildingonagrowingknowledgebase,thepolicyidentifiesthosefactors,ordrivers,thatcanfavortheriseofviolentextremismorinsurgencyaswellasthosethatcaninfluencetheradicalizationofindividuals. Broadly speaking, these include structuralpush fac-

tors,includinghighlevelsofsocialmarginalizationandfragmentation;poorlygovernedorungovernedareas;govern-mentrepressionandhumanrightsviolations;endemiccorruptionandeliteimpunity;andculturalthreatperceptions. Simultane-ously,pullfactorsthathaveadirectinfluenceonindividuallevelradicalizationandrecruitmentincludeaccesstomaterialresources,socialstatusandrespectfrompeers;asenseofbelonging,adventure,andself-esteemorpersonalempowerment

thatindividualsandgroupsthathavelongviewedthemselvesasvictimizedandmarginalizedcanderivefromthefeelingthattheyaremakinghistory;andtheprospectofachievinggloryandfame.ThepolicyidentifieswhatUSAIDhaslearnedstrategicallyandprogrammaticallyabouttheroleofdevelopmentassistancetocounterthesedriversandaffectacountrysdevelopment.

InthecontextoftheU.S.GlobalDevelopmentPolicyandtheQuadrennialDiplomacyandDevelopmentReview(QDDR)onenhancingcivilianpower,thepolicyidentifieswaysthatUSAIDcanworkwithitsinteragencypartnersandamplifythedevelop-mentvoicewithintheUSG. Italsoemphasizestheimportanceoflocalpartnershipwithcommittedstakeholdersandenhancedengagementwithbilateralcounterpartsandmultilateralinstitu-

tions.Thepolicyaffirmstheimportanceofthedevelopmentdiscipline

to,andUSAIDsdistinctandcriticalrolein,addressingthesecriti-calnationalsecurityanddevelopmentchallenges.ThisincludesUSAIDsfocusonsustainabilityandbuildingownershipandcapacityatalllevels. Ifappliedcorrectly,adevelopmentresponsecanserveasaneffectivetooltoaddresstheseissues.Specifically,thepolicydirectstheAgencyto:(1)Considerkeyengagementcriteriaattheearliest

stageofprogramdevelopment,recognizingthatthedevelopmentresponseispartofabroaderUSGeffort.Thesecriteriainclude: anassessmentofthedriversofviolentextremismand

insurgency,hostcountry(governmentandpopula-tion)commitment,andpotentialdevelopmentresponses;

adeterminationofanappropriateandcriticalrolefordevelopmentassistance;

adeterminationthatanadequatelevelofsecurityexiststopermitimplementingpartnerstooperateandcommunicatewithUSAID;

identificationofrisksto the Agency, ourpartners andrelateddevelopmentinvestments,aswellasaplantomitigaterisk;and,

considerationofprogram,management,andresourceplans.

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USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency ExecutiveSummary

(2)Applyacorebodyofprogramprinciplesatallstagesoftheprogrammingcycle.Thefollowingprinci-pleswillguideUSAIDsdesignandimplementationofdevelopment

programming

targeted

at

violent

extrem-

ismandinsurgency.TheseareinformedbyourknowledgebaseaswellasUSAIDsbroaderstabilizationexperience.ForAnalysis,Planning,andDesign Focusonthedriversofviolentextremismandinsurgency.

USAIDwillidentifyandprioritizedrivers,setclearobjectives,designafocusedsetofinterventions,andsystematicallyevaluaterelatedmeasuresofprogressandimpact.

Promoteinclusivecountryownership.USAIDwillengageawiderangeofcountrystakeholderscommittedtoaddressingtheseissues.

Exerciseselectivity.USAIDwillinvestwhereitcanachievethegreatestimpact,avoidprogramsthatcouldhaveadestabilizingeffect,andtargetresourcesdemo-graphically,sectorally,andgeographically.

Takeacoordinatedandintegratedapproach. Inclosecoordinationwithinteragencyandotherpartners,USAIDwillcoordinateandintegratesuchprogramswith

other

assistance

efforts.

Tailorandcoordinatecommunications.USAIDwill

effectivelycommunicatelocalownershipandpartner-shiptoachieveprogramobjectives.

Thinklocallyandbringanentrepreneurialapproach.USAIDwillspecificallytailorprogrammingtothelocalenvironment,scaleupsuccessfulapproaches,anddis-continueineffectiveinvestments.

Considertransnationalstrategies.USAIDwilltakeadvantageofappropriateopportunitiesforcross-bor-derorregionalprogrammingandcoordination,asthedynamics

driving

extremism

and

insurgency

often

crossnationalboundaries.

ForOperationalandManagementResponsiveness Flexibility,agilityandprocurementspeed.USAIDwill

increaseitscapabilitytoprocurerapidly,adjustascon-ditionschange,andexpanditsworkwithandthroughlocalpartners.

Intensiveprogrammanagement.USAIDwillensurestaffaretrainedandequippedtoprovidehands-onmanagementandoversightrequiredforresults.

Innovation,evaluation,andlearning.USAIDwillpro-moteinnovation,createmechanismsforon-goingreviewandadaptation,andactivelysharelessonslearned.

Informed

risk-taking

and

experimentation.

USAID

will

encouragestafftotakerisks,informedbythebestavailableinformationandmitigationpractices.

(3) EstablishandempoweraSteeringCommitteetooverseethepolicysimplementation,providetechnicalleader-ship andsupport, particularlyto Missions, drive USAIDknowledgemanagement,andsupportAgencyandinteragencyplanning,strategyandcoordination.Thispolicywillbefollowedbyimplementationguidelinesandasystematic

approach

for

knowledge

management,

staff

training

andmentorship.

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USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency IntroductionandContex

INTRODUCTIONAND1 CONTEXTWheregovernmentsareincapableofmeetingtheircitizensbasicneedsandfulfillingtheirresponsibilitiestoprovidesecuritywithintheirborders,theconsequencesareoftenglobalandmaydirectlythreatentheAmericanpeople.Toadvanceourcommonsecurity,wemustaddresstheunderlyingpoliticalandeconomicdeficitsthatfos-terinstability,enableradicalizationandextremism,andultimatelyunderminetheabilityofgovernmentstomanagethreatswithintheirbordersandtobeourpartnersinaddressingcommonchallenges.

-2010NationalSecurityStrategy3Throughdevelopment,weseektoinvestincountrieseffortstoachievesustainedandbroad-basedeconomicgrowth,whichcreatesopportunitiesforpeopletoliftthemselvesoutofpoverty,awayfromviolentextremismandinstability, andtowardamoreprosperousfuture.

-2010QuadrennialDiplomacyandDevelopmentReview4Theevents,andaftermath,ofSeptember11,2001broughtintosharprelieftheimportanceofviolentextremismandinsurgencypracticedbyal-Qaidaanditsaffiliates.Thesephenomenacon-

tinuetoimpactpartsoftheMiddleEast,SouthAsia,andsub-SaharanAfrica,amongotherregions.Whileal-Qaidaanditsaffili-atesposethegreatestdirectthreattotheUnitedStates,violentextremismandinsurgencypracticedbyotheractorsandmoti-vatedbyotherideologiessuchastheFARCinColombiaarechallengesinnumerousdevelopingcountries.Thedriversandeffectsofviolentextremismandinsurgencyvaryacrosscontext.

Whileintertwinedwithpoliticalandsecuritydynamics,manyofthedriversofviolentextremismandinsurgencyaredevelop-mentchallenges. Indeed,factorssuchassocioeconomicinequalities,repression,corruption,andpoorgovernanceoftencreateanenablingenvironmentforradicalizationandviolentextremism.InformedbyUSAIDsdecadesofexperienceinconflict-affectedcountries,agrowingbodyofknowledge,evidence,andpracticeisemergingfromUSAIDsdevelopmenteffortstocounterviolentextremismandinsurgency. Itaffirmsthateffectivedevelopment

responsestothesephenomenatargetspecificfactorsinspecificsettingsbasedonsounddevelopmentprinciplesandinamannerconsistentwiththeUSGsbroaderpromotionofuniversalvaluesincludingdemocracyandhumanrights.Thispolicy,consistentwithUSAIDForwardprinciples,providesUSAIDwithguidanceonthedevelopmentresponsetoviolentextremismandinsurgencyby:

outliningkeyconcepts,drivers,anddevelopmentresponses;

elaboratingspecificengagementcriteriaandprogram-mingprinciples;and

identifyinginstitutionalenhancementstosupportUSAIDsdevelopmentrole.

ThepolicysintendedresultisthatUSAIDdesignsandimplementseffective,evidence-baseddevelopmentprogrammingtargetingdriversofviolentextremismandinsurgencywhilesystemicallylearningfromandadaptingitsapproaches.DevelopmentisoneofseveraltoolsofU.S.nationalpower.As

the2011NationalStrategyforCounterterrorismstates,Weareengagedinabroad,sustainedandintegratedcampaignthathar-nesseseverytoolof Americanpower-military, civilian, andthepowerofourvalues-togetherwiththeconcertedeffortsofallies,partnersandmultilateralinstitutions.Theseeffortsmustalsobecomplementedbybroadercapabilities,suchasdiplomacydevelopment,strategiccommunications,andthepoweroftheprivatesector.5 ImplementingthispolicyshouldalsoservetostrengthenUSAIDsinteragencyvoiceondevelopmentscontri-butiontoaddressingthesecriticalnationalsecurityissues.3 2010NationalSecurityStrategy,http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf,p.264 QuadrennialDiplomacyandDevelopmentReview,http://www.usaid.gov/qddr/QDDR_FullReportLo.pdf, ExecutiveSummary,p.ix5 NationalStrategyforCounterterrorism, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterror-ism_strategy.pdf,p.2


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KeyConcepts USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency

2 KEYCONCEPTSWhileprecisedefinitionshaveeludedmanyexperts,thispolicydrawsonUSGelaboratedterminologyandUSAIDsownengagementwithexpertstodefineviolentextremismandinsurgency. Definingtermsisnecessaryforasharedunder-standingwithinUSAIDofthesechallengesandpotentialdevelopmentresponsestothem. Atthesametime,eachsitua-

tionisdifferent,andthesetermswillneedtobedefinedandunderstoodin theirparticular contextand guidedby U.S. for-eignpolicy.

Violentextremismreferstoadvocating,engagingin, preparing, or otherwisesupporting ideologicallymotivated orjustifiedviolencetofurthersocial, eco-nomicandpoliticalobjectives.

Insurgencyistheorganizeduseofsubversionandviolencetoseize,nullifyorchallengepoliticalcontrolofaregion. Itisprimarilyapoliticalandterritorialstrug-gle,inwhichbothsidesusearmedforcetocreatespacefortheirpolitical,economic,andinfluenceactivi-

tiestobeeffective. Insurgencyisnotalwaysconductedbyasinglegroupwithacentralized,mili-

tary-stylecommandstructure,butmayinvolvedifferentactorswithvariousaims,looselyconnectedinnetworks.6

Whileviolentextremismandinsurgencysharemanyofthesame drivers, they differin theirdegree of organization, supporbase,anduseofviolence.Violentextremism,forexample,oftemanifestsitselfattheindividuallevelandinhighlyinformal,dif-fusenetworks. Suchnetworksareoftentransnationalincharacter,whileinsurgenciesareoftendelimitedbygeography.Also,violentextremismcanexistinquitestableenvironments,aswellasinsemi-permissiveandnon-permissivecontextsassociatedwithinsurgencies. Incertaincases,violentextremismaninsurgencycanoverlap.

6 U.S.GovernmentCounterinsurgencyGuide, January2009,p. 2.

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KnowledgeBase USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency

Culturalthreatperceptions.Thisincludestheoftendeeplyheld,existentialperceptionofdominationbyanothergroup,theWest,oranoppressiveinternationalorder.

Cultural

drivers

also

include

more

broadly

per-ceivedthreatstorelatedcustomsandvalues,including

genderrolesandeducation.Simultaneously,USAIDhasseenthatpullfactorsareneces-saryforpushfactorstohaveadirectinfluenceonindividual-levelradicalizationandrecruitment. Pullfactorsareassociatedwith

thepersonalrewardswhichmembershipinagroupormove-ment,andparticipationinitsactivities,mayconfer. Suchpotentialbenefitsinclude:

access

to

material

resources,

social

status

and

respect

frompeers;

asenseofbelonging,adventure,andself-esteemorper-sonalempowermentthatindividualsandgroupsthathavelongviewedthemselvesasvictimizedandmargin-alizedcanderivefromthefeelingthattheyaremakinghistory;and,

theprospectofachievinggloryandfame.Socialnetworkscomprisedofrelatives,friends,orneighborscanalsodrawotherssimilarlyaffectedbysocialmarginalizationorfrustrated

expectations

into

the

orbit

of

violent

extremist

ideas

andnetworks. Otherpullfactorsinclude:thepresenceofradicalinstitutionsorvenues,serviceprovisionbyextremistgroups,andextremistinvolvementinillegaleconomicactivity.GapsremaininUSAIDsunderstandingofviolentextremismandinsurgency.Thisincludestheroleofgender.Womenmayactasbothapotentialbrakeon,aswellasadriverof,violentextrem-ism. Somesuggestthatfamilyties,andwomensrolesinfamilies,createpsychologicalbarriersforhusbands,sons,orothermalerelativestojoinviolentextremistgroups. Othershaveasserted

thatwomen

may

serve

as

motivators

for

male

family

members

tojoin. Understandingtheroleofgenderatthelocallevelisfundamental.RespondingtoViolentExtremismandInsurgency9USAIDsresponsestoviolentextremismareoftenpreventiveaimedatpreemptingradicalizationbymitigatingspecificdrivers.Programmingusuallytargetsspecificgeographicareasand/orsub-populationsdeemedvulnerabletotheextremistappeal. Inmanycontexts,USAIDprogramminginthisarea issmall-scale

anddistinct,andoftenaccompaniesalarger,ongoingdevelop-mentportfolio.Developmentprogrammingdirectedatcounteringinsurgency,ontheotherhand,tendstobereactiveinnature,seekingtocon-

tainandreduceactivesupportforanongoinginsurgency. Sucheffortstendtobelarger-scale,morecomprehensive,andmulti-sectoral.Theyoftenareundertakenaspartofabroader,interagencystabilizationeffort.Ourcurrentunderstandingofdrivers,andexistingdevelopmentresponses,hasyieldedsomestrategiclessons. Atagenerallevel,notalldriversofviolentextremismandinsurgencyareappropri-atelyaddressedthroughadevelopmentresponse.ThesebroadlessonsechowhatUSAIDalreadyknowsaboutsounddevelop-mentprinciples,andrefinethedevelopmentresponsetoviolentextremismandinsurgency.Whilepreliminary,keylessonsinclude

Developmentassistancecandirectlyaddresssocioeconomicdrivers. Pushfactors,suchasmarginalization,frustratedexpectations,andunmetbasicneeds,oftenhavespecificdevelopmentresponsesthatcanaddressconcreteunderlyinggrievances. Pullfactors,particularlysocialnet-works,canalsobeaddressed,particularlywhentheyincludefacilitatingaccesstoeconomicopportunityandservices,aswellasenhancingthevoiceofmarginalizedpopulationsintheircommunitiesorsocieties. USAIDsexperiencewithintegratedyouthprogrammingoffersexamplesofcross-cuttingapproachesthatincludevoca-

tionalandtechnicaltraining,lifeskills,employment-searchsupport,andpositive,peer-group,civicengagement.

Politicaldriversarealsoresponsivetodevelopmentassis-tance.Whilegeneraldemocracyandgovernance(DG)approachesmayhaveindirecteffectsoncounteringvio-lentextremism,DGinterventionstargetingat-riskcommunitiescanbemoredirectlyeffective. Forexamplepoliceharassmentandintimidationcanimpactat-riskurbanandperi-urbancommunities.Thiscanbemitigatedbyactivitiessuchascommunitypolicing,NGOadvocacy,andmediacoverage. DGandotheractivitiescanalsodirectlyaddresspoorlyorun-governedareasbybuilding

9 Thispolicydoesnotdirectlyaddresscounter-terrorism (CT)approachesbasedonintelligence,lawenforcementandmilitaryassets;otherUSGdepartmentsandagenciesaregenerallybetterplacedtoengageinsuchCTprogramming. However,USAIDsdevelopmentresponsetoviolentextremismaninsurgencycontributestoCTgoalsbymitigatingthespecificdriversthatencouragetheuse,advocacyof,andsupportforviolence.

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USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency KnowledgeBase

confidencebetweenlocalcommunitiesandgovernment.Forexample,assistinglegitimategovernmentactorstoorganizetown-hallmeetingsandconductsmall-scaleinfrastructure

projects,

as

in

some

parts

of

Afghanistan,

canincreasesuchinteractionanddemonstrategovern-mentresponsiveness.

Culturaldriversshouldnotbeignored.Whilelessamenabletoinfluencebydevelopmentassistance,thereareprinciplesthatshouldbeconsideredtoaddresscul-

turaldrivers,forexample,byrespectingindigenousand/orreligiouscustoms.Thesemightbeaddressed,inpart,byengagingindigenousreligiousleadersorothergroupsandsupportingalternativevoices. (Missionsshould

consult

with

USAIDs

Regional

Legal

Advisor

(RLA)orGeneralCounsel(GC)inadvanceofprogram-mingtoensurecompliancewiththeEstablishmentClauseoftheFirstAmendmentconcerningseparationofchurchandstate.)

Preventionisessentialandmoreeffectivethanmitigationofactivedrivers.Institutions,actors,andprocessesrelevant

toat-riskpopulationscanbesourcesofresilienceagainsttheinfluenceofviolentextremistnarrativesandprovideyouth,inparticular,withapositiveroleandvoiceincom-munitygovernanceanimportantoptionforturningapotentialsourceofinstabilityintoanasset. Oneexampleisthewidespreadexistenceoffadas,informalassocia-

tionsofyoungpeopleinNiger. Fadasprovideanon-violentoutletforexpressinggrievances,anetworkforaddressingneeds,andapositivemechanismforsocialrelationshipsandcollectiveaction. Insomecases,therewillbetensionsbetweensupportingthestatusquoofmoretolerant,buthierarchicaltraditions,andempower-ingyouthfulvoicesforchange.

Local,customaryauthoritiesarekeypartners. Giventheinstabilityininsurgencyenvironmentsinparticular,work-ingwithexistinglocalauthoritiesthatplaygovernanceroles(e.g.disputeresolutionandsecurity)isimportant.Acommonapproachinsuchacontextistobuildtheeffectivenessandlegitimacyofstateinstitutions. How-

ever,supportingtheprojectionofcentralgovernmentpresenceinplaceswhereithasbeenhistoricallyweakornon-existentmaybedestabilizing. Itmayactuallyweakencustomary,

local

authorities

(i.e.

tribal

leaders)

by

affectingtheirabilityand/ordesiretostandagainstinsurgents.10

Communicationsisadevelopmentassistancepriority.Giventheroleofperceptionsinradicalizationandrecruitment,mediaandcommunicationsarecentraltodevelopmentresponsestothedriversofviolentextrem-ismandinsurgency. Thisincludessupportforlocalmediadevelopmenttofosterindependentvoicesasacounterweighttoextremistones. Forexample,USAIDprovidedaninitialgranttoToloTVinAfghanistanin2002.Tolo

has

since

become

ahighly

influential

moderate

voice

inAfghanistanand,with45%marketshare,isAfghanistansmostpopulartelevisionstation.11 Providinginformationaboutdevelopmentactivities,whichismoreeffectivelydonebylocalcommunicationsnetworks,isanotherapproach. USAIDsprogrammingexperiencein

WestAfricaindicatesthatcommunityradiocanbeapar-ticularlycost-effectivemediumwithsignificantreach.

10Tribalism,GovernanceandDevelopment,September2010,ManagementSystemsInternational11AfghanMediain2010, pp.111-113,AltaiConsulting, researchconductedfromMarchto August

5

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USAIDsDistinctandCriticalRole USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency

USAIDSDISTINCTAND4 CRITICALROLEOneUSGagencyalonecannotachievecriticalU.S.nationalsecurity objectives.The DepartmentofState(DOS), Depart-mentofDefense(DOD),USAID,andotheragenciesdrawon

theirrespectivestrengthstocreateanintegratedresponse.USAID

applies

the

development

discipline

to

its

worldwide

developmenteffortsaswellastoitsresponsestoviolentextremismandinsurgency. Itsstrengthsinclude:Developmentandtechnicalexpertise.USAIDhasdevelopmentexpertiseinareassuchasdemocraticgovernance,health,edu-cation,economicgrowth,agriculture,andothersectors. ManyUSAIDstaffareserving,orhaveserved,incountriesdealingwithviolentextremismand/orinsurgency.TheAgencyhasdevelopedexpertiseincommunity-based,multi-sectoralstabi-lizationprogramming. USAIDisincreasinglydrawinglessonsfrom

such

experience

to

apply

to

longer-term

initiatives.

For

example, USAIDapplieditsstabilizationexpertisein apilotprogramtohelptheColombiangovernmentconsolidateits

territorialgainsagainsttheFuerzasArmadasRevolucionariasdeColombia(FARC),andreducecocacultivation.Theprogramresultedinasignificantconsolidationofstatepresenceintar-getedmunicipalities,whichsaw,forexample,an85%reductionincocaanda56%increaseinelectoralparticipation.ThisapproachhasnowbeenadoptedmorebroadlybytheU.S.EmbassysColombiaStrategicDevelopmentInitiativeaswellas

theColombiangovernmentsNationalConsolidationPlan.Research,assessmentandprogramdevelopmenttools.USAIDhasdevelopedassessmentframeworksandprogrammingguidesrelatedtoconflictmanagementandmitigationandpolit-icaltransitionthatarealsoapplicabletoviolentextremistandinsurgencyenvironments. Morerecently,USAIDhasdevel-opedTheGuidetotheDriversofViolentExtremismandDevelopmentAssistanceandCounter-Extremism:AGuidetoPro-gramming,aswellastheDistrictStabilizationFramework(DSF),anintegratedcivilian-militarytoolnowusedinpartsof

Afghanistan.Theseandothertoolsoffersystematicwaysofanalyzingissuesrelatedtoviolentextremismandinsurgencyaswellascraftingdevelopmentresponsesbasedonlocalcondi-

tions.Fieldpresence,localstaff,andpartners.USAIDMissionsarelocaplatformsforU.S.,international,andlocalstaffwithcontextualknowledgeandlanguageskills,whomonitoron-the-grounddevelopmentsandengagegovernmentalanddirectnon-gov-ernmentalcounterpartsinprogramimplementation.Withlocal expertise andlong institutionalmemories, ForeignServiceNational staff is a particularly strong Agency field asset. Finally,ourimplementingpartnersadddepthtoourknowledgebaseandreachoutsidecapitals.Mobilizationmechanisms.USAIDhasuniquecapabilitiesfortar-geted,rapid-responsefieldanalysis,programdesignandimplementation.Thishasprovenparticularlyadvantageousinvolatileinsurgencycontexts. Recentprocurementreformsgiv-ingUSAIDMissionsaddedflexibilitywillfacilitatesmallergrantsforlocally-specificdevelopmentresponsestoviolentextremismandinsurgency.Focusonsustainability. Evenasitmanagesbothshort-termsta-bilizationandlong-termassistance,USAIDfocusesonsustainability. Althoughnotallstabilizationimpactswillrequiresustainedprogram support, manywill, particularlyto buildcapacityandsystemstostrengthenresiliencytoviolentextremismandinsurgency.Thisfocusonlonger-termcommit-menthashelpedUSAIDtoforgewide-ranging,lastingpartnershipscriticaltoeffectivedevelopmentprogrammingin

theseandothersettings.

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USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency InteragencyIntegrationandCooperation

INTERAGENCY INTEGRATION5

AND

COORDINATION

AdevelopmentresponseisonlyonecomponentofbroaderUSGeffortstocounterviolentextremismandinsurgency.Insomecases,thesuccessofdevelopmentassistanceiscontingentonotherUSGassets,suchassecurityassistance,which

can

create

greater

stability

for

development

programs

totakehold.Inthefield,interagencyintegrationisincreasinglythenormunderChiefofMissionauthority. USAID,DOD,andDOSdevelopstrategiesandcoordinateprograms;eachbringsdiffer-entassetstoacommonmission.WhileperhapsmostrobustlydevelopedinsettingssuchasAfghanistan,Iraq,andColombia,suchintegrationisalsohappeninginlargelystablecontexts,suchas West Africa.Thebenefitsofintegration, particularlyfield-based,applynotjusttolarger-scale,well-resourcedMis-

sionscounteringinsurgency,butalsotosmall,finitely-resourcedeffortscounteringviolentextremisminlargelystablesettings.USAIDMissionshavedevelopedcloserelationshipswithDODcountry-levelcounterpartstojointlyplanandcoordinate. InAfghanistan,jointinterventionshavebeeneffectivewhenUSAIDisinvolvedinpre-operationplanningforquickmobiliza-

tionofdevelopmentresourcesalongsidemilitaryoperations.Inmanycases,coordinatingwhileidentifyingdistinctrolesthatmaximizeinteragencycomparativeadvantagesiskey. More-over,asUSAIDbuildsupitslearningcapacity,ourinteragencypartnerswillbesignificantresourcesfor lessonslearned, whichcancontinuetoinformeffectiveintegration,coordinationand/ordifferentiation.

PROVINCIALRECONSTRUCTIONTEAMS(PRTs): INTERAGENCYFIELDINTEGRATIONDesignedtooperateinsemi-permissiveenvironments,aPRThelpstostabilizeanareathroughitsintegratedcivilian-militaryapproach. Itcombinesthediplomatic,military,anddevelopmentalcomponentsofUSGagenciesinvolvedinlocalstabilizationandreconstructionefforts.ThePRTaimstoimprovestabilitybybuildinghostnationcapacitytogovern;enhancingeconomicviability;anddeliveringessentialpublicservices,suchassecurity,lawandorder,justice,healthcare,andeducation. USAIDwillworkwithitsinteragencypartnerstoassessthelessonsandbestpracticesassociatedwithPRTs.

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PolicyGuidance USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency

6 POLICYGUIDANCEEngagementCriteriaRecognizingthatthedevelopmentresponseisonepartofabroaderUSGefforttoaddressthesenationalsecurityconcerns,

thefollowingserveasengagementcriteriathatUSAIDwillcon-siderpriorto,andreassessindesigning,implementingand,ifneeded,adjustingprogrammingintheseareas. Dependingoncontext,decision-makingmaybefield-based,Washington-based,orboth.

Assessmentofthedriversofviolentextremismandinsur-gencyandidentificationofpotentialdevelopmentresponses.AnalysiswillbeconductedincoordinationwithUSAIDregionalandfunctionalbureausinWash-ington,usinginput from theDepartment ofState, and

theengagement

of

other

interagency

partners.

Itwill

beinformedbyUSAIDanalyticandtechnicalguides.

Considerationofhostcountry(governmentandpopula-tion)commitmentandcapacitytoaddressthedevelopmentrelateddriversofviolentextremismandinsurgencyandforpossibleprogramresponses.

Determinationthatthereisanappropriateandcriticalrolefordevelopmentassistanceinpreventingormitigatingdriversofviolentextremismorinsurgency.Thisdetermi-nationincludesCountry Team leadership, particularlytheUSAIDMissionDirectorandAmbassador,aswellasWashington-basedinteragencyleadership.

Determinationthatanadequatelevelofsecurityexiststopermitimplementingpartnerstooperate,monitorpro-grams,andcommunicatewithUSAID.

IdentificationofriskstotheAgency,itspartners,andthedevelopmentinvestment(i.e.thatitcouldbeunderminedbydestabilizingelements),anddeterminationthatreason-ablestepscanbetakentomitigatethoserisks. Riskscanbephysical,programmatic,andfinancial.

Considerationofprogram,resource,andmanagementplansrequiredforimplementation.Thiswillbecon-ductedbyMissionleadership,andotherAgencyandinteragencystakeholdersatPostand/orinWashington,andwilloftenincludeUSAIDRLAsand/orGC,whomMissionswillengagepriortoprogramdesignforcom-pliancewithappropriatelegalstatutesandauthorities.

ProgrammingPrinciplesThefollowingprincipleswillguideUSAIDsdesignandimple-mentationofdevelopmentprogrammingtargetingdriversofviolentextremismandinsurgency.TheseareinformedbyUSAIDsknowledgebase,theU.S.GlobalDevelopmentPolicy,includingitsfocusontailoringdevelopmentstrategiesinstabiliza-

tionandpost-crisissituations,theUSAIDPolicyFramework2011-2015,aswellasUSAIDsbroaderstabilizationexperience.Here,stabilizationreferstotheprocessofmakingacountryor

territorylesslikelytodescendinto,orreturnto,astateofconflictorinstabilityandcontributingtoconditionsthatwilladvancesus-

tainabledevelopment.12USAIDpursuesstabilizationwhereviolenceisrecurrentandreachessignificantlevelsincludingwhereinsurgencyismanifest;stabilizationalsocanapplyinessentiallystablesettingswherevio-lentextremismistheissue. Stabilizationispartof,andnotseparatefrom,anoveralldevelopmentresponse. Operationally,

12Stabilizationisalsousedinconflictprevention,management,andmitigation, aswellaspost-conflictreconciliation andreconstructionbutisdistinctfromhumanitarianassistance. Stabilizationdoesnotimplypreservingthestatusquo. Political,socialandeconomictransformationcanbeunstable,butmayleadtomorepropitiousconditionsfordevelopment.

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USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency PolicyGuidance

however,stabilizationgenerallyrequiresdifferentobjectives,bene-ficiaries,modalities,andmeasuresthanthosemoreorientedtolonger-termdevelopment. Butlinkingbothundertheframeworkofanoveralldevelopmentresponseiscriticalforcraftingeffec-tive,ultimatelysustainabledevelopmentprogrammingtocounterviolentextremismandinsurgency.Becausetheseenvironmentsareoftenfluidandcomplex,therearechallengesassociatedwithimplementingtheseprinciples.Thispolicyacknowledgesthosechallengesandidentifiesareasforfur-

theraction.Theywillbesubjecttoregularreviewandupdating.

FORANALYSIS,PLANNINGANDDESIGNFocusonthedriversofviolentextremismandinsurgency:Informedbylocalresearchandassessment,USAIDMissionswillidentifyandprioritizedrivers,setclearobjectives,designafocusedsetofinterventions,andsystematicallyevaluaterelatedmeasuresofprogressandimpact. Intheirassessments,Missionsshouldconsidertheroleofwomenvis-a-visdriversandanyrelevantdevelopmentresponses. Noteverydevelopmentalneedleadstoviolentextremismorinsurgency,andcommitting

largeresourcestocountriesaffectedbyviolentextremismand/orinsurgencyisnotasolutioninitself.In these contexts, analysisusuallymust be conductedin shorttimeframes. Inaddition,itcanbechallengingtoensurethatallstakeholderspointsofviewareincorporatedintoanalysiswhilealsoavoidingbiases. Moreover,operatinginsemiornon-permissiveenvironmentscanreducemobilityandlimitopportunitiesforspeakingtovariedaudiencesandunderstand-ingrealitiesontheground.USAIDwillcontinuetorefineits

toolsforrapid,on-the-groundanalysisthatinformsprogramdesignandimplementation.Promoteinclusivecountryownershipatalllevels:In

program

assessment,

design,

implementation

and

evaluation,

USAIDwillengageawiderangeofcountrystakeholdersfromthecommunitytothenationallevelwhoarecommittedtoaddressingthedevelopmentrelateddriversofviolentextremismandinsurgency. Countryownershipisakeyingredientofeffec-

tive,sustainabledevelopment.Thiscanincludehostgovernmentinstitutions,civilsociety,customarylocalauthorities,communitiesand/orlocalpopulationseachofwhichcanhaveanimportantroletoplay.

TOOLSFORASSESSINGDRIVERSTheDistrictStabilityFrameworkinAfghanistan. Toincreasetheeffectivenessofdevelopmentassistanceincounteringinsurgency,USAIDandtheCounterinsurgencyTrainingCenter-Afghanistan(CTC-A)developedtheDistrictStabilityFramework(DSF),acomprehensive,data-drivenframeworktoensurethatprogrammingiscontinu-allyinformedbyongoinganalysisofon-the-grounddevelopments. DSFassistsin(a)identifyingsourcesofinstability;(b)targetingactivitiestodiminishormitigatethedriversofinstability;and(c)monitoringandevaluatingoutcomesagainstspecificstabilityobjectivesinaparticulararea.TheDSFprocessisiterative,aslessonslearnedfromshort-

termactivitiesarefedbackintoanalysisandre-design. USAIDisimplementingDSFineasternAfghanistan. InSarkanidistrict,forexample,DSFallowedUSAIDtomoreeffectivelyaddressthebroadproblemoflackoflegiti-mategovernmentbydistinguishinggovernmentrepresentatives'inabilitytocirculateduetoinsecurity,versusalackofcapacity,andtailoringinterventionsbyvillage.FocusGroupsinYemen. SomeUSAIDMissionshavealsoreliedonlocalorganizationstoconductfocusgroupsandsurveystoinformbroaderanalysis. Suchanapproachallowsformoreopinionstobeaccessed,reducestheriskofbias,andprovidesreal-timedata. In Yemen,USAIDsupportedlocalresearcherstoorganizeandconductapproxi-mately20youthfocusgroupsandadditionalyouthstakeholderfocusgroupdiscussions.Theresultsofthatassessmentexercisedemonstratetheutilityofsuchappliedresearchforprogramdevelopment:youth,forexample,stressedseveraldriversofviolentextremismthatadultyouthstakeholdersdidnot.

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INCLUSIVECOUNTRYOWNERSHIP

InWestAfrica. USAIDprogramsinChadandMaliaredevelopingpartnershipswithlocalgovern-ment,religiousandtraditionalleaders,andnascentNGOs.Throughtrainingforlocalofficials,youthemploymentandcommunityimprovementprojects,keylocalactorsaredevelopingincreasedcapability

torespondtodriversofinstability.FATASecretariatinPakistan. USAIDcoordi-nates

overall

strategy

and

priority

areas

for

interventionwiththeFATASecretariatandtheUSGinteragency.Toencourageandensurecommunityinvolvement,USAIDworkscloselywithlocalgovern-mentrepresentativestoengagetheirconstituentcommunitiesinprojectselection,design,andimple-mentation. LocalandregionalgovernmentrepresentativeengagementiskeytoUSAIDssuccessinincreasingcommunityparticipationandbuy-in.

Inmany

places,

poor

governance

is

amajor

factor.

USAID

oftenengageswithgovernmentsthatlackthecapacityforfullcountryownership,evenifthereispoliticalwilltoaddressthedevelopmentchallengesfomentingviolentextremismand/orinsurgency. Inotherplaces,capacitymayexistbutdemon-stratedpoliticalwillislacking. Ultimately,USAIDmustleverage

andfurtherdeveloplocalcapacityrelatedtoservicedeliveryandgoodgovernanceprinciples,suchastransparencyandaccountability,torespondtodriversofviolentextremismand/orinsurgency. USAIDwillusecasestudyanalysistofur-

therunderstandhowbesttopromoteinclusivecountryownershipincounteringviolentextremismandinsurgency.Exerciseselectivity:USAIDwillmakechoicesaboutwhereitsinvestmentswillachievethegreatestimpact,avoidprogramsthatcouldhaveadestabilizingeffect,andtargetitsresourcesdemo-graphically,sectorallyandgeographically. Radicalizationandrecruitmentareoftenhighlylocalizedandconcentratedinspe-cificpopulationsand/orcommunities. Notalldriverspresentinagivencontextmaybeamenabletodevelopmentassistance.USAIDwilltakeintoaccounttheplansofotherUSGagenciesanddonorsactivelyengagedinspecificprogramstocounterviolentextremismandinsurgency. Conductingamappingexerciseisessentialtoidentifyareasofoverlapandpotentialareasforintegration.ThisincludesUSAIDsaccessto,andabil-itytouse,informationandanalysisgeneratedbyotheragenciesSelectivitycanbechallengingbecausemultipleimperatives(hostcountry,USG,unmetdevelopmentalneeds)oftenrequireUSAIDresponsivenesstoamuchbroaderarrayofneedsthan

targetedanalysismaysuggest.Tobetterguidedecision-making,USAIDwillusecasestudyanalysistoidentifybestpracticesassociatedwithapplyingtheprincipleofselectivityintheseenvironments.

SELECTIVITYVIATHETRANS-SAHARACOUNTERTERRORISMPARTNERSHIP(TSCTP)

TSCTP,amulti-countryinteragencyeffortthataimstocombatviolentextremism(VE)intheSahelregionofAfrica,involvesstrengtheningbothmilitaryandciviliansecurityforces,conductingoutreachcampaignsonnon-violenceand

tolerance,andconfidence-building,community-developmentprogramsforregionsidentifiedthroughinteragencyassessments.USAIDcontributionstothePartnershipinclude:theregionalPeaceforDevelopmentprograminNigerandChad;communitydevelopmentactivitiesinMali;andaresearchagendaexaminingthedriversofVEintheSahelandprovidingaframeworkfordevelopmentprogrammingtocounterVE. Inthiscontext,USAIDprogram-mingtargetsspecificcommunitiesandgroupswithintheseregionstomitigatethedriversthatcanleadtosupportforextremistideologiesandorganizations.

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STABILIZATION,COORDINATIONANDSUSTAINABILITYINAFGHANISTAN

Bothcivilianandmilitaryactorshaveusedcash-for-worktosuccessfullyachieveneartermstabilizationobjectivesinAfghanistan. Butthesustainabilityoftheseprogramshasbeenalong-standingconcernbytheAfghanGovernmentanddonors when shorttermjobsare notconnected topotentialfuture employment (i.e., clean-up campaignsorrefurbishingcanalsthatcommunitieswouldotherwisedothemselves).USAIDhasmadesustainabilityafundamentalobjectiveforcash-for-workactivitiesinstabilizationenvironments. Recog-nizingthatthegovernmentmustbeactivelyinvolvedintheimplementation,wehaveincreasedthecoordinationbetweenourprojectsandthelineministries,connectingtheprojectstosuccessfulruraldevelopmentprojectsthatarealreadybeingimplementedbyGIRoA.Toimprovehumanresourcecapacity,USAIDcash-for-workprogramsworkwithlocal

communities

through

job

skill

training

and

mentoring,

which

can

be

through

their

own

skilled

citizens

or

through

externalresources. ThroughacollaborativeGIRoA-ledcommunityconsultation,communitiesidentifychallenges,ownandresolvetheirproblems,andlinktocommunityandlocalgovernmentinstitutions.Thecommunityprojectsthatthecommunitydecidesuponnotonlyaddresssourcesofinstabilitybutalsosupportlonger-termeconomicgrowth(i.e.insteadofjustclearingcanals,communitiesarebuildingmoreefficientcanalstogetwatertonewfarmland).Thereisalsoawageanalysisthatmustaccompanyeveryapprovedprojectsoweavoiddistortionoflocaleconomies.

Takeacoordinatedandintegratedapproach:Aspartofearlyprogramplanningandincloseinteragencycoordi-nation,USAIDMissionswillestablishaplanforcoordinatingandintegratingprogramsdirectedatdriversofviolentextremismand/orinsurgencywithotherformsofassistance. Planningwillneedtotakeintoaccountrequirementsforlonger-termdevel-opmentprogrammingtoreinforceearlygainsandsustainability.ThisincludescaseswhereUSAIDconductsrapid,discreteactivitiesforstabilizationeffectsforexample,howalarge-scale,cash-for-workprogramcouldbettersupportmedium-termeconomicdevelopment.Stabilizationdoesnotalwaysprecedelonger-term,sector-basedapproaches;simultaneousimplementationmayberequired.

Whethersequentialorconcurrent,differenttypesofassistancemustbecontinuouslycoordinatedandstrategicallylinked.Criteriashouldbeestablishedearlyfortransitioningamongthedifferenttypesofassistance,basedoncontext-specificfactorssuchaspermissivenessoftheoperatingenvironment. Amini-mallevelofsecurityisrequiredforstabilizationandlong-termdevelopmenttotakehold.ThisplanningwillneedtobeconductedinclosecoordinationwiththeDepartmentofStateandotherinteragencypartners

toensureacommonunderstandingofeachothersoperational

INTEGRATIONINIRAQFrom2006to2008,USAIDpromotedstabilityincommunitiesmostaffectedbytheincreasingviolenceinthecountrybyprovidingjobs,training,andsmallgrantstoat-riskyouthwhomightotherwisebeattractedtotheinsurgency. Alongwiththesurge,

jointcivilian-militaryProvincialReconstructionTeams(PRTs)weredeployedthroughoutthecountrytoimproveU.S.engagementwithIraqis. Beginningin2009,USAIDbeganconsolidatingthegainsitachievedsincethesurge.USAIDcontinuestosupportprivate-sectordevelopmentandimprovingtheIraqiGovernmentsabilitytodeliveressentialservicestoitspeople. InApril2010,theIraqiGovernmentreleased

theNationalDevelopmentPlan. USAIDhelpedtheIraqiMinistryofPlanningformulatetheplan,animpor-

tantmilestonethatoutlinestheIraqisownprioritiesandvisionofhowtoachievethem.

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needs and capacities, particularly as relates to security. Percep-tionsofsufficientsecurityoftendifferamonginteragencypartners. Integrationandsequencingrequiresintensiveeffortand

management

by

USAID

and

implementing

partner

person-

nel;integrationfirstrequirescoordinationonastrategicandthenonanimplementationlevel. Agencystaffinghasnotcon-sistentlybeenconfiguredand/orsufficientlyresourcedtoaddressthisimportantrequirement, and specificguidancehasbeenlacking. USAIDwillreviewlessons,developguidelinesandreconsiderresourcerequirementstopromotecoordi-natedandintegratedplanninginbothWashingtonandthefield.Tailorandcoordinatecommunications:USAIDwilleffec-tivelycommunicatelocalownershipandpartnershiptoachieveprogram

objectives.

This

will

include

how

USAID

incorporates

hostgovernmententitiesintothepublicfaceofitsprograms,whetherthroughorganizingofficialeventsorcommunicatingto

themediathelocalcommunitysroleinaprogram. BrandingistypicallyoneelementofUSAIDscommunicationseffortsandisimportanttotransparency. Bystatuteandpolicy,USAIDwillgenerallybrandorco-brandUSAID. However,localcontextmaymakesuchbrandingorco-brandingcounterproductiveforadevelopmentresponsetoviolentextremismandinsurgency. Incoordinationwithinter-agencypartners,theAgencywillconsidercreativeornuancedmethodstobalancesecurity,political,andcommunicationsgoalssothatoverallprogramobjectives,suchasstrengtheninggovernancepresenceoramplifyingthevoiceofcommunityleaders,areachieved.WorkingwithGCandtheBureauforLegislativeandPublicAffairs(LPA),USAIDwillreview

TAILOREDCOMMUNICATIONSINCOLOMBIA

InColombia,USAIDworkswiththeColombianPres-identsCenterforConsolidatedandIntegratedAction(CCAI),whichleadsthedesignandoversightoftheGovernmentofColombias(GOC)counterinsur-gencyprogramintheregionalcapitalsthatserveasgatewaystoremote, neglectedregions.AllCCAI-relatedactivitiesarebrandedGOCinitiativeinorder

to build support fortheGOCinthose areas. Com-munitieshaveviewedtheseactivitiespositivelyand,

therefore,havebeenpositivetowardstheGOCforbringingthemtotheirrespectiveareas.

existingregulationsandcraftspecificrecommendationsrelatedtobrandingandmarkingwhenappropriateandnecessary.Morebroadly,theAgencywillseekinnovativeapproachestodevelopment

outreach

and

communications

in

these

environ-

mentsandcapturetheseapproachesincommunicationsstrategiesandplans.Thinklocallyandbringanentrepreneurialapproach:Informedbylocalactors,USAIDwillspecificallytailorprogrammingtothelocalenvironment, scaleupsuccessfulapproaches,anddiscon-tinueineffectiveinvestments. Everylocalityhasvaryingdriversofextremismorinsurgency,aswellasspecificresourcesandpoten-

tialpartnershipsthatcanmitigatethosedrivers. Successes

LOCALENTREPRENEURIALAPPROACHINCHAD

TheTSCTPprograminChadhasprovidedexten-sivetrainingandtechnicalassistancetofivenationalcivilsocietyorganizations,strengtheningtheirtechni-calandinstitutionalcapacity.OneexampleistheChadianAssociationofHerdersandNomads(AEN)whichhasdemonstratedasignificantleapincapacity,movingfromavolunteer-drivenassociation

toonethatincludesdedicatedfull-timestaff. USAIDpartnerssuchasAENprovidetrainingforcommu-nityleaderstosupporttheirroleinmobilizingcommunitymembersandfacilitatingparticipatoryproblem-solvingtoensurethatlocalinitiativesareappropriate,conflict-sensitive,andsustainable.

cannotautomaticallybereplicatedelsewherewithoutadjustmentfordifferentcontexts. Localactivitiesdonothavetobebig;smalamountsofresourcesatthecommunitylevelcanhaveasignifi-cantimpact. Bystartingsmall,riskcanbediversifiedandmitigated,allowingforexperimentalapproachesortestingnew,non-traditionalpartnerssuchasdiasporagroupsandprivatesec-

toractorswhomaybroadenUSAIDsreachandimpact.Anentrepreneurialapproachrequiresadifferentriskmanagementapproachandintensivemonitoringandevaluationeffortstolearnquicklyfromefforts,toexpandeffectiveinterventions,andlimitunsuccessfulprojects.Alongwithsupportinginformedriskmanagementandinnovativemonitoringandevaluationpractices,USAIDwillcontinuetoreviewanddisseminatebestpractices

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associatedwithalocallydriven,entrepreneurialapproachtorespondingtoviolentextremismandinsurgency.Considertransnationalstrategies:USAIDwilltakeadvan-tageofappropriateopportunitiesforcross-borderorregionalprogrammingandcoordination,asthedriversofviolentextremismandinsurgencyoftencrossnationalboundaries. Thiscouldincludecomplementaryprogrammingoneithersideofabor-der,oronecross-borderprogram. Sometimes,USGand/orhostcountrypoliciesoneithersideofthesamebordercouldbedifferentenoughtochallengetheexecutionofacoordi-natedapproach.TransnationalstrategiesrequirestrongcoordinationbetweenUSGandhost-governmententitiesinvolvedineachofthecountries. CoordinationwithUSGregional

actors

in Washington, Department

of

State Regional

Bureaus,aswellastheappropriateCombatantCommandisalsoessential. USAIDwillusecase-studyanalysistoexaminefurtherthelessonsandbestpracticesassociatedwithcross-borderorregionalprogrammingintheseenvironments.

WORKINGTRANSNATIONALLYINTHEHORNOFAFRICA

Counteringviolentextremism(CVE)programmingintheHornofAfricapromotesstabilityinastrategiccrossborderareathroughprovisionofcommunicationequip-menttolocalcommunitieswherepeacecommitteeshavebeenestablishedtoserveasafirstresponsetosta-bilizearegionaffectedbyviolentextremism,causedinpartbyal-Shabaabfighters.Thiscross-borderprogramisacriticalcomponentofanearly-warningandearly-responseapproachtothedriversofviolentextremism.

FOROPERATIONALANDMANAGEMENTRESPONSIVENESSFlexibility,agility,andprocurementspeed:USAIDwillincreaseitscapabilitytoprocurerapidly,adjustasconditionschange,andexpanditsworkwithandthroughlocalpartners.At

times,USAIDneedsmechanismsthatcanrespondinweeks,ifnotdays. Existing,pre-competedcontractingandgrant-makingmechanismsareexamplesofmorerapidprocurement. In

RAPIDPROCUREMENTCAPABILITY

Insituationswheretherearerapid-responseandprogram-start-uprequirements,USAIDsOfficeofTransitionInitiatives(OTI)pre-competedSWIFTcontractingmechanismallowsforamoremanage-ablecompetitionamongagroupofsevenorganizationsforspecificprograms. Onenewpro-curementcanbecompletedinanaverageoffourweeks,orevendaysifrequired. Inaddition,thecon-

tractrequirestheawardeetobeabletostartimplementingactivitieswithin48hoursofaward.

somesituations,exceptionstofullandopencompetitionmayberequired. Becausetheoperatingenvironmentisoftenhighlyfluid,flexibilityiscriticaltoallowforprogrammaticchange.USAIDwilldevelopavarietyofprocurementmechanismstoberesponsive,withflexibilitybuiltintoscopesofworkandoptionsforworkingwithavarietyoflocalandinternationalpartners.13 Contractingwithandprovidinggrantstomoreandvariedlocal partners, andcreatingtheconditionswhereaid isnolongernecessaryforthecountrieswherewework,isanobjectiveofUSAIDsImplementationandProcurementReform(IPR). Itisalsoanimportantelementofaneffectivedevelopmentresponsetoviolentextremismandinsurgency.AspartofIPR, USAIDwillcontinueto review itsprocurementpracticesandensurethatthereareoptionstoaddresstheneedforflexibility,agility,andrapidresponseinthesetypesofenvironments.Intensiveprogrammanagementandsystematicmonitoringandreportingofmeasuresofprogressandimpact:USAIDwillensurestaffisequippedtoprovidesubstantialdirectionandhands-onmanagementrequiredforresults,andthatprogramoversightisacloselysharedresponsibilitybetweenthefieldandheadquarters. Intensivemanagementandoversightrequirestafftimeandfieldvisits,whichMissionscan-notalwaysaccommodatewithlimitedoperatingexpensebudgetsand/orwhereUSAIDofficersmaynotbeabletodirectlyobserveprojectsgivensecurityrestrictions. Innovative13WorkingcloselywiththeappropriateandrelevantprocurementspecialistsinWashingtonandthefield.

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USINGDRIVERSBASEDRISKANALYSIS

SeveralUSAIDmissionsinAfricahaveusedtheprevi-ouslyreferencedGuidetotheDriversofViolentExtremismandDevelopmentAssistanceandCounter-Extremism: AGuidetoProgramming. Metricsderivedfromtheriskanalysiswereincorporatedintotraditionalandnon-tra-ditionalprogrammanagementtools,suchasbaselinestudies,mediaassessments,youth-ledcommunitymap-ping,andindependentpollingtoguideprogramimplementation.

MONITORINGINCHALLENGINGENVIRONMENTS

SomemissionssuchasIraq, Pakistan, andYemenhaveintroducedmulti-layeredmonitoringsystemsincludingindependentthird-partymonitoring,useofgeospatialinformationsystems(GIS)andphotography,interagencysupport,andlocalstakeholderengagement. Geospatialanalysis,inparticular,providesacommonlyunderstoodandpowerfulsystemsframeworktocollect,organizeandanalyzeplace-baseddata. Forinstance,spatialanaly-sisprovidesthecapabilitytolookattheeffectivenessofvariousaidprogramsandprojectsonstabilizationofdif-ferentcommunities.

usesoftechnology,includinggeospatialinformationsystems(GIS),canhelpovercomethesechallenges. Independent,third-partymonitoringandlocalstakeholderfeedback,whereappropriate,

can

also

be

useful.

Anotherimportantelementofmanagementandoversightisconsistent,appropriatecollectionof,andreportingon,measuresofprogressandimpactrelatedtocounteringdriversofviolentextremismandinsurgency.Whererelevant,USAIDwilltrackoutcome-levelindicatorsinthegeographicareasthatitspro-gramsaretargetingtomonitorwhetheritsactivitiesarehelping

toreducetheemergenceandseverityofviolentextremismandinsurgency. Learningfrominnovationsinthefield,USAIDwillcontinuetorefineitsmonitoringandevaluationplatformsand

tools,particularlywheresecurityisaconcern,toensuretheAgencyadaptsandretargetsitsprogramminginrealtime.USAIDwillalsoreviewitsoperating- expenseneedsrelatedtoeffectiveprogrammanagementandoversight.Innovation,evaluation,andlearning:USAIDwillpromoteinnovation,createmechanismsforself-critiqueandcontinuousadaptation,andsharelessonslearned.Arangeofmethodsareoftenrequiredtoensurereal-timeanalysisandlearninginclud-ingrapidappraisal,indicatorstiedtodrivers,andattitudeandbehavior-changemeasures.ThesemethodsrequireresourcesfromMissionsthatarefrequentlyunderstaffedand/orhavelim-itedbudgets. Inaddition,thestateoftheartforevaluatingactivitiescounteringviolentextremismandinsurgencyisstillnas-cent. USAIDwillfurtherresearchinthisfieldinthecontextofUSAIDsnewEvaluationPolicy.Thatpolicycallsforhigherstan-dardsofmethodologicalrigor,greatertransparencyaboutevaluationfindingsand,onaverage,dedicatingtoexternalevalu-ationatleastthreepercentoftheprogrambudgetmanagedbyanoperatingunit. USAIDwillexplorewaystoadaptitsreport-ingrequirementsandmonitoringandevaluationsystemstoenableresultsforecastinginshortertimeframesandprograms

LEARNINGBYEVIDENCESUMMITUSAIDsponsoredanEvidenceSummitinSeptember2010thatbroughttogetherrepresentativesfromtheinteragency,donorandacademiccommunitieswhospe-cializeinviolentextremismandinsurgencyrelatedresearchandevaluationtolauncheffortstoexaminemethodologiesforevaluatingprogrammingandtoinformthispolicy. Specifically,theSummitfocusedon

threeproblemareaswhereongoingdevelopmentprac-ticeandevidenceintersect:dampeningprocessesofradicalizationeitherattheindividualorsocietallevel;dis-ruptingtheformationofgroupswillingtoemployterrorandotherformsofpoliticalviolencetoachievetheiraims;andpromotingstabilizationonceaninsurgencyhasemerged.TheSummithighlightedUSAIDsownefforts

tolearnfromits engagementsinIraq,Afghanistan,Colombia,andtheSahelanddemonstratedwhatandhowtheagencyislearning,whilealsopointingoutmeas-urestheagencycantaketoimproveitspractices.

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USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency

tobeadjustedaslocalcontextsevolve. USAIDsBureauforPolicy,PlanningandLearning(PPL)willdevelopspecificguidanceandhighlightgoodpracticesforevaluationsincomplexsettings,wherealackofabilitytomeasureimpact, shorttimeframes, andevaluatorsafetymaybeconcerns.Informedrisk-takingandexperimentation: SupportedbyimprovedAgency-widepracticesandinformedbythebestavail-ableinformationandmitigationpractices,USAIDstaffwillbeencouragedtotakerisks,adapttoincorporatelessonslearned,andbuildonsuccess. Thereisahighdegreeofphysical,psychological,programmaticandfinancialriskinherentintheseofteninsecureenvironments.TheseenvironmentscanputAgencyandimple-mentingpartnerstaffatphysicalandpsychologicalrisk,andAgencyresourcesandpracticeshavenotkeptpace. Program-matically,therearechallenges:itcanbedifficulttoidentifydriversandprogrammingoptions;thereremainsneedforexperimenta-

tionandnotallprogramswillsucceed;and,insomecases,takinganyorcertainactionsmaybecounterproductive.

PolicyGuidance

USAIDwillimproveitspracticesandresourcesdirectedattheserisks.TheAgencywillsupportstaffwithtraining,confidentialcon-sultations,physical-fitnessopportunities,andbenefits. Missionmanagerswillensurethatimplementingpartnersreceiveappro-priateresourcesandhavemethodsforpromotingstaffwell-being. USAIDwilldevelopflexible,creativestandardstodefineprogramsuccesstoincludedecidingnottoact,aswellasadapting,basedoncontinuouslearningofwhatdoesanddoesnotwork.USAIDwillalsoconsideradditionalmechanismstoverifythatintendedbeneficiariesareusingresourcesforintendedpurposes. Wherenecessary,MissionswillavailthemselvesofscreeningmechanismsavailablethroughUSAIDsOfficeofSecu-rity,andwillconsultwiththeRLAorGC,asappropriate. Thisensuresthatacontext-appropriatevettingsystemnotonlyaddressestheimpactonprograms,butisalsothoroughandmeetstheregulatoryandlegalrequirementsalreadyaddressedbyestablishedsystems.

MITIGATINGRISKIn-KindGrants:In-kindratherthancashassistancetolocalorganizationsallowstheAgencytoworkwithnon-tra-ditionalpartnerswhoeitherarenotformalorganizationsorwouldnotnecessarilymeetrequirementsforreceivingcashgrants. In-kindassistanceprovidestheAgencyamodalitythroughwhichtotakeariskbysupportingactorswhoarenewtoreceivingassistance,buthaveimportantideasthatneedtobesupported.InAfghanistan:A3(AccountableAssistanceforAfghanistan)isaUSAIDinitiativetopreventdiversionofassis-

tancebyextortionorcorruption. Somechangesincluderestrictingthenumberofsubcontracttiers;tighteningfinancialcontrolstoestablishauditingproceduresfor100percentoflocallyincurredprojectcosts;advocatingincreaseduseofelectronicfundstransfers;performingadditionalprojectoversightinhigh-riskareas;anddelegatingmoreoversightauthoritytoUSAIDfieldstaff.

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USAIDInternalChanges USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency

7 USAID INTERNALCHANGESToadvancetheAgencysdevelopmentresponsetoviolentextremismandinsurgency,thispolicydirectsUSAIDtoimple-mentthefollowingchangessomeimmediately,othersover

time.FormalizeseniorleadershipinvolvementUSAIDseniorleadersandmanagerswillengageinrelevantpol-icy,strategy,andprogramdecision-makingandoversight,asappropriate. EachrelevantBureau/OfficewilldesignateoneDeputyAssistantAdministrator(DAA)/equivalenttoberesponsibleforrelevantstrategicandinteragencyengagementandforthispolicysimplementationatthoselevels. Similarly,MissionDirectorswillberesponsibleinthefieldastheyengageonprogramdevelopment,management,andrelatedopera-

tionalissues.Thispolicysengagementcriteriawillframeseniorleader/managerinvolvementontheseissues.EstablishandempoweranAgencySteeringCommitteeUSAIDwillestablishandempoweraSteeringCommittee.RelevantBureau/Officeheadswilldesignatestaffto,andsup-port theirserviceon, theSteeringCommittee,whichwill:

Overseethispolicysimplementation; Provide technical leadershipand support, particularly to

Missions;

DriveAgencyknowledgemanagement;and Support Agency andinteragencyplanning, strategy, andcoordination.

AnarticulationoftheSteeringCommitteesstructureandopera-tionwillfollowthispolicy. USAIDwillalsodesignateafull-timeSeniorPolicyAdvisortoserveacontinuouscoordinationfunctionontheseissues.

CraftnewpolicyguidanceUSAIDwilldevelopnewguidancetofacilitateprogramanalysisdesign,andimplementation,inaccordancewiththispolicy. Pri-orityactionissuesinclude:

Riskmanagementinhigh-threatenvironments; Procurementflexibilityforeffectiveandtimelyresponse

informed by on-goingefforts; and, Effectivecommunicationstrategies,includingupdated

brandingguidance.ExecuteappliedresearchagendaUSAIDwillcoordinateanappliedresearchagenda,anddisseminatefindings,asappropriate. Possibleresearchareasinclude:genderincounteringviolentextremismandinsurgency;useofmediaandcommunications;and,programmeasurementandevaluation.TheAgencywillmineexistingUSGandexternalinformation, research, andapproachesin itsresearchefforts.Designandimplementknowledge-management systemUSAIDwillsystematicallycollectanddisseminatecasestudiesandlessonslearnedcriticaltoengagementontheseissues.USAIDwilltrainstaffonthispolicy,relatedtoolsandthemostrecentfieldexperienceandlearning.TheAgencywillprioritize

trainingforseniormanagersoperatingintheseenvironments,fieldandWashingtonstaffwhodesignandmanageprograms,aswellasnewDevelopmentLeadershipInitiative(DLI)ForeignServiceOfficers.Whereappropriate,trainingshouldincluderelevantstudyoflanguage,culture,andpolitics. USAIDwilladaptpoliciesandsystemstoensurepersonnelreceivenotonlytrainingbutfieldmentorshipandtechnical support.

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USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency USAIDInternalChanges/Conclusion

TheAgencywillalsoseekcollaborative,USG-widetrainingopportunities.Thisincludes expanding Agency participationinForeignServiceInstitute(FSI)coursesandDODpre-deploy-mentprograms. USAIDwillseekgreaterinteragencyinclusioninitsowntrainings.StrengtheninteragencyleadershiproleUSAIDwillrobustlyparticipateinrelevantinteragencyprocesses. USAIDwillproactivelyengagethePresidentsNationalSecurityStaff(NSS),DOS,DOD,andotheragencies

tofurtheritsinteragencyintegrationontheseissues.TheAgencywillsystematicallyengageitsSeniorDevelopmentAdvi-sorstotheCombatantCommands,andthelattersUSAIDLiaison Officers, in these efforts. USAID will strengthen intera-gency

sharing

of

its

growing

technical

expertise

in

countering

thedriversofviolentextremismandinsurgency,andwilllearnfromhowtheinteragencyanalyzesandprogramsvis--vis

thesechallenges.Enhancebilateral,international,andnon-traditionalpartnerengagementIncoordinationwiththeinteragency,USAIDwillincreaseitsengagementwithotherdonoragenciesonthedevelopmentresponsetoviolentextremismandinsurgency.Whereappro-priate,USAIDwillmovebeyondinformationsharingtocountry-based,

joint

strategy

development

and

program

plan-

ning. Multilaterally,USAIDwillalsodrawonandsharebestpractices.The Agencywillengagenon-traditional partnersincounteringlocaldriversofviolentextremismandinsurgency.Diasporagroups,theprivatesector,andlocalreligiousleadersoftenpossessareachthatmakethempotentiallyeffectivepart-nersinamplifyingUSAIDslocalimpact.14

CONCLUSIONInformedby broaderUSG effortsincludingtheU.S. GlobalDevelopmentPolicyandQDDR,thispolicyservesasafounda-tiononwhichUSAIDwilldesignandimplementeffective,evidence-baseddevelopmentprogrammingtargetingdriversofvio-lentextremismandinsurgencywhilesystemicallylearningfromandadaptingitsapproaches.USAIDisindispensibletoanyUSGdevelopmentresponsetocounterviolentextremismandinsur-gency. ThepolicywillalsofortifyUSAIDsdevelopmentvoiceastheUSGdevisesandimplementspolicies,strategiesandprogramsinsupportofoursharednationalsecurityobjectives.

14

Documents

￼THE DEVELOPMENT RESPONSE TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND INSURGENCY USAID POLICY BUREAU FOR POLICY, PLANNING AND LEARNING SEPTEMBER 2011 Putting Principles into Practice

THE DEVELOPMENT RESPONSE TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND INSURGENCY USAID POLICY BUREAU FOR POLICY, PLANNING AND LEARNING SEPTEMBER 2011 Putting Principles into Practice