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of International Security Assistance ManagementVOL. 29 NO. 1February 2007

TheDepartment of Defense

Regional Centers forSecurity Assistance

TheDepartment of Defense

Regional Centers forSecurity Assistance

THE DISAM JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT

I do not know if things around your house are like they are at mine – every year weare inundated with subscription requests for ourselves or others (as gifts) from a varietyofpublications. AtDISAMwedonotbeat thebushes,butwearegladyouareononeofapproximately1500thatwesendprintedcopiesoftheJournal.Ihopethatyougetsomethingoutofeacheditionandweareproudofthis.

OurfeaturearticlesthiseditionfocusonthefiveDepartmentofDefenseRegionalCentersforSecurityStudies. Wehaveanoverviewarticleandthenindividualarticlesprovidedbyeachcenter.Itwillnottakeyoulongtoreadeachofthem,andIknowmostwillfocusontheonemorethatmaybemostapplicabletoyouifyouhaveaparticularareaofresponsibilityof interest. In addition to those, there is a variety of regional articles in our LegislationandPolicysectionthatprovidepolicy inputs fromtheDepartmentofState,addressing theAmericas,MiddleEast,EastAsiaandPacific,andSouthandCentralAsia.Also,country-specifictopicsaddressingJapan,Korea,andTaiwanfurtherdevelopPacificregionalissues.

OurPerspectives sectioncontainsarticles fromoneofDISAM’sguest instructors,Mr.RolandTropewholooksattheimportanceandrelevanceoftechnologytransferrulesindealingwith“ImmaterialTransferswithMaterialConsequences”aswellastwoofDISAM’sfull-timefaculty. MajorHankKronpresents a paper he recently presented at anArmy conferencedealingwithMiddleCross-Culturalissues.

The Army Security Assistance Training Management Organization’s provides theirthoughtsontheimportanceofateamtrainingconceptindevelopingthecapabilitiesofourfriendsandallies.Similarly,youcanseehowMedicalCivicAssistancePrograms(MEDCAPs)arealsocontributingtohostcountrycapabilities.

Mr.GaryTaphornlooksattheplanningfunctionwithinthesecurityassistanceofficein-countryandtheflowfromtheplanningguidanceandprocessesfortheMissionPerformancePlan,TheaterSecurityCooperationPlan,CombinedEducationandTrainingProgramPlan,and the Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and TrainingBudgettools.Wefollowthatarticlewithan“IntroductiontoTheaterStrategyandRegionalSecurity”suppliedbyLieutenantColonelClarenceBouchat,theArmyWarCollege’sDirectorofTheaterOperationsStudies.

Two of DISAM’s experts in distance learning, Mr. Rick Rempes and Mr. Bill RempocollaboratetogiveyouanupdateofDISAM’son-lineprograms.WhatagrowingenvironmentthroughouttheDepartmentofDefense. It isbothexcitingandamazingtoseehowfarthequalityanddiversityofon-lineeducationandtraininghavecomeinsucharelativelyshorttime.

ThisJournalcapturesanumberofarticlesviaotherchannels,butmorethannormal,alsoprovidesmoreinputfromthecoresecuritycooperationcommunity.Thankstoallfortheirinputsthatmakethiseditionatrue“keeper”.Bestwishestoallforablessedholidayseasonandaterrific2007.KnowthatDISAMlooksforwardtothecomingyearandtheopportunitytosupportallofyouinyoursecuritycooperationefforts!

RONALDH.REYNOLDS Commandant

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Feature Articles “TheDepartmentofDefenseReg�onalCentersforSecur�tyAss�stanceStud�es”................ 1 “TheGeorgeC.MarshallCenterEuropeanCenterforSecur�tyStud�es”............................. 5 “AsianPacificCenterforSecurityStudies”........................................................................ 11 “TheCenterforHem�spher�cDefenseStud�es”.................................................................. 15 “TheAfr�caCenterforStrateg�cStud�es”........................................................................... 19 “NearEastSouthAs�aCenterforStrateg�cStud�es”........................................................... 23

Legislation and Policy ThomasA.Shannon,Ass�stantSecretaryofStateforWesternHem�sphereAffa�rs “WhytheAmer�casMatter”......................................................................................... 25 RobertG.Joseph,UnderSecretaryofStateforArmsControlandInternat�onalSecur�ty “Broaden�ngandDeepen�ngOurProl�ferat�onSecur�tyIn�t�at�veCooperat�on”........ 32 C.Dav�dWelch,Ass�stantSecretaryofStateforNearEasternAffa�rs “M�ddleEastReg�onatCr�t�calCrossroads”............................................................... 36 AmbassadorRandallL.Tob�as,D�rectorofUn�tedStatesFore�gnAss�stanceand Un�tedStatesAgencyforInternat�onalDevelopmentAdm�n�strator “TheUn�tedStatesandJapan:Partners�nHope”........................................................ 39 ChristopherHill,AssistanceSecretaryofStateforEastAsianandPacificAffairs “TheUn�tedStatesandtheRepubl�cofKoreaAll�ance”............................................ 42 CliffordA.Hart,Jr.,Director,OfficeofTaiwanCoordination “TheUnitedStatesPolicyTowardTaiwan”................................................................. 48 R�chardA.Boucher,Ass�stantSecretaryofStateforSouthandCentralAs�a “SouthandCentralAs�aUpdate”................................................................................. 51

Perspectives “TheGlobalMasterofArtsProgram:AGraduate’sPerspect�ve”............................... 53 ColonelStewardKowall,USAF,ChiefofInternationalTrainingandEducationfor DeputyUnderSecretaryoftheA�rForceforInternat�onalAffa�rs “HowtoRequestandGetThoseExclusiveFlyingTrainingQuotas”......................... 55 RolandL.Trope,TropeandSchrammLLP “ImmaterialTransferswithMaterialConsequences”.................................................. 57 R�chardN.Helfer,Colonel,USAandJonD.Jones,Un�tedStatesArmySecur�ty Ass�stanceTra�n�ngManagementOrgan�zat�on “Strengthen�ngOurAll�es,OneSold�erataT�me”..................................................... 64

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THE DISAM JOURNALof International Security Assistance Management

Volume 29 No. 1

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L�eutenantColonelDouglasLougee,USA,BrookeArmyMed�calCenter “CanWeBu�ldaBetterMed�calC�v�cAss�stanceProgram?Mak�ngtheMost ofMed�calHuman�tar�anC�v�cAss�stanceFund�ng”............................................. 68 Henry“Hank”Kron,Major,USA,DefenseInst�tuteofSecur�tyAss�stanceManagement “Cross-CulturalCons�derat�onsfortheUn�tedStatesSecur�tyCooperat�on �ntheM�ddleEast”.............................................................................................. 74 GaryTaphorn,DefenseInst�tuteofSecur�tyAss�stanceManagement “PlanningfortheSecurityAssistanceOrganization:OrHowDoWeGetThere FromHere?”............................................................................................................. 88 L�eutenantColonelClarenceJ.Bouchat,D�rector,TheaterOperat�onsStud�es U.S.ArmyWarCollege “AnIntroduct�ontoTheaterStrategyandReg�onalSecur�ty”..................................... 99Education and Training R�chardRempesandB�llR�mpo,DefenseInst�tuteofSecur�tyAss�stanceManagement “DefenseInst�tuteofSecur�tyAss�stanceManagement:D�stanceLearn�ng UpdatesandIn�t�at�ves”........................................................................................ 123

The Department of Defense Regional Centers for Security Assistance Studies

Providinginternationalvenuesforbilateralandmultilateralstudy,communication,andexchangeofideas.TheDepartmentofDefense(DoD)RegionalCentersforSecurityStudiesare: • TheGeorgeC.MarshallEuropeanCenterforSecurityStudies • TheAsiaPacificCenterforSecurityStudies • TheCenterforHemisphericDefenseStudies • TheAfricaCenterforStrategicStudies • TheNearEastSouthAsiaCenterforStrategicStudies The regional centers are theprincipal strategiccommunications tools for creatinga regionaldialogueonU.S.securitypolicyfortheSecretaryofDefense.Theyprovideinternationalvenuesforbilateralandmultilateralstudy,communication,andexchangeofideasinvolvingmilitaryandcivilianparticipants.ConsistentwiththeSecretary’snewvisionforthecenters,theircoreobjectivesareto: • Counterideologicalsupportforterrorism • Harmonizeviewsoncommonsecuritychallenges • Educateontheroleofdefenseincivilsocieties TheSecretaryofDefensechargedeachof theDirectors to transform the regional centers tomeetthechallengesofthepost-September11,2001world.Inadditiontoarticulatingthethreecoreobjectivesareaslistedabove,thenewvisionincludesthefollowingguidanceforthecenters:

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• Focus on improving alumni outreach programs to better communicate with and influenceforeignsecurityelites. • MaximizecollaborationwiththeOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense(OSD)toensure that center programs are consistent with U.S. government policy and that policy- makersareinformedbythecenters’wealthofexpertise. • Increasecoordinationamongthecenters. • A collaborative set of centers with a coherent message exceeds the sum of their individualcontributions. • Strive tobecome test beds for interagency jointnessby strengthening tieswith the DepartmentofState(DoS)andotheragencies. • Help lead the Department’s efforts to improve cooperation with non-government organizations,particularlyhumanitarianorganizations,toinformationU.S.government decision-makingincrises. • Expandparticipationtoincludemorenon-governmenteliteswhoshapeopinionsand informdecisionsonsecurityissuesintheregion. • Createacommoninformationtechnologynetworktoimprovealumnioutreachefforts andstrengthencollaborationamongcenters,otherDoDeducationalinstitutions,and OSDpolicy. • CooperateonthetransitiontotheDefenseSecurityCooperationAgency(DSCA)as theunifiedexecutiveagentforallcenters. On29September2005,theDeputySecretaryofDefensesignedthememorandumestablishingtheDSCAastheexecutiveagentfortheregionalcenterseffective1October2005.Astheexecutiveagent,theDirector,DSCA,subjecttothepolicyoversightoftheUnderSecretaryofDefenseforPolicy(USD(P))isresponsibleforprogramming,budgeting,andexecutionforallresourcesnecessarytosupporttheoperationoftheregionalcenters,toincludealloperationandmaintenancecosts(includingpersonnelcostsandbaseoperationssupportcosts),exceptthattheSecretaryoftheArmyshallremainresponsibleforbaseoperationsandpersonnelsupportfortheGeorgeC.MarshallEuropeanCenterforSecurityStudiesinaccordancewithDoDDirective5100.3. InadditiontotheirrelationshipwithDSCA,thedirectorsoftheregionalcenters,alsosubjecttothepolicyoversightoftheUSD(P),reportto,andarecurrentlyundertheauthority,direction,andcontrolof,commandersofthecombatantcommands,asfollows: • U.S.EuropeanCommand:GeorgeC.MarshallEuropeanCenterforSecurityStudies • U.S.EuropeanCommand:AfricaCenterforStrategicStudies • U.S.PacificCommand:AsiaPacificCenterforSecurityStudies • U.S.SouthernCommand:CenterforHemisphericDefenseStudies • U.S.CentralCommand:NearEast-SouthAsiaCenterforStrategicStudies Infiscalyear2006,theregionalcentersweretheDepartment’sprimaryassetforregionaloutreachandnetwork-buildingefforts,extendingprogramsandeventstomorethan7,000representativesfromover160differentcountries.Theregionalcentersprogramstargetforeignmilitaryofficers,civiliansecurityanddefensepolicyofficials,andkeynon-governmentinfluencerswith: • Residentprogramsconductedattheregionalcenters • Regionalin-theaterprograms

• Outreachopportunitiesinconjunctionwithapermanentregionalpresence EachoftheRC’sutilizessophisticatedpre-andpost-attendancesurveystogagetheeffectivenessoftheprogrammaterialandreinforcecontinuedcommunicationwiththeparticipant. Residentprogramsconductedatthecentersnotonlyprovideacademicinstruction,theyleveragetheopportunityforparticipantstogainanAmericanculturalexperienceatthesametime.ThecentersintheWashingtonD.C.areaalsotargetrepresentativesofthediplomaticcorps.Forfiscalyear2006,almost60percentoftheprogramsofferedwereresidentprograms.Thatratiowilldecreasetothe30-40percentrangebyfiscalyear2009asfundingbecomesavailabletoincreaseregionalin-theaterprograms. Regionalin-theaterprogramsprovideunique“outreach”opportunitiestounderstandregionalchallengesandconcernsandtailorthecontentofseminars,coursesandworkshops.Duetotheflatbudgetprojectionsfromfiscalyears2007to2008theregionalcenterswillconcentrateonrevisingandexpandingtheirregionalin-theatreprogramofferingsfocusingonrealigningtheirprioritiestomeettheQuadrennial Defense Reviewobjectives.Thein-theaterprogramsprovidethefoundationforinitiatinganddevelopingrelationshipswithkeyinfluenceswithinthevariouscountries. TheregionalcenterscontinuetoredesigntheirprogramsinresponsetoPresidentialandDoDdirectives,placingrenewedemphasisoncounteringideologicalsupportforterrorism.Forexample,infiscalyear2007eachofthecenterswillpursueadiversegroupofregionalcenterpartnerstoofferreal-world,casestudy-orientedcoursesthat leverageexisting,regionalmilitary,governmentalandnon-governmentaleducationalinstitutions.Allfivecentersproposeaddingprogramsorcontentonunderstandingandrespondingtoterrorism,andwillcontinuetorefinecontent.AkeyexampleistheStability,Security,Transition,andReconstruction(SSTR)Coursethatisbeingdesignedtodevelopandenhancesecuritypractitionerknowledgeofandskillinplanning,preparing,andrespondingtothemyriadofcomplexchallengesofanSSTRscenario.Overall,infiscalyear2007thecenterswillincludecounterterrorismmodulesinalmost80percentofallprogramofferings. Theregionalcentersarealsoplacingadditionalemphasisonnewprogramsdesignedtobuildonrelationshipswithformerparticipants,creatingvaluablein-roadstokeyregionalleaders.Beginninginfiscalyear2009,thecenterswillincreaseoutreachofferingsby25percent,includingin-regioncourses, in-region conferences, in-region workshops, in-region seminars, and former participantactivities.Thecenterswillalsoincreasetheirleverageofcommunicationproductsthroughmultimedia,distancelearning,newsletters,e-bulletins,andwebcaststosynchronizeoutreachefforts,reachingalargergroupinlesstime. In-regionpresenceisseenasessentialtobuildinganetworktoleverageformerparticipantasamechanismtoinfluence • Militaryorganizations • Governments • Academics • Keycivilsocietyactors • Representativesofinternationalorganizations • Non-governmentalorganizations • PrivatesectorentitiesimportanttoU.S.governmentandDoDgoals andobjectivesintheregion Beginninginfiscalyear2007thecenterswillexpendsignificanteffortstoestablishapermanentfootprintintheMiddleEastandAfricanregions.Additionally,allofthecenterswillincreasetheir

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engagement with regional military war colleges and civilian universities to partner on programs,developingadditionalrelationshipstofacilitatestrategiccommunicationsintheirregions. Combatantcommandershavereportedtheyconsidertheregionalcenterstobeamongtheirmosteffectivesecuritycooperationprograms.Keypartnersalsorecognizethevalueofparticipationinthecenters: • Onecenteralonecountsamongitsalumnitwoministersofdefense • Oneministerofforeignaffairs • Eightchiefsordeputychiefsofdefense • Twelvechiefsordeputychiefsofservice • Twenty-fiveambassadors ThearticlesonthefollowingpageshighlighttheuniquenessofeachCenterandtheirimpressivecontributionstotheirregions.


Thereexistsanunderutilizedtool,asfarassecurityassistanceisconcerned,inthecombatantcommanders’arsenal for furtheringU.S. interests, their regional securitycenters. TheGeorgeC.MarshallCenteractivities includeeducation, research,andoutreach throughacombinationof in-residenceandin-regioncourses,seminars,andconferences.Untilnowthecentershaveplayedonlyaminorroleinareasofsecurityassistance.However,duetotheneedtoensureorganizationswhichenableourcollectivesecurityeffortspresentaunifiedfront,thecoordinationbetweenorganizationswhichtraditionallyplanandexecutesecurityassistanceandthecenterscanandshouldincreaseorfundamentallychange. Inthepast,therewaslittlemotivationfortheregionalsecuritycenterstoinvolvethemselvesin security assistance processes. On 1 October 2005, the Defense Security CooperationAgency(DSCA)tookadministrativeresponsibilitywhichincludesplanning,programming,andbudgeting,of theregionalcenters. TheRegionalCombatantCommands(RCC)havemaintainedoperationalcontrol.InlightofDSCA’srole,thisshouldobligethecenterstobecomebiggerplayersinsecurityassistance, includingthecloseplanningandcoordinationofevents toensurecongruencywiththeoverarchingsecuritycooperationrequirementsoftheOfficeofSecretaryofDefenseandtheRCC.Inviewofothernationsandmultinationalorganizations,theregionalcentersbenefitfromatraditionalassociationwithacademia rather than themilitary. Theyarealsoabetter resource for furtheringthemesassociatedwithU.S.securityassistanceenabledstrategiccommunicationsefforts,aswellasotherareasrelatedtotheday-to-dayexecutionofsecurityassistance.

Thisarticlewillprovideabriefunderstandingofwhatconstitutethemajorelementsofsecurityassistance, also referred to as military assistance by the Department of State and the agenciesresponsible for its execution. Iwillmake specific recommendations forgreater regional securitycenterinvolvementtoenhancesecurityassistanceprocesses.

The Elements of Security Assistance

According to the Department of State (DoS), foreign assistance programs fall into nineteentypesofaccountsinfivemajorcategories.Militaryassistanceisonecategory.1AlltheDoSforeignassistance programs have the goal of advancing U.S. foreign policy, each with slightly differentapproachesanddifferentprogramsbutultimatelyfocusedonthesamepurpose. AccordingtotheForeign Assistance Act:

TheCongressherebyfinds that theeffortsof theUnitedStatesandother friendlycountriestopromotepeaceandsecuritycontinuetorequiremeasuresofsupportbasedupon the principle of effective self-help and mutual aid [through] measures in thecommondefense against internal and external aggression, including the furnishing ofmilitaryassistance,uponrequest,tofriendlycountriesandinternationalorganizations.”2

The George C. Marshall Center European Center for Security Studies

1. UnitedStatesDepartmentofState,U.S. Foreign Assistance Reference Guide,Washington,GPO,January 2005.2. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961(PublicLaw87-195),asamended,4September1961,website:http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/109/24796.pdf,page215,20June2006.


Military assistance aid includes foreign military financing (FMF) and international militaryeducationandtraining(IMET). TheForeign Assistance Actstates:

ThePresidentisauthorizedtofurnishmilitaryassistance,onsuchtermsandconditionsashemaydetermine,toanyfriendlycountryorinternationalorganization,theassistingofwhichthePresidentfindswillstrengthenthesecurityoftheUnitedStatesandpromoteworldpeaceandwhichisotherwiseeligibletoreceivesuchassistance,byacquiringfromanysourceandproviding(byloanorgrant)anydefensearticleordefenseservice.3

InrelationtoIMET,italsostatesthefollowing: ThePresidentisauthorizedtofurnish,onsuchtermsandconditionsconsistentwiththisActasthePresidentmaydeterminemilitaryeducationandtrainingtomilitaryandrelatedcivilianpersonnelofforeigncountries.”�OnestatedobjectiveoftheFMFprogramistopromotebilateral,regionalandmultilateralcoalitionefforts,notablyintheGlobalWaronTerrorism.5

ThepurposeofIMETistoprovidetrainingtostudentsfromalliedandfriendlynations.IMETstudentsprimarilyconsistofforeignmilitarypersonnel,butinsomeinstancescanincludeciviliansaswell.AnassumptionmadeaboutIMETisthatduetotheexposuretoU.S.professionalmilitaryorganizationsinademocracy(underciviliancontrol),similarvaluesordesireforalike-mindedandorganizedmilitarywillbetransferredtotheIMETstudentandpropagatedupontheirreturntotheirhomecountry.AkeyobjectiveofIMETistoencourageeffectiveandmutuallybeneficialrelationsandincreasedunderstandingbetweentheUnitedStatesandforeigncountriesinfurtheranceofthegoalsofinternationalpeaceandsecurity.6

The Execution of security assistance - Department of State Within the DoS, the Under Secretary forArms Control and International Security leads theinteragencypolicyprocessandprovidespolicydirectionforsecurityassistance.TheUnderSecretaryhaspolicyoversightfortheBureauofPolitical-MilitaryAffairs. TheBureauofPolitical-MilitaryAffairsbridgesthegapbetweenDoSandtheDepartmentofDefense(DoD)andalsoprovidespolicydirectioninsecurityassistancematters.TheUnderSecretaryforPoliticalAffairsmanagestheday-to-dayaffairsofregionalpolicyissuesandtheirbureaus,Africa,EastAsiaandPacific,EuropeandEurasia,NearEast,SouthAsia,WesternHemisphere,InternationalOrganizations,andInternationalNarcoticsandLawEnforcement. Theassistantsecretariesofthegeographicbureaus, throughtheUnderSecretary,guidetheoperationsofthevariousU.S.missions.The Execution of Security Assistance - Department of Defense AccordingtotheDoD,whenmeasuredinman-years,itexpendsthegreatestlevelofeffortinthe day-to-day management of security assistance an estimated 20,000 man-years.7 The Foreign Assistance ActchargestheSecretaryofDefensewithmanyaspectsofsecurityassistance,toinclude

3 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961(PublicLaw87-195),asamended,4September1961,website:http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/109/24796.pdf,p.258,20June2006.�. Ibid.,pp.251,252.5. UnitedStatesDepartmentofState,U.S. Foreign Assistance Reference Guide,Washington,GPO,pp.37,38,January2005.6. Ibid,p.33.7. DefenseInstituteforSecurityAssistanceManagement,The Management of Security Assistance,at:http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DR/greenbook.htm,4July2006


theestablishmentofprioritiesintheprocurement,delivery,andallocationofmilitaryequipmentandidentificationofrequirements.8TheUnderSecretaryofDefenseforPolicyisthecenterofgravitywithinDoDforsecurityassistancematters.TheUnderSecretaryservesastheprincipaladvisortotheSecretaryofDefenseforallmattersconcernedwiththeintegrationofdepartmentalplansandpolicieswithoverallnationalsecurityobjectives,andexercisesoveralldirection,authority,andcontroloversecurityassistancemattersthroughthevariousassistantsecretariesofdefenseanddepartments.9TheDoD-levelagencymanagingtheday-to-daydirectionandexecutionofsecurityassistanceforDoDistheDefensesecuritycooperationAgency,asubordinatetotheAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforInternationalSecurityAffairs. ThecombatantcommandersareresponsibleformakingrecommendationstotheSecretaryofDefenseonallmattersrelatedtosecurityassistance,toincludeprograms,policies,andprojections.EachcombatantcommandintegrateselementsofsecurityassistanceanditscomponentU.S.foreignpolicygoalsandobjectivesintobroadtheaterengagementstrategies. ThesestrategiesbuilduponguidanceintheSecretaryofDefensesecuritycooperationGuidance.Aprimarydifferencebetweenthesecretary’sguidanceand thatof thecombatantcommands iswhereas thesecretary’sguidancemaynotmentioneveryregionorcountryinacombatantcommandsareaofresponsibility(AOR),thecommandsstrategynormallycontainsacountry-by-countryrundownofobjectivesanddesiredend-states. Withinthecombatantcommands,thesinglefacetothecustomeristypicallythesecurityassistanceorganization(SAO),whichispartoftheembassyandcountryteam.Thecombatantcommanderscommand,supervise,andsupportthevariousSAOswithintheirAOR.ThefunctionsarenormallydonewithclosecoordinationandcooperationwiththerespectiveChiefsofMission.ThelegislatedfunctionsofSAOsare: • Foreignmilitarysalescasemanagement • IMETprogrammanagement • Securityassistanceprogrammonitoring,evaluation,andplanningofthehostcountry’s militarycapabilitiesandrequirements • Administrativesupport • Promotinginternationalcooperativeprograms • Otherliaisonfunctions10

Recommendations for Change Sincemanycombatantcommandshaveresponsibilitiesassociatedwithsecurityassistancespreadamongmorethanonedirectorate,theregionalcenters,withtherequisitestaffingandresources,areinapositiontoensuretheseeffortsareconsolidatedandfocusedbyassistingthecombatantcommandlevelplanning,executionandoversightofsecurityassistance.Likewise,theregionalcenterscanhelpunifytheeffortsoftheothersecurityassistanceorganizationsastheyrelatetooursecuritycooperationend-statesandobjectivesaswellasprovideconsistencyofmessagetoourforeigncounterparts.

8. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961(PublicLaw87-195),asamended,4September1961,athttp://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/109/24796.pdf,p.308,20June2006.9. DefenseInstituteforSecurityAssistanceManagement,The Management of Security Assistance,athttp://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DR/greenbook.htm,4July2006.10 Ibid.


Involvementbytheregionalcenterswouldprovidedimensionsandfocusotherorganizationsmay not with regard to security assistance. The centers’ involvement in the security assistanceprocesscouldallowforgreaterconsistencyandcoordinationofnationalandRCClevelStrategicCommunicationsthemestobeintegrated.EvenwiththelegislatedrestrictiononwhocanbetrainedunderIMET,centersstillprovidealargerandmorediverseaudiencebasesincethecentersdrawuponnotonlymilitary leadership,butcivilian leaders,membersof the legislature,andmembersof theinternationalmedia.Theentireaudiencecouldbeexposedtothepurposesandresultsofoursecurityassistanceandotheraidprograms,andcenterscouldprovidealargerandbetterpoolofmetricdatatobolsterfundingdecisionsandanystrategychanges. Asanacademicinstitution,inordertoextendthecontactandexposuretoU.S.messages,thecenterscoulddevelopandcultivatea sortof alumniassociationof IMETstudentsas theydo fortheircourseattendees.11Analumniassociationwouldprovideandenhancetheexecutionofsecurityassistanceinthefollowingmanner: • A better mechanism for developing and maintaining a RCC specific database of attendeestoU.S.sourcededucationandtrainingandthemeansofconstantcontact throughthelifeandserviceoftheindividual. • A forum to reinforce training and further develop themes instilled during training –democracy,ruleoflaw,andsoforth. • A sense of belonging to an organization of elites among their fellow countrymenandpeers. • TheSAOcanutilizethispooltoidentifycurrentandfuture“moversandshakers”who shouldbesystematicallyidentifiedforfurtherdevelopmentthroughIMET. • ApoolofpotentialadvocatestoforwardcertainU.S.positionsorpolicies. • Aforumforcontactonamoresocialratherthanofficialormilitarylevel,onefrom which,takingaculturalviewpoint,theU.S.couldderivestrategicdividends. Ascentersofacademicexcellence,theregionalcentersarewell-placedandequippedtoenhancethetheater,regional,andcountryunderstandingformilitaryandcivilianpersonneltoincludeforeignservice nationals involved in security assistance. This includes those assigned to the regionalcommands, the components of that command, and any other associated unit involved in securityassistanceandcooperationstrategy.Thecenterscanprovideinitialandcontinuingregionandcountry-specificeducationandorientationpriortotheseindividuals’arrivalattheirassignments.Thepurposeandoverallbenefittothisproposalisanequallevelofunderstandingregardingcountry,region,andAORspecificsecurityissuesandplantowardattainmentoftheRCCs’securitycooperationobjectivesandend-states.Theregionalcentersaredistinct,suchastheMarshallCenterbeingabilateralU.S.andGermanorganization,soeventuallysomehybridofthepreviousrecommendationsmayemerge,buttheultimateresultwouldbethesame. Itisapparenttheregionalcentersareuniqueorganizationswithuniquemissions,oneswhichcouldenhancetheexecutionofsecurityassistanceandtheRCCs’securitycooperationefforts.Theypossessthenecessarytools,well-qualifiedfaculty,andbackgroundtobringthispaper’srecommendationstofruition;itisuptotheRCCstotapintoandmakeefficientuseofthesetools.Thiswillnecessitate

11. SimilarrecommendationsforanIMET-relatedassociationcanbefoundinJohnCope’sInternationalMilitaryEducationandTraining:AnAssessment”,howevertherecommendationsinthispaperdifferinscope,scale,andwhobesttooverseethem.


thecoordinationofalltheplayers,suchasDSCA,theRCCs,andtheregionalcenters,tosetthesechangesinmotion.Bibliography1. AppendixB:Department of State Program Evaluation Plan.(n.d.),wegsite:http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/200�/23510.htm,4July2006.2. Arms Export Control Act of 1976(PublicLaw90-629),asamended,30June1976,website:http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/109/24796.pdf,4July2006.3. CommitteeonInternationalRelations/CommitteeonForeignRelations,Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2005,Washington,GPO,January2006.�. Cope,JohnA.,International Military Education and Training: An Assessment,NationalDefenseUniversity,October1995.5. DefenseInstituteforSecurityAssistanceManagement,The Management of Security Assistance,website:http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DR/greenbook.htm,4July2006.6. Department Organization, web site: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/436.htm, 10 June2006.7. Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance,website:http://www.state.gov/f/,26June2006.8. DoD5105.38M,Security Assistance Management Manual(SAMM),DepartmentofDefense,Washington,GPO,3October2003.9. DODD 5105.38, Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), Department of Defense,Washington,GPO,10August1978.10. DODD5200.1-M,Acquisition Systems Protection Program,March199�.11. DODD 5230.11, Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations,16June1992.12. DefenseSecurityCooperationAgency,Partners,April2006.13. Defense Security CooperationAgency, Partners, November 2005, Neil Hedlund and LornaJons.1�. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961(PublicLaw87-195),asamended,4September1961,athttp://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/109/24796.pdf,20June2006.15. Foreign Assistance Act, Section 644 (reference [b]) andAECA, Section 21 (reference [c])establishthelegalbasisforamulti-tierpricingstructurefortrainingprovidedundertheU.S.securityassistanceauthorities.16. DepartmentofDefense,Financial Management Regulation, Volume157000.1�-R,Chapter7addressestrainingratesandpricingprocedures.WhenacaseisfullyfundedwithMAPfundsand/orFMSCredit(non-repayable), theFMSrateisadjustedtoexcludemilitarypayandentitlementsinaccordancewithFAASection503(a).17. Fiscal Year 2007 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations,website:http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/cbj/2007/,10July2006.18. Limitations on Assistance to Security Forces,website:http://ciponline.org/facts/leahy.htm,�June2006.19. National Guard State Partnership Program Overview,website:http://www.ngb-ia.org/public/spd.cfm/spi/spp_overview,28May2006.


20. National Security Strategy, athttp://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf, 23 June2006.21. Panel: DoD Should Split Procurement, R&D From Other Defense Spending(7December2005),athttp://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1�003�2&C=america,21December2005.22. Roosevelt,FranklinD.,Fireside Chat on National Security and the Common Cause,Washington,D.C.,December29,19�0”athttp://www.ibiblio.org/pha/7-2-188/188-21.html,1June2006.23. Title XII: Matters Relating to Other Nations, at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&dbname=cp109&sid=cp1096p9Uf&refer=&r_n=sr254.109&item=&sel=TOC_839820&,29June2006.2�. Title22oftheUSC.25. Truman, Harry S., Inaugural Address, Washington, D.C., 20 January 19�9 at http://www.homeofheroes.com/presidents/inaugural/33_truman.html,20May2006.26. UnitedStatesDepartmentofState,International Traffic in Arms Regulations,Washington,GPO,1April2005.27.UnitedStatesDepartmentofState,U.S. Foreign Assistance Reference Guide,Washington,GPO,January2005.28. UnitedStatesGovernmentAccountabilityOffice,Briefing Report to Congressional Requesters, Security Assistance:Observations on the International Military Education and Training Program,Washington,GAO/NSIAD-90-215BR,June1990.29. UnitedStatesGovernmentAccountabilityOffice,Briefing Report to Congressional Requesters, Security Assistance: Observations on the Post Cold War Program Changes, Washington, GAO/NSIAD-92-248,September1992.30. United StatesGovernmentAccountabilityOffice,Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Security Assistance:DoS and DoD Need to Assess How the Foreign Military Financing Program for Egypt Achieves U.S. Foreign Policy and Security Goals,Washington,GAO-06-437,April2006.31. United States Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Committees, Southeast Asia:Better Human Rights Reviews and Strategic Planning Needed for U.S. Assistance to Foreign Security Forces,Washington,GAO-05-793,July2005.32. USAID History,athttp://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/usaidhist.html,4June2006.33.Kennan,GeorgeF.,“X”,The Sources of Soviet Conduct, Foreign Affairs,July19�7,athttp://www.foreignaffairs.org/19�70701faessay25�03/x/the-sources-of-soviet-conduct.html,4June2006.


History of the Asian Pacific Center for Security Studies OnSeptember30,1994,PresidentClintonsignedH.R.4650,which included$3million forthestart-upoftheAsia-PacificCenterforSecurityStudies,patternedaftertheEuropeanCenterforSecurityStudies(theMarshallCenter). TheCenterofficiallyopenedonSeptember4,1995,witharibbon-cuttingceremonyattendedbytheHonorableWilliamJ.Perry, then-SecretaryofDefenseandGeneralJohnM.Shalikashvili,thenChairmanoftheU.S.JointChiefsofStaff.Also,ninetyattendeesfromthirty-threecountriesparticipated,includingseveralministersofdefenseandkeyinternationalrepresentatives. TheAsia-PacificCenterforSecurityStudies(APCSS) isaDepartmentofDefenseacademicinstitutethataddressesregionalandglobalsecurityissuesusingamultilateralandmulti-dimensionalapproachtodefiningandaddressingregionalsecurityissuesandconcerns.EstablishedinHonoluluonSept.4,1995,themostbeneficialresultisbuildingrelationshipsoftrustandconfidenceamongfutureleadersanddecision-makerswithintheregion. TheCenterwascreatedtobuildonthestrongbilateralrelationshipsbetweentheU.S.PacificCommandandthearmedforcesofthenationsintheAsia-Pacificregion,byfocusingonthebroadermultilateralapproachtoaddressingregionalsecurityissuesandconcerns.The Official Seal of the Asian Pacific Center for Security Studies TheLampofKnowledgerepresentstheacademicfocusofthecenterandsignifiesthedesiretofosterunderstanding,cooperationandthestudyofregionalsecurityissues.ThelaurelbranchesformaWreathofPeacethatemphasizetheCenter’snon-warfightingapproachtoaddressingregionalsecurity issues. Thevisibleportionof theworldglobedepicts theU.S.PacificCommand’s areaof responsibility. The continuous ribbon symbolizes the strong interrelationship among the sixgeographicregionsoftheAsia-Pacifictheater.(TheSealwascreatedbyDr.JimmieR.Lackey,whowasthenanArmycolonel,andnowtheCenter’sexecutivedirector.)The Asian Pacific Center for Security Studies Mission

APCSSeducatesanddevelopsleaderstoadvancestrategiccommunicationsandsecuritycooperationintheAsia-PacificRegion.

TheAPCSSisaDepartmentofDefenseacademicinstitutethataddressesregionalandglobalsecurity issues using a multilateral and multi-dimensional approach to defining and addressingregionalsecurityissuesandconcerns.Themostbeneficialresultisbuildingrelationshipsoftrustandconfidenceamongfutureleadersanddecision-makerswithintheregion. Thecenterhasastrongfocusonexecutiveeducationviabothresidentandregionalevents.Theseacademiceventsincluderesidentcoursesandoutreacheventsincludingmini-courses,conferencesandresearch.Theyareintertwinedtoproduceadynamic,integratedprogramofstudy,conferencesandresearchtosupportthecenter’smission.

Asian Pacific Center for Security Studies


TheAPCSShassetasatopprioritytoprovideprofessionalandpersonalrelationshipstothestudentsbybeing: • Adaptive,innovativeandflexible • Askingwhynot? • Keepinguptodateusingstate-of-the-artinuseoftechnologyandmethods • Focusedonmostimportantandemergingsecuritychallenges • Promotingpreventionofconflictsandpeacefulresolutionofdispute • Seekinglong-termandnear-termreturnsoninvestment • CommittedtoteamingregionallyandgloballyOur Vision TheAsianPacificCenterforSecurityStudiesaddsuniquevalueasa: • Venueofchoiceforsecurity-cooperationeducation • Trustedstrategiccommunicationsfacilitator • Sought-aftersecurity-challengecounselorcatalystforcapacity-building(e.g.,leader, interagency); • FoundationforcommunitiesofinfluenceThe Asian Pacific Center Offers Four Security Oriented Courses Theone-weekSeniorExecutiveCourse(SEC)isanintensiveprogramforcurrentleaders.Itisdesignedformilitaryofficersatthetwo-andthreestarlevel,andcivilianequivalentsfromtheAsia-PacificRegion.Thecurriculumemphasizestheimpactofchangeintheregionandevolvingsecurityroles, capabilities, and opportunities. The six-week Executive Course (EC) focus is on buildingrelationships among mid-career leaders and decision makers within the region. Its curriculumemphasizesthenon-warfightingaspectsofsecurityandinternationalrelations,andchallengesfellowstodevelopregionalandtransnationalperspectives.Securityisexaminedasacomprehensivemixofpolitical,economic,social,military,diplomatic,informationandecologicaldimensions. The two-weekJuniorExecutiveCourse (JEC) isdesigned toprovidemid-gradeAsia-Pacificspecialists with graduate-level instruction on trends and current issues shaping theAsia-Pacificsecurityenvironment.ThecoursefocusesonU.S.securitypolicyandprovidesanintroductiontoculture,politics,protocolsandchallengesofkeycountriesintheregion. The three-week Comprehensive Security Responses to Terrorism (CSRT) Course providesfocusedknowledgeandskillspracticedattheoperationalandstrategiclevel,alldesignedtoenhanceFellowsabilitytoworktogethertocounterideologicalsupportforandcombatterrorismcooperativelyforthelongterm.Thecoursefacilitatesrelationshipsamongcurrentandfuturecounter-terrorismpractitioners.Italsohelpsengendertrustnecessaryforincreasedinformationsharing,andidentifywaystoreduceculturalobstaclestocooperationintheinternationalstruggleagainstterrorism. The three-week Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations andactivitiescoursefocusesonthreebroadtopicareas: • Pre-conflict/complexemergencyconditionsetting • Post-conflict/complexemergencytransitions • Post-conflict/complexemergencyreconstruction


In addition, the course also addresses the following basic definitions and types of stabilityoperations. • Coalitionbuilding, • Interagencycoordination • Interventionsandoccupations • Post-conflictandcomplexemergencyreconstructionsteps • Transitionplanning • Strategiccommunications ThefollowingarealistoffactsofaccomplishmentssincetheofficialopeningoftheschoolonSeptember�,1995. CollegeofSecurityStudiesExecutiveCourse. • Completed28classes • Included1833fellowsfromforty-fivecountries • Included165generalofficersandseniorcivilians •• Courseparticipantsincludedthefollowing: •• Futureleadersandpractitioners •• LieutenantColonels,Colonels,BrigadierGeneralsandcivilianequivalent •• Heldclassesof80/20mixofinternationalandU.S.students •• Heldclassesof60/40mixofmilitaryandcivilianstudents SeniorExecutiveCourse.Transnationalsecuritycooperation • Completed13Courses • Included2�9Fellowsfromthirty-onecountries •• Courseparticipants: •• Currentleadersandpractitioners •• Generalofficerandvice-ministeriallevel •• 90/10mixofinternationalandU.S.students •• 60/40mixofmilitaryandcivilianstudents Junior Executive Course (JEC) first course held in October 2004. Asia-Pacific SecurityFoundations • Completed5Courses • Included100Fellowsfromfourcountries •• Courseparticipants: •• IncludedmidlevelAsia-Pacificspecialists •• SeniorLieutenantsandCaptains •• Heldclassesof10/90mixofinternationalandU.S.students •• Heldclassesof85/15mixofmilitaryandcivilianstudents

1�The DISAM Journal, February 2007

ComprehensiveSecurityResponsetoTerrorism(CSRT),firstclassheldinApril2004. • Completed5courses • 272Fellowsfrom��countries •• CourseParticipants •• MAJ/LTC/COL/civilianequivalent • 80/20MixofinternationalandU.S. • 60/40Mixofmilitaryandcivilian Alumniassociationshasparticipantsfromthefollowingcountries: • Bangladesh • Philippines • Mongolia • Madagascar • Thailand Alumnialreadyoccupyingseniorpositionswithintheircountry: • MinisterofDefense(3) • MinisterofForeignAffairs(3) • ChieforDeputyChiefofDefense(1�) • Ambassador(32) • ChieforDeputyChiefofService(18) • CabinetorParliamentappointment(12)

Asian Pacific Center for Security Studies Total Alumni = 2,473. TheAsianPacificCenterhasheld107conferencessinceJuneof1995.Thetotalattendeesoftheconferencessince1995equals6,700from66countries.


Twenty years ago, duringArgentina’s turbulent transition to democracy, a retired U.S. armycolonelwasloyallyassistingtheciviliangovernmentof thenPresidentRaulAlfonsin.TheretiredarmycolonelwasworkingasanadvisorintheDefenseMinistryandwasaskedbyajournalisthowmanycivilianswereemployedinpolicymakingpositionsthere.“Sir,”camethedryresponse,“wehavecitizenswhoareperfectlycapableofrunningtheMinistryofDefense.Theyarecalledmilitarymen.”

InthecountriesofLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean,manyofwhomwereexperiencingtransitionstodemocraticrule,whatcivilianinputstherewereduringthe1980sandearly1990sfocusedmostlyoncivilandmilitaryrelations.Thegoalwastoensurethatelectedofficialsmaintaincontrolofthearmedforcesinthecontextofmutualrespectandcollaboration.Meanwhile,the“nutsandbolts”issuesofadministrationofmilitaryandsecurityforces,andoverallquestionsofstrategy,werestillleftlargelyinthehandsofthearmedforces.

Evenin1995bythetimeofthefirstDefenseMinisterial(DMA)inWilliamsburg,Virginia,mostcountriesintheregionhadtransitionedtorepresentativedemocracy,butfewcivilianshadacquiredexperienceindirectingandmanagingdefenseandsecurityforces.Authoritariangovernmentshadseennoneedforcivilianofficialswhowouldinfluencethedefenseandsecuritysector. Notonlyhad the circumstancesof authoritarian rulenot exposedmilitary leaders to thenormally stressfulpracticesofavibrantdemocraticsociety,suchasprocessingdemands,resolvingdisputes,decision-making,allocating resources,anddevelopingand implementingpolicies. Butalso, thosecivilianprofessionalswhohadnoopportunitytomanagethesecuritysectorlogicallyavoideddefensestudies.Clearly,bothcivilianandmilitaryleadershadmuchtolearnabouthowtoachievenationalobjectivesinademocraticsystem.

AtthefirstDMA,someoftheciviliandefenseministersfromtheregionraisedtheneedforaninstitutiontohelpeducateciviliansonthemanagementofdefenseandsecuritywiththenSecretaryofDefenseWilliamPerry.In1996duringtheDMAinBariloche,Argentina,theestablishmentoftheCenter forHemisphericDefenseStudies (CHDS)was announced. Its purpose is to raise theunderstandingofciviliansandmilitarypersonnelabout their shared roles in themanagementandimplementationofdefenseandsecuritytomeetnationalsecurityrequirements.

Less thantenyears later,more than13,000individualshaveparticipatedinCHDSseminars,conferencesandworkshopsandmorethan2,500alumnifromthroughouttheregionhavegraduatedfromitslonger(three-week)courses.Threequartersofwhomareciviliansandonefourthmilitary.AgrowingnumberofCHDSalumnihavegoneontobecabinetministers,headsofnationallegislatures,presidential/ministerialadvisors,andgeneralandflagofficersingovernmentsaroundtheregion.Manyarekeyplayersinformulatingsecuritystrategiesanddefensepolicies.The“DeclarationofSantiago,”issuedattheFourthDMAin2002,specificallyrecognizedtheroleofCHDSanditsrelevancefortheHemisphere.Increasingly,U.S.embassiesarerelyingonCHDSregionalandsubjectmatterexpertisetoprovideneeded“connectivetissue”withregionalpolicymakerswhosegovernmentsarenotalwaysinlinewithWashington’spolicies.

SinceSeptember11,2001,CHDSwhichcalls itselfapolicy tool forenhancingcivilianandmilitary relations has focused on providing educational outreach support to increase regional

The Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies


understandingabout theneed foreffectiveprograms tocombatviolent fundamentalist ideologies,promoting increased inter-agency and regional cooperation, andbuilding support for defense andsecurity policies among key civilian decision-makers. Working closely with the Office of theSecretaryofDefense, theNationalDefenseUniversityandtheseniorleadershipatSOUTHCOM,NORTHCOM,andCHDShasbeenabletofostertrustrelationshipsandfrankdialoguewithpeoplerepresentingabroadrangeofpoliticalbeliefsandaffiliationsfromaroundtheregion.

OnehighlysuccessfuloutreachefforthasbeenCHDS’sNationalSecurityPlanningWorkshops(NSPWs).Theworkshopsbringtogetherseniornational-leveldecisionmakerstoaddressstrategicpolicyandstrategyformulationandimplementation.TheNSPWsfosterinteragencycoordinationofcivilandmilitarycooperation,andprovidesuniqueopportunitiesforU.S.andhostcountrynationaldialogue.ThefirstNSPWwasheldinAugust2004inPanamafortheincomingadministrationofPresidentMartinTorrijos.Sixmonthslater,aCHDSgraduatewhoheadsPeru’scongressionalsecurityanddefensecommissionwasinstrumentalinarrangingforaplanningworkshopinhiscountry.AsaresultofaspecificrequestbyParaguayanVicePresidentLuisCastiglionitohisU.S.counterpart,VicePresidentRichardCheney, inSeptember2005CHDSheldanNSPWon integral security inAsuncion.InMayof2006,theCenterwasinvitedbythenewHondurangovernmenttoconductanNSPWforseniorofficialsledbyVicePresidentElvinSantosandMinisterofDefenseAristidesMejiaCarranza.Finally,fromJuly28throughJuly30,2006,CHDSconductedawell-receivedNSPWforseniorCostaRicanofficialsattheinvitationofthenewgovernmentheadedbyPresident(andNobellaureate)OscarArias.

DennisF.Caffrey,CHDSdeanofstudentsandadministration,statedthefollowing: TheNSPWshaveprovidedpricelessvenuesforthetrustedexchangeofinformation,ideasandnewperspectivesonissuesthataffectallofus.Becausewetrytoholdthemearlyinthetermofanewgovernmentintheregion,theyfeeltheyaresupportedwithhands-onhelp,andtheUnitedStatesgetsahearingforitsconcernsfrompeoplewhomatter.

More recently, attention has been focused on the Center’s Interagency Coordination andCounterterrorism(ICCT)course,whichaddresses intra-interagencyand internationalcoordinationwithafocusonthelongwaragainstterroristviolence.Participants,mostlymiddlemanagersfrommilitary,lawenforcement,civilianagencies,internationalandnon-governmentalorganizations,receiveup-to-the-minuteinformationonglobaltrendsonthewaronterror,andhownationalgovernmentsaroundtheworldareorganizingtomeetthethreat.

In June 2006, the ICCT brought Joaquin Villalobos, former commander of the SalvadoranFarabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrilla group, together with Ambassador(retired)DavidPassage,theU.S.deputychiefofmissiontoSanSalvador(1984-1986),andAmbassador(retired)WilliamWalker,whoservedastheU.S.envoytoElSalvadoraspeacenegotiationsinthatcountryfinally bore fruit. The former senior vice president ofNDUand one of the founders ofCHDSalsoattendedtohelpdiscusstheapplicabilityoflessonslearnedfromtheCentralAmericaninsurgencies to today’s challenges. The71 students from seventeen countries in the region, plusSpainandMorocco,takingpartinthethree-weekcourseweretreatedtoinsightsandanalysisneverbeforegivenbythreeofthatconflict’smostimportantprotagonists.

CenterDirectorRichardD.Downiestatedthefollowing: I think some of the greatest values CHDS brings to its students are intellectualclarityandtheopportunitytoshareperspectivesacrossnationalboundaries,regionsandcultures. Becauseofthetypesofpeopleweareabletocalluponforexample,seniorofficialsfromDoD,HomelandSecurity,DepartmentofState,thebestandthebrightestfromNDUandmembersofourownacademicstaff,aswellasabroadarrayofother


experts we are privileged to call friends, the Center literally vibrates with relevancefor both Washington’s need for engagement and the region’s thirst for expertise.

KennethLaPlante,CHDSdeputydirectorstatedthefollowing: Inthepast,U.S.militaryeducationintheregionwasstovepipedintoonearea,wherecertainlythereweredividendsintermsofinfluence,butitsufferedfromsometimesbeinganechochamberratherthanaplacewhereanhonestexpressionofdifferencescananddoesleadtonewideasandnewperspectives,aswellasconsensus.CHDS’rolehasbeentodojustthattoopenupcommunicationwithpeoplewhomaybeevenadecadeago,probablywouldnothavegivensecuritystudies,orevenengagementwiththeU.S.government,asecondthought.

Former students, including educators, academic researchers, journalists, non-governmentorganizations, a think tank staff, alongwithmilitary andpoliceofficers, report that several otherCHDSofferingshavealsoprovedtobeofsignificantbenefitbothfor theireducationandto theircareers.Forexample,itsAdvancedPolicyMakingSeminar(APS),asustainmentactivitydesignedtonurtureCHDSalumnibyenhancingtheirexistingknowledgeofsecurityanddefenseissuesandprocesses,offersthemtheopportunityforprofessionaldevelopmentandcontinuedinteractionandnetworkingwiththeircounterpartsfromothercountries.

The Center’s Senior Executive Dialogue (SED), provides a unique opportunity for thehemisphere’sseniorleaderstodiscusspolicyissuesandinteractinpersonwithU.S.counterpartsinWashington,D.C.,andthecombatantcommands.TheSEDisorganizedbysub-regionandprovidesanotheropportunitytopromoteincreasedregionalcooperationonsecurityanddefenseconcerns.Theparticipants,ministerial-leveldecisionmakers,havereportedthattheirdiscussionsheldduringtheSEDhavehaddirectimpactonhowcriticalissuesareaddressedbackintheirowncountries.

Twonewacademic initiativesareabout tobe launchedat theCenter. TheFacultyOutreachProgramwillbringoneortwomembersofthefacultytothosecountrieswithactiveCHDSalumniassociations toconductanumberofevents. Beyondbringing thealumniup todateon the latestinitiativesintheCenter,theCHDSenvoyswillpresentthelatestthinkingattheCenteronthemajortopicsof theday, ranging from theGlobalWaronTerrorismandCountering IdeologicalSupportfor Terrorism, to Stability Operations, Defense Transformation, and National Security Strategyformulation.

The second initiative is a long-anticipatedAdvanced Course, geared to those “who remaindecisively,actively,andenthusiasticallyengagedinthedefenseandsecuritysector,”reportsDr.CraigDeare,CHDSdeanofacademics.Healsostatesthefollowing:

Although career defense ministry officials represent the ideal candidate, we willwelcomethosewhoexercisetheirinfluenceinthefieldsofacademics,media,legislatures,orotherexecutivebranchareas,suchaspresidentialstaff,planning,treasury,andsoforth.

Thefirsttwoofthefourteen-weekdistancelearningandthree-weekin-residencecourses,tobepresentedinMarch2007.ThecoursewillfocusonTerrorismandStabilityOperations.And,forthefirsttimeever,NDUwillbegrantingthreecredithoursforsuccessfulcompletionofthecourse.

Strategiccommunicationwith the region isalsoconducted inanumberofotherwaysat theCenter.CHDShascompletedtwoDepartmentofDefensesponsoredresearchprojects:

• ThefirstonPeacekeepinginLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean

• The second on Gaining Regional Support to confront the ideological support of terrorism


Inaddition,inFebruaryofthisyear,theCenter,incooperationwithNDU’sCenterforTechnologyandNationalSecurityPolicy(CTNSP),hostedaworkshoponBolivia’sfutureundertheleadershipofitsnewPresident,EvoMorales.The21/2-dayeventbroughttogethernearlyadozenBolivianparticipants to better understand the challenges and opportunities presented by Bolivia’s newadministration.Adebateseries,called“Face-to-FaceEncounters,”alsoregularlyengagesexpertsinapoint-counterpointapproachtoprovideinsightontopicsofincreasingconcerninthehemisphere.TheencounterbetweenformerFMLNCommanderVillalobosandex-U.S.AmbassadorWalkerwasthelatestinthesefriendly,butnoholdsbarred,exchanges.

IndividualresearchbyCHDSfaculty,studentsandalumniisalsoacornerstoneofCentereffortstocontributetoacooperativeinternationalsecurityenvironmentandmutualunderstandingofU.S.andregionaldefenseandsecurityissues.TheSecurityandDefenseStudiesReviewoffersanarrayoftimelyarticlesbyregionalspecialists,andCHDSfacultyarefrequentlyaskedtospeakatU.S.andinternationalconferences,aswellastowritebooksandscholarlyarticles.

Dr.HerbHuser,editoroftheSecurityandDefenseStudiesReviewstatedthefollowing: We have been blessed with the kind of articles from our contributors that lendthemselvesnaturally tobook-length collaborations. That interest, byNDUPress andothers,iswhathelpsaffirmthatwearebreakingnewground.

RecentlyCHDSProfessorJohnT.Fishelrecentlypublished,togetherwithDr.MaxManwaringof the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College, a critically-acclaimed book,Uncomfortable Wars Revisited.InJuly,Dr.JaimeGarciaCovarrubias,professorofnationalsecurityaffairs,presentedapaperon“Nationalisms,fundamentalismsandsecurity”inMadridattheIIIAtlanticForumonLibertyandDemocracyinEuropeandAmerica,organizedbytheFundacinInternacionalparalaLibertadheadedbyPeruviannovelistMarioVargasLlosa.(TheeventwasinauguratedbyformerSalvadoranPresidentFernandoFloresandclosedbyformerSpanishPresidentJoseMariaAznar.)

CHDSambitiousmissiondoesnot endwithproviding education and advancing researchonsecurityanddefenseissues.TheCenteralsoinsistsonthepromotionofactivitiesthatarepossibleonly through the establishmentof apermanent anddynamicnetwork throughout thehemisphere.Five active CHDSAlumniAssociations in the region inArgentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay andUruguayarepartofthatrobustnetworkofsecurity-mindedprofessionals,andhelpensureastronginteractionnotonlybetweenCHDSanditsalumni,butalsoamongthealumnithemselves.

Dr.LuisBitencourt,CHDSprofessorandalumnicoordinatorstatedthefollowing: Securityanddefensearethemesthatareconstantlychanging,andrequireconsistentattentionandamultiplicityofperspectivesthatpromotebroaderandbetterunderstanding.Thealumniassociationsarethemoreeffectivewaytomobilizealumniandconveythismission.

Dr.Downie,DirectorCenterforHemisphericDefenseStudiesstatedthefollowing: Globalization has not only shortened the distances between people; it has alsochanged the nature of the security and defense challenges we all face. Security anddefenseparadigmsarechanging,anewpremiumisbeingplacedonalternativeviewsandademocratizationandexpansionofthecommunityinwhichsolutionsarefound. Fortunatelyforusandforfuturegenerations,today’sdefenseandsecuritygraduatesaroundtheregionformpartofagrowingregional/internationalcommunity.WeatCHDSaredelightedtobeexpandingouractivitiestooffergreateropportunitiestolearntogetherandfromeachother.


Africa’s security is of great interest to the United States, both because of its impact on thecontinentanditsglobalimplications.WhilethisseemslikeanobviousstatementtothosewhohaveworkedwithAfricansinthesecurityarena,historicallyAfricahasnotalwaysreceivedappropriateattentionfromWashingtonDC;andeventoday,therearemanyintheU.S.whounder-estimateitsimportance.

TheAfricaCenter forStrategicStudies isSecretaryofDefense’s primary asset for outreachandnetwork-buildingtoAfrica.Byofferingacademicprogramsandnetworkingopportunities,theAfricaCentercreates,maintains,andsupports“communitiesofinfluence”withaninterestinAfricansecurity.Theseeffortsfocusonthesecoreobjectives:

• Counterideologicalsupportforterrorism

• Harmonizeviewsoncommonsecuritychallenges

• Educateontheroleofsecurityincivilsocieties

SecretaryofDefenseDonaldH.Rumsfeldhasoftennotedtheneedformoreaggressive,swiftandnontraditionalinformationcampaignstocounterthemessagesofextremistandterroristgroups.ThisphilosophyisincorporatedintomanyU.S.policydocumentsandstrategiesincludingtheupdatedNational Strategy for Combating TerrorismreleasedinSeptember2006whichstates,“Inthelongrun,winningthewaronterrormeanswinningthebattleofideas.”

Similarly,thePentagon’sQuadrennial Defense Reviewreleasedearlierthisyearnotesthat,“TheUnitedStateswillnotwinthewaronterrorismorachieveothercrucialnationalsecurityobjectivesdiscussed in this Report by military means alone.Victory in the long war ultimately depends onstrategiccommunication.”BybuildingnetworksoftrustandcommunicationsthatbridgethegapsbetweenindividualswithaninterestinAfrica,theAfricaCenterforStrategicStudiesisanintegralpartofthiseffort.The Africa Center “Community” TheAfricaCenterCommunityisthenetworkofleadingprofessionalsinAfricansecuritywhohavetakenpartinAfricaCenterprograms.Members,numberingmorethan2500,includeprogramparticipants,guestspeakers,adjunctfaculty,distinguishedvisitors,stakeholders,andfull-timestafffromAfrica,EuropeandtheUnitedStates.Whileotherinstitutionsusetermslikestudentsandalumni,theAfricaCenterreferstotheseindividualsasparticipantsandcommunitymemberstoillustratethattheAfricaCenterdoesnotteachbutinsteadprovidesaforumfordialogueamongequals.

OneoftheCommunity’sstrengthsisitsincrediblediversity.Membersincludecivilian,military,parliamentarian,lawenforcement,andcivilsocietyofficialsfromacrosstheUnitedStates,Europe,andAfrica.Membersalsorangefromseniorleaders(includingseveralcurrentandformerAfricanHeadsofState)toindividualswhoarejuststartingtheircareers.

Separatedbygeography,culture,language,andmanyotherfactors,mostcommunitymemberswouldhavenootherwaytomeeteachother,muchlessmaintainanon-goingdialogueonsecurityissues.

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies


Programs AfricaCenterprogramsareasdiverseasthepeopleworldwidethattheorganizationreaches,spanningtopicsfromcounter-terrorismtohealthanditsimpactonsecurity.Academics SincetheAfricaCenter’sinceptionin1999,morethan2500participantshavetakenpartinitsacademicprograms.ManyAfricaCenterprogramstakeplaceinAfrica,andalloperateundertheumbrellas of academic freedom and non-attribution which allow participants to speak freely andcandidly.Thiscreatesauniqueenvironmentfulloflivelydebateanddiscussion,andallowsinnovativeandpracticalideastocomeforward.Inadditiontoplenarypresentationsandbreakoutdiscussiongroups,mostacademicprogramsalsoincludeacapstoneexercisewhichallowsparticipantstoputideasintopracticeinasimulatedAfricaenvironment.

Theflagshipacademicprogramis theSeniorLeaderSeminar.Heldonceperyear inrotatinglocations, this program includes nearly every African country as well as Europe and U.S. Itscurriculumisalsothemostexpansive,coveringcontentoncounter-terrorism,civil-militaryrelations,defenseeconomics,conflictmanagement,andsecuritystudies.SmallerSub-regionalSeminarsandTopicalSeminarsallowparticipantstomorecloselyexaminetheuniquechallengesofasingletopicorsub-region.Previousprogramsinthesecategorieshaveincluded:

• TheSecurityChallengeofSmallArmsandLightWeaponsProliferation inAfrica (Uganda,200�)

• EnergyandSecurityinAfrica(Nigeria,2005)

• TowardsEnhancedConflictManagementinCentralAfrica(Cameroon,2004)

TheAfricaCenteralsoorganizesrecurringacademiccoursessuchasitsAfricanDefenseAttachéCourseandNextGenerationofAfricanMilitaryLeadersProgram.Community Chapters CommunityChaptersaretheAfricaCenter’smajortoolformaintainingitsnetworkinAfrica.Byformingnationalassociationsdevotedtopromotingsecuritydebateandnetworking,formerAfricaCenterprogramparticipantsmaintaincommunicationswiththeAfricaCenter,keepintouchwitheachother,andevendevelopindependentprogramsthatbuildontheirAfricaCenterexperiences.Todate,therearefifteenchaptersthatspanthecontinent.WithinageneralframeworksetupbytheAfricaCenter,chaptermemberschooseforthemselveshowtheywanttheirchaptertofunction.Someareonlyseekingachancetonetwork,whileothersareinterestedinmoreformalizedprojects.TheAfricaCenterBurkinaFasoChapterhasorganized two seminars since2005onpeace and securitywithseveralhundredparticipants,andiscurrentlyconductingaEuropeanUnionfunded,trainthetrainerprojecttoofferinstructiontosecurityprofessionals.

Strategic Communications

TheAfricaCenterprovidesitscommunitymemberswithfreeaccesstoaseriesofcommunicationsinitiatives focusing on African security. The Africa Center’s web site is the following: www.africacenter.org,monthlyelectronicpublication,andquarterlyprintnewsletterprovideinformationon current events on the continent, U.S. policy statements towards Africa, analysis of securityissues,andinformationonAfricaCenterevents.Theyalsoallowcommunitymemberstomaintaincommunicationsbyprovidingcontactinformation,newsaboutpromotionsandcurrentprojects,andarticleswrittenbycommunitymembers.Abookfocusingoncounter-terrorismandAfricaiscurrentlybeingproduced.


Collaborative Projects and Support Programs TheAfricaCenterseekstosupporttheprogramsofotherU.S.governmentagenciesandfindwaystoworkwithotherorganizationsaroundtheglobe.TheMaritimeSafetyandSecurityintheGulfofGuineaseriesofevents,forexample,arecollaborationswiththeU.S.EuropeanCommandandU.S.NavalForcesEurope.TheGoldenSpearSymposiumSeriesisaU.S.CENTCOMprogramdesignedtofacilitateopendiscussiononregionalcooperationandcapacitybuildingtopreventandrespondtonaturalandhumanitariandisastersintheHornofAfrica.TheAfricaCenteralsocollaborateswithnon-U.S.organizations,includingaseriesofeventsworkingwiththeEconomicCommunityofWestAfricanStates(ECOWAS)andwarcollegesinAfrica.The Future of the Africa Center TheAfricaCenterisconstantlyevolvingtomeetthechangingneedsofthesecurityenvironmentinAfricaandthegrowingimportanceofAfricatotheUnitedStatesgovernmentandDepartmentofDefense.Africa Center Regional Office; U.S. Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia InOctober2006,theAfricaCenteropeneditfirstpermanentofficeonthecontinent.Thison-the-groundpresencewillallowtheAfricaCentertoincreaseitsinfluenceandsupportU.S.securityinterests in theregionbystrengtheningrelationshipswithgovernments, regionalandsub-regionalorganizations,civilsociety,non-governmentorganizations,U.S.missionsinthesub-region,leadingacademicinstitutions,andAfricaCentercommunitychapters. In time, theAfricaCenterplans toopenannexesineachAfricansub-region.Online Learning and Content Forthepasttwoyears,theAfricaCenterhasexperimentedwithofferingportionsofitscoursecontentonline.TheAfricaCenterrecognizesthatonlinelearningandcommunicationswillcontinuetogrowinitimportance.Videoteleconference,interactiveusesoftheinternet,andothertechnologicalinnovationscouldallowtheAfricaCenter todramaticallyexpanditsaudienceandfacilitatemorecommunicationamongitscommunitymembers.Research TheAfricaCenterplanstoconductoriginalresearchinitsfieldsofexpertise.ThecapabilitywillallowtheAfricaCentertoprovideadditionalresourcestoitscommunityandotherU.S.governmentagenciesandotherpartners,aswellasimprovethecontentofitsownprograms.Why Africa Matters ExpertsagreethatAfrica’sstrategicimportancetotheU.S.willincreasesubstantiallyinthefuture.

• WaronTerror

Africahasbeenandwillremainacrucialfrontintheglobalwaronterror.Radical Islamismhaslargelyfailedtotakeholdinsub-SaharanAfrica,butpovertyandother threats to Africa’s stability offer terrorist organizations with potential recruitment grounds,andAfrica’sunder-governedspacescouldoffer safehavens. Theseareas includethevasttracksinandaroundtheSahara,Somalia,andmarineareassuchas GulfofGuineandpartsoftheIndianOceanalongAfrica’scoast.

• Energy

Estimatesvary,butasmuchas18percentofthepetroleumusedintheUnitedStates isimportedfromAfrica,andthisfigureisestimatedtogrowtoatleast25percentin the near future. Freedom from the dependence on Mid-East oil is fundamental to


U.S.economicdevelopmentandtheBushAdministration’senergystrategy.African nationshavebeenandwillcontinuetobeinvaluablepartnersinthisregard,butoil explorationandproductionexpansionisthreatenedbyinstability.

• GrowingMarkets

Recent gross domestic product productivity increases in sub-Saharan Africa are greater than other regions. For example, developing countries as a whole experienceda0.5percentincreaseingrossdomesticproductfrom2003to200�,but Africa’sgrossdomesticproductincreasedbyfourtimesasmuchinthesameperiod. Africa’spopulation,currently800million,ispredictedtogrowtomorethan2billion by2050,andapproximately44percentofthepopulationisundertheageoffifteen, representingtheworld’syoungestpopulation.

• HumanImmunodeficiencyVirusandAcquiredImmunodeficiencySyndromeand OtherDiseases

Oneof thegreatest threats to securityandstability inAfrica is infectiousdiseases, particularlyhumanimmunodeficiencyvirusandacquiredimmunodeficiencysyndrome (HIV/AIDS). Estimatesstatethatapproximately25.8millionAfricanarecurrently livingwithHIV/AIDS. Inaddition to the instability to thegeneralpopulation this cancause,thesecountriesalsohavehighinfectionratesamongtheirsoldierspresenting obviouschallenges.TheBushAdministration’sEmergencyPlanforAIDSRelief,an unprecedentedfive-year,$15billioneffort,illustratestheimportanceofthisissueto theU.S.

Inadditiontotheseissues,thereareanumberofadditionalfactorsthatimpactAfrica’ssecurity.Poverty,displacement,naturaldisasters,climatechange,andothershavecriticalimpactsonAfricasecurityandU.S.policytowardsAfrica.

AsU.S.prioritiesandthesecuritychallengesinAfricachange,theAfricaCenterforStrategicStudieswillcontinuetobeaconduitamonginterestedindividualsaroundtheworldastheyworktogethertowardsafree,peaceful,andprosperousAfrica.


ThemissionoftheNearEastSouthAsiaCenterforStrategicStudies(NESA)CenteristoenhancestabilityintheNearEastandinSouthAsiabyprovidinganacademicenvironmentwherestrategicissues can be addressed, understanding deepened, partnerships fostered, defense-related decision-makingimproved,andcooperationstrengthenedamongmilitaryandcivilianleadersfromtheregionandtheUnitedStates.AsofApril2006,DavidW.Barno,LieutenantGeneral,USA(Retired),formerCommanderoftheCombinedForcesCommandAfghanistan,becametheNESACenterDirector.

LaunchedinOctober2000,theCenterbuildsonthestrongbilateralrelationshipsbetweentheUnitedStatesandcountriesintheNESAregionbyfocusingonamultilateralapproachtoaddressingregionalsecurityconcernsandissues.Itisdesignedtomeettheknowledgeneedsofnationalsecurityprofessionalsbyprovidingaforumforrigorousexaminationofthechallengesthatshapethesecurityenvironmentoftheregion.TheCenterprovidesafocalpointwherenationaldecisionmakerscangathertoexchangeideasandexploretoolsforcooperativeproblemsolving.

The core curriculum examines four broad themes: the impact of globalization on regionalstrategicissues;thechangingstrategicenvironment-includinganassessmentofthecampaignagainstterrorism and the implications of initiatives such as missile defense and military transformation;elementsofstrategicplanning;andconceptsforenhancingregionalsecurity.

TheCenter’sannualcoreactivitiesinclude:

• Four three-week Executive Seminars (mid-to-upper level military and civilian professionals)

• One eight-day Senior Executive Seminar (upper-level military and civilian professionals)

• Two two-week Counter-Terrorism Seminars (mid- and upper-level military and civilianprofessionals)

Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies


• Several one- to three-day topical seminars for the Washington, D.C.-based NESA regioncommunity

Additionalactivitiesforfutureimplementationincludemission-relevantresearchfellowships,alumniactivities,anddistanceeducationprograms.

Executive, senior executive, and counter-terrorism seminars are held in Washington, D.C.Thematic regional and sub-regional conferencesare held in Washington, D.C. or in the region.ParticipationisopentomilitaryandofficialcivilianrepresentativesfromallcountriesintheNESAregionwith which the U.S. government maintains formaldiplomatic relations, non-NESA countries thathave strategic interests in the region,U.S.military,and federal government officials. Participants arenominated by their governments. The twenty-fourparticipatingnationsfromtheregioninclude:

Afghanistan India Lebanon Oman Tunisia

Algeria, Iraq Maldives Pakistan Turkey

Bahrain Israel Mauritania Qatar TheUnitedArabEmirates

Bangladesh Jordan Morocco SaudiArabia Yemen

Egypt Kuwait Nepal SriLanka

FundedbytheDepartmentofDefense,theNESACenter,comprisedofnearlyfortyfacultyandstaff,isassociatedwiththeNationalDefenseUniversityinWashington,D.C.ThepurviewoftheNESACenterextendsfromtheAtlasMountainsinthewesttotheHimalayasintheeasttoMarrakechtoBangladesh.

The countries with which the United States has diplomatic relations will participate in theCenter’sprograms,aswellascountrieswithastrategicinterestintheregion.

Afghanistan Egypt Jordan Mauritania Pakistan Tunisia

Algeria India Kuwait Morocco Qatar Turkey

Bahrain Iraq Lebanon Nepal SaudiArabia TheUnitedArabEmirates

Bangladesh Israel Maldives Oman SriLanka Yemen

ParticipationintheCenter’sprogramsisnotlimitedtothesenations.Weareactivelysolicitingtheparticipationofneighboringcountrieswithsecurityinterestsrelevanttothestatesoftheregion.

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Why the Americas MatterBy

Thomas A. Shannon Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs

[The following are excerpts �thAnnualKillamPublicLecture inOttawa,CanadaSeptember1�,2006.]

IthinkthisisanappropriatemomenttotalkaboutNorthAmericabutalsomorebroadlyaboutthehemisphere.ForthoseofyouwhoarenotfamiliarwiththeNorthAmericanForum,itsprangupasaparallelstructuretothesecurityandprosperitypartnershipofNorthAmerica.Itwasoriginallyaneffort tobringopinionmakers,privatesectorleaders,universityprofessorsandpresidents,andleadersofnon-governmentorganizationstogetherwithgovernmentofficialsfromthethreecountriesof NorthAmerica. The intent was to begin to see if there was some way that the governmentsworkingwiththeprivatesector,universitiesandnon-governmentorganizationscouldbegintocreateavisionforNorthAmerica.AnunderstandingofwhatNorthAmericaisasanentityandthenhowgovernmentscouldbeworkingtofashionamoreproductivecooperationandaddressthekindsofproblemswesawintheimmediateaftermathofSeptember11,2001.

Therearethreeconvenorsorco-convenorsforthis.OntheU.S.sideitisformerSecretaryofStateSchultz,ontheMexicansideitisformerFinanceMinisterPedroAspeandontheCanadiansideitistheformerPremierofAlbertaPeterLougheed.ThefirstsessionwasheldlastyearinSonoma.ThisyearitisheldinBanff.NextyearitwillbeheldinMexico.

IthoughtitparticularlyappropriatethattheeventsinHalifaxwerefollowedimmediatelybytheconferenceinBanffbecauseitlinkedthetragiceventsofSeptember11,2001towhathascomeoutofit.IthinkisarealexaminationofwhatNorthAmericaisandanefforttounderstandhowwe,asdifferentasweareinouridentitiesandasdifferentasweareinournationalsovereignty,Canada,theUnitedStates,andMexicodoshareacommonplace,doshareacommonmarketandincreasinglyareconnecteddemographicallyandculturally.Byunderstandingthisandlookingforwaystoenhancethatdegreeofconnectednessarewegoingtoremaincompetitiveintheworldandwegoingtobeinapositiontoprotectouropensocietiesagainstthreatswhicharenotgoingaway.Forthatreason,Ithoughtitusefultocomeheretoday.

Ithinkthereisalotofopportunityoutthere.Thismightnotbeimmediatelyevidentwhenyoureadthepressorlookatwhatispresentedintelevisionprogramsandanalyses,butmyownviewisthatthisisthehemispherethathasmadeincrediblestridesandprogressoverthelastseveraldecadesandreallyispositionedtodotremendousthingsandNorthAmericaisgoingtobeaveryimportantpartofthat.IwouldliketodoisstartbytalkingaboutwhatIthinkthecentralissueinthehemisphereisandwhythisisimportantfortherestoftheworld.LetustalkabouthowthehemispherehassoughttocreateacommonagendaamongdemocraticnationsandhowtheUnitedStateshasengagedinit,andfinally,howNorthAmericarelatestoit.

LEGISLATION AND POLICY


Ichosethetitle“WhytheAmerica’smatter”simplybecausethenewssooftenfocusesoneventsinIraqoreventsinAfghanistan.Becauseofthelargerwaronterrorwesometimesforgetthatweliveinahemispherethatis:

• Democratic

• Committedtofreemarkets

• Committedtoeconomicintegration

• Committedtodevelopingtheindividualcapacity

All the above are necessary to take advantage of the economic opportunities that are beingpresented through thekindofeconomicgrowthwehavebeenable toachieve in the regionmorebroadly. Inmanyways this hemisphere has already gone throughwhat wewould call the firstgenerationoftransformationalchallengesbycommittingitselftodemocracy,bycommittingitselftofundamentalhumanrightsandbybuildingaconsensushoweverdebateditis,butitisstillaconsensusaroundaneconomicmodelandanapproachtoeconomicgrowth.

Whatwearelookingatrightnowinthishemispherereallyisasecondgenerationproblemorsecondgenerationissuesofgovernmentalandsocietaltransformation.Thisisreally,inthewesternhemisphere, about how you link democracy and development. It is about how you show thatdemocracyisnotaconservativeformofgovernmentdesignedtoprotecttheprivilegesofelitesbutisactuallyarevolutionaryformofgovernmentthatisdesignedtobreakopensocieties.Itisdesignedtocreateopportunitiesnotonlyforpoliticalparticipationbutforeconomicandsocialparticipationandthataswethinkaboutdemocracyweneedtothinkaboutitinmuchlargertermsthanjustvotingorelectoralmechanismsormachineries.Weneedtothinkaboutitintermsofademocraticstate,notjustademocraticgovernment,andthisincludespoliticalcitizenship,economiccitizenshipandsocialcitizenship.Inaregionwhichhasbecomedemocratic,andhascommitteditselftoacertaineconomicmodel,weobviouslyfacebigproblems,bigsocialproblems,inrelationshiptothefollowing:

• Poverty

• Inequality

• Politicalexclusionandsocialexclusion

Oneofthestrikingthingsoverthelastfewyearsishowthisregionhassoughttodealwithalltheproblems.

IwouldliketostartbytakingyouallbacktoAprilof2001,toQuebecCity,wheretheSummitoftheAmericasmetindifficultandcontentiouscircumstances.AlthoughQuebecCityhasthefameofbeingafortress,itwasevenmoresoinAprilof2001.YouwillrecallthatthiscameafterSeattleandGenoaandaperiodofkindofanti-globalizationdemonstrationswhichwerequitedramaticandintense.TheSummitoftheAmericaswasseenasaperfectopportunityfortheseforcestokindofappearonthestepsofQuebecCityandtrytobreakthroughanddisrupttheSummitoftheAmericas,whichsomanyassumedwasjustgoingtokindofrepeatthechantofglobalization.Theironyisofcoursethatasthedemonstratorsoutsidewereexpressingtheirconcernaboutwhatwashappeninginside. Insidewassomethingquiteremarkableinthesensethatthedemocraticleaderswhowereparticipatinginthateventforthefirsttimecommittedthewesternhemispheretodemocracy.Thesecondwasabroadcommitment to freemarketsandeconomic integration throughestablishingatimetableforfreetradeovertheAmericas.Now,weallknowthattimetablehasnotbeenmet.Weallknowthat,especiallywiththesuspensionoftalksinDohaandtheinabilitytocometotermsonagriculturalissues,ourabilitytoactuallyclosealargerfreetradeovertheAmerica’sintheneartermislimited.Whatwasimportantthenandisimportantstillisthattherewasacommitmenttofreetrade


andarecognitionthatitisthrougheconomicintegrationthatdemocraticgovernmentshavethemeanstobreakdowneconomicelitesandoligarchies.Wecontinuetolookfornewwayssothatprosperitydoesnotjusttricklethroughsocietyitcoursesthroughsociety.

TheotheritemwhichIthinkcomingoutofQuebecwasimportantwasacommitmenttocreateanewhemisphericsecurityagenda.ForthelongesttimeoursecurityagendahasbeendefinedbytheRioTreatyandbyconfidencebuildingmeasuresbetweenstates,theassumptionbeingthattheessential vulnerability or threat in the hemisphere was state on state violence. What the leadersagaininstructedtheirforeignministerstodowastotakeanotherlookatthesecurityagendaandtoadjustittoarealityinwhichtherealthreatstostateswerenototherstatesinahemispherethathadcommitteditselftodemocracybutinsteadthethreatswereterrorism,drugtrafficking,naturaldisasters,environmentaldisastersandpandemicsandinsodoingcreatedanopeningforstatedialogueaboutsecuritywhichwasnewanduniqueandfresh.Itactuallytookalotofthatdialogueoutofdefenceministriesandputitinlawenforcementagenciesandintelligenceagencies,incrisisandemergencyresponseagencies,andalsoinhealthagencies,especiallythosethatdealtwithpandemics.Ithinkthiswasanimportantstepforwardinagainbuildingkindoftheconnectivetissuewithinthehemispherethatallowsaconversationandalevelofcooperationthatreallyhadneverexistedbefore.

Whenwelookbackonthatsummit,Ithinkwhatweseeis:

• Acreationofaconsensusaroundpoliticalvaluesandaroundeconomicmodels

• Aclearinstructionstogovernmentstobegintodevelopthemechanisms

• Theactionplanortheagendanecessarytomakethesecommitmentsreal.

Thegovernmentshaveresponded,bureaucracieshaveresponded,throughtheInterAmericanDemocraticCharter.TheOASwasabletotakethedemocracyclauseoftheQuebecCitySummitandputitintotheinterAmericansystem,butitwasabletodoitinawaythatitisreallyworthtakingaminuteortwotounderstandwhattheInterAmericanCharter,thedemocraticcharter,is.Iamnotsurehowmanyofyouhavehadachancetolookatitinanydetail.ThefirstarticleofthatCharter,thefirstclauseofthefirstarticle,saysthatdemocracyisarightofallthepeoplesoftheAmericasandthattheirgovernmentshaveanobligationtopromoteanddefendit;inotherwords,democracyisaright.

Now,thisisaradicalstatement.Typically,ifyoutalktopeoplewhostudythesethingstheywillarguethatdemocracyisaformofgovernmentthatismadeuporconstructedfromfundamentalrightssuchasfreedomofassociation,freedomofspeech,freedomofbelief,butthatitisthesefundamentalrightsthatarelibertiesandfreedoms,not theformofgovernment.Buttheforeignministerswerearguingtheoppositenottheopposite,theywerearguingthat,althoughithascomponentpartsthatareliberties,democracyitselfisaright.Thiswasauniquestatement.ItwasauniquestatementfortheAmericas.Ithinkitwasauniquestatementintheworld.Itsaidthatgovernmentshaveanobligationtopromoteanddefenddemocracy,soitcreatesnotonlyarightforindividualsandpeoplesbutanobligationforgovernments.Thesecondclauseofthefirstarticlesaysthatdemocracyisessentialforthepolitical,socialandeconomicdevelopmentoftheAmericas.Thisstatementisjustasradicalasthefirstbecausewhatitisproposingisthatfordevelopmenttoberealithastobedemocratic.Whattheforeignministerswereattemptingtoarticulateherewasabeliefthatthishemisphereneededtofashionanewunderstandingofdevelopmentandanewmodelfordevelopmentandnotamodelthatiscapitalist,socialistorcommunist,butamodelthatisdemocratic.

I think that this has highlighted the essential issue that we are facing in this hemisphererightnow,whichisthislinkagebetweendemocracyanddevelopmentandtheabilitytoshowthatdemocracycandeliverthegoods,thatattheendoftheday,asImentionedearlier,democracyisnot


aconservativeformofgovernment,thatinfactithasthepotentialtobeaveryrevolutionaryformofgovernment,arevolutionaryformofgovernmentthatprotectsindividualrightsandlibertiesbutatthesametimegivespeopleavoiceintheirnationaldestinyandrecognizestheminacitizenshipwhichisallinclusiveandwhich,moreimportantly,takesthestepbeyonddemocraticgovernmenttotherecognitionthatweliveindemocraticstatesandasmembersofdemocraticstatesourgovernmenthasresponsibilitiestoprovidebenefitsandservicesandwehaveresponsibilitiesalsotoengageinoursocietiesandoperateinoursocietiesasdemocraticactors.InsomewaysthechallengesthatwefacenowinthehemispherearetheproductoftheconsensusthatwascreatedinQuebecCityandthenthecommitmentthatwasbuiltthroughtheInterAmericanDemocraticCharter.Oneotherpointwhichisveryimportanttomakehere,theInterAmericanDemocraticCharterwasapprovedbyacclamationinLima,PeruonSeptember11,2001.Foruswhohadbeenworkingonitforsometimeitwasaprofoundlybittersweetmoment,sweetobviouslybecausethepromiseoftheQuebecCitySummithadbeenrealizedinanimportantagreement,bitterobviouslybecauseourcountrywasunderattackandweknewwhatthiswasgoingtomeanforusintheyearstocome.

The fact thatSeptember11,2001kindof links terrorismanddemocracy in suchadramaticwayisimportantandthefactthatthecharteritselflinksdemocracyanddevelopmentsisalsovitallyimportant.Oneofthethingsthatwehavetriedtodo,theUnitedStatesgovernmenthastriedtodo,asitestablishesitspolicyintheregionandasitlooksathowitexpendsresourcesistomakesurethatourpolicycorrespondstothestructureortheconsensusthatwasbuiltinQuebecCity,whetherit be commitment to consolidation of democratic institutions, whether it be promoting economicopportunityandprosperity,etheritbeinvestinginpeopleorwhetheritbeinworkingtoprotectthedemocraticstatefromnonstateactors.Inotherwords,ourpolicy,andthismightsurprisesomeofyou,reallywasconceivedthroughthesummitprocess. It isstructurereflectsthesummitprocessandaswetrytoimplementitwetrytoimplementitinawaythatcorrespondstothatprocessandcorrespondstotheprioritieslaidoutinthatprocess.IthinkwehavedoneaprettygoodjobofitandIwillrunyouthroughafewnumbersjusttogiveyouanidea.

Forinstance,theBushadministrationhasdoubledforeigndirectassistancetoLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean.WhenPresidentBushcameintooffice,theUnitedStateswasspendingabout$800millionayearinforeigndirectassistancetotheregion.Thatisnowabout$1.6billion.Ithasbeen$1.6billionforthepastfiveyears.Infact,ifyoulookattheentireamountofmoneythatthepreviousadministrationspentintheregionitwasalittleunder$7billion.TheBushadministrationhitthatfigureataboutfouryears,soeverythingsincethenhasbeenkindofanaddon.

Whatisimportantalsoisthatthismoneyhasbeenconcentratedinspecificareas.Thedevelopmentside of the equation has been enhanced. There has been an important alternative developmentcomponentputintothecounterdrugactivities,especiallyintheAndes,andalotofmoneyhasalsogonetoHaitiinordertohelpHaitiworkitselfthroughaverydifficultpoliticalmomentandshowthatademocracycanrebuild.Ademocraticgovernment,withthehelpoftheUnitedNations(U.N.)andcountrieslikeCanada,canrebuildademocraticstate.

TheBushadministrationincreasedfundingtothePeaceCorpbyabout�0percentandputaboutathousandnewPeaceCorpvolunteersintotheregionandintocountriesthathistoricallyhadnothadPeaceCorpvolunteerslikeMexico.

TheBushadministrationcreated theMillenniumChallengeCorporationand theMillenniumChallengeAccounts,whicharedesigned to take theprinciplesdevelopedat theMontereyUnitedNations meeting on financing development linking the policy of developing countries to donorassistanceandprovidingnewmoneysandnewfundstopromotegovernmentsthatmaketherightkindsofdecisions,therightkindofpolicydecisionsaboutfightingcorruption,improvingeducation,improving health care and creating an environment in which people develop individual capacity.


Theadministrationhasputabout$500millionuptothispoint,newmoney,intotheregionthroughtheMillenniumChallengeAccountanditwillputadditionalmoneyinifweareabletonegotiatecompactswithBoliviaandwithGuyana.

Thenthroughtradeandpreferentialaccessprogramswehavewethinkdramaticallyreshapedtheeconomicdynamicintheregionandhavebeguntofosteraseriesofmicroeconomicrevolutionsinspecificcountrieswherewehavefreetradeagreementsthatarereallyallabouttearingdownoldeconomic structures and old ways of doing things and opening up market space and creating anenvironmentinwhichnewcompaniescanemergeandinwhichsmallandmediumsizedenterpriseshaveachanceandcreateeconomiesthatpullpeopleoutoftheinformalsectorandintotheformalsectorwherenotonlydotheypaytaxesbuttheyarealsocoveredbylabourlawandbysocialsecurityregimes.

Rightnowabout85percentto90percentofallgoodscomingfromLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeantotheUnitedStatescomeindutyfree,eitherthroughGSP,throughourCaribbeanBasinInitiative,throughtheAndean Trade Preference and Drug Eradication Act,orthroughourfreetradeagreements.RightnowourfreetradeagreementscoverabouttwothirdsoftheentireGrossDomesticProductofthehemisphere.

Wethinkthatthiskindofresponsetotheregion,thatthiskindofengagementwiththeregionhasbeenpositive.IwilllettheCanadiansspeakforthemselves,butIknowtheCanadianengagementhasbeenjustasrobust.Thisisimportantbecauseitreallyischangingadynamicintheregionanditischanginghowpeopleunderstandtheirfuturesandhowtheyunderstandtheirengagementwithothercountries.Thisiswhyfromourpointofviewwehavetomaintainahemisphericapproachinourpolicy.

WehavetomaintainapanAmericanapproachtoourpolicybecausewithoutthatSouthAmericainparticular,partsofSouthAmerica,reallyruntheriskofbecomingPluto,ofkindoffloatingofftothefarendoftheuniverseandeventuallybeingdeclarednotaplanet.IdonotsayitentirelyinjestbecauseSouthAmericainparticularhasatendencytoparochialism.Ithasatendencytocloseinonitself.EvenwithalltheactivitythatcountrieslikeBrazilandothersaredoingtotrytoopentheregionupandthedegreetowhichtheChileanshavebeenreachingoutveryaggressively.Historicallytherehasbeenatendencytolookinward,tonotnecessarilyseeitselfaspartofalargerhemisphericproject.Wehavetodoeverythingpossibletonotallowthattohappen,andtonotallowthatbreaktooccur.

ThisisactuallyamomentinwhichIcantalkabitaboutthechallengesthatwefaceintheregionandespeciallythechallengestotheconsensusthatwebuiltthroughtheQuebecCitySummitprocessandthenthroughallthesummitsthathavecomeafterit.

Obviously,oneofthemostvocalandvisiblechallengesofthisconsensusisHugoChavezinVenezuela.ChavezhasamessagewhichresonatesinsomepartsofLatinAmerica,especiallyonthefringesofpoliticalsociety.Wehaveseenitexpressedandmanifestedinavarietyofways,oneofthemostdramaticbeingduringtheMardelPlataSummitwhenapeople’ssummit,acountersummit,washeldasaneffortagaintoattackthelargerfreetradeagendaoftheregion,notjusttheUnitedStatesbuttheregion,butalsoasaresponse,anegativeresponse,totheimpactofglobalization.

Thischallengeisreallyachallengeofvision.Itisachallengeofideas.Weneedtounderstanditthatwayandweneedtorespondtoitinthatway.Inotherwords,wereallyshouldnotseeitasapoliticalthreat.Weneedtoseeitasachallengetoustoimproveourabilitytocommunicatebutmoreimportanttoimproveourabilitytoprovideresults.WhatImeanbythisisthatinsomewayswhatweseeinthiscompetingvisionissomethingthatwehaveseenandheardbefore.Thevisionisbasedonpersonalisticpolitics.Ithasheavyauthoritarianoverlayanditseesdemocracyasameanstochannelclassconflict. Itseesdemocracyasameans tochoose leadersbutnotasamethodof


government.Themethodofgovernmentisreallyabouttryingtoaddresstheproblemsofclassconflictandclassdivisionsthroughanelectedgovernmentbutactinginanauthoritarianwayanddoingsobyconcentratingresourcesback to thestate,back to thepublicsector,andbyresistingeconomicintegration,thebeliefbeingthateconomicintegrationactuallydegradesanderodesthepowerofthestateandthatthestateisnecessarytoaddresstheunderlyingsocialproblemsthatespeciallySouthAmericancountriesface.

Fromourpointofviewatleastwehaveseenthismovie.Wehaveheardthesearguments.Weknowwhat the result is. It isbroken institutions, it is failedeconomiesand it isasuffocationofcivilsociety.Thisisamessagethatresonatesbecauseofdesperation.Itisamessagethatresonatesbecauseofthefrustrationthatpeopleinsomecountriesfeelaboutgovernmentsthatarenotdeliveringthegoods.

Oneofthechallengesthatweface,oneofthethingsweneedtodo,islookforwaystomakesurethatgovernmentsthathavemadeacommitmenttodemocracy,governmentsthathavemadeacommitmenttofreemarketsandeconomicintegration,cansucceed.Mostofthemaresucceeding.Thosewhoarenotarenotsucceedingbecausetheirinstitutionsareweakandbecausethepoliticaldynamicinthecountryissofractiousthatthereisnopossibilityforcontinuityofpolicyovertime.In this regard, the inter American system has institutions and organizations that can help thesecountries.

Infact,oneoftheimportantaspectsoftheInterAmericanDemocraticCharteristhatitcreatesameansforcountriesinthehemispheretoexpresssolidarityandprovideinstitutionalassistancetocountriesthataregoingthroughdemocraticcrises,notonlyintermsofelectoralobservationbutalsointermsofavarietyofotherinterventionsthatcanbedone.WeareonlybeginningtounderstandthepowerandthestrengthoftheInterAmericanDemocraticCharterinthisregard.Thereisalotmorethatwecanbedoing.Thereisalotmorecreativitythatwecanbebringingtothisissue.

IguessthecentralpointhereaswelookatthiskindofIdonotwanttousetheword“battle”,butaswelookatwhatthesecompetingvisionsmeanandhowitiswearegoingtoaddressthem,ultimately we have to address them through results. We can not address them through rhetoric.Wecannotaddressthemthroughideologicalattack.Wehavetodoitbyshowingthatwehavethecapabilityoflinkingdemocracyanddevelopmentanddeliveringthegoodsandservicesthatmanyofthecountriesintheregionneedtoaddresstheunderlyingproblemsofpovertyandequalityandexclusion.Ithinkwecandoit.Infact,Ithinkthereistremendousopportunityouttheretodoit.

WhenyoulookatwhatcountrieslikeChileandElSalvadorhavebeenabletodointermsofreducingpovertylevels,andespeciallycriticalpovertylevels,therearelotsofgoodmodels.Therearelotsofapproachesthatwork.Italsorequiresadegreeofflexibilityonourpartasweunderstandthatcountriesallhaveaninternalpoliticaldynamicthatneedstobeworkedoutandthatwhatweneedtobedoingislookingforwaystohelptofacilitatethatprocess,tohelpthesecountriesworkthisout.

In this regard, I believe that there is still a consensus around democracy, free markets andeconomic integration and a consensus around the importance of investing in people so that theydon’tbecomedependentonthestatebuttheybecomeindependentinthemselves,thattheyhavethecapacitytotakeadvantageofeconomicopportunity.IbelievethatCanadaandtheUnitedStatescanplayahugeroleinthis.

ThiskindofbringsmebacktoNorthAmerica.WhatwehavebeenabletoaccomplishthroughNorth American Free Trade Agreement(NAFTA)hasbeenremarkableintermsofdramaticeconomicgrowthanddramaticgrowthoftrade.ButNAFTAwasanagreementwhichoncedonewaskindoflefttoitselfandlefttotheprivatesector.ItwasreallythroughthesecurityandprosperitypartnershipthatgovernmentsfinallyreengagedinaNAFTAprocessandfinallybegantolookforwaystoenhance


NAFTAbutatthesametimebuildintoitothercomponents,especiallyonthesecurityside,recognizingintheaftermathofSeptember11,2001thatitisthroughprotectingoursecuritythatweprotectourprosperityandweprotectthewellbeingofourdemocraticinstitutionsbutalsointermsofbuildingnewconstituenciesforgovernments.

Oneoftheinterestingthingsaboutthesecurityandprosperitypartnershipisthatithascomponentsthatallowthosewhousetheborderallthetime,whethertheybetheprivatesectorandmovementofgoodsandservices,whetheritbestateandmunicipalinstitutionsalongtheborder,thefrontier,orotherpeoplewhohaveanabidinginterestinborders,whethertheybenon-governmentorganizationsoruniversities,orwhohavestudied thematgreat length, toprovide input togovernmentsand toenhanceourunderstandingofwherefrictionpointsstillexistandwhatmorewecandointermsofharmonizing regulations, in termsof improvingprocedures andprocesses,but also indevelopinglevelsofcooperationandcollaborationthathavenotexistedbefore.

WhentheStatePartnershipProgramwasfirstconceivedseveralyearsagoitwasseenassomethingthatwouldbedoneasanaddontoNAFTAandtakingintoaccounttheeventsofSeptember11,2001butithasevolvedovertime.WiththedisastersthatweintheUnitedStatesfacedbecauseofHurricaneKatrina,becauseofthefearsraisedbythepossibilityofanavianflupandemic,ourunderstandingofsecurityinNorthAmericaanditsrelationshiptotradehasalsochangedandevolved.

WhatwearedoinginNorthAmericatodayisconsolidatingdemocraticstates,integratingthemeconomicallybutthenprovidingasecurityoverlayandalevelofcooperationanddialoguethatwillstrengthentheeconomicinstitutions,strengthenourabilitytoprotectandpromoteourprosperityandenhanceourabilitytocreatetheopportunitythatpeoplecanactuallytakeadvantageof.Inthiswaywehavetakenamodelofeconomicintegrationthatislargelyacceptedaroundthehemisphereandraiseditonelevelhigher.Itisahugechallengefortherestofthehemispherebutitisachallengethatwehavetopushthemtoaccept.

We think that thedegree towhichwecan improveourcooperationandcollaborationwithinNorthAmericawillactuallybeeffectivelypullingcentralandSouthAmericaandtheCaribbeanwithusandlettingthemknowthatwecanindeedaddress thefundamentalproblemofdemocracyanddevelopment inNorthAmericawithMexicoasavitalpartner, lookforwaystoaddressprofoundissues like immigration, and create an environment in which our democratic societies, our opensocieties,aresecure.Thisisobviouslyimportantforus,itisimportantforyou,itisimportantforMexico,itisimportantforothercountriesintheregion.

OneofthereasonswhyIwantedtosaywhytheAmericasmatter,asidefromtheobviousinteresttoourselves,isthatthedegreetowhichwecanshowthatdemocracycandeliverthegoods,thedegreetowhichwecanlinkdemocracyanddevelopmentandshowthatyoucanhaveopensocietiesthatareresilient,thatcanprotectthemselvesandcanprotecttheireconomicinstitutionsisthatwearesendingaverystrongmessagetothosepartsoftheworldthatarejustbeginningademocratizationprocess,whetheritbeintheMiddleEastorwhetheritbeinsouthandcentralAsia.ThedegreetowhichwecanshowthatdemocracycandeliverthegoodswillactasasourceofencouragementforthosewhoarereallyworkingtodemocratizecountriesintheMiddleEastandelsewhereintheworld.Thedegreetowhichwefailwillreinforcethosewhohavealwaysarguedthatonlyauthoritariangovernmentscanaddressthetoughdecisionsthatarerequiredtoendpovertyandinequalityandcreatesocietiesthatareallowedtogrow.

ForthatreasonIthinkthattheAmericasisstillthenewworld.IthinkthattheAmericasstillhavethecapabilitytoshowtherestoftheworldsomeprofoundandimportantlessonsingovernanceandinhowyouprotectindividuallibertiesbutoperatesuccessfullyinaglobalizedeconomy.


Broadening and Deepening Our Proliferation Security Initiative Cooperation

By Robert G. Joseph

Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security [ThefollowingareexcerptsfromthespeechpresentedinWarsaw,PolandonJune23,2006.]

Fromtheoutset,Polandhasbeenakeypartnerintheproliferationsecurityinitiative(PSI)andmygovernmentisgratefulforitsstrongeffortstofurthertheworkoftheInitiative.Threeyearsago,inKrakow,PresidentBushproposed thecreationof theProliferationSecurity Initiative,bringingtogetherthosenationswillingtoworktogethertostopthetraffickinginweaponsofmassdestructionandtheirmeansofdelivery.Today,thesixty-sixnationsgatheredhereinWarsaw,andothersthathaveendorsedthePSI,demonstratethebreadthofthatglobalcommitment.Ourpresencesendsastrongmessagetoproliferatorsthatweareunitedinourdeterminationtouseourlaws,ourcapabilities,andourpoliticalwilltoensurethatproliferatorswillnotfindsafehavenwithinourborders,airspace,orterritorialwatersfortheirdeadlytrade.

Wearehere inPolandnotonlybecauseweagree that theproliferationofweaponsofmassdestructionisintolerableandathreattoallofus.Wearealsoherebecauseweunderstandtheneedtodefeattheweaponsofmassdestruction(WMD)threatsposedbystateslikeIranandNorthKorea,terroristgroupslikealQaeda,andthefacilitatorswillingtobuyandsellsensitivetechnologyforthesestatesandgroups.Ourreadinesstofindandimplementsolutionstothelegal,operational,andpolicyissuessurroundingproliferationwillremovetheinhibitionsagainstactionandwillensurethatwesucceedinaddressingthesethreats.Proliferation Security Initiative and the Broader Proliferation Strategy The governments represented here have undertaken varying levels of engagement andparticipationinthePSI.SomehavebeenactiveinPSIfromthestart.Othershavejoinedrecently.Many have participated in exercises or cooperated in PSI interdictions. Some, having made thepoliticalcommitmenttosupportPSIandtoengageinsomePSIactivities,maystillbeconsideringhowtomaketheircommitmentmosteffective.

Inmanyways,thesedifferencesrevealtheessenceofPSI.Individualstatescontributeastheircapabilitiesandtheirlawsallow,usingtheirdiplomatic,military,economic,lawenforcement,andintelligence tools to combat the trade inproliferationcreativelywithin the contextprovidedbyasharedcommitmenttotheprinciplesonwhichweareallagreed.PSIcountrieshaveputalloftheseassetstoworkinamultinational,flexible,yettargeted,fashion.

Threeyears into thePSI, it isuseful toassess theprogressof the initiative to reinforcewhyPSIhasbecomeavitalcomponentinthefightagainsttheproliferationofWMDandastandardofgoodnonproliferationbehavior.Weshouldconsiderhowtodevelopfurtherthecapacitiesneededtodefeatthethreatposedbysuchproliferation,includingwhatnewtoolsarerequiredtoensurethatthePSIremainsadynamicinitiative.ThistooisconsistentwithourobligationsunderUnitedNations(U.N.)SecurityCouncilResolution15�0,whichrequiresstatestoputinplacelawsandenforcementmechanismstostoptheproliferationofWMD.

One area for further development is the creation of tools to interdict payments betweenproliferatorsandtheirsuppliers.Weneedtodevelopadditionaltoolssuchasdenyingproliferatorsaccesstofinancing,whichmytreasurycolleaguewilldiscussinmoredetailonthenextpanel.For


ourpart,theUnitedStateshasputinplaceanewexecutiveorder,whichprohibitsU.S.personsfromdoingbusinesswithentitiesdesignatedbecauseoftheirproliferationactivities.

WhenthePSIwasfirstenvisioned,responsiblestateswerebecomingincreasinglyawareofthedangersposedbyblackmarketnetworksoperatingintheshadowsoflegitimatebusinesstodeliverWMDandmissile-relatedtechnologiestostatesandpersonsofgreatconcern.ThethreatposedbyterroristnetworksseekingtoacquireWMD,andtheinabilityofanyonestatebyitselftostoptheproliferationofWMD,heightenedthisawareness.Inessence,agapexistedthatproliferatorshadbecomeadeptatexploiting.Proliferatorsweresucceedingbytakingadvantageofgovernmentsthatdidnothaveadequateinformationorcapabilities,orinsomeinstancesthepoliticalwilltoenforcelegalauthoritiesagainsttheproliferationtrade.

ThePSIprinciplesweredevelopedtoreinforcepoliticalwill,cooperation,andlegalframeworkstoclosethisgapanddenyproliferatorstheabilitytooperate.Thus,theprinciplesrecognizethateachsovereignstatehasnationalauthorities,theabilitytousethembroadly,includinginconjunctionwithinternationallegalauthoritiesandincooperationwithlikemindedstates,tobringeffectivepressureagainsttheproliferationtrade.

TheexercisetrainingprogramandoperationalmeetingsofthePSIhavebeeneffectivetoolsindirectingoureffortstoturntheseagreedprinciplesintoaction.Todate,wehaveheldtwenty-threeexercisesimprovingandtestingourcapabilitiesonland,air,andsea.Recently,inTurkey,morethanthirtynationsparticipatedinthemostfar-reachingexercisetoincludetrainingineachofthesemodesofshipment.Anotherareafortrainingthatwewillexperiencefirst-handthisafternoonalbeitinanabbreviated form is thegaming simulationsdesigned tohighlight the interactionbetween limitedinformation,varyinglegalauthorities,andavailableoperationalcapacity.Proliferation Security Initiative Interdictions and National Capacity Turningfromexercisestoconcreteresults,weshouldbeproudofthePSIrecord.Whileitmightbeinstructivetodiscussmoredetails,itisinevitablethatmuchofourworkisdonequietlyandwithcooperation in sensitive channels outside the public spotlight.We should welcome this. Discreetactionsoftenhelpusstayonestepaheadoftheproliferatorsandgivethemlessinsightintostepstheycantaketoevadedetection.

BetweenApril2005andApril2006,theUnitedStatesworkedsuccessfullywithmultiplePSIpartnersinEurope,AsiaandtheMiddleEastonroughlytwodozenseparateoccasionstopreventtransfersof equipmentandmaterials toWMDandmissileprograms incountriesof concern.Forexample,PSIcooperationhasstoppedtheexporttoIran’smissileprogramofcontrolledequipmentanddual-usegoods.OnePSIpartnerhasalsostoppedtheexportofheavywater-relatedequipmenttoIran’snuclearprogram.

AsweevolvethePSI,oureffortswillneedtobeflexibleinordertoadapttothelessonswelearn in real world interdictions, as well as in our training exercises, and in assessing responsesby proliferators to evade our efforts. One clear lesson is that PSI must continue to operate as aresults-orientedactivity;onethatidentifiesproblemsanddevelopsinnovativesolutions.Forsuchanapproachtocontinuetobeeffective,timelyinformationsharingwillremainakeyelementofthePSIandoneinneedofemphasisinthenextyear.

Continuing to Build the Proliferation Security Initiative

Asweconsiderwhatwewanttoaccomplishinthenextyear,IwouldhighlightthreeopportunitiesforfurtherdevelopmentofourInitiative.First,becausePSIisanactivity,notanorganization,muchoftheforwardmomentumofPSIrestsonthesustainedcommitmentandinnovativeeffortsofeachoftheparticipatingnations.Maintainingourreadinesstorespondtoproliferationactivitiesmustbe


asharedobjectiveofallPSIstates.Regularparticipationintrainingexercisesthattestcapacitiesandlegalauthoritiesisapositivewaytomaintainouroperationalreadinessagainstwhatarecreativeandcleveradversaries.

WhilethismeetingisanopportunityforallgovernmentstotakestockofPSI’srapiddevelopmentandtoreinforcethestrongmessageofdeterrencetoproliferators,wemustbereadytodiscussthehardquestionswefacewhenconsideringactionstostopproliferation.Furthermore,wemustcontinuetoexplore the limits of our legal authorities, to address the liability questions that could arise, and,perhapsmostimportantly,toovercomethedifficultiesinsustainingthepoliticalwilltoenforcelawsproactivelyagainststatesofproliferationconcern.

AsecondchallengeisbroadeningglobalparticipationintheInitiative.AsPresidentBushsaidwhenheannouncedthePSIthreeyearsago:

“Overtime,wewillextendthispartnershipasbroadlyaspossibletokeeptheworld’smostdestructiveweaponsawayfromourshoresandoutof thehandsofourcommonenemies.”

WearemakinggoodprogresswithmorethanseventycountriesnowsupportingthePSI.ThisisatestamenttotheoutreachactivitiesconductedbyPSIpartners.However,asPSIpartnersweallneedtocontinueanactiveoutreachcampaigntoencourageadditionalcountriestocommittothePSIStatementofInterdictionPrinciplesandtobepreparedtotakeactionagainstproliferation.ThemoreglobalthePSIreach,thelesstheopportunityforproliferatorstofindsafehavenfortheiractivities.

SignificantpercentagesofglobalcommercetransitthroughsuchkeystrategicareasastheStraitsofMalacca, theSuezCanal, theMiddleEastandGulf regions,aswellasmajorair routeswhichcrisscrosstheglobe.Sincethistimelastyear,thePSIhasbeenendorsedbymanystatesinCentralAsia and the Middle East and Gulf regions. The participation by these states adds an importantelementtooureffortstodenyproliferatorsaccesstomaritimeandairroutes.WecontinuetoengagewithstatesinAsia,animportantregionforenhancingourcooperation,aswellasinLatinAmericaandAfrica.WeshouldincreaseoureffortstogainmorePSIpartnersfromeachofthesekeyregions.

Tofurthersecureincreasedparticipation,wewillneedtodispelanymisunderstandingsaboutthePSIPrinciples.Somecountriesdonot fullyunderstand theflexibilityof the Initiative and itscompleteconsistencywithnationalandinternationallegalobligations,particularlywhenquestionsofinfringementonnationalsovereigntyarise.Thepartnersgatheredhereunderstandthateachcountryinvolved inaPSI interdictionwill relyon itsown legalauthorities,whichmaybedifferent fromanothernation’s.Governmentscanlooktotakeactionwhenandwheretheirownlawsaswellasinternationalauthoritiesprovidethenecessarylegalbasis.Eventhoughauthoritiesmaydifferamongstates,whatremainsconstantistheabilityforallstatestoenforceexistingauthoritiesstrictlyandtodevelopnewlawsasneeded.

A third challenge for the Initiative isdeveloping solid informationand suggestedcoursesofactiontorespondtoproliferationactivities.TheunravelingoftheA.Q.Khanproliferationnetworkdemonstrated the importance of working with key supplier and transshipment countries to shareinformation.A.Q.Khan’snuclearnetworkhighlightedfortheworldtheabilityofanillicitnetworktooperatewithoutdetectionbylawenforcementandotherregulatorybodies.Thenetworkalsoreliedonanumberofvulnerablepointsalongthesupplychain,includingfinanciers,shippers,distributors,andfrontcompanies.

Itisvitaltooursuccessthatwehavesolidinformationthatwecanuse.Weneedtoconsiderhowwecandomoretobuildthekindofpartnershipsitwillrequiretoexchangeinformationandrecommendationsforactioninatimelyway.Connectingthedotsandsharingassociationsbetweenthevariouspiecesofthesupplychainusedbyproliferatorsareimportantareasforenhancingour


interdictioncapabilities.Todothis,weneedtosensitizeandinvigoratetheattentiontoproliferation-related activities by our enforcement personnel across a range of disciplines, including financialregulators,customsofficials,consularofficers,andtraditionallawenforcementofficers.

IntheUnitedStates,PSIhasbeenanimportantorganizingfactorinourreviewofinterdictionopportunitieswiththefullrangeofintelligence,lawenforcement,diplomatic,economic,andmilitarytools. We have learned through both our PSI successes and failures the importance of gatheringexpertisefromallofourrelevantagenciesandtointegrateawiderangeofoperationalcapabilitiestorespondquicklyandeffectivelytoinformationofproliferationactivity.WehaveheardfrommanyPSIpartnergovernments,suchasPoland,Canada,andPortugal, that thePSIsimilarlyhashelpedthemestablishregularinteragencycoordination.

Inconclusion,thenextyearshouldbeanopportunitytofurtherdeveloptheinitiativenotonlyamong statesparticipating in thismeeting today, butnew states ready to join in thefight againstproliferation.OnbehalfoftheUnitedStates,Iurgeeachnationtocommittothefollowingactionsinthecomingyear:

• First: think innovatively. Undertake a review of your laws and how they can be strengthened to deny the proliferation ofWMD and missile-related shipments and servicesthatsupportproliferationfromorthroughyourstates

• Second: enforce aggressively. Develop a regularized interagency mechanism in your government to review enforcement data and share information on possible interdictions of shipments, personnel, funds, and other services that aid in proliferation

• Third: engage regularly. Commit to active outreach and to host and participate in PSIexercisesinyourregionandbeyond

These activities will ensure that all of our governments are both developing the capacity toactagainstproliferatorsandcreatingconnectivityandoperationsforactionwithotherPSIpartners.Carrying out these activities also will send a strong signal to proliferators that PSI partners arepreparedtotakeeffectiveactionsagainstthem.Together,wecanbroadenanddeepenourpartnershipagainstproliferationofnuclear,chemical,andbiologicalweapons,theirrelatedmaterials,andmeansofdelivery.Thisisapreeminentthreattointernationalpeaceandsecurity.Wemustcontinuetodoallwecantocombatthisthreat.


Middle East Region at Critical CrossroadsBy

C. David Welch Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs

[ThefollowingareexcerptsoftheaddresspresentedtoTuftsUniversityFletcherSchoolofLawandDiplomacy,Medford,Massachusetts,September6,2006.]

The Middle East region stands now at a critical crossroads with profound implications forAmerica’snationalsecurity.Theregionisintransition,buttowhat?Withacombinedpopulationofsome230millionpeople,thevastmajorityofwhomisunderagethirty,theregionisconfrontingchallengesof anorderofmagnitudebeyondwhatwe couldhave envisionedwhen Iwashere in1975.Thesocialist,secularstatemachinerythatonceheldsuchpromisehasdemonstrablyfailedtokeepupwiththeneedsofthepeople.AstheArab Human Development Reportsfrom2002to200�havechronicled,hugedeficitsintheareasofeducation,economyandpoliticshaveresulted,creatingvacuumsthatinsomecases,well-organizedIslamicorganizationshavesteppedintofill.[TheArab Human Development Reportsfrom2002-200�canbefoundatthefollowingwebsite:http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=Arab%20Human%20Development%20Reports%20from%202002%20-%20200�&hl=en&lr=scholart.]

Governmentshavebeenslowtorespondtothisrapidchange,butmanyarebeginningtodoso.Egypt, for instance, throughapainfulprocessofeconomicreform,hasbeengrowingfor thepastcoupleofyearsat5percentandisexpectedtogrowevenfasterin2006.ThoughslowincomparisontoAsia’spowerhouses,Egypt’sgrowthisallowingit toabsorbmostof thenewentrants intothelaborforceandisbeginningtochangemindsets.Egypthasalsorecentlyexperimentedwithdirectelectionsandisbeginningthedifficultprocessofexpandingpoliticalspaceinaone-partydominatedsystem.

Suchchangesarecrucial,buttheyarealsoslow.Theyneedtimeandspacetocometofruition,butinthatsameperiodtherearedisruptivealternativevisions.Whilethereisatrendtodemocracy,thereisalsoresistanttoit.Thesamefactorspushingreformsuponthegovernmentsoftheregionare also empowering those who would like to wipe the entire slate clean and start over with anexclusionary,intolerantworldview.Inmanywaysthisisarace,andourdecisionhasbeentoseektoengagenowratherthanwaittoseewhathappenslater.Thereisalegitimatequestionastowhetherwewillsucceed,butweknowthatifwedonothingwewillmostcertainlyfail.

Thechallengesarenumerousbutthepathisclear.Obviously,Iraqisahugefocus.WemustworkwithmoderateIraqistostabilizeIraqandtogivethatnationachancetostrengthenitsdemocraticfoundations.Securityisprimordialtothatendeavorand,forthemoment,thatcanonlybecreatedbyacombinationofU.S.trooppressure,Iraqiforcesbuild-up,reconciliationwithnon-terroristelementsoftheinsurgency,andeliminationofdeathsquads.ThismustbecomplementedbycontinuedinternationalsupportforIraq.OurfocushereistheUnitedNationsandIraq-ledeffortforaninternationalcompactlinking Iraqieconomic reformandpolitical steps toenhanced internationalfinancial andpoliticalsupport.

Wemustcontinuetogoontheoffensiveagainstradicalsandextremistswhoexploitotherconflictstoundermineanon-violentandliberalorder.Inparticular,wemustconfrontthenewchallengethattheIslamicRepublicofIranrepresentstotheinternationalcommunityandtopeaceandstabilityintheregion.And,morewidelythroughouttheregion,wemustcontinuewithoureffortstosupportmoderate governments and civil society in their efforts to meet the needs of their people and toencouragegenuinefreedomtotakeroot.


Meetinganyoftheseindividualchallengeswouldnotbesufficienttobringpeaceandstabilitytotheregion.AndtheArab-Israeliconflict,whichhasbeensocentralforsolong,mustbesolvedifanyhopefor lastingpeace is tobeassured. Preciselybecauseallof these issuesaresodeeplyintertwined,ourapproachmustbecomprehensiveandmustseizeopportunitieswhereonlydangersseemapparent. Innoplacenowaretherisksandopportunitiesmoreapparentthaninthecurrentsituation in Lebanon, for it is related to all of these challenges. Hezbollah, a powerful terroristorganization,emergedasa“state-within-a-state”becauseofthefailureofthecentralgovernmenttomeettheneedsofitscitizens.IranhasaidedandabettedHezbollah’sgrowththroughcoldhardcashandweapons,apolicythatdatesbacktotheearly1980’s,butrecentlyhasbeenreinvigorated.IranhasalsolookedtoreplicatetheHezbollah“model”inIraqinordertofurtherdestabilizethatcountry,andhasenlistedtheminorityAlawiteregimeinSyria.AfterHezbollahinitiatedtheviolenceonJuly12,2006theU.S.andFranceledtheefforttocreateanewdynamicinLebanonforgreaterstabilityandpeaceinthatcountry,aneffortthatresultedinUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolution1701(UNSCR1701).Through1701theinternationalcommunitysupportsthesovereigntyoftheLebanesestate,withamonopolyonforcewithinitsbordersandcontrollingthoseborders,sothatHezbollahcannotbepresentasanarmedgroupinthesouthandcannotberearmed.ItisourexpectationthattheintroductionofaninternationalforceintoLebanontoworkwiththegovernmentofLebanonandtheLebaneseArmedForcescanachievethesecriticalobjectivesandavertyetanotherroundofviolenceinthispivotalnation.

With the arrival of the international force, we will also look to empower the governmentof Lebanon by urging the prompt lifting of the Israeli embargo by deploying the force as Israelwithdraws,andbybeginningreconstructioneffortsinearnest.WewillalsoworkwiththegovernmentofLebanoninconcertwiththeinternationalcommunitytoaddressunderlyingstructuralproblemsintheeconomythatexistedbeforethewar.Thiscanonlybeabeginning.WemustalsoworkforHezbollah’sdisarmament,whichisintheendtheonlywaytosupportharmonyamongallLebanese.Aboveall,Syria’scontinuedinterferenceinLebanonmuststop.

Iranloomsasanemergent,dangerouschallenge.Shortly,wewillbegoingbacktotheUnitedNationsSecurityCounciltodemonstratetotheIraniangovernmentthattheinternationalcommunityisresolvedtoseeanendtoIran’sefforttoweaponizeitsnuclearprogram.TogivestrengthtotheEU-3(France,EnglandandGermany)negotiationswithIran,theU.S.recentlyagreedtojoinourEuropeanpartnersatthetablewiththeIraniansshouldIranagreetosuspendenrichmentandreprocessing.Iranhasmadeabundantlyclearthattheywillnot,andtheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)hasconfirmedcontinuationofenrichment,sowehavenochoicebuttoconsiderhowfurthertoisolateIran.WecontinuetoholdouthopethatIranwillabidebythewilloftheinternationalcommunity,buthopeisnotaplan.WewillthereforeseektoconstrainIran’sabilitytobenefitfromtheinternationalcommunitywhichitnowthreatens.

StabilizingIraq,shoringupLebanon,andcontainingIranareallpartofabroaderstrategythatalso seeks an end to thePalestinian-Israeli conflict. For too long, extremists have tradedoff thetragedyofthisconflicttoattractrecruitsbyradicalizingthepooranduneducated.Increasingly,itisextremistIslamicgroupswhomostvigorouslyexploitthisissue.WeremaincommittedtoadvancingthePresident’stwo-statevisionofpeace,andwecontinuetoworkwiththepartiesandkeyregionalalliestorealizethatvision.Progresswillalsostrikeablowtorejectionistgroupsthathaveadoptedanti-Israelirhetoricinanattempttofurthertheirownpoliticalagenda.

WhilemakingprogressontheArab-Israeliconflictremainsacoreconcern, theabilityof theinternationalcommunityandkeystatesintheregiontoimprovetheireconomicandpoliticalsituationremainstheonlywaytocreatetheconditionsforrealdevelopmentandlastingstability.Tothedegreethatweand theyare successful theambitionsof radicalsandextremistswill fail. Increasing thescopeofpoliticalfreedom,reducinghighratesofunemployment,creatingopportunitiesforpersonal


economicimprovement,andraisingthestandardoflivingwillhelpaddresstherootcausesofterrorismandreducetheappealofextremist-Islamicpoliticalmovements.Bycreatinganautonomousbusinessclass,newpoliticalleaderscouldemerge.

Itwillbeequally important thatgovernments in the region takeon the taskof reform. Theinternationalcommunityshoulddoitsutmosttosupportreformersastheygothroughtheinevitablegrowingpains.Ourplanisambitious.Wecontinuetopushforgreatermarkettransparency,privatizationofbankingandfinancialinstitutions,andaMiddleEastFreeTradeAgreement(MEFTA)by2012.Tobuildpartnershipsforchange,theU.S.hasinitiatedtwocomprehensiveplans:theBroaderMiddleEastandNorthAfrica(BMENA)initiativeandtheMiddleEastPartnershipInitiative(MEPI).Thesetwo programs work directly with civil society, nascent democratic movements, and governmentofficialstoidentifyareasofreformandprovidesupportwherepossible.

Weareundernoillusions.Weknowhowhardconflictresolutionandreformintheregionwillbe.ButIamanoptimistandIthinkwecansucceed.AsIsaidbefore,theMiddleEastisaregionintransitionandithascometoacrossroads.U.S.leadershipiskey.Howwerespondwilldefineourrelationshipwiththeregionfortheforeseeablefuture.


The United States and Japan: Partners in Hope

By Ambassador Randall L. Tobias

Director of United States Foreign Assistance and United States Agency for International Development Administrator

[ThefollowingareexcerptsoftheremarkspresentedtotheMidwestU.S.andJapan38thAnnualMeetingIndianapolis,Indiana,September11,2006.]

ThoseofyouwhoknowmefrommypreviouslifeintheprivatesectormayknowthatIfranklyneverexpectedtofindmyselfservingasournation’sfirstDirectorofU.S.ForeignAssistanceandAdministratorofUSAID.ThisisnotexactlyhowIhadplannedtospendmytimeatthisstageinmylife.Buttheissuesrelatedtoforeignassistancearesoimportant,andopportunitiesforimpactsogreat,thatIconsideritanenormousprivilegetohavebeenaskedbythePresidenttoleadthenewandsignificantforeignassistancereformeffortunderwaywithintheUnitedStatesGovernment.

BeforeItellyouaboutoureffortstorefocusUnitedStatesforeignaid,Idowanttofirsttakenoteofthesignificanceofthedayonwhichwearegathered.Fiveyearsagotoday,theUnitedStateswasattackedbyterroristswhohadplottedandtrainedinanation-statemarkedbyrepression,failedgovernance,andlackofopportunity.AndindeedthetasktowhichIamdevotingmytimethesedaysisverydirectlyrelatedtooureffortstoaddresstheserootcausesofterrorism.

OnSeptember11,2001,itbecameclearthatthelocusofnationalsecuritythreatshasshiftedtothedevelopingworldwherepoverty,oppression,injustice,andindifferenceareexploitedbyourfoestoprovidehavenforcriminalsandtheplanningofcriminalacts.Foreignassistanceisaneffectivetool for countering these new threats, and thus has become a foundational pillar of our nationalsecurityarchitecture.

Ensuringthatwedeliverthatassistancestrategically,andinpartnershipwithourfellowdonors-suchasJapan-isvital to itseffectiveness.BothJapanand theUnitedStateshave longrecognizedthathelpingourneighborsintheglobalcommunityofnationsissimplytherightthingtodo.Butinmorerecenttimes,andwithevengreaterawarenessintheyearssinceSeptermer11,2001,wehavealsocometounderstandthatinvestinginforeignassistanceisessentialforotherreasons,becauseourfutureisinextricablylinkedtothoseweseektoassist,andbecausehopeistheantithesisoffearandhatred.

• Howdowetrulycreatehope?

• Howdowegetthebestreturnonourforeignassistanceinvestment?

Theshortanswertothatquestion-asI learnedthroughmyexperienceleadingthePresident’sEmergencyPlanforAidsRelief-isremarkablysimilartowhatIlearnedinmythirty-nineyearsinthecorporateworld. Whether in Japanor theUnitedStates, togeta returnon investment in theprivatesectorrequiresaclearvision,clearobjectives,andthenafocusonperformance,results,andaccountability.Inforeignassistance,too,wemusttakethatsamestrategicapproach.

ThatiswhywehavecreatedanewstrategicframeworkforUnitedStatesforeignaid-oneintendedtofocusourforeignassistanceonprogramsintendedtodevelopwell-functioningandaccountablenation-statesthatrespondtotheneedsoftheirpeople,becausethemajorityshareholdersinthefuture

�0The DISAM Journal, February 2007

ofanynationmustbethepeopleofthosecountriesthemselves.Andwemustalwaysrememberthatourforeignassistanceisnotaboutus-itisaboutthem.

OurframeworkexplicitlyidentifiesendgoalsforU.Sforeignassistancethatfocusonultimatelygraduatingthenationswearehelpingfromtheneedtoreceivefurtherforeignassistance.Butwithoutacoordinated,comprehensive,mutuallysupportiveforeignassistanceprogramwewillnotbeabletoachieve,andthensustainforthelongterm,thegainsofourinvestments.

Theframeworkexplicitlyidentifiesacomprehensiveapproachtoachievingthosesustainableresults.Itrecognizesthatnationscannotprogresswithoutpeace,security,andstability.Theycannotprogresswithoutjustanddemocraticgovernance.Theycannotprogresswithoutinvestmentsinthehumancapacityof theircitizens.And theycannotprogresswithouteconomicgrowth.ThesenowaretheobjectivesofU.S.foreignassistance.Andweareinthemidstofreformingtheorganization,planningandimplementationofUnitedStatesforeignassistanceinordertoachievethisobjective.

IknowthatJapan,too,isinthemidstofreformingitsownforeignassistancecapabilitiesandwelookforwardtoworkingwithourcounterpartsthere,aswehavesoofteninthepast,toleverageourrespectivestrengthstowardtheaccomplishmentofoursharedgoals.

TheUnitedStatesandJapanhaveastrongrecordofaidcooperationworldwideinareasincludinghealth,water, tradeand investment,humanitarianassistance, andpost-conflict reconstruction.Forinstance,in2002,theUnitedStatesandJapanbeganacollaborationtolaunchtheCleanWaterforPeopleInitiative,ajointendeavortoprovidesafewaterandsanitationtotheworld’spoor,improvewatershed management, and increase productivity.As part of the initiative, this past March, ourtwogovernmentssignedanagreementwiththeIndianMinistryofUrbanDevelopment.AsaresultwithfinancingfromJapanandpolicyandtechnicalassistancefromtheUnitedStatesover100,000householdsin368slumsettlementsacrossBangalorecitywillreceivewaterandsanitationservices.Perhapsmostimportantly,agrantjointlysponsoredbytheU.S.andJapanishelpingBangaloreslumresidentsorganizetomakecriticaldecisions,suchaswheretolocatepublicwatertapsandcommunitytoilets.

ThereasonweareworkingwiththecityauthoritiesandfocusingonhelpingresidentstakepartindecisionmakingisbecauseJapanandtheUnitedStatesbothrecognizethatempoweringhumanpotentialandachievingtransformationaldevelopmentrequiresmorethanshort-termcharityoreventhelong-termprovisionofservices.Citizensmustunderstandthattheirgovernmentsareresponsiblefortheirhealthandsafety,foreducatingacriticalmass,andforcreatingtheconditionsneededforeconomicgrowth.Wemusteducateandsupportcitizenstomakedemandsoftheirgovernments,andrejectexcusesforfailure.That’spartofwhatdemocraciesareallabout.

Buttheeffortsofdonorgovernmentsalonewillnevercreatethekindofhopeandopportunitythatthepublicandprivatesectorscanfostertogether.ThatiswhytheU.S.governmentiscommittednotonlytoworkingwithfellowdonors,buttocreatingopportunitiesforpartnershipwiththeprivatesector.

In2001,theU.S.governmentstartedaninnovativeinitiativethatunitestheuniqueskillsandresourcesofprivatecompanies,foundations,andotherpartnerstoidentify,design,implement,andfunddevelopmentprojects.Sinceitsinception,USAID’sGlobalDevelopmentAlliancesinitiativehasprovidedover$1.4billiontofundapproximately400public-privatealliancesworldwide,leveragedover$4.6billionincommittedpartnercontributionsandengagedover1000alliancepartners.

OneofthoseisanalliancewithacompanybasedrighthereintheMidwestProcterandGamble(P&G).The longstanding partnership between USAID and P&G launched a new product PUR®

�1 The DISAM Journal, February 2007

PurifierofWaterusedasanewpoint-of-usewaterpurificationproduct.Whenproperlydeployed,PURispracticalandeffectiveforprovidingsafedrinkingwaterinemergencies.

Lastyear,followingthedevastatingearthquakeinPakistan,P&Galongwithmanyintheprivatesectordemonstratedthekindofgenerosityofwhichwecanallbeproud.Whendisasterstruck,P&Grespondedbyproviding$270,000 incashaswellasadonationofPURsachetsworthmore than$30,000.Thetotaldonationprovidedenoughproducttoproducesafedrinkingwatertomorethan50,000householdsforthreemonths.TheU.S.matchedP&G’scontributiontosupportthepurchaseofmaterials,suchasbucketsandcloths,neededforproperpreparationofPUR.Whilehouseholdsfrequentlyhavethesecommonmaterials,inthecaseofthisdevastatingearthquake,manyfamilieshadlostalloftheirpossessions.OurpartnershipprovedessentialtoprovidingsafedrinkingwatertoPakistaninitshourofneed.

Yet,whilewecertainlywelcometheprivatesector’scontributionsinresponsetohumanitariancrises,Iwouldencourageallofyouheretodaytoconsiderbeingourpartnersonlong-termprojectsaswell.Buildingsustainablesocietiesaroundtheworld,drivenbysustainableeconomies,isintheinterestofallofus.Andthereisnotimelikethepresenttogetinvolved.Thereformsunderwaywillallowthoseintheprivatesectorlookingforthebestwaytopartnerwithustogaugewheretheirresourcesarelikelytohavethegreatestimpact.

Despite thehistoryandgenerosityofourforeignaidprogram,remarkably, theUnitedStateshasneverbeforehadacomprehensiveandintegratedforeignassistancestrategy.Now,cleargoalsandobjectives,withcommonindicatorstoassessperformance,willenableustocomparecountryprogress,partnerperformance,andprogramresultsagainstourgoals,inwaysthathaveneverbeforebeenpossible.Asleaderswhoknowandunderstandthevalueofsoundinvestment,Ihopeaswemoveforwardonreformthatwewillbeabletocountonyoursupport.Together,wecangetthereturnoninvestmentthattheglobalcommunityexpectsfromforeignassistance,andthatallhumanbeingsdeserve.InaspiritofpartnershipwithallieslikeJapananddrawingontheinnovationoftheprivatesectorwecanhelpreplacefearandhatredwiththekindofenduringhopethatmighthavehelpedpreventthetragedywerememberonthisday.

�2The DISAM Journal, February 2007

The United States and the Republic of Korea AllianceBy

Christopher Hill Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

[The following are excerpts of the statement to the House International Relations Committee,Washington,D.C.,September27,2006.]

I would like to focus my remarks on the U.S. and KoreanAlliance; on the many importantissueswhichwehavebeenable tomakeessentialprogress asweupdate it for the21stCentury.An alliance as important as this one is really a living and growing entity that needs tending andnurturing.TheRepublicofKorea(R.O.K.)isakeyallyoftheUnitedStatesinAsiaandaroundtheworld.Likeus,theR.O.K.isdedicatedtomaintainingregionalsecurityandtopromotingpeaceandstabilityaroundtheglobe.Butouralliancerepresentsmorethanadefensivebalanceofpower.Itisalsoapositiveforceforprogress.Wenowhaveahistoricopportunitytotransformouralliancetomeetthechallengesofthe21stcentury,includingbothtraditionalandnewsecurity,economic,andtransnationalchallenges.Weareworkingverycloselywith theDepartmentofDefense, includingmycolleagueRichardLawless,toadaptourpartnershipwiththeR.O.K.tomeetthosechallengesontheKoreanpeninsula,inNortheastAsiaandaroundtheglobe.Thematureglobalpartnershipweareforgingtogethernowreflectsthecombinedcapabilitieswebringtobearnotjustinthemilitarysphere,butalsointhepolitical,economicandculturalareas.Today,weviewthatpartnershipasachancetopooloursharedgoalsinthefaceofnewchallengesandopportunities,fromterrorismtothe tsunamireliefefforts tohumanimmunodeficiencyvirus/acquiredimmunodeficiencysyncrome(HIV/AIDS)toournewAsia-PacificPartnershiponCleanDevelopmentandClimate.

Wewanttolookaheadandbegintoidentifyfurtherwaysinwhichourtwocountriescanworktogether to realizeourgoals and face sharedchallengesbasedon the strongbondsof friendship,commonpoliticalvaluesandeconomicinterdependence.

Shared Security Concerns

Asweconstructanewpartnership,however,itisimportantwenotlosesightofthecornerstoneofourallianceover theyears: thesecurityof theR.O.K. NorthKorearemainsaveryreal threatwithoveramilliontroops,possiblyseveralnuclearweapons,andapropensitytoexportallkindsofdangerousthings.Buthowwedothesethingsisundergoingatremendouschange.Foronething,itisnolongersolelytheU.S.thatdictatesthetermsofthisrelationship.Ithasevolvedintoamorebalancedpartnership.WorkinginconcertwithSeoul,wearerealigningourtroops,consolidatingourbases,andshiftingmoreresponsibilitytotheR.O.K.’sarmedforcesallwhileenhancingourcapacitytodefendthePeninsulaintimeofcrisis.

Wecontinuetofaceanumberofchallengingissuesinourmilitaryalliance,whichIknowmycolleague,DeputyUndersecretaryLawless,willdiscuss ingreaterdetail.Ourmilitarypartnershipis no longer the dominant feature of our bilateral relationship but it still remains an importantfoundation.Thecurrentissueanimatingbothourpoliticalandmilitaryrelationship,onewhichIamsureMr..Lawlesswillcoveringreaterdepth,isthequestionoftransitioningtheoperationalcontrolofRepublicofKoreaforcesinwar-timetoanindependentcommandstructureincontrasttotoday’sCombinedForcesCommandarrangement.ThisstemsfromakeyplatformpositionPresidentRohMoo-hyunpromotedduringhiscampaignforPresidentin2002.Wearenowworkingoutthedetailstofulfillthatrequest,becauseitmakessenseinthecontextofour21stcenturypartnership.Thisisanissuethathasexcitedanumberofpublicprotestsandengenderedpresscomment.IrealizethatformanyKoreanscontemplatingtheendofthisarrangementisdifficult.ItisimportantforKoreans


tounderstandthatitistheUnitedStates’enduringcommitmenttothedefenseoftheR.O.K.,notamilitaryheadquartersthathassafeguardedtheircountryformorethanfiftyyears.Atthesametime,wedon’taccepttheviewthatthisarrangement,whichhasworkedwell,hassomehowdiminishedtheR.O.K.’ssovereigntyormadeitlessofacountry.

Therehasalsobeensignificantdiscussiononthetimingofthetransfer.WhenPresidentBushandPresidentRohmetat theWhiteHouseonSeptember14,2006 theyagreed that it shouldnotbecomeapoliticalissue.DecisionsabouttheplacementofourtroopsandthesizeofourtroopswillbemadeinconsultationwiththeSouthKoreangovernment.Wewillworkinaconsultativewayattheappropriatelevelofgovernmenttocomeupwithanappropriatedate.WewillalsobelookingtothegovernmentofSouthKoreatoprovideanadequateshareoftheextracostsassociatedwithstationingU.S.troopsthere.

WhileIamdiscussingoursecuritystrategyinthecontextofourmodernizingalliance,IthinkitisalsonoteworthythattheR.O.K.’snationalsecuritystrategyisconsistentwiththeU.S.efforttopursuestrategicflexibilityintheregion.WerespecttheKoreanpositionthatitwon’tbedrawnintoaconflictinNortheastAsiaagainstthewilloftheKoreanpeople.Inturn,Koreahasdemonstrateditsrespect,giventherangeofchallengesfromthewaronterrorismtohumanitarianoperationsinresponsetonaturaldisasters,forU.S.forcestobeflexiblydeployedacrossregionsanddifferentpartsoftheglobe.

Lookingfurtherintothefuture,thesedevelopmentsintheU.S.andR.O.K.militaryalliancecouldevolvetowardanewcooperativestructureofsecurityinNortheastAsia.Theultimatedestinationisnotyetclear;itcouldbeaformalinstitution,orperhapsjustaseriesofinformalrelationships.However,IbelievethattheremaybeopportunitiestocreatenewmultilateralmechanismsinNortheastAsiathatwouldhelppromotecooperativerelationsamongChina,Korea,Japan,andtheUnitedStates.Suchamechanismcouldalsohelpaddresstheinevitableregionalfrictionsthatcanandwillariseandprovideaforumforimprovingmutualunderstanding.

Thesix-partytalkshavedemonstratedthatwhentherearecommoninterests,themajorplayersinNortheastAsiacanworktogethertoaddressproblems.IbelievethisframeworkhasthepotentialtodevelopintoamechanismthatcancooperativelymanagechangeontheKoreanPeninsula,aswellasusefullyaddressarangeoffunctionalissuesinthesub-regionfromenergyandenvironmenttoeconomicandfinancialcooperation.

Meanwhile,wearealsoworkingwithKoreansasaforceforpeaceintheglobalcommunity.Koreanshaveparticipated alongsideAmericans inU.N. peacekeepingmissions around theworldandKoreahasbeenareliablepartnerinthewaronterror.Withacontributionof2,300troops,theR.O.K.isthethirdlargestcoalitionpartnerinIraq.WehopeKoreawillcontinuetomakeastrongandpositivecontributiontowardbuildingstabilityanddemocracybeyonditsborders.Indeed,wecanworkinpartnershipwithSeoultopromotenewformsofsecuritycooperationinNortheastAsiaasawayofdealingwithcommonthreatsandovercominghistorically-basedtensionsbetweenKoreaanditsneighbors.Challenges to the North AtthecoreofassuringregionalsecurityandstabilityinNortheastAsiahasbeenconfrontingthesecuritythreatposedbyboththestrengthsandweaknessesoftheD.P.R.K.TheR.O.K.hasbeena critical partner in the multilateral effort to end North Korea’s nuclear program. Of course, theR.O.K.’srelationshipwithitsneighbortothenorthisanexceptionalcase.Ontheonehand,thereistheaspirationoftheSouthKoreanpeopletoseetheirnationmadewholeonceagain.Ontheother,theyhavefirst-handexperience,beginningwiththeoutbreakoftheKoreanWarthroughthepresentofthethreatposedbyNorthKorea’sideologicalhostilityanditsconsiderablearsenalofconventionalandastheNorthcontinuestoboastnuclearweapons.TheU.S.andR.O.K.alliancewasformedasan

��The DISAM Journal, February 2007

explicitresponsetothesethreats.WeremaincommittedtothefundamentalmissionofdefendingtheRepublicofKorea.

Inthatvein,asImentionedearlier,theUnitedStatesandtheR.O.K.haveembarkedonamajormodernizationofouralliancethatwillenhanceourabilitytofulfillourmissionbybetterexploitingourrespectivestrengthsandcapabilities.Atthesametime,weareworkingwiththeR.O.K.toendthenuclearthreatposedbyNorthKoreatheDemocraticPeoplesRepublicofKorea(D.P.R.K.).AstheU.S.,R.O.K.,D.P.R.K.,China,Japan,andRussiaallagreedinlastyear’sSeptemberJointStatement,NorthKorea’sdenuclearizationwouldopenthepathtoapermanentpeacetreatyonthePeninsulaandmarkaprofoundcontributiontowardamorestableandsecureNortheastAsia.WesupporttheR.O.K.’shopethatsuchapeacetreatywouldlaythefoundationsforreunificationandextendthepeace,prosperity,andfreedomthattheSouthenjoystotherestofthePeninsula.

But our concerns about the behavior and actions of the Pyongyang regime extend beyonddenuclearization.TheD.P.R.K.’s economic failings and totalitarianbehavior create another setofproblems.TheU.S.hassoughttoaddresstheplightofNorthKoreanrefugeesandimplementthe2004 North Korean Human Rights Act,andindoingsowehaveforgedanactivedialoguewiththeR.O.K.onthemosteffectivewaystoassistthisvulnerablepopulation.TheR.O.K.hasdedicatedsignificantenergyandresourcestoassistingNorthKoreanasylumseekers.TheR.O.K.hasresettledmorethan8,700NorthKoreanasylumseekerswithin itsborders, including1,387 just lastyear.Asyouareaware,theU.S.hasrecentlyresettledsomeNorthKoreanrefugeesintheU.S.,andwecontinuetoworkwithinternationalorganizationsandcountriesintheregiontolookforadditionalopportunitiestoassistandresettleNorthKoreansinneed.Evenaswemoveforwardwithourownprogram,theR.O.K.willcontinuetobetheprimaryresettlementdestinationforNorthKoreanasylumseekers.WewillcontinuetoworkcloselywiththeR.O.K.onthisimportantCongressionalandAdministrationpriority.

In addition to our concerns about North Koreans outside the D.P.R.K., the U.S. and R.O.K.arebothfocusedontheconditionsfacingNorthKoreansinsidetheD.P.R.K.Inparticular,theU.S.remainsconcernedabouttheserioushumanrightsabusesintheD.P.R.K.TheR.O.K.alsoworriesaboutthesituationfacingNorthKoreansintheD.P.R.K.,butwhileitsharesthesamegoaloffreedomintheNorth,itsapproachtotheissuehasattimesdifferedfromourown.WecontinuetourgetheR.O.K.totakeamoreactivestanceagainstD.P.R.K.humanrightsabuses,andtosupportinternationalmeasuresaimedataddressingtheNorth’sabuses.A Common Interest in Free Trade Youknowwellthatwhilewearestillmilitaryallies,wenowhaveamoremature,multi-facetedrelationshipthatfeaturesahealthyandstrongeconomicpartnershipbasedonacommoninterestinfreetrade.Itisthatpartnershipthatisbecomingthedriverofourrelationship.

WearecurrentlyworkingwiththeGovernmentofSouthKoreatonegotiateafreetradeagreement(FTA)thatwouldbethelargestU.S.tradeagreementinmorethanadecade.Koreaisalreadyourseventh largest tradingpartner.ThroughJulyof2006weexchangedmore than$45billionworthofgoods,andwehaveahealthytradeinservicesaswell.TheUnitedStatesisthelargestforeigninvestor inKorea,andKoreaninvestment in theUnitedStates isgrowingrapidly.Wehaveneverbeforebeensoeconomicallyvested ineachother’swellbeing thanweare today.AnFTAwouldfurther strengthen this economic relationship, bringingbenefits toboth countries andproviding anewpillarforthealliance.Thesenegotiationswillnotbeeasy,asnoundertakingofthismagnitudeis.Therearepowerfulinterestslineduponbothsides.Wearetryingtobringdownbothtariffandnon-tariffbarriersincludinginKorea’shighlyprotectedagriculturalmarketsandintheautomotivesector.PollsinKoreashowopinionisaboutevenlysplitovertheFTA.InawayithasbecomeaproxyforattitudesaboutKorea’splaceintheworldingeneral.OpponentsassertitwillimpoverishKorean


farmersandturnKoreaintoaU.S.economiccolony.OthersseetheFTAasahistoricopportunityforKoreatoundertakeneededreformstomodernizeitseconomyandbecomeadynamiceconomichubforNortheastAsia.

PresidentRohhasunambiguouslyalignedhimselfwiththelatter,moreconfidentpointofview.I too amconfident that in the end, that point of viewwill prevail inKorea, andour commercialrelationshipwillmovetoanewlevel,bringingoursocietiesclosertogether.AsuccessfulU.S.andR.O.K.FTAwouldalsohavearegionalimpact.ItcouldbecomepartofanetworkofFTAsinthePacificaswehavealreadyconcludedagreementswithAustraliaandSingaporeandarenegotiatingwithThailandandMalaysia.ItmightalsospurJapantoaccelerateitsmarketopening.Global Concerns TheAlliancehasalsochangedtoencompasssharedpoliticalvalues.AsSouthKoreahasevolvedfromamilitarydictatorshiptoafullydemocraticsociety,theUnitedStatesandtheRepublicofKoreahavebecomeamorenaturalpairing,sharingacommonrespectforhumanrights,ruleoflaw,andfreedomofspeech.This,Ibelieve,shouldprovidethefoundationforourefforts,intandemwithourjointworkwithintheSixPartyTalkstoovercomethedivisionoftheKoreanPeninsulaandbringaboutgenuinereformandrespectforhumanrightsintheNorth.

Furthermore,ourcommonpoliticalvalueshaveopenedthewayfortheUnitedStatesandKoreatoworktogether,side-by-side,onanunprecedentednumberofglobal issuesofcommonconcern.TraffickinginPersonsisanexcellentexample.Ourcountriesstandtogetherinopposingtraffickingasanflagrantviolationofhumanrightsandasaformofmodern-dayslavery.Lastyear,theSouthKoreanNationalAssemblyunanimouslypassedanti-prostitutionandanti-traffickinglawsaimedatendingthecommercialsexualexploitationofwomenandgirls.InourannualTrafficking in Persons Report,theStateDepartmentheldupyourlawasmodellegislationthattherestoftheworldshouldregardasa“bestpractice.”

TheR.O.K.isalsoakeypartnerinanumberofmultilateraleffortstomeetthechallengesofthe 21st century. It is a foundingmember of theAsia-Pacific Partnership ofCleanDevelopmentandClimate.SouthKorea isalsoactivelyparticipatinginahostofmultilateralefforts todevelopanddeploy transformational technologiesable to rise to thechallengeofgeneratingadequateandaffordablesuppliesofclean,sustainableenergythatwillbenefittheenvironmentandcouldreducegreenhousegasemissions(GHG).TheseincludetheCarbonSequestrationLeadershipForum(CSLF),theInternationalPartnershipforaHydrogenEconomy(IPHE),Methane-to-Marketspartnership,andthe InternationalThermalExperimentalReactor(ITER)projectwhichseekstodevelopcleanfusionenergy.The Ties That Bind OurAlliancehasalsoexpandedtoincludetiesofeducation,cultureandfamily.KoreanscontinuetoflocktotheUnitedStatestostudy.ThereareoveramillionKorean-AmericanslivingintheUnitedStates.Theyhavehadahugepositive impactonourcountryandcontinue toprovideavitalanduniquelinkbetweenthetwonations.

ThereislittledoubtthatliftingU.S.requirementsforKoreanvisitorstoobtainvisasfortourismorbusinesstravelwillprovideatangibleboosttoacloserbilateralrelationship.ItiscertainlyoneofourbiggestpublicoutreachchallengesinKorea.TheKoreansareawareoftheirstatusasourseventh-largesttradingpartner,oneofourstrongestmilitaryallies,andoneofourprimarysourcesoftouristsandforeignstudents.Koreaisalsothethird-largestcontributoroftroopstoIraq,aftertheU.S.andGreatBritain,andhasbeenaparticipantinpeacekeepingoperationsinAfghanistan,EastTimorandAfrica.SoKoreanslookatallofthisandwonderwhytheyarenotincludedwithJapanandthetwenty-sixothercountrieswhosepeoplecanvisittheU.S.withoutavisaundercertaincircumstances.


ThereareanumberofrequirementstobeallowedintheVisaWaiverProgram,including,forexample:planstoissueanelectronicpassport;aprogramtoensureeffectivebordersecurityandlawenforcementcooperationwiththeU.S.;and,avisarefusalrateoflessthan3percent.TheKoreansaredevelopinganelectronicpassportandexpecttohaveitreadyfortheirgeneralpublicsometimenextyear. Theyhavemadegreatefforts toworkcloselywithuson lawenforcementandbordersecurity,andwehaveveryactivecooperationwiththem.Fiftyyearsago,thebloodthatboundourcountrieswasthebloodspilledonthebattlefield.NowitisthelivingbloodoffamiliesthatstretchfromSeoultoSanFranciscothatunitesus.KoreancultureandAmericancultureareincreasinglycoming together. Our roleasgovernmentshouldbe to removeasmanyobstaclesaswecanandencouragetheseexcitinganddynamicculturalties.Public Diplomacy At the same time we are coming together, persistent displays of anti-American sentimentssometimesseemtobearegularfeatureofthepoliticallandscapeinKorea.IdonotbelievethatacrossthegeneralpopulationfeelingsagainsttheUnitedStateshaveactuallygrowninanysignificantway.Itwas,however,somethingthatItookveryseriouslyduringmytimethereasAmbassadorandIstilltakeitveryseriouslybutIthinkthisissomethingthatis,frankly,somewhatmisunderstoodhereintheU.S.ThenumberofKoreanswhoaretrulyanti-Americanisverysmall.However,thenumberofpeoplewhocareaboutwhatAmericadoesandhowweinteractwiththeRepublicofKoreaisverylargejustabouteveryoneinSouthKorea,really.AndKoreansliketoexpresstheiropinions.Theyliveinafreesocietyandtheyhavethatrightandtheyexerciseit.Yes,sometimestheyprotestagainstthe U.S. or one of our policies but they also protest against real estate taxes, education reforms,fishingregulations,laborlawsandawholerangeofissueswhollyunrelatedtothealliance.

Ourtwocountrieshaveatremendousconnection,encompassingthetensofthousandsKoreanofstudentswhohavestudiedhere,themanyKoreanswhohaverelativeslivinghere,orthepersonalrelationshipsforgedbetweenmembersofthetwomilitaries.ManyKoreanshaveagreataffectionfortheU.S.eveniftheydonotalwaysagreewithusandIwasremindedofthatoftenwhenIwasambassadorthere.Iwouldsaythough,thatthereissomethingthatwecoulddobetterintalkingtoKoreaandthatistofocusevenmoreonthefuture.TheKoreanwarandtheallianceofthelastfiftyyearsareveryimportantandweshouldnotforgetthem,butolderKoreansalreadyunderstandandappreciatethathistory.WealsoneedtomakeourcasetotheyoungergenerationofKoreansespeciallythoseintheirtwentiesandthirtiesandIdonotthinkbringingupthewaristhemosteffectivewaytoreachthem.Howmanyofyouhaveevertriedtoconvinceatwenty-yearoldthatsomethingwasimportantbycitingsomethingthathappenedin1951.IcantellyouthatitisnotanymorelikelytoworkwithKoreantwenty-yearoldthanwithAmericantwenty-yearold.

Wehavetofocusonthefutureoftherelationshipandhowitschangingandisgoingtomeetthefutureneedsofourtwocountries.KoreahasbecomeaverytechnologicallysophisticatedsocietyandKoreans,veryrightly,havealotofconfidenceabouttheirfuture.Ourmessagetothemshouldbethatwesharethisconfidence.AmbassadorVershbowandourembassyinSeoulareworkinghardtogetthatmessageout;thegoodnewsisthatwehavealreadymadesignificantprogressontellingthisverycompellingstory.

Iwouldadd thatCongresshas an important role toplay in communicatingwith theKoreanpublic.WhenmemberstraveltoKoreaormeetvisitingKoreanlegislatorsorofficialshereintheU.S.itsendsastrongsignalthattherelationshipisimportanttous,soIwouldliketoacknowledgetheroleyouhavealsoplayed.Notably,yourrecentvisit,Mr..Chairman,toKoreageneratedalotofattentionthere.Visitssuchas thosehaveanenormous impactonKoreanperceptionsofU.S.prioritiesandpolicies.


Inthisrespect,akeygoalofourpublicoutreacheffortsistoencouragecontinueddirectcontactbetweenKoreancitizensandU.S.officialsandtohelpadvanceourforeignpolicyinterestsinKoreaandstrengthenouralliance.OnenewwaywehopetodothisisbyestablishingadiplomaticpresenceinKorea’s second largest city,Busan.By inauguratingwhat is calledanAmericanPresencePost(APP)there,wehopetoreachouttoanunder-targetedsegmentoftheKoreanpopulationthathasexperiencedasignificantandgenerationalshiftawayfromthetraditionallypositivefeelingstowardsthe U.S. Furthermore, an additional diplomatic post in Korea would demonstrate an expandingcommitmenttoacriticalallyinaregionwheretheriseofChinaandinstabilityofNorthKoreacreateapossiblyunfavorablegeopoliticaloutlook.

Finally,theestablishmentofanAPPinKorea’slargestportandmaintransportcenterforU.S.importswillbenefitourgrowingbusinessandcommercialandcontributetothesuccessofourFreeTradeAgreement negotiations. In response to our Secretary of State call for new ways to makediplomatic inroads into under-represented regions, we have already begun preliminary logisticalinvestigationsfor theopeningofanAPPinBusan,Koreathat isrequiredbeforewecanformallysubmittheproposaltoCongressforapproval.IlookforwardtoyourfuturesupportinwhatIfullyexpecttobearewardingforeignpolicyproject.Conclusion OurrelationshipwiththeRepublicofKoreaisonewithalongandhonorablepast;butmoreimportantly,anevenmorepromisingfuture.Itisblossomingintoamaturingglobalpartnership,andweareatapointintimewherewecanstarttotranslatethoseexcitingideasintoactionsthatwillbenefitbothcountriesandourcloserelationship.IlookforwardtodoingwhatIcantoworkwithyoutoseizethishistoricopportunity.


The United States Policy Toward TaiwanBy

Clifford A. Hart, Jr. Director, Office of Taiwan Coordination

[ThefollowingareexcerptsoftheremarkspresentedtotheU.S.andTaiwanBusinessCouncilDefenseIndustryConference,Denver,Colorado,September12,2006.]

AsalwayswhendiscussingU.S.policytowardTaiwan,itisimportanttoreviewcoreprinciples.First,wemustnot forget that the stakes arehigh:whileunlikely,war in theTaiwanStrait is notimpossible. The Peoples Republic of Chin (P.R.C.) refuses to renounce the use of force againstTaiwan,evenasanysuchuseofforcewouldbeadisasterforpeopleonbothsidesoftheStrait,theregion,andAmericaitself.TheUnitedStatesthereforehasanabidinginterestinthepreservationofpeaceandstability there. PresidentBushhasmadeclearhiscommitment to the longstandingtouchstonesofouroneChinapolicy,thethreeU.S.andChinaJointCommuniques,andtheTaiwan Relations Act. Preciselytodefendthepeace,AmericadoesnotsupportTaiwanindependenceandopposesunilateralchangestothestatusquobyeitherside.Weurgeallpartiestoavoidconfrontationalorprovocativeacts,andwebelievethefutureofTaiwanshouldberesolvedpeacefully.

Inthiscontext,wecontinuetocallonBeijingtoreachouttoTaiwan’selectedleadersinaflexibleandsincerespiritwithaviewtopromotinggenuinedialogue.WealsocallonBeijingtodemonstratemoremilitarytransparency,toceaseitsarmsbuildupoppositeTaiwan,andtoreduceitsarmedthreattoTaiwan.Atthesametime,weassignspecialimportancetoPresidentChen’sJune8,2006,publicreaffirmationofhiscommitmentsarethefollowing:

• Taiwanwillnotdeclareindependence

• Changethenationalname

• Pushforsovereigntythemesintheconstitution

• Promoteareferendumtochangethestatusquo

WearealltoopainfullyawarethattheP.R.C.continuestochannelasubstantialportionofitsremarkableeconomicgainsintoamilitarybuild-uptargetedagainstTaiwan.AstheDepartmentofDefense’sannualChinesemilitarypowerreportmakesclear,thisbuild-uprisksdisruptingthestatusquoas thePLA’s rapidmilitaryexpansion iscreatingacapabilitiesgap that iswideningwith thedeploymentofeverynewmissile,fighteraircraft,submarine,warship,andtank.

Inlawandpolicy,theUnitedStatesstandsbehinditscommitmenttomakeavailabledefensearticles and services to enableTaiwan tomaintain a sufficient self-defense capability. Indeed, inresponsetoBeijing’smilitarybuild-up,WashingtoninthisdecadehassubstantiallyboosteditsdefensecooperationwithTaipeiandtakenstepstomaintainitsowncapabilitiesshouldthePresidentchoosetorespondmilitarilytoanyuseofforceorcoercionagainstTaiwan.PresidentBushfiveyearsagomadeaground-breakingcommitmenttosellTaiwanseveraladvanceddefensiveweaponssystemsthatithadrequested.EvenasIspeak,twoKIDD-classdestroyersapartofthepackagePresidentBushapprovedaresailingfromtheUnitedStatestojoinTaiwan’sfleet.

PerhapsbecauseAmericahasmovedwithspeedtomeetthenewchallenge,manyofTaiwan’sfriendsintheUnitedStatesregretthatTaipeihasfailedtorespondinkind.Fortunately,IampleasedtospeaktoyouatatimewhenthereappearstobegrowingrecognitionamongthepeopleofTaiwanthattheyneedtodomore.Inthisregard,however,theyaredependentontheirleadersfromacross


thepoliticalspectrumtoundertakeseriousdeliberationsonthethreatandagreeonhowtoallocatetaxpayers’dollars tomeet it.This in turncanonlyhappen if those leadersplacenationalsecurityabovepartisanpoliticsand responsiblyarticulate thediverseviews thatarebound toexist inanydemocracy.Speakingfromourownexperience,thesedeliberationsmustresultinaction,requiringaseriouswillingnessofpoliticalpartiestocompromiseandburydifferencesintheinterestofpeace,prosperity,andsecurity.

BecausetheAmericanpeopleshareadirectinterestinthesuccessofthisprocess,theimpatienceone sometimeshears fromTaiwan’sAmerican friends is not unreasonable.Such concernsdonotthreatenthetraditionalfriendlytiesbetweentheTaiwanandAmericanpeoples;theserestonunusuallystronganddeepfundamentals.Nevertheless,optimalcooperationbetweenourpeoplesdependsonaserious,matureeffortinTaipeitomeetTaiwan’ssecurityneeds.LeaderswhoaspiretorepresenttheTaiwanpeopleindealingswiththeAmericanpeopleshouldappreciatethattheirpositionsrightnowoncorenationalsecurityissuescannothelpbutinformthesortofrelationshiptheywillhavewithWashingtoninyearstocome.

IhastentoaddthatIamoptimisticaboutthewayahead.ItisimportantthatwebearinmindjustwhatisgoingoninTaiwan.First,evenwithdifferentpartiescontrollingthelegislatureandtheexecutive,Taiwanalreadycommitsnearly2.5percentof itsgrossdomesticproduct (GDP) to thearmedforces.Thatislessthaninthepastandthanwethinkisnecessary,but,inaneconomythesizeofTaiwan’s,itissubstantial.Taiwanhasalsobeenmakingimportantstridesinthemoreeffectiveuseofitsmilitarycapabilities,andwearehopefulthattrendwillcontinue.Finally,wearepleasedthattherulingandoppositioncoalitionsareatlastagreedinprincipleontheneedtoincreasethedefensebudget.

Onthatfinalpoint,theTaiwanlegislature’sconsiderationofthe2007defensebudgetthisfallwillgiveusanindicationofhowwell-foundedouroptimismis.Itisonethingforbothcoalitionstocallforincreasesinthebudgetto2.85percentofGDPin2007and3percentin2008.Itisquiteanotherforthemtoapprovethecomponentsofabudgetthatadduptothosepercentages,especiallywhentheremaybesharpdifferencesonsomemajorandexpensiveweaponsystems.Attheendoftheday,whatwillbemostimportanttotheUnitedStatesisnotthatTaiwanhasapprovedfundingforanygivenpackageofarms-whetherhomemadeorimported-butthatTaiwan’sleadersengageinaseriousdeliberationonsecurityandexercisewisdomandpoliticalcourageinagreeingtofundurgentlyneededincreasesinTaiwan’sself-defensecapabilities.

AmericafullyrespectstheprerogativeoftheTaiwanpeopleexercisedthroughtheirleaderstodecidehowmuchtospendondefenseandhowtospendit. InademocraticpoliticalsystemlikeTaiwan’s,thereisnosinglecorrectansweroutthereforhowexactlytostructuretheresponsetoamilitarythreat.Theonethingthatissure,however,isthatfailuretoriseabovethepoliticalfrayto arrive at the best possible answer under the circumstances will represent a singular failure inleadership.

Foritspart,theUnitedStatesremainscommittedtofulfillingPresidentBush’s2001decisiontosellTaiwancertaindefensiveweaponsystemsitrequested.Atthesametime,mygovernmenthasmadeclearitsviewthaturgentneedshaveemergedrequiringimmediatefunding.WebelieveinparticularthatTaipeishouldmovenowtoinvestinhardeningcriticalinfrastructureandbuildingadequatewarreservestockstoensurethesustainabilityofitsforces.Intheideal,Taiwanwillappropriateenoughofitswealthtopurchaseallthatitneeds.Sincetherealworldnormallyoperatesshortoftheideal,however,forusabigquestionishowTaipeiwillallocateitsdefensedollarsifithastomaketoughchoicesamongcompetingrequirements.

Decadesfromnow,peopleonbothsidesoftheStraitwillthankthepeopleofTaiwanforthedecisionstheyaremakingrightnowonnationalsecurity.Weaknesscansparkconflictasreadilyas


aggression.AsthePeople’sRepublicofChinacontinuesitsaggressivebuild-upofforcestargetedagainstTaiwan,itfallstothedemocraticpeopleofTaiwantomakereasonable,prudentcommitmentstomeetthechallenge,emphasizingdefensivemilitarysystemsandstrategiesthatreinforcepredictabilityandstability.

Attheendoftheday,Taiwan’sdemocracygivesitadvantagesthatmakeitthenaturalguardiannotonlyoftheisland’ssecuritybutofpeaceintheStrait.ItwastothisinpartthatPresidentBushreferredwhenhepraisedTaiwan’s democracyduringhis speech atKyoto lastNovember.As thePresidentsaid,byembracingfreedomatalllevels,TaiwanhasdeliveredprosperitytoitspeopleandcreatedafreeanddemocraticChinesesociety.Insodoing,ithassetahopefulexamplefortheregionandtheworld.Giventheseadvantages,andmycountry’srocksolidsupportforTaiwan’ssecurity,IamoptimisticaboutthepreservationofpeaceandstabilityintheTaiwanStraitoverthelongterm.IwillbeevenmoreoptimisticifTaiwan’spoliticalleaderscanmakethetoughdecisionsneedednowtoaddresspressingissues.


South and Central Asia UpdateBy

Richard A. Boucher Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia

[ThefollowingareofexcerptsofapresentationfortheForeignPressCenterBriefing,Washington,D.C.,July17,2006.]

IhavebeenatthisnewjobnowforaboutfiveorsixmonthssoIthoughtitwasmaybeagoodchancetocomebyandtalktoyouaboutthemanythingsthataregoingoninthisregion.IwasjustoutinPakistanandAfghanistanwiththeSecretaryofStateand,asyouknow,oneofthefirstthingsIdidonthejobwastoaccompanythePresidenttoAfghanistan,PakistanandIndia.Sowehavecertainlydevotedalotofhigh-levelattentiontothisregionoverthepastseveralmonths.

I thinkoneof themost interesting things tome issortofcoming in to take theSecretaryofState’slogicofputtingSouthandCentralAsiatogetherandseewhatwecouldactuallyaccomplishinconcreteterms.AndIthinkyouhaveheardustalkandbriefbeforeaboutthepotentialofSouthandCentralAsia,theenergypotentialofCentralAsia,themarketsofSouthAsia,PakistanandIndia,thesourcesofsupplyandgoodsfromthesouth,thesourcesoffinancingandinvestmentfromthenorth.ManyopportunitieshereandIthinkweallseethosetheoreticalopportunitiesandtheoverwhelmingopportunityofdevelopingaregionofstabledemocraciesbetweentheMiddleEastandSouthAsia,betweenRussiaandChina,aregionthatcanstandonitsownandmoveforwardintheworldasaregionof,asIsaid,democraticstabilityandnewfoundprosperity.

Andsoalotofwhatwehavebeendoingis tryingtomaketheseideasbecomearealityandindeedputtingtheregiontogetherinthiswaymakessense. WewanttoseeCentralAsiaandtheothers maintain their ties to Russia and China and Europe and Turkey and everywhere else. Wewanttoseenewtiesdevelop.Themoreoptionstheyhave,themorechoicestheyhave,themoreindependencetheyhave.

• Wehavebeenworkingonelectricity,and indeedfundedelectricitystudiesandsee developtheprospectsofelectricitylinesfromKazakhstan,KyrgyzstanandTajikistan downtoPakistan,andthecountriesoftheregionthemselvesareworkingonthis.

• Wehavebeenworkingwith theAsianDevelopmentBank, theKazakhsandothers onanall-weatherhighwayfromAlmatytoKarachi,withotherpiecesthatcangoin differentplaces,andtheUnitedStatesisfundingthebridgeakeycomponentofthat, abridgefromTajikistantoAfghanistan,aswellasgettingtheringroadfinishedin Afghanistan.SoAfghanistanisnowaplaceoftransitandaplaceofcontactandnot anobstacletocooperation.

• Wehavealsobeenworkingwithcountriesintheregionontheissuesoftradepolicy, customsprocedures,bordersecurity.Allthesethingscanmaketradeflowsothatthe production of CentralAsia, the melons of the FerghanaValley, can make it to the marketsofthesouth.Andmakingsurethatallthosetraderelationshipsareinplayis anotherimportantpartofintegration.

AndthenthereiscooperationinSouthAsiaitself. Obviouslytherearedifficultieswiththis.SouthAsianfreetradeandSouthAsianregionalcooperationremainsveryimportanttousandwewillbeworkingwiththecountriesoftheregiontotrytoencouragethemtocooperatewitheachother.


ItisanambitiousagendaforthewholeregionandformanyoftheindividualcountriesthattheUnitedStatesispromotinghere.Wehave,Ithink,accomplishedalotwithIndiaanditisalsocominguptomorrow,theone-yearanniversaryofPrimeMinisterSingh’svisittotheUnitedStates.Soitisagoodoccasion,Ithinkalso,torecognizethatwearetakingthevisionthatthePrimeMinisterandthePresidentenunciated,takingmanyoftheconcreteprogramsthatthePresidentandthePrimeMinisterannouncedduringthePresident’svisittoIndiainMarch,andturningthoseintoreality,turningthoseintocommissionsandfundingandstudiesandlegislationandespeciallymovingforwardveryquicklyontheU.S.-Indiacivilnucleararrangements.

OurCongresshasbeenverysupportive.WehaveseenlegislationmovenowfromcommitteesintheHouseandtheSenate.WelookforwardtoseeingvotesintheHouseandtheSenate,maybethismonth.TherearesomeIthinktheHousewillbeacting,perhapsinthenextweek,andwehopetheSenatewillaswell.

The United States and India civil nuclear agreement is on track. The legislation is movingforwardquicklyandtheUnitedStatesiskeepingourcommitmentofturningthePresident’sandthePrimeMinister’svisionintorealitythatthecompaniescanuseforcooperationandthatwecanusetohelpsupportIndianeconomicgrowthandIndia’seconomicfuture.

TheotherareathatIwouldliketotalkaboutalittlebitisPakistanandAfghanistan,thewaronterror.OurrelationshipwithPakistanismuchbroaderandwehaveinitiatedawholeseriesofdialogueswithPakistantheStrategicDialogue,theEconomicDialogue,theEducationDialogue,theScienceDialogue,alltheseareaswherewehaverealpracticalcooperationgoingonwithPakistan,helpingPakistanwithitsenergyneedsaswell.Inadditiontothat,there’salotofcooperationwithPakistanintermsofhelpingthePakistaniGovernmentsupportitseffortsoutintheborderregions.

YouhaveinbothPakistanandAfghanistanasimilarprocessgoingonofgovernmentextendingitscontrol,extendingitspeacefulandbeneficialactivitiestotheedgesofthefrontieronbothsides,andwe’resupportingthePakistaniGovernmentindoingthatandontheAfghansideoftheborderwe’resupportingtheAfghanGovernmentindoingthat.SothatwiththedeploymentoftheNorthAtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO) troops, the deployment of policemen, drug eradicators, butalsothebuildingofroads,buildingofelectricitylines,irrigationschemes,governmentoffices,we’rehelpingbothPakistanandAfghanistanextendtheirauthorityouttotheedgesofthecountrysothattheseplacescan’tbeusedbyterroriststofightus,tofightNATO,tofighttheAfghangovernmentandtofightthePakistanigovernment;andintheend,inadditiontotheactualfightingthathastotakeplace,bringingthebenefitsofgovernment,thebenefitsofgoodgovernmentanddevelopment,totheseregions,becauseIthinkwhatwethinkinthelongtermwillbringpeaceandsecuritytothepeoplewholivethere.

Sothosearesomeofthebigthingswearedoing.Wecantalkaboutanyofthecountriesandspecificissuesinthisregion,butIthoughtatthismoment,fiveorsixmonthsafterIstartedandoneyearaftertheIndianmeetingswiththePresident,itwasagoodtimetocomeoutandtellyouthingsaregoingquitewellinthisregionandthereisalotofprogressinturningthevisionsintoreality.


The Global Master of Arts Program: A Graduate’s Perspective

[TheeditoroftheDISAM JournalwouldliketothanktheFoundationsAETC/IA Newsletterfortheirpermissiontoreprintthefollowingarticle.Thefollowingisanopinionoftheauthor.]

Graduatestudiesforsecuritycooperationexpertsprovidesgreaterknowledge,expandedhorizons,anduniqueexperiencesbyMarySue“Suzy”Sutton.Asoneofthethirty-threestudentsofthe2006classofGMAPII,Iproudlymarcheddowntheaisletoreceivemydiplomaduringthegraduationceremony onMarch 25, 2006. Crossing the stage to receivemyMaster ofArts in InternationalRelationsfromTheFletcherSchoolwasoneofthehighlightsnotonlyofmycareer,butalsoofmylife.

What is GMAP II?

TheGMAPIIisintendedforcivilianandmilitarypersonnelservinginthesecuritycooperationfield.ItisayearlongprogramthatculminatesinaMasterofArtsinInternationalRelationsfromTheFletcherSchoolofLawandDiplomacyatTuftsUniversity.Theprogramcombinesthreetwo-weekresidencysessionswithInternet-mediatedstudy.Presentedintrimesterformwiththreecoursespresentedduringthefirstandsecondtrimesters,andtwocoursesplusathesisinthethirdtrimester,studentscontinueworkingintheirhomestation/country.

Attendanceatthreetwo-weeksessionsin-residenceismandatory.ThefirstandthirdsessionsareheldatTheFletcherSchooloutsideBoston,Massachusetts.Thesecondtwo-weekresidencyisconductedinWashington,D.C.Usinga360degreeinterdisciplinaryapproach,studentsgainaglobalperspectivethatprovidesaframeworkforanalyzingandunderstandingtoday’scomplexanddynamicworldofinternationalaffairs.

Personal Insights

The graduation ceremony ended a year of rigorous but rewarding professional work andacademic study. This opportunity came from the Defense security cooperationAgency (DSCA)Workforce Improvement initiative. As a student in the public-sector/security focused version ofGMAPII, Iwasprivileged toundertakeaworld-classcurriculum taughtbyan imminent faculty.Theirimpressivecredentialsnotwithstanding,studentsfeltcomfortableaddressingmostprofessorsby theirfirstnames. The faculty,manywithaPh.D. fromrenownedschools suchasHarvardorMIT,sharedbothacademicandpracticalknowledgeandexperience.With the formerMinisterofDefenseforGermanyconductingtheTrans-AtlanticSecurityRelationshipcourse,apreviousChiefEconomistfortheU.S.DepartmentofLaborteachingtransnationallaborissues,anemployeeoftheWorldTradeOrganizationleadingusthroughtheintricaciesofinternationaltrade,andanattorneywhoworkedintheUnitedNationsSecretariatintroducingustointernationallawandorganizations,noonecouldaskforabetterqualifiedfaculty.

Throughoutmyyearofstudy,contributionsmadebyclassmatessupplementedfacultyexpertiseandexperience.Theclassconsistedofadiverse internationalmixofmid-levelprofessionals thatincludedDepartmentofDefensecounterpartsaswellas internationalstudentsfromseveralwalksof life. Classmates includeddiplomats fromCameroon,Canada,Hungary, IndonesiaandEastern

PERSPECTIVES


Europe;journalistsfromGreeceandIndia;amedicaldoctorfromBelgium;asecurityanalystfromtheUnitedKingdom;afinancialofficerfromNigeria,andSecurityAssistanceOfficeemployeesfromChile,MongoliaandTaiwan.

InadditiontotheGMAPIIfacultyandfellowstudents,thestaffofTheFletcherSchoolwentoutof theirway tomake theexperiencemeaningful. ThedeanofGMAPpersonallyparticipatedthroughouteachoftheresidenciesandentertainedusatherhomeduringthefirstresidency.Inthefuture,IknowIcanreachouttoaglobalsocialandprofessionalnetworkoffaculty,friends,andotheralumniforguidanceandsupport.

Althoughthecombinationofworkandstudywasintense,itwasalsorelevantandrevealing.HavingcompletedmyyearinGMAPIIandearnedmymaster’sdegree,Iseeworldeventsinamoremeaningfulmanner.Ihavegainedtheglobalperspectivenecessarytohelpunderstandtheworldofsecuritycooperationtodayaswellastomorrow.Asarecentgraduate,Istronglyencourageinterestedsecurityassistancepersonneltoapplyforthisunparalleledprofessionalandpersonalopportunity.


How to Request and Get Those Exclusive Flying Training Quotas

By Colonel Steward Kowall, USAF

Chief of International Training and Education for Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs

The new SAF/IA Chief of International Training and Education explains the process for requesting and allocating flying slots.

TheboardiscomprisedoftheDivisionChiefand/orDeputyfromallDeputyUnderSecretaryoftheAirForceforInternationalAffairs(SAF/IA)RegionalDivisions,AF/A3OT,AF/CCPoliticalAdvisor,AF/A30X,subjectmatterexperts,AFSAT/TO,andischairedbyanO-6.Theboardpublishesareportlistingprimaryallocationsandalistofalternatecountriesthatisforwardedtothecombatantcommanders(COCOMS)inMarchfortheirreview/concurrence. InMay,AFSATisprovidedtheboardresults,andthecountrymanagerswillthencontactthecountriesselectedtoreceivetheprimaryslots.CountriesneedtoacceptordeclineallocationsnotlaterthanJuly.

Allshortnoticerequestsduringtheyearofexecution(currentyear)needtobesenttoAFSAT/DOT (and information sent toSAF/IAPT). AFSAT/DOT is the point of contact for fulfilling allflighttrainingrequestsandrequirements.Donotsendyourrequestsdirectlytotheschoolhouses,AF/A3OT,AETC/DORortheFTUSquadrons.RequestsmustbeworkedbyAFSATIAWtheprioritiesapprovedandestablishedbytheboard.

Ilookforwardtoworkingwithyouinthefuture.Ifyouhaveanyquestionsorconcernsregardingthisprocess,pleasecontactmyofficeat:SAF/IAPT,phone(703)588-8929orDSN425.Flight Training Requirements Currently Exceed Available Allocations Withmoreofourcoalitionpartnersworkingside-by-sidewithusworldwidetosupporttheGlobalWaronTerror. It isessential toensuretheirflighttrainingrequirementsareaccuratelyforecastedduringthedatacallforincorporationintheProgrammedFlightTraining(PFT)process.ThePFTconferenceisheldannually(lateNovember/earlyDecembertimeframe)atRandolphAirForceBase,Texas.Thisconferenceisthedecision-makeronhowmanytrainingslotswillbeallocatedtotheU.S.AirForce,AirNationalguard,AirForceReserve,andtheinternationalcommunity.Italsoreflectstheshortagesforallflighttrainingrequests. Anaccurateaccountingofyourcountry’srequestsiscriticaltoourabilitytosuccessfullyadvocateforinternationaltrainingwithintheAirForcecorporateprocess.

Theprocess forcapturingyourcountry’s requirementsbeginswhenAF/A3, throughAFSAT,sends out a data call message in the February time frame. The data call is for training requeststhroughtheFYDPandisdueattheendofMarch.Thefirstthreeyearsofrequirementssubmittedaremostimportant.ItisessentialthatallcountriesprovideAFSATtheirrequirementswhenthecallgoesout.AFSATalsoneedstoknowifyourcountrydoesnotrequireflighttraining.Providethemwithanegativeinput.Therequirementsneedtobeasaccurateaspossible.Anticipatedsalesandnewsalesandtheirassociatedflighttrainingrequestsshouldbeincludedintheoutyears.

Your requirements, plus the results of the PFT conference, (i.e., how many allocations theinternationalcommunityreceived),arethedocumentsusedwhentheSAF/IAflighttrainingboardis conducted annually. All airframeswithmore requirements than allocations areboarded. Thisyearanewpolicywasinstitutedforboarding.Insteadofboardingforaoneyearperiod,theboardwillmakerecommendationsforatwoyearperiod.Thiswillallowcountriesthatrequireuptoone


yearofEnglishlanguagetrainingpriortostartingflighttrainingtoprogramandscheduleallcourseseffectively.Thisyear’sboardwillbeheldFebruary2007forfiscalyear2008andfiscalyear2009allocations.


Immaterial Transfers with Material ConsequencesBy

Roland L. Trope Trope and Schramm LLP

[WewouldliketothanktheDigital Protectionmagazineforallowingustoreprintthisarticle.]

CompaniesoftenperceiveU.S. lawsasbewildering in theircomplexity,burdensome in theircompliancecosts,andintimidatingintheseverityoftheirpenalties.ParticularlyonerousisthedefensetradecontrolsregimeembodiedintheU.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations(ITAR).TherisksofnoncompliancewithITARappearinsettlementsreachedinMarch2006betweentheU.S.StateDepartment’sDirectorateofDefenseTradeControls(Directorate)andTheBoeingCompanyandL-3Communications(togetherwithitssubsidiary,Goodrich).ThesecompaniesagreedtopaycivilpenaltiesofU.S.$15millionand$7million,respectively,andtoimplementcostlycomplianceimprovements.ManycompaniesdiscoveronlybelatedlythataneffectiveITARcomplianceprogramgeneratessubstantialcommercialbenefits.Forexample,ifaU.S.firmplanstodevelopandsellahigh-techproducttooverseascommercialcustomersanddoesnotrealizethatitsproposedproductwillincorporateITAR-controlledcomponents,itcoulddiscoveraftersignificantdevelopmentandtestingexpendituresthatitcannotexporttheproducttocustomersincertaincountries(directlyorindirectly)becausetheDirectoratewillnotgrantitalicense.Thecompanymightalsobeprohibitedfrom distributing the product’s marketing materials to foreign nationals if such materials containITAR-regulateddata,orfromprovidingrepairandmaintenanceservicesforsuchproducttocertaincountries.

TherisksofITARviolationscontinuetoincreasewiththeproliferationofnewcommunicationtechnologies because companies fail to focus sufficiently on controlling their data and advertingthewaysinwhichtheyoftenlosecontrolofit.ItisimperativethatdefensecontractorsretaintightcontrolofdigitaldatabecausetheITARregulatesdataexportsnotonlyinhardcopybutalsoindigitalform(whichisfareasiertolosecontrolofandwithmoreseriousconsequences).Existingregulationsalreadycontemplate“immaterial”exports(includingdigitaldata)becausetheITARcoversexportsofdatacarriedinthemind’seye.Theactofshowingadefensearticle’sblueprintstoaforeignnational,forexample,isdeemedanimmediate“export”tohisorherhomecountry.1ThesameITARprovisionregulatesdigitaltransmittalstoaforeignnationalasiftheyweretransfersofhardcopiesbyhand.Moreover,withoutalicensefromtheDirectorate,aU.S.companycannotreleaseITAR-regulateddatatoanyofitsforeignnationalemployees,whethersuchreleaseoccursviatheinternettoanoverseaslocationorviae-mail,instantmessaging,orevenfiletransfersthroughthecompanyintranettosuchemployeeslocatedintheU.S.CompaniesintentonwinningdefensecontractsorperformingworksubjecttotheITARmustthereforefundamentallyre-thinktheirapproachtotechnicaldatabecausetheITARrequiresthattheycontrolthedestinationsoftheirdigitaltransfers,internetbroadcasts,andotherelectroniccommunications.

ToassistinunderstandingtheITARastheyapplytodigitaldata,weexplorethemisstepsofahypotheticalcompany,NanoNautica,asitembarksondefensecontractingfortheU.S.government.

________________________________________________________1. Code of Federal Regulations.Title22,Section120.17(a)(1),2005.


The Company

NanoNautica,aU.S.corporation,earnedasignificantmarketshareforitsadvanceddesignofhighperformance,computer-controlledprecisioninstruments.HeadquarteredinCupertino,California,NanoNauticaclaimsnonationalcorporate identity,hassatelliteoffices inBrazil, theNetherlands,Norway,andChina,andemploysseveralIndianandIraniannationalsassoftwareprogrammers,aswellasaBraziliannationalasitsinformationtechnology(IT)administrator.Inthisrespect,itisnotdissimilarfrommanyothermodernmultinationalcorporations(MNCs).Until1992,NanoNauticawasaU.S.defensecontractor,butfrustratedbydisagreementswiththeU.S.governmentoverrightstoitstechnicaldata,itsboardofdirectorsapprovedthesaleofitsdefenseunitandredirectedproductiontowards civil aeronautics. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, however, its management wasattractedbythefinancialopportunitiesintheU.S.DepartmentofDefense(DoD)andNASAcontractsandorderedmodificationsoftwoproductsforsalespecificallytothosecustomers.Companyengineersadaptedacontrolmovementgyroscope(CMG)andrelatedsoftwaretofacilitateguidanceofacraft’sorientationthatoutperformsCMGsystemscurrentlydeployedonU.S.spacecraft.NanoNauticaalsomodifiedformilitaryuseitscommercialgyromicrochip–adevicethatdeterminesanairborneplane’sorientation,orhelpstostabilizeandsteerguidedmissiles.International Traffic in Arms Regulation Compliance Planning As the person in charge of NanoNautica’s data governance procedures, your responsibilitiesinclude ensuring company-wide compliance with all regulations covering the export of defensearticles,services,andtechnicaldata.Thecompany’schiefinformationsecurityofficer(CISO)asksyou to assist her in preparing for ameetingwith the chief executive officer (CEO). Her list ofpotentialITARcomplianceissuesincludes: • Perimeter defenses.NanoNauticawillconsolidateitsdefense-relatedworkintoits Cupertino plant and reinforce the perimeter and entrance safeguards. The CEO believesthiswillavertanynoncompliancewiththeITAR. • E-mail and instant message access. NanoNautica’s IT administrator (resident in its Sao Paulo office) has access privileges to all international communications (including e-mail and internal messages discussing and transmitting technical data related to the CMG and gyrochip projects). Management instructed engineers on those projects to use code names for e-mail attachments containing sensitive data, believingthatthisroutine,low-costwayofdisguisingsensitivedatawouldminimize theriskthatanyoneoutsidethedefenseunitwithaccessprivilegeswouldopensuch attachments–aquestionableassumption.Inpractice,theengineersregularlyselected constellation names for CMG files and names of stars for gyrochip files – an all transparentpatternthatcouldfacilitatedataleaks. • Network security.ToensurethecontrolofthedestinationsofITAR-regulateddata transmissions,NanoNautica’slegalcounselproposedthatthecompanycreateaspecial access-controlled intranet solely for CMG and gyrochip communications. Such anetwork,however,wouldbecostlytocreateandmaintain,andcoulddiminishthe productivebrainstormingamongengineersthatoftenleadstoinnovativeengineering solutions.TheITdepartmentrespondedwithacounterproposal:encryptallsensitive traffic,anddistributethekeytoauthorizedpersonnelwithinstructionstotreatitasa “tradesecret.”Ifthecompanyadoptsthatproposal,theCEOpreferstoencryptonly the attached, code-namedfiles;while this solution has the advantage of fixing the cost of securing relevant files, it ignores the problems that arisewhen individuals mustmakeadhocdecisionsastowhichfilescontainITAR-regulatedata.Italso


overlooksknownencryptionrisks.2Moreover,allrelevantpersonnelmustbetrained inITARcompliance,ultimatelyamuchmorecostlysolutionthanomnibusencryption. Adhocdecisions–evenwithcompliancetraining–poseasignificantcompliancerisk becausetheydecentralizecomplianceauthorityanddiffusecontrol. • Laptop use.TherearecertainhourswhenallNanoNauticaengineersworldwidecan workcollectivelyonproblemsfromtheirofficesorhomes.ThisrequiresNanoNautica toissuecompanylaptopstofacilitatecommunications.ITAR-controlleddataonthese laptopsmakestheminvitingtargetsfortheftbycompetitorsandintelligenceagents (bothmilitaryandcorporate).Companiesincomparablefieldswithsimilarinformation securityrisksbarpersonnelfromusinglaptops,despitefrequenttravel,becausetheft wouldposeunacceptablerisks.Theirpolicyissimple:“Thebestlaptopforusisno laptopatall.”3NanoNauticaisconsideringtheefficacyofsuchapolicyforitsCMG and gyrochip project engineers, as well as practicable and less Draconian alternatives.

BecausetheCEOwantstorecommendtoNanoNautica’sboardofdirectorsanomnibusprogramthat addresses both compliance and security issues, there is potential accountability for you andtheCEOintheeventofacomplianceoversightorbreakdown. Yourresponsibility is todesignacompliance program that effectively balances costs and risks, yet avoids the strategic error mostcomplianceofficersmakeat thisphase: designingaprogram that responds tocorporateofficers’wishesratherthantotheapplicableregulations(inthiscase,ITARrequirementsandtheirprobableinterpretationbytheDirectorate).The International Traffic in Arms Regulation Afterconductinganauditofcompanyaction(andinaction)withrespecttoITARrequirements,youidentifyseveralareasinwhichthecompanymustmakechangestocomplywithITAR.Registration TheITARrequiresanycompanyengagedinthemanufacturingorexportingofdefensearticlesorthefurnishingofdefenseservicesintheU.S.toregisterwiththeDirectorate.�Asingleinstanceofmanufacturingadefensearticletriggersthisduty.NanoNauticashouldthereforehaveregisteredwiththeDirectoratebeforeitbeganproductionofarticlesdeveloped,adopted,ormodifiedfordefenseuse(suchastheCMGandmodifiedgyrochip)5.Accountability TheITARrequiredcompaniestoappointanempoweredofficialwhomustsigntheregistrationform filed with the directorate.6 The ITAR further requires that the empowered official have“independent authority” to enquire into any aspect of a proposed export.” To verify the legalityof the transactionand theaccuracyof the information tobesubmitted” to theDirectorate,and torefusetosignanylicenseapplicationorotherrequestforapprovalwithoutprejudiceorotheradverse

________________________________________________________2. Federal Financial Institutions Examine Council, IT Examinations Handbook:InformationSecurity,July2006,pp.56-57;www.ffice.gov/ffiecinfobase/booklets/information_security/information_security.pdf.

3. V.Vara,“MovingTargets:HowCompaniesCanKeepEmployeesfromLosingtheInformationinTheirLaptops,”The Wall Street Journal,June19,2006,p.R9.

�. Code of Federal Regulations,Title22,Section122(a),2005.

5. Code of Federal Regulations,Title22,Section122.21(a),2005.

6. Code of Federal Regulations,Title22,Section122.25,2005.


recourse.”7Theseprovisionscreatepotentialliabilityforthecompanyandtheempoweredofficial,ifthecompanycommitscertainITARviolations. Itistheempoweredofficial’sresponsibilitytoalertthecompanyto“redflags”andtoinvestigateanypotentialITARviolations.TheempoweredofficialmustalsonotifytheDirectoratewithinfivedaysofanychangeinacompany’sownershiporleadership,anacquisitionordivestmentofaforeignsubsidiary, a change in location (the consolidation of defense work in NanoNautica’s Cupertinooffice)orachangeinbusiness(forexample,ifNanoNauticastartsdealing“inanadditionalcategoryofdefensearticlesordefenseservices,”whichhappenedwhenitswitchedtomakinggyrochipsformilitarysystems).8 Inlightoftheserequirements,NanoNauticaisalreadyinnoncompliancewithITARnotificationrequirements.Unlicensed Release of Technical Data

Companiesshouldalsobealerttothefactthat,undertheITAR,“alicenseisrequiredfortheoral, visual or documentary disclosure of technical data by U.S. persons to foreign persons,”9 ascanoccurwhenafirmrespondstoaforeigncustomer’srequestforaproposalorsendspromotionalproductinformationtoforeignnationalrepresentativesofaU.S.oroverseasfirm.TheITARrequiresalicenseforsuchexports“regardlessofthemannerinwhichthetechnicaldataistransmitted”(forexample,inperson,bytelephone,electroniccorrespondence,andsoon).Itthusincludesanyandalldatatransmittedbye-mail,intranet,orinstantmessage–regardlessofwhethertheforeignrecipientisoutsideorwithintheU.S.IfaU.S.persontransmitsITAR-regulatedtechnicaldatabye-mailorinstantmessagetoaforeignnationalwithoutalicense,orenablesaforeignnationaltoobtainacopyofsuchdataviasuchatransmission,anillegalexportorreleasehasoccurred.AnycomplianceplanmustthereforeavertunlicensedreleasesofITAR-regulatedtechnicaldatatoforeignnationalsortooverseasofficers,andrecognizethatforsuchareleasetooccur,aforeignnationalwouldnothavetoreadane-mailorevenopenitsattachedfile.

Inthedigitalera,thisexplanationseemscounterintuitive.SurelytheITAR’sprovisionshaveevolvedtoconformtotherealityofthewaysMNCsdobusinessusingtheinternetandwebsitestoenablecompaniestoworkacrossnationalborders.NaonNautica’sdevelopmentofCMGunitsandgyrochipsresultedfromcollaborativeeffortsbyengineersfromallitsoffices.Personnelaroundthegloberoutinelysharedtheirideasthroughthecompany’sintranet,e-mail,instantmessaging,andvideoconferencingusingavoice-over-IP(VoIP)system.Thus,ITAR-controlledtechnicaldatarelatedtoCMGs.gyrochips,andsoftwarehasbeencirculatinginandoutoftheU.S.andbetweenU.S.citizensandforeignnationalswithintheCupertinodefenseplantthroughouttheresearchanddevelopmentprocess.Theseroutinetransmissions,however,raisesignificantissuesundertheITAR.Deemed Exports of Data Unlicensed transmissions of ITAR-controlled data from NanoNautica’s Cupertino officeto anoverseasoffice areviewedas illegal exports, and each transmission is a separateviolation.Additionally, each transmissionof ITAR-controlleddata fromaU.S.person toa foreignnationalwithintheCupertinolocationconstitutesanunlicensed“deemedexport”tothatforeignnational’scountryandisthereforeaseparateviolation.

AquestionthatfrequentlyarisesiswhetherthereisawaytorecharacterizecompanyconducttobringitwithinwhatispermissibleundertheITAR.Doesencryption,forexample,avoidliabilityby

________________________________________________________

7. Code of Federal Regulations,Title22,Section120.25(�),2005.8 Code of Federal Regulations,Title22,Section122.�(a)(2),2005.9. Code of Federal Regulations,Title22,Section125.2(c),2005.


makingthetransmissionanontransfer?Canarecipientbedescribedaspossessingdataonlyafterithasbeendecrypted?Thesimpleanswertobothis“no”. The logicmightnot seemsound,but it is in fact the logicof ITAR,whichdefines“export”muchmorebroadly.CompaniessubjecttotheITARmustdistinguishbetweenproceduresthatretaincontroloverdataandproceduresthatrelinquishcontrol.Securityprotocols(suchasencryption)thattravelwithsensitivedatainevitablyrelinquishcontrolofdigitaldatatotherecipient,whereassecurityprotocolsthatlimitwhocanhandleandreceivesensitivefilesretaincontrolofdigitaldata. Filesneednotbedecoded toviolate the ITAR’sprohibitions. Under ITAR,whena foreignnationalhasanopportunitytoobtainacopyofdata,accessisdeemedtohaveoccurred,evenifthedataisencryptedandpurportedlyunreadable.IntheITAR,suchpotentialaccessconstitutesanexportandrequiresalicenseorexceptionfromthelicenserequirement.NanoNautica’sITadministratorinitsSAOPauloofficehasaccessprivilegestoallinternalcommunicationsincludinge-mailandinstantmessagesdiscussingandtransmittingdatarelatedtotheCMGandgyrochipprojects.SuchaccessmeansthatunlicensedtransfersofITAR-controlleddatacomewithinhisreviewandtherebyviolatetheITAR. AlthoughNanoNautica’sCEOprefers toencrypt ITAR-controllede-mail, that isnotenoughtocomplywithITARbecauseencryptioncouldfailtoprovideadurablesafeguard.Asaferpolicywouldbetoadopttheproposedaccess-controlledintranet.Itisimportanttorecognizethatthemostobviousapproachtoportablesecurity–encryption–isonlyatemporarystopgap.Placingencrypted,ITAR-controlleddatainthehandsofforeignnationals,intheabsenceofalicense,removesthedatafromcompanycontrolandplaces it in thecontrolof thosewhomighthavea strong incentive toappropriateit.Acomplianceprogramcannotbecharacterizedaseffectiveifitreliessolelyononesafeguardorprotocoltoprotectagainstunauthorizedorunlicensedreleases.Likearaccoontryingto rifle throughaclosedgarbagecan,adeterminedhacker (withenoughcomputerpower)canbecountedontocrackencryptionifheplayswithitlongenough. IfNanoNauticastoresITAR-controlleddatainanunlockedclosetinitsCupertinoofficeandallowsforeignnationalsvisitingfromChinatostorebriefcasesinthatcloset,thatwouldgivethemaccesstotheITAR-controlleddata.Thismightseemtoconfuseaccesswithdisclosure.However,the ITAR’sbroaddefinitionofexport includes“disclosing(includingoralorvisualdisclosure)ortransferringtechnicaldatatoaforeignperson,whetherintheUnitedStatesorabroad.”10IfaU.S.persontransmitsITAR-controlledtechnicaldatabye-mailorinstantmessagetoaforeignperson,ormakesitpossibleforaforeignpersontoobtainacopyofsuchdatabysuchtransmission,anexporthasoccured.Withoutalicense,thatexportviolatestheITAR.TheITARdoesnotdefine“export”tomeantransferanddisclosure–transferbyitselfissufficient.

Penalties and Precautions ThemagnitudeofITARpenaltiesmakescomplianceanextremelyimportantdata–governanceissue.IftheDirectoratedeterminesthatsuchviolationswereunintentional,itcanimposeacivilpenaltyofupto$500,000foreachviolation. Onedayofheavye-mail trafficcouldexposeNanoNauticato tens ofmillions in fines. And this does not illustratemerely aworst-case hypothetical. TheDirectorateroutinelychargesmultipleviolations.Ifitdeterminesthattheviolationswereintentional,theexposureismuchgreater:criminalpenaltiescanbeimposedofupto$1millionperviolationortwicetheamountNanoNauticamighthavegainedfromsuchconduct,whicheverisgreater.Moreover,whethercivilorcriminal,suchviolationsresultinstrictliability–withnoexonerationforgoodfaithorinadvertence.

________________________________________________________10. Code of Federal Regulations,Title22,Section120.17(a)(�),2005.


Acompany’sdatagovernancepoliciesmust,therefore,ensurethatitsconvenientconveyancesofsensitivedigitaldatadonotresultinITARviolations,andtherebyincurcostlyanddisruptiveinternalinvestigations, negotiations with the Directorate, penalties, potential debarment from governmentcontracts,andreputationaldamage(thislastcanbesignificant).

Lessons Learned The ITAR isdesigned toprotect themost sensitivedata–militarycrucial tonational securityfrom release to actualorpotential adversaries. If sucha releaseoccurs,NanoNauticawill eitherbe viewed as having given a foreign power the opportunity to appropriate ITAR-controlled data(probablyaggravatingitspenalties)orashavingcreateddefine-in-depthcontrolsforitssensitivedatathatrequireacommensurateefforttocircumvent(possiblymitigatingitspenalties). NanoNauticashouldreviseitsoriginalcomplianceprogramonathroughinternalinvestigationthat identifiesallpotential ITARnoncompliance issues. It should thendraft aplan forvoluntarydisclosuretotheDirectorate.NanoNauticamightcallatemporaryhalttoitsdefensework–astand-downtopermittheimplementationofproceduresthatwillpreventfurtherunlicensedexportsand“deemedexports.” Consolidationofdefenseworkinoneplantwillnotsuffice.IfNanoNauticawantstocontinueitscollaborativemodeofresearchanddevelopment,itmustobtainlicensesforeachforeignrecipientofITAR-controlleddata.Thedirectorate,however,mightnotgrantallthelicensesNanoNauticaseeks.Althoughitwouldbecostly.NanoNauticashouldcreateaseparatechannelofcommunicationsforITAR-controlleddata, and should limit access to that channel toU.S.personsand ITAR-licensedforeignnationals. NanoNautica should also encrypt all sensitive portable files (whichmight limit the damagecausedbyaviolationbymakingithardertobreakintoandreadthesensitivedata.)And,itshouldtrainitsengineerstoalertittoproposedproductdevelopmentsthatwouldrequiregenerationof,accessto,orincorporationofITAR-controlleddataortechnology.SuchnoticeshouldenableNanoNauticatoweightherisksofpursuingsuchdevelopmentinlightofthepossibilitythattheDirectoratemightnotissuealicenseforsaletocertaincountriesandtheirnationals. TheconsequencesoffailingtorecognizewhenaproductincorporatesITAR-controlleddataortechnologycanbeglimpsedinaninternale-mailthattheseniorcontractsmanageratanL-3subsidiarysent(afterlearningofunlicensedreleasesofcertaingyrochipsknownasQRS-11Sensors):

BEI[asupplierofgyrochips]hasconfirmedthatallQRS-11Sensors,regardlessofwhetherornottheyareusedpredominantlyforcommercialapplicationsareonthemunitionslist.Thiswouldmeanthatifwecan’tgetacommodity,jurisdictionfromtheDepartmentofState,whichdetermines...[ouravionicsproduct]tobeacommercialunit,wewillneedtohaveavalidatedlicenseeachtimeweexportit,aswellashavingtosubmitavoluntaryselfdisclosureforpreviouslyexportingitwithoutalicense.Obviously,wedon’twantthattohappen.11

Witheachnewtechnologicalenhancementofdatamobilitycomesincreasedwaysforsensitivedatatoleak.DailyCDburningandtransmittalsofelectronicdispatchescancreateinstantandspecificexceptionstocompany’swellintentionedcomplianceplan.Althoughnocompanycanguaranteethatitssensitivedatawillbesecuredagainstaccessbyprohibitedpersons,companiesshouldnotlettheconveniencesofnewtechnologiesmakeITAR-controlleddataoranysensitivedata–lesssecure.

________________________________________________________11. Undatedinternale-mailfromL-3subsidiaryGoodrichAvionics,asquotedinU.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, Draft Charging Letterre:InvestigationofGoodrichCorporationandL-3CommunicationsCorporation,pp.6-7;www.pmdtc.org/Consent%20Agreements/2006/Goodrich%20Corporation/Draft%20Charging%20/Letter.pdf.


Companiesshould,therefore,routinelyevaluatetheircomplianceprogram’spotentialvulnerabilitiesastechnologyevolves.Companiescanminimizetheriskofinadvertenttransfersofsensitivedatawithout compromising research anddevelopmentflexibility, if they tag data that has commercialvalue and legal sensitivity and control it accordingly. Aconscientiousprogramwill significantlyminimize(throughnotaltogethereliminate)theriskofunauthorizedaccess.

About the Author RolandL.TropeisapartnerintheNewYorkCityofficeofTropeandSchrammandanadjunctprofessor in the Department of Law, U.S. Military Academy. He provides strategic and legaladviceonmergersandacquisitions,exportanddefensetradecontrols,tradesanctions,anti-moneylaundering,personaldataprotection,informationsecurity,intellectualproperty,cyberspacelaw,anddefenseprocurements.HehasaBAinpoliticalsciencefromtheUniversityofSouthernCalifornia,aBAandanMAinEnglishlanguageandliteraturefromOxfordUniversity,andaJDfromYaleLawSchool.HecoauthoredthetreatiseCheckpointsinCyberspace:BestPracticesforAvertingLiabilityinCross-BorderTransactions (AmericanBarAssociation, 2005). Contact himat e-mail address:[email protected].


Strengthening Our Allies, One Soldier at a TimeBy

Richard N. Helfer, Colonel, USA Former Commander of Security Assistance Training Management Organization

and Jon D. Jones

United States Army Security Assistance Training Management Organization VictoryintheGlobalWaronTerrorism(GWOT)willrequirefirmresolveonthepartoftheUnitedStatesalonewithcapablepartnerswhoshareourinterests.Thesepartnersmustbewillingtofightwithus.Theymustbestrongmilitarily,andhaveinteroperableequipmentanddoctrine.Theymustofferustheirbases,theirroadsandairfields,andtheirnationalairspace.

Security cooperation provides the “tools” that enable the United States to engage foreigncountries.SecuritycooperationgoalsandprogramsareincludedintheSecretaryofDefenseSecurityCooperationGuidance,ArmySecurityCooperationStrategy,UnifiedCommandsTheaterSecurityCooperationStrategiesandtheU.S.Ambassadors’MissionPerformancePlans.ThesecurityassistancetrainingprogramisacriticaltoolusedbytheU.S.ArmytotrainforeignsoldiersbothincontinentalUnitedStates(CONUS)andoutsideofthecontinentalUnitedStates(OCONUS).

A Counterterrorism MTT trains a CTPhilippineReactionTeamatthepistolrange.

MTTinstructorsdemonstrateMOUTclearingprocedures.

JointtrainingbeingconductedinColombiawithU.S.aviationforcesandColombianaviation..

TAFTtrainsEcuadorianQuickReactionForce.


This is where SecurityAssistance Training Management Organization (SATMO) comes in.SATMO’smissionistoplan,form,prepare,deployandsustainCONUS-basedsecurityassistanceteams (SATs) in support of the Secretary of Defense Security Cooperation Guidance, ArmySecurityCooperationStrategy,UnifiedCombatantCommandsTheaterCooperationStrategies,U.S.Ambassadors’MissionPerformancePlansandtheGlobalWaronTerrorism.

SATMOtrainsanyArmy,onanyskill,atanylevel,ontheirturfandunderanyconditionsshortofcombat. In2006alone,SATMOdeployedteamsto26differentcountries;withover314U.S.personneltrainingover2,500foreignpersonnel.Since1985,SATMOdeployedpersonnelhavespentalmosttwomillionman-daysonforeignsoilinthispursuit.Incoordinationwiththehostnation,thecombatantcommand(andinconcertwithU.S.securityassistanceofficers(SAOs)intheforeigncountriesrequestspecificArmytrainingandtechnicalassistancefromSATMO.

AsSATMOdevelops,coordinatesandexecutesthesemissions,itassuresouralliesandpartnersof theU.S. resolve to fulfill our defense commitments to their countries. Training and technicalassistancemakeouralliesstronger.ArmyteamstrainandhelpthemtoemployU.S.systemswehavesoldorgiventothem.Theyfightbetter,givingtheenemymoretoworryabout.Ouralliesunderstandandmayevenadoptourproceduresanddoctrine.Whileourteamsareworkingwithanally,theirpresencedetersaggressionfromopposingcountries.

(Left)ColombianAviationTAFTtreamswiththeFastRopeInsertionandExtractionSystem.

Centertop)ColombianAviationTAFTtrainwithColombianQuickReactionForcesrehearsingtargetinsertion.

(Centerbelow).AU.S.Contractor(farright)instructsfutureinstructorsfortheGeorgianCompanyCommander’sCourseduringarecentMTT.Currently,theGeorgianCompanyCommander’sCourseisbeinginstructedbytheGeorgianmilitaryleaders.

(Right)DuringarecentMTTintheDominicanRepublic,WestPointCadetsprovideDominicanRepublicCadetstrainingonroomclearingtechniques.


SATMO handpicks warrior-diplomats fromArmyActive Duty, National Guard and Reservepersonnel,federalciviliansanddefensecontractors.SATMOcaneven“tap”theAirForce,Navy,Marines,andDoDforexpertpersonnel.TheservicessendtheirbesttoSATMO,certifyingeachasasoldier-diplomat,abletocreatethegoodwillthatencouragesouralliestostickwithusthroughthickandthin.Cradle to Grave Coverage • Planning.SATMO’sdeskofficersstartattheearlieststagesofmissiondevelopment intheplanningprocesstohelptheSAOdeterminemissionandfundingrequirements whilemeetingpolicyguidanceatalllevels.

• Preparing.Beforedeploying,teamsattendafive-daycoursecalledSecurityAssistance TrainingTeamOrientationCourse(SATTOC).EachSAOmemberundergoestraining in anti-terrorist and force protection, counter-surveillance, special driving skills and cross-cultural communications. They receive threat, intelligence and medical briefings, get their immunizations up-to-date, and spend time team-building. Key totheirsuccessisaclearunderstandingoftheoverallmission,goals,objectives,and endstate.Eachteamchiefdemonstratesthisunderstandinginapersonalsessionwith theSATMOCommander.Duringthisweek,teammembersalsoin-process,updating personnelandfinancialrecords.Finally,iftheSAOwantstheteamtobespecially equipped, SATMO’s logistics section outfits them individually and as a team, and arrangesforshipmentoftheitemstothehostcountry.

• Deploying.SATMOmakesalltravelarrangements,getscountryandtheaterclearances, paysforticketsandperdiem,notifiestheSAOofplannedarrivaldates,andsendsthe teamonitsmission.

• Sustaining. SATmanagersactasanumbilicalcordbetweentheteamandtheU.S. Thisconnectionensuresthateachteamreceivesallthesupportnecessarytoaccomplish theirmission.SATMOevenoperatesandactivefamilyresourcegroupto“keepthe homefiresburning.”

• Re-deploying.SATMOplansandexecutesallpartsoftheteam’sreturntoCONUS. Even after their return, SATMO budget and logistics personnel spend up to three yearsclosingoutfinancialfilesandpropertyrecords.Thismissionisextensive,but SAOsandotherembassyrepresentativeshelpSATMOtodeveloptheverybestArmy trainingandtechnicalassistancemissionforeachcountry.

Security Assistance Teams SATMOfieldsbothpermanentchangeofstation(PCS)teamsforoneortwoyearsortemporaryduty (TDY) teams for under 180 days. Teams performboth training and technical assistance to

GeorgianMaintenanceMTTdiscusspropermaintenanceproceduresforaUH-1.

BahrainMLRSTAFTtechnicalexpertdiscusselectricaltestingequipment.


ourallies.AkeyfunctionforteamsistosurveyacountrytodeterminethebestuseofU.S.foreignmilitary air. Expert teams assess the foreign army’s status and needs, and recommend materiel,training,andtechnicalassistancesolutions.What Kind of Training? Intwowords:almostanything.Restrictedonlybyforeigndisclosureandreleaserequirements,SATMOtrainseverythingfrombasicriflemarksmanshipto“howtobeaministerofdefense.”Asanexample,SATMOassistedandpreparedLatviatoenterintotheNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization.SATMOtrainsjointandservicestaffs,servicechiefs,brigadeandbattalioncommandersandstaff,andprovincialcommanders.SATMOhasestablishedtrainingcoursesforforeigngovernmentstoincludeanEthiopianCommandandGeneralStaffCollegeandnumerouscompanyleaderschools.ASATintheUkraineplannedandexecutedanon-commissionedcorpscenterandschool.InthePhilippinesSATMOteamsenhancedtheabilityoftheirLightInfantryBattalions,andLightReactionCompaniesto conduct sustained operations against insurgency while providing training on U.S. governmentprocuredequipment.

InColombia,aonemanpsychologicaloperationsteamdevelopedandtrainedportionsoftheColombianArmy (COLAR) on a repatriation and reindoctrination program focused on counter-gureillaandinsurgencygroupsoperatinginColombia.Thisprogrampersuaded10,000“badguys”todesertandbecomefunctionalmembersofsociety,whiletheCOLARrecoveredammunitionandnumerousweaponsfromthedeserters. TheCOLARalsoseizedtwomilitaryaircraftwhichwereassistingguerillaandinsurgencygroups,anddestroyedseveralillegaloperatingdruglaboratories.Finally,theCOLARreceivedinvaluableintelligencegatheredfromthedesertersonotherelementsoftheguerillaandinsurgentoperations. WhenouralliesacquireU.S.governmentequipment,itincreasinglyenhancesourinteroperability.SATMO teams train their personnel in operations, maintenance, and tactical employment of thatequipment.Thisbuildsastrongerallythatcanworkwithusmorereadily. Returningteammembersseethatsecurityassistancemissionsareamongthemostrewardingjobsinthemilitarytoday.However,thesemissionscanbeveryfrustratingbecauseofculturaldifferencesandlanguagebarriersthatmaketheirownchallenge.Inteampreparation,SATMOstressesawarenessofthesechallengesandstrivestoconditiondeployingteamstocounterthecultural“friction.”SATmemberslearnthefollowing: • Keepfrustrationsinperspective • Meetthepeople • Learntheirlanguage • Understandtheirculture • Eattheirfood • Becomefamiliarwiththeirreligion • Participateinculturalevents SATMOpreparesusforthenextwarbydevelopingourallies’abilityandwillingnesstofightwithus.SATMOtrainstheworld,onesoldieratatime.

About the Authors HavingcompletedhiscommandatSATMO,ColonelRichardN.HelferhaschosentoculminatehiscareerwithafinalassignmentinAfghanistan. JonD.JonesisthesecurityassistanceteammanagerforthePacificregionattheUnitedStatesArmySecurityAssistanceTrainingManagementOrganization,FortBragg,NorthCarolina.HeisaretiredU.S.ArmySpecialForcesofficer.


Can We Build a Better Medical Civic Assistance Program? Making the Most of Medical Humanitarian

Civic Assistance FundingBy

Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Lougee, USA Brooke Army Medical Center

[TheviewsexpressedinthisarticlearethoseoftheauthoraloneanddonotrepresentofficialpolicyofBrookeArmyMedicalCenter,theSanAntonioMilitaryPediatricCenter,theDepartmentoftheArmy,DepartmentofDefenseoroftheUnitedStatesGovernment.]

MedicalCivicAssistancePrograms(MEDCAPs)oralsoknownasMedicalReadinessTrainingExercises(MEDRETES)areonewaythatthemilitaryhealthservicescontributetothetheatersecurityplan. MEDCAPfunding isprimarily through theHumanitarianCivicAssistance(HCA)programwhichisauthorizedbyTitle10Section�01oftheUnitedStatesCode.AccordingtotheU.S.Code,HCAgoalsare:

• PromotethesecurityofthehostnationandtheUnitedStates

• EnhancereadinessskillsofthemembersofU.S.militarymedics1

ThemostcommonMEDCAPmissionprovidesshort-termmedicalcaretoaruralpopulationinadevelopingcountry2.Underthismodel,aU.S.militarymedicalunitwilldeploytoapre-determinedlocationandsetupaclinicinschools,communitycenters,localhealthfacilitiesortentsandproviderapidtriage,medicalanddentalcaretoasmanypatientsaspossible.Afterspendingadayortwoinonecommunity,theMEDCAPwillmoveontoanotherpre-determinedsiteandrepeattheprocess.ItisimportanttonotethatsomeMEDCAPSaresurgicalinnature,forexample,providingreconstructiveorcataractsurgerytolocalpopulations.ThispaperdoesnotaddressthesesurgicalMEDCAPS.

MEDCAPsareaconvenienttoolformilitarymedicalunitstopracticedeploymenttoadevelopingcountry.3Theyarealsoameansforengagementwithhostnationmilitariesandunderservedcivilianpopulations.InSOUTHCOMalone,therearefrom60-70MEDCAPsanually.�Inatypicaltwoweekmission,severalthousandpatientswillreceivemedicalcare.Whileafewofthesepatientsmaybetreatedforlife-threateningconditions,thevastmajorityareeitherhealthyorhavechronicmedicalconditionsthatcannotbeaddressedbyaone-timeclinicvisit.Is There Room to Improve Medical Humanitarian Civic Assistance Programs? OneproblemwithMEDCAPsisalackofdatathatobjectivelydemonstratebenefit.Objectiveoutcomedata; commonly referred to asMeasuresofEffectiveness (MOEs), is lacking frombothhostnationbenefitandmilitarytrainingstandpoints.AfterActionReports(AARs)aretheprimaryinformationsourceaboutMEDCAPoutcomes.Unfortunately,AARsfocusexclusivelyonprocess

________________________________________________________1. UnitedStatesCode:Title10Section�01:Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations.July12,2005.2. Crutcher JM, Beecham HJ, Laxer MA: “Short-Term Medical Field Missions in Developing Countries:APracticalApproach”,Military Medicine,1995,pp.160,339-343.3. Mario V. Garcia, Jr., “Achieving Security Cooperation Objectives Through the United States EuropeanCommandHumanitarianandCivicAssistanceProgram-SecurityAssistanceCommunity”,DISAM Journal,Winter2003,Vol.25No.1andNo.2p,105-108.�. Loomis,E.,“HumanitarianandCivicAssistanceProgram”,DISAM Journal,Winter2000.


assessmentssuchasnumbersofU.S.militarydeployedandpatientvisitcounts.OutcomeassessmentsthatdocumentreadinessskillsdevelopedandhealthimprovementstolocalpopulationareinvariablyabsentfromAARs.

SeveralauthorsandstudieshavediscussedtheweaknessesofmedicalHCA. DrifmeyerandLlewellynrevieweddozensofMEDCAPAARsfromseveralcountriesandreceivedfeedbackfromhundreds of U.S. military medic-participants in MEDCAPs.5 They noted the lack of MOEs andinadequatepre-deploymenttraining.Theyandotherauthorshavealsonotedthelackoflong-termbenefittohostnation.6,7,8ArecommendationofmanyoftheseauthorshasbeentoshiftMEDCAPfocusfromshort-termclinicstowardspublichealthimprovements.

AnotherrecommendationhasbeentocoordinateMEDCAPactivitieswithnon-governmentalorganizations(non-governmentorganizations)toprovidelong-termcare.Thisisseenastheobviousanswertotheconundrumofattemptingtodoamedicalinterventionwithoutgettingboggeddownwithlong-termcaretohostnationcivilians.9

Thenon-governmentorganizationsolutionignoresseveralproblems.

• One, non-government organizations are inherently politically neutral and may bereluctanttogetinvolvedwithanoperationprovidedbyU.S.military.

• Two, the extreme short-term nature of MEDCAPs makes it difficult for a non-governmentorganizationtohaveapracticalreasontocooperate.

• Three, most military medical units have little experience with non-governmentorganizationsandhavenothadtheopportunitytodeveloptherelationshipoftrustthatisneededforeffectivecooperation.

Conversely,legalissuessuchasmalpracticeinsurancecomplicateformalinteractionbetweenmilitarymedics andnon-governmentorganizations. Finally, health care that is providedbynon-government organizations without coordination through host nation institutions may actuallydestabilizesecuritybyde-legitimizingthehostnationgovernment.10

Is a Long-Term Health Benefit from Medical Civic Assistance Programs Desirable? Acommon interpretationofmilitarydoctrinegoverningmedicalHCA is thatbenefit tohostnationisincidentaltotrainingreceivedbyDoDpersonnel.Theinterpretationbeingthatbenefittohostnationissubordinatetotrainingorevennotnecessaryaslongasmilitarytrainingtakesplace.Theoriginofthisinterpretationisunknown;clearlytheU.S.CodegoverningHCAdoesnotstatethebenefitsareincidentaltotrainingdoctrine.Onthecontrary,itstatesthefollowing:

________________________________________________________5. Drifmeyer,J.&Llewellyn,C,“MilitaryTrainingandHumanitarianandCivicAssistance”,Military Medicine,Vol.169,January2004.6. Kelley JE, Changes Needed to the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program, United States GeneralAccountingOfficePublication,GAO/NSIAD-94-57,December1993.7 LuzG.A.,DePauwJ.W.,GaydosJ.C.,HooperR.R.,LegtersL.J.,“TheRoleofMiitaryMedicineinMilitaryCivicAction”,Military Medicine,1993,pp.158,362-366.8. WeisserR.J.,Jr.,“TheMaturingofMEDRETEs”,Military Medicine,1993,pp.158,573-575.9. NickleC.J.,The Role of Health Services Support in the Theater Security Cooperation Plan: Do We Have It Right?,PublishedbyNavalWarCollege,Newport,RhoneIsland,May,200�.10. Macrae,J.,Dilemmas of “Post”-Conflict Transition: Lessons for the Health Sector,ReliefandRehabilitationNetwork.


“Suchactivities(HCAmissions)shallservethebasiceconomicandsocialneedsofthepeopleofthecountryconcerned.”11

Ashort-termclinicofunprovenbenefitisprobablynotthebestwaytomeetthoseneeds.Arethereothercompellingreasonstoavoidalong-termhealthbenefitfrommedicalHCAprojects?Fromaplanningstandpoint,asimpledeploy,provideshort-termcare,andredeployoperationisaconvenientwaytogetaunitintothefield.Whileconvenient,thisformulaignoresthestatedgoalsoftheHCAprogram.Whenviewedthroughtheprismoftrainingandsecurityenhancement,along-termhealthbenefitmaywellbeintegral,notincidentaltomeetingthestatedgoalsoftheHCAprogram.

Inotherwords,a long-termhealthbenefitmaybetheverykeytogoodtrainingandsecurityenhancement.WhywouldtheU.S.Congressauthorizefundstotrainthemilitarytodothingsthatdonotprovidesignificantbenefit?Thebasicpremiseoftrainingispreparingtroopstobeproficientoperationallyhopefullyalltrainingisaimedatincreasingmilitaryproficiencyinactivitiesthataremostbeneficial.

Likewise,ifahealthinterventionexecutedbytheU.S.militarydoesnotprovidelastingbenefit;securityrelationshipsmaybedamagedbyraisingexpectationsthatarenotsustained.Inaworsecasescenario,hostnationleadersandlocalsmayviewtheseshort-terminterventionsasnothingmorethancynicalexercisesinpublicrelations.Proposed Model for Improved Medical Humanitarian Civic Assistance Thefollowingisalistofbasicprinciplesoftheproposedmodel:

• On-goingprojects,notonetimeevents

• TrainforSecurity,Stabilization,Transition,andReconstructionOperations(SSTRO)

• Coordinationwithhost-nationhealthofficialstoprovidelegitimacy

• Built-inMeasuresofEffectiveness

• Synergywithotherinterestedparties.On-Going Projects, Not One Time Events Thekeychangewiththismodelwouldbethedevelopmentofasetofpublichealthprojectsthatspecificallyaddressthehealthprioritiesofthehostnation.Insteadofdeployingtodoatwo-weekseriesofshort-termclinics,militaryunitswouldsystematicallyrotatetoworkonanon-goinghealthproject.Areasonableamountoftimeforprojectcompletionwouldbetwotofiveyears.Duringthistime,multiplemilitarymedicalunitswoulddeploy toworkoneachproject.Trainingwould takeplacesimultaneouslywithprojectwork.

Participatingmedicalunitswoulddeployfortwo-fourweeks,witheachdeploymentbuildingupontheprecedingmissionstocompletetheoverallprojectobjectives.Priortodeployment,unitswouldreceiveasetoflearningtoolsthatwouldbetaskandcountryspecificandalsoteachgeneralprinciplesofthehealth-relatedaspectsSSTRO.

Eachspecificprojectwouldhavealeadagentthatwouldberesponsibleforprojectdevelopmentandmanagement.Leadagentscouldbedrawnfromseveralsources;forexample,academicmilitarymedical departments, the U.S.Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, theUniformedServicesUniversity,andmilitaryoverseasmedicalresearchunitscoulddevelopprojectproposalsandcompeteforHCAfunding.

________________________________________________________11. United States Southern Command Doctrine 40-46,March1,1995,p.�.


The Geographic Combatant Command Surgeon office would be responsible for developingselectioncriteriaandassessmentofwhetheraspecificprojectshouldbecontinued.TheAirForce’sInternationalHealthSpecialistprogramisanotheroptionforassistingwithdevelopmentandoversight.Ideally,allthreeserviceswoulddevelopacadreofregionalhealthexpertswithlinguisticandculturalskillstofunctionasmedicalcivilaffairsofficers

Medicalplannerswouldprovideadministrativesupport,butdefer to themedicalexpertsandcommandsurgeonstodevelopandexecutetheprojects.ExamplesofpossibleprojectswouldincludeHIV prevention, health education, hospital equipment repair, and disease surveillance programs.Short-termclinicalactivitiesmayalsotakeplaceduringthedeployment,butwouldnotbetheprimaryfocus.Traininglocalhealthworkerswouldbeanintegralpartofeachproject.Training for Security, Stabilization, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations DepartmentofDefenseDirective3000.05,November2005,directedtheDoDtomakeSSTROequivalenttocombatoperationsinpriority.12ItfurtherdirectsDoDtointegrateSSTROacrossthefullspectrumofDoDactivities,includingtrainingandexercises.ThegoalofSSTROincludes:

• Meetinghumanitarianneeds

• Helpdevelopindigenouscapacityforsecuringessentialservices

Clearly,HCA is found in the full spectrumofDoDactivitiesand training forSSTRO is thelogicalgoalofHCA.

SSTRO will likely take place in post-war, post-disaster, and complex emergency scenariosTrainingobjectivesformedicalHCAdeploymentswouldtherefore,beaimedatteachingU.S.militarymedics skills that will be critical for these situations.Additionally, pre-planned medical SSTROmaytakeplaceinpotentialat-risknations,withthegoalofshoringupafailingstatepriortototalcollapse.Inthesecases,medicalHCAmissionsmayfunctionasbothatrainingANDoperationaldeployment.

DoD3000.05 further notes need forU.S.military tobuild “indigenous capacity” toprovideessentialservicesandoftheimportanceoflearningtoworkincivil-militaryteams.Pre-deploymentMEDCAPtrainingcycleswouldincludegeneralSSTROprinciplespluspreparationforthespecificprojectthattheunitwouldbetaskedtoworkon.Learningtoworkwithinadevelopingnationhealthsystemwillteachmedicshowtobuildthelegitimacyofhostnationinstitutions-akeySSTROgoal.Coordination with Host Nation Public Health Departments ThespecificprojectswouldbedevelopedincollaborationwiththehostnationMinistryofHealth(MoH).TobestmeetHCAprogramsecuritygoals,thehostnationmustviewaprojectasexistingprimarilytomeethostnationneeds.Paradoxically,bymakinghostnationbenefit thetoppriority,U.S. military training will also be improved by teaching medics skills that support public healthdepartmentsinthedevelopingworld.Tobuildlegitimacy,theMoHmusthavefinalvetopoweroverkeyprojectprocessesandcomponents.

Cooperationwill hopefully flowdownward from the centralMoH level to local communityleaders.Ofcourse,localcooperationisneverguaranteed,andHCAprojectmanagersandparticipantsmustbepreparedtowinthesupportoflocalhealthworkersandleaderswhichwillprovidefurtherinvaluable trainingopportunities. Follow-onevaluationofprogramsuccessand failurewouldbe

________________________________________________________12. Department of Defense: DoD Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, andReconstruction”,November28,2005.


built-inwithspecificdelineationofresponsibilitiesbetweenU.S.military,hostnationmilitary,MoHandlocalgovernment.Measures of Effectiveness Measuresofeffectiveness(MOEs)wouldbedevelopedaspartofinitialprojectandthoroughlyintegratedintoeveryaspectofprogram.MOEswouldfocusonthreeareas:

• Healthimprovement

• Militarytraining

• Security

Funding for these assessmentswouldbe integrated into theoverall programpackage.Usingstandard public health planningmodels, each project would have specificmetrics assessed priortostartandthroughouttheprojectlife-cycle. Publichealthoutcomesmeasuressuchasdeathanddiseaserateswouldbethegoldstandardforprogramhealtheffectiveness.MOEsformilitarytrainingwouldincludepreandpostdeployment testingof learningobjectivesanddocumentationofskillspracticed.Useofperiodicanonymousquestionnairesandfocusgroupsforhostnationleadersandlocal participants are another way to assess program effectiveness. Requiring appropriate MOEswouldrepresentamajorsteptowardsprofessionalizingthemedicalHCAprogram.Synergy ProjectsthatdemonstratesynergywithotherrelevantresourceswouldbepreferredandmorelikelytobeselectedforHCAfunding.HCAmoneyswouldbeviewedasseedmoneytogrowamulti-faceted,synergisticprogram.Forexample,projectsthatcombineHCAfundingwithresourcesfromresearch grants, civilian philanthropic funding, or other U.S. government development programswouldbe consideredmore competitive. Because theseprojectswouldbeon-going, enlisting thecooperationofnon-governmentorganizationswouldbefareasierthanforshort-termclinics.WorkingwithothergroupswouldbothservetodomorewithlessDoDresourcesaswellasfulfillingimportanttrainingobjectivessuchaslearningtocoordinateandcooperatewithnon-militaryorganizations.Current Working Model of These Principles TheSanAntonioMilitaryPediatricCenter(SAMPC),ajointArmy-AirForcepediatricresidencyprogramhasestablishedaworkingHCAprogramthatmodelstheseprinciples.Since2001,ithasfieldedteamsofmilitarymedicstoHondurasthreetimesperyeartoworkonanon-goingnutritionalscreeningproject. Theprogramcoordinatesall activitieswith thehostnationMoHandprogrammanagersmeetperiodicallywithhostnationrepresentativestoshareresultsandcollaborateonnewgoals.

During deployments, U.S. medics work side-by-side with local health workers to assess thenutritionalstatusofisolatedruralcommunities.Nutritionalscreeningisakeycomponentofpost-war/post-disasterneedsassessmentsandthusisanexcellentvehicleformilitarytrainingaswellasameanstoprovidethehostnationwithimportantpublichealthdata.

Priortodeployment,theteamshaveatwelveweektrainingcyclethatteachesthembothhowtodothisspecificoperationaswellasgeneralmilitaryandmedicalskillsthatarecommonlyneededinpost-war/post-disasterscenarios.Teammembersplantheoperationfromstarttofinish,learningaboutdeployment,forceprotectionplansandhowtocoordinatewithhostnationworkers.

TheprogramhaslackedthefundingtocompletesomeoftherelevantMOEs,buthasdocumentedbase-linepublichealthratessuchasmalnutrition.Italsohasassistedthehostnationinevaluationofeffectivenessofprogramssuchasimmunizationsandmicronutrientsupplementation.Preandpost-deployment testshavedocumented thatparticipantsgainedsignificantlymoreknowledge through


actualdeploymentasopposedtoapurelydidacticlearningprogram.13Italsodemonstratedsignificantpositivechangeinattitudessuchasparticipants’confidenceinabilitytodeployforahumanitarianoperationandanincreasedrespectforhealthworkersindevelopingnations.

ActualHCAexpendituresarefarlowerperparticipantthanatypicaltraditionalshort-termclinicMEDCAP.Costsarekeptlowbyhavingteamstayinausterelodgingsuchaslocalhealthcentersandbyusingfewermedications.Theprogramalsoutilizesmedicalresearchgrantstofundmanyoftheactivitiesandhasenteredintoanagreementwithalocalnon-governmentorganizationstoassistteams.

Conclusion

MilitaryMedicshavebeentalkingaboutimprovingtheHCAprogramforyears.WithcurrentemphasisonSSTROasoutlinedbyDoDDirective3000.05,itistimetore-structurethisprogramtomeettoday’ssecurityandtrainingneeds.Thesimpledeploy-doshort-termcare-redeploymodelmaynotprovideU.S.militarymedicswithalloftheskillstheyneedtohaveameaningfulimpactinSSTRO.IncrementaltinkeringwithcurrentmedicalHCAprogramisunlikelytoachievetherequiredtransformation.

ThebiggestobstacletoimprovingtheHCAprogramisinstitutionalinertia,notfunding.Thefundsalreadyexist,theyjustneedtobeusedinamoreflexibleandsophisticatedmanner.Projecttracking,planning,andMOEinstitutionwillrequirefunding,butthesecostscanbeoffsetbydecreasedfundingformedicationsandincreasedsynergywithotherfundingsources.

To institute these changes, project managers and Geographic Command Surgeons will needgreatercontrolovermedicalHCAfundsincludingtheabilitytoapplyfundinginaflexiblefashion-payingforpeople,equipmentandmedicalsuppliesfromasinglesource.Thecurrentpracticeofstrictstove-pipingHCAfundsthroughtheindividualservicecomponentsofageographiccommanddoesnotallowforinter-servicecooperationandiscounterproductive.Asinglepotofmoneyunderthecontrolofthecommandsurgeonwhointurnsprovidesittotheleadagentforprojectexecutionwouldbeideal.

Thelinkbetweenhostnationhealthbenefit,U.S.trainingandhostnationsecurityneedsfurtherexploration.TrainingU.S.medicstosupportindigenoushealthinfrastructureshouldberecognizedasaprimarytrainingobjective.ProjectsthatsupportthehostnationwillteachmedicskeyprinciplesofSSTROandaremorelikelytoprovidealastinghealthbenefit.Providingalastinghealthbenefitwillenhancehostnationsecurity.SystematicdevelopmentofMOEswillprofessionalizetheHCAprogram and ensure that scarce training funds are used appropriately. Instituting this model willimprovehealth,buildlegitimacyofhostnationinstitutions,andimprovemilitarytraining-allofwhichwillimprovesecurityforU.S.andallies.

About the Author

LieutenantColonelDougLogeeisanArmyPediatricianwhoiscurrentlyassignedtoBrookeArmyMedicalCenterandisthedirectoroftheSanAntonioMilitaryPediatricCenter’scivilmilitary-medicaltrainingprograminHonduras.HehasparticipatedinfifteenHumanitarianCivicAssistancemissionsincludingworkinginareasaffectedbynaturaldisasterandlowintensityconflict.HeisaninstructorfortheMilitaryMedicalHumanitarianAssistanceCourseandhasstudiedPediatricsandPublicHealthatoverseaslocations.

________________________________________________________13. Lemmon,K.,Lynch,J.,Hartstein,B.,Lougee,D.,Unpublisheddata.


Cross-Cultural Considerations for the United States Security Cooperation in the Middle East

By Henry “Hank” Kron, Major, USA

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management TheformerCommanderofU.S.CentralCommand,GeneralTonyZinniprovidesafascinatingaccountofculturallybasedmisunderstandingatseniorlevelsinTomClancy’sbookBattle Ready.General Zinni describes how in his initial experience in the Middle East, Secretary of DefenseWilliam Cohen left a senior meeting in theArabian Gulf uncertain as to where his interlocutorsstood. SecretaryCohenofferedsuccinctexplanationsandcrisp requests forendorsementofU.S.militaryobjectivesintheregion.Frustratedbyhearinganythingbutdirectandclearresponsestohisagenda,GeneralZinniexplainshowheadvisedtheSecretaryofDefensethattheyactuallyhadreceivedendorsementsofourobjectiveinthosemeetings.Perplexed,SecretaryCohensaidhedidnothearanyendorsementsatall.1However,theculturallyastuteGeneralZinnipointedoutthesubtlemeaningofapartingphraseoffered toSecretaryCohen:“youmustalwaysknowthatwe’reyourfriends”.2 Vaguenesshadbeenused todeliberatelyavoidaclearlydefinedpositionwhichwouldhavecontaineduncomfortablecriticism.Theoperativeimplicationwasapositivereinforcementofthestrategicrelationship,therebyagreenlightwithoutsayingexactlyso.AnotherexampleofthetypicalindirectnessintheMiddleEast,butwhatwasreallymeantwasnotreadilyunderstood-evenbySecretaryofDefense.

Despite the fact that English was the common language, cultural rather than linguisticinterpretations defined the nature of the communication. From seniorU.S. government officialsondownto thearrayofU.S. forcesdeployed in theArabianGulf region implementing theentirespectrumofsecuritycooperationactivities,AmericansgrapplewiththesignificantimpactsofculturaldifferencesintheMiddleEast.3TypicalexamplesofmisunderstoodcommunicationintheMiddleEastare:theeverpoliteandpositiveresponsestorequeststhatreallymeansomethingelse;avoidanceofstraightforwardbluntcriticism,seeminglyirrationaldelaysthatbeliealackofconsensusamongdecisionmakers;thereluctanceofdetailedlongrangeplanning,theinexplicableavoidancetocommittoobviousrequirementsaccordingtoourneedsassessments.TheseareafewexamplesofsituationsthatfrequentlypresentthemselvestoAmericansintheregion.Despiteourlongandsuccessfulhistoryofengagementintheregion,manyAmericanscontinuetomisunderstandtherealmeaningsbehindtheseforeignbehaviors.Theuniquecontextofinterpersonalcommunicationinconductingsecurity

________________________________________________________1. GeneralAnthonyZinnilateronpointsoutthatSecretaryCohencommittedhimselftounderstandingtheMiddleEasterncultureandconnectingtothepeopleintheregion.TheincidentrecountedinBattle Ready happenedearlyinSecretaryCohen’stenure.SecretaryCohenbecameadmiredforspendingtimeoutthereandlearningtheculture.2. TomClancy,Battle Ready with General Tony Zinni Ret., (Putnman,NewYork,2004),pp.308-309.3. In thisdiscussion, the termMiddleEast isdefinedas tohsepeopleswhosemother tongue isArabic,and/orsocietieswithIslamictraditionsasthepredominantbasisofculturalvalues.Whileethnicallyandsomewhatculturallydifferent,theTurks,Iranians,andAfghansarealsoincludedinthiscategory.So,thisdefinitionofMiddleEastcanextendwellintoboththeEUCOMandwellintoCENTCOMAreasofResponsibility(AoR).Forinstance,intheCENTCOMAor,thefourcountriesthatcomprisetheCentralAsianStates,despitetheirTurkicheritageandintheinstanceofTajikistan-aFarsilineage,haveevolvedintohybridculturescombiningthelegacyoftheCentralAsiansteppetribeswithrecentRussianinfluences.ThesocietiesoftheIndiansubcontinent,despitetheirrobustIslamicidentities,possessuniqueculturesthatincorporatetheSouth-WestAsianculturewithBritishtraditions.MarioniteandCopticChristiansintheLevantand“Misir”(Egypt)whosemothertongueisArabicwilltendtoexhibitmostlythesameculturallybasedcommunicationpatternsastheirMuslimbretheren.LikewiseArabicspeakingpeoplesacrosstheMahgrebandsub-SaharaAfricawillalsogenerallysharethesameculturallybasedcommunicationpatternsaspeoplesintheArabianpeninsulaandMesopotamia.


cooperationactivitiespresentsopportunitiesforustoacquireimprovedskillsinunderstandingthementalitiesandmeaningofourMiddleEasternpartners. Weneed toconstantlywork toenhanceourcross-culturalcomprehensionlevelstomoreeffectivelyinteractwithourforeignpartnersintheMiddleEast.

TheUnitedStatesDepartmentofDefenseprofessionalswhoengagewithourMiddleEasternpartners are generally well prepared to deal with the obvious cultural differences. U.S. servicemembers and particularly those involved in implementing security cooperation activities in theMiddleEastreceiveeffective“culturalawareness”training,butthescopeanddepthisprimarilytoavoidembarrassingsocialoffenses.U.S.securitycooperationimplementorsaresensitizedtoIslamicpracticesandtraditionalMiddleEastnorms.Theaimistodemonstrateourrespectforfundamentalvaluesintheregionsothatwecanestablishcrediblerelationshipsthatsupportourmutualinterests.Americanpersonnelintheregiongenerallyknowabout:inappropriateuseofthelefthand,aresensitiveto avoid compromising situations among mixed genders, adjust well to the enhanced restrictionsduringRamadan,andunderstandwhat’sgoingonwhenhearing thecalls toprayerfive timesperday.

However,ashighlightedinthepassagefromTomClancy’s,Battle Ready�,eventhemostseniorU.S.officialscanthoroughlymisreadthetruemeaningsconveyedtousinEnglishbyourMiddleEasternfriendsandallies.OftentimessubtlecuesandhintsgounrecognizedwhileAmericansengagewithMiddleEasterners.Thisisgenerallyduetomisunderstandingsofculturallybasedassumptions.Our security cooperation personnel encounter many subtle and foreign forms of verbal and non-verbal communication that are misinterpreted and or unnoticed, resulting in lost opportunities toeffectively engage. There are many types of situations where less than effective cross-culturalcommunicationcandirectlyandadverselyaffectexpectationsandimpacttheoutcomesofsecurityassistanceactivities.Moreover,inlargepartbecauseoftheintangiblenatureofthissubjectmatter,well intended after action-reviews tend to overlook the impacts, the contributing causes, and theresulting lost opportunities. Cross-Cultural misunderstandings often contribute to misunderstoodintentions,dilutedexplainactions,alteredperceptions,and inmanyinstancessignificantly impactmutual expectations and outcomes. Moreover, cultural misunderstandings and the impacts theycangeneratefrequentlyoccurasunrecognizedfactors-primarilyontheAmericanside.Giventheimportanceof securitycooperation incontributing towardsour strategicobjectives in theWaronTerrorism, exploiting any and every opportunity to become more effective in understanding ourpartnersintheMiddleEastbecomesatoppriority.

Oncewehaveacknowledgedthat therearesituationsin theMiddleEast thatpresentforeignandsubtleformsofcommunicationwhichwemaymisinterpret.Wecanthenworktogainadeeperunderstandingand improveourcross-culturalcomprehension level. Tobetterunderstandwhy, tomorereliablypredictwhen,andtomoreeffectivelymanageexpectationsrequiresanin-depthlookintothemotivationsthatdrivebehaviorandthecommunicationpatternsthattendtoemergewhichreinforcethosemotivations.Wecanthenobservethedifferencesincross-culturalcommunicationintheMiddleEastandmoreeffectivelydefinetherealmeaningsconveyedincommunication.

In working to improve our knowledge, skills and abilities to better understand the variousnuancedmeaningsinMiddleEasternculturalcontexts,wefirstneedtobecomemoreattunedtowhatismeant,ratherthanjustwhatissaid.Inlearningtoreadthemeaningswefirstneedtounderstandthebasicmotivationsof theactions. Recognizingandappropriately interpreting the fundamentalmotivationswhichdrivemeaningsdependsonknowingaboutthecoreethosoftheculture.Wewill

________________________________________________________�. TomClancy,Battle Ready with General Tony Zinni Ret., (Putnman,NewYork,200�).


address someof thekeydriversofmotivationandbehaviors in theMiddleEastbypeelingbacktheonionofreligiousimperatives,values,traditions,andattitudes.Thenwewillhighlightpivotalbehaviorpatternsthatreinforcethosevalues.Wewillthenuseaseriesofcross-culturaldialoguestoexhibithowAmericansandMiddleEasternersusedifferentmentalitiestoapproachthesametopicsofdiscussion.Progresstowardsimprovedcross-culturalcommunications,requiresfactoringinnewconsiderationswhile interpretingmeaning in interpersonal engagements.And finally,we need torealizethatittakesongoingpracticeandexperiencetoimprovecross-culturalcommunicationskills.

Culturaladjustmentandgainingenhancedcross-culturalcommunicationskillsisamoreelusiveeffortthanwemightinitiallyconsider.Effectivecross-culturalengagementrequiresafocusedandraisedcomprehensionof foreignandnuancedcommunications,coupledwithpracticalexperienceovertime.Further,complicatingmatters,assessingeffectivecross-culturalcommunicationsisalsoadifficulteffort.Howwasthisparticular“blendofcircumstances”reachedandwhatcouldhavebeenarefrustratingquestionstoaddress.Outcomesaremorereliablemeasurementsofeffectiveness,butinter-personalrelationshipsandcross-culturalcommunicationsdefieshardevidenceofeffectiveness.Thiscontributestolessemphasisontheintangibleaspectsofinter-personalrelationshipsdespiteourrecognitionoftheimportanceofthosedynamics.Weknowitisimportanttodrinkteaandengageincasualconversation,butitisachoreformostAmericansandmanydonotrealizethedepthandbreadthofmeaningsintheinformationexchangedwhile“shootingthebreeze”.

Confuciussaid“Allpeoplearethesame,itisonlytheirhabitsthataredifferent.”Inapracticalsense, cultural adjustment to different habits suggests adjustment not to culture but to behavior.Cultureisanabstractionthatcanbeappreciatedintellectually,butbehavioristhekeymanifestationofculturethatweencounter,experience,anddealwith5.Bothverbalandnon-verbalcommunicationareimportantbehaviorsincomprehendingtheactualmeaningconveyedinagivencontext.Reallyunderstandingkeydimensionsofwhat’sgoingon in agiven situationbywhat is termed readingbetweenthelinescanbeavague,intangible,anduncertaineffort-evenwithinone’sownoperatingenvironment, let alone in a foreign context. Trying to detect the real meaning of what is beingcommunicatedoftenreliesonunfamiliarcuewordsandphrases,aswellasallsortsofbodylanguage.Furthercomplicatingthiseffort,definingthetruemeaningofamessagecanalsobehingeduponwhatisnotsaid,orhowintenselysomethingissaid,andwhensomethingissaidinagivencontext.

Muchofthiscross-culturalmisunderstandingisduetorelianceonexpectationsbasedonsocialconditioning.Thefamiliarterm“ethnocentrism”pointstouniversaltendenciesforpeopletoevaluateforeignbehaviorbythestandardofone’sownculture.Weareconditionedfromoursocialenvironmenttoexpectandassumecertainmeaningsingivensituations.Ourculturalupbringingprovidesuswithaframeofreferencethatweunconsciouslyusetointerpretsituations.However,werecognizethatforeignculturesproduce,insomeinstances,vastlydifferenthabitsandpatternsofactiontoconveydifferentmeanings.Theoldproverbnotwithstanding,wecanputourselvesinsomeoneelse’sshoes,butitisstillourownfeetwefeel.6 AusefulwaytoidentifyanddefinethedifferencesinMiddle

________________________________________________________5. CraigStorti,The Art of Corssing Cultures,Yarmouth,Main,1989,p.14.6. Ibid,p.51.


EasterncommunicationpatternsistoalsorecognizeAmericanbehaviorpatternsandtheunderlyingAmericanculturalbasisforcommunicatingandcomprehendingsituations.7

Americanpractitionersinthefieldcanworktoraiseawarenessofprobabledifferencesinmeaningand over time understand the coded hints, the underlying, oblique, and indirect subtle meaningsconveyedbyMiddleEasterners.However,weneedtorealizethatthereisnoconsistentlyapplicableformulatodiscernmeaningineverysetofcircumstances.Thereisnoabsoluteexplanationthatcanbeapplied toeverysituation. Eachsituation includesparticipantswith individual traitsandeachsituationcarriesauniquecontext thatdefineswhatmeaningandresponsesareappropriateforthepeopleengaged.

The cross-cultural dialogues in following paragraphs will illustrate and contrast the MiddleEasternandAmerican“mentality”.TheideahereistoidentifysomekeyculturallybasedassumptionsintheMiddleEastthatdrivesdifferentbehavior.Cross-culturaldialoguesareusefultoolstohighlighthowdifferentculturalconditioningaffectsinterpersonalbehaviors.Thedialoguesshowthatcultureaffectsmeaningandthatonceawareofthemotivationsandsubtleties,wecanworktoimproveourunderstandingofactualintentions,andreducethepitfallsoffalseexpectations.Theexplanationsofthedialoguescontaingeneralizations.Culturalgeneralizationsmaybeaccurateaboutwidergroups,but would never be wholly trueof particular individuals. Individuals encountered in theMiddleEastwilldisplayabroadrangeofcharacteristicsthatmayormaynotconformtoanyextenttothetypical generalizations. In particular,military officials in theMiddleEast generally represent aneliteprogressiveclasswithin their society. Mostof themilitaryofficials in theMiddleEastwhoare specially selected to interact withAmericans have either already served overseas or possessexperienceinteractingwithforeigners.Assuch,theytendtohaveadjustedtheirowncross-culturalcommunicationskillstobetterinteractwithAmericans.Consequently,theMiddleEasternofficial’swaysofcommunicatingwithAmericanswillinvariablybedifferentthanthegardenvarietymerchantin thebazaar. Nonetheless,a lifetimeofculturalconditioningwillcontinuetohaveacompellingdriveuponthemotivationsandexpressionsthatMiddleEasternofficialswillexhibit.

Thereisanunderlyingethos-asharedcoreofassumptionsaboutpeopleandtheworldthatMiddleEasternerswill continue toexperienceandexpress. It is thesecoreculturallydrivenmotivationsandcommunicationpatternsthatarekeytounderstandingcontextandmeaning.HighlightingtheunderlyingMiddleEasternculturalethosthatmotivatesanddeterminesbehaviorpattersprovidesuswithabasisofexplanationofthesupportingbehaviors.Core Middle Eastern Ethos • Attheendoftheday,God,notdetailedplanningdeterminesoutcomes(fate)

• Avoidshame-preservethecollectivehonor(groupidentity)

________________________________________________________7. Wedevelopournotionsofhowtobehaveandinterpretsituationsfromoutupbringing.Weinternalizethesebehaviorsandmeaningstothepointwheretheybecomeunconsciousandinstinctual.Whatweknowandunderstandiswhatwehavetakeninandhasbeenreinforcedfromourexperiences.ButtheworldweobserveandthebehaviorsweinternalizearenotexactlythesameasMohammed’s.IntheU.S.,parentsteachtheirchildren:thatitisgoodtobeanindividual;selfreliance;saywhatyoumeanandmeanwhatyousay;wherethereisawill,thereisaway;hardworkcantakeyouwhereveryouwanttogo;andthatonceyouaregrownup,youaloneareresponsibleforyouractions.InMohammed’sworld,kidslearnto:identifythemselvesthroughthegroup;dependonothersastheydependonyou;avoiddirectinterpersonalconfrontations;andthatGod’swillisparamount.Theselearnedculturalattitudesareacquiredovertimeprimarilyintheformativeyears.Mostpeoplecannotevenexplainwhytheybehaveorthinkincertainways.Thisisalsopartofthereasonwhyweprojectourownnormsontopeopleofothercultures.Ifwedonotrememberformallylearningtheseways,itmusthavebeeninbornandthereforeuniversallyhuman.Anotherreasonweattributeourownnormstoforeignersisthatpeoplewehaveencounteredhaveconsistentlybehavedaccordingtoourexpectationssowhyinterpretthingsanyotherway?


• Obligationstoalwaysremaincourteous,polite,respectful,andhospitable

• Requirementstoprotectthevirtuesofourwomen8

• Preserve and enhance the stature of history and reputation - of family, clan, tribe, region,ethnicity,thoselikeus[statesarethenewestlink]

Someofthesupportingbehaviorpatternsarelistedbelow.

• Exaggeratedflattery isanexpectation. Reducedquantitiessubtlysignalscriticism. Absenceofanyflatterysilenceisthunderouslymeaningfulanddevastating.

• Identityliesinmembershipofasocialgroup.Thegrouptakesthecredit,sothegroup getstheflattery,nottheindividual.Overdoingindividualflatteryinvitesjealousies fromothers.Intentionallyover-exaggeratedflatterytoanindividualsignalsanintent towishbadtidingsuponthem.

• Since my team (family, clan, tribe, neighborhood, region, sect, nation, country) is everything, respecting the hierarchy is vital, and inter-personal relationships are approached through cooperation, group support and preserving appearances. Embarrassing others openly, publicly, and directly by competition and slander is reservedforoutsiders.

• Workingthenetwork.Raiseandreducestature-praiseandcriticize-viaintermediaries andemissaries.Whoisdoingit(whotheyareinthehierarchy)signalshowheavythe meaningis.

• Silence speaks volumes. The absence of what would otherwise be said can be thunderouslymeaningful.Nocomment-nojoy-noshame.

• Onealwaysknows-knowshowtodoit,knowssomeonewhocandoit.Knowing things and knowing people demonstrates individual abilities and personal stature. LongdiatribesaboutrelatedtopicscanmeanIreallydon’tknowaboutthatsubject, butlookhowmuchIdoknowaboutthis-soyou’llcontinuetorespectme.

• Smilesandhospitableofferingsmean little substantively. Strangersand foreigners mustreceivemore.Familiarfacescangaugetheirstandingbyhowmuchtheyreceive relativetopreviousinstancesandothers.

• The interpersonal relationship matters. Friendship sows trust, respect, and mutual obligationsforsupport.Thus,theneedtolookeachotherstraightintheeyes,smell one’s breath and body odor, touch hands and arms - to connect viscerally. Middle Easternershavehighlyhonedskillsatreadingandjudgingpeople.

• MiddleEasternerscarrythereputationoftheirentiregroup.So,who’sselectedtobe there “who’swho” signals “what’swhat”. Someonewith the reputation and clout needstobetheretohaveanythingdone.“Experts”withnocloutmeansnoimportance. Itisnotunliketheaxiom:“Itisnotwhatyouknow,butwhoyouknow...”

________________________________________________________8. Ourwomencanbeunderstoodintermsofpriorityandintensitybyrelationshipinthevariousgroupstowhichfamilyreputation,obligationsofprotection,andkindrednessisascribed.Therefore,inconcentriccirclesofdecreasingprioritieswecanseeMiddleEasternmalesfeelingprotectiveforfemalesof:theirimmediatehousehold,extendedfamily,neighborhood,tribe,province,country,region,ethnicity,religion,andfinallyanywomanindistress.


Conceptual Comparisons of American and Middle Eastern Cultural Attributes American MiddleEastern

Actionoriented Interactionoriented

Goaloriented Beingoriented

Directandopen Indirectandtactful

Disclosing Facesaving

Optimistic Fatalistic

Individualorientation Interdependentorientation9

SymmetricalRelationships ComplimentaryRelationships

(age,status) (age/status)

Doonethingatatime Jugglemanythingsatonce

Concentrateonthejob Distractionsandinterruptionsok

Sticktodeadlinesandschedules Timecommitmentsareobjectives

Focusedonthejob Focusedonthepeople

Reluctanttoborroworlend Oftenandeasilyborrowandlend

Avoidcrossingprivacyboundaries Minimalprivacyboundarieswith family/friends/closeassociates

Accustomedtoshorttermrelationships Tendencytowardslifetime relationships10

The following situationbaseddialoguesare intended to illustrate typical culturaldifferencesandhowAmericansandMiddleEasternerscanapproachthesamesituationfromentirelydifferentviewpoints. For some readers, the subtle cuesandmeaningsconveyedby theMiddleEasternerswillbeevidentandstark.However,weneedtoremindourselvesthatwhatmayseemobvioustocomprehendinanacademicenvironmentcanbeeasilymisreadormissedaltogetherwhileengaginginaforeignanddistractingsetofcircumstancesontheground.

Situation: Just Trying to Help -Versus- I Need A Straight Shooter Who’ll Get It DoneIronMike:Isawtheofficialinthecustomsofficetoday.Abdullah:Oh,good.IronMike:HesaidyouneverspoketohimaboutreleasingthatU.S.ForeignMilitarySales(FMS)equipment.Abdullah:I’mverysorry,sir.IronMike:Infact,hesaidhe’sneverheardofyou.Abdullah:Itispossible,sir.

________________________________________________________9. HasanDindi,MaijaGazur,WayneGazur,AysenDindi,Turkish Culture for Americans, InternationalConcepts,Boulder,Colorado,1989,pp.V-VI.10. EdardT.HallandMildredReedHall,Understanding Cultural Differences,AnchorPressDoubleday,1977,p.15.


IronMike:ButwhenIaskedyouifyouknewhimandifyoucouldhelp,yousaidyoucould.Abdullah:Oh,yes,sir.IronMike:Butitwasn’ttrue.Youdon’tknowhimandyoudidn’teventalktohim.Abdullah:Excusemesir,butIwasonlytryingtohelp. ForIronMike,Abdullahisnotonlyineffective,butmaybeconsideredaliar!Hesaidheknewthecustomsofficialandhecouldhelp.Abdullahdidnotknowthecustomsofficial-thereforehelied.Howeverinhisworld,Abdullahisobligedtogivehisbossapositiveresponse-whetherornothecanactuallydeliver.AnotherArabwouldunderstandthatAbdullah’spositiveresponseshouldnotbetakenliterally-thatheactuallyknowsthemaninthecustomsofficeandisgoingtobeabletodosomething.Itisunderstoodthathe’swillingtotrytohelpeitherbecauseitishisjobandhissuperiorhastaskedhim,or in another similar situation because a friend has asked for help. Abdullahfiguresthathemayknowsomebody thatknows thecustomsofficialandsomebodycanhavesomepull. Abdullahwillusehisnetworkof friends tohelp.! Abdullahalsoexpectssometimetogetthisnetworkingdoneandifaftersometime,hecan’tthenheexpectshisbosstorealizethathewasn’tabletodoitandheshouldlookforanotheralternative-withoutdirectconfrontation.Instead,IronMikedirectlyconfrontsAbdullahwiththefailureandevenimplieshe’saliar.ItisameasureofAbdullah’sgoodmannersthathemaintainshiscomposureand respectfulness. IfotherArabshadbeenwitness to IronMike’sconfrontationrevealingAbdullah’sdeficiencies,theshamefactorwouldhaveaseriousimpactonAbdullah.ItwouldbenosurprisetootherArabsinthatcase,ifAbdullahgraduallywithdrewhiseffortsandfoundapolitereasontofindemploymentelsewhere.IronMikewouldhavenoclueastowhyhelostagoodman.11

Situation: A Bird In the Hand - Versus - One Well Done or Two Half BakedMohammed:Sir,wouldyouliketoseethetwonewofficeswe’vecompleted?IronMike:Offices?Ithoughtweagreedtobuildoneofficeand,iftherewereanyfundsleftoverattheendofthefiscalyear,wewouldbuyequipmentfortheoneoffice.Mohammed:Yes,buttherewasenoughmoneytobuildtwoofficesatonce.IronMike:But,isthereanymoneyleftovertoequiptheoffices?Mohammed:Unfortunately,no,sir.IronMike:Thenwecan’tusethem!Mohammed:Notpresently,butisn’titgood?Weusedallthemoney! IronMikethinksMohammediscookingupsomethingonthesideorisirresponsiblewith government funds, or just plain irrational. Mohammed’s view is completelydifferentyetjustasrationalanddutifulasIronMike’s.Mohammedwouldn’tthinktorely on left overmoney to remain available to fund office equipment. It is better touseup all themoney at oncewhile youhave it available and then request additionalmoneyforthenecessaryequipmenttocompletetheoveralleffort.Nowyouhavetwoofficesand the fundingsource isunderpressure toequipat leastone ifnot two. Allthisisbasedonoperatingassumptionsofpredictabilityandreliabilityofthesystem,the

________________________________________________________11. CraigStorti,Cross-Cultural Dislogues, InterculturalPress,YarmouthMaine,199�,p.112.


government,andeveninrealityingeneral.IronMiketrusthissystemandgovernment,andasanAmericanhasgrownupwithprincipleslike:Makeithappen,wherethere’sa will there’s a way, there’s nothing we can’t do . . . ! Government services aretransparent, lawabiding, and for thebenefitof citizens regardlessofwho’s involved. Mohammedhasnosuchnotionsofaccountabilityingovernmentorpredictabilityoveroutcomes in life.Fatedetermineseverythingandifyouhave ityouuse itor lose it.12

Situation: Feasibility - The Facts or the ManIronMike:IthinkweshouldexaminethefeasibilitystudyfortheproposedMinistrybuilding.Nasser:Iagree,sir.Perhapswecanbeginbydiscussingwhothedirectoroftheprojectwillbe.IronMike:Thatwillhavetobedecided,ofcourse.Butfirstwehavetoseeiftheprojectisdoable.Nasser:Yes,sir,that’sexactlymypoint. Iron Mike wants to examine the substance of the new project for a Ministrybuilding to see if it is executable. Nasser is also interested in determining ifthe project is doable, but not by examining the facts contained in the feasibilitystudy. He will know if it is really going to happen based on who’s put in charge ofthe project. If someone of influence and authority is put in charge, then it meanstheMinistry takes the project seriously. If a relativelyminor officialwith no cloutis selected to run theproject -nomatterhowexperthemaybe - it isagoodbet theprojectwillnevergetoffthegroundregardlessofhowwellengineeredtheplansare.13

Situation: A Very Persuasive Decision BriefIronMike:So,Hamad,howdoyouthinkthebriefingwas?Hamad:Sir,BrigadierAliwasveryimpressed.Yourpresentationwasclear,organized,andinformative.Iron Mike: Well we worked really hard to capture all the data - we focused on therelevantmetrics.Hamad:Yes,thebriefinghadalotofinformation.IronMike:Yes,butItisbeenawhileandnofeedbackordecisionfromBrigadierAli.Hamad:IthinktheBrigadiermayhavethoughttherewassomethingmissing,thatyouwerenotveryinvolvedorenthusiasticabouttheproject.IronMike:Idon’tknowwhatelseIcouldhavedone,thefactsreallyspeakforthemselvesinproject. ForIronMike,thecoldhardfactsdon’tlie.Youcan’targuewiththestatistics.Stickto thenumbersandwecan’tgowrong. BrigadierAli appreciates facts too,but factsarenotgoingto implement theproject. This isIronMike’sprojectandBrigadierAliisthinkinghecertainlyhashisinformationinorder,he’smadeapersuasivecaseonthe

________________________________________________________12. Ibid.,p.7813. Ibid.,p.84.


meritsofthefacts.ButwhoisIronMike.Wecantrustfactsonpaper.BrigadierAliwantsawarmandfuzzyaboutIronMike-thathe’scommittedtocompletetheprojectasoutlined.Inadditiontothefacts,BrigadierAliwantstoseesomethingofIronMike-theman-inhisbriefing,butIronMikedidn’tcomeoutfrombehindhisnumbers.InsteadofembarrassingIronMikebyopenlydiscussinghisrational,BrigadierAliwouldprefertochoosesilenceasasignalthathe’snotconvincedtogivetheprojecttoIronMike.IfIronMikepressedforananswer,apoliteyetseeminglyobliquereasonwouldbegivenbyBrigadierAli’sintermediariesthatwouldfurtherconfoundIronMike.1�

Situation: The Plan is Under StudyIronMike:Abdulsalam,whatdidyouthinkofthenewplan?Abdulsalam:Seemsveryfine,butI’mstillstudyingit,weneedtobecertain.IronMike:Stillstudyingitafterthreeweeks?Itisnotthatcomplicated!Abdulsalam:Thereareoneortwoaspectsthatmightbeaproblem.IronMike:Oh,Iknowthat,butweshouldputtheplanintoactionandworkthebugsoutlater.Abdulsalam:Seriously? IronMike is ready toadoptnewconcepts intoactionandmakeadjustmentsonceimplemented. Manyotherculturesareskepticalofnewthings,“There’snothingnewunderthesun.”Thepresumptioniswhat’sworkedisbetterthanriskingfailure.Whenalltheglitchesareaddressedintheplan,thenAbdulsalammaybemoreinclinedtoinitiateatrailrun.Trialanderrorisnotthepreferredwaytooperate.Americansbelieveifyoufallonyourface,yougetup.Manyotherculturesfeelifyoufallonyourface,nooneeverforgetsthesightofyousprawledinthemud.15

Situation: Wait Here - Versus - I’ll Do It Myself on the WayIronMike:Khalid,Iwaswonderingifmyvehiclewasreadyfromtheserviceshopdownthestreetyet?Khalid:Yes,sir.Theshopcalledandyourcarisready.IronMike:Great.I’llgopickitup.Khalid:Oh,nosir!I’llsendadrivertopickitupandbringithereforyou.IronMike:Noneedtopullsomeoneoutoftheofficeforthat.Itisonmywayanyway.Khalid:Please,sir.Youwaithereanddrinksometea.I’llhavethecarhererightaway. IronMikeisunawareoftheimageandstatushecarriesaroundinthisenvironment.TheimageoftheAmericanofficerinchargewalkingdownthestreettothegaragetotalkwiththemechanicstogethisowncarsignalstothoseinthisenvironmentthathisofficeisindisarray,hisdriversandassistantsareabsent,andhehasnoclouttodoanythingaboutit.NotonlydoesthisreflectbadlyonIronMikeintheeyesofthe

________________________________________________________1�. Iid.,p.121.15 Ibid.,p.22..


locals,butallthelocalsworkinginhisofficewouldneverliveitdowntoothersthattheyallowedsuchanindiscretiontohappen.16

Situation: Performance Evaluation - Constructive CriticismIronMike:Khalil,let’sgooveryoursemi-annualperformanceevaluation.Khalil:Whateveryouthink,sir.IronMike:Asyouknow,you’reperformingwelloverall.TherearejustafewareasforimprovementI’dliketodiscusswithyou.Khalil:Isee.IronMike:Oneisinwriting,whichisn’teasyforyou,isit?Khalil:No,sir.IronMike:Andtheotherisinidentifyingtrainingneeds.Yourstaffcouldusemorecomputertraining.Khalil:Yes.IronMike:Anyway,itisallwrittenhereinthereport.Youcanreaditforyourself.Otherwise,noseriousproblems.Khalil:I’mverysorrytodisappointyou,sir. The imperativesofhonor andavoidanceof shamemeans that criticismhas tobehandledverydelicately in theMiddleEast. Oftentimes, a lackof overdonepraise issufficient to signal dissatisfaction. When unavoidable, criticism should be expressedwiththeutmostdiscretionandindirection.IronMikewasactuallypleasedwithKhalil’sperformanceandsaidso-once,andclosedwith“otherwisenoproblems.”AnAmericanwouldprobablyreadthatevaluationjustforwhatIronMikemeant.ForKhalil,thebriefunderstatedpraisecoupledwithadirectfocusonspellingoutthedeficienciesmeanthisbossthoughthe’sperformingbadly.KhalilnaturallyassumesthatIronMikewillbendoverbackwardstobesensitiveaboutKhalil’ssenseofselfimage,honor,andreputation.IfthatwasthebestIronMikecoulddotopraisehimandifthatrepresentsthebestfaceIronMikecouldputonthesituation;thenKhalil’sreadwasthingsarebadforhimthere.If IronMikehadquickly slipped the critique into amajorityof the timehighlightingKhalil’s successes, thenKhalilwouldhavebeenable to stomach thecriticism. Now,Iron Mike has no clue that Khalil’s morale is shot after that performance evaluation. ThatterriblyinsensitivesessionwillbethemainfamilytopicofdiscussionforalongtimeinKahlil’shouse.ItwouldbenosurprisetoanotherArabifsoonenoughKhalil’sperformancereallydropsoffandhesoonfindsanewplacetowork.Khalilwouldoffera plausible andpolite reason tofind employment elsewhere yetwould remainon thefriendliestofterms.IronMikewillstillhavenoclueastoreallywhyhelostsuchagoodman.17

Situation: She’s The Best Man For the JobIronMike:Khalid,Eventhoughthehostnationseniorleadershippledgedtofullysupportourinvestigation,eversinceIsentinLieutenantJanetoinvestigatetheincident,thehostnationsupporthasdeclined.Aretheystonewallingbecauseofgender?

________________________________________________________16. Iid.,p.64.17. Ibid.,p.69..


Khalid:Sir,Thereareseveralfemaleforensicofficersinthemilitaryhere.IronMike:Well,LieutenantJaneistheverybestforensicexpertwehave.Thatshouldhavesignaledourpriorityonthis.Khalid:I’msureeveryonerecognizeshertechnicalexpertise.AlthoughIronMikeperceivesapassive-aggressivereactiontoassigningLieutenantJanetothecase,hecan’tseeanyotherreasonthangenderbiasasthecauseofhostnationindifferencetoher.IronMikesentinthebestexperthehadtoworkthecase.Thehostnationreactiondoesn’tmakesense.Khalidunderstandsthatthelackofenthusiasmbythe host nation to pursue the case is because an unknown officer of very young ageshoweduponthescenewithoutIronMike’spersonalendorsementontheground.Herexpertisenotwithstanding,heryouthandlackofintroductionbyatrustedsenior,signalsalackofpriorityintheeyesofthelocals.

Situation: The “Inshallah”IronMike:Mohammed,willyoubeheretomorrowtojoinusfordinner,andwillyoubringyourfriendstooplease?Mohammed:Yes,-Inshallah!IronMike:We’llexpecttoseeyouandyourfriendsherefordinnertomorrowat19:00.Mohammed: Yes,Mike, Inshallah. Dinnerwithyou andour friends. Itwill beourpleasure! IronMikehasheardoftherealmeaningofInshallah-“ifitisGodwill”,itreallymeansnot likely tohappen. So, IronMikewill now invite another group for dinnerbecausehedoesn’texpectMohammedtoshow. InMohammed’scontext,Inshallahmustbeadded-asreinforcementofhispersonalcommitments.Hesaidyes-twice,andconfirmedyesisfordinner-withfriends.Althoughhewilldoeverythinghecantoattend,itisdoubtfulhewouldshowuppreciselyat19:00sharp. IronMike isprobably in fora surprisewhenMohammedshowsat20:30andMikewillhavetoawkwardlymanagethesituationashehadinvitedanothercompetinggrouptothedinner.Themeaningof“Inshallah”canrangefromadefiniteyes-asinasubordinate’sresponsetoadirectorderfromasuperior,anuncertainmaybe,andeventoapolitedeflectionsignalingno.Thelocalenvironment,thecontextofthecircumstances,andthepeopleinvolvedwillalldeterminetheappropriateusage.

Situation: Getting to Know YouIronMike:Hassan,nowthatwe’llbeworkingtogetherascounterparts,Iwantedtoletyouknowaboutmybackground.I’vegotB.S.andM.Sdegreesinengineering,andhave18yearsexperienceintheU.S.ArmyCorpsofEngineers.I’vecompletedseveralmajorprojectsofthetypewe’reabouttoembarkontogether.Howaboutyou?Hassan:Sir,myfamilyisfromasectionofBaghdad-thatyouwouldprobablynotbefamiliarwith.MyuncleNasserspeaksexcellentEnglishandwouldliketomeetyou.ShallIarrangetohavemyUncleNassermeetyou? MikehasnoclueastothemeaningofHassan’sseeminglyofftargetresponse.MikewillprobablydriveonandseehowHassanperforms,butwhycouldn’tHassanjustrattleoffhiscredentialsandexperienceandwhatdoeshisfamily’slocationandhisunclehavetodowithitanyway?Ontheotherhand,HassanconsidersitveryinappropriatetotouthisowncredentialsdirectlytoMike.Hassantypicallydiscusseshisfamily’sbackground


andmostArabswouldinstantlyunderstandhisreputationbyhisfamilynameandhisbyhisneighborhood...HassandidrealizethatMikewouldn’tknowhisfamily’sreputationbymentioningthecityandneighborhood,sohethenproceededtosetupameetingforMikewithhisunclewhowouldrepresenthisfamilyandactasanintermediarywithMikeandopenlybragabouthisnephew’simpressiveengineeringcredentials.

Situation: The AgendaIronMike:Khalifa,Iseewhatyoumean,that’saveryimportantpoint,That’swhatweneedtofocusonbut...Khalifa:Sir,nowifIcouldexplainsomeofthedetails.IronMike:Iwishyouhadbroughtthistomyattentionearlierinthemeeting.Khalifa:Excuseme,sir?IronMike:Imean,thisissomethingweneedtolookattogetherveryclosely.But,we’vealreadyextendedourmeeting.Khalifa:Yes,ofcourse,sir.Butifyou’lljustbearwithmeafewmoments.IronMike:LetmeaskmysecretarytoputyouonmycalendarforFriday.Khalifa:Excuseme,sir?IronMike:Sowecancontinuethen..Khalifa:Youwantmetocomebackagain,onFriday? EventhoughIronMikerecognizes that they’regettingsomewhere,he’sunwillingtofurtherextendthemeetingandpreferstokeepthingsontrackratherthanupsettheschedule.Schedulesaremanmade,butoncewehaveaschedule,formanyofusA-Typehardchargers,itistheperson,nottheschedulethathastodotheaccommodating.Todootherwisemeansbeingunorganizedandundisciplined. Khalifa isoperatingoffofanothersetofassumptions.Thetimeandschedulesaremeanttobeaflexibleframeworktoorganize theday’sactivities. Whatcanafewmoreminutesof their timebeworthcomparedtoresolvingtheissue.18

Thefollowingexcerptshighlighthowcomplexcross-culturalinteractionscanbeandhowothersassumeAmericansareconditionedtorespond.

Knowledge and a Little Luck!

Sometimein1906IwaswalkingintheheatofthedaythroughtheBazaars.AsIpassedanArabCafé,innohostilitytomystrawhatbutdesiringtoshinebeforehisfriends,afellowcalledoutinArabic,“Godcurseyourfather,OEnglishman.”Iwasyoungthenandquickertempered,andcouldnotrefrainfromansweringinhisownlanguagethat“Iwouldalsocurseyourfatherifhewereinapositiontoinformmewhichofhismother’stwoandninetyadmirershisfatherhadbeen!”Iheardfootstepsbehindme,andslightlypickedupthepace,angrywithmyselfforcommittingthesinLordCromerwouldnotpardon-arowwiththeEgyptians.InafewsecondsIfeltahandoneacharm.“Mybrother,”saidtheoriginalhumorist,“returnanddrinkcoffeeandsmokewithus.Ididnotthink

________________________________________________________18. Iid.,p.121.


thatyourworshipknewArabic,stilllessthecorrectArabicabuse,andwewouldbenefitfurtherbyyourimportantthoughts.”

RonaldStorrs.“Orientations.19

ThoseAmericans,They’llFollowTheRules-EvenWhenThere’sNoGoodReasonTo!

OncewewereoutinaruralareainthemiddleofnowhereandsawanAmericancometoastopsign.Thoughhecouldseeinbothdirectionsformilesandsawnotrafficwascoming,hestillstopped!

TurkishExchangeStudentIn“ThereIsADifference.20

Profiling the Yanks

MacDonald’srestaurantsareprobablyagoodreflectionof theAmericancharacter. They’refast,efficient,theymakemoney,andthey’reclean.Ifthey’reloudandcrowdedandifthefoodiswastefullywrapped,packaged,boxed,andbagged...let’sfaceit,that’susAmericans.

AndyRooney“AFewMinutesWithAndyRooney”.21

Increasingeffectiveness incross-culturalcommunication involvesbecomingmoreattuned towhattherealmeaningisinasituation-whatismeantversuswhatissaid.WeneedtorecognizeourownAmerican-centricassumptionsandthendeliberatelyadjustourinterpretationstoouracquiredunderstandingsofMiddleEasternmotivations,culturalconditioning,assumptions,andsupportingbehaviors.Thechallengeisnotonlytobecomeequippedtodefinethesituationmoreappropriately-thatisaccordingtothelocals’viewpoint.Wealsoneedtoincreaseourperceptivenesstorecognizethebriefandsubtlecueswhileengaginginthesubstanceoftheagenda,andinvariablywhilefunctioningwithin a broader and distracting environment. Discerning the significance of various behaviorpatternscanbelikeacquiringanewlanguage.Whenwelistentosomeonespeakaforeignlanguagewetendtoonlyhearthosewordsthatseemfamiliar,andtherestisnoise.Similarly,inobservingforeignbehavior-includingEnglishspokeninaforeigncontext-wepickoutthoseactionsandthemeaningof thespokenEnglishanddefinewhat’sgoingonaccordingtoourownculturallybasedassumptions.Alltherest,richinmeaningtoeveryonebutus,isjustrandomundifferentiatedactionandutterances.Itisthesamewhenwecomeacrossawordwedon’tunderstandwhilereading.Weguessatthemeaningfromthecontext. FurthercomplicatingthischallengeistheMiddleEasternstyle of omission of input, or the deliberate timing or intensity of the input - all which impart asignificancethatisaltogetherabsentinAmericanformsofcommunication.Wealsoneedtobeawarethatthereisnotonlybehaviorthatwemisinterpretbecausethere’snocorrespondingculturalmeaningintheAmericancontext,butthereisbehaviorandspeechintheMiddleEastthatwedon’tevenpickuponatall.Thereis,quiteliterally,moretoaforeignculturethanmeetstheeye.Whilewecan’talwaystrustwhatwesee,ourobservationsremaintheprimarygaugetolearnaboutaforeignculture.Wesimplyhavetobeawarethatsomeofwhatweseemayonlybeintheeyesofthebeholder!22

In identifyingMiddleEasterncoreculturalethos,wegainan improvedunderstandingof thecommonmotivationsofbehavior.WecanrealizethatMiddleEasternmotivescanbeverydifferentthanAmerican“mentalities”.Peoplenaturallyassumethattheirinterpretationsofcontextandmeaning

________________________________________________________19. CraigStorti,The Art of Crossing Cultures,pp.85-86..20. Ibid.,p.112.21. Ibid.,p.113.22. Ibid.,p.81.


arecommoneverywhere.Therefore,itisacommontendencyforAmericanstodrawupontheirowndistinctAmericanframesofreferencetodefinemeaningincross-culturalsituations-andlikewisefor the inexperiencedMiddleEasterner. ThelistofkeyMiddleEasternvaluesandthehighlightsofvariousbehaviorsthattendtoemergeinsupportofthosevalues,provideabasistoexaminethecross-culturaldialogues.Cross-culturaldialoguescanbeaneffectivetooltoexhibitvastlydifferentmentalities expressed in key yet nuanced and subtle communications. The explanations of thedialogues-fromtheviewpointsoftheAmericanandMiddleEasternparticipants-offerinsightsasanewframeofreferencetodefinemeaningincertainsituations.

AmericanservicemembersconductingsecuritycooperationactivitieswithMiddleEasternersneed toremainmindful thatwe’veacquiredourownculturalconditioningover thecourseofourformative years into adulthood. We need to recognize that like learning a foreign language inadulthood,wegainproficiencybut our newlygainedknowledge, skills, and abilities to adjust toforeign contexts should be a continuous learning process. If approached as an ongoing effort toenhanceourcross-culturalcommunicationabilities,wecanexpecttoincreaseourunderstandingsofwhy,increaseourabilitytopredictwhen,andtherebyimproveourmanagementofimportantmutualexpectationsthatemergeintheuniqueinteractiveandpersonallydrivenfieldofsecuritycooperationactivities.

References

1. Clancy,Tom.Battle Ready with General Tony Zinni Ret,(Putnam,NewYork,2004),pp.308-309.

2. Storti,Craig.The Art of Crossing Cultures,(Yarmouth,Maine,1989),p.14.

3. Ibid,p.51

�. HasanDindi,MaijaGazur,WayneGazur,AysenDindi.Turkish Culture For Americans,(InternationalConcepts,Boulder,Colorado,1989),pp.V-VI.

5. Hall,EdwardT.andHall,MildredReed.,Understanding Cultural Differences,(AnchorPressDoubleday,1977),p.15.

6. Storti,Craig.Cross-Cultural Dialogues(InterculturalPress,YarmouthMaine,199�),p.112.

About the Author

MajorHankKronhasbeentheDirectorofMiddleEastStudiesatDISAMsinceAugust200�.InadditiontopresentingMiddleEastsubjectstovariouscoursesofferedatDISAM,heisaninstructorin SAO Operations, International Military Training, and U.S. Defense Acquisition Policies andProcedures.HeisaMiddleEastForeignAreaOfficerwithnineteenyearsofservice.HeservedasaPolitical-MilitaryStaffOfficeratCentralCommandHeadquarters. HehasaM.A.inNearEastStudiesfromPrinceton,andaB.A.SummaCumLaudefromCityUniversityofNewYorkinPoliticalScience.


Planning for the Security Assistance Organization: Or How Do We Get There From Here?

By Gary Taphorn

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

If you have served in a security assistance organization (SAO), the actions outlined above,whetherinwritingorexpressedorally,shouldsoundfamiliar.ThecommonthemeinallofthetaskersabovefromColonelShawkinaughisthattheyareshort-terminnature,theso-called50-metertargets.Aswithanyotherorganization, theSAO inevitablybecomespre-occupiedwithnear-term issues.While there is nothingwrongwith this, focusingon these actions to the exclusionof long rangeissuescanpotentiallybefruitless-orworse-counterproductive.Intoday’senvironmentwhereanincreasingnumberofSAOpersonnelareservingone-yearunaccompaniedtours,aten-weeksuspensetoprepareforthearrivalofMajorKummingmightseemlikeamid-termaction,wheninrealityitisamereblipontheradarscope.TheSAOmustbeequallyconcernedwiththeso-called�00-metertargets,thosegoalsoractionswhichwilllikelynothappenonhiswatch,butonthatofhissuccessor,orevenhissuccessoronceortwiceremoved.

This is thecrucialplanningfunctionof theSAO,inwhichithelps toshapetheorganizationandcapabilitiesofthehostnationmilitary,aswellasitscapabilityandwillingnesstoworkwiththeUnitedStatesonissuesofregionalorglobalsecurity.Planning Guidance Fortunately,thesystemhasplentyofsafeguardsandguidancetoaidColonelShawkinaughinhisplanningresponsibilities.BoththeDepartmentofState(DoS)andDepartmentofDefense(DoD)have,overtime,developedplanningprocesseswhichapplyuniformlyandgloballytoallembassiesandSAOs.Moreover,sincetheonsetoftheGlobalWaronTerror,DoSandDoDhavemoreclosely

MEMOFOR: AllPersonnel OfficeofDefenseCooperation AmericanEmbassyBandaria

FROM: ColonelButchShawkinaugh Chief,ODC

SUBJECT: SummaryofTaskersfromWeeklyODCStaffCall

1. UrgeBandarianAirForcetosignAmendment2toBN-C-YCYbeforeitexpires onthe28thofthemonth.

2. WorkwithBandarianTrainingDirectoratetoidentifyanEnglishlanguage qualifiedfieldgradeofficertoattendU.S.ArmyCommandandGeneralStaff Schoolbeforewelosethequota.

3. SetuphotelreservationsandrentalcararrangementsfortheHMMWV maintenancemobiletrainingteam(MTT)comingnextweek.

4. Takethenecessaryactionswithembassyhousing,theinternationalschool, andthecombatantcommandbudgetfolkstoaccommodateinboundMajor I.M.Kumming,thereplacementforMajorNuisance,whowillarriveinten weekswithfourchildren.


coordinatedtheirgoalsandprograms.Tothisend,andforthefirsttime,thetwodepartmentsconvenedatwo-daysecuritycooperationsummitinWashingtoninApril2006.

ThisarticleexaminesthefourplanningprocessesfortheSAOchief,onewithDoSandthreewithinDoD.ItalsodescribestheresultantdocumentsandexplainstheirbenefittotheSAOandtothebilateralrelationshipwiththehostnation.Eachplanningprocesswasdevelopedindependentlyandinresponsetoseparaterequirementsandeachoperatesonitsownannualcycle.Collectively,however,theymakeforacompletematrixofplanningguidancefortheSAOchief.Thefourprocessesareasfollows:

• TheMissionPerformancePlan(MPP)

• ThecountrycomponentoftheTheaterSecurityCooperationStrategy(TSCS)

• TheCombinedEducationandTrainingProgramPlan(CETPP)

• Theforeignmilitaryfinancing(FMF)andInternationalMilitaryEducationandTraining (IMET)BudgetFormulationandSubmissionWebToolThe Mission Performance Plan FrompersonalexperienceasaDefenseInstituteofSecurityAssistanceManagement(DISAM)instructor, the author can attest that most students bound for SAO billets are well aware of thecombatantcommander’stheatersecuritycooperationstrategy(TSCS).However,strikinglyfewhaveheardoftheMissionPerformancePlan(MPP)fortheirembassy.

Infact,theMPPismoreimportant.ItisthesingleplanningdocumentwithintheU.S.governmentthatdefinesournational interests inanygiven foreigncountry. TheMPPcoordinates theeffortsandestablishestheperformancemeasurementamongallU.S.governmentagenciesrepresentedontheembassycountry team(includingtheSAOandthedefenseattachéoffice)orwhichotherwisehaveinterestsinthatcountry.TheMPPisnotintendedtolimitthescopeoftheactivitiesoffederalagencies.Rather,itcreatesaframeworkforallagenciestodefinepriorities,articulatethegoalsandobjectivesof theirprograms,anddirectly relateprogramaccomplishments toagency-specificandgovernment-widestrategicgoals.TheMPPprocessisthusatrulyinteragencyactivity.

AteachU.S.embassy,theplaniscreatedbythecountryteamundertheleadershipofthechiefofmission,normallytheambassador.GuidanceprovidedtomembersofthecountryteamstressestheimportanceofcongruitybetweentheMPPandeachagency’sstrategicplan(forDoD,thecountrycomponentoftheTSCS).TheMPPaddressesnotonlyforeignpolicyandnationalsecurityissues,butalsoestablishesbenchmarksforinternalembassyadministration,staffing,andbudgetefficiencies.Finally, theMPPactsasa transmissiondocument for therequestofappropriatedfundsunder theDoS-managedforeignoperationsbudget.OfkeyinteresttoSAOchiefsaretherequestsforFMFandIMETfunding.

Uponapprovalbytheambassador,theMPPissenttotheDoSwhereitundergoesinteragencyreview.Allconcernedagencies,includingDoD,thenhavetheopportunitytoreviewandcommentoneachindividualcountryMPP.Eachofthemorethan180DoSmissionsaroundtheworldexecutesthisprocessannually.TheMPPsforfiscalyear2008weresubmittedtoDoSforreviewinFebruary,2006.Inpart,thisistomeetthetimelinesforthesubmissionoftheforeignoperationsbudgetrequesttotheCongress.Timelinesarediscussedinmoredetailbelow.

IndividualMPPsaretypicallyunclassifieddocuments,butaremarkedSensitiveButUnclassified(SBU),theDoSequivalentofForOfficialUseOnly(FOUO)and,assuch,mustbecontrolled.MPPsfollow a standardized and highly structured format and are organized to reflect how an embassysupportsDoS’sfourbroad,enduringstrategicobjectivesanditstwelvestrategicgoals,asreflectedin


thefiscalyears2004through2009DepartmentofStateandUSAIDStrategicPlan.(Thisdocumentcanbefoundathttp://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/200�/).

Thechartbelowoutlinestheseobjectivesandgoals.WhileColonelShawkinaughandhisfellowSAOssupportatleastindirectlymostorallofDoS’stwelvestrategicgoals,theirworkmostdirectlyimpactsonregional stabilityand counterterrorism.

The Theater Security Cooperation Strategy SincetheendofWorldWarII,UnitedStatesmilitaryforceshavebeencontinuouslyinvolvedinamyriadofpeacetimemissionsandactivitiestohelpshapethestrategicenvironment.Fordecades,however,mostofthiswasdoneonanad hocbasis,withnooverarchingguidanceonprioritizationof partner countries and use of DoD resources. It was not until 1998 that DoD formalized itspeacetimeengagementprocessandstrategy.Itdidsobyestablishingtherequirementforgeographiccombatantcommandstodevelopandimplementtheaterengagementplans(TEPs)thatwouldshapetheenvironmentintheirareasofresponsibility.

UnderSecretaryofDefenseRumsfeld’s tenure, theTEPswererenamedsecuritycooperationplans,andnowsecuritycooperationstrategies.SecretaryRumsfeld’spersonalstampontheprocessisseenprimarilythroughtheSecurity Cooperation Guidance(SCG),whichwasissuedinitiallyin

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Figure1.DepartmentofStatefourstrategicobjectivesandtwelvestrategicgoals,asoutlinedinthefiscalyears2004-2009DepartmentofStateandUSAIDStrategicPlan.SecurityassistancesupportsprimarilythestrategicobjectiveofAchievePeaceandSecurity.


April2003andfollowedbyamorerobustversioninNovember2005(andamendedinJune2006).TheSCGprovidesthebasisforallfurthersecuritycooperationplanningandactivitieswithinDoD.ThisdocumentactsasthefoundationforallDoDinteractionswithforeigndefenseestablishmentsandsupportsthepresident’sNationalSecurityStrategyandtheSecretaryofDefense’sNational Military Strategy.Therequirementtoproduceasecuritycooperationstrategynowextendstoallcombatantcommanders(bothgeographicandfunctional),aswellastosecretariesofthemilitarydepartmentsanddirectorsofDefenseagencies.TheSCGmakesreferencetofourwaysinwhichweaccomplishourstrategicobjectives,asarticulatedintheMarch2005National Defense Strategy.Theyare:

• Assurealliesandfriends

• Dissuadepotentialadversaries

• Deteraggressionandcountercoercion

• Defeatadversaries

TheSCGthenidentifiesatotalofnineteenobjectiveswhichcollectivelysupportthefourgoalsabove. Asgeographiccombatantcommandsdevelop their theatersecuritycooperationstrategies,they align their programs, activities and priorities with these SCG goals and objectives. TheTSCS is comprisedofvarious sections, including strategies for sub-regionswithin thecombatantcommander’s(COCOM)areaofresponsibility(knownasregionalstrategies)andstrategiesoftheCOCOMcomponent commands. However, forColonelShawkinaughandotherSAOchiefs, thekeycomponentoftheTSCSisthecountry-specificportionofthedocument,nowtypicallycalledacountrycampaignplan(althoughthenamevariesamongtheCOCOMs)andenclosedasanappendix.WhilethecountrycampaignplanisdraftedbytheCOCOMJ5,itisutilizinginputfromtheotherCOCOMdirectorates,thecomponentcommands,andabovealltheSAO.Indeed,theSAObecomestheunofficial“pointman”forthedevelopmentandexecutionofmostofthecountry-levelportionoftheTSCS.Asthede factoexpertwithintheCOCOMonhispartnernation,theSAOisinthebestpositiontorecommendthenatureofpeacetimeengagementandthetypesofactivitieswhichwillyieldoptimalbenefitstoboththeUnitedStatesandthehostnation,andwiththemostefficientexpenditureofresources.TheSAOandotherplayerswithintheCOCOMutilizeaclassifieddatabasecalledTheaterSecurityCooperationManagementInformationSystem(TSCMIS)toschedule,track,andassessspecificsecuritycooperationactivitiesandevents.

Insummary,justastheMPPistheambassador’sdocument,soistheTheaterSecurityCooperationStrategythedocumentoftheareacombatantcommander.WhiletheSAOisnottheleadagencyineitherprocess,ithasakeyroletoplayinbothformulatingandexecutingtheplanandstrategy.Inrareinstances,theSAOmaydetectconflictingguidanceorprioritiesbetweenhisambassador’sMPPandthecombatantcommander’sTSCS.Insuchcases,theSAOchiefmustseekclarificationorresolutionatthefirstopportunity.WhiletheSAOchiefisintheoccasionallydifficultpositionofrespondingtotwomasters,heisalsouniquelypositionedtounderstandboththecombatantcommandandtheembassy,balancetheirrespectivepriorities,andleveragetheirresources.The Combined Education and Training Program Plan TheSecurity Assistance Management Manual(SAMM,paraC10.�.1)isthegenesisofthisthirdplanningrequirement.Specifically,itrequiresthat:

SAOs in coordination with host country counterparts (author’s italics) develop aCombinedEducationandTrainingProgramPlan(CETPP).

ThesameparagraphspecifiesthattheCETPPispartoftheSAOinputtothebudgetprocess,includingtheambassador’sMPPandthecombatantcommander’sTSCS.TheformatoftheCETPPisspelledoutbySAMMFigureC10.F1.


The CETPP is the SAO chief’s “deliverable” for the annualTraining Program ManagementReviews(TPMRs),hostedeachspringbythecombatantcommands.Thecountryplanscreatedforthespring2006TPMRcycleareforbudgetyear2007andbeyond.TheSAOisrequiredtopreparetheCETPPasanunclassifieddocumentanduploadittotheSecurityAssistanceNetwork(SAN)forreviewpriortotheTPMR.(Beginningin2005,theCETPPsmigratedtotheSANweb).Morethananyoftheotherplanningdocuments,theCETPPillustratestherequirementfortheSAOtocoordinateitsplanningwiththatofthehostnation.Putdifferently,ifColonelShawkinaugh’strainingofficer(orforeignservicenationalemployee)returnedtoBandariafromtheTPMRandannouncedthatalltrainingrequestedontheCETPPwasapproved,itwouldbenosurprisetoBandariancounterparts.Since it is not always possible that all requested training will be approved, or otherwise becomeavailable,theSAOmustalsoworkcloselywiththehostnationonalternativeplans.Forexample,ifBandariarequestsaseniorserviceschool,suchastheU.S.ArmyWarCollege,throughitsIMETprogram,analternativeplanmustinplaceintheeventthatBandariadoesnotreceiveaninvitationtothecourse.

TheCETPPisrequiredtoaddresstheexecutionofalltrainingwithDoD,regardlessofthesourceoffunding.Intheory,thehostnationhasunlimitedabilitytorequesttrainingthroughFMScaseswhicharepaidwithcustomerfunds.Atthispoint,theconstraintmaybeDoDtrainingresources.However, the reality remains that many countries are so limited in budgets that, unless the U.S.paysforboththecostofthetrainingcourse(i.e.,tuition),aswellastheassociatedtravelandlivingallowances,theycannotaffordthetrainingatall.MostnationsreceiveatleastsomeU.S.appropriatedfundsfortraining.TheIMETprogramaloneprovidedtrainingfundstoatleast135countriesinfiscalyear2006. OtherU.S.-fundedsourcesof training include, forexample, theCombatingTerrorismFellowshipProgram(CTFP)andInternationalNarcoticsandLawEnforcement(INCLE).Finally,

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Figure2.LiketheMPP,theTSCSutilizesanannualcycle.TheabovediagramdepictsEuropeanCommand’sannualplanningcycle.Thecountrycampaignplan(CPP)isthekeydocumentforengagementwitheachcountry.Asof2006,COCOMsarerequiredtosubmitaformalassessmenttotheJointStaffandOSDwithinsixtydaysaftertheendofeachfiscalyear.


the new authority for the President under section 1206 of the fiscal year2006 National Defense Authorization Act(commonlyreferredtoas“buildingpartnercapacity”orsimply“1206authority”)alsoprovidesforU.S.-fundedtraining.

The Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training Budget Formulation and Submission Web Tool Thefinalplanningdocument is theDefenseSecurityCooperationAgency’sFMFand IMETBudgetFormulationandSubmissionWebTool.Thisdocumentdiffersfromtheotherthreeplanningtools in that it applies only to countrieswhich receive (or areproposed to receive) IMETand/orFMFasassistance.Thisexcludestheso-calledpurely“cashcustomers”suchastraditionalNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO)alliesandmiscellaneousotherhighincomecountriesrangingfromAustraliaandSouthKoreatoKuwaitandtheUnitedArabEmirates.ThewebtoolhasbecometheautomatedsuccessortotheolderAnnualIntegratedAssessmentofSecurityAssistance(AIASA),inwhichembassiessubmittedtheirannualrequestsbycablenarrativetotheDoS.ThewebtoolismanagedbyDSCAonapassword-protectedwebsiteinwhichtheaccessofthevariousDoDusersiscustomizedaccordingtotheirposition(SAO,combatantcommand,etc.).DSCAremindsSAOsthatbudgetrequestsshouldbeconsistentwiththeobjectivesandprioritiesintheSecretaryofDefense’sSecurity Cooperation Guidance.

Web tool submissionsbySAOswork theirway through thecombatantcommands, the JointStaffandOfficeofSecretaryofDefense(OSD)levelofficesbeforebeingusedbyOSDandDSCAindiscussionswithDoS.DependingonthejustificationbyColonelShawkinaugh,theimportanceofhishostnationtoU.S.foreignpolicyandnationalsecurity,andnumerousotherfactors,theoriginalSAOsubmissionmaybeendorsed,reduced,or(rarely)increasedatthecombatantcommandlevel

2. CombinedEducationandTrainingProgramObjectives

a. SpecificU.S.ProgramObjectives.U.S.trainingprogramobjectivesshouldsupportobjectivesarticulatedintheMissionPerformancePlan(MPP),TheaterSecurityCooperationPlan(TSCP)andintheDoDSecurityCooperationGuidance(SCG).WhiletheTSCPprovidesaseven-yearfocusandtheSCGislimitedtofiveyears,trainingobjectivesshouldbenear-term(twoyears)andbeunclassified.

b. HostCountryObjectives.

c. SignificantAccomplishmentsTowardMeetingTheseObjectives.Providetangibleexamples of how individuals applied Security Assistance training to achieve programobjectives.

d. FutureObjectivesandProgramRequirements.ThisparagraphshouldaddressU.S.andhostcountryout-yearobjectiveswithregardstoSecurityAssistancetrainingprogramrequirements.Data(e.g.,IMET,FMF,FMS)mustcloselymatchtheinputsdevelopedbytheU.S.CountryTeamfortheMPPanddatafoundintheTSCP.

3. ProgramPlanningandImplementation

a. Program Development. This should include a brief description of the trainingplanningprocess,highlightinghostcountryandSAOroles,problems(ifany),andplansforimprovement.TheobjectiveistodemonstrateanorderlyprocessintheshapingofatrainingprogramthatisintheU.S.interestandsupportiveofMPP,TSCPandSCG.

Figure3.AnextractofPartOneoftheCETPPformat,asfoundintheSAMM,FigureC10.F1.ItemphasizestheimportanceofthetrainingprogrammeetingbothU.S.andhostnationobjectives.WhiletheSAMMindicatesthattheCETPPshouldbelimitedtotwoyears,combatantcommandsnowconsidertheCETPPamulti-yeardocument,withthenumberof“out-years”variouslydefined.


orhigher. Theend resultof thisprocess is theannualCongressional Budget Justification (CBJ),submitted in January at thebeginningof each sessionofCongress. TheFMFand IMETbudgetprocesswithinDoDchannelsisoutlinedinthefigurebelow.

Thelengthytimelinesassociatedwiththisprocessaresymptomaticofwhatsomewouldcallthecumbersomenatureofsecurityassistance.Forexample,DSCAinitiatedthebudgetcycleinputforfiscalyear2009withacall-upmessageonSeptember29,2006.ThattaskerrequiredSAOstosubmittheirIMETandFMFrequestsandjustificationby10NovembertomeetaDoSdeadlineofMarch30,2007.Theadministrationusesthenexttenmonthsforinteragencydiscussions,includingwiththeOfficeofManagementandBudget(OMB),tofinalizethebudgetrequestbeforesubmissiontoCongressthefollowingJanuary.Congresstypicallyrequirestypicallyafullannualsessionormorebeforepassingtheresultantforeignoperationsappropriationsbill.Asoftenasnot,thisspendingbillispartofanomnibuspackageafteraseriesofcontinuingresolutionsearlyinthefollowingfiscalyear.Effectively,then,theSAOsarebeingaskedtomakebudgetrequestsforfiscalyear2009whenCongresshasnotyetactedoneventhefiscalyear2007budgetandthe2008budgetrequesthasnotyetevenbeensubmittedtoCongress.Bythisauthor’scalculation,ColonelShawkinaughcannowexpectaturn-aroundtimeof26to28monthsbetweenhissubmissionontheWebToolandeventualallocationoffundstoBandaria.Bythattime,ColonelShawkinaughhaslikelymovedtohisfirstor

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Figure4.TheannualflowofSAOrequestsforcountryFMFandIMETisdepictedhere,asperDSCA’sFMFandIMETBudgetFormulationandSubmissionWebTool.SAOsmadetheirsubmissionforfiscalyear2009inOctoberandNovemberof2006.


evensecondfollow-onassignmentwhilehissuccessor(possiblyonceremoved)mustlivewiththeresults.TheDSCAchartbelowillustratesthecompletebudgetcycle.

Infairness,thebudgetsubmissionthroughthewebtoolisonlyslightlylonger(perhapsninetydays)thanthatthroughtheMissionPerformancePlan.DSCAiscognizantofthedifficultiesthatthesetimelinesimposeontheSAO.ItprovidesasmuchguidancetoSAOsaspossiblebyincludinginthewebtoolthecurrentrecommendedlevelsoffundingwithintheadministrationfortheinterimyears(inthiscase,fiscalyear2007andfiscalyear2008).However,thelengthybudgetprocesscontinuestoimpedetheabilityofSAOsandcombatantcommandstoreactswiftlytochangingrealitiesandemergingchallengesintheirregions.ThisisaprimaryreasonwhyDoDhasaskedfor(andreceived)fromtheCongresstheauthorityto“buildpartnercapacity,”asoutlinedinthefiscalyear2006 National Defense Authorization Act(section1206).

ThereisnoformalDSCArequirementthatSAOfundingrequestsforFMFandIMETbeidenticalinboththeMPPandthewebtool. However, thecombatantcommandsrealizetheimportanceofcoordinating both efforts and in general are now ensuring that SAO input into both processes isconsistent.ItshouldbementionedthattheannualFMFandIMETsubmissionisactuallyafour-yearplan. In thiscase, thefiscalyear2009submissionisactuallyforfiscalyears2009through2012.In part, this is designed to meet a Congressionally-mandated requirement for a national securityassistancestrategy.

The final fiscal year 2006 appropriation for FMF, after a one percent rescission, was$4,464,900,000.Ofthisamount,Congressearmarkedcertainamountstospecificcountries.Theseearmarks,asinprioryears,werealmostentirelyforthethreeMiddleEastpeacepartners,specifically,$2,280,000,000forIsrael,$1,300,000,000forEgypt,and$210,000,000forJordan.Therewerealsoapproximately$40millioninearmarksfornineothercountries,ofwhich$30millionwasfor the

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Figure5.Thecompletebudgetcyclefortraditionalsecurityassistancefundingandmostothercategoriesofforeignaid.ThePresident’sannualCongressionalBudgetJustification(CBJ)isenactedbytheCongressthroughtheForeignOperationsAppropriationsActapproximatelyoneyearlater.


Philippines.Evenexcludingthesmallerearmarks,theFMFdedicatedbyCongressforthebigthreealoneamountsto84percentofthetotal.ThismeansthatColonelShawkinaughandthevastmajorityofhisSAOchiefcounterpartsareeffectivelycompetingforlessthan$700millionoftheentireFMFpie.

Aword about executionofFMF is appropriate here. For obvious reasons, theSAOshouldworkcloselywiththehostnationtopromptlycommitFMFmoniesthroughtheFMSprocess.Theever-present factorof inflation alone shoulddrive early commitmentof funds, under thepremisethatthesamearticlesandserviceswillalmostcertainlycostmoresixmonthsorayearfromnow.However,theincreasingscrutinyofresourcesatalllevels,fromthecombatantcommandtotheStateDepartment,isalsoafactor.IftheBandarians“sit”ontheirFMFforayearorsoafteritsallocation,itwillsoonerorlatermakeColonelShawkinaugh’sjobhardertojustifycontinuedfundingfortheBandariancountryprogram.

Tosummarizethefourprocessesjustdiscussed,anotionalSAOplanningcalendarisprovidedbelow.Thetimelinesindicatedareforcalendaryear2006.

The Assessment Environment Adecadeorsoago,itwasnotunusualforFMFand/orIMETfundingwithinindividualcountryprogramsto“cruise”atthesamelevelforanumberofyearswithonlycasualscrutinyinWashington.Formostcountries,however,thosedaysarelonggoneasboththeexecutivebranchandtheCongressaremorecloselyexaminingthe“bangforthebuck”inforeignoperationsappropriations.CongresshasplayedakeyroleherethroughtheGovernment Accountability and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993.Thislawrequiresmostfederalagencies,includingtheDepartmentofState,tocompletethreeplans,whichcanbesummarizedasfollows:

1. A strategic plan of at least five years in duration. In response to thisrequirement, Department of State and the United States Agency for InternationalDevelopment(USAID)producedtheirStrategicPlanforFiscalYears200�through2009,whichwasreferencedabove.

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Figure6.NotionalSAOPlanningCalendar.Datesprovidedareforcalendaryear2006.


2. Aperformanceplanonanannualbasis,designed to reflectperformancebasedonthebudgetaryresourcesforthatyear.Performancegoalsandindicatorsaretobeexpressedinanobjectiveandquantifiablemanner.TheDoS’scurrentperformanceplan also producedwithUSAIDwas published inFebruary 2006 and is titledFiscal Year 2007 Joint Performance Summary.Itison-lineathttp://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/perfplan/2007/. 3. Aperformancereport,alsoonanannualbasis,whichreviewsthesuccessofachieving thepreviousyear’sperformancegoals, identifiesanycausesof failure inmeetingthosegoals,andevaluatesthecurrentyear’sperformanceplaninlightoflastyear’s successesor failures. DoSsatisfies this requirementwith itsPerformance and Accountability Report (PAR), themost recent (2005)ofwhichcanbe foundathttp://www.state.gov/documents/organization/58402.pdf.

In its 2005 performance report, DoS rated itself “on target” for all twelve strategic goals,includingregionalstabilityandcounterterrorism.However,whenevaluatingthe195performanceindicators supporting the strategicgoals, only78percentof themwere considered“on target”orabove.Putdifferently,43performanceindicatorswererated“belowtarget”or“significantlybelowtarget”. Additionally, theperformance report summarized the results of surveysby theOfficeofManagementandBudget (OMB)using itsProgramAssessmentRatingTool (PART). OMBusesthistooltoassessallfederalprogramsagainstperformance-relatedcriteria.Ofthe39PARTreviewsconductedofDoSprograms (asof the2005performance report),22were ratedeffective,fiveasmoderatelyeffective,andtwelveasadequate.Allfouroftheassessmentsdirectlyinvolvingsecurityassistancewereconsideredeffective.Anextractofthesefromthe2005reportisbelow.

ScoreandRating asof StrategicGoal StateBureau ProgramName October2005

RegionalStability AfricanAffairs SecurityAssistance 97%–Effective Sub-SaharanAfrica

RegionalStability SouthAsianAffairs SecurityAssistance 93%–Effective

RegionalStability WesternHemisphere SecurityAssistance 90%–Effective Affairs(WHA)

RegionalStability International Contributionsto 86%–Effective OrganizationAffairs International PeacekeepingActivities

Inits2007performanceplan,DoSidentifiedseveninitiativesandprogramsunderitsstrategicgoalofregionalstability.Ofthese,twoweredirectlyrelatedtosecurityassistance.ThefirstofthesefocusedonthenumberofforeignmilitarypersonnelreceivingtrainingundertheIMETprogramandthesecondonU.S.militarytrainingforAfricanunitsdeployedinpeacekeepingoperations.

Separately, the geographic COCOMs have been submitting annual assessments to the OSDannuallysince2004.Asof2006,thatrequirementisextendedtothemilitarydepartments,defenseagencies, and the functional combatant commands. All such DoD entities have sixty days aftertheendof thefiscalyear tosubmitareport toOSD. Theseassessmentsaredesignedtoevaluatetheeffectivenessoftheirsecuritycooperationfunctionsandactivities,helpshapethefutureuseof


resourcesformaximumeffectiveness,andlastlyidentifyconstraintsthatcanbefixedbychangesinlawand/orpolicy.

Thepointofthisdiscussionistoemphasizethat,whetherattheglobal,regional,orcountrylevel,thedegreeofoversightofforeignoperationsprogramsissteadilyincreasing.ThelessonforColonelShawkinaughisthathisplansforutilizingFMF,IMET,andotherappropriationsandresourcesmustbewell-justified,fullycoordinatedwiththehostnation,andfullysupportedbyboththeambassadorandthecombatantcommander.

Fromtheirfirstdaysinuniform,militarypersonnelaretaughttheimportanceofteamwork.SAOpersonnelinparticular,whoworklargelyinsmalloffices,understandthisconcept.ButthetransientnatureofpersonnelservinginSAObillets,thelengthytimelinesassociatedwithbudgetprocesses,andthecomplexnatureofequippingandtraininganymilitaryorganizationallcombinetoaddanewdimensiontoteamworkfortheSAO.TheSAOteamincludesthoseU.S.personnelwhohavenotyetbeenidentifiedfortheassignment,orperhapsnotyetevenpromotedtotheappropriategrade,andwhowillnotarriveinBandariaforanothertwo,three,orfiveyears.Onlybycarefullyfollowingtheplanningprocessesdescribedhere,andworkingcloselywithcounterparts,willColonelShawkinaughensurethecontinuedsuccessoftheSAOteam.About the Author Mr.GaryTaphorn is an assistant professor atDISAM and a retiredU.S.Army officer. HepreviouslyservedintwosecurityassistanceofficesandcurrentlymanagestheSecurityCooperationOfficerOverseas(SCM-O)course.


An Introduction to Theater Strategy and Regional SecurityBy

Lieutenant Colonel Clarence J. Bouchat, USA Director, Theater Operations Studies

U.S. Army War CollegeU.S.CentralCommand(CENTCOM)founditselfinabubblingpotofcrisesfromoneendtotheother.WehadtodevelopaCENTCOM[theater]strategytohandlethemwithoutnecessarilyusingmilitaryforce–orelseonlyasalastresort. Weneededtohelpbuildstabilityinthistroubledregion,inmyreview,orwewouldpaythepriceinthelongrun. GeneralAnthonyZinni CentralCommandCommander1997-2000 Battle ReadywrittenwithTomClancy

Theater Strategy SincethedemiseoftheSovietUnionanditsalliesasanoverarchingworld-wideopponent,regional security issues have risen as the greatest challenge for U.S. national security. Even theGlobalWaronTerrorismisachainofregionalproblemslinkedbyanamorphousnetworkbasedonanextremistphilosophyandanti-Westernsentiment.Sinceregionalproblemsnowdominatesecurityissues, theprimarycontribution towardsattainingU.S.national,defense,andmilitarystrategybytheDepartmentofDefense(DoD)isatthetheaterlevelthroughthecombatantcommander’stheaterstrategy. Theaterstrategycoordinatesboththeuseofforceandthemanyothermilitaryactivitiessupportingnationalstrategythatdonotinvolveforce,sincenotallsecurityproblemscanorshouldberesolvedwithkineticsolutions.Despiteitsimportancetomilitaryandnationalstrategy,however,thereislittledefinitiveorcomprehensiveinformationavailableontheaterstrategy.Forthatreason,thisarticleactsasaframeworktointegratetheconcept,processes,products,andactivitiesassociatedwiththeaterstrategy.Itintroducestheimplementationofnationalstrategyatthetheaterandoperationallevelsbyexplainingwhattheaterstrategyis,itsbasis,howitisformulated,andhowitisexecutedwith emphasis on theater security cooperation.With this background, a reader involved with thedevelopment,execution,orsupportoftheaterstrategywillbetterunderstanditsroleindefenseandnationalaffairsthroughexamplesfromacasestudyoftheformulationoftheaterstrategyandsecuritycooperationinCENTCOMleadinguptoOperationEnduringFreedom(OEF)inAfghanistan.Theater Strategy Overview JointPublications3-0,Joint Operations,and5-0,Joint Operation Planning,usethisnew,broaderdefinitionoftheaterstrategy:

Concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectivesof national and multinational policies and strategies through the synchronizedand integrated employment of military forces and other instruments of nationalpower. [JP 5-0, Signature Draft 24August 2006, GL-26, JP 3-0 Sep 2006, GL-32]

Theater strategy directs military activities ranging from peacetime cooperation with othercountries,tomeetingpotentialthreatsthroughcontingencyplanning(previouslyknownasdeliberateplanning)andcrisisactionplanning.Theaterstrategyorganizesatheater’sforcesandoperationalareas,andarrangestherelationshipamongthemtoensureunifiedaction.Theaterstrategyalsoensuresadequatelogisticsandothersupportfortheateractivities,andsynchronizesjoint,multinational,andinteragencyoperationsandtraining[JFSCPub13-2�].Allofthismaintainsmilitaryunityofeffortwithinageographicregiontoachievestrategicgoals.Suchunityofeffortintheaterstrategymustbemaintainedevenwhilesomeregionsofthetheaterareatwarorinconflict,andothersremainatpeace


[JP3-0Sep2006,I-14].Thustheaterstrategymustbebroadenoughtoencompassawidevarietyofpolitical-militaryactivitiesatthesametime.Campaigns,militaryoperations,securitycooperation,anduseoftheoperationalarteachisapartoftheaterstrategythroughoutthecontinuumofmilitaryactivities.

Theaterstrategyisanextensionofnationalmilitarystrategytailoredtoageographiccombatantcommander’s area of responsibility (AOR). It is both similar and in complementary support tonational strategy.Acombatant commander’s theater strategyconsistsof the threeelements foundinanystrategy: theaterobjectivesandstrategicendstates (ends),whichareachieved through thesynchronizationofintegratedstrategicconcepts(ways),byusingtheaterorganization,activities,andplansemployingjoint,interagency,andmultinationalresources(means),andtherebyaccomplishesnationalandmultinationalobjectives[JFSC-1p.3-25].

Thegeographiccombatantcommanderisthefocusfordevelopingandexecutingtheaterstrategy.Theaterstrategyshouldbecoordinatedwithotherregionalelementsofpower,asisdonewithnationalstrategyintheinteragencyprocess.TheDepartmentofState’s(DoS)AssistantSecretariesofStatedirectRegionalBureaus,but theyhave less authority and resources thanageographiccombatantcommanderhas,andtheregionalareasusedbytheDepartmentsofStateandDepartmentofDefense(DoD)donotcoincide(seeFig.1).Diplomatically,nationalstrategyismainlyappliedatthecountrylevelthroughtheU.S.ambassadorandthecountryteam.AtthecountryteamlevelDoDrepresentativessuchasthedefenseandmilitaryserviceattachés,andthecombatantcommander’ssecurityassistanceofficers,worktogetherwiththerepresentativesfromtheotherfederalgovernmentagenciesintheembassytoattainnationalstrategicgoalsasinterpretedbythePresident’spersonalrepresentative,theambassador.Thecountryteammilitaryrepresentativesmustbalancetheambassador’sguidancewiththatoftheirDoDcommanders.Atthecountrylevelthissystemworkswhenbothsidesreferenceandusethecommonnationalstrategicdirection.Onaregionallevel,however,thereisnoequivalentoftheNationalSecurityCouncil(NSC)tocoordinateeffortsamongthevariousU.S.federalagencies,muchlessinternationallywithlike-mindedstates.Thissometimesgivesthegeographiccombatantcommanderastrongercomparativeinfluenceintheregionwhenhedirectsacomprehensivetheaterstrategy.

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Figure 1. DoD Combatant Commanders Area of Responsibility and DoS Regional Bureau Areas


TocompoundtheimbalancebetweentheDoSandDoDfurther,theDoSsimplylacksthedepthofpersonnelandresourcesgiventotheDoD[Zinni319].TheDoS,forinstance,hasfewerthanabrigade’sworthofforeignserviceofficers(FSO)(4-5000people) in thefield.Theirresourcesfortangibleengagementactivitiesalsodonotmatch theopportunities that theDoD’s schools,visits,exercises,equipment,andothercooperationactivitiesoffer.ThusanimbalancehasoccurredwheretheDoShastheauthorityforinternationalengagement,buttheDoDhasmostoftheresourcestodoso.

Therearealsonoeconomicand information regions,equivalent to theDoDAORsandDoSregionalbureaus,inwhichtheotherelementsofnationalpowerareplannedorcoordinated,furtherweakeningnationalstrategicdirectionattheregionallevel.Allofthesechallengestothedevelopmentand implementationof theater strategy emphasize theneed tokeep theater security in very closesupportofnationalstrategy,andforgovernmentofficerstoworktowardscommongoals.Sources of Theater Strategy Thenationalstrategicdirectionthatatheatercommanderreceivesshouldinitiateandguidethedevelopmentoftheaterstrategy.NationalstrategicdirectionisthecommonthreadthatintegratesandsynchronizestheactivitiesoftheU.S.militarywithothergovernmentagencies,andisderivedfromnationalvalues,interests,andpolicy[JP5-0Sig,Aug2006,II-1].ThePresidentandSecretaryofDefensetranslatepolicyintostrategicanddefenseendstatesandobjectives,whicharereflectedinthefollowing:

• NationalSecurityStrategy(NSS)

• NationalDefenseStrategy(NDS)

• UnifiedCommandPlan(UCP)

• ContingencyPlanningGuidance(CPG)

• StrategicPlanningGuidance(SPG)

• JointProgrammingGuidance(JPG)

• QuadrennialDefenseReview(QDR)

• The“ForcesForUnifiedCommands”memorandumandnationalpolicyand multinationalpolicystatements

• GoalswhentheUnitedStatesisoperatingaspartofanallianceorcoalition

TheinterplaybetweentheseguidingdocumentsisshowninFigure2[JP3-0Sep2006,I-2toI-3].

Todigestthedirectiongiven,theChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff(CJCS)usestheresourcesoftheJointStrategicPlanningSystem(JSPS),theconsultationmeansbywhichtheCJCSdevelopsstrategy,plans,budgets,andassessments[JP3-0Sep2006,GL-20].ThustheJSPSprovidesstrategicguidance and direction to the armed forces of the United States for theater security cooperationplanning, joint operation planning, and force planning, illustrated in Figure 3. [JP 5-0, Sig,Aug2006,II-4].TheCJCSrefinesthisdirectionfurtherforthecombatantcommandersintheformoftheNationalMilitaryStrategy (NMS), the JointStrategicCapabilitiesPlan (JSCP),GlobalForceManagement,andotherformsofguidance[JP3-0Sep2006,I-2toI-3].Ofallofthesedocuments,theJSCPisusuallythemostfocusedingivingdirectguidancefortheaterstrategyforcontingencyplanning.


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Figure 2. Strategy: Foundation for all Major Processes.

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Figure 3. Joint Strategic Planning (Joint Pub 5-0, Figure I-1).


Theprocessanddocuments,citedabove,workwellforcontingencyplanning.However,intheunanticipatedcircumstancesandshorttimeperiodthatusuallyfollowsacrisis,lessformalformsofnationaldirectionaregiven.Whenexistingplansandguidanceareapplicabletheyshouldbeused,althoughtheyarenormallysupplementedbyadditionaldirectionasthecircumstance’sintelligenceandsituationbecomebetterknown.MemosandverbalguidancefromthePresident,SecretaryofDefense,orCJCSmayinitiateorchangeaplanortheaterstrategy,tobefollowedbymoreformalplanningdirectivesintheformofaWarningOrder,PlanningOrder,orAlertOrder[5-0sigI-19toI-20].Otherformsoftimelyandflexibledirectionduringacrisisarethenationalpolicystatements,speeches,andotherformsofstrategiccommunicationthatinformtheU.S.andinternationalpublic.StrategiccommunicationsfromthePresidentandcabinetsecretariesestablishunityofthemesandmessages,andassuchcanbeamajorsourceofnationalsecuritydirectioninacrisissituationwhenlittledocumentedguidancemaybeavailable[JP5-0,SigAug2006,II-2].

Jointstrategicplanningfromthetheaterstrategylevel,beitcontingencyorcrisisplanning,shouldcontributetothePresidentandSecretaryofDefense’sformulationofpolitical-militaryassessments,definepoliticalandmilitaryobjectives,developstrategicconceptsandoptions,allocateresources,and formulate policy [JP 5-0 sigAug 2006, II-1]. Ultimately, national strategic direction guidestheaterstrategy,buttogetherthegeographiccombatantcommands’theaterstrategiesalsoinfluencestrategicdirection.TheSecretaryofDefensemeldsthesetheaterstrategiestoensurethattherelativeimportanceofthecombatantcommands’competinginterestsareprioritizedandintegrated,andthatthey adequately support strategic goals in a limited resource environment. This resulting globalstrategyisthebridgecoordinatingnationalandtheaterstrategies[3-0Sept2006,I-7].

Vignette1:Woodward,Bob.Bush at War.NewYork:SimonandSchuster.2002.pp.24-26and189-190.Inhisbook,BobWoodwardchroniclestheformationofstrategicdirectionfortheresponsethatledtoOperationEnduringFreedom.Thesepassagesshowhownationaldirectionfortheaterstrategyisformedinacrisis.ThisreadingopenswiththeattackonthePentagon.TheauthornotesthelackofacontingencyplanagainstAfghanistan,sotheSecretaryofDefensestartsformingthefirstdraftofstrategicdirection,bydefiningtheproblem.Threeweekslater,inthesecondreading,theSecretaryissuesveryclearstrategicguidancetotheDepartmentofDefensetouseforcrisisactionplanning.

Theater Strategy Formulation Fromtheinterlockingsourcesthatformstrategicdirection,thecombatantcommanderprovidescomprehensiveguidanceanddirectiontohissubordinatesandstafftoformulatetheaterstrategy.Toeffectivelycraft theater strategy,however, thecommanderandstaffmustunderstand indepth thecontextof the theater and itsmission,which is typically achieved throughdevelopinga strategic(ortheater)estimate[JFSCPub1,3-26].Oncethetheater’senvironmentandmissionareanalyzedandunderstood,thecommander’svisionfortheatersecurityisformed.Fromtheresultingtheaterobjectives the theater concept is derived and codified into theater strategy and its implementingactionsandplans.

Astrategicestimatestartswithareviewofthecomplexandinterconnectedtheaterenvironment(Figure � on next page). This contextual review sets the parameters within which to frame thecombatantcommander’stheateractionsandplans.Thisreviewmusttakeintoaccountthegeographic,economic,andculturalcharacteristicsoftheregion;thegeopoliticalcontextofregionalinfluences,causes,andinterests;andanunderstandingofthecapabilitiesandvulnerabilitiesofeachfriendly,neutral,andadversarialstateorrelevantorganizationintheregion.ThisreviewmustalsoaccountfortheUnitedStates’ownsituation,includinglimitationsintheformofconstraints,restraints,andrestrictions;planningassumptions[JFSCPub13-26to27](whichshouldbeperiodicallyreviewed


forvalidity);anddeducerelativepowerandcapabilities.Atheater’senvironmentisbestanalyzedthroughasystemsapproach.Thisisanintegrated,holisticperspectivethatimprovesunderstanding,andgeneratesmoreoptionsthanjustmilitaryactionsthroughforce.

With a systemsperspective, [commanders]gain the situational awareness todeterminewhateffects(behaviors)needtobeattainedwithintheOperationalAreatoachievetheirobjectives. . .[and]tomitigateriskandactwithgreaterprecision[CommanderHBviii].Onesystemsapproachtoanalyzingatheater’senvironmentisthrougharegionalstrategicappraisalwhichisanassessmentofaspecificregioninwhichU.S.regionalinterestsaredetermined,policiestosupporttheseinterestsareidentified,andstrategiestosupportthepoliciesaredeveloped[Lemons,RSA,3].

Morefocusedanddetailedisthenetassessmentofacountry,asystemsunderstandingof the operational environment in the form of a common, shared, relevant databaseand a network of people . . . used to understand key relationships, dependencies andvulnerabilitieswithinandacrosspolitical,military,economic,social, information,andeconomicsystems . . . [toascertain] leveragepoints suchaskey linksandnodes . . .toinfluenceadversarycapabilities,perceptionsanddecisionmaking[Lemons,NA,2].

ThesesystemanalysesdonotreplacebutcomplementproductssuchastheJointIntelligencePreparation of the Operational Environment. Sun Tzu’s dictum to “know the enemy and knowyourself,andyoucanfightahundredbattleswithnodangerofdefeat,” isreflectedinasystemictheaterenvironmentanalysis.

Alongwiththeanalysisofthereviewofthetheatersenvironment,athoroughmissionanalysisofgivennationalandmultinationalstrategicdirectionisneeded.Thisanalysisderivesobjectives,desired effects, and key assumptions [JP 5-0 sig,Aug 2006 III-17]. The emerging effects basedapproachinjointoperationsisusefulinderivingtheaterstrategicobjectives,effects,andassumptionsbecauseitssystemicanalysisexaminesallaspectsofanopponentorfriendlysystem,andcoordinatestheapplicationofallinstrumentsofnationalpower.Thisprocess:

enhanc[es]theprobabilitythatobjectivescanbetranslatedmoreaccuratelyintoactionabledirection...[giving]asharedcommonunderstandingoftheeffects...beforetasksareprescribedandassigned...[CHBEffects,viii].

Withanimprovedunderstandingoftheassignedmissionthroughtheeffectsbasedapproach,the combatant commander identifies and prioritizes specified, implied, and essential tasks,whichtailorandorientahighercommand’spurposetoregionalconditions[JP5-0sig,Aug2006III-18].Determiningtheappropriatescopeandcontentofthemission,andproposingchangestoitthrough

• Assignedobjectivesfromnationalauthorities.

• Translationofnationalobjectivestoobjectivesapplicabletothecombatant commandoftheater.

• Visualizationofthestrategicenvironmentandhowitrelatestothe accomplishmentofassignedobjectives.

• Assessmentofthethreatstoaccomplishmentofassignedobjectives.

• Assessmentofstrategicalternativesavailable,withaccompanyinganalysis, risks,andtherequirementsforplans.

• Considerationsofavailableresources,linkedtoaccomplishmentof assignedobjectives.

Figure 4. Strategic Estimate.


restating it back to higher headquarters is an important aspect of this mission analysis. Once thetheater’ssituationandmissionarethoroughlyanalyzed,thetheatercommanderarticulateshisintentthroughstrategicvision,whichthenguidestheaterobjectives,theaterstrategicendstates,andmissionstatements[JFSCPub120003-26].

Baseduponthestrategicestimate,thecombatantcommanderdevelopsstrategicalternatives(broadstatementsofwhatistobeaccomplished). Thecombatantcommanderthenselectsimplementingactions thatwillsupportnationalormultinationalpoliciesandaddress therequirements identifiedinthetheater.Theselectedimplementingactionsbecomethebasisforthetheaterstrategicconcept,whichsetsthestageforplanningandactionsinbroadflexibleterms.Suchplansandconceptsincludethosefortheatersecuritycooperation,combatoperations,andsupportthroughouttherangeofmilitaryoperations[JP3-0Sep2006,I-10to11].

Fromtheanalyzedmissionandregionalenvironment,thecombatantcommanderdeterminesthepossiblemeanshiscommandwillemploytoattainnationalgoals. Theremaybediversesetsofoptionstoaddressthetasksandproblemsfacedbythecombatantcommander.Thesecoursesofactionmustbeevaluated,comparedtoactionsthatotherplayersintheregionmaytake,andthenthemostappropriateone(s)selectedtocompletethestrategicestimate[JFSCPub1,2000,3-28].Usingasystemicapproach,anymilitaryactionsmustbeintegrallycoordinatedwithalargerinteragencyeffortofdiplomatic,informationandeconomicefforts[CHBEffects,I-1].Thecombatantcommanderalsoorganizescommand relationships,and requests resources required to fulfillany requirementsderivedfromthistheaterstrategydevelopmentprocess.Theaterstrategyisthebasisforinitiatingandcoordinatinginternationalprogramsandactivities,requestingsupportforthetheater,andsynergizingactionsandactivitieswiththeothercombatantcommands.Theresultingestimateiscontinuouslyupdatedbasedonaconstantlychangingenvironmentinthetheater,andtomaintainconsistencywithnationalobjectivesandendstates[JFSCPub1,2000,3-29].

Thus, theater strategy isderived fromU.S.national strategy,and theater strategydeterminesoperationsandactivities.Sincetheinaugurationofthe Security Cooperation Guidance in 2003,theaterstrategyanditsimplementationplansmustbewritteninaprescribedformat,andannualassessmentsprovidedtotheSecretaryofDefense[JP5-0SigAug2006,I-3].Thisshouldstandardizetheproductsofwhathasbeenanadhocsystem.However,sincenotwocombatantcommandsfollowthesameprocess,theproceduresfordevelopingtheaterstrategyremaindifferent.Eachcombatantcommandhasadapted itsmethod to thepeculiaritiesof its region, and thepersonalitiesof its commanders.Theprocessdescribedhereisgeneric,butitisthebasisformanyoftheprocessesfoundamongthegeographiccombatantcommands.

Vignette2:Clancy,TomwithTonyZinniandTomKoltz.Battle Ready.NewYork:G.P.Putnam’sandSons.200�.pp.311-31�.These are Gen Zinni’s reflections on the state of CENTCOM as he takes commandin 1997. What he describes here is the formal and deliberate method of developingtheaterstrategy,incontrasttothecrisismethoddescribedinVignette1.Hediscussesthesourcesofnationalstrategywhichhemustconsidertodeterminehistheater’smission,summarizes the theater’ssituation,states thestrategicalternatives,andproposeswaysofimplementinghisstrategy,includingoperationalandtheaterengagementplans.NotethatGenZinniidentifiesanewchargeto“shape”theregion. ShapingisasignificantadditiontotheaterstrategyandwillbepresentedlaterinthisarticleintheTheaterSecurityCooperationImplementationsection.


Theater Strategy Implementation – Joint Operation Planning

Theater strategy implements many activities of a combatant command through its guidance,whichensuresthoseactivitiesareindirectsupportofthetheaterstrategicobjectiveswhichinturnsupport national objectives and strategy. One of the most important missions for a geographiccombatantcommanderis todeterhostileactionsagainstU.S.andfriendly-nationinterests,and, ifnecessary,tocountersuchhostileactionsthroughcontingencyoperations.Tobepreparedforsuchcontingencies,combatantcommandersconductjointoperationplanning,whichtranslatesnationalandtheaterstrategyintooperationalconcepts.Jointoperationplanningencompassesbothcontingencyplanningandcrisisactionplanning(CAP),ascoordinatedattheoperationallevelthroughcampaignplanning[JFSCPub-1�-10].Theprocessforbothcontingencyandcrisisactionplanningissimilar,althoughtheirtimelinesandthevalidityofassumptionsusedaresignificantlydifferent.TheDoDisdevelopingamodifiedmethodofcampaignplanningknownasadaptiveplanning,whichismeanttoincorporatebothcontingencyandcrisisactionplanningintoone.Theelementsintroducedhere,however,arestillvalidandwillbeincorporatedintoadaptiveplanning.Thecurrentjointoperationplanningmethodremainsinstructiveforthebasicprocessuntiladaptiveplanningisvalidatedandapproved..

Contingencyplanning is themeansduringpeacetimebywhichcontingenciesareanticipatedanddeliberateplansdeveloped. TheseplansarebasedupontheSecretaryofDefense’sCPGandCJCS’sJSCP[JP5-0sigAug2006,I-16].Toensurecloseadherencetonationalstrategicgoalsandguidance, contingencyplansundergo an in-progress review (IPR)by theSecretaryofDefense atcriticalpointsinthedevelopmentprocess,illustratedinFigure5.TheprocessalsoinvolvestheentireJointPlanningandExecutionCommunity(JPEC,seeFig.6),an informalgroupconsistingof theJointChiefsofStaffandtheirstaff,themilitaryservicesandtheirmajorcommands,thecombatantcommandsandtheirsubordinatecommands,andthecombatsupportagencies[JP5-0sigAug2006x].ContingencyplansarefullycoordinatedbytheJPEC,andoftenhaveforcesandresourcesallocatedto them before execution. Because of its thorough coordination, contingency planning normallytakeslongertocompletethancrisisactionplanning.Theassumptionsuponwhichcontingencyplansarebasedareimportanttotheprocess,butmaynotalwaysbevalidwhenfacedwiththeactualcrisisenvisioned.Forthatreasonnearlyallcontingencyplansaremodifiedthroughcrisisactionplanning

Figure 5. Joint Operation Planning Activities, Functions, and Products. (JP 5-0 Aug 2006,)

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beforeexecution.Tokeepthemasrelevantaspossible,contingencyplansareupdatedregularly[JP5-0sigAug2006,I-16toI-17].

Crisisactionplanningoccursasthecontingencyitaddressesunfolds.CAPismoreimmediatethancontingencyplanningandthecontingencyplanassumptionsareeitherverifiedasfactordisprovedleadingtotheplan’smodification[JP5-0sigAug2006,III-22].CAPoftenbuildsuponpreviouslyconductedcontingencyplanning,butacrisiscouldoccurforwhichnopreviousplanninghastakenplace,[JP5-0sigAug2006,I-19toI-20]ashappenedwithOperationEnduringFreedom.Insuchsituationsoperationsordersaredevelopedfromscratchratherthanmodifiedfromoperationsplans.

Theaterstrategy,astranslatedintotheaterplansthroughthejointoperationplanningprocess,isonemajorexampleofhowtoexecutetheaterstrategy.

Vignette3:Clancy,TomwithTonyZinniandTomKoltz.Battle Ready.NewYork:G.P.Putnam’sandSons.200�.pp11-13.TheseareGenZinni’smemoirscoveringhistimeastheCENTCOMcombatantcommanderfrom1997to2000.OperationDESERTVIPER,recountedhere,wasoneoftheperiodic“smackdowns”ofIraqafterOperationDesertStorminresponsetohinderingtheworkofU.N.weapons’inspectors.ThisreadinghighlightstheprocessofgettinganoperationalplanapprovedbythePresidentinacrisis,andthebalanceofauthoritybetweentheServicechiefsandcombatantcommanders.

Theater Strategy Implementation – Products and Activities Toimplementatheater’sstrategy,andtherebynationalsecuritystrategy,avarietyofactivitiesand products are involved. Through the contingency planning process just described, combatantcommanders’ staffs produce the estimates, base plans, concept plans and operational plans (also

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Figure 6. Joint Planning and Execution Community. (JP 5-0 Aug 2006, Figure 1-2)


calledlevel1,2,3,and�plans),andcrisisactionplanningthatcollaborativelycoordinateefforts,and identify forces, functional support, and resources to deter and defend against aggression, orparticipate in assistance to civil authorities [JP 5-0 sig,Aug 2006, I-17 to I-18]. Anothermajormeansofimplementingtheaterstrategyisthroughtheatersecuritycooperation.Thetheatersecuritycooperationplanthatresultsfromthisprocessispartofthejointoperationplansfamily,andwillbecoveredinmoredetailinafollowingsection.Theaterorganizationandtheaterlogisticscoverothercrucialaspectsofimplementingtheaterstrategy,byarranginghowtoattainunityofeffortamongtheU.S.Services,governmentagencies,andothercountries’forces.Thisisaccomplishedthroughorganizing the commands in a theater, and sustaining theater strategy and its activities and plansthroughlogisticsandmovement.

Although the above activities are the major products and efforts needed to support theaterstrategyandnationalobjectives,thereareotheractivitiesthatarealsoelementsofimplementingatheaterstrategy.Sincethecombatantcommanderisresponsiblefordevelopingjointoperationplansforhistheater,heisalsoresponsibleforensuringthattheforcecapabilitiesneededtoexecutethoseplansareavailabletohimthroughapportionmentinGlobalForceManagementorthe“ForcesForMemorandum.” At the theater strategic level, force planning encompasses all of those activitiesperformedby the supported combatant commander and the subordinate component commands toselectforcesandcapabilitiestoaccomplishanassignedmission,orrequestcapabilityfoundwanting[JP5-0sigAug2006I-4].However,havingforcesassigned,attached,orapportionedforanoperationplan(OPLAN)isoflittleuseifthoseforcesarenotreadyfortheirmission.Forthatreasonanothermeansbywhichthecombatantcommanderhelpstoimplementtheaterstrategyisthroughthetrainingof jointforces. Althoughthe individualservicesandspecialoperationscommandareresponsibleforthecombattrainingofassociatedforces,thecombatantcommanderisresponsibleforensuringthatthoseforcescanoperatetogetherinthemannerenvisionedbyhiscommand’splansandstrategy[JP5-0sigAug2006 I-16]. Multinational trainingaccomplishes thesamepurposebetweenU.S.forcesandfriendly international forces in the region. Oneway toensure thatassigned,attached,andapportionedforcescanoperatetogetheristoconductjointormultinationalexercisestoensureforcesarecapableoffulfillingtheobjectivesespousedinthetheaterstrategy[JP5-0sigAug2006,II-5].Thesethreemeansofimplementingtheaterstrategy,attainingadequatemilitaryforcecapabilityfor themission, ensuring those joint andmultinational forces areproperly trained, andprovidingadequatejointandmultinationalexercisestogaugetheforces’capability,areallimportantactivitiesofacombatantstaffthatsupporttheaterandnationalstrategyobjectives.

AnothermeansofimplementingtheaterstrategyisthroughaCombatantCommander’sInitiativeFund.Theexpensesforrunningthevariousgeographiccombatantcommandheadquartersarepaidthroughtheservicebudgetsandleavelittleflexibilityonhowthemoneyisspent.Somecombatantcommandershavechaffedatthisfundingarrangementbelievingthatservicechiefshadlittleinterestorunderstandingoftheengagementprograms[Zinni323].TheCombatantCommander’sInitiativeFund,althoughrelativelysmall,isspentatthediscretionofthecombatantcommanderinordertofurther theneedsofhis command, andoften supports theater strategy. This canbeusedas seedmoneytostartprogramstobefundedformallylater,ortodirectlysupportunanticipatedsituationsthroughtheatersecuritycooperation[USCTitle10,a,I,6,166a].Suchfundsmayprovidesignificantregionalleveragetoatheaterstrategyifjudiciouslyapplied.

Asanendproductoftheaterstrategy,combatantcommandersfeedbacktonationalauthoritiestheirinputstobetterdevelopandrefinenationalstrategyandpriorities.TheIntegratedPriorityLists(IPL),forinstance,arehighpriorityrequirementsthatfillcapabilityshortfallsacombatantcommander’scomponent forces face when trying to accomplish their assigned missions. This feedback givescombatantcommandersaformalvoiceinforceplanning,nationallevelapportionmentofresources,anddevelopmentofstrategicconceptsintheProgramming,PlanningandBudgetingSystem(PPBS,


seeFig.2)[JP1-02,IPL].AnotherfeedbackmechanismistheJointQuarterlyReadinessReview(JQRR,formerlytheJointMilitaryReadinessReview(JMRR))inwhichtheservicesandcombatantcommandersrespondtoastatedfuturecrisisscenariowithlimitingfactors(LIMFACS)anddeficienciesthatmayreducemissionaccomplishmentintheircommand.JQRRfeedbackcoversmanyaspectsoftheater:

• Strategy,mobility,andsustainment

• Intelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissance

• Jointheadquarterscommandandcontrol

• Jointpersonnelandtrainingthatmaybebeyondthecontrolofthecombatant commanders

Suchfeedbackinfluencesnationalpolitical-militaryassessments,andtheformulationofstrategicpolicyandplanningguidance[JFSCPub12-21,Macken].Theendresultshouldfocustheseniornational leadership on pressing immediate readiness issues in order to determine where to placeadditionalemphasisandresources,andtherebybettersupportthetheaterstrategythroughimprovedfunding,assignedforces,andcombatsystems.

Vignette�:Clancy,TomwithTonyZinniandTomKoltz.Battle Ready.NewYork:G.P.Putnam’sandSons.200�.pp.331-33�.These are Gen Zinni’s memoirs from the time he was Commander of CENTCOM,implementinghistheaterstrategyandthechallengeofgainingsupportforhisstrategyfromnationalauthorities.GenZinniraisesapointaboutthecontroloffundingforthecombatant commanders, and the built-in tension between the services and combatantcommands.

Theater Security Cooperation Overview Theater security cooperation (TSC) is part of the combatant commander’s theater strategyof linking military activities involving other countries to U.S. national strategic objectives. ThecharacteristicsofTSCareinherentlyjoint,interagency,andmultinational.Whereasmuchoftherestoftheaterstrategyismilitaryinnature,theatersecuritycooperationincludesmoreofadiplomatic,information,andeconomicflavor[JP3-0,Sep2006,xxvi].Aspartofagreaterinteragencyeffortinnationalsecurity,TSCisacomplementaryactivitywithotheragenciessuchastheDoSwithitsoversightofsecurityassistanceprograms,ortheDepartmentofJusticewhichhastheleadinfightingdrugandhumantrafficking.

The TSC seeks to shape and maintain the international environment within which the U.S.militarymustactduringbothpeacetimeandcontingencies. TheTSCconsistsofboththeoveralltheaterenvironmentinwhichitisexecuted,andtheprogramsthatexecuteit.ThepurposeofTSCistoreinforceeachgeographiccombatantcommander’smissiontodeteraggressionbystrengtheningtiesandinteroperabilitywithfriendlymilitaryforces,supportingregionalstabilityandU.S.values,andshowingU.S.resolveinsupportingallies[JP3-0Sep2006I-6,I-12]. Eachcommand’sTSCiscustomizedtothespecificgeographic,economic,political,demographic,andmilitarysituationsfoundinaregion.Bydesign,TSCstressesactivitiesthatdirectlysupporttheateroperationalplansand objectives. This is unlike the previous philosophy of theater engagement which relied uponvariedmilitaryactivities toonlygeneratebilateralgoodwill;TSC isacontinuousprocess that ispertinent throughallphasesof jointoperationplanning. Itsmultiplyingeffect ismostfeltduringPhase0,Shape,andPhase1,Deter,operationsbecauseeachcansuccessfullyisolateadversariesandbuttressesalliesonitsownreducingtheneedtoresorttocombatoperations[JP3-0sep2006,V-3toV-�].


Eachregion’stheatersecuritycooperationdirectionisderivedfromspecificnationalstrategicengagement known as security cooperation. Security cooperation consists of a focused programofbilateralandmultilateraldefenseactivitiesconductedwithothercountriestoserveU.S.securityinterests,and,asaresult,buildtherightdefensepartnershipsforthefuture[JP5-0Sep2006,I-3].AlthoughforeignpolicyisthepurviewoftheDoS,theDoDisalsoactivelyengagedinforeignpolicythroughsecuritycooperation.Atthestrategiclevel,JointPublication5-0,Joint Operation Planning,states:

Security cooperation consists of a focused program of bilateral and multilateraldefenseactivitiesconductedwithforeigncountriestoserveU.S.mutualsecurityinterestsandbuilddefensepartnerships. Securitycooperationeffortsshouldalsobealignedtosupport strategic communication themes, messages, and actions. The [Secretary ofDefense] identifies security cooperation goals, assesses the effectiveness of securitycooperationactivitiesandrevisesgoalswhenrequiredtoensurecontinuedsupportforU.S.interestsabroad. Althoughtheycanshiftovertime,examplesoftypicalsecuritycooperationgoalsinclude:creatingfavorablemilitarygeographicalbalancesofpower,advancingmutualdefenseorsecurityarrangements;buildingalliedandfriendlymilitarycapabilities for self-defense andmultinational operations, and preventing conflict andcrisis.[24Aug2006,pgI-3]

AgeographiccombatantcommanderfocusessecuritycooperationatthetheaterlevelbyderivinghistheatersecuritycooperationguidancefromsourcessuchasthePresident’sUCPandtheCJCS’sJSCP[JP5-0sigAug2006,II-5].However,theSecretaryofDefense’sCPGAnnexA,andSecurity Cooperation Guidance (SCG) (see Fig. 7) articulate more specific direction for the combatantcommanders,JointStaff,eachoftheServices,andthedefenseagencies[JP3-0Sep2006,I-3,I-9].Theoverallcombatantcommander’stheatersecuritycooperationprogramistheinterpretationofthisnationalsecuritydirection,andbuiltfromthefoundationofaregionalstrategicappraisal.Theatersecuritycooperationisexecutedthroughthetheatersecuritycooperationplan(TSCP),whichproposesandprioritizesmilitaryactivitieswithothercountries[JP3-0Sep2006,I-6].TheTSCPactivitiesmustdemonstrablysupportthetheater’sstrategyanddefenserelationshipstopromotespecifiedU.S.securityinterestsidentifiedinJointPublication5-0,Joint Operation Planning,as:

• Militarycontacts,includingseniorofficialvisits,portvisits,counterpartvisits, conferences,stafftalks,andpersonnelandunitexchangeprograms.

• Nationalassistance,includingforeigninternaldefense,securityassistanceprograms, andplannedhumanitarianandcivicassistanceactivities.

• Multinationaltraining.

• Multinationalexercises,includingthoseinsupportofthePartnershipforPeace Program.

• MultinationaleducationforU.S.personnelandpersonnelfromothernations,both overseasandintheUnitedStates.

• Armscontrolandtreatymonitoringactivities.[24Aug2006,pgI-3]

The subordinate service components of each combatant command (for instance, PacificAirForcesinPacificCommand)playanimportantroleinTSC,especiallywhendirectlydealingwiththecounterpartServicecomponentsoftargetnations.


Vignette5:Clancy,TomwithTonyZinniandTomKoltz.Battle Ready.NewYork:G.P.Putnam’sandSons.2004.pp.316-318.TheseareGenZinni’smusingsovertheimportanceofengagement(thetermthenusedforwhatwe now call theater security cooperation) towar fighting. He is outspokenforengaging in“notstrictlymilitaryactivities” thatstill impacted the theater,suchasenvironmentalsecurity.Heagainilluminatestheimportanceofinteragencyoperations,especiallyinsupporting“notstrictlymilitary”concerns.

Theater Security Cooperation Planning ATSCP is a deliberately developed plan covering non-combat military activities with othernationswithinaregion.ATSCPimplementsthecombatantcommander’stheatersecuritycooperationprogram,andthusisawaytoshapethesecurityenvironmenttoprotectandpromoteU.S.interestsandregionalobjectives[JP3-0Sep2006,I-6].ATSCPisajointstrategicplan,partofthejointoperationplanning familypresentedearlier. JointPublication5-0,Joint Operation Planning, describes theTSCPplanningprocess:

In response to direction in the DoD Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG), [combatantcommanders],ServiceChiefs,andcombatsupportagenciesdirectorspreparesecuritycooperationstrategiesinaccordancewithSCGobjectivesforCJCSreviewandSecretaryofDefenseapproval,withthegeographiccombatantcommandersasthesupportedentities.Thesestrategiesserveasthebasisforsecuritycooperationplanning.Collaborationamongthecombatantcommands,Services,and combat support agencies is essential. Equally important is the close coordination with U.S.agenciesthatrepresentotherinstrumentsofnationalpower,andparticularlywiththeU.S.ChiefsofMission(Ambassadors)intheCCDRs’AORs.[JP5-0sig24Aug06I-3]

ATSCPiscomposedofatheatersituationoverview,thecombatantcommander’smission,howtheplanwillbeexecuted,anassessmentoftheprogramtodate,andthecurrentplan’simplementation[CJCSM3113.01A31May2000,C1toC-8].TheSituationsectionisderivedfromanarea’sregionalstrategicappraisalandanalyzestheenvironmentinwhichtheTSCPwillbeimplemented.TheMissionstates the theater’s prioritized regional objectives (see Fig. 8) as derived from national strategicdirection.Thecombatantcommandergivesguidanceonthethreatstosecurityandstabilityinthetheater,opportunities,assumptions,andaplanningscheduletodevelopaTSCP[CJCSM3113.01A31May2000,A-10toA-11].

Figure7.OSDSecurityCooperationGuidanceThemes

• Combatterrorism • Transformingalliancesandbuildingcoalitionsforthefuture • Influencethestrategicdirectionofkeypowers • Cooperatewithpartiestoregionaldisputes • Combatingweaponsofmassdestructionproliferation • Strengtheningalliances • Realignglobalpostureandoverseasfootprint


Figure8.SamplesofEUCOMTheaterSecurityCooperationObjectives

• EncourageNATO,EuropeanUnion,andEuropeannationstoencouragebeyond Europe

• Promotecombinedapproachesinthewaronterrorism

• Ensureaccesstoanduseofsupportingfacilitiesandinfrastructure

• Revitalizethepartnershipforpeace

• RevitalizeMediterraneandialogue

• Promotehumanimmunodeficiencyvirusandacquiredimmunodeficiencysyndrome awarenessandprevention

• Improveabilitiesofsub-regionalorganizationsandkeypartnerstoconductstability operationsandfightterrorism

Theexecutionsectionof theplanconsistsof thecommander’svision,objectives,prioritizedeffects (all three defining a theater strategic end state), and concept sections. The centerpiece isthecombatantcommander’sconceptwhichoutlinessecuritycooperationactivities,resources,andinteragencycoordinationneeded to realize thestatedvisionandobjectives [CJCSM3113.01A31May2000,C-3toC-�].Thesecuritycooperationactivitiescomprisethetypicalwaysthroughwhichtheatersecuritycooperationisexecuted,whiletheresourcesandinteragencycoordinationsectionsrepresentthemeans.Assessmentofpasttheatersecuritycooperationisneededtoimprovethecurrentplan,andthoselessonsshouldbeappliedthroughtheTSCP’sImplementationGuidance.Theannexesprovidedetailedinformationonthetheatersecurityactivitiesandinteragencycoordinationrequiredbytheplan[CJCSM3113.01A31May2000,C-6toC-8].

ThecrucialpartofaTSCPistheconceptsection’ssecuritycooperationactivitiestoengageothercountriesanddirectlysupportthecombatantcommander’sstrategy,andthecomplementaryannexes.Foreaseoforganization,CJCSManual3113.01A,Theater Engagement Planning,listseightseparatecategoriesforconsiderationwhendevelopingsecuritycooperationactivities[CJCSM3113.01A31May2000,C-4toC-6].Theunderpinningofeachoftheseactivitycategoriesremainssolid,butintheyearssinceCJCSM3113.01Awaswrittenmuchhaschangedintheperspectiveofjointdoctrine.Forthatreason,amodifiedlistingofseventheatersecuritycooperationactivitycategoriesbaseduponnewJointPublication5-0,JointOperationPlanning,guidancewouldbebestrepresentedas:

• Multinationalexercises

• Multinationaltraining

• Multinationaleducation

• Securityassistance

• Humanitarianandcivicassistance

• Military-to-militarycontacts

• Otherengagementactivities

Theseactivitiesshouldsupportspecifictheaterobjectives,sonoteverycategorywillbegivenequalimportanceorweightdependinguponwhatneedstobeaccomplished.TheSCGenumeratesotherengagementactivitiestoinclude:

• Bilateralinformationoperations

• Intelligencesharing


• Armscontrolandmonitoring

• Defenseexperimentationandindustrialcooperation

Oncedeveloped,eachTSCPisreviewedbythetheater’sservicecomponentstodeveloptheirownsupportingplans. ATSCPcoversa seven-yearperiod [CJCSM3113.01A31May2000,A-�].Uponcompletion,theTSCPisforwardedtotheChairman,JointChiefsofStaffforreviewandinclusion in a global family of security cooperation plans. This review should ensure theTSCPattainsnationalobjectives,andthat togethereachof theregionalTSCPsissustainableatagloballevel[CJCSM3113.01A31May2000,A-�toA-5].Thesetheaterplansarealsocoordinatedwithsimilarplansthateachoftheservicesproduce,andaresupportedbydefenseagenciessuchastheDefenseSecurityCooperationAgency,DefenseLogisticsAgency,themilitaryservicesandunifiedcommandssuchasU.S.TransportationCommandorU.S.SpecialOperationsCommand[CJCSM3113.01A31May2000,A-8].

AlthoughCJCSM3113.01A,Theater Engagement Planning,callsforanationallevelreviewofthemilitary’stheatersecuritycooperationprogramsthereisnoprocessinplacetoprioritizeeffortswithinthegovernment,andtheprocesswithintheDepartmentofDefensehasnotprioritizedwellamongitscommands,agencies,andServiceseither.Thissituationhasledonewarcollegescholarto observe, “because there is nonational level prioritization, eachparticular component is left todeterminewhichrequirementtosupport.”[Hagar,1-28]DirectionfromtheSecretaryofDefenseinhisSecurityCooperationGuidanceattemptstoremedythissituation,aspartofhistransformationeffortsinsecuritycooperation.

Vignette6:Clancy,TomwithTonyZinniandTomKoltz.BattleReady.NewYork:G.P.Putnam’sandSons.2004.pp.337-338.ThisreadingfromGenZinni’smemoirsastheCENTCOMcommanderisanexampleofengagingYementokeepitfrombecomingafailedstate.Heoffersseveralwaysthroughsecurity assistance and intelligence sharing to make a difference. Notice how theatersecuritycooperationworkstobenefitbothparties,andhowheleveragesseveraltypesofactivitiestoachievehispurpose.

Theater Security Cooperation Execution AsJP3-0,Joint Operations,notes,“securitycooperationisakeyelementofglobalandtheatershapingoperations...”[JP3-0,Sep2006,I-13]andmoreofacombatantcommandstaff’stimeisspentonthesesecuritycooperationactivitiesthananyotheraspectoftheaterstrategy.Inaresourceconstrainedenvironment,asallgovernmentoperationsare,thetricktoexecutingTSCismatchingtheTSCrequirements,whichthecombatantcommanderdeterminesisneededtosucceedinhismission,withfiniteresourcesallocatedtoeachcommanderincompetitionwithotherpriorities.PrioritizationofgoalsandresourcesisanecessityinTSC.ForeachofthetheatersecuritycooperationactivitiesFigure9,thecombatantcommandermustplanfortheforcesandcommandorganizationneededtocontroltheseendeavors,andthemovementandsustainmentaspectsthatsupportthem.Allofthesevariousactionstoimplementtheatersecuritycooperationactivitiesareultimatelymeanttopreparethecommandtomeetitsassignedmissions,tobalancetherisk,andmanagetheconsequencesinherentintryingtoattaintheobjectivesofitsstrategyinafiscalandresource-constrainedenvironment.


Figure9.SamplesofTheaterSecurityCooperationActivities

• Multinationalexercises

•• Fieldtrainingexercises

•• Commandpostsimulations

• Multinationaltraining

•• Jointcombinedexchangetraining

• Multinationaleducation

•• Regionalcenterforsecuritystudies

•• Seniorservicecolleges

• Securityassistance

•• Foreignmilitarysales

•• Internationalmilitaryeducationandtraining

• Military-to-miitarycontacts

•• Seniorofficervisits

•• Portvisits

•• Jointcontactteams

• Humanitarianandcivicassistance

•• Mineclearing

•• Excessproperty

• OtherActivities

•• Exerciserelatedconstruction

•• Intelligencesecuritycooperation

•• Informationoperations

•• Commandandcontrolprograms

Althoughthecommandersandstaffsofthecombatantcommands,militaryservices,anddefensesupportagencieseachplayanimportantroleinplanningandexecutingtheatersecuritycooperation,thesecurityassistanceoffices(SAOs)whicharepartofthecountryteamofmostAmericanembassies,arethepintmen.TheSAOsaremilitarymembers,DoDcivilians,andhostnationemployeesthatcloselyworkwiththehostgovernmenttoensurethattheirsecurityrequirementsandthecombatantcommander’ssecuritycooperationplanforthatcountrymesh.TheSAOmembersalsoensurethattheireffortsinsupportingthemilitaryelementsofpowerwiththehostnationarealsosynchronizedwiththebroaderdiplomatic,economic,andinformationactivitiesestablishedbytheAmericanambassadorreferencingtheNational Security StrategyandDoS’Strategic Plan.TheSAOusuallyadministersinternationalmilitaryeducationandtrainingandothertrainingandeducationprogramsbymatchinghostcountryneedstoavailableU.S.positions,andcoordinatingtheU.S.fundingallottedtosomecountries.SAOsalsoarrangeforsalesordonationsofmilitarygoods,services,andtrainingtothehostcountrythroughforeignmilitarysales,whicharesalesdirectlyfromtheU.S.government;directcommercialsales,whicharesalesbrokeredbytheU.S.governmentbutarefromaU.S.company;or one of several other special programs that transfer goods to developing countries. SAOs incoordinationwiththeDefenseAttaché’sOffice,whichisalsopartofthecountryteam,mayalsoberesponsible forcoordinatingbilateralexercises,U.S.participation in tradeandair shows,overseeexchangeprogramsandmilitarytomilitaryexchanges,orberesponsibleforahostofmanyothersecuritycooperationactivities.Theoverlapofdutiesbetweenthesetwomilitaryagenciesrequires


closecooperationbetween the two. SAOsare thecombatant commander’sdirect representativestotheirhostcountry,andresponsibleforthesuccessofthecommand’stheaterstrategyandtheatersecuritycooperationintheiraffectedarea. The planning and execution of these security cooperation activities by the SAO and otherinvolved DoD organizations, directly support combatant commanders when preparing for futuremilitaryoperations,especiallyengagingfriendlyandneutralcountries,anddeterringhostilitieswithpotentialopponents.TheU.S.militaryemploysafullspectrumofactionstoprotectnationalinterestsrangingfrommutualpeace-timecooperationtofullcombatagainstaggressors.ShapingmaybethemostimportantoftheseOPLANphasesbecause,ifsuccessfullyconducted,shapingactivitiescanbythemselvesreducethefrequencyofcrises,andtherebyaverttheneedtoresorttocombatoperations.ShapingactionsalsopromoteU.S.andcoalitionpartners’mutualinterests,increaseunderstandingof the region,andstrengthen futuremultinationalmilitarybondsandoperations. This shaping isaccomplished through security activities that organize and train forces, maintain operational areaaccess,rehearsaloperationalplans throughexercises,employspaceassets,andanticipatestabilityoperationsthatmayoccurinlaterphases[JP3-0Sep2006,V-3toV-4].AsthedarkblueareainFigure10 shows, shapingactivities remains tobe the foundationuponwhich theotherphasesofmilitaryoperationsaredeveloped.

Theconsiderationsbehind thephasesofmajoroperations thatcombatantcommandersmakewhenengagingfriendlyandneutralcountries,anddeterringhostilitieswithpotentialopponentsareamajor componentof theater strategy, andaredirectly supportedby theater security cooperationactivities.TheU.S.militaryemploysafullspectrumofactionstoprotectnationalinterestsrangingfrommutualpeace-timecooperationtofullcombatagainstaggressors. Shapingmaybe themostimportant of these OPLAN phases because, if successfully conducted, shaping activities can bythemselvesreducethefrequencyofcrises,andtherebyaverttheneedtoresorttocombatoperations.ShapingactionsalsopromoteU.S.andcoalitionpartners’mutualinterests,increaseunderstandingof the region, and strengthen future multinational military bonds and operations.This shaping isaccomplished through security activities that organize and train forces, maintain operational area

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Figure 10. Generic OPLAN Phasing versus Level of Military Effort. (Joint Staff J7) (Vego, 5)


access, rehearseoperationalplans throughexercises, employ spaceassets, andanticipate stabilityoperations thatmayoccur in laterphases[JP3-0Sep2006,V-3toV-4].As thedarkbluearea inFigure10shows,shapingactivitiesremainthefoundationuponwhichtheotherphasesofmilitaryoperationsaredeveloped.

Deterphaseoperationsarecloselylinkedtotheshapingactivities,althoughintheformertheroleoftheatersecuritycooperationdiminishes.Deteroperationsareovertconventionaldeterrenceorincreasedreadinesstoaverttheneedfortheviolentuseofmilitaryforce.TheDeterphasepreparestheU.S.militarytoconductpotentialhigh-tempooperationsintendingtopreemptfurtheradverseactionsby anopponent.With the contingencybetter defined in this phase, deterrenceoperations preparejoint intelligencepreparationof theoperationalenvironmentandunderstandingof theoperationalarea’sphysicalenvironment;preparetheoperationalareathroughuseofspecialoperations,stabilityoperations, civil affairs activities, and logistics sustainment; continue the employment of spacecapabilities;enableforceprotection;anduseflexibledeterrentoptionsinordertoisolateanopponentandstymiehostileintentionsbeforeresortingtocombat[JP3-0Sep2006,V-4toV-8].Whileshapingactivitiesanddeterrenceoperationsdirectlybenefitthemostfromtheatersecuritycooperation,theatersecuritycooperationspansallsixphasesofmilitaryoperationsand isavaluableaugmentation toeach.Theatersecuritycooperation isacontinuingactivity foreachcombatantcommand,militaryService,anddefenseagencyduringalllevelsofpeace,contingencies,andwar.

Vignette7:Clancy,TomwithTonyZinniandTomKoltz.Battle Ready.NewYork:G.P.Putnam’sandSons.2004.pp.181-183.TheseareGenZinni’smemoirscoveringhistimeastheEUCOMdeputyJ-3from1990to1992.After the fallof theBerlinWall,butbefore theendof theSovietUnion, theEUCOMcommander,GeneralGalvin,sentacontingentofofficerstoMoscowaspartofhiscommand’sengagementactivities.ThenBrigGenZinnidiscussestheimportanceandintentofmilitary-to-militarycontactsforacombatantcommander.

Summary ThisoverviewoftheaterstrategyandtheatersecuritycooperationisaprimerononeofthemostimportanttoolstheU.S.militaryusestoengageothercountries,deterunwantedactions,anddefendU.S.andfriendlynationinterests.Tobeeffective,theaterstrategyandtheatersecuritycooperationmustbederivedfromandconsistentlylinkedtonationalandmultinationalstrategicguidanceandpolicy,andformulatedtomeettherequirementsfoundineachoftheworld’sregions.Toattainthesecuritygoals of a combatant commander’s strategy, the proper support for joint operation plans throughorganizational structure, force projection, sustainment, readiness training, and force developmentinputisessential.Acrucialmeanstoattainacombatantcommander’sobjectivesisthroughtheproperderivation and development of theater security cooperation.Theater security cooperation directlysupportsnationalgoalsattheregionallevel,andenhancesmilitaryoperationsbyobviatingtheneedformilitaryaction,orbypreparingtheenvironmentbetterforU.S.militaryinterventionshoulditbenecessary.Theaterstrategyisanimportantpartofrealizingnationalstrategyaroundtheworld,andtheatersecuritycooperationisnotonlyoneofthemostpowerfultoolsinattainingthegoalsoftheaterstrategybut,throughitsabilitytoobviatetheneedforviolentmilitaryaction,acosteffectivetoolaswell.TheOperationEnduringFreedomcasestudyshowshoweachofpartoftheaterstrategyandtheatersecuritycooperationismanifestinanunexpectedmilitaryoperationandtheactionsthatleduptoitintheyearsbefore.Theater Strategy: Operation Enduring Freedom Case StudyOperation Enduring Freedom Overview OperationEnduringFreedom(OEF)inAfghanistanwasnotthecampaignforwhichtheU.S.militaryhadpreparedintheyearsfollowingOperationDesertStorm.ForavarietyofreasonsOEF


wasacombinationofhightechnologyweaponsandsophisticatedcommandandcontrolwithtacticsandequipmentU.S.forceshadnotseriouslyemployedinnearlyacentury.Bynecessityitsoperationsandsupportwerebothjointandcombinedinwaysthearmedforceshadnotconsideredbefore.Yet,byrelyingoninternationalconnectionsestablishedintheyearsleadingtothisunexpectedoperation,modifyingestablishedprocesses,andthecreativityandingenuityofprofessionalandwell-ledforces,U.S.forceswereabletocompletetheirassignedcombatmissions.Doingsowasdifficult,however,andpresentedmanychallenges.

TheOEFwasashort-notice,comeasyouareoperation.ItwasfoughtinaregioninwhichtheU.S.militaryhadcompletedlittlecontingencyplanning,conductedwithminimalcrisisactionpreparation,andtheactivecombatpartwasofrelativelyshortdurationandusedlimitedU.S.forces.Itwasanoperational success, replacing thepariahgovernmentof theTalibanwithonemore representativeofthepeopleofAfghanistanandwillingtoadheretotheconventionsofcivilizednations.Terroristorganizations, most notably al Qaeda, lost an important sanctuary for their activities, and wereweakened. However, thisoperationalsobecame thebasis for significantchanges tomilitaryandinteragencyprocessesandoperationsthatweretofollow,duetotheproblemsencounteredduringitsexecution.Someoftheseproblems,especiallytheinterdependenceofoperations,andstrategyandsecuritycooperationatthenationalandtheaterlevels,arethefocusofthiscasestudy.

This case studycovers the theater security cooperationendeavors inCENTCOMfrom1996to 2001, and the national and theater strategy that developed for OEF before and during combatoperations.Itreviewsandappliesthetheaterstrategyconceptsdescribedinthisarticle,andcontraststhedoctrinalprocessofdevelopingtheaterstrategywiththereactivecrisisactionmethodsthatwereadaptedfromtheestablishedprocessesforOEF.ThenextsectionfocusesonthenationaldirectiongiventothecombatantcommanderwagingOEFandtheoperationsthatresulted.Withthisbetterunderstandingofoperationsanddirectiongivenduringtheoperation,thefinalpartofthiscasestudypresents the theater security cooperation that preceded theoperation, andhow it affected combatoperations.Thefirstreading,below,isanearlyanalysisofOEFtofamiliarizethereaderwiththatoperation.

Reading 1: Bonin, JohnA. Operation Enduring Freedom: An In-Stride Analysis of the Afghanistan Campaign. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Department of MilitaryStrategy,PlanningandOperations,U.S.ArmyWarCollege.May2002.pp.3-23.ThisstudyisanearlyanalysisofOperationEnduringFreedomhighlightingthedifficultyofexecutingnationalandtheaterlevelstrategyinanunexpectedsituation,andusingjointforcestocombatterrorism.Readthistoascertainnationalstrategicdirectionandmissionsgiven to thecombatantcommander, and then foranunderstandingofhowoperationsevolved.As an early review of an operation, this study is subject to further revision.ReproducedwithpermissionoftheArmyHeritageFoundation,Carlisle,Pennsylvania.

Theater Strategy and Crisis Planning in Operation Enduring Freedom ThissectionpresentsthedevelopmentofcombatoperationsinEnduringFreedom,whichdidnotfollowthecontingencyplanningprocessaspresentedinthisarticle.TheattacksontheU.S.homelandsurprisedmanybythequarterfromwhichtheycame.Asaresult,therewaslittledirectguidanceorpreparationformilitaryoperationsagainstAfghanistanbeforeSeptember2001,althoughdiplomatic,information,andeconomicelementsofpowerwerealreadyengagedinisolatingtheTalibanregimeandpressuringalQaeda.PlansexistedinCENTCOMforstrikesagainstAfghanitargets,ashadbeendonebythepreviousadministration,buttherewerenoplansforgroundoperationsorregimechange,hence this was a crisis action planning process. Nonetheless, national and theater guidance werequicklydevelopedintostrategiesthatguidedoperations. Thispartofthecasestudycontraststhecontingencyplanningprocessofdevelopingnationalandtheaterstrategieswiththeadhocprocess


thatfollowedtheSeptember11,2001attacks,toshowthatthedeliberateprocesscanbeadaptedwhenneeded,andthatitisoftenamessierprocessthanmilitarymanualsshow.Indeed,tomakemattersworse,asnationalstrategicdirectiondevelopedandevolvedduringOEF,theoperation’sgoalsandobjectivesrapidlychangedtokeeppace.

Below,readthepresidentialadministration’snationalsecuritypolicydirectivethatwastoolateininfluencingpolicywithregardtotheTaliban,andtheexamplesofnationalsecuritydirectionthatweregivenonthefly.Theevolvingnationalsecuritydirectionanddemandforimmediateactionmadedevelopingacoherenttheaterstrategytocounterterrorism,particularlyalQaedaandthegovernmentsthatharboredthem,difficulttodevelop.

Reading2:CombatingTerrorism,National Security Policy Directive (NSPD) 9.Summarymadeby theFederationofAmericanScientistsathttp://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-9.htm.25October2001.The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) is a watchdog group that acts as aconvenientclearinghouseforgovernmentdocuments.Fromopensourcereporting,FAShasassembledthecontentoftheotherwiseclassifiedNSPD9,whichwasthefirstpolicydirectiveofthenewBushadministrationtoaddressterrorismandalQaeda.Ironicallyitwassettobesignedon10September2001.ThiswasoneofthefewnationalsecuritydirectiondocumentsissuedduringOperationEnduringFreedom,anditwasreleased18daysaftercombatoperationsstarted.Reading3:Woodward,Bob.Bush at War.NewYork:SimonandSchuster.2002.Readpp.30-33.Inthispassage,BobWoodwardchroniclestheformationofnationalstrategicdirectionforthecrisisactionresponsethatledtoOEF.ThePresident’sspeechontheeveningofSeptember11,2001establishestheBush Doctrine,declaringthatAmericawouldpursuethosewhoplannedandexecutedterroristacts,andthosewhoharboredthem.Securitypolicyandnationalstrategicdirectionaresometimespromulgatedinthiswaythroughdramaticpublicspeeches,especiallyinacrisis.Intheend,nationalstrategyisalwaysthePresident’stomake;inthiscasethePresidentdidnotconsultwiththeVicePresident,SecretaryofState,orSecretaryofDefense.Reading�:Woodward,Bob.Bush at War.NewYork:SimonandSchuster.2002.Readpp.97-101.On17September2001,BobWoodwardrecountsaNationalSecurityCouncilmeetinginwhichthePresidentgivescleardirectionbasedondiscussionsheldearlieronSeptember16,2001(pages78to81).HechoosesthelevelofthemilitaryresponseagainstAfghanistan,how wide to make the war on terrorism, and issues diplomatic initiatives, as part ofnational securitydirection. In the second reading,memosare signedwhich formallyissuestrategicdirectionfornearlyallaspectsofdiplomatic, information,military,andeconomicresponses.Reading5:Woodward,Bob.Bush at War.NewYork:SimonandSchuster.2002.Readpp.229-23�.ThissnapshotbyBobWoodwardchroniclesthecontinuingformationofnationalstrategicdirectionforOEF. Objectivesfor thecampaignareexaminedindetailbythecabinetprincipals.Notetheissuesthatarisewithrelyingonindigenousoppositionforces,thediscussiononinteragencycooperation,supportfromothercountries,andprioritization.Theprincipalcabinetmembers involvedmaybe trying todirecteventsoutsideof thecontroloftheUnitedStates,andaredoingsoonOctober11,2001,fivedaysafterthestart


ofhostilities.JawbreakeristhecodenameofthefirstCentralIntelligenceAgencyteamoperatinginsideAfghanistan.Reading6:Franks,TommyandMalcomMcConnell.American Soldier.NewYork,ReganBooks.2004.Readpp.249-252,255-262,and278-282.Inhisautobiography,theCommanderofCENTCOMrecountshowhiscommandbuilttheguidanceandplanthatdirectedOEF.Hehadtodesignthemilitaryresponsewithminimal guidance from command authorities because they were developing nationaldirectionduring this timetoo,as thereadingsaboveindicated. TheCENTCOMstaffusedtheirbestjudgmentofwhattheirbosseswouldwant,andstartedtobuildatheaterstrategytomeetthenewsituation.ThispassageoutlinesthethreeoptionsthateventuallyevolvedintoOEF.

Theater Security Cooperation and Operation Enduring Freedom Asashortnoticecrisis,OEFwasessentiallyfoughtwiththeenvironment,forces,andprocessesthatwere inplaceonSeptember10,2001.Thenational and theater securitycooperationpursuedwithcountriesoftheCENTCOMregionpriortohostilitiessetthestageforwhatwaspossible,ornotpossible,duringtheoperation.Althoughadditionaldiplomatic,information,military,andeconomicactionswereaccomplishedintheharried,confuseddaysthatfollowedtheSeptember11,2001attacks,operationswereconductedbasedontheinternationalpoliticalenvironmentthatCENTCOMandtheDoScarefullyconstructedintheyearsprior.SincefewpeopleseriouslyplannedforaregimechangeinAfghanistanbeforeSeptember11,2001,thesesecuritycooperationeffortswerefocusedonachievingoutcomesfordifferentpurposesandindifferentplaces.Thepersonalcontacts,establishedtrustandprocedures among governments, familiarity with bases and forces, and exercised interoperability,however,gaveCENTCOMoperationalflexibilitytopursueOEF.Inparticular,CENTCOMbenefitedfrominternationalassistancewhichprovidedoverflightpermission,basing,intelligence,forces,ormanyotherformsofsupportandaidfromKuwaittoKyrgyzstanandbeyond..

ThereadingsbelowofferexamplesoftheatersecuritycooperationeffortsthatprecededSeptember11,2001,andsetthestageforOEF.Thesearetheshapingactivitiesthattheatersecuritycooperationsupports,soyouwillreadexamplesofsecuritycooperationcontinuingaroundtheregion,asanothermeansofinfluencingtheoutcomeoftheconflict.Thesedocumentsshowwhatwasdonetoengagethepoliticalandmilitaryinterestsinthisregion,andhowsuchrelationswereusedtosupportOEF.Notealso theweaknessesof the securitycooperationefforts that leftoperationalgaps tofill, andthreatenedthesuccessofOEF.ThereadingsbelowarepresentedintheapproximatechronologicalsequenceunderthreesuccessiveCENTCOMcommanders,GeneralPeay,GeneralZinni,andGeneralFranks.

Reading7:Peay,J.H.Binford.Game Plan 1996-1997.MacDillAirForceBase,Florida:CentralCommand,PublicAffairsOffice.1996.Readpp.3-14. This is anoverviewof theater strategyandengagementusedby theCommander,CENTCOMfrom1996to1997.Sincetheaterstrategyandtheatersecuritycooperationare long-range activities, the actions taken or not taken during this time would havereachedfruitionduringOEF.ReadthisdocumenttoseehowCENTCOMapproachedengagement with key supporters of the future OEF effort, to include Pakistan, Qatar,SaudiArabia,Kuwait,andBahrain.AlthoughinitsAOR,crucialgovernmentsaffectedbyOEF,IranandAfghanistan,didnothavediplomatictieswiththeU.S.,andthereforewerenotdirectlyinfluencedbytheaterstrategy;however,thatstrategymayhavebeenformedwiththosecountriesinmind.OtherkeyplayerssuchasUzbekistanandKyrgyzstanwere not assigned by the Unified Command Plan to CENTCOM’sAOR until 1999.


AlthoughmarkedForOfficialUseOnly,thisdocument’sproponenthasdeterminedthattheprotectivemarkingnolongerapplies.Reading8:Clancy,Tom,withTonyZinniandTomKoltz.Battle Ready.NewYork:G.P.Putnam’sandSons.2004.Readpp.335-336. InthissetofreadingsfromGenZinni’smemoirs,heiscommanderofCENTCOM.Hewritesaboutatimewheretherelationshipshegainedthroughthemilitary-to-militaryrelationshipsoftheatersecuritycooperationopeneddoorsduringacrisisinMay1998,whichwereotherwiseunavailable.HisinsightonPakistan’sviewstowardcooperatingwiththeU.S.beforethetragediesinSeptember11,2001,isimportant,andshedsomeunderstandingonPakistan’sinvolvementinOEF.Reading9:Clancy,Tom,withTonyZinniandTomKoltz.Battle Ready.NewYork:G.P.Putnam’sandSons.200�.Readpp.3�2-3�3. InthisreadingfromGenZinni’smemoirs,hediscusseshisfirstvisittocentralAsiaasthecommanderofCENTCOMinSeptember1998.Heanalyzesthestateofaffairsbetween these countries and the U.S. before September 2001, and the problems theyfaced. Heaccesses theeffectivenessofhis theater securitycooperationplan,and thegrowingthreatofalQaedaintheregion.Reading 10: Franks, Tommy R., Posture of Military Forces – CENTCOM. MacDillAir Force Base, Florida: CENTCOM. 28March 2001. Posture statement presentedto the 107th Congress, House of Representatives Committee on theArmed Services.pages 13 through 57. Accessed at: http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has087000.000/has087000_0.HTM(onSeptember25,2006). TheCommander,CENTCOMgavethissummaryofthestateofhiscommandandregionsixmonthsbeforethecommencementofOEF.Hestartsbycitingactivitiesthatarepartofhistheaterengagementplan(nowknownastheatersecuritycooperationplan).General Franks presents threats in the region, which are many, but only specificallymentionsAfghanistanorcentralAsiatwice,onceobliquelythroughterrorismandoncewithsmuggling.IfcentralAsiawasnotaconcerntoCongressorCENTCOM,it thenfollowsthatthetheaterstrategywouldnotaddressthisregionsufficientlyeither.Reading11:Woodward,Bob.Bush at War.NewYork:SimonandSchuster.2002.pp.172-173,and199. At the September 29, 2001 National Security Council meeting, BobWoodward’saccountstressesnationalsecuritycooperationefforts.Multinationalsupportisbeginning,butUzbekistanremainsanunknown.Akeyquestionfromthismeetingis“weneedtoidentifywhatthePentagonwantsfromcountries...”ByOctober�,2001,inthesecondreading, Uzbekistan was supporting U.S. military requirements. Security cooperationseemstohaveachieveditsdesiredeffect.Reading12:Williamson,JoelE.andJenniferD.P.Moroney. Security Cooperation Pays Off: A Lesson from the Afghan War. DFI Government Practice Inc. DFI GovernmentPractice, Inc., publication, web site [email protected]. Accessed at: http://disam.osd.mil/pubs/INDEXES/Journals/Journal_Index/v.2�_3/Williamson,%20Joel%20E.,%20and%20Moroney,%20Jennifer%20D.P.,%20Dr..pdfon15Jul2006.pp.79-82.

ThisarticlegivesabriefoverviewofthetypesofsecuritycooperationthattheUnitedStatesconductedinCentralAsiabycountrybetween1996and2001andtheoperationalimpacttheyhad


forOperationEnduringFreedom. Thearticleadvocatesfor increaseduseofsecuritycooperationbecauseitisacosteffectivemilitaryoperationsenabler.Case Study Points to Consider • Inordertoexaminetheeffectivenessoftheatersecuritycooperationinsupportingcombat operationsduringOEF,wemustfirstnotethetheaterstrategy,missions,andobjectivesthat guided its efforts. Identify the national strategic guidance given to the CENTCOM commanderinthewakeoftheSeptember2001attacks,andtheformalnationalstrategic directiongivenindocumentsthatprecededtheattackbutmightstillbeapplicabletothe situation.Commentonhoweffectivetheguidancewastowardsreachingitsgoals.

• Afteridentifyingthenationalstrategicguidancegiven,identifythemissionandgoalsthat GeneralFranksissuedtohiscommandtoguidetheOEFeffort,andshowthelinksbetween nationalandtheaterguidance,ifany.

• Since therewas little time to reflecton the situationandactionwasdemandedquickly, wastherightnationalstrategicandtheaterguidancegiven,diditsufficientlycoverwhat neededtobecovered,anddiditoutlinewhatwasneededtoimplementit?Asanoperational commander,wastheresomethingelseyouwouldhavewishedwasgiven?Wastheguidance givensufficienttoreachthegoalsthatwereset?

• Many restraints and constraints were placed on military operations, because of the environmentinwhichOEFwasfought.Thatenvironmentwasshapedinlargepartbythe theatersecuritycooperationpoliciesandactivitiesthatCENTCOMengagedinbeforeand during OEF. Identify the theater security activities that occurred or were proposed between1996and2001,andcritiquetheirinfluenceonsuccessesandproblemsinOEF. Were these TSCP activities able to support combat operations in a way and place not considered when they were proposed? Discuss this in terms of the theater security cooperation categories (Multinational exercises, multinational training, multinational education, security assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, military-to-military contacts, or other engagement activities) as conducted with countries in the region and surroundingregions.

• TSCPsaremeanttoshapetheAORforpotentialfutureoperations,andtheOEFcasestudy scenariohereisdifferentonlyinthattheOEFeventshavealreadyoccurred,soweknow the“future”withcertainty.Knowingnowwhatproblemswillneedtoberesolvedforthe “future,”butremainingbasedonthegeneralsituationandguidancein1996,whattheater securitycooperationactivitiesshouldbedevelopedtobetterprepareforanticipatedcombat operationsincentralAsia?

• Aswithanygovernmentendeavor,aTSCPisrestrainedbylimitedfunds,resources,and time.Therefore,theactivitiesofagoodTSCParewrittenwithaneyetosalesmanship, meaningselling theSecretaryofDefense, thePresident, and theCongressonhowwell theactivitiessupportnationalgoalsandobjectives toattainfunding. Theprioritization, integration, and synergy among the activities of a TSCP, and with the activities of the TSCPsofothercombatantcommands,aresellingpoints. Clearsuccinctdescriptionsof theTSCPactivitiesarealsoimportantifwearetoinfluencebusydecisionmakers.Forallof these reasons, integrate thepiecesof theTSCP thatweredevelopedearlier, looking for prioritizationandsynergyamongtheplan’sactivities;clearadherencetonationalguidance throughendsandwayslinks;firmgroundinginthescenarioandaddressingaproblemof concern;andactivitiesthatclearlydescribethemselvesintermsofwho,what,where,when, why,andhow.


ReferencesClancy,TomwithTonyZinniandTomKoltz.Battle Ready.NewYork:G.P.Putnam’sandSons.200�.

CombatantCommands:Funding Through the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff.U.S. Code. Title 10, SubtitleA, Part I,Chapter 6, Paragraph 166a. 2006.Referenced from theCornellUniversityLawSchoolwebsiteat:http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sec_10_00000166---a000-.html.Accessed11October2006.

Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations. Suffolk, Virginia:JointWarfightingCenter,JointConceptDevelopmentandExperimentationDirectorate.24February2006.

DoDDictionaryofMilitaryandAssociatedTerms,JointPublication1-02.Washington,D.C.:U.S.JointChiefsofStaff,J-7.12April2001,asamended14April2006.

Hager, Gregory L. Supporting and Integrating Theater Security Cooperation Plans, U.S. ArmyStrategicResearchProjectA13732�. CarlisleBarracks,Pennsylvania:U.S.ArmyWar College. 3May200�.

JointOperationPlanning,JointPublication5-0SignatureDraft.Washington,DC:U.S.JointChiefsofStaff,24August2006.

JointOperations,Joint Publication 3-0.Washington,DC:U.S.JointChiefsofStaff.17September2006.

The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide,JointForcesStaffCollege(JFSC)Publication1.Washington,D.C.:JointForcesStaffCollege,NationalDefenseUniversity.2000.

Lemons,StevenM.,Guide to Formulating a Net Assessment.CarlisleBarracks,Pennsylvania:U.S.ArmyWarCollegeDepartmentofDistanceEducation.2006.

Lemons, Steven M., Guide to Formulating a Regional Strategic Appraisal. Carlisle Barracks,Pennsylvania:U.S.ArmyWarCollegeDepartmentofDistanceEducation.2006.

Macken,Jerry.Joint Quarterly Readiness Review Update.Washington,D.C.:JointStaffOperationsDivision(J3)ReadinessDivision.Undated.

Meinhart, Richard. Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff 1990-2005.CarlisleBarracks,Pennsylvania: StrategicStudies Institute,April2006.Accessedat:http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub703.pdf#search=%22Strategy%3A%20Foundation%20for%20all%20Major%20Processes%20Joint%20Chiefs%20of%20Staff%22(on25October2006).

Security Assistance.U.S.DepartmentofState,BureauofPolitical-MilitaryAffairs:http://www.state.gov/t/pm/c17251.htm(accessed25October2006).

Vego,Milan,Campaign Planning and the New Joint Publication 5-0.Campaigning.JointAdvancedWarfightingSchool,NationalDefenseUniversity.WashingtonDC.12January2006:page5.accessedat:http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/jaws/Publications/Campaigning_Journal_1-Jan-2006.pdf#search=%22Vego%2C%20Milan%2C%20Campaign%20Planning%20and%20the%20New%20Joint%20Publication%205-0%20%22.

TheaterEngagementPlanning,Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3113.01A.Washington,D.C.:U.S.JointStaff.31May2000.Woodwaud,Bob.BushatWar,NewYork:SimonandSchuster,2002.Peay,J.H.Binfora,GamePlan,1946-`997,p.121.Bonin,JohnA.OperationEnduringFreedom,p.119


Distance Distance Foreign Learning AllDISAM Learning Fiscal Service FiscalYear FiscalYear Percent Year Course USA USAF Maritime National Industry Other Total Total* ofTotal

2004 SAM-OC 64 140 74 5 45 27 355 IPSR-OL 44 363 119 0 145 34 705 Total 1060 4991 21.2%



*Includesallresident,mobileeducationteam(MET)anddistancelearningcourseenrolleesforthefiscalyear.

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management: Distance Learning Updates and Initiatives

By Richard Rempes

and Bill Rimpo

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management In the winter 2003-200� editionof theDISAM Journal,Volume26No. 2,web site: http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/indexes/Journals/Journal_Index/v26-2/McFarland.pdf,wereportedontheprogressofourSecurityAssistanceManagementOnline (SAM-OC)course. Aspromised in thatarticle,wehaveupdatedthecourseinresponsetousercomments.Inaddition,wehavedevelopedandimplementedseveralnewonlinemodulesofinstructiontoprovidejust-in-timetrainingforthesecurityassistancecommunity.Inthisarticle,wewillreportonthestatusoftheOrientationCourse(SAM-OC),andtheInternationalProgramsSecurityRequirements–Online(IPSR-OL)course.Wewill alsodescribe indetail twoofournewestofferings“MilitaryStandardTransactionReportingandAccountingProceduresforForeignMilitarySales”(MILSTRIP)and“SecurityCooperationandHumanRights.”Status of Fielded Courses TheSAM-OCandIPSR-OLcoursescontinuetoprovideanalternativetoconventionalclassroominstructionforhundredsofstudentsinneedofinitialandrefreshertraininginsecurityassistanceandinternationalprogramssecurity.Thefollowingchartdetailsenrollmentinthesetwocoursesoverthepastthreeyears:

EDUCATION AND TRAINING


SAM-OC Updates Severalchangeswereimplementedtoimprovetheoverallfunctionalityofthecourseinadditiontoupdatesforvolatilecontentincludinglegislativeandpolicychanges,currentforeignmilitarysales(FMS)figuresandagencynameandaddresschanges.

• Thethreequizzesassociatedwiththecoursehavebeenre-writtentonowpresent20 multiplechoicequestionseach(vice17).Studentswillnowseeeachquizscorein Blackboard (DISAM’s online learning management system) under “My Grades” as a percentage (e.g. 80/100) as opposed to a raw numeric score. Additionally, a glitch that caused randomly selected questions to occasionallyappearmorethanonceinaquizhasbeenfixed.

• Aprintfunctionhasbeenaddedonthemainmenuthatallowsforeitherfull(landscape) orhalfpage(portrait)printoutsofthecurrentlessonpage.

• The audio narration has been recoded into a “streaming” format which allows for playbacktobeginassoonasasmallportionoftheaudiofilehasbeendownloaded.

• Theregistrationprocesshasbeenchangedfromself-enrollmentinBlackboardtoan automaticenrollmentprocesshandledbytheDISAMregistrar.

• Coursecertificatesarenowprovidedviaalinkinane-mailsenttostudentswithinfive workingdaysofsuccessfulcompletionofthecourse.International Programs Security Requirements-Online Updates In the summer of 2006, the 2-day and 5-day classroom versions of the IPSR course wereconsolidatedintoasingle3-dayversion.AstheIPSR-OLcoursewasoriginallydesignedtomirrorthe2-dayversion,itiscurrentlyintheprocessofrevisiontoreflectthe3-dayclassroomversion.Thecurrenton-linecoursewillcontinuetocountforcredittowardstheInternationalAffairsCertification.Inadditiontothecontentrevisions,thecoursewillbeupdatedtoincorporateallthetechnicalandfunctionalchangesfoundintheSAM-OCcourse.

New InitiativesRealeducationmustultimatelybe limited tomenwhoinsistonknowing– therest ismeresheep-herding. EzraLoomisPound

Werealized thatdevelopingnewdistance learningproducts requiredasystematicprocessorelsewedonothingbut“herdsheep.”Thefirststepinthisprocesswastodeterminewhatthesecurityassistancecommunitysawasadeficiencyinknowledge.InAprilof2002DISAMconductedasurveyof international customers, security assistanceoffices, and the implementing agencies. [Taphorn,2002] Additionally, DISAM faculty routinely identifies training needs in the security assistancecommunity through direct observation and inquiries made at CONUS MILDEP organizations,security assistance offices (SAOs)worldwide and at security cooperation related events, such as


TrainingProgramManagementReviews(TPMRs), InternationalMilitaryStudentOfficer (IMSO)conferences,TheatreSecurityCooperation(TSC)conferencesandthevariousmobileeducationteam(MET)coursesconductedannually. Asaresultof theseefforts,a listof trainingneedsexistsforDISAMtoconsiderasnewdistancelearningprojects.

Recenttopprioritiesonthisever-growinglistincluded:

• Aneedforinstructionwitha“drillandpractice”approachregardingtheMILSTRIP,

• How-tomodulesforreadinganFMSbill(DDForm645)andtheletterofofferand acceptance(LOA)

• AnonlineversionoftheMissileTechnologyControlRegime(MTCR)course

AstheDefenseSecurityCooperationAgency(DSCA)schoolhouse,DISAMcanalsorespondtorequestsforDLproductionassistancefromotherDSCA-affiliatedorganizations. Forexample,theDefenseInstituteforInternationalLegalStudies(DIILS)requestedassistancewithaDLcourseonhumanrights.DISAMhascompletedtwooftheseprojects,MILSTRIPforFMSandSecurityCooperationandHumanRights,whicharediscussedinmoredetailbelow.Military Standard Reqisitiioning and Issue Procedure for Foreign Military Sales HaveyoueverwonderedwhattheacronymMILSTRIPmeans?HaveyoueverbeenaskedtointerpretanAE2documentfromS9GwithastatuscodeofBCandthenmakealogisticsmanagementdecisionbasedonthestatusoftherequisition?

DuringDISAM’svisitstoSAOsaroundtheworld(inparticularournewestcustomercountries),andinourdiscussionswiththecustomerandtheimplementingagencies,itbecameevidentthatcustomershadalackofunderstandingontheMilitaryStandardRequisitionandIssueProcedures(MILSTRIP)ingeneralandintheinterpretationofthecodesfoundinthevariousMILSTRIPdocuments.TheseproblemsaremoreevidentwiththenewerFMScustomersandincountrieswithsmallofficesandsecuritycooperationprograms.Additionally,themovetousetheSecurityCooperationInformationPortal(SCIP)forinformationdisseminationaddstotheconfusionsurroundingMILSTRIP.

WhyisMILSTRIPsoimportantforourinternationalcustomersandSAO’s?Itistheprocedurebywhich the customerordersmaterials from theU.S. supply system. Understanding theuniquecodesthatcomprisearequisitioniscriticalinthecustomers’abilitytosubmitordersandintrackingthestatusoftheseorders.MILSTRIPforFMSisdesignedwiththeFMScustomerandtheSAOinmind,butisjustasusefulforpersonnelintheimplementingagencies.

MILSTRIPforFMSwillintroducethestudent to the standard and unique codesthat make up a MILSTRIP document, thecommon documents used within the U.S.supply system, and how to interpret statusdocumentssenttothecustomer.Thismodulewasdevelopedusingthesameinterfaceandmotifasourotherdistancelearningcourses.

• Navigationisthroughlinear“next”and“back”buttonsaswellasanon-linear“pop-up”menu.


• Aprintfunctionhasbeenaddedtothenavigationlinepermittingthestudenttoprint thecurrentscreenforfuturereference.

• Eachsectionopenswithashortvideosettingforthescenetheinformationtobe presentedinthesection.

Thecourseconsistsofsevensections.MILSTRIPforFMSprogressivelytakesthestudentfromabasicunderstandingofMILSTRIPtoacomprehensiveexerciseconcludingthemoduleofstudy.SectionOnebreaksdowntheMILSTRIPdocumentintofivemajorgroupsdiscussingthepurposeoftherecordpositionsinthedocument.

FollowingSectionOne,webeginadiscussionofavarietyofrelateddocuments. • Therequisitiondocument(SectionTwo) • Thestatusdocument(SectionThree) • Threemodifyingdocuments(SectionFour) • Theshippingdocument(SectionFive) Eachsectionbuildsontheinformationprovidedintheprevioussection,providinganintegratedpictureoftheMILSTRIPprocess.

Unique to the MILSTRIP for FMS module is incorporation of hands-on interactions for thestudentusingfacsimilesofSecurityInformationPortal(SCIP)interactivescreens.Asthemilitaryservicesmoveawayfromprovidingthecustomerpapercopiesoflogisticsreports,SCIPisbecomingthesolesourceforinformationforourinternationalcustomers.SectionSixdiscussestheuseofSCIPtoviewlogisticsdatathroughplannedreportsaswellasadhocreportgeneration.SCIPalsohasthecapabilityforthecustomertosubmitrequisitionson-linetothesupplysystem.Thestudentwillinputdataforarequisition,gaininghands-onexperienceusingrepresentationsofactualSCIPscreens.AnexampleofaSCIPscreenisonthenextpage.

How doesoneuseMILSTRIP forFMS to interpret aMILSTRIPdocument? Built into themoduleisatranslator.TheMILSTRIPtranslatortakesthecodesinselectedfieldsandexpandsthemintotheirfulldefinitions.ThetranslatorcanbefoundundertheResourcesbuttononthenavigationbar.Notallfieldscanbedisplayedduetothenatureofthedata.Forinstance,thereisnotranslationfor theNationalStockNumber (NSN)fielddue to thevast numberofNSNs thatwouldhave to


beloaded.Asyoucanseefromthescreenshotofthetranslator,thestatuscode“BC”usedinourexamplemeanstheitemisbackorderedandtherequisitionercanexpectalongdelay.

Currently,MILSTRIPforFMSisonlyavailableonCD-ROMandisprovidedtostudentsintheSAM-F,SCM-OcoursesandtostudentsattendingaMETcourse.RequestsfortheMILSTRIPforFMSCDcanbesubmittedusingtheDISAMpublicationorderformlocatedat:http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/DISAM%20publication%20order%20form.htm.Security Cooperation and Human Rights TheDefenseInstituteofInternationalLegalStudies(DIILS)providesinstructiononavarietyoflegaltopicsrelatedtosecuritycooperation,oneofwhichisinternationallyrecognizedhumanrights.In the spring of 2006,DIILS andDISAMbegan a cooperative effort to produce an introductoryon-linehumanrightsmodule.Thematerialcontainedinthismodulecloselyparallelstheblockofinstruction that DIILS instructors present in the resident DISAM SCM-O and SAM-TO courses.Topicsincludeinternationalhumanrightslaw,grossviolationsofhumanrightsandcongressionalhumanrightsawarenessandaction.


Themodule ispresented in the same formatas theSAM-OCand IPSR-OLcourses, is fullynarrated,andcontainsavarietyofinteractionstofacilitatelearningandretentionofthematerial.Asanexample,oneinteractionasksthestudenttomatcharticlesfromtheUnitedNationsCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRightstorelatedamendmentstotheUnitedStatesConstitution.

Currently,thismoduleofinstructionisavailableontheDISAMwebsiteat:http://www.disam.dsca.mil/DistLearn/DL.htm.Conclusion Overthepastfiveyears,theadditionofdistancelearningmaterialstotheDISAMcurriculumhasprovidedstudentswithnumeroustrainingopportunitiesbeyondthetraditionalclassroom.Theseinclude:

• Formalcertificateinstructiononsecurityassistancetopics(e.g.SAM-OC,IPSR-OL)

• Short modules of basic instruction on specific topics on the periphery of security assistance(e.g.SAOEntitlements,EthicsandHumanRights)


• Informal, in-depth information, instruction and practice on specific topics e.g., theLetterofRequest,MILSTRIPforFMS,andtheInternationalMilitaryStudentPre- DepartureBriefing

Thelastthreeyearsofenrollmentdataforourfor-creditcoursesreflectthecontinuingneedfordistancelearning,inadditiontostandardclassroominstruction,forthesecurityassistancecommunity.TheIPSR-OLandSAM-OCcoursesalonerepresent15-20percentofthetotalannualDISAMstudentload,andseveralofthedevelopedshortmodulesofinstructionhavefreedupvaluabletimeinourresidentcoursesforothergroup-orientatedlearningactivities.

Aswithallcourses, thevalueof the instruction is inpartdeterminedbyassessmentofpost-trainingperformance,and in-partby thefeedbackobtainedfromourstudents. Regardingstudentfeedback,DISAMencouragesallofourDLstudentstocommentonexistingcoursewareandtomakerecommendationsforfuturecoursewarethatwillbenefitthesecuritycooperationcommunity.About the AuthorsMr.RichardRempes is anAssistantProfessor and thedistance learning technicalmanager at theDefenseInstituteofSecurityAssistanceManagementandisthesystemadministratoroftheDISAMBlackboarde-learningsite.HeisaformerU.S.ArmyAmmunitionsLogisticsandQualityAssuranceSpecialistandtaughtattheU.S.ArmyDefenseAmmunitionCenter.HeholdsanM.A.ine-EducationfromtheUniversityofPhoenixandaB.A.A.inMarketing,andBroadcastandCinematicArtsfromCentralMichiganUniversity. He can be contacted at (937) 255-3899,DSN 785-3899 or [email protected].

Mr.. Bill Rimpo is anAssistant Professor and the distance learning content manager at theDefenseInstituteofSecurityAssistanceManagement.HegraduatedfromtheAirForceInstituteofTechnologywithaM.S.inlogisticsmanagementin1986.HeservedinavarietyofoperationsandmaintenancepositionsintheintercontinentalballisticmissilecareerfieldaswellaslogisticsplansinAirForceMaterielCommandandtheDefenseLogisticsAgency.Hecanbecontactedat(937)255-8187,DSN785-8187ore-mailWilliam.rimpo@disam.dsca.mil.ReferencesMcFarland,E.,Rempes,R.(200�).“SecurityAssistanceManagementOnLineUpdate”,The DISAM Journal,Vol.26,No.2.

Taphorn, G. (2002). Distance Learning Survey of SecurityAssistance Community [e-mail msg.].DISAM,26April2002.


Documents

The Department of Defense Regional Centers for Security ... 29_1/Journal 28-4.pdf · Department of Defense Regional Centers for Security Assistance. ... “The Center for Hem spher