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The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies
The Darfur Conflict and
Civilian Protection
Conference Report
29-30 January 2007
Cairo, Egypt
1
Table of Contents:
1. List of Abbreviations……………………………………………………….…………………..1
2. Executive Summary…………………………………………………………………………….2
3. Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………….5
4. Summary of Presentations and Discussions:
4.1 Opening Session……………………………………………………………………………..6
4.2 First Session: Humanitarian Situation in Darfur…………………….......7
4.3 Second Session: Civilian Protection in Darfur……………………………….9
4.4 Third Session: The Future of Humanitarian Intervention………….…12
4.5 Fourth Session: Why the DPA (Abuja) Failed?..........................14
4.6 Fifth Session: The Arab and African Role in Darfur……………………..17 5. Final Session: Conclusions………………………………………………………………….19
6. Annex:
6.1 List of Participants…….…………………………………………………………………..22
6.2 Agenda…………………………………………………………………………………………..29
1. List of Abbreviations:
UN United Nations
AU African Union
SC United Nations Security Council
DPA Darfur Peace Agreement (Abuja, 5 May 2006)
NGO Non-governmental Organization
INGO International Non-governmental Organization
IGO Intergovernmental Organization (including the UN)
IDP Internally Displaced People
MENA Middle East and North Africa
GoS Government of Sudan
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
WFP World Food Program
IHL International Humanitarian Law
AMIS African Mission in Sudan
ICC International Criminal Court
ICJ International Court of Justice
JEM Justice and Equality Movement (Darfur)
SLM Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (Darfur)
2
2. Executive Summary:
The conference "The Darfur Conflict and Civilian Protection" was held in
Cairo on 29-30 January, and was initiated by The Cairo Institute for
Human Rights Studies (CIHRS), with support from the Open Society
Institute. A wide range of participants were involved including
governmental, IGO, INGO, NGO, academic and media personnel. The
conference represented the first time officials and representatives from
the GoS and Darfur opposition movements met face-to-face since the
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) process was concluded in May, 2006.
The conference was organized around five thematic panel presentations,
each followed by an open floor discussion. The five thematic panels were
entitled: (1) Developments Concerning the Humanitarian Situation in
Darfur, (2) Proposals for Civilian Protection- Including the Role of the
African Union and United Nations, (3) Perspectives on the Future of
Humanitarian Intervention, (4) Why the DPA (Abuja) Agreement Failed to
Provide Peace and Security, and (5) Perspectives on the Arab and African
Role Regarding the Situation in Darfur. The conference also included an
"Opening" session and a "Concluding" session.
The presentations and discussions canvassed a wide range of issues
concerning Darfur, with a particular focus on the issues of civilian
protection, the peace process, and humanitarian intervention. An
overarching consensus was expressed that progress concerning all of
these issues remains dependent on finding a political solution to the
underlying causes of the Darfur conflict. While no formal list of
conclusions was proffered during the concluding session, none-the-less, a
convergence of opinion among a large majority of the participants
developed around the three main issues:
A. Civilian Protection in Darfur:
The security of civilians in Darfur, including IDPs and humanitarian aid
workers, is currently the worst it has ever been. There has been a
dramatic increase in attacks on civilians. The unprecedented rise in
pillage of humanitarian supplies and attacks on humanitarian workers over
the last nine months has endangered the viability of all humanitarian
operations within Darfur and eastern Chad. This situation is an extreme
threat to the protection of civilians, as millions of IDPs within these areas
depend on humanitarian aid for their basic subsistence. The GoS,
government supported Janjaweed militias, and, to a lesser extent, rebel
factions in Darfur are all guilty of attacks against civilians and hindering
the delivery of humanitarian aid. However, the burden of responsibility
for the humanitarian crisis primarily rests with the GoS, as the most
powerful actor in Darfur and the sovereign authority in Sudan. Civilian
protection has deteriorated in accordance with and as a result of the
intensified violence and geographical expansion of the Darfur conflict. In
the short term, there is a need for the leaders of the GoS and rebel
3
factions to commit themselves to abiding by the rules of International
Humanitarian Law within Darfur, including allowing humanitarian agencies
to carry out their work in a secure and unfettered manner. In the long
term, civilian protection is dependent on two major elements: (1) The
willingness of the GoS and Darfur movements to hold genuine transparent
peace negotiations in which both sides compromise on their most extreme
demands, and protection of civilians is included as an obligatory condition
for all parties, (2) the legal system of Sudan must undergo a holistic
reformation to ensure that the national laws and judicial process' provide
sufficient and fair mechanisms of accountability which end the widespread
practice and culture of impunity that officials and others enjoy within
Sudan, especially for crimes committed within Darfur.
B. The Darfur Conflict and the DPA1:
The causes of the Darfur conflict are rooted in a collusion of resource
competition (especially for fertile land) and ethnic identity. Moreover,
unequal development caused by the central governments unwillingness to
distribute resources to the periphery areas of the country in an equitable
manner is largely responsible for the many internal conflicts within Sudan,
including in Darfur. Since the DPA was signed, the conflict in Darfur has
increased. The DPA failed largely because it neither adequately addressed
nor engendered widespread agreement concerning the issue of resource
management, distribution and control, including local natural resources.
Furthermore, the constant fragmentation, disorganization and lack of
political will for peace among the GoS and rebel factions has lead to an
inability and/or unwillingness among these actors to consistently adhere
to agreed upon obligations. There is a great need for transparent,
inclusive and genuine negotiations between the GoS and rebel factions;
and for non-combative stakeholders to peace in Darfur (ex: local Darfur
communities and tribes) to be involved in this negotiation process.
C. Humanitarian Intervention2:
The use of a UN-AU hybrid peacekeeping force in Darfur must be
considered in light of the deep, complex causes of the conflict. As such,
the use of force for humanitarian intervention in Darfur remains a limited,
short-term solution to the problem. Nonconsensual humanitarian
intervention (i.e. carried out without the consent of the GoS) within Darfur
has the danger of causing further destabilization in Sudan, and the region.
Therefore, any humanitarian action that is taken in Darfur may cause
1 On Friday the 5th of May 2006, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
(Minni Minawi) signed the Darfur Peace Agreement. This peace agreement, which covers security,
wealth-sharing and power-sharing, was the result of two years of painstaking negotiations mediated by
the African Union (AU). DPA text available in English, Arabic and French at http://www.amis-
sudan.org/dpafull.html 2For the purposes of this report Humanitarian Intervention is referred to as an interference, usually
involving the use of force, in a sovereign state by an outside entity for humanitarian purposes. The
underlying idea being that state sovereignty can be by-passed in order to ease or halt certain forms of
human suffering and/or governmental behavior that contradicts with basic tenements of international
law.
4
more harm than good, unless it is carried out in a widely
accepted/supported manner that is in conformity with international law.
Any intervening UN force may have to secure the acceptance of the
Sudanese government to avoid a further escalation and intensification of
the conflict. All efforts should be made to strengthen and support the
existing AU peacekeeping force, AMIS, in Darfur. In this respect, INGOs,
NGOs and others should lobby African governments to increase the size
and strengthen the civilian protection mandate of this force, while at the
same time pressuring the UN to provide generous financial support for its
operation. Furthermore, heavy pressure should continue to be applied on
the GoS to allow for an AU-UN hybrid force in Darfur that can provide
effective civilian protection. Unless the GoS becomes more cooperative in
this matter it is likely that civilian protection in Darfur will continue to
decline. As such, the unconditional support the GoS receives from most
Arab governments and within much of Arab mass media is extremely
irresponsible and unethical. Arab governments have an international legal
obligation and moral duty to do all they can to ensure that international
crimes are not committed against civilians in Darfur, and that the GoS
does all that it can to provide these civilians with protection and security.
This lack of will among Arab governments to apply sufficient pressure on
the GoS is symptomatic of a general lack of knowledge and/or
understanding of the Darfur situation within the Arab world, which often
leads to a rejection or mitigation of the seriousness of the humanitarian
crisis that is occurring.
In addition to the informative and constructive exchange of information
and views that took place, several positive developments occurred during
the conference. First, officials from the GoS and representatives from
some Darfur opposition movements expressed a desire to renew the
peace negotiation process, and to do so in a transparent, inclusive
manner. Second, the GoS renewed its commitment to the Darfur-Darfur
Dialogue process contained within the DPA.3 Third, the GoS welcomed
and pledged cooperation with a proposed Media Mission4 to Darfur to be
undertaken by CIHRS, in cooperation with other organizations. Forth, a
series of cooperative working-groups were established among a variety of
INGOs and NGOs dealing with the Darfur issue.
3 Chapter four in the DPA calls for a Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation “in which
representatives of all Darfurian stakeholders can meet to discuss the challenges of restoring peace to
their land, overcoming the divisions between communities, and resolving existing problems to build a
common future.” The DDDC was envisioned as a way to build support for the DPA and address
important outstanding issues of reconciliation, reconstruction, and political representation. However,
there is a great deal of confusion about the Dialogue because the DPA does not clearly define its
specific objectives, the process for achieving them, or the mechanism for implementing its outcomes.
Read more at
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/article/detail/9390?PHPSESSID=d249ea58b0e88eca1656
aa31f9e1e60d 4 The proposed media mission would allow for a delegation of reporters from Arab media outlets to
visit Sudan and Darfur, and meet up with Sudanese media personnel.
5
3. Introduction: On the 29th and 30th of January 2007, the Conference "The Darfur Conflict and Civilian Protection" took place in Cairo, Egypt at the initiative of The Cairo
Institute for Human Rights Studies (www.cihrs.org), with support from the Open
Society Institute. The conference was attended by governmental authorities, parliamentarians, academics and representatives from opposition groups of
Darfur, embassies, the UN, NGOs, INGOs and Arabic media outlets. The majority of participants were INGO and NGO representatives from throughout the North
African and Middle East region, including from Sudan. The conference was scheduled to coincide with the proceedings of the AU summit in Adidas Ababa.
The interventions and presentations of the conference focused on the causes of
the Darfur conflict, with a special emphasis on the lack of civilian protection
within this conflict. Key issues that emerged included the role of local, regional and international actors in providing and promoting civilian protection for IDPs,
humanitarian aid workers and other civilians within Darfur and eastern Chad, the inability of humanitarian aid organizations to deliver aid to displaced peoples due
to the deterioration of the security situation, and the causes of increased conflict within Darfur since the signing of the DPA.
The aims of the conference included:
• To inform and raise awareness among the populations of North African
and Arabic countries concerning the humanitarian crises, especially the lack of civilian protection within Darfur
• To provide a platform for dialogue between Sudanese governmental
authorities, Darfur opposition group representatives, and the IGO, INGO, NGO community
• To pressure Arabic governments to play an active and constructive role in efforts to provide civilian protection within Darfur
• To strengthen and aid in the cooperation/coordination of INGO and NGO advocacy for and research on civilian protection in Darfur,
especially within the Middle East and North African (MENA) region • To provide a platform for information exchange among the IGO, INGO
and NGO community dealing with Darfur, including Sudanese NGOs
• To suggest methods and approaches on how different actors can contribute to strengthening civilian protection in Darfur
• To contribute to efforts to revitalize peace negotiations between the GoS and opposition movements in Darfur
This report contains a summary of the discussions and presentations that took place during the conference, and is not intended as a comprehensive review.
While this document is believed to contain a correct representation of the views
and opinions expressed by the conference participants, the organizers cannot assume any liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or
subsequent use of any of the information herein.
The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS)
6
4. Summary of Presentations and Discussions 4.1. Opening Session
Session Panelists: Mr. Bahey el Dien Hassan (Moderator) Director of CIHRS
Mr. Ahmed Haroun Sudanese State Minister of Humanitarian Affairs
Mr. Kamal el Jozooli Sudanese Lawyer and Secretary-General of the Sudanese Union of Writers
Opening Session Summary:
Mr. Jozooli began the session by drawing attention to the fact that the humanitarian situation in Darfur has deteriorated since the signing of the DPA on
5 May 2006, with the conflict becoming more intensified and wide-spread. Several factors have contributed to this deteriorating situation including: 1. The
DPA lacked the support and commitment of most rebel groups within Darfur, 2. The response of the Sudanese government to the situation is more dependent on
external factors (ex: threat of sanctions) then on dealing with the internal
dynamics of the conflict (ex: rebel grievances), 3. The DPA was a product of outside pressure more than internal agreement and compromise. Thus, the crisis
will only improve when the GoS begins a genuine dialogue and bargaining process with Sudanese actors and stakeholders in the conflict.
Minister Haroun acknowledged that the GoS may need to reevaluate their current relationship with civil society groups. He then asserted that the response
of the international civil society and media to the situation in Darfur has become entrenched against the GoS, and lacked sufficient coverage and attention on
crimes committed by rebel groups within Darfur. Security measures and terrorist actions are not distinguished from one another. The GoS seeks peace, and is
ready to negotiate with any party.
Mr. Hassan concluded the session by pointing out the "multiple layers of tragedy" that have contributed to the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. The failure of Arab, African, and international efforts to stop the killing in Darfur has resulted in
four years of increased violence and daily atrocities. Rebel groups may share responsibility; however, the GoS bears the greatest responsibility, and lacks the
political will to solve the crisis. A sever lack of responsibility for civilian protection
exists within Sudan and the region at large. In particular, mainstream public opinion in Arab regions seem unconcerned about the victims of crimes when
committed by Arabs/Muslims against Arabs/Muslims, as in Darfur. Such victims seem of no value unless they can be used as tools to denounce foreign
involvement; and any attempt to raise awareness of the situation is met with accusations of imperialist or Zionist plots to replace the Sudanese regime. The
Arab media can only talk about Darfur in terms of conspiracy theories. Over 200,000 dead, mass rapes and 2.5 million refugees—yet none of this has stirred
the Arab conscience. A double-standard exists among the Arab public and
governments: What happed to the regional outrage against the killings and mass rapes of Muslims in Bosnia? Why, when it comes to Darfur, have the Arabic
intellectuals, governments, media and public fallen silent? It is extremely important for the Arab world to put moral pressure on the GoS to conform to
7
their legal and moral obligations to protect civilians in Darfur, perhaps even more
important than the political pressure they can exert.
4.2. First Session:
Developments Concerning the Humanitarian
Situation in Darfur
Session Panelists: Hany Megally (Moderator) Director- Middle East Department, International Institute for Transitional Justice
Tamara Refaii
Media Official at ICRC (Red Cross) regional office Mosaad Mohamed Ali
Amal Center for Relief of Torture Victims (Sudan) Bashir Ahmed
Amnesty International Jamie Balfour
Humanitarian Advisor, Oxfam Khaled Mansoor
World Food Program (WFP-UN)
First Session Summary:
Ms. Rafaii began the session by outlining ICRC operations in Darfur and the challenges it faces. The ICRC has a mandate to deliver food, medicine, perform medical procedures, monitor IHL and document the situation. The ICRC project
in Sudan is its largest in the world, comprising 1500 staff and a budget of 73 million dollars. Within Darfur, security and medical care are the largest concerns
of most Sudanese IDPs and civilians. Over the last year the humanitarian situation in Darfur and the ability of the ICRC, and other humanitarian
organizations, to operate effectively have both dramatically worsened. 37 security incidents (ex: attack on workers) disturbed ICRC's ability to operate in
2006. The humanitarian situation in Darfur and the security of aid workers has
never been worse. There are daily violations of IHL, international customary law and basic ethics of warfare in Darfur. Within this context, ICRC and other
humanitarian organizations have no freedom of movement and limited access to IDPs. Without the ability to operate effectively humanitarian organizations can
not alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. As such, the solution to the humanitarian crisis lies in a political process that creates the necessary political
will to stop attacks on humanitarian organizations and civilians.
Mr. Ali then gave a historical overview of the conflict in Darfur. The conflict in Darfur is historically rooted in competition for power and resources between
different tribal and ethnic groups. In Darfur there are 107 tribes, most of these, Arab and African alike, are Muslim. In the 1980's, conflict in the area began to
escalate due in large part to the desertification of northern Darfur. Desertification of this area lead the nomadic Arab tribes of the north to begin encroaching and
seizing pastoral land of African tribes in central Darfur, initially around the Jabal Marra area. Open conflict between these two blocks began and escalated
between 1987-93. During this period 27 Arab tribes united to move against non-
Arabs and drive them off the land. Throughout the late 1990's Arab tribes attacked and burned the homes of the indigenous populations of central and
southern Darfur. This was carried out with the increasing support of the GoS. Many indigenous people began to flee. In the early 2000's, these attacks
increased and the government refused to intervene to prevent them from occurring. Thus, to stop these attacks indigenous groups began forming militias;
forming the basis of the Darfur rebel groups. In response to this armed
8
retaliation the GoS began efforts to fragment the indigenous militias while at the
same time providing logistical and financial support to the Arab tribes/militias, including aerial bombardments of villages. The 2003 attack of rebel groups on a
government air base elevated the status of the conflict into what we are now witnessing. It is important to note that not all Arab tribes are aggressors within
the conflict, however, many Arab tribes involved have oriented their attacks to target civilians in an attempt to drive them off the land. These attacks have
been responsible for the destruction of over 2000 villages, and the creation of 4 million refugees. The DPA has had no positive impact on the situation, largely
because many rebel groups never signed it. Some of those that did sign it have
fragmented and are once again fighting. (Mr. Ali later added) The majority of responsibility for the continuing conflict in Darfur lays with the government, in
particular their policies of arming Arab militias and the use of indiscriminate bombing campaigns on villages.
Ms. Bashir Ahmed highlighted the expansion of the Darfur conflict into eastern Chad, and, with it, the exportation of atrocities committed against IDPs
and other civilians. Attacks on civilians by Janjaweed militias crossing into Chad
have increased in intensity and geographical range, at times penetrating 150km into Chad. Such attacks are not only an affront to ethics and international law,
but also contribute to the destabilization of the region. Ms. Ahmed then drew attention to the widespread use of rape as a weapon within the conflict and the
disturbing nature of the atrocities that are committed in Darfur and Chad by reading the testimony of a girl who was brutally raped by the Janjaweed and
forced to watch as they executed 19 men.
Mr. Balfour began by reiterating the unprecedented increase in the level of attacks on humanitarian workers within the last half-year and the deteriorating
access of humanitarian organizations to effected populations, which is worse than at any time during Oxfam's 20 year involvement in Darfur. Large amounts of
humanitarian workers have been evacuated from Darfur due to these attacks. Pillage of property and equipment is a huge problem for humanitarian
organizations. During 2006, 170 vehicles used by humanitarian organizations were hijacked in Darfur and Chad; severely limiting their ability to deliver aid.
Simultaneously, intensified violence has increased the number of displaced peoples by 25% since the signing of the DPA. 120,000 refugees have fled into
eastern Chad. Amid the increasing violence, AMIS, the ill-equipped
undermanned, and under financed AU peacekeeping force in Darfur, has switched into defensive mode, and now provides less protection for civilians than at any
time in its operation. In an unprecedented statement issued on 17 January 2007, UN agencies operating in Darfur have warned that humanitarian operations
in Darfur are on the verge of a complete breakdown.5
Mr. Mansour continued to stress the dire humanitarian crises faced by civilians and humanitarian workers in Darfur. WFP's operation in Darfur is its largest in the world, and attempts to provide food for 3 million people. Many gains made in
providing for the nutritional and sanitation needs of IDPs in Darfur have been under threat especially by the end of 2006. In July 2006 UN humanitarian
organizations were unable to deliver aid to 470,000 people. The reduction of aid services to IDP camps has resulted in a severe deterioration of hygiene
standards, leading to a recent Cholera outbreak that affected 2,700 people.
5UN Joint Statement available in English and Arabic at http://www.unsudanig.org/%2007.pdf
9
First Session Open Floor Discussion:
Minister Haroun: The humanitarian crisis in Darfur is a product of the war, and
the rebel groups in Darfur bear full responsibility for the continuation of this war. The GoS does not, and has not been accused of blocking humanitarian supplies
within Darfur.
Ambassador Mohammad Abdullah (Ambassador of Sudan in Egypt): The
internal and border security of Sudan is of the utmost importance to the GoS. International organizations and media must be objective and focus on the crimes
committed by rebels in Darfur.
Other points: • General agreement that the solution is political
• GoS can do and is legally obligated to do more to protect civilians and stop the violence.
• Coverage of Darfur may concentrate on the GoS because the GoS severely
restricts the access of journalists into Darfur. • Important to try to find immediate, practical solutions to alleviate the
humanitarian situation while the political dialogue is in process
4. 3. Second Session:
Proposals for Civilian Protection- Including the Role of
the African Union and United Nations
Session Panelists: Mr. Abdullah Khater (Moderator) Darfurian Writer
Mr. Nadim Hasbany Arab Media Officer, The International Crisis Group (ICG)
Mr. Saleh Mahmoud
Sudanese MP and Human Rights Lawyer Ms. Diedra Clancy
The Darfur Consortium, International Refugee Rights Initiative Ms. Leslie Lefkow
Human Rights Watch
Second Session Summary:
Mr. Nadim Hasbany began by posing the question of where the conflict in Darfur is headed. Could the conflict become just as prolonged as the conflict
between North and South Sudan? A new generation in Darfur is being raised in refugee camps, a fact that damages the chances of a successful peace process
from occurring. The first priority concerning the conflict should be to provide protection for civilians; the second is to ensure that a genuine constructive
political process begins. The international community has failed in its international legal obligation to provide protection for civilians in Darfur. The
Security Council (SC) and the European Union (EU) have been unwilling to impose sanctions regimes, while Arab governments support the GoS against any
type of intervention. The Sudanese government only reacts to strong, concerted
pressure. The Crisis Group recommends targeted sanctions on Sudanese governmental officials. In particular, many individuals in the GoS have been
10
acquiring large amounts of private wealth through "secret" companies run by the
government. Target these companies and the oil interests of the Sudanese government to apply immediate pressure on the GoS to stop feeding the conflict
in Darfur, and begin protecting civilians.
Mr. Mahmoud pointed out that the main issue should be the protection of the 4 million displaced peoples, 2 million of which live in refugee camps. In this matter, the GoS has the preponderant responsibility to protect these people
under international law. If the GoS fails to do so, then this responsibility falls to the international community, and Chapter 7 of the UN Charter should be used by
the S.C. to ensure the safety of IDPs in Darfur. Whether you call the situation "ethnic cleansing" or "genocide" does not matter, in both cases the international
community is legally obligated to step in and ensure protection. Some argue it is
only the responsibility of the AU—but AMIS does not have the capability to provide protection. A Commission from the Parliament of Sudan on Darfur
recently reported that AMIS itself has requested the GoS to provide them with protection. As such, the use of UN forces is the only means to provide real
protection for civilians in Darfur. If the international community does not step in then ethnic cleansing will continue to escalate. The GoS's suggestion to
"relocate" IDPs to "safety areas" is another way of furthering ethnic cleansing and should not be accepted. Depopulated areas in Darfur are already being occupied
by non-indigenous migrants. Furthermore, the issue of justice and accountability
is an important tool in efforts to stop the killing. When the ICC first announced its investigation and lists of names were being circulated, there were very little
attacks for 3 months. But after the perpetrators witnessed that nothing concrete was occurring they became convinced that there would be no accountability and
full impunity, so they began attacking the people of Darfur once more.
Ms. Clancy presented several "reflections on the role of the AU" concerning the Darfur situation. When the AU peacekeeping mission, AMIS, was first sent to Darfur their mandate did not include protection of civilians. This mandate was
expanded in October 2004 to include limited protection of civilians, an appropriate measure considering that the AU Constitution includes a "duty to protect" clause.
However, several factors, including the failure to provide sustained civilian protection, allegations that AU soldiers were involved in rape and AMIS's close
cooperation with the GoS, lead people in Darfur to view AMIS with distrust and
resentment. AMIS found itself being rejected by the very people it was supposed to be protecting. SC Resolution 1706, which seemed to call for the gradual
sidelining of AMIS by a UN force, was passed by the SC with minimal AU consultation. Officials at the AU felt marginalized by the Resolution. There is
currently huge confusion concerning what has and has not been agreed to by the GoS concerning the implementation of Resolution 1706. The African Union
Summit is currently in session in Adidas Ababa. It was agreed to at last years AU Summit that Sudan would be given the Chairmanship of the organization this
year. While the AU and AMIS have been criticized, they still have important roles
to play in Darfur. Many are calling on the AU to not allow Sudan to take the Chairmanship, fearing that this would severely damage the ability of the AU to
perform the role of a third-party peace-broker and peacekeeper within the Darfur conflict.
Ms. Lefkow's intervention concentrated on the role that accountability and justice can and should play in efforts to provide protection for civilians in Darfur.
Intervention by an international organization or force has a limited ability to
create lasting peace in Darfur. The solution to the humanitarian crisis is much more complex, and will have to include the development of a system of
11
accountability and justice within Sudan that will engender the trust and
acceptance of citizens in Darfur. Furthermore, fair and transparent national mechanisms of accountability have an essential complementary role to play in
efforts to ensure the protection of civilians within the ongoing conflict. A "crisis of confidence" exists among Darfurians toward the GoS. Legal reforms can help to
rebuild this confidence. In particular, Sudanese law provides no legal framework for command responsibility.6 Also, immunities exist within Sudanese laws that
provide impunity for governmental officials. These types of laws are a signal to Darfurians that justice will not be delivered.
Second Session Open-Floor Discussion:
JEM: It is well-known that the problem is political and requires a political
solution. All humanitarian problems in Darfur have a political solution.
SLM: The GoS bears the responsibility for what is happening in Darfur.
There is a need for officials in the GoS to be strongly punished. AU plays very little role in Darfur. AU's role in the Abuja agreements was of no help.
International forces and sanctions are needed.
Ms. Clancy: Recommendations- 1. Use accountability mechanisms 2. Need genuine, inclusive renegotiations 3. Need clear timetable and benchmark for
hybrid operation in Darfur. 4. Call for deployment in Chad to provide security for
civilians and regional stability 5. Need to strengthen AMIS forces
Other Points: • International organizations are the life-line of Darfur people.
• Darfur has received very little aid from Arab governments or Islamic charities
• The fact that the situation in Darfur is a regional problem with regional effects has not been wildly recognized within the region
• Chad's support for rebel movements must be taken into consideration
6Command responsibility, sometimes referred to as the Yamashita standard or the Medina
standard, is the doctrine of hierarchical accountability in cases of war crimes, and includes the
obligation to refrain from ordering and/or to take action to stop ones subordinates from committing
war crimes/ human rights abuses. The doctrine of “command responsibility” was established by the
Hague Conventions IV (1907) and X (1907) and applied for the first time by the German Supreme
Court in Leipzig after World War I, in the trial of Emil Muller. The Yamashita standard is based
upon the precedent set by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Japanese General
Yamashita. He was prosecuted, in a still controversial trial, for atrocities committed by troops under
his command in the Philippines. Yamashita was charged with "unlawfully disregarding and failing to
discharge his duty as a commander to control the acts of members of his command by permitting
them to commit war crimes." The Medina standard is based upon the massacre at My Lai which US
captain Ernest Medina failed to prevent. It holds that a commanding officer, being aware of a human
rights violation or a war crime, will be held criminally liable when he does not take action. See for
instance:
http://www.hlc.org.yu/english/War_Crimes_Trials_Before_National_Courts/Serbia/index.php?file=729
.html
12
4.4 Third Session:
Perspectives on the Future of Humanitarian
Intervention
Session Panelists: Khaled Mansoor (Moderator) World Food Program (WFP-UN)
Mr. Aryeh Neier Open Society Institute, President
Dr. Mohamed el Sayed Said Ahram Center for Political Studies, Vice-President
Third Session Summary:
Mr. Neier asserted that humanitarian intervention, as a policy choice within the international sphere, still is and will remain an effective and necessary tool to
prevent and/or stop the most egregious international crimes (ex: ethnic cleansing, genocide) from occurring. However, before humanitarian intervention
can or should be used a certain set of criteria must be met: 1. The crimes
committed/humanitarian crises should be of “extreme gravity” with massive negative consequences; 2. All other means of solving the situation (ex: economic
and diplomatic pressure) must have been exhausted; 3. The intervention should have a high-probability of success, and low-probability of making the situation
worse; 4. The act should possess legitimacy. While the first condition above is certainly true of the situation in Darfur, the answers to the other three criteria
need to be studied and discussed to see if they have been met. In particular, the criteria of “legitimacy” needs to be examined. What constitutes a “legitimate”
intervention? Certainly one carried out by the S.C. under Chapter 7 of the U.N.
Charter would enjoy legitimacy under international law. Yet, political considerations have and will always make it extremely unlikely that the S.C.
would authorize humanitarian intervention. Thus, what about unilateral intervention by another state? Another set of criteria would have to be met for
unilateral intervention to be legitimate: 1. The intervention should be based on extraterritorial human rights obligations, and/or convention based prerogatives
(ex: The Convention on the Elimination of Genocide); 2. The intervention must demonstrate a “purity of intention” that excludes motives based on securing the
strategic interests of the intervening country (ex: resource procurement); 3. The
intervention must be carried out in a manner that conforms to international humanitarian law standards and principles. As such, the purpose of the
intervention should never be to overthrow the government of the territory, and the use of force should not exceed what is required to protect civilians. At the
moment, the backlash against interventionist policies that has been created by the Iraq debacle has stifled debate on and support for the use of humanitarian
intervention in general, including when it comes to Darfur. As a result, the U.S., European countries and others are unwilling to send troops or lead in efforts to
intervene in Darfur. However, if we agree that genocide and ethnic cleansing are
not acceptable, than humanitarian intervention, when in conformity with the criteria listed above, must be considered as an acceptable policy choice of
international organizations, as well as individual states.
Dr. Said provided a counter argument to Mr. Neier’s point-of-view. According to Dr. Said, the principle of humanitarian intervention may be logically coherent. However, the history of Western intervention in the MENA region raises huge
questions concerning its legitimacy as a policy choice. First, humanitarian
13
intervention is reminiscent of the neo-colonial experience, and is often viewed as
an extension of this experience. Second, the case of Palestine evinces a prejudiced selectivity and double-standard concerning where and when
intervention takes place in the region. For instance, why do Western countries advocate for intervention in Darfur and not in the West-Bank and Gaza? Third, it
is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to ensure that humanitarian intervention is carried out with a “purity of intention,” and not as a means of furthering the
intervening states own interests. Iraq is a prime example of this difficulty. Fourth, the manner in which “humanitarian intervention” was carried out against
Iraq during and after the first Gulf War demonstrated a complete lack of respect
for the well-fare of Iraqi citizens. The bombing campaigns and later the sanctions regime were responsible for extreme human suffering, and contrary to the
standards and principles of IHL. There is a clear lack of mechanisms within the international realm to ensure the same type of abuses do not occur once more.
What matters then is not the principled logic of humanitarian intervention but the particularities: Who? How? Where? And for what purposes? In this regard,
considering that decisions of the S.C. are highly politicized, using the ICJ may offer a more fair and transparent method to decide the legitimacy of
humanitarian intervention on a case-by-case basis.
Third Session Open-Floor Discussion: Ms. Amal Basha: In Arab regions one of the main problems concerning the
issue of Darfur is the lack of acknowledgment that a humanitarian and political crisis exists. Instead people focus on conspiracy theories concerning Western
intentions to overthrow the regime.
Mr. Neier: Regarding legitimacy, both the AU and UN General Assembly have
accepted the principle of humanitarian intervention. The issue of humanitarian intervention needs to be debated and not ignored. Using the ICJ as a decision
body concerning humanitarian intervention would be ineffective. Bosnia filed a case of genocide against Serbia more than a decade ago and it still has not been
decided on.
Dr. Said: I support intervention in Darfur in some form. But many of those who
call for it have brutal, illegitimate records of intervention. Why should they be trusted?
Abbas Abdallah Suleiman (SLM): What is happening in Darfur is not
acceptable. I call it ethnic cleansing. Immediate pressure needs to be put on the GoS by local and international organizations.
Other Points:
• No Arab country wants to accuse another Arab country of committing
grave crimes for fear that its own crimes will come to light. • Talking about theories of intervention is not useful. What we need is
concrete solutions and recommendations. The case of Darfur is unique, and urgently needs a solution.
14
4.5 Fourth Session:
Why the DPA (Abuja) Agreement Failed to Provide
Peace and Security
Session Panelists: Mr. Kamal el Jozooli (Moderator)
Lawyer and Secretary-General of the Sudanese Union of Writers
Heidar Al Nour The Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM), Darfur
Mohammed Adam Elhassan Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Darfur
Hany Raslan Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies
Dr. Alex De Waal Expert on Sudan, Global Equity Initiative
Dr. Pricilla Joseph
Sudanese Parliament Member
Fourth Session Summary:
Mr. Nour warned that the lack of a transparent, genuine peace process in Darfur could lead to the break-up of the country. The reason why the DPA/Abuja Agreement failed is simple—there was no actual agreement. There were peace
talks, but these failed. A majority of rebel groups never signed the DPA.
Minnawi, the leader of the faction that did sign the DPA, was never a part of the process or legally entitled to sign the agreement. Furthermore, the vast majority
of Darfurians were opposed to the terms of the DPA on key issues such as the distribution of resources. The GoS only signed the agreement due to
international pressure and never intended to adhere to it; a fact which has been attested to by the unaltered behavior of the government in Darfur over the last 9
months.
Mr. Hassan pointed out that the Darfur crisis is a part of a national historical problem related to mismanagement and unequal distribution of resources. The DPA process was faulty for several reasons: 1. Mediation by the AU was biased
toward the GoS. The Darfur factions were separated and not allowed to communicate with each other; 2. The international community applied too much
pressure and did not allow enough space for negotiations. The text of the
agreement was also flawed: 1. The DPA failed to observe the Declaration of Principles7; 2. The text was written by foreign experts not the parties to the
conflict; 3. The percentage of national revenue granted to the Darfur region was less than the percentage of Sudan’s population that Darfurians comprise. These
reasons explain why only one of the three main movements in Darfur signed. The one that did sign is perhaps the weakest of all three. The DPA not only
failed, it made matters worse. The JEM is ready for a ceasefire and serious, genuine negotiations.
Mr. Raslan held that all parties involved in the DPA negotiations contributed to its failure. The fragmented and divided nature of the rebel factions and the lack
7 Representatives of Sudan’s government, the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality
Movement all signed a three-page "declaration of principles" aimed at helping calm the Darfur crisis,
on Wednesday July 5, 2005. This Declaration is available in English and Arabic at www.africa-union.org
15
of consistency in governmental policy make it almost impossible to create a
common political outlook or “unified vision” concerning a solution to the conflict. Due to this internal fragmentation and lack of central coordination, no party to
the DPA was capable of meeting the obligations of the agreement. Most representatives of the rebel factions are chosen from within tribal groups. As a
result, many of the rebel representatives lacked experience and the necessary skills to effectively contribute to the negotiation process. The representatives of
the JEM were experienced in this process but their Islamist politics made them unpopular among the other groups. Furthermore, conflicting regional and
international stances contributed to the confusion and inconsistencies. The IDPs
and people of Darfur have largely been left out the peace process, and are being held hostage by the inefficiencies and lack of political will for peace among the
government and rebel factions.
Mr. Alex de Waal was an expert consultant in the DPA process on negotiations concerning “Security Arrangements.” He began by drawing attention to the fact that the conference represented the first time that representatives of the GoS and
rebel groups have met face-to-face since the Abuja negotiations, which could be a positive indication that mediation between the groups may be a possibility once
more. He then went on to describe the context of the negotiations. The DPA process was extremely hindered by the fact that neither the GoS nor the rebel
movements demonstrated a willingness or readiness to compromise on any of their demands. A long and painstaking process was required, yet the
international community applied great pressure for an unrealistic “quick fix” that
would immediately stop the bloodshed. This pressure ultimately resulted in a premature end to the negotiation process. The core concept that guided the
drafting of the Security Arrangements was the principle of consent. Any security arrangement had to be obtained by consent, and could not be forced onto the
parties. One of the problems encountered during the process was the lack of active involvement within the process by the JEM. Though they were repeatedly
sought out for consultation they were rarely forthcoming in their participation. None-the-less, the Security Arrangements arrived at were a relative success and
neither the GoS nor any of the rebel factions objected to any clause within the
security section of the text when presented to them on the 4th and 5th of May 2006. The political power-sharing arrangements of the text were more
problematic and divisive. The Security Arrangements were organized around a ceasefire leading to disengagement and withdraw of forces to designated
positions. Also included were a partial arms-control regime and a ceasefire commission that would monitor hostile actions. In the end the GoS did not live
up to its ceasefire obligations and the commission failed. One major mistake of the AU was to expel two non-signatory groups from the ceasefire commission. It
is impossible to have a ceasefire without the agreement and participation of all
parties. Key issues and difficulties concerning the Security Arrangements: 1. Demilitarization of IDP camps is a necessity. Yet, who should provide security
within the camps? ; 2. Disarmament of the Janjaweed is also essential. However, it is impossible to do this through force, and must be done through an
agreement. ; 3. No matter how many peacekeeping troops are deployed they must have the correct mandate and operational concept, otherwise they will fail.
Working with the communities in Darfur to gain their consent and acceptance must be a key aspect of any future peacekeeping mandate. The fundamental
responsibility for the DPA’s failure lies with the belligerent parties to the conflict,
and not with regional or international actors, despite their many mistakes. The way ahead lies in taking immediate measures to protect civilians and revitalized
efforts to get a workable security agreement between the parties to the conflict.
Dr. Priscilla Joseph argued that the failure of the DPA was due in large part to what the agreement neglected to include. In particular, the DPA failed to
16
address the allocation of land/water resources within Darfur, referring instead to
the national allocation of resources. Local resource competition is one of the main causes of the conflict. Unless such regional resource arrangements are
worked out disarmament of the Janjaweed, and other militia groups will remain impossible. Also, the DPA was focused on arrangements between the fighting
groups, but did not properly consider the role or interests of other, non-combatant, stake holders, in particular the IDPs and other civilians within Darfur.
The agreement between South and North Sudan was partially successful because southern leaders were allocated positions within the central government; no
similar allocation has yet occurred with Darfur leaders. Furthermore, the
assumption that those who signed the agreement were the most influential leaders in Darfur has been proven very wrong. It now appears the GoS is ready
to bring on-board other factions that have not signed the agreement. If so, this is a positive development. If a solution to the Darfur crisis is not found there is a
risk of it escalating into a regional conflict.
Fourth Session Open-Floor Discussion: Minister Haroun: The GoS is ready to negotiate if and when other parties are.
We intend to accelerate the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue to reach compromises among different groups.
Ambassador Mohammad Abdullah: The DPA has not failed as an agreement.
The implementation of the agreement has failed. The text of the DPA is a valid
foundation to base peace on but was abandoned. The GoS and other parties need to make efforts to adjust and negotiate this document. We welcome a
reactivation of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue process.
Mr. Hassan (JEM): The agreements on security and civilian protection are too vague in the DPA.
Mr. Al Nour (SLM): The Darfur movements don’t lack a vision. They presented
their demands very clearly, but were ignored by the GoS. The GoS is mainly to
blame for not paying attention to the demands and needs of the Darfur tribes.
Mr. Raslan: The national state in Sudan is not crystallized. Equitable distribution of wealth within the country may be impossible without central
organization in the state. The economic and political development of Darfur may be the only way out of the situation.
Mr. de Waal: The government is without stable polices and keeps changing its
positions. The greatest danger is the loss of confidence in the negotiation process
on both sides. Need confidence building measures. Any future peacekeeping will have to be 90% outreach and 10% force. Negotiations in the future need to be
as transparent and open as possible.
17
4.6 Fifth Session:
Perspectives on the Arab and African Role Regarding
the Situation in Darfur
Session Panelists:
Ms. Amal Al Basha (Moderator) The Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Regional Coordinator; The Arab
Sisters Forum for Human Rights, Director
Mr. Ahmed Haroun Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, Sudan
Mr. Osman Kalibo Bella Ambassador of Chad in Egypt
Dr. Iglal Raafat Professor in Political Science, Cairo University
Fifth Session Summary:
Ambassador Bella began the session by high-lighting the serious threat to regional stability and security that is caused by the extension of the Darfur conflict into Chad.
Dr. Raafat concentrated on the regional, especially the Egyptian role in the ongoing conflict. The conflict in Darfur is part of the overall crisis in Sudan in
which the central government neglects and marginalizes the economic development and distribution of resources to other regions of the country. While
the solution is largely political, the problem also has a significant cultural element that shouldn’t be ignored. All post-independence governments, including the
current GoS, have failed to address and/or respect the diverse cultures and pluralistic nature of Sudanese society. This is a historical factor inherited by the
current government and not only of its own making. However, one problem with
the current GoS is that it has intensified and solidified the aggressive armed confrontation in Darfur, and has deepened cultural divides within the society.
Egyptian policy makers also fail to acknowledge the pluralistic nature of Sudanese society. This has led the Egyptian government to ignore different parties and
interests within Sudan. Egypt prefers to deal with Khartoum as if it is the only political player in Sudan. In other words, Egypt sees Sudan in its own likeness.
It strongly favors dealing with a centralized, undemocratic stable government rather than a fragmented, decentralized democratic state. Thus, Egypt supports
the central government almost unconditionally and refuses to participate in any
action that may contribute to fragmentation or pluralization within Sudan's political sphere. There may be indications that this relationship is changing.
Egypt has allowed South Sudan to open an office in Cairo. Also, Egypt tacitly supported S.C. Resolution 1706, and voted against Sudan's chairmanship of the
AU.
Minister Haroun asserted that the situation in Darfur is a local conflict, based on resource competition. None-the-less, Arab and African states have a role to play in the solution of the Darfur situation. Events in Darfur effect countries in
East Africa and the MENA region, and have consequences for the national security of states throughout the Arab world. Furthermore, the structural features of the
conflict—questions of identity, development, center-periphery relations, etc—are present in all Arab and African countries. The interest of all Arab and African
states is to secure peace and security in Sudan. The motives and strategy of the
“big powers,” in particular the U.S. and E.U., are not justified. These powers do
18
not have a role to play. They are only interested in Sudan as a theater of US-
China competition and the exploitation of resources. To understand this point one must examine the interests of the 108 foreign organizations operating in
Sudan. Questions concerning the budgets and management of resources of international humanitarian organizations operating in Darfur are relevant and
necessary. The GoS supports humanitarian work in Darfur as long as it does not support any other agenda. The GoS is supportive of AU peacekeeping troops, but
highly skeptical of the deployment of international troops due to the experiences of international troop coalitions in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Resolution
1706 will lead to the collapse of the Sudanese state if international forces enter
the country. The DPA is a valid framework for peace agreements. The DPA was not opposed by Darfur movements when it was presented. The main substance
of the agreement is still valid. An Arab role in humanitarian action is requested, but this must be carried out in a clear and transparent manner. The AU needs to
resume and strengthen its role in the cease fire. Also, the AU remains the best choice for mediator concerning peace negotiations. Egyptian-Sudanese relations
have been very strong and unified until recently. Egypt's vote against Sudan Chairmanship of the AU is puzzling considering the position would not give Sudan
any more power or influence than it already has.
Fifth Session Open-Floor Discussion: Minister Haroun: There needs to be an agreement on the level of intervention
that will be allowed. The GoS wants to bring others to the table. All other
countries in the region suffer from similar problems. There are some limitations on the role that Arab countries can play concerning aid and intervention.
Ms. Lefkow: The proxy war between Chad and Sudan has a large effect on the
human rights of civilians in Darfur, and must be dealt with in order to have progress in the peace process and civilian protection in Darfur.
Mr. Nadim: The Arab states have largely played a negative role in the Darfur
crisis by giving unconditional support for the GoS. One can not compare
international intervention in Darfur with Palestine/Iraq/Lebanon/Afghanistan. In these countries the crisis has largely been caused by foreign intervention. In
Sudan the crisis has been brought on by the government.
Other Points: • Is there an effective role that can be played by the Arab League?
• Arab and African countries need to put more pressure on the GoS • Role of Egypt should be to try to bring together groups in Sudan
19
5. Final Session: Conclusions
Session Panelists: Mr. Majdi el Naeem (Moderator)
Human Rights Activist, Sudan
Mr. Ahmed Haroun Minster of Humanitarian Affairs, Sudan
Mr. Moataz el Feigery CIHRS, Programs Director
Ms. Diedra Clancy Darfur Consortium
Mr. Kamal el Jozooli Lawyer and Sec. Gen. of Sudanese Union of Writers
Mr. Alex de Waal
Sudan Expert, Global Equity Initiative
Mr. El Feigery began by giving an overview of the conference. One of the main goals of this conference has been to increase knowledge in the Arab region on the
situation in Darfur and to encourage the Arab public and governments to become involved in a constructive manner to solve the situation. There seems to be a
consensus concerning several observations made throughout the conference: 1. Civilian protection in Darfur is largely dependent on a political solution to the
conflict; 2. A political solution is in turn dependent on their being a political will
for peace among the parties to the conflict; 3. Any successful political solution will have to find a way of halting human rights abuses in Darfur; 4. The situation in
Darfur is part of a larger problem of unbalanced and inequitable development in Sudan; 5. The DPA has not improved the situation in Darfur; 6. The use of
forceful intervention in Darfur will do little to improve civilian protection, the most important tool remains reconciliation and trust-building measures; 7. Sudan
needs to reform its judicial and legal system to provide accountability for crimes committed in Darfur; 8. Humanitarian access in Darfur is the worst it has ever
been, and efforts need to be made to protect humanitarian workers and allow
them free movement and access to IDPs within Darfur. Large disagreements were expressed concerning a couple issues, including:
A. S.C. Resolution 1706 and Humanitarian Intervention as a policy choice: There
was disagreement among participants whether the large UN peacekeeping force envisaged in 1706 would help to provide stability and civilian protection in Darfur
or if it would destabilize Sudan and have a negative effect on civilian protection. Most agreed that the use of force without the GoS consent would be destabilizing.
The legitimacy of Resolution 1706 was also highly controversial. Some argued
that it represented a Western attempt to expand control over resources, while a majority argued it represented the international will and should be accepted by
the GoS. The debate concerning Resolution 1706 was reflective of the more general debate on the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention as a policy choice.
Some held that humanitarian intervention is a necessary and legitimate choice when confronted by international atrocities. Others contended that humanitarian
intervention may have to be abandoned a policy choice because it is extremely open to abuse as a means of justifying military action motivated by resource
expropriation.
B. The DPA: Many rebel faction representatives argued that the DPA was
fundamentally flawed and peace negotiations needed to start all over. The GoS held that the DPA constituted a valid basis for future peace negotiations and
simply needed to be adjusted in some ways. INGO and NGO representatives
20
usually advocated for a middle-ground approach: the DPA can be a basis for
future talks but significant and fundamental changes may be required. Some important developments that took place during the conference included: 1.
The attendance of both GoS officials and rebel movement representatives at the conference, which constitutes the first such face-to-face meeting since the Abuja
talks; 2. The Minister of Humanitarian Affairs for Sudan and Sudan's Ambassador in Egypt have expressed the desire of the GoS to begin inclusive negotiations
once more with rebel groups, and to invigorate the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue process; 3. A number of Darfur faction representatives have also expressed a
desire to reopen the negotiation process with the GoS.
Ms. Clancy began with a serious of “reflections and questions from the NGO community” attending the conference. Some important points made by the NGO community included: 1. Protection of civilians in Darfur is essential to any
solution to the crisis; 2. The role of AMIS and its relation to the U.N. needs to be
clearly defined; 3. A UN-AU hybrid peacekeeping force still remains the best option to date for providing civilian protection; 4. Attacks on civilians by both the
GoS and rebel groups must stop; 5. Access for humanitarian organizations, journalists, etc. in Darfur should be facilitated by all parties to the conflict; 6.
There is a need for more awareness and understanding concerning the inter-state element of the conflict and human rights abuses in Darfur; 7. The Sudanese legal
system does not provide a sufficient framework of accountability for the actions of governmental officials, and may need to be reformed; 8. There is a need for an
open debate on the meaning of “civilian protection” in connection with
humanitarian intervention. Questions for the NGO community: 1. How can we improve our understanding of the political context in which our advocacy takes
place?; 2. How can we engage a broad spectrum of Sudanese political, intellectual and cultural opinions concerning our work?; 3. How can we respond to
questions dealing with international interests in Darfur?; 4. Is there a need for greater dialogue between international, regional and local NGOs on the issue of
Darfur?
Mr. Jozooli reviewed the weaknesses of the DPA, and recommended that inclusive dialogue between the GoS and rebel factions needs to be commenced using the DPA as a starting point. The DPA process and text should serve as a
learning experience and lessons need to be taken away from the experience. Any
new peace process needs to include a comprehensive reform of the legal and judicial system in Sudan, and a commitment by both sides to refrain from
attacking civilians and to actively provide protection for civilians.
Mr. de Waal welcomed the invitation by Abdul Mohammed to reopen Darfur-Darfur Dialogue. Such a dialogue may be required to produce a lasting peace. Mr. de Waal suggested the NGOs, such as CIHRS, could help to initiate such
dialogue. He then pointed out that a Chad-Chad Dialogue may be in order as well. Mr. de Waal then pointed out that CIHRS and others are interested to send
a Media Mission of Arab journalists to Darfur, and wanted to know the Sudanese Ministers opinion on such mission.
Minister Haroun began be reiteration the government's commitment to inclusive talks and to abide by these talks. He said an effective ceasefire was
needed, and also called for further deployment of AMIS forces to monitor and streamline humanitarian aid within Darfur. The negation process needs to
continue to reach a peace agreement. The DPA can serve as the core to build on. The fragmentation of movements remains a challenge. A bottom up approach to
negotiations may be needed to reach a peace agreement. The Arab role should
21
be to provide humanitarian aid and solidarity with Sudan. The African role needs
to be enhanced through the 3-package deal8, and this is the best framework to overcome the difficulties of Resolution 1706. Attempts to revise Resolution 1706
will only slow and damage the process. The GoS appreciates humanitarian aid but still has reservations including their high administrative spending and
adoption of the Western agenda. Minister Haroun then invited human rights organizations to begin an active dialogue with the government. The concerns of
all must be considered in their advocacy campaigns. Concerning the “Media Mission,” Minister Haroun welcomed the initiative, and asked for a proposal of the
project to be sent to him. He stressed that the presence of the reporters in
Khartoum would be desirable. This way a balanced view of the situation could be gained.
Final Session Open-Floor Discussion:
Ambassador of Sudan, Mohammad Abdullah: We extend an invitation for the Media Mission to come to Sudan and for a Darfur-Darfur Dialogue to begin. Talks
are important between the GoS and factions. Negotiations are not conditional and are open to all groups.
JEM: We can’t sit at the table with the government unless government proves it
is truly committed to abiding by an agreement and providing a atmosphere conducive for peace.
SLM: The government's intention is to manipulate the opinions of people here today.
Mr. Amir Osman: The rebel groups and government are urged to sit down
together and write a declaration on (1) their acceptance of each other and desire for peaceful coexistence, and (2) draft an agreement on arms control.
Other Points:
• Proposal: Send a delegation of Arab writers to Darfur. • Get the reporters who will be attending the Media Mission delegation to
Sudan to "Knock on the Doors of Arab Countries" and try to get people within the Arab world to pay attention to what is happening in Darfur
• It is important to make Darfur citizens a part of the solution in our work.
8 The 3-Package Deal was brokered between Kofi Annan and the Sudanese government at the end of
2006, as an alternative to accepting Resolution 1706. In this agreement the UN provides technical and
logistical support to AMIS, followed by a limited deployment of UN peacekeeping personal into
Darfur under the over-all control of the AU.
22
6. Annex:
6.1. List of Participants:
Participants from Egypt
Organization Occupation Name N
American-
university
Intern Catherine Baylin 1
AUC lecturer Ibrahim Alnour 2 Ahram center for
strategic and
political studies
Journalist
/researcher
Dr. Mohammed Sayed
Said 3
American-
university
Human rights
lecturer
Lana Baydas 4
American
university in
Cairo
Director of
Center for
Philanthropy &
Civic
Engagement
Barbara Ibrahim 5
Ahram center for
political and
strategic studies
Researcher Hanny Raslan 6
Cairo university Political scientist Dr.Iglal Raafat
7 Shomooa
association
Administrative Mohammed Kamal 8
African
development
center
Researcher Saber Nayel 9
Ahram Journalist Asmaa Al-Hussieny 10
Middle east
association for
peace and human
rights
chairman Abdel Fattah Hamid 11
Arab human
rights activists
program
Executive manager Ahmed Badaawi 12
v-day karama Director Hebak Osman 13 Egyptian
initiative for
personal rights
Executive director Hossam Bahgat 14
Andalus institute
for tolerance and
anti-violence
studies
Lawyer Mahmoud Farouk 15
Khalil center for
consultance and
legal studies
Lawyer Ahmed abdullah 16
Arab human
rights activists
program
Researcher Waddah Idris 17
African
development
center
Executive director Mohieldien Soliman 18
Eggyptian center
for child ights
Post graduate
student
Nezar Isaak 19
Solidarity for
development and
Board director Mariam Ishak 20
23
human rights
association
ICRC regional
office
Media official Tamara Riffai 21
United Nations
world food
program
Media Official Khalid Mansour 22
World food
program-United
Nations
Media coordinator Mohammed Ammasha 23
Human rights
watch office at
cairo
Media official Fady Alqady 24
ERT lecturer Dr.Abdulmoneim
Yossuf 25
Justice and
Equality
Movement
Cairo office media
official
Mohammed Adam 26
Justice and
Equality
Movement
Sharafeldien Saleh 27
Justice and
Equality
Movement
Adam Senousy 28
Justice and
Equality
Movement
Essa Yehia 29
Justice and
Equality
Movement
Official speaker Abdel Fattah Ibrahim 30
Justice and
equality
movement
engineer Mohammed Essa 31
Justice and
Equality
Movement
Secretary general
cairo office
Abdullatif Adam 32
Justice and
Equality
Movement
Doctor Shaza Samir 33
Sudan liberation
movement
regional office
Office manager Idris Arbab 34
Sudan liberation
movement
Secretary general
of the regional
office
Ahmed Hassan 35
Sudan liberation
movement
Media official in
the regional office
Musa Babker 36
Sudan liberation
movement
Member Heidar Alnour 37
Sudanese
ettehady party
Director of
Alettehady party
office in cairo
Merghany Mosaad 38
Contemporary
sudan research
center
Director Moniem Soliman 39
Contemporary
sudan research
center
secretary Ibrahim Yehia 40
Maan Post graduate Bakry Mohammed 41
24
Officials
Email Occupation Name N
Chad minister to
cairo
Mr.Osman Calibo
Bella
44
Esam2005_com@hot
mail.com
Office manager Essameldien
khalafallah
45
Sudanese State
minister for
humanitarian affairs
Mr.Ahmed Haroun 46
Monitors
Organization Occupation Name N
Libya embassy Delegated
minister Ammar
Mohammed
Kourish
47
Sudanese
embassy
Ambassador Mohammed
Abdullah Idris
48
Sudanese
embassy
Diplomat Moddather
Abdullah
49
Sudanese
embassy
First Secretary Abdelraouf
Amer
50
Saudi embassy First Secretary Mofleh
Alsalman
51
Ford
Foundation
Emma playfair 52
Ford
foundation
consultant Sara
Hammood
53
Participants from outside Egypt
• Participants from international organizations
organization student
Social
democratic
forum
Secretary general Nabil Magid 42
Darfur media
and
journalist's
league
Vice-chair Mohammed Abdel
karim 43
25
Organization Occupation Name N
CICC Outreach
Liaison , middle
east and south
africa
Anjali kamat 54
International
refugee rights
initiative
Co-Director Deiedre Clancy 55
OXFAM Humanitarian
Policy Adviser Jamie Balfour 56
International
Cisis Group
Media official Nadim hasbany 57
International
center for
transitional
justice
Director of MENA Program
Hanny Megally 58
Human rights
watch
Researcher Leslie Lefkow 59
Save darfur
coalition
International
outeach
coordinator
Amir Osman
mohammed
Osman
60
Human Rights
first
Campaign manager
Nicky Lazar 61
OSI Program
director Gregor
B.M.Meiring
62
OSI Nejla
Sammakia
63
OSI President Aryeh Neier 64
OSI Senior legal
officer Killy Askin 65
Amnesty Campaign
coordinator Bashair
Ahmed
66
Save darfur
coalition
International associate
Sean
P.Brooks
67
International
media
support
Program officer Finn
Rasmussen
68
Social science
research
council-
England
lecturer Alex Dewaal 69
• Participants from Sudan
N Name Occupation Organization
70 Magdy Elnaiem Researcher
71 Abdoallah
Adam Khater
Journalist Darfur Center
for peace
26
enhancement
72 Pricilla Kuch Parliament
Member
73 Salih Mahmoud Parliament
member
74 Osman
Hemmieda
Director SOAT
75 Kamal Gezouli Lawyer Sudanese
Writer's union 76 Faisal Elbagir Program
coordinator
Khartoum
center for
human rights 77 Massaad
Mohammed Ali
Lawyer Amal center
for relief
• Participants from Arab organizations
N Name Occupation Organization
78 Amal Basha CICC Regional
cooordinator
Arab sister's
forum for
human rights 79 Maan
Elbayary
Journalist Gulf journal-
emirates 80 Mahifiz
Mohammed
Lecturer Moroccan
center for
democracy
and human
rights studies 81 Sameera
Ainan
Lawyer Moroccan
organization
for human
rights 82 Mohammed
Neshnash
Vice chair Moroccan
organization
for human
rights 83 Hamid Marey Economist Civil society
enhancement
committees 84 Fawzia rabia Educational
resoursec
specialist
Amnesty
Media Personnel
organization Occupation Name N
Watany
alyoum
Journalist Taher Abozied 85
27
Middle east
news
agency
Journalist Ahmed Gheeth 86
Ekhbaria
channel –
saudi
Arabia
Camera
director Hany Mustafa 87
Watany Journalist Rimon Edward 88
Almasry
Alyoum
Journalist Wael Ali 89
Gulf journal
Emirates
Journalist Naglaa Kamal 90
Middle east
journal
Journalist Zeinelabedien
mohammed
91
Gezeera
journal
Journalist Atteyat abdelrehiem 92
Rose
Alyossuf
Editor Howaida Yehia 93
Nahdet
Misr
Journalist Mahmoud Bassuny 94
Al-Hayat,
Egypt
Journalist Haytham Kasem 95
Al-Osbooa Journalist Khaled mohammed
Ali
96
Gomhouria Journalist Moataz El-Hadidy 97
Ahram Journalist Emad Hegab 98
Ahrar Journalist Mohieldien Said 99
Ahaly Abdelsalam Amira 100
Al-Raay Journalist Mohammed
Abdelmaguid
101
Al-Hayat Journalist Ahmed Mustafa 102
Noseldonia Journalist Tamer Kamal 103
Al-
Massaeya
Journalist Sahar Ragab 104
Almogaz Journalist Marwa Said 105
Reporter Salha Omar 106
Participants from Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies
N Name Occupation Phone Email
107 Bahey Hassan Director 7951112 [email protected]
108 Moataz elfegiery Programs
director
7951112 [email protected]
109 Mohammed Ahmed Sudan Project
coordinator
7951112 [email protected]
110 Jeremie Smith Researcher
and advocate
7951112 [email protected]
111 Bassam Bahgat Project
coordinator
7951112 [email protected]
28
7. 2. Conference Agenda:
The Conflict in Darfur
and Civilian Protection Cairo 29-30 January 2007
Agenda
First Day: 29 /1/2007
9-9:30 Registration 9:30-10 Opening session
Panelists:
Minister.Ahmed Haroun
Sudanese State Minister of Humanitarian Affairs
Bahey el Dien Hassan
29
(Moderator) Director of CIHRS
Kamal EL Jozooli
Lawyer and the Secretary-General of the Sudanese Union of Writers
10-12 First session
Developments of the humanitarian situation in Darfur
Moderator: Hany Megally
Director of the Middle East Department at the International Institute for Transitional
Justice
Panelists:
Bashair Ahmed
Amnesty International
Tamara Refaii
Media official at ICRC regional office
Mosaad Mohamed Aly
Amal Center for Relief of Torture Victims (Darfur)
Khaled Mansoor
World Food Program UN
Jamie Balfour
OXFAM
12-12:30 Coffee break
12:30-2:30 Second session
Proposals for Civilian's Protection: Role of the African Union and UN troops
Moderator: Abdoallah Khater
Darfurian writer
Panelists:
Saleh Mahmoud
Sudanese MP and Human Rights Lawyer
Nadim Hasbany
The International Crisis Group
30
Leslie Lefkow
HRW
Diedre Clancy
The Darfur Consortium
2:30-3:30 Lunch break
3:30-5:30 Third session
The perspectives of future humanitarian intervention
Moderator: Khaled Mansoor
World Food Program UN
Panelists:
Aryeh Neier
President of Open Society Institute
Dr. Mohamed el Sayed Said
Vice President of Ahram Center for Political Studies
The Second Day: 30 January 2007
10-12 Fourth session Why the Abuja agreement failed to provide peace and security?
Moderator: Kamal EL Jozooli
Lawyer and the Secretary General of the Sudanese Union of Writers
Panelists Dr.Pricilla Joseph
Sudanese parliament member
Heidar alnour
The Sudanese Liberation Movement ( Darfur)
Mohammed Adam Elhassan
Justice and Equality Movement (Darfur)
Hany Raslan
31
Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies
Dr. Alex DeWaal
Sudan Expert, Global Equity Initiative
12-12:30 Coffee break
12:30-2:30 Fifth session
Perspectives on The Arab and African role regarding the conflict in Darfur
Moderator : Amal albasha
Regional Coordinator for the CICC and Head of the Arab Sister's Forum for Human
Rights
Panelists: Minister Ahmed Haroun
Sudanese State Minister of Humanitarian Affairs
Mr.Osman Kalibo Bella
Ambassador of Chad
Dr. Iglal Raafat
Political Scientist, Cairo University
2:30-4:00 Lunch break
4:00-5:00 Final Session: Conclusions
(Moderator) Majdi el Naeem
Human Rights Activist, Sudan
:
Panelists: . Minster Ahmed Haroun
of Humanitarian Affairs, Sudan
Moataz el Feigery
CIHRS, Programs Director
Diedra Clancy
Darfur Consortium
Kamal el Jozooli
Lawyer and the Secretary General of the Sudanese Union of Writers
32
Dr. Alex de Waal
Sudan Expert, Global Equity Initiative