The crisis began in the early fall of 1962. The cutter Rockaway got orders to proceed south out of New York. We arrived

on scene a few days later. The civilian world did not yet know.

On the evening of 22 October 1962, US Pres John F. Kennedy went on the air to announce the discovery of missiles in

Cuba. Additionally, loaded Russian ships were headed for Cuba. Hence, he announced a maritime blockade to prevent

further shipments of missiles and military equipment from arriving in that country. Kennedy also demanded that

Khrushchev dismantle and remove all missiles from Cuba.

The Rockaway was in place, in the blockade, along with numerous other ships. The American Navy, including the US

Coast Guard, in place across the Russians path creating the Cuban blockade – the “Cuban Missile Crisis.” Days passed.

The Russian ships came closer to the quarantine line. The ships stopped.

Would the Russian ships try to break the line or would they back off? For six terrifying days, the two superpowers

considered their options until on 28 October Khrushchev agreed to Kennedy's demands. The world had teetered on the

brink of war – possibly nuclear war. The Russians had blinked while we stood firm.

That’s the short story of the Cuban Missile Crisis but my story is more personal. I was an engineman stationed aboard

the Coast Guard Cutter the Rockaway (WAVP 377). My billet included operating the ship’s lifeboat at Special Sea Detail

and other shipboard emergencies.

Officially, this was not a declared conflict/war but for me this came ultra close to a combat mission. Here’s why:

Shortly after noon I got a call to meet on the mess deck. An ensign had assembled the group consisting of all the

Rockaway’s gunners mates, a boatswains mate, the ensign and myself. He advised that we were the “landing party”

should an invasion need to take place. There was silence from all assembled.

We knew some of what was happening – the blockade. I had gone up on deck, after a four hour watch as a throttleman

in “B” engineroom. You could see the line of American ships on spaced a few miles apart, on either side of us, all the

way to the horizon and beyond.

The ensign, after his silencing announcement, proceeded to provide details of what was expected of us – the landing

party - should we need to invade:

First, he told us, that the ship’s five inch guns will soften up the beach. Next we will launch the lifeboat with us as the

landing party- the ensign will lead us. We will have M-1 rifles and other small arms and plenty of ammunition. Other

details were provided.

Lastly, he asked if there were any questions. I raised my hand. I looked around and said, “Sir, if all of the gunners mates

are in the landing party, Who will operate the five inch gun?” He paused and then said, “I’ll have to get back to you.”

Now, more than fifty years later, I’m still waiting for that answer! And luckily we never had to invade Cuba – maybe the

failed Bay of Pigs fiasco an few months earlier was a lesson learned. For sure, the Russians backing off from our blockade

ended the crisis.

My story is not a negative about the Coast Guard, a little funny – Yes. It’s more of a quirk in planning. A note of humor in

an otherwise tense situation. I still laugh when I remember the look on that ensign’s face as he tried to answer my

question. Personally, I’m glad I never had to participate in any landing. The Guard has a long history of significant

combat participation.

Coast Guardsmen and their forefathers have fought in every conflict since the Constitution became the law of the land.

Coast Guardsmen operated the landing craft during invasions of WWII. One Guardsman won the Congressional Medal of

Honor. On the morning of 27 Sept., 1942, Signalman First Class Douglas a Munro organized a rescue mission that saved

500 Marines who were pinned down on the Guadalcanal beach . Munro, the first and only member of the U.S. Coast

Guard to receive the Medal of Honor, In his honor, the Coast Guard Cutter Munro was commissioned 7 Sept., 1971.

There is a statue of Munro at the Coast Guard Training Center in Cape May, NJ, as well. Coast Guard-manned ships sank

at least 11 enemy submarines during WWII. During the Korean War (1950-53), the Coast Guard performed a variety of

tasks. The Coast Guard was asked to participate in the Vietnam War by the Army, Navy, and Air Force and performed a

variety of duties. At the outset of the military buildup in the mid-1960s, the Navy lacked shallow water craft needed for

inshore operations. To help fill this need, the Coast Guard sent 26 82-foot cutters to Vietnam.

Coast Guardsmen have also participated in the country's most recent conflicts. Three were assigned to U.S. forces in

Operation Just Cause, the liberation of Panama in 1989. With the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 1 August 1990, the Coast

Guard was again called to perform military duties on a large scale. Currently, many are serving in Iraq patrolling the

Straits of Hormuz. Last year CWO Jack Brown received the Bronze Star Medal for his life saving efforts, while wounded,

during a rocket attack on the Iraqi embassy.

Our distinguished combat service has and will no doubt continue. I’m proud to be a Coasty.

References

• Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships

• Department of the Navy Naval Historical Center

• United States Coast Guard Historian's Office: Rockaway

• United States Coast Guard Historian's Office: Mackinac, 1949 WHEC-371

• Gardiner, Robert. Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1947-1982, Part I: The Western Powers. Annapolis,

Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1983. ISBN 0-80721-418-9.

• United States Coast Guard at War by Robert Scheina Historian's Office:

About the author:

Stephen Van Rensselaer served on active duty in the U.S. Coast Guard from September 1960 until September 1964.

Initial duty was at Field Testing and Development – Curtis Bay, MD. He served aboard the cutter Rockaway from April

1962 until September 1963 as an EN3 and EN2. He transferred to Group New York aboard a 65 footer. In August of 1964

watched as the 82 footer and crew from Group New York steamed up the Hudson River and was lifted aboard a freighter

to be carried to Vietnam.

Rockaway WAVP 377

USCGC Rockaway (WAVP-377, WAGO-377, WHEC-377, WOLE-377) sometime before the Coast Guard's 1967 adoption of the "racing

stripe" markings on its ships.

Construction and U.S. Navy &U.S. Coast Guard service

Name: USCGC Rockaway

Namesake: Rockaway Inlet, on Long Island, New York, at the entrance to New York Bay

Builder: Associated Shipbuilders, Inc., Seattle, Washington

Laid down: 30 June 1941

Launched: 14 February 1942

Completed: January 1943

Acquired: Loaned by U.S. Navy to U.S. Coast Guard 24 December 1948

Transferred permanently from U.S. Navy to U.S. Coast Guard 26 September 1966

Commissioned: 10 January 1949

Decommissioned: 29 January 1972[1]

Reclassified: Oceanographic vessel, WAGO-377, 1965

High endurance cutter, WHEC-377, 1 May 1966

Offshore law enforcement vessel, WOLE-377, 23 September 1971

Struck: 26 September 1966 (from Navy List)

Fate: Sold for scrapping 21 October 1972

Notes: Served as United States Navy seaplane tender USS Rockaway (AVP-29) 1943-1946

General characteristics

Class and type: Casco-class cutter

Displacement: 2,390 tons (full load) in 1967

Length: 310 ft 7.75 in (94.685 m) overall; 300 ft 0 in (91.4 m) between perpendiculars

Beam: 41 ft 2.375 in (12.5571 m) maximum

Draft: 13 ft 1 in (4.0 m) maximum aft at full load in 1967

Installed power: 6,080 horsepower (4.54 MW)

Propulsion: Fairbanks-Morse direct-reversing diesel engines, two shafts; 166,430 gallons of fuel

Speed: 18.2 knots (maximum sustained) in 1967

13.2 knots (economic) in 1967

Range: 9,902 nautical miles (18,339 kilometers) at 18.2 knots in 1967

18,289 nautical miles (33,871 kilometers) at 13.2 knots in 1967

Complement: In 1967: 151 (10 officers, 3 warrant officers, 138 enlisted personnel)

Sensors and

processing systems: Radars in 1967 (one each): SPS-23, SPS-29D

Sonar in 1967: SQS-1

Armament: In 1967: 2 x 81-millimeter Mark 2 mortars

2 x .50-caliber (12.7-millimeter) Mark 2 machine guns

2 x Mark 32 Mod 5

Note:

As per the United States Coast Guard Historian's Office (at

http://www.uscg.mil/history/webcutters/Rockaway_1948.asp). However, NavSource.org (at

http://www.navsource.org/archives/09/43/4329.htm) places her decommissioning date on 21 September 1972.

OR

Construction and U.S. Navy &U.S. Coast Guard service

Rockaway began life as the United States Navy Barnegat-class seaplane tender USS Rockaway (AVP-29). She

was laid down on 30 June 1941 by Associated Shipbuilders, Inc. at Seattle, Washington, launched on 14

February 1942, and commissioned into the U.S. Navy on 6 January 1943. She operated primarily in the Atlantic

Ocean during World War II. She began conversion to a press information ship, redesignated AG-123, in July

1945 in anticipation of the invasion of Japan scheduled for 1945-1946,, but this was cancelled and she was

converted back into a seaplane tender when the war ended without the invasion being necessary. She was

decommissioned on 21 March 1946 and placed in reserve in the Atlantic Reserve Fleet at Orange, Texas.

Transferred to the United States Coast Guard

Barnegat-class ships were very reliable and seaworthy and had good habitability, and the Coast Guard viewed

them as ideal for ocean station duty, in which they would perform weather reporting and search and rescue

tasks, once they were modified by having a balloon shelter added aft and having oceanographic equipment, an

oceanographic winch, and a hydrographic winch installed.

The U.S. Navy loaned Rockaway to the Coast Guard on 24 December 1948. After undergoing conversion for

use as a weather-reporting ship, she was commissioned into the Coast Guard service as USCGC Rockaway

(WAVP-377) on 10 January 1949.

U.S. Coast Guard service

Rockaway was stationed at Staten Island in New York City, which remained her home port throughout her

Coast Guard career. Her primary duty was to serve on ocean stations in the Atlantic Ocean to gather

meteorological data. While on duty in one of these stations, she was required to patrol a 210-square-mile (544-

square-kilometer) area for three weeks at a time, leaving the area only when physically relieved by another

Coast Guard cutter or in the case of a dire emergency. While on station, she acted as an aircraft check point at

the point of no return, a relay point for messages from ships and aircraft, as a source of the latest weather

information for passing aircraft, as a floating oceanographic laboratory, and as a search-and-rescue ship for

downed aircraft and vessels in distress, and engaged in law enforcement operations.

She took part in a number United States Coast Guard Academy cadet cruises inincluding 1963(with the author

participating) and 1965. Rockaway was reclassified as an "oceanographic ship" and redesignated as WAGO-377

in 1965.

On 1 May 1966, Rockaway again was reclassified, this time as a high endurance cutter, and was redesignated

WHEC-377. On 26 September 1966 her period on loan to the Coast Guard ended when she was stricken from

the Navy List and transferred permanently to the Coast Guard.

On 23 September 1971, Rockaway was once again reclassified, this time as an off-shore law enforcement

vessel, and was redesignated WOLE-377. Rockaway was decommissioned on 29 January 1972[2]

She was sold

for scrapping in October 1970 to BV Intershift of Rotterdam, the Netherlands.

About the author:

Stephen Van Rensselaer served on active duty in the U.S. Coast Guard from September 1960 until September 1964.

Initial duty was at Field Testing and Development – Curtis Bay, MD. He served aboard the cutter Rockaway from April

1962 until September 1963 as an EN3 and EN2. He transferred to Group New York aboard a 65 footer. In August of 1964

watched as the 82 footer and crew from Group New York steamed up the Hudson River and was lifted aboard a freighter

to be carried to Vietnam.

In September 1958, Rockaway salvaged a U.S. Navy seaplane 180 nautical miles (333 kilometers) from

Bermuda. In December 1964, she rescued four people from the merchant ship Smith Voyager.

On 24 February 1966, Rockaway stood by the British merchant ship Parthia until a commercial tug arrived to

assist Parthia.

From 20 January 1967 to 30 March 1967, Rockaway conducted an "Eastern Tropical Pacific Cruise" in the

Pacific off Mexico, where she undertook an oceanographic survey. From November 1967 through January

1968, she conducted an oceanographic survey off Norfolk, Virginia. She was involved in more oceanographic

surveys over the Mid-Atlantic Shelf from 6 May 1968 to 12 May 1968 and again from 11 July 1968 to 18 July

1968.

From 14 January 1969 to 19 January 1969, she conducted a survival craft drift project 159 nautical miles (294

kilometers) east of the Chesapeake Bay. In August 1969, she conducted extensive oceanographic work

associated with the Barbados Oceanographic and Meteorological Experiment. She then conducted more

oceanographic surveys from Nova Scotia, Canada, to Cape Hatteras, North Carolina, from 20 October 1969 to

23 November 1969, over the Mid-Atlantic Outer Continental Margin from 30 March 1970 to 5 April 1970, from

Nova Scotia to Cape Hatteras between 19 May 1970 and 14 June 1970, and near the Grand Banks of

Newfoundland between 6 October 1970 and 21 October 1970. In November 1970, she surveyed a nerve-gas

dump site.

Rockaway conducted a fisheries research cruise from Nova Scotia to Cape Hatteras between 2 March 1971 and

3 April 1971. Another research cruise took her back to the Grand Banks of Newfoundland in May 1971. From

15 July 1971 to 18 September 1971, she studied the influence of Mediterranean effluent upon the Atlantic

Ocean.

Decommissioning and disposal

Notes

1. ^ Per the United States Coast Guard Historian's Office (at

http://www.uscg.mil/history/webcutters/Rockaway_1948.asp). However, NavSource.org (at

http://www.navsource.org/archives/09/43/4329.htm) places her decommissioning date on 21 September

1972.

2. ^ Per the United States Coast Guard Historian's Office (at

http://www.uscg.mil/history/webcutters/Rockaway_1948.asp). However, NavSource.org (at

http://www.navsource.org/archives/09/43/4329.htm) places her decommissioning date on 21 September

1972.

References

Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships..

NavSource Online: Service Ship Photo Archive AVP-29 / AG-123 Rockaway WAGO / WHEC /

WOLE-377 Rockaway

Department of the Navy Naval Historical Center: Online Library of Selected Images: U.S. Navy Ships:

USS Rockaway (AVP-29), 1943-1948

United States Coast Guard Historian's Office: Rockaway, 1948 AVP / WAVP / WHEC / WAGO /

WOLE-377 Radio call sign: NBTM

United States Coast Guard Historian's Office: Mackinac, 1949 WHEC-371

Gardiner, Robert. Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1947-1982, Part I: The Western Powers.

Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1983. ISBN 0-80721-418-9.

THE COAST GUARD AT WAR By Robert Scheina

THE COAST GUARD AT WAR By Robert Scheina

See also

USS Rockaway (AVP-29)

Name: USCGC Rockaway

Namesake: Rockaway Inlet, on Long Island, New York, at the entrance to New York Bay

Builder: Associated Shipbuilders, Inc., Seattle, Washington

Laid down: 30 June 1941

Launched: 14 February 1942

Completed: January 1943

Acquired: Loaned by U.S. Navy to U.S. Coast Guard 24 December 1948

Transferred permanently from U.S. Navy to U.S. Coast Guard 26 September 1966

Commissioned: 10 January 1949

Decommissioned: 29 January 1972[1]

Reclassified: Oceanographic vessel, WAGO-377, 1965

High endurance cutter, WHEC-377, 1 May 1966

Offshore law enforcement vessel, WOLE-377, 23 September 1971

Struck: 26 September 1966 (from Navy List)

Fate: Sold for scrapping 21 October 1972

Notes: Served as United States Navy seaplane tender USS Rockaway (AVP-29) 1943-1946

General characteristics

Class and type: Casco-class cutter

Displacement: 2,390 tons (full load) in 1967

Length: 310 ft 7.75 in (94.685 m) overall; 300 ft 0 in (91.4 m) between perpendiculars

Beam: 41 ft 2.375 in (12.5571 m) maximum

Draft: 13 ft 1 in (4.0 m) maximum aft at full load in 1967

Installed power: 6,080 horsepower (4.54 MW)

Propulsion: Fairbanks-Morse direct-reversing diesel engines, two shafts; 166,430 gallons of fuel

Speed: 18.2 knots (maximum sustained) in 1967

13.2 knots (economic) in 1967

Range: 9,902 nautical miles (18,339 kilometers) at 18.2 knots in 1967

18,289 nautical miles (33,871 kilometers) at 13.2 knots in 1967

Complement: In 1967: 151 (10 officers, 3 warrant officers, 138 enlisted personnel)

Sensors and

processing systems: Radars in 1967 (one each): SPS-23, SPS-29D

Sonar in 1967: SQS-1

Armament: In 1967: 2 x 81-millimeter Mark 2 mortars

2 x .50-caliber (12.7-millimeter) Mark 2 machine guns

2 x Mark 32 Mod 5

Description: Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962-One of the greatest showdowns between West and East during the

long struggle known as the Cold War was the Cuban Missile Crisis. Alarmed by the placement of nuclear armed missiles

by the Soviet Union in Cuba, Presi)

Cuban missile crisis (1962). In May 1960, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev promised military assistance to

the beleaguered Castro regime in Cuba. Two years later, he saw that the USSR's relations with Cuba also

represented a unique opportunity to offset the threat posed to Moscow by US nuclear missiles based in Turkey.

In addition to aircraft, air defence systems, armoured vehicles, and troops, Khrushchev offered a selection of

nuclear-armed medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles. Castro accepted the offer and within months

the USA and the USSR were on the verge of all-out nuclear war. On 14 October 1962, following indications of

increased military activity on Cuba and a growing Soviet presence, an American U-2 aircraft photographed

missile sites in western Cuba. Subsequent intelligence indicated that the missiles—SS-4 and SS-5, both with 1

megaton warheads—had the ability to reach almost the entire continental USA, including every Strategic Air

Command base. On 22 October 1962, after intense debate in the Executive Committee (ExComm) of the

National Security Council, during which the possibilities of aerial bombardment or invasion of Cuba were

discussed, US Pres John Kennedy announced a maritime blockade to prevent further shipments of missiles and

military equipment. Kennedy also demanded that Khrushchev dismantle and remove all missiles from Cuba.

For six terrifying days, the two superpowers considered their options until on 28 October Khrushchev agreed to

Kennedy's demands. In return, the USA agreed never to invade Cuba and (secretly) to remove its missiles from

Turkey.

— John P. Campbell

US Military History Companion: Cuban Missile Crisis

Top

Home > Library > History, Politics & Society > US Military History Companion

(1962–63)

On 15 October, 1962, U.S. intelligence discovered Soviet strategic nuclear missile bases under construction in

Cuba, leading to the most dramatic and dangerous crisis of the nuclear age. After a week of secret deliberation

with a group of advisers (the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, or ExComm), President

John F. Kennedy demanded that the missiles be withdrawn and imposed a naval ―quarantine‖ on shipments of

―offensive‖ weapons to Cuba. Kennedy ordered a massive redeployment of U.S. forces to the Caribbean and

placed the Strategic Air Command (SAC) on heightened alert.

Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev was furious at what he considered Kennedy's flagrant interference in

Soviet‐Cuban affairs and his violation of freedom of navigation. But by the time the quarantine took effect on

the morning of 24 October—after a unanimous endorsement by the Organization of American States—

Khrushchev ordered Soviet ships not to challenge the blockade. For several days a settlement proved elusive

and pressure built for more decisive action.

Neither Kennedy nor Khrushchev wanted to risk nuclear war over the issue, and both became increasingly

concerned that an accident or inadvertent military action might trigger escalation. An apparent break in the

tension came on 26 October, when, in a rambling, emotional letter, Khrushchev offered to withdraw the missiles

in return for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba. But in a second, tougher letter received the following morning,

Khrushchev demanded that Kennedy withdraw analogous Jupiter missiles from Turkey (deployed under the

aegis of NATO). Most of Kennedy's advisers argued strongly against this, on the ground that it would be

interpreted by the Soviets as evidence of American weakness, and by NATO as betrayal of an ally. Kennedy

decided to ignore Khrushchev's latest demand and accept his earlier offer.

As the ExComm deliberated on 27 October, word reached the White House that an American U‐2

reconnaissance plane had been shot down over Cuba, and that another had inadvertently strayed over Siberian

air space, narrowly avoiding a similar fate. Kennedy resolved to bring the crisis to an end. Ignoring the

ExComm's advice, he secretly agreed that the United States would withdraw its missiles from Turkey ―within a

few months‖ as a private quid pro quo to a UN‐verified withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. Kennedy

would also pledge publicly not to invade Cuba. Khrushchev accepted, and on 28 October the acute phase of the

crisis came to an end.

Castro, feeling betrayed by his Soviet patron, refused to allow United Nations inspectors on Cuban soil to verify

the withdrawal. But satisfied by aerial photography that the Soviets had withdrawn the weapons the United

States considered offensive, Kennedy issued a proclamation terminating the quarantine on 21 November.

The causes of the crisis have long been debated. Khrushchev conceived the deployment in the late spring of

1962, after a hasty and uncritical decision‐making process involving only a small group of advisers. His goals

appear to have been to deter a feared American invasion of Cuba; to redress the United States's massive

superiority in strategic nuclear weapons, publicly revealed by the United States in October 1961, exploding the

myth of a ―missile gap‖ favoring the Soviet Union; and less importantly, to reciprocate the Jupiter deployment

in Turkey.

The crisis provides textbook illustrations of important misperceptions and miscalculations. The U.S.

government had calculated that the Soviet Union would not deploy nuclear weapons to Cuba because such a

move would be inconsistent with past Soviet behavior, and because it seemed obvious that it would trigger a

major confrontation. The Kennedy administration also failed to appreciate the extent to which the public

demolition of the missile gap myth heightened the Soviets' sense of vulnerability; the strength of Soviet and

Cuban fears of a U.S. invasion of Cuba (heightened by the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of the previous year);

and the strength and sincerity of the Soviet view that if the United States had the right to deploy missiles in

Turkey, the Soviet Union had the right to deploy missiles in Cuba. Consequently, Kennedy failed to deter the

move in a timely fashion, issuing stern warnings against it only in September 1962, when the secret deployment

was well underway.

Similarly, Khrushchev grossly overestimated the willingness of Kennedy and the American people to tolerate a

major disruption in the hemispheric status quo; under estimated the likelihood that American intelligence would

discover the missiles prematurely; and failed to appreciate that the secrecy and deception surrounding the

deployment would inflame American passions. Consequently, Khrushchev underestimated the risks of the

deployment.

Although scholars differ in their assessment, some consider the Cuban Missile Crisis a classic case of prudent

crisis management. Kennedy and Khrushchev prevented the conflict from escalating while they sought and

found a mutually satisfactory solution. They did so by avoiding irreversible steps, curtailing unwarranted

bluster, and avoiding backing each other into a corner. Other scholars have criticized the handling of the crisis

as being too timid or too reckless. Kennedy's critics on the right lament his unwillingness to seize the

opportunity to destroy Castro; his critics on the other side of the spectrum condemn his willingness to risk

nuclear war merely to delay the inevitable—the vulnerability of the American homeland to Soviet nuclear

weapons. Hard‐liners in the Soviet military severely criticized Khrushchev for yielding to U.S. pressure. New

information on intelligence failures, command and control breakdowns, and near accidents suggest that both

leaders' fears of uncertainty, misperception, misjudgment, accident, and unauthorized military action provided a

critical degree of caution and circumspection that prevented the crisis from escalating even further.

Paradoxically, the Cuban Missile Crisis led to an immediate improvement in U.S.‐Soviet relations. A series of

agreements intended to restrain the arms race and improve crisis stability followed, most notably the Hot‐Line

Agreement and Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. Over the following decades, the superpowers crafted a modus

vivendi designed to prevent a similar occurrence whereby the Soviet Union refrained from deploying military

equipment with offensive capabilities to Cuba, and the United States acquiesced in a Communist‐controlled

Cuba with close ties to the USSR.

[See also Arms Control and Disarmament; Cold War: External Course; Cold War: Changing Interpretations;

U‐2 Spy Planes.]

Bibliography

Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1987; rev. ed. 1989.

James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis,

and the Soviet Collapse, 1993.

James G. Blight, and David A. Welch, Risking ‗The Destruction of Nations': Lessons of the Cuban

Missile Crisis for New and Aspiring Nuclear States, Security Studies, 4 (Summer 1994), pp. 811–50.

Anatoli I. Gribkov, and William Y. Smith, Operation Anadyr: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the

Cuban Missile Crisis, 1994.

Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, 1994.

Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1997.

James G. Blight and David A. Welch, eds., Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1998

……………………………………….

The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 is generally regarded as the most dangerous moment of the Cold

War, one in which the world moved perceptibly close to nuclear conflict between the superpowers.

In the period after Fidel Castro's successful revolution in Cuba, 1959, the Americans considered various plans

to restore an anti-Communist government. In April 1961 these plans culminated in the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs

invasion which the American government authorized and supported. This was followed by a build-up of Soviet

forces in Cuba. Throughout 1962 the issue of Cuba caused difficult relations between the superpowers, already

tense as a result of the Berlin Wall crisis of the previous year. The Americans publicly signalled that they would

not tolerate the Soviets placing ‗offensive‘ nuclear missiles in Cuba, which lay only about one hundred miles

from the coast of Florida. Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet leader, appeared to understand and to comply with this

demand. President Kennedy stated on 13 September that if Cuba were to become an offensive military base then

he would take whatever steps were necessary to protect American security. During September the first missiles

and the equipment to build the launchers arrived in Cuba.

On 14 October photographs from U2 aircraft revealed that medium-range missiles were being installed and on

16 October the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExCom) held the first of its meetings to

resolve what the American government regarded as a direct threat to its security. President Kennedy announced

on television the detection of the missiles, demanded their removal, and the ExCom went into semi-permanent

session to consider the next American steps. A variety of strategies was considered, including doing nothing

(which was quickly dismissed), various forms of diplomatic action (which ran the risk of leading to negotiation

and hence counter-concessions by the Americans) over the missiles' removal, invasion, an air strike against the

missiles, and a blockade. Kennedy initially favoured military action of some sort and the possibility of invasion

and air strike was held in reserve throughout the crisis. However, a blockade to prevent further missiles

reaching Cuba emerged as the preferred solution. A blockade, accompanied by demands for the removal of the

existing missiles, offered various advantages. It demonstrated American resolve and willingness to use military

force, it capitalized on America's local naval superiority, it gave time for Khrushchev to back down, and it

threw back onto him the difficult next step of escalating further the crisis if he were not to comply. The

ultimatum, in short, offered the ‗last clear chance‘ to avoid an uncontrollable confrontation which might

probably end in nuclear war.

At first Khrushchev appeared reluctant to comply. He made a good deal both of the American threat to Cuba's

integrity and the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Turkey. Kennedy was reluctant to make

any deal which traded the Turkish for the Cuban missiles, though he personally had ordered the removal of the

missiles from Turkey several months earlier on the grounds that they were unnecessary to American security

and provocative to the Soviet Union. The imposition of the American blockade went ahead and the risks of

incidents between the two naval forces became apparent.

In the days after 16 October the tension increased and the two states appeared to be moving to war as the

Soviets showed no willingness to back down. On 26 October the Americans received in secret what they

interpreted as a personal letter from Khrushchev which offered the possibility of a solution. The letter, in effect,

offered to remove the missiles in return for the Americans removing the blockade and agreeing not to invade

Cuba. The following day Khrushchev sent a public letter which was both more belligerent in tone and which

demanded the removal of the missiles from Turkey in return for removal of the missiles from Cuba. The

Americans were adamant that such a deal was unacceptable, moreover the tone of the letter suggested to them

that Khrushchev might have lost control within the Presidium to more hawkish elements. The same day Soviet

surface-to-air missiles in Cuba shot down an American plane. American military action appeared imminent. At

that point Robert Kennedy, brother of the President, suggested that the Americans agree to Khrushchev's first

(secret) letter, publicize the ‗agreement‘, and in that way attempt to lure Khrushchev into acceptance—making

clear at the same time that the burden of failure and responsibility for war would fall onto Khrushchev if he

failed to accept.

The following day the crisis ended on these terms. The Americans had secured a great diplomatic victory,

though by running enormous risks, and Kennedy's prestige stood at its new peak. The Soviets got much less out

of the crisis, though they were able to share public credit for the resolution of the crisis. However, they had got

the American promise not to invade Cuba and, some time later, they saw the Americans remove their medium-

range missiles not merely from Turkey but from Europe as a whole. The Soviet withdrawal appears to have

fatally undermined Khrushchev's prestige within the Presidium and to have led to his overthrow two years later.

The Americans consolidated their leadership within NATO which had been threatened by their inability to

prevent the Soviet gains in Berlin in 1961.

The successful resolution of the crisis led to an immediate improvement in superpower relations. The ‗hot line‘

was installed to give direct communications between the leaderships in Washington and Moscow, and in 1963

the two powers, with Britain playing an important minor role, went on to conclude the Partial Test Ban Treaty

which outlawed nuclear testing in the atmosphere. Above all, the mutual realization of how close the world had

come to war led the two superpowers to give renewed attention to their doctrines of nuclear deterrence. In the

West the missile crisis was taken as a paradigm case of a new science or art of ‗crisis management‘, and the

decision-making processes within ExCom were analysed in order to learn the ‗rules‘ or conventions of the new

science. In particular the importance of manipulating risk, or brinkmanship, emerged as a key element in

coercive diplomacy—using the risk of war to push the opponent into backing down—together with the equal

importance of allowing the opponent a last clear chance to avoid uncontrollable escalation. Kennedy himself

laid great emphasis on finding terms to offer to Khrushchev that would not be so humiliating that in fact he

would decline to take them.

— Peter Byrd

Britannica Concise Encyclopedia: Cuban missile crisis

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(1962) Major confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union over the presence of Soviet nuclear missiles

in Cuba. In October 1962 a U.S. spy plane detected a ballistic missile on a launching site in Cuba. Pres. John F.

Kennedy placed a naval blockade around the island, and for several days the U.S. and the Soviet Union hovered

on the brink of war. Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev finally agreed to remove the missiles in return for a

secret commitment from the U.S. to withdraw its own missiles from Turkey and to never invade Cuba. The

incident increased tensions during the Cold War and fueled the nuclear arms race between the two countries.

See also Fidel Castro.

For more information on Cuban missile crisis, visit Britannica.com.

US Government Guide: Cuban Missile Crisis

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The Cuban Missile Crisis was a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in October 1962

that threatened all-out nuclear war. The dispute involved the Soviet placement of intermediate-range ballistic

missiles in Cuba.

On October 15, 1962, President John F. Kennedy received a briefing from intelligence advisers informing him

that the Soviet Union was installing intermediate-range ballistic missiles, medium-range bombers, in Cuba and

sending more than 10,000 troops to that island nation. The Executive Committee of the National Security

Council (known as Ex Comm) gave Kennedy four options. He could do nothing, use quiet diplomacy and not

publicize the presence of the missiles, take the weapons out with an air strike, or impose a naval blockade

against Cuba.

The ―do nothing‖ option was not feasible because Congress had already passed a joint resolution backing

military action if offensive weapons were found in Cuba, and Republicans were using the possibility of the

existence of such weapons against Democrats in the upcoming midterm (1962) congressional elections. Six

members of the Ex Comm favored an air strike. Kennedy decided against it because he thought American allies

in Europe would not approve until other alternatives had been tried. Attorney General Robert Kennedy argued

against bombing, calling the tactic ―a Pearl Harbor in reverse.‖ The State Department legal adviser argued that

bombing would be a violation of international law. Moreover, there were logistical concerns. The bombing

could not be done by a single ―surgical‖ strike; 500 or more missions would be required, destroying hundreds of

targets to prevent missiles or aircraft from attacking the United States. The magnitude of the operation would

lead to high casualties (provoking international outrage) and losses among the Soviet military, which might

bring on military action by its forces against the United States.

On October 17 Kennedy decided on a blockade, or ―quarantine,‖ as his advisers called it, because a blockade is

prohibited under international law unless a nation is at war. It would begin only with further shipments of

missiles but if necessary could expand to cover civilian goods. Implementing it in stages would permit time for

diplomacy to work. The quarantine would take place near American waters, where the United States had

overwhelming naval superiority.

On October 22 Kennedy gave a televised speech to the nation in which he called the presence of the missiles ―a

change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country if our courage and our commitments are ever

to be trusted again, by friend or foe.‖ He described the threat to the United States, saying that ―the purpose of

these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere.‖ He

announced the quarantine and warned the Soviet Union that ―it will be the policy of the United States

Government to regard any missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an

attack upon the United States by the Soviet Union, requiring a full retaliatory response.‖ Soviet ships attempting

to enter Cuban waters would be subject to search in international waters, and if Soviet ships tried to run the

blockade, Kennedy would order American ships to fire on them. The following day the Council of the

Organization of American States unanimously backed Kennedy's quarantine.

For several days Soviet ships headed toward the blockade line and work on missile sites in Cuba accelerated.

Then the ships stopped dead in the water, leading the members of the Ex Comm to think that the crisis was

over. But one ship started again toward Cuba, and a Soviet air-defense missile battery shot down an American

U-2 reconnaissance plane flying over Cuba, heating the crisis up again.

The crisis was finally resolved by negotiations between President Kennedy and Soviet chairman Nikita

Khrushchev. Khrushchev offered to remove the missiles if the President would pledge that the United States

would not invade Cuba. Kennedy hinted, through Attorney General Robert Kennedy, that if the Soviets ended

the crisis, the United States would remove intermediate-range missiles from bases in Turkey. On October 28,

the Soviets agreed to withdraw their missiles (and accepted verification by United Nations observers). The

United States ended the quarantine and pledged not to invade Cuba.

The Soviets withdrew 42 missiles and 42 long-range bombers as well as 5,000 troops. They also removed

weapons that the United States did not know were on the island: 9 short-range missiles equipped with nuclear

warheads, which would have been used in case of an American invasion, and 36 nuclear warheads for use on

the medium-range Soviet missiles. The short-range missiles could have been fired by local commanders,

without authorization from Moscow, a possibility of which the American side was completely unaware. After

the crisis ended, the Soviets kept in Cuba 37,000 of the 42,000 troops already there—a number far higher than

American estimates during the crisis—as well as fighter planes and antimissile weapons. (The size of the Soviet

commitments was not revealed to the American side until Soviet and American officials who had been involved

in the crisis held a series of meetings between 1987 and 1992.)

American intermediate-range Jupiter missiles were withdrawn from Turkey and Italy. Kennedy pledged not to

invade Cuba, but on December 14, 1962, he wrote to Khrushchev that the United States would require

―adequate assurances that all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and are not reintroduced, and that

Cuba itself commits no aggressive acts against any of the nations of the Western Hemisphere.‖ He thus left

open the possibility that the United States might invade Cuba if these assurances were not received.

See also Kennedy, John F.; National Security Council

Sources

Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: The Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

James Bright and David Welch, On the Brink: America and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis

(New York: Hill & Wang, 1991)

US History Encyclopedia: Cuban Missile Crisis

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Often regarded as the most dangerous crisis of the nuclear age, the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 was a

culmination of several Cold War tensions that had been building for some time. As a result of Cuban leader

Fidel Castro's turn toward Soviet-style communism in the early 1960s and the failed U.S.-sponsored Bay of

Pigs invasion of April 1961, U.S. Cuban relations were openly hostile by 1962. In April and May 1962, the

Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev decided to deploy Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, just ninety miles from

Florida. In an agreement with Castro, the weapons would be shipped and installed secretly, so that when they

were operational, the West would be presented with a fait accompli.

During August and September 1962, U.S. intelligence found evidence of increasing Soviet military aid arriving

in Cuba, including advanced surface-to-air missile installations, IL-28 Beagle nuclear-capable bombers, and

several thousand Soviet "technicians." Refugee reports also suggested that Soviet ballistic missiles were on the

island. Although U.S. intelligence could not confirm these reports, critics of President John F. Kennedy's

administration used them in political attacks during the lead-up to the November congressional elections. In

response, in September, Kennedy publicly warned that if weapons designed for offensive use were detected in

Cuba, "the gravest consequences would arise."

On 14 October, a U-2 aerial reconnaissance flight over Cuba returned photographs of long, canvas-covered

objects. As American photo analysts pored over the photos during the next twenty-four hours and compared

their findings to their catalogs of known Soviet weaponry, it became clear that the Soviets were installing

medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and launch pads in Cuba, where they would be within easy striking

distance of much of the mainland United States.

Having just dealt with the civil rights riots at the University of Mississippi, the Kennedy administration again

found itself confronted with a crisis. The president was informed of the discovery on the morning of 16 October

and immediately convened a White House meeting of his top national security advisers, a body that later

became officially known as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, or ExComm. Kennedy

decided not to confront the Soviets until he and the ExComm could consider and prepare courses of action.

During this series of top secret meetings, several courses of action were considered, ranging from direct military

strikes on the missile sites, a full-scale invasion of Cuba, a quid pro quo removal of American Jupiter missiles

in Turkey, and a blockade of the island. Acutely aware that miscalculation by either side could spark nuclear

war, Kennedy settled upon a blockade of Cuba in tandem with an ultimatum to the Soviets to remove the

missiles, both to be announced during a special national broadcast on television during the evening of 22

October. In that broadcast, Kennedy declared that a naval quarantine of Cuba would go into effect on the

morning of 24 October and would not be lifted until all offensive weapons had been removed. He also

announced that he had ordered increased surveillance of Cuba and, ominously, that he had directed the armed

forces "to prepare for any eventualities."

On 24 October, as U.S. strategic nuclear forces were placed on DEFCON 2, the highest alert status below actual

nuclear war, the world waited anxiously for the Soviet response to the quarantine. Despite some tense moments,

the deadline ultimately passed without serious incident, as several Soviet-chartered ships either changed course

or stopped short of the quarantine line. On 25 October, the

U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai E. Stevenson, famously confronted his Soviet counterpart,

Valerian Zorin, with photographic evidence and said he would "wait until hell freezes over" for a Soviet

explanation. At U.S. insistence, the Organization of the American States officially condemned the Soviet-Cuban

action and thereby formalized Cuba's hemispheric isolation.

Over the next few days, U.S. intelligence reported that not only were the MRBMs nearing operational status,

but there were also intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and tactical nuclear weapons on the island.

While U.S. forces continued to mobilize, a series of letters between Kennedy and Khrushchev was

supplemented by several secret unofficial channels, the most notable of which was Attorney General Robert F.

Kennedy's secret meetings with Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, and Georgi

Bolshakov, the intelligence chief at the Soviet embassy.

On Saturday, 27 October, the crisis was at its peak. During the afternoon, reports came in of an American U-2

being shot down over Cuba by a surface-to-air missile. As tension mounted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported

that they were ready to launch an invasion of Cuba within twenty-four hours. In communications on 27 and 28

October, Khrushchev formally capitulated by agreeing to dismantle the missiles and ship them back to the

Soviet Union. In turn, Kennedy publicly announced that he had pledged to provide a noninvasion guarantee to

Cuba conditional on the offensive weapons being removed and the implementation of effective international

verification. Secretly, he also agreed to remove the American Jupiter missiles from Turkey.

Although the crisis had been largely defused peacefully, it was not over. Castro refused to allow UN inspectors

onto Cuban sovereign territory, and Khrushchev initially refused to accept that the Soviet IL-28 Beagle bombers

were offensive weapons. Intensive discussions through the United Nations finally led to Khrushchev agreeing

on 20 November to remove the bombers in exchange for a lifting of the naval quarantine.

For many, the crisis demonstrated the dangers of the nuclear age. Subsequently, a telephone hotline was

established linking the White House and the Kremlin and efforts were intensified to secure arms control

agreements and détente.

Bibliography

Fursenko, Aleksandr, and Timothy Naftali. One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–

1964. New York: Norton, 1997.

Garthoff, Raymond L. Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Rev. ed. Washington, D.C.: Brookings

Institution, 1989.

May, Ernest, and Philip Zelikow, eds. The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile

Crisis. Concise ed. New York, Norton, 2002.

—David G. Coleman

Russian History Encyclopedia: Cuban Missile Crisis

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The Cuban Missile Crisis was one of the most serious incidents of the Cold War. Many believed that war might

break out between the United States and the Soviet Union over the latter's basing of nuclear-armed missiles in

Cuba.

Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba promising to restore the liberal 1940 constitution but immediately took

more radical steps, including an economic agreement in 1960 with the Soviet Union. In turn, the Soviet premier,

Nikita Khrushchev, promised in June to defend Cuba with Soviet nuclear arms. In early 1961, the United States

broke relations with Havana, and in April it helped thousands of Cuban exiles stage an abortive uprising at the

Bay of Pigs.

Khrushchev was convinced that the United States would strike again, this time with American soldiers; and he

believed that Castro's defeat would be a fatal blow to his own leadership. He decided that basing Soviet missiles

in Cuba would deter the United States from a strike against the Castro regime. Moreover, so he reasoned, the

Cuba-based medium-range missiles would compensate for the USSR's marked inferiority to America's ICBM

capabilities. Finally, a successful showdown with Washington might improve Moscow's deteriorating relations

with China.

In April 1962, Khrushchev raised the possibility of basing Soviet missiles in Cuba with his defense minister,

Rodion Malinovsky. He hoped to deploy the missiles by October and then inform Kennedy after the

congressional elections in November. He apparently expected the Americans to accept the deployment of the

Soviet missiles as calmly as the Kremlin had accepted the basing of U.S. missiles in Turkey. Foreign minister

Andrei Gromyko, when finally consulted, flatly told Khrushchev that Soviet missiles in Cuba would "cause a

political explosion" (Taubman) in the United States, but the premier was unmoved. In late April, a Soviet

delegation met with Khrushchev before departing for Cuba. They were told to "explain the plan" to install

missiles "to Castro" (Taubman). In fact, their mission was more one of "telling than asking." Castro was hardly

enthusiastic, but was ready to yield to a policy that would strengthen the "entire socialist camp" (Taubman).

Later the Presidium voted unanimously to approve the move.

Perhaps most remarkably, Khrushchev believed that the deployment of sixty missiles with forty launchers, not

to mention the support personnel and equipment, could be done secretly. General Anatoly Gribkov warned that

the installation process in Cuba could not be concealed. And American U-2 spy planes flew over the sites

unhindered. The Cubans, too, doubted that the plan could be kept secret; Khrushchev responded that if the

weapons were discovered the United States would not overreact, but if trouble arose, the Soviets would "send

the Baltic Fleet."

In July 1962, the American government learned that the USSR had started missile deliveries to Cuba. By the

end of August, American intelligence reported that Soviet technicians were in Cuba, supervising new military

construction. In September, Kennedy warned that if any Soviet ground-to-ground missiles were deployed in

Cuba, "the gravest issues would arise." Rather than calling a halt to the operation, Khrushchev ordered it

accelerated, while repeatedly assuring Washington that no build-up was taking place.

On October 14, U.S. aerial reconnaissance discovered a medium-range ballistic missile mounted on a launching

site. Such a missile could hit the eastern United States in a matter of minutes. On October 16, Kennedy and his

closest advisers met to discuss the crisis and immediately agreed that the missile must be removed. On October

22, Kennedy announced a "quarantine" around Cuba, much to Khrushchev's delight. The premier thought the

word sufficiently vague to allow for negotiation and exulted, "We've saved Cuba!" Despite his apparent

satisfaction, Khrushchev fired off a letter to Kennedy accusing him of interfering in Cuban affairs and

threatening world peace. He then went to the opera.

The turning point came on October 24, when Attorney General Robert Kennedy told the Soviet ambassador that

the United States would stop the Soviet ships, strongly implying that it would do so even if it meant war.

Khrushchev reacted angrily, but a letter from President Kennedy on October 25 pushed the premier toward

compromise. Kennedy wrote that he regretted the deterioration in relations and hoped Khrushchev would take

steps to restore the "earlier situation." With this letter, Khrushchev finally realized that the crisis was not worth

the gamble and began to back down. Another war scare occurred on the twenty-seventh with the downing of a

U-2 over Cuba, but by this point both leaders were ready and even anxious to end the crisis. On October 29, the

premier informed Kennedy that the missiles and offensive weapons in Cuba would be removed. Kennedy

promised there would be no invasion and secretly agreed to remove America's Jupiter missiles from Turkey.

Khrushchev's Cuban gamble helped convince the Soviet leadership that he was unfit to lead the USSR. This

humiliation, combined with failures in domestic policies, cost him his job in 1964.

Bibliography

Fursenko, Aleksander, and Naftali, Timothy. (1997). "One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro and

Kennedy, 1958 - 1964. New York: Norton.

Nathan, James A. (2001). Anatomy of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Taubman, William. (2003). Khrushchev: The Man and His Era. New York: Norton.

Thomson, William. (1995). Khrushchev: A Political Life. Oxford, UK: Macmillan.

—HUGH PHILLIPS

Spotlight: Cuban Missile Crisis

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From our Archives: Today's Highlights, August 30, 2006

In 1962, poor communication between the United States and the Soviet Union led to the Cuban Missile Crisis,

and nearly caused a war. To help prevent further such miscommunications, a hotline was established between

the two countries on this date in 1963. Though the image of the hotline was one of a red telephone, that

particular one was a set of high-speed teleprinters. The hotline became an actual telephone in the 1970s.

Columbia Encyclopedia: Cuban Missile Crisis

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Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, major cold war confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

After the Bay of Pigs Invasion, the USSR increased its support of Fidel Castro's Cuban regime, and in the

summer of 1962, Nikita Khrushchev secretly decided to install ballistic missiles in Cuba. When U.S.

reconnaissance flights revealed the clandestine construction of missile launching sites, President Kennedy

publicly denounced (Oct. 22, 1962) the Soviet actions. He imposed a naval blockade on Cuba and declared that

any missile launched from Cuba would warrant a full-scale retaliatory attack by the United States against the

Soviet Union. On Oct. 24, Russian ships carrying missiles to Cuba turned back, and when Khrushchev agreed

(Oct. 28) to withdraw the missiles and dismantle the missile sites, the crisis ended as suddenly as it had begun.

The United States ended its blockade on Nov. 20, and by the end of the year the missiles and bombers were

removed from Cuba. The United States, in return, pledged not to invade Cuba, and subsequently secretly

removed ballistic missiles it had placed in Turkey.

Bibliography

See R. F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days (1969, repr. 1971); A. Chayes, The Cuban Missile Crisis (1974); R. Garthoff,

Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis (1989); A. Fursenko and T. Naftali, ―One Hell of a Gamble‖ (1997); E.

R. May and P. D. Zelikow, ed., The Kennedy Tapes (1997); M. Frankel, High Noon in the Cold War (2004); M.

Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight (2008).

Intelligence Encyclopedia: Cuban Missile Crisis

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The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 was triggered by the Soviet deployment to Cuba of medium-range,

nucleararmed ballistic missiles. The United States demanded that the Soviet Union remove these missiles and

imposed a naval blockade on Cuba, threatening to sink any Soviet ships that approached the island without

permitting their cargoes to be inspected. Eventually, the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.) announced that it would

remove the missiles, and the crisis ended. Most historians affirm that the world has never been closer to global

nuclear war than during the 13 days of the Cuban missile crisis (Oct. 14–Oct. 28, 1962).

The roots of the Cuban missile crisis go back, in part, to an earlier crisis—the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of

Cuba by Cuban expatriates trained, supplied, and directed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The purpose

of the failed invasion was to overthrow Fidel Castro's leftist rule of Cuba, but had two unintended effects. First,

it frightened Castro, causing him to make concessions to the U.S.S.R, which wanted to place military bases on

the island of Cuba, in exchange for protection against further U.S. invasion attempts. Second, it heightened

tensions between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Khrushchev, the Soviet leader, read U.S. weakness in the Bay of Pigs

fiasco, and blustered publicly that he might retaliate by driving the U.S. out of West Berlin. U.S. President John

Kennedy, in return, openly boasted that the U.S. possessed many more (and more accurate and deliverable)

nuclear missiles and warheads than the U.S.S.R., and would consider striking first with them if it ever found

itself at a military disadvantage. Kennedy's claim was true; in 1962, the U.S.S.R. had at most 20 or 30—perhaps

as few as four— functional, deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); the U.S. had several hundred.

Nevertheless, Kennedy had claimed, during his presidential campaign, that the incumbent Eisenhower's

administration had allowed the Soviets to get ahead of the U.S. in missiles, causing a "missile gap." A missile

gap did exist, as Kennedy knew, but in reverse; it had always been the U.S. that was far ahead of the U.S.S.R. in

such weapons. Once in office, Kennedy dropped the old story about the "missile gap" and brandished the United

States's nuclear superiority openly against Khrushchev.

Khruschev's response was to secretly build missile bases on Cuban soil to compensate for Soviet inferiority in

ICBMs. These missiles were medium-range and intermediate-range, rather than intercontinental, but from Cuba

could reach the entire continental U.S. except its northwest corner. Similar missiles had been by stationed the

United States for years in Turkey, which borders southern Russia. Castro gave permission to the Soviets to

build Cuban missile bases in trade for a promise of protection against U.S. invasion and for cancellation of

Cuban monetary debts.

Construction of the Cuban bases proceeded throughout the summer of 1962. The U.S. was aware, from various

intelligence sources, that the Soviets were building up military forces on the island, but did not realize that

intermediate-range nuclear weapons were part of the plan. Kennedy issued warnings to Khrushchev that the

U.S. would not tolerate a major military buildup in Cuba, but would do "whatever must be done" to guarantee

U.S. security; Kennedy and his advisors believed that Khrushchev would take these grave warnings seriously,

and were also aware that the U.S.S.R. had never yet placed nuclear weapons outside Russian territory; these

factors made it seem unlikely that nuclear weapons were part of the Cuban buildup. Nevertheless, they were.

U-2 spy planes (aircraft designed to take reconnaissance photographs from very high altitudes) were making

regular flights over Cuba, observing the military buildup. On October 14, a U-2 spy plane photographed an area

near San Cristóbal, Cuba, revealing launch pads, missile erectors, and transport trucks for medium-range

missiles. Four of the launchers were already in firing position. Khrushchev had decided to deploy launchers for

at least 16 intermediate-range missiles (capable of reaching most of the continental U.S.) and 24 medium-range

missiles (capable of reaching the southeastern U.S., including Washington, D.C.).

The U-2 pictures were shown to Kennedy on the morning of October 16. Much like the Kennedy

administration's claims during the Bay of Pigs crisis that the U.S. had no illegal intentions in Cuba,

Khrushchev's claims to have no desire to base missiles in Cuba had proved to be untrue. Kennedy hastily

assembled an ad hoc executive committee of the National Security Council, which helped him come up with

two alternative plans: (1) Immediate attack on the Soviet missiles sites in Cuba, followed by a full invasion of

the island using 180,000 U.S. troops. (2) A naval blockade of Cuba, to be lifted only if the Soviets removed its

missiles. If the blockade did not work—and it was a risky plan, as such a blockade is, by international law, an

act of war—the invasion plan would be carried out.

On October 22, 1962, Kennedy addressed the American people by television. He stated: "This sudden,

clandestine decision to station strategic weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil is a deliberately

provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country if our courage

and our commitments are ever to be trusted again…To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all

offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba

from whatever nation or port will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back."

Over the next four days, ships carrying Russian goods were searched at sea, and several Soviet vessels carrying

missiles were turned back by U.S. naval vessels. The U.S. Strategic Air Command placed all its B-52

intercontinental bombers on 15-minute takeoff alert on October 20; on October 22, it placed them on a

revolving airborne alert, with a percentage of bombers airborne at all times, ready to head over the North Pole

toward the Soviet Union. ICBM crews were also placed on highest alert, ready to launch, and nuclear-armed

Polaris submarines moved to their pre-assigned war stations at sea. The Soviet Union already had over 45,000

of its own troops on Cuba (though the U.S. estimated only 16,000), armed with 90 shortrange nuclear warheads

that would have been used against a U.S. invasion force. (The U.S. did not know of these short-range nuclear

weapons.)

A U.S. invasion of Cuba, had it occurred, could have escalated rapidly to nuclear war, first in Cuba and then

globally. The entire world, including Kennedy and Khrushchev and their advisors, feared throughout the crisis

that global nuclear war was extremely probable. If nuclear war had occurred, it could have caused hundreds of

millions of deaths, and significantly destroyed the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and many other nations as functioning

societies.

On October 26, Khrushchev sent a private message to Kennedy indicating that he would be willing to remove

the missiles if the U.S. would promise not to invade Cuba. The following day, a more formal message said that

Soviet Union would remove its missiles only if the U.S. would remove its Jupiter-class intermediate-range

missiles from Turkey. In secret negotiations between Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and U.S. attorney

general Robert Kennedy (brother of President Kennedy), the U.S. did promise not to invade Cuba in exchange

for withdrawal of the Soviet missiles; it did not, however, promise to remove its missiles from Turkey. These

missiles were considered largely symbolic by U.S. strategists, and were technically unreliable and obsolete.

Additionally, their threat to the U.S.S.R. could have been replaced by deployment of a Poseidon submarine

carrying nuclear missiles to the eastern Mediterranean. In secret, therefore, Kennedy seriously considered

trading the missiles in Turkey for the missiles in Cuba, although in public he refused to do. On October 28—

one day before the deadline urged by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff for launching a Cuban invasion—the Soviets

stated that they would remove their missiles from Cuba. The crisis abated.

Many historians have viewed Kennedy's handling of the Cuban missile crisis as a masterpiece of statesmanship.

The Soviet Union backed down; its missiles were removed; U.S. goals were fully met; American geomilitary

prestige was preserved. Other historians argue that the Kennedy administration was not as deft in reality as it

seemed publicly. Kennedy and his advisors were badly frightened; Secretary of State Dean Rusk began to weep

when told, at the height of the crisis, that a U-2 plane had been shot down over Cuba. Robert Kennedy said later

that his brother had put events in motion that he could not control.

What is certain is that Khrushchev and Kennedy were both willing to risk global nuclear war for dubious gains.

The Soviets were soon to achieve strategic nuclear parity with the U.S. simply by building more and better

ICBMs; any strategic advantage to be gained by placing missiles in Cuba would, therefore, be short-term. By

the same token, no long-term U.S. interests were at stake in the deployment of Soviet intermediate-range

missiles to Cuba, as within a few years every city in the continental U.S. would be vulnerable to Soviet ICBMs

and submarinelaunched ballistic missiles anyway. Kennedy administration officials knew that the Soviet

buildup in Cuba would, at worst, decrease the United States's massive strategic advantage, or appear to do so—

in Kennedy's words, make the Soviets "look like they're coequal with the U.S." Kennedy was thus, willing to

gamble the world's future not to save the U.S. from an imminent military threat, but because to tolerate the

Soviet buildup in Cuba would, in his words, "have politically changed the balance of power. It would have

appeared to, and appearances contribute to reality."

The U.S. emerged from the Cuban missile crisis with greatly expanded confidence in its own geopolitical skill.

Its policymakers had verified, as they believed, that "showing resolve" (threatening to use military force) was

more effective than diplomacy, the United Nations, or international law—with the proviso that the U.S. should

be more willing to commit conventional (non-nuclear) military forces in a crisis, in order to keep back from the

nuclear abyss. Today, many historians argue that U.S. willingness to invade Vietnam is directly attributable to

its success during the Cuban missile crisis.

Further Reading

Books

Nathan, James. Anatomy of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 2001.

Periodicals

Frankel, Max. "Learning from the Missile Crisis." Smithsonian. October, 2002: 53–64.

Law Encyclopedia: Cuban Missile Crisis

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Home > Library > Law & Legal Issues > Law Encyclopedia This entry contains information applicable to United States law only.

The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis was a dangerous moment in the cold war between the United States and the

Soviet Union. The actions taken by President John F. Kennedy's administration prevented the installation of

Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, just ninety miles from Florida. The crisis also illustrated the limitations of

international law, as the United States relied on military actions and threats to accomplish its goal.

The crisis grew out of political changes in Cuba. In the 1950s, Fidel Castro, a young lawyer, led a guerrilla

movement against Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista. Batista lost the confidence of the Cuban people and on

January 1, 1959, fled the country. Castro became premier of the new government.

At first, the United States supported the Castro government. This changed when Castro seized U.S.-owned

sugar estates and cattle ranches in Cuba. The United States subsequently embargoed trade with Cuba, and the

Central Intelligence Agency began covert operations to topple Castro. In 1960 Castro openly embraced

communism and signed Cuba's first trade agreement with the Soviet Union.

Many Cubans had left the island of Cuba for the United States following the Castro revolution. Aided by the

United States, a Cuban exile army was trained for an invasion. Though most of the planning took place in 1960,

when President Dwight D. Eisenhower was finishing his second term, the final decision to invade came during

the first months of the Kennedy administration. In April 1961, Cuban exiles invaded Cuba at the Bay of Pigs.

The invasion was a debacle, in part because U.S. air support that had been promised was not provided. The

exile army was captured.

Convinced that the United States would attempt another invasion, Castro asked Premier Nikita Khrushchev, of

the Soviet Union, for nuclear missiles. Khrushchev agreed to what would be the first deployment of nuclear

weapons outside the Soviet Union. President Kennedy at first did not believe the Soviets would follow through

on their promise. On October 14, 1962, however, photographs taken by reconnaissance planes showed that

missile sites were being built in Cuba.

President Kennedy convened a small group of trusted advisers, called the Executive Committee of the National

Security Council (Ex Com). Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy served on Ex Com and became the key

adviser to the president during the crisis.

Military officials advocated bombing the missile sites or invading Cuba. Others argued for a nuclear strike on

Cuba. These ideas were rejected in favor of a naval blockade of Cuba. All ships attempting to enter Cuba were

to be stopped and searched for missiles and related military material.

President Kennedy, believing that the Soviets were using the missiles to test his will, resolved to make the crisis

public. Bypassing private, diplomatic procedures, Kennedy went on national television on October 22 and

informed the United States of the missile sites, the naval blockade, and his resolve to take any action necessary

to prevent the missile deployment.

Tension built during the last days of October as the world awaited the approach of Soviet missile-bearing ships

at the blockade line. If Soviet ships refused to turn back, it was likely that U.S. ships would either stop them or

sink them. If that happened, nuclear war seemed probable.

During the crisis, the United Nations was not used as a vehicle for negotiation or mediation. The United States

and the Soviet Union ignored an appeal by Secretary General U Thant, of the United Nations, that they reduce

tensions for a few weeks. Instead, the Security Council of the United Nations became a stage for both sides to

trade accusations. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, from the United States, presented photographs of the missile

sites to back up the U.S. claims.

On October 24, the crisis began to ease, as twelve Soviet ships on their way to Cuba were, on orders from

Moscow, diverted or halted. However, construction on the missile sites continued. On October 26, Premier

Khrushchev sent a long, emotional letter to President Kennedy, claiming that the missiles were defensive. He

implied that a pledge by the United States not to invade Cuba would allow him to remove the missiles.

President Kennedy replied, accepting the proposal to exchange withdrawal of the missiles for the promise not to

invade. He also stated that if the Soviet Union did not answer his reply in two or three days, Cuba would be

bombed. On October 28, the Soviets announced on Radio Moscow that the missile sites were being dismantled.

Some historians maintain that President Kennedy acted heroically to meet a threat to the security of the United

States. Others claim that the missiles at issue were of limited range and were purely defensive, and that

Kennedy was reckless in brandishing the threat of nuclear war. Most agree that the crisis was probably the

closest the Soviet Union and the United States ever got to nuclear war.

History Dictionary: Cuban missile crisis

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Home > Library > History, Politics & Society > History Dictionary

A confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1962 over the presence of missile sites in

Cuba; one of the ―hottest‖ periods of the cold war. The Soviet premier, Nikita Khrushchev, placed Soviet

military missiles in Cuba, which had come under Soviet influence since the success of the Cuban Revolution

three years earlier. President John F. Kennedy of the United States set up a naval blockade of Cuba and insisted

that Khrushchev remove the missiles. Khrushchev did.

Wikipedia: Cuban Missile Crisis

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Home > Library > Miscellaneous > Wikipedia

For other uses, see October Crisis.

Jupiter IRBM picture

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a confrontation between the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba in the

early 1960s during the Cold War. In Russia, it is termed the "Caribbean Crisis" (Russian: Карибский кризис,

Karibskiy krizis), while in Cuba it is called the "October Crisis". The crisis ranks with the Berlin Blockade as

one of the major confrontations of the Cold War, and is generally regarded as the moment in which the Cold

War came closest to a nuclear war.[1]

The critical crisis phase was preceded by deployment of Jupiter and Thor medium-range ballistic missiles,

which was performed by the US Air Force at 5 sites near İzmir, Turkey, in 1961. These MRBM were able to

carry thermonuclear warheads and had operating ranges up to 1500 miles. This created an important threat to

many cities and industrial and military facilities of the Soviet Union, including Moscow.

In Havana, there was fear of military intervention by the United States in Cuba. [2]

In April 1961, the threat of

invasion became real when a force of CIA-trained Cuban exiles opposed to Castro landed at the Bay of Pigs.

The invasion was quickly stopped by Cuba's military forces due to lack of support and poor management on the

part of the U.S. After the U.S.-backed Brigade 2506 failed, Castro felt that the United States would invade Cuba

to finish what it started.[3]

Castro declared Cuba a socialist republic on May 1st, 1961,[4]

although not a Soviet

satellite, and began to modernise Cuba's armed forces with direct Soviet funding.

The United States feared the Soviet expansion of communism or socialism, but for a Latin American country to

ally openly with the USSR was regarded as unacceptable, given the Russo-American enmity since the end of

the Second World War in 1945. Such an involvement would also directly contradict the Monroe Doctrine which

prevented European powers from getting involved in South American matters.

In late 1961, Kennedy engaged Operation Mongoose, a series of covert operations against Castro's government.

They were unsuccessful.[5]

More overtly, in February 1962, the United States launched an economic embargo

against Cuba.[6]

The United States also considered covert action. Air Force General Curtis LeMay presented to Kennedy a pre-

invasion bombing plan in September, while spy flights and minor military harassment from the United States

Guantanamo Naval Base were the subject of continual Cuban diplomatic complaints to the U.S. government.

In September 1962, the Cuban government saw significant evidence that the U.S. would invade, including a

joint U.S. Congressional resolution authorising the use of military force in Cuba if American interests were

threatened,[7]

and the announcement of a U.S. military exercise in the Caribbean planned for the following

month (Operation Ortsac).

As a consequence, Castro and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev agreed to secretly place strategic nuclear

missiles in Cuba. Like Castro, Khrushchev felt that a U.S. invasion of Cuba was imminent, and that to lose

Cuba would do great harm to his prestige worldwide, especially in Latin America. He said that he wanted to

confront the Americans "with more than words...the logical answer was missiles."[8]

The tensions were at their height from October 8, 1962. On October 14, United States reconnaissance saw the

missile bases being built in Cuba. The crisis ended two weeks later on October 28, 1962, when the President of

the United States John F. Kennedy and the United Nations Secretary-General U Thant reached an agreement

with the Soviets to dismantle the missiles in Cuba in exchange for a no-invasion agreement. Khrushchev's

request that the Jupiter and Thor missiles in Turkey be removed was ignored by the Kennedy administration and

not pressed by the Soviet Union.[9]

Kennedy gave a key warning in his first public speech on the crisis (October 22, 1962):

It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the

Western Hemisphere as an attack on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet

Union.[10]

This speech included another key policy:

To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is

being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba from whatever nation and port will, if found to contain

cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back. This quarantine will be extended, if needed, to other types of

cargo and carriers. We are not at this time, however, denying the necessities of life as the Soviets attempted to

do in their Berlin blockade of 1948.

Kennedy ordered intensified surveillance, and cited cooperation from the foreign ministers of the Organization

of American States (OAS). Kennedy "directed the Armed Forces to prepare for any eventualities; and I trust

that in the interest of both the Cuban people and the Soviet technicians at the sites, the hazards to all concerned

of continuing the threat will be recognised." He called for emergency meetings of the OAS and United Nations

Security Council to deal with the matter.[10]

Contents

[hide]

1 American early reports

2 U-2 flights and discovery

3 Planning an American response

4 Quarantine

5 Crisis deepens

6 Secret negotiations

7 Crisis continues

8 Drafting the response

9 Ending the crisis of 1962

10 Aftermath

11 Historical notes

12 In popular culture

13 See also

14 Notes

15 References

16 External links

American early reports

In Paris while on honeymoon, CIA director John McCone was told by French intelligence that the Soviets were

installing missiles in Cuba. He warned Kennedy that some ships were missile-laden; however, the President —

in consultation with his brother Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara — concluded that the Soviets would not do so. Kennedy's government

had received repeated Soviet diplomatic disclaimers that there were neither Soviet missiles in Cuba, nor plans to

install any, and that the USSR was not interested in provoking an international confrontation which would

affect the United States House of Representatives elections in November.[11]

In late August, a reconnaissance flight photographed a new series of SAM sites being built, but on September 4,

1962, Kennedy told Congress that there were no offensive missiles in Cuba. The same day, Robert Kennedy met

Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. In that meeting he stated American concern about nuclear missiles in

Cuba. The ambassador assured him that they were defensive and that the military build-up was insignificant.

Days later, another reconnaissance flight photographed the building of a submarine pen disguised as a fishing

village. On September 11, the Soviets publicly stated that they had no need to install nuclear weapons outside

the USSR, including in Cuba. That day, Khrushchev personally communicated to Kennedy that there would be

no offensive weapons installed in Cuba.[12]

U-2 flights and discovery

U-2 reconnaissance photograph of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. Shown are the transports and tents for

fuelling and maintenance.

The first consignment of SS-3 MRBMs (medium range ballistic missiles) arrived on the night of September 8,

followed by a second on September 16. The Soviets were building nine sites — six for SS-4s and three for SS-

5s with a 4,000 kilometer-range (2,400 statute miles). The planned arsenal was forty launchers, a 70% increase

in first strike capacity. The Cuban populace readily noticed it, with over one thousand reports reaching Miami,

which U.S. intelligence considered spurious.[13]

While Brugioni concentrates deeply on the IMINT in his book, Eyeball to Eyeball,[14]

Hilsman may give a

slightly broader view in his book, To Move a Nation.[15]

On October 8, Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticós (1959-1976) spoke at the U.N. General Assembly: "If ... we

are attacked, we will defend ourselves. I repeat, we have sufficient means with which to defend ourselves; we

have indeed our inevitable weapons, the weapons, which we would have preferred not to acquire, and which we

do not wish to employ". Several unrelated problems meant the missiles were not discovered by the U.S. until an

October 15 U-2 flight showed the construction of an SS-4 site at San Cristóbal, Pinar del Río Province, in

western Cuba.

Planning an American response

Kennedy saw the photographs on October 16;[16]

he assembled the Executive Committee of the National

Security Council (ExComm), fourteen key officials and his brother Robert, at 9.00 a.m. The U.S. had no plan

for dealing with such a threat, because U.S. intelligence was convinced that the Soviets would not install

nuclear missiles in Cuba. The EXCOMM quickly discussed five courses of action:

1. do nothing

2. use diplomatic pressure to get the Soviet Union to remove the missiles

3. an air attack on the missiles

4. a full military invasion

5. the naval blockade of Cuba, which was redefined as a more restrictive quarantine.[17]

Unanimously, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that a full-scale attack and invasion was the only solution. They

agreed that the Soviets would not act to stop the U.S. from conquering Cuba; Kennedy was skeptical, saying:

They, no more than we, can let these things go by without doing something. They can't, after all their

statements, permit us to take out their missiles, kill a lot of Russians, and then do nothing. If they don't take

action in Cuba, they certainly will in Berlin.[18]

Kennedy concluded that attacking by air would signal the Soviets to presume "a clear line" to conquer Berlin.

Adding that in taking such an action, the United States' allies would think of the U.S. as "trigger-happy

cowboys" who lost Berlin because they could not peacefully resolve the Cuban situation.[citation needed]

President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara in an ExComm meeting.

The ExComm then discussed the effect on the strategic balance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the

missiles would seriously alter the balance, but Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara disagreed. He was

convinced that the missiles would not effect the strategic balance at all. An extra forty, he reasoned, would

make little difference to the overall strategic balance. The US already had circa 5,000 strategic warheads, whilst

the Soviet Union only had 300. He concluded that the Soviets having 340 would not therefore substantially alter

the strategic balance. In 1990 he reiterated that "it made no difference...The military balance wasn't changed. I

didn't believe it then, and I don't believe it now."[19]

The ExComm did agree, however, that the missile would affect the political balance. First, Kennedy had

explicitly promised the American people less than a month before the crisis that "if Cuba should possess a

capacity to carry out offensive actions against the United States...the United states would act"[20]

. Second, U.S.

credibility amongst their allies, and amongst the American people, would have been damaged if they had

allowed the Soviet Union to appear to redress the strategic balance by placing missiles in Cuba. Kennedy

explained after the crisis that "it would have politically changed the balance of power. It would have appeared

to, and appearances contribute to reality."[21]

Thus full-scale invasion was not an option, but something had to be done. Robert McNamara supported the

naval blockade as a strong but limited military action that left the U.S. in control. According to international law

a blockade is an act of war, but the Kennedy administration did not feel itself limited, thinking that the USSR

would not be provoked to attack by a mere blockade.[citation needed]

By October 19, frequent U-2 spy flights showed four operational sites. As part of the blockade, US military was

put on high alert to enforce the blockade and to be ready to invade Cuba at a moment's notice. The 1st Armored

Division was sent to Georgia, and five army divisions were alerted for maximal action. The Strategic Air

Command (SAC) distributed its shorter-ranged B-47 Stratojet medium bombers to civilian airports and sent

aloft its B-52 Stratofortress heavy bombers.

Quarantine

Address on the Buildup of Arms in Cuba

Kennedy addressing the nation on October 22, 1962 about the buildup of arms on Cuba

Problems listening to this file? See media help.

In customary international practice, a blockade stops all shipments into the blockaded area, and is considered an

act of war. Quarantines are more selective, as, in this case, being limited to offensive weapons. While the

original U.S. Navy paper did use the term "blockade,"

This initially was to involve a naval blockade against offensive weapons within the framework of the

Organization of American States and the Rio Treaty. Such a blockade might be expanded to cover all types of

goods and air transport. The action was to be backed up by surveillance of Cuba. CNO's scenario was followed

closely in later implementing the quarantine.

Kennedy made an address to the Nation in which he said "To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on

all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated." "1962 Year In Review: Cuban

Missile Crisis"

Admiral Anderson's paper, by differentiating between the quarantine of offensive weapons and all materials,

indicated that a classic blockade was not the original intention. Since it would take place in international waters,

President John F. Kennedy obtained the approval of the OAS for military action under the hemispheric defence

provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (i.e., the Rio Treaty).

Latin American participation in the quarantine now involved two Argentine destroyers which were to report to

the U.S. Commander South Atlantic [COMSOLANT] at Trinidad on November 9. An Argentine submarine and

a Marine battalion with lift were available if required. In addition, two Venezuelan destroyers and one

submarine had reported to COMSOLANT, ready for sea by November 2. The Government of Trinidad and

Tobago offered the use of Chaguaramas Naval Base to warships of any OAS nation for the duration of the

quarantine. The Dominican Republic had made available one escort ship. Colombia was reported ready to

furnish units and had sent military officers to the U.S. to discuss this assistance. The Argentine Air Force

informally offered three SA-16 aircraft in addition to forces already committed to the quarantine operation.[22]

President Kennedy signs the Proclamation for Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba at the

Oval Office on October 23, 1962.

At 7 p.m. on October 22, President Kennedy delivered a televised radio address announcing the discovery of the

missiles.

Crisis deepens

Only an hour later, at 11:24 a.m. a cable drafted by George Ball to the U.S. Ambassador in Turkey and the U.S.

Ambassador to NATO notified them that they were considering making an offer to withdraw missiles from

Turkey in exchange for a withdrawal from Cuba. Later, on the morning of October 25, journalist Walter

Lippman proposed the same thing in his syndicated column. For many years this has been interpreted as a trial

balloon floated by the Kennedy administration, although the historical record suggests this is not the case.[citation

needed]

At the time the crisis continued unabated, and that evening TASS[citation needed]

reported on an exchange of

telegrams between Khrushchev and Bertrand Russell, where Khrushchev warned that the United States' "pirate

action" would lead to war. However, this was followed at 9:24 p.m. by a telegram from Khrushchev to Kennedy

which was received at 10:52 p.m., in which Khrushchev stated that "if you coolly weigh the situation which has

developed, not giving way to passions, you will understand that the Soviet Union cannot fail to reject the

arbitrary demands of the United States", and that the Soviet Union views the blockade as "an act of aggression"

and their ships will be instructed to ignore it.

On the night of October 23, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed Strategic Air Command to go to DEFCON 2, for

the only time in history. The message, and the response, were deliberately transmitted uncoded, unencrypted, in

order to allow Soviet intelligence to capture them.[5]

Operation Falling Leaves quickly set up three radar bases

to watch for missile launches from Cuba.[clarification needed]

The radars were experimental models ahead of their

time. Each base was connected with a hotline to NORAD control.

At 1:45 a.m. on October 25, Kennedy responded to Khrushchev's telegram, stating that the U.S. was forced into

action after receiving repeated assurances that no offensive missiles were being placed in Cuba, and that when

these assurances proved to be false, the deployment "required the responses I have announced... I hope that your

government will take necessary action to permit a restoration of the earlier situation."

The image is a recently declassified map used by the U.S. Navy's Atlantic Fleet showing the position of

American and Soviet ships at the height of the crisis.

At 7:15 a.m., the USS Essex and USS Gearing attempted to intercept the Bucharest but failed to do so. Fairly

certain the tanker did not contain any military material, it was allowed through the blockade. Later that day, at

5:43 p.m., the commander of the blockade effort ordered the USS Kennedy to intercept and board the Lebanese

freighter Marcula. This took place the next day, and the Marcula was cleared through the blockade after its

cargo was checked.

At 5:00 p.m. William Clements announced that the missiles in Cuba were still actively being worked on. This

report was later verified by a CIA report that suggested there had been no slow-down at all. In response,

Kennedy issued Security Action Memorandum 199, authorising the loading of nuclear weapons onto aircraft

under the command of SACEUR (which had the duty of carrying out the first air strikes on the Soviet Union).

The next morning, Kennedy informed the executive committee that he believed only an invasion would remove

the missiles from Cuba. However, he was persuaded to give the matter time and continue with both military and

diplomatic pressure. He agreed and ordered the low-level flights over the island to be increased from two per

day to once every two hours. He also ordered a crash programme to institute a new civil government in Cuba if

an invasion went ahead.

At this point the crisis was ostensibly at a stalemate. The USSR had shown no indication that they would back

down and had made several comments to the contrary. The U.S. had no reason to believe otherwise and was in

the early stages of preparing for an invasion, along with a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union in case it

responded militarily, which was assumed.[23]

Secret negotiations

At 1:00 p.m., John A. Scali of ABC News had lunch with Aleksandr Fomin at Fomin's request. Fomin noted

that "war seems about to break out" and asked Scali to use his contacts to talk to his "high-level friends" at the

State Department to see if the U.S. would be interested in a diplomatic solution. He suggested that the language

of the deal would contain an assurance from the Soviet Union to remove the weapons under UN supervision and

that Castro would publicly announce that he would not accept such weapons in the future, in exchange for a

public statement by the U.S. that it would never invade Cuba. The U.S. responded by asking the Brazilian

government to pass a message to Castro that the U.S. would be "unlikely to invade" if the missiles are removed.

At 6:00 p.m. the State Department started receiving a message that appeared to be written personally by

Khrushchev. Robert Kennedy described the letter as "very long and emotional." Khrushchev reiterated the basic

outline that had been stated to Scali earlier in the day, "I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships

bound for Cuba are not carrying any armaments. You will declare that the United States will not invade Cuba

with its troops and will not support any other forces which might intend to invade Cuba. Then the necessity of

the presence of our military specialists in Cuba will disappear." At 6:45pm, news of Fomin's offer to Scali was

finally heard and was interpreted as a "set up" for the arrival of Khrushchev's letter. The letter was then

considered official and accurate, although it was later learned that Fomin was almost certainly operating of his

own accord without official backing. Additional study of the letter was ordered and continued into the night.

Canada, the NORAD ally of the United States, was not consulted in these negotiations.

Crisis continues

“ Direct aggression against Cuba would mean nuclear war. The Americans speak about such

aggression as if they did not know or did not want to accept this fact. I have no doubt they would

lose such a war. ” — Che Guevara, October 1962

[24]

S-75 Dvina with V-750V 1D missile on a launcher. An installation similar to this one shot down Major

Anderson's U-2 over Cuba.

Castro, on the other hand, was convinced that an invasion was soon at hand, and he dictated a letter to

Khrushchev which appeared to call for a preemptive strike on the U.S. He also ordered all anti-aircraft weapons

in Cuba to fire on any U.S. aircraft, whereas in the past they had been ordered only to fire on groups of two or

more. At 6:00 a.m. on October 27, the CIA delivered a memo reporting that three of the four missile sites at San

Cristobal and the two sites at Sagua la Grande appeared to be fully operational. They also noted that the Cuban

military continued to organise for action, although they were under order not to initiate action unless attacked.

At 9 a.m. Moscow's Voice of Russia began broadcasting a message from Khrushchev. Contrary to the letter of

the night before, the message offered a new trade, that the missiles on Cuba would be removed in exchange for

the removal of the Jupiters from Turkey. Throughout the crisis, Turkey had repeatedly stated that it would be

upset if the Jupiter missiles were removed. At 10 a.m. the executive committee met again to discuss the

situation and came to the conclusion that the change in message was due to internal debate between Khrushchev

and other party officials in the Kremlin.[25]

McNamara noted that another tanker, the Grozny, was about

600 miles (970 km) out and should be intercepted. He also noted that they had not made the USSR aware of the

quarantine line and suggested relaying this information to them via U Thant at the UN.

An Air Force U-2 "Dragon Lady" similar to this one was shot down over Cuba.

While the meeting progressed, at 11:03 a.m. a new message began to arrive from Khrushchev. The message

stated, in part, "You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this disturbs you because it is ninety miles by sea

from the coast of the United States of America. But... you have placed destructive missile weapons, which you

call offensive, in Turkey, literally next to us... I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from

Cuba the means which you regard as offensive... Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that

the United States ... will remove its analogous means from Turkey ... and after that, persons entrusted by the

United Nations Security Council could inspect on the spot the fulfillment of the pledges made." The executive

committee continued to meet through the day.

The engine of the Lockheed U-2 shot down over Cuba on display at Museum of the Revolution in Havana.

That morning, a Lockheed U-2 piloted by Major Rudolf Anderson, USAF had departed the U-2 forward

operating location at McCoy AFB, Florida. At approximately 12:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, the aircraft

was shot down by an S-75 Dvina (NATO designation SA-2 Guideline) SAM emplacement in Cuba, increasing

the stress in negotiations between the USSR and the U.S. It was later learned that the decision to fire was made

locally by an undetermined Soviet commander on his own authority. Later that day, at about 3:41 p.m., several

U.S. Navy RF-8A Crusader reconnaissance aircraft on low-level photoreconnaissance missions were fired upon,

and one was hit by a 37 mm shell but managed to return to base. At 4 p.m. Kennedy recalled the executive

committee to the White House and ordered that a message immediately be sent to U Thant asking if the Soviets

would "suspend" work on the missiles while negotiations were carried out. During this meeting, Maxwell

Taylor delivered the news that the U-2 had been shot down. Kennedy had earlier claimed he would order an

attack on such sites if fired upon, but he decided to leave the matter unless another attack was made. In an

interview 40 years later, McNamara remembers[citation needed]

:

We had to send a U-2 over to gain reconnaissance information on whether the Soviet missiles were becoming

operational. We believed that if the U-2 was shot down that—the Cubans didn't have capabilities to shoot it

down, the Soviets did—we believed if it was shot down, it would be shot down by a Soviet surface-to-air-

missile unit, and that it would represent a decision by the Soviets to escalate the conflict. And therefore, before

we sent the U-2 out, we agreed that if it was shot down we wouldn't meet, we'd simply attack. It was shot down

on Friday [...]. Fortunately, we changed our mind, we thought "Well, it might have been an accident, we won't

attack." Later we learned that Khrushchev had reasoned just as we did: we send over the U-2, if it was shot

down, he reasoned we would believe it was an intentional escalation. And therefore, he issued orders to Pliyev,

the Soviet commander in Cuba, to instruct all of his batteries not to shoot down the U-2.

Drafting the response

Emissaries sent by both Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev agreed to meet at the Yenching Palace Chinese

restaurant in the Cleveland Park neighbourhood of Washington D.C.[26]

Kennedy suggested that they take

Khrushchev's offer to trade away the missiles. Unknown to most members of the EXCOMM, Robert Kennedy

had been meeting with the USSR Ambassador in Washington to discover whether these intentions were

genuine. The EXCOMM was generally against the proposal because it would undermine NATO, and the

Turkish government had repeatedly stated it was against any such trade.

As the meeting progressed, a new plan emerged and Kennedy was slowly persuaded. The new plan called for

the President to ignore the latest message and instead to return to Khrushchev's earlier one. Kennedy was

initially hesitant, feeling that Khrushchev would no longer accept the deal because a new one had been offered,

but Llewellyn Thompson argued that he might accept it anyway. White House Special Counsel and Advisor

Ted Sorensen and Robert Kennedy left the meeting and returned 45 minutes later with a draft letter to this

effect. The President made several changes, had it typed, and sent it.

After the EXCOMM meeting, a smaller meeting continued in the Oval Office. The group argued that the letter

should be underscored with an oral message to Ambassador Dobrynin stating that if the missiles were not

withdrawn, military action would be used to remove them. Dean Rusk added one proviso, that no part of the

language of the deal would mention Turkey, but there would be an understanding that the missiles would be

removed "voluntarily" in the immediate aftermath. The President agreed, and the message was sent.

An EXCOMM meeting during the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Kennedy, Secretary of State Rusk, and

Secretary of Defense McNamara, in the White House Cabinet Room.

At Juan Brito's request, Fomin and Scali met again. Scali asked why the two letters from Khrushchev were so

different, and Fomin claimed it was because of "poor communications". Scali replied that the claim was not

credible and shouted that he thought it was a "stinking double cross". He went on to claim that an invasion was

only hours away, at which point Fomin stated that a response to the U.S. message was expected from

Khrushchev shortly, and he urged Scali to tell the State Department that no treachery was intended. Scali said

that he did not think anyone would believe him, but he agreed to deliver the message. The two went their

separate ways, and Scali immediately typed out a memo for the EXCOMM.

Within the U.S. establishment it was well understood that ignoring the second offer and returning to the first put

Khrushchev in a terrible position. Military preparations continued, and all active duty Air Force personnel were

recalled to base for possible action. Robert Kennedy later recalled the mood, "We had not abandoned all hope,

but what hope there was now rested with Khrushchev's revising his course within the next few hours. It was a

hope, not an expectation. The expectation was military confrontation by Tuesday, and possibly tomorrow..."

At 8:05 p.m. the letter drafted earlier in the day was delivered. The message read, "As I read your letter, the key

elements of your proposals—which seem generally acceptable as I understand them—are as follows: 1) You

would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and

supervision; and undertake, with suitable safe-guards, to halt the further introduction of such weapon systems

into Cuba. 2) We, on our part, would agree—upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the

United Nations, to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments (a) to remove promptly the

quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against the invasion of Cuba." The letter was also

released directly to the press to ensure it could not be "delayed."

With the letter delivered, a deal was on the table. However, as Robert Kennedy noted, there was little

expectation it would be accepted. At 9 p.m. the EXCOMM met again to review the actions for the following

day. Plans were drawn up for air strikes on the missile sites as well as other economic targets, notably

petroleum storage. McNamara stated that they had to "have two things ready: a government for Cuba, because

we're going to need one; and secondly, plans for how to respond to the Soviet Union in Europe, because sure as

hell they're going to do something there".

At 12:12 a.m. on October 27, the U.S. informed its NATO allies that "the situation is growing shorter... the

United States may find it necessary within a very short time in its interest and that of its fellow nations in the

Western Hemisphere to take whatever military action may be necessary." To add to the concern, at 6 a.m. the

CIA reported that all missiles in Cuba were ready for action.

On October 27, the US Navy dropped a series of "signalling depth charges" on a Soviet submarine (B-59) at the

quarantine line, unaware that it was armed with a nuclear-tipped torpedo with orders that allowed it to be used if

the submarine was "hulled" (hole in the hull from depth charges or surface fire).[27]

Ending the crisis of 1962

After much deliberation between the Soviet Union and Kennedy's cabinet, Kennedy agreed to remove all

missiles set in Turkey on the border of the Soviet Union in exchange for Khrushchev removing all missiles in

Cuba.

At 9 a.m. on October 28, a new message from Khrushchev was broadcast on Radio Moscow. Khrushchev stated

that, "the Soviet government, in addition to previously issued instructions on the cessation of further work at the

building sites for the weapons, has issued a new order on the dismantling of the weapons which you describe as

'offensive' and their crating and return to the Soviet Union."

Kennedy immediately responded, issuing a statement calling the letter "an important and constructive

contribution to peace". He continued this with a formal letter: "I consider my letter to you of October twenty-

seventh and your reply of today as firm undertakings on the part of both our governments which should be

promptly carried out... The U.S. will make a statement in the framework of the Security Council in reference to

Cuba as follows: it will declare that the United States of America will respect the inviolability of Cuban

borders, its sovereignty, that it take the pledge not to interfere in internal affairs, not to intrude themselves and

not to permit our territory to be used as a bridgehead for the invasion of Cuba, and will restrain those who

would plan to carry an aggression against Cuba, either from U.S. territory or from the territory of other

countries neighbouring to Cuba."[28]

The practical effect of this Kennedy-Khrushchev Pact was that it effectively strengthened Castro's position in

Cuba in that he would not be invaded by the United States. It is possible that Khrushchev only placed the

missiles in Cuba to get Kennedy to remove the missiles from Turkey and that the Soviets had no intention of

resorting to nuclear war if they were out-gunned by the Americans. However, because the withdrawals from

Turkey were not made public at the time, Khrushchev appeared to have lost the conflict and become weakened.

The perception was that Kennedy had won the contest between the superpowers and Khrushchev had been

humiliated. However, this is not entirely the case as both Kennedy and Khrushchev took every step to avoid full

conflict despite the pressures of their governments. Khrushchev held power for another two years.[28]

Aftermath

The compromise was a particularly sharp embarrassment for Khrushchev and the Soviet Union because the

withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Turkey was not made public—it was a secret deal between Kennedy and

Khrushchev. The Russians were seen as retreating from circumstances that they had started — though if played

well, it could have looked just the opposite. Khrushchev's fall from power two years later can be partially linked

to Politburo embarrassment at both Khrushchev's eventual concessions to the U.S. and his ineptitude in

precipitating the crisis in the first place. However, the Cuban Missile Crisis was not solely responsible for the

fall of Khrushchev. The main reason was that rival politicians such as Leonid Brezhnev believed that

Khrushchev did not have enough "power" to handle international crises[citation needed]

.

For Cuba, it was a partial betrayal by the Soviets, given that decisions on how to resolve the crisis had been

made exclusively by Kennedy and Khrushchev, and certain issues of interest to Cuba, such as the status of

Guantanamo, were not addressed. This caused deteriorated Cuban-Soviet relations for years to come.[29]

On the

other hand, Cuba continued to be protected from invasion.

One U.S. military commander was not happy with the result either. General LeMay told the President that it

was "the greatest defeat in our history" and that the U.S. should invade immediately.

The Cuban Missile Crisis spurred the creation of the Moscow-Washington hot line, a direct communications

link between Moscow and Washington D.C. The purpose was to have a way that the leaders of the two Cold

War countries could communicate directly to solve such a crisis.

Various commentators (Melman, 1988; Hersh, 1997) also suggest that the Cuban Missile Crisis encouraged US

use of military means, such as in the Vietnam War.

This Russo-American confrontation was synchronous with the Sino-Indian War, dating from the U.S.'s military

quarantine of Cuba; historians speculate that the Chinese attack against India for disputed land was meant to

coincide with the Cuban Missile Crisis.[30]

Historical notes

Adlai Stevenson shows aerial photos of Cuban missiles to the United Nations in November 1962.

Arthur Schlesinger, historian and adviser to John F. Kennedy, on National Public Radio on October 16, 2002,

concluded that Castro had not wanted the missiles but that Khrushchev had forced them upon Cuba in a bit of

political arm-twisting and "socialist solidarity." However, Castro has said that although he was not completely

happy about the idea of the missiles in Cuba, the Cuban National Directorate of the Revolution accepted them

to protect Cuba against U.S. attack, and to aid its ally, the Soviet Union.[31]

Schlesinger believed that, having

accepted the missiles, Castro was angrier with Khrushchev than he was with Kennedy when the missiles were

withdrawn, because Khrushchev had not consulted Castro before deciding to remove them from Cuba.[32]

In early 1992 it was confirmed that Soviet forces in Cuba had, by the time the crisis broke, received tactical

nuclear warheads for their artillery rockets and IL-28 bombers,[33]

though General Anatoly Gribkov, part of the

Soviet staff responsible for the operation, stated that the local Soviet commander, General Issa Pliyev, had

predelegated authority to use them if the U.S. had mounted a full-scale invasion of Cuba. Gribkov misspoke: the

Kremlin's authorisation remained unsigned and undelivered.[citation needed]

(Other accounts show that Pliyev was

given permission to use tactical nuclear warheads but only in the most extreme case of an U.S. invasion during

which contact with Moscow was lost. However, when U.S. forces seemed to be readying for an attack (after the

U-2 photos, but before Kennedy's television address), Khrushchev rescinded his earlier permission for Pliyev to

use the tactical nuclear weapons, even under the most extreme conditions.)

Castro has stated that he knew during the crisis that the warheads had indeed reached Cuba, and that he had

recommended their use, despite being sure that Cuba would be completely destroyed should nuclear war break

out.[33]

In October 1997, The John F. Kennedy Library released a set of tape recordings documenting the crisis for the

period October 18 to October 29, 1962. These recordings were made in the Oval Office. They include President

Kennedy's personal recollections of discussions, conversations with his advisors, meetings with the Joint Chiefs

of Staff and members of the president's executive committee.

Arguably the most dangerous moment in the crisis was unrecognised until the Cuban Missile Crisis Havana

conference in October 2002, attended by many of the veterans of the crisis, at which it was learned that on

October 26, 1962 the USS Beale had tracked and dropped practice depth charges on the B-39, a Soviet Foxtrot-

class submarine which was armed with a nuclear torpedo. Running out of air, the Soviet submarine was

surrounded by American warships and desperately needed to surface. An argument broke out among three

officers on the B-39, including submarine captain Valentin Savitsky, political officer Ivan Semonovich

Maslennikov, and chief of staff of the submarine flotilla, Commander Vasiliy Arkhipov. An exhausted Savitsky

became furious and ordered that the nuclear torpedo on board be made combat ready. Accounts differ about

whether Commander Arkhipov convinced Savitsky not to make the attack, or whether Savitsky himself finally

concluded that the only reasonable choice left open to him was to come to the surface.[34]

At the Cuban Missile Crisis Havana conference, Robert McNamara admitted that nuclear war had come much

closer than people had thought. Thomas Blanton, director of the National Security Archive, said that "a guy

called Vasili Arkhipov saved the world."

In popular culture

The 1974 docudrama The Missiles of October is a serious portrayal of the crisis.

Joe Dante's 1993 film Matinee is set in Key West, Florida, during the Cuban Missile Crisis. It portrays a B-

movie production about a man turning into a giant ant due to exposure to radiation.

The 1999 romantic comedy Blast from the Past portrays a family who hides in a bomb shelter during the crisis,

emerging over thirty years later to the modern world of 1997.

The 1999 Brendan DuBois novel Resurrection Day is premised on an alternative history in which a fictional

United States Air Force general responded to the October 27 U-2 downing with airstrikes, triggering a chain of

events leading to a nuclear war.

The 2000 film Thirteen Days focuses on the career of John Kennedy's associate Kenny O'Donnell (played by

Kevin Costner) during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

In the video game Metal Gear Solid 3: Snake Eater, a conspiracy theory is employed in the plot. In the game,

the removal of missiles from Turkey was only used as a cover-up by the US government. The USSR agreed to

remove the missiles from Cuba in exchange for the handover of a top weapon scientist who had earlier defected

to the US.

The second season finale of Mad Men, "Meditations in an Emergency," is set during the missile crisis, much of

the episode is devoted to the panic of the characters in New York City.

The Tangent Comics imprint of DC Comics is set in an alternate timeline where the missile crisis degenerated

into nuclear war when a U.S. superhero named the Atom flew to Cuba and was mistaken by radar technicians

for an inbound nuclear missile.

See also

Cuba portal

International crisis

Cold War

Brinkmanship

Bomber gap

Missile gap

Dino Brugioni

Cuba-United States relations

Cuban-Soviet relations

Thirteen Days (book), written by Robert F. Kennedy

The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara

The Missiles of October - 1974 docu-drama about the crisis.

Stanislav Petrov

Sino-Indian War, which occurred at the same time as the Crisis.

Able Archer 83, 1983 NATO training exercise seen by the USSR as start of a nuclear attack.

Norwegian rocket incident, 1995 scientific experiment initially seen as nuclear attack by Russia.

Cuban Missile Crisis: The Aftermath, a video game based on fictional outcomes of the crisis

The World Next Door, alternate history of the crisis

Notes

1. ^ B. Gregory Marfleet, ‗The Operational Code of John F. Kennedy During the Cuban Missile Crisis: A

Comparison of Public and Private Rhetoric‘, Political Psychology, 21/3, p 545.

2. ^ Castro's Cuba. 1962. LOC: 62:10759. page 13.

3. ^ "Cuban Missile Crisis Causes". http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/days/causes.html.

4. ^ Pope, Ronald R., Soviet Views on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Illinois State University, 1982), p.7

5. ^ a b Franklin, Jane, [excerpts from The Cuban Missile Crisis - An In-Depth Chronology],

http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~hbf/missile.htm

6. ^ The American Presidency Project. "Proclamation 3447—Embargo on all trade with Cuba".

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=58824.

7. ^ Cuban resolution,october U.S. Public Law 87-733, S.J. Res. 230

8. ^ quote in Weldes, J. - "Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile

Crisis" University of Minnesota Press, 1999 p.29

9. ^ Mark J. White, The Cuban Missile Crisis (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996), p. 228

10. ^ a b Kennedy, John F. (October 22, 1962), Speech on the Cuban Missile Crisis,

http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/10/documents/kennedy.speech/

11. ^ Kennedy, Robert. Thirteen Days: A memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. W.W. Norton & Company.

pp. 3–5. ISBN 0-393-09896-6.

12. ^ The Cuban Missile Crisis, BBC

13. ^ Interview with Sidney Graybeal - 29.1.98, George Washington University National Security Archive,

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-21/graybeal3.html

14. ^ Brugioni, Dino A. (Updated edition (October 5, 1993)). Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the

Cuban Missile Crisis. Random House. ISBN 0679748784.

15. ^ Hilsman, Roger (1967). To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of

John F. Kennedy. Doubleday.

16. ^ Revelations from the Russian Archives

17. ^ Allison, Graham. Essence of Decision. Pearson Education. pp. 111–116. ISBN 0-321-01349-2.

18. ^ Kennedy, Robert. Thirteen Days: A memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. W.W. Norton & Company.

pp. 14. ISBN 0-393-09896-6.

19. ^ Blight, J. & Welch, D. - 'On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis'

Noonday Press, 1990

20. ^ Kennedy, J. - 'The President's News Conference of September 13, 1962', In 'Public Papers of the

Presidents: John F Kennedy, 1962' pp. 674-681. Washington, DC. Government Printing Office, 1963

21. ^ Kennedy, J. - 'After Two Years: A converstaion with the president' Television and radio interview,

December 17 1962. In 'Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy, 1962' pp.889-904.

Washington, DC. Government Printing Office 1963

22. ^ Anderson, George Whelan Jr. (Chief of Naval Operations), "The Naval Quarantine of Cuba, 1962:

Abeyance and Negotiation, 31 October -13 November", The Naval Quarantine of Cuba, 1962, U.S.

Naval Historical Center, Report on the Naval Quarantine of Cuba, Operational Archives Branch, Post 46

Command File, Box 10, Washington, DC, http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq90-5c.htm

23. ^ Helms, Richard (Deputy Director for Plans, CIA) (19 January 1962), Memorandum for the Director of

Central Intelligence: Meeting with the Attorney General of the United States concerning Cuba, George

Washington University National Security Archives,

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/620119%20Meeting%20with%20the%20Attorney%2

0Gen..pdf

24. ^ Attack us at your Peril, Cocky Cuba Warns US by Henry Brandon, The Sunday Times, October 28,

1962

25. ^ For the President's Eyes Only, pg. 300

26. ^ Frey, Jennifer (January 14, 2007). "At Yenching Palace, Five Decades of History to Go". Washington

Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/13/AR2007011301272.html.

Retrieved on 2008-12-27.

27. ^ "The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: Press Release, 11 October 2002, 5:00 PM". George Washington

University. 2002-10-11. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/press3.htm. Retrieved on

2008-10-26.

28. ^ a b Faria p. 103

29. ^ Ramonet, Ignacio, Fidel Castro: My Life. Penguin Books: 2007, p. 278. ISBN 978-0-1410-2626-8

30. ^ Frontier India India-China Section Note alleged connections to Cuban Missile Crisis

31. ^ Ramonet, Ignacio, ibid, p. 272

32. ^ In his biography, Castro does not compare his feelings for either leader at that moment, however he

makes it clear that he was angry with Khrushchev for lack of consultation. See Ramonet, Ignacio, Fidel

Castro: My Life. Penguin Books: 2007, pp. 284-5. ISBN 978-0-1410-2626-8

33. ^ a b Arms Control Association: Arms Control Today

34. ^ Dobbs, Michael, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear

War, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2008; p. 303, 317. ISBN 978-1-4000-4358-3.

References

The short time span of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the extensive documentation of the decision-making

processes on both sides makes it an excellent case study for analysis of state decision-making. In the Essence of

Decision, Graham T. Allison and Philip D. Zelikow use the crisis to illustrate multiple approaches to analysing

the actions of the state.

It was also a substantial focus of the 2003 documentary The Fog of War, which won an Oscar.

Allison, Graham and Zelikow, P. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis; New York:

Longman, 1999.

Blight, James G., and David A. Welch. On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban

Missile Crisis; New York: Hill and Wang, 1989.

Chayes, Abram. The Cuban Missile Crisis, International Crisis and the Role of Law; Oxford University

Press, 1974; 2nd ed., 1987.

Diez Acosta, Tomás, October 1962: The 'Missile' Crisis As Seen From Cuba; Pathfinder Press, New

York, 2002.

Divine, Robert A. The Cuban Missile Crisis; New York: M. Wiener Pub.,1988.

Dobbs, Michael. One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear

War; Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2008; ISBN 978-1-4000-4358-3.

Faria, Miguel, Cuba in Revolution—Escape from a Lost Paradise(2002); Hacienda Publishing, Macon,

Georgia, ISBN 0-9641077-3-2. http://www.haciendapub.com

Frankel, Max, High Noon in the Cold War; Ballantine Books, 2004; Presidio Press (reprint), 2005; ISBN

0-345-46671-3.

Fursenko, Aleksandr, and Naftali, Timothy; One Hell of a Gamble - Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy

1958-1964; W.W. Norton (New York 1998)

Fursenko, Aleksandr; Night Session of the Presidium of the Central Committee, 22-23 October; Naval

War College Review, vol. 59, no. 3 (Summer 2006).

George, Alice L. (2006). Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis.

University of North Carolina Press. ISBN 0807828289.

Gonzalez, Servando The Nuclear Deception: Nikita Khrushchev and the Cuban Missile Crisis;

IntelliBooks, 2002; ISBN 0-

9711391-5-6.

Kennedy, Robert F. Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis; ISBN 0-393-31834-6.

Khrushchev, Sergei, How my father and President Kennedy saved the world; American Heritage

magazine, October 2002 issue.

May, Ernest R. (editor); Zelikow, Philip D. (editor), The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during

the Cuban Missile Crisis; Belknap Press, 1997; ISBN 0-674-17926-9.

Polmar, Norman and Gresham, John D. (foreword by Clancy, Tom) DEFCON – 2: Standing on the

Brink of Nuclear War During the Cuban Missile Crisis; Wiley, 2006; ISBN 0-471-67022-7.

Pope, Ronald R., Soviet Views on the Cuban Missile Crisis: Myth and Reality in Foreign Policy

Analysis; University Press of America, 1982.

Stern, Sheldon M., Averting the Final Failure: John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis

Meetings; Stanford University Press, 2003; ISBN 0804748462

Stern, Sheldon M. (2005). The Week The World Stood Still: Inside The Secret Cuban Missile Crisis

(Stanford Nuclear Age Series). Stanford University Press. ISBN 0804750777.

The Cuban Missile Crisis: Declassified (Television Program)

External links

IV. Chronology of Submarine. Contact During the Cuban Missile Crisis. October 1, 1962 - November

14, 1962. Prepared by Jeremy Robinson-Leon and William Burr.

CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962(.pdf, 354 pgs.) U.S. Central Intelligence Agency,

McAuliffe, M. ed., CIA History Staff, 1992.

Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, 1961 - 1963, Volume XI of the Kennedy Administration in the

Foreign Relations of the United States series, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Keefer,

E., Sampson, C., & Smith, L., Eds., U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1996. The

official U.S. documentary historical record.

Declassified Documents, etc. - Provided by the National Security Archive at The George Washington

University.

Declassified "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense" on "Justification for U.S. Military

Intervention in Cuba," from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., March 13, 1962, html text from

Cryptome .pdf from National Security Archive, at The George Washington University.

Transcripts and Audio of EXCOMM meetings - Provided by the Miller Center's Presidential Recordings

Program, University of Virginia.

Tapes of debates between JFK and his advisors during the crisis

President Kennedy's Address to the Nation on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba

The World On the Brink: John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis

14 Days in October: The Cuban Missile Crisis - a site geared toward high-school students

Nuclear Files.org Introduction, timeline and articles regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis

Cuba Havana Documentary Bye Bye Havana is a documentary revealing what Cubans are thinking

about today

Annotated bibliography on the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Alsos Digital Library.

October, 1962: DEFCON 4, DEFCON 3

Spartacus Educational(UK): Cuban Missile Crisis

Latin American Task Force

What the President didn't know

Document - Britain's Cuban

The Cuban Missile War: an alternate history timeline

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On the morning of 27 Sept., 1942, Signalman First Class Douglas a Munro organized a rescue mission that

saved 500 Marines who were pinned down on the Guadalcanal, beach ...

It was 27 Sept., 1942. Signalman First Class Douglas A. Munro wouldn't see the 28th.

Munro, the first and only member of the U.S. Coast Guard to receive the Medal of Honor, In his honor, the Coast Guard

Cutter Munro was commissioned 7 Sept., 1971. There is a statue of Munro at

the Coast Guard Training Center in Cape May, NJ, as well

had been aboard the the seaplane tender Ballard.

Anchored just off Guadalcanal, the ship received word that 500 men from the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, had met

fierce resistance from the Japanese and were pinned down on the beach, their backs to the sea. So bad was it

that the Marines had begun to stack dead bodies - like sandbags - for cover.

Munro immediately volunteered to lead five Higgins boats in to get them out.

The signalman and his crew stayed low in the small boats as lead whistled and screamed overhead. As they neared

the island the anguished cries and moans of wounded Marines grew louder, until a gentle bump followed by a

scraping sound told the rescue team they had arrived in hell.

The gray-helmeted Munro and his crew swung into action. The evacuation had begun.

The Higgins boats, too small to remove all of the Marines at one time, made several trips from the island to ships.

Near the end of the mission, when only a few Marines remained on the beach, enemy fire intensified, pinning them once

again.

Munro recognized immediately that the Marines were in an untenable position, and their deaths were imminent. He

quickly placed his vessel between the beachhead and the enemy, thus drawing the fire to himself.

When the last Marine was huddled safely behind the boat, Munro grabbed one of the Higgin's two guns and released a

murderous burst of return fire, trying desperately to hold the enemy off until Marines could be taken aboard. Moments

later he was mortally wounded. His crew, injured themselves, carried on until the last boat arrived and cleared the beach.

Munro maintained consiousness long enough to utter these last four words: "Did they get off?" Assured that they had, he

slowly closed his eyes and entered eternity. He died knowing he had sucessfully completed his last mission.

Eight months later, on 27 May, 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt presented the Medal of Honor to Munro's mother,

Mrs. James Munro.

In his honor, the Coast Guard Cutter Munro was commissioned 7 Sept., 1971. There is a statue of Munro at the Coast

Guard Training Center in Cape May, NJ, as well

The U. S. Coast Guard, long one of the nation's armed forces, has seen combat in virtually every conflict

fought by the United States since

From CDR Glenn Grahl, CO, TACLET South at the press conference announcing the death of PO Bruckenthal: Let me start by extending my deepest sympathies to the family and friends of Petty Officers Bruckenthal, Pernaselli and Watts who lost their lives this weekend while serving their country on the frontlines of the war on terror. The Coast Guard is extremely saddened by the loss of Petty Officer Bruckenthal who was killed by terrorists Saturday while bravely serving his country in Iraq. We sincerely hope that his family and friends can find a little comfort knowing that he and his Navy shipmates died as heroes. We also want the family and friends of those wounded to know that our thoughts are with them and that the contribution and sacrifices of these brave Coast Guardsmen and Sailors will not be forgotten. PO Ruggiero spoke to his father today and it is reported that he is doing fine. The Coast Guard has been serving in the Middle East in a small, quiet, but important fashion since the beginning. More significantly, the Coast Guard has been a critical element of the U.S. military throughout our nation’s history. Securing the homeland and f ighting and winning the global war on terror remains our priority. It is true that this is the Coast Guard’s first combat death since Viet Nam. Coast Guardsmen deploy as part of the military with the full understanding that they may be thrust in harms way, but until Saturday that was only a considered possibility, now it is a known reality, but it is a reality that we are prepared to deal with because it is a mission that matters. PO Bruckenthal was an outstanding performer and a great shipmate. Upon his return he was to be rewarded for his performance by being selected for the TACLET South training team.

The U. S. Coast Guard, long one of the nation's armed forces, has seen combat in virtually every conflict fought by the United States since 1790. World War II saw the Coast Guard come to grips with the empire of Japan as well as the armed might of Nazi Germany. This included going into action against Adolf Hitler's vaunted submarine fleet, nicknamed "hearses" by the Coast Guardsmen who fought them to the death on the open seas. During the war the U.S. Navy credited Coast Guard forces with sinking or assisting in the sinking of thirteen of Hitler's U-boats, although the number was probably only eleven. In the Pacific Theatre the Navy credited Coast Guard warships with sinking one Japanese submarine but they probably sank two. Coast Guardsmen also captured two Nazi surface vessels and they can take pride in knowing that they were the only United States' service to do so during World War II. Additionally two U-boats surrendered to Coast Guard-manned warships at the end of hostilities, including one, U-234, that was bound for Japan transporting a cargo of uranium and the latest German rocket and jet technology.

Although the Coast Guard is one of the nation's armed forces, they entered the war as novices in anti-submarine warfare. Nevertheless Coast Guardsmen learned their trade quickly and adapted to combat on the seas in an efficient and deadly manner. During the long campaign across the open waters of the North Atlantic, battling fierce storms as well as the highly trained and well equipped German U-boat fleet, the famous Treasury Class and other cutters earned the respect of both allies and enemies. Later, Coast Guard-manned Navy warships joined the battle and continued escorting convoys and sailing in hunter-killer groups through the end of the war.

Smaller cutters made history by fighting and sinking U-boats right off the coast of the United States. One of these cutters, the U.S.S. Icarus, C.G., sank the U-352 and then rescued the surviving crewman off North Carolina (left) in 1942. The crewman of the Icarus have the distinction of being the first U.S. servicemen to capture German prisoners of war in World War II.

Cutters and their crews gained international recognition during a number of combat actions in the North Atlantic and in the waters off Greenland and Iceland. The U.S.S. Spencer, C.G., one of the 327-foot Treasury Class cutters, attacked and sank the U-175 in the open Atlantic (right) after the hearse attempted to attack the convoy that Spencer was guarding. This action was unique in that two combat photographers caught the battle on film, providing an unmatched visual record for posterity of the destruction of one of Hitler's vaunted U-boats and the rescue of its crew. Some of the Spencer's crew actually boarded the stricken submarine, becoming the first U.S. servicemen to board an enemy warship that was under way at sea since the War of 1812.

The campaign was not all one-sided as a number of cutters and Coast Guard-manned Navy warships were damaged or sunk by the enemy in both theatres of operation. Some of the losses were heavy, including all hands of the weather ship U.S.S. Muskeget, all but two of the crew of U.S.S. Escanaba, C.G., and 158 out of 186 of the crew of U.S.S. Leopold. The U.S.S. Alexander Hamilton, C.G., torpedoed and sunk in January, 1942, was the first U.S. naval vessel lost in combat after the tragic day at Pearl Harbor. Other vessels were damaged in combat with U-boats, including the U.S.S. Campbell, C.G., and the U.S.S. Menges, but were salvaged and returned to duty.

Since the end of the war divers have discovered submarines where none had been documented as being sunk while the sea floor remains empty where it was thought a "hearse" was positively destroyed. Due to the nature of anti-submarine warfare at sea many of the officially credited sinkings were in fact incorrect. Enemy submarines that the Allies were sure had been sunk at a particular time and place were in fact only damaged and did make it back to port. When no prisoners were taken or wreckage found it was at best an inexact science to determine if a submarine had indeed been sunk. So, keeping that fact in mind, here is a revised listing of the enemy craft credited by the U.S. Navy to the Coast Guard as combat victories during World War II.

In what wars and conflicts did personnel from the Coast Guard (or its predecessors) serve and what were the Coast Guard’s casualties in each?

War Number Served Deaths in Action Wounded Total Casualties Quasi-War with

France unknown unknown unknown unknown

War of 1812 100 (?) unknown unknown unknown Mexican War 71 officers unknown unknown unknown

Civil War 219 officers 1 unknown unknown Spanish-

American War 660 0 unknown unknown

World War I 8,835 111 * unknown unknown World War II 241,093 574 ** unknown 1,917 Korean War 8,500 *** 0 0 0 Vietnam War 8,000 7 60 67

Mayaguez Incident

7 **** 0 0 0

Grenada: Operation

Urgent Fury 162 0 0 0

Panama: Operation Just

Cause 9***** 0 0 0

Operations Desert Shield /

Storm 400 0 0 0

Kosovo 100 0 0 0 Operation Iraqi

Freedom 1,250 ****** 1 1 2

* = 81 Coast Guard deaths from other causes, i.e. crashes, accidents, disease or drowning. ** = 1,343 Coast Guard deaths from other causes, i.e. crashes, accidents, disease or drowning. *** = Approximate number of Coast Guardsmen who were eligible for the Korean Service Medal. **** = Crewmen on board HC-130B CG-1339. ***** = There were 6 personnel from Group Miami LEDET who were stationed aboard the USS Vreeland (FF-1068) which was conducting CN operations when the ship was diverted for Operation Just Cause. Three others were assigned permanently to Panama and were also involved in the conflict. No casualties were incurred. ****** = As of 3 June 2004