The Cosmological Argument - Daniel Bonevacphilosophical.space/philosophy/Cosmological.pdfThe Cosmological Argument •Aristotle: God is the prime mover of the universe •Aquinas:

The Cosmological Argument

Saturday, November 30, 19

God?



Classical Theism

Classical conception of God: God is

Omnipotent: all-powerful

Omnipresent: everywhere

Omniscient: all-knowing

Eternal: everlasting

Transcendent: beyond the world

Compassionate: caring


Dissident conceptions

Via negativa-- the “negative way”-- We can know only what God is not

Deism: God created the world, but has no further interaction with it; no miracles

Pantheism

God is everything

Panentheism

God includes everything


GodA Posteriori Arguments



The Cosmological Argument

•Aristotle: God is the prime mover of the universe

•Aquinas: God is the first cause

•Avicenna: God is the Necessary Being


Nyaya-Vaisesika Argument

•The earth is an effect (like a pot)

• Therefore, it has a cause


Aquinas’s Argument

•“The second way is based on the nature of causation. In the observable world, causes are to be found ordered in series; we never observe, or even could observe, something causing itself, for this would mean it preceded itself, and this is impossible.”



• “Such a series of causes, however, must stop somewhere.

• For in all series of causes, an earlier member causes an intermediate, and the intermediate a last (whether the intermediate be one or many).

• If you eliminate a cause you also eliminate its effects.

• Therefore there can be neither a last nor an intermediate cause unless there is a first.

• But if the series of causes goes on to infinity, and there is no first cause, there would be neither intermediate causes nor a final effect, which is patently false.”



•“It is therefore necessary to posit a first cause, which all call 'God'.”



•Let a be the current state of the world

• It was caused, as was its cause, etc.

• . . . <— e <— d <— c <— b <— a

•This can’t go on to infinity, or we’d never have reached a

• So, there must be a first cause, God

•God <— . . . <— c <— b <— a


Aquinas and Agrippa

•We’ve seen similar argument patterns in epistemology and metaphysics

• Start with a binary relation—justification, or, here, causation

• Transitivity: A causes B, B causes C ==> A causes C

• Seriality: For every B, there is an A that causes it

• Irreflexivity: Nothing causes itself

•All models of this relation are infinite!


Turtles All the Way Down



• Issues:

•Why can’t this go on to infinity? What’s the argument against a backwards infinite chain? . . . <— e <— d <— c <— b <— a

• Suppose there is a first cause. Why call it God?


Avicenna (980-1037)

• ... there is in being a being which has no reason for its being.

• ...that which is contingent cannot enter upon being except for some reason which sways the scales in favour of its being and against its not-being.

• If the reason is also contingent, there is then a chain of contingents linked one to the other, and there is no being at all;

• for this being which is the subject of our hypothesis cannot enter into being so long as it is not preceded by an infinite succession of beings, which is absurd.

• Therefore contingent beings end in a Necessary Being.


Avicenna• Something has a reason for its existence iff it is contingent

• Suppose everything were contingent

• There would be one linked to another in a chain infinitely long

• But then infinitely many beings would have had to occur before any given one could come into existence

• Therefore, nothing would exist

• So, something is necessary, having no reason for its being


Two Necessary Beings?• Suppose there were two

• The distinction between them would have to be essential or accidental

• But accidents are contingent

• If the distinction were accidental, one or both would be contingent

• If it's essential, they are compounds, and thus caused, so, contingent


Al-Ghazali (1058-1111)

• The cosmological argument depends on the impossibility of a backwards infinite chain of causes

• But why is that impossible?


Al-Ghazali• Argument would have to be a priori or a posteriori

• It can't be a priori, for there's no contradiction in the idea

• Can it be a posteriori?

• No---the necessary being could just be the backwards infinite causal series, made up of contingent beings!

• . . . . <— e <— d <— c <— b <— a


Averroes (1126-1198)

•There are two kinds of agent:

• (1) [Causation] the agent to which the object which proceeds from it is only attached during the process of its becoming; once this process is finished, the object is not any more in need of it—for instance, the coming into existence of a house through the builder;

• (2) [Dependence] the agent from which nothing proceeds but an act which has no other existence than its dependence on it.


Averroes

• We need to distinguish two sense of causal dependence

• Efficient cause: builder to house

• Dependence: act and object are inseparable

• Let's call that inseparable dependence grounding


Averroes

•Al-Ghazali is right about efficient causation

•The being without an efficient cause could just be the total chain

•But the argument works for inseparable dependence, that is, grounding


Averroes• . . . . <— e <— d <— c <— b <— a

|G1

|G2

|G3

|....


Averroes

•There could not be an infinite descending grounding series

•Could the ungrounded thing just be the descending series?

•No: an infinite descending grounding series couldn't ground anything


Averroes• . . . . <— e <— d <— c <— b <— a

|G1

|G2

|G3

|...

GodSaturday, November 30, 19

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716)


•Principle of Sufficient Reason: “Nothing happens without a sufficient reason.”

• So the universe— the whole series of contingent causes— must have a sufficient reason for its existence:

• Something which is its own sufficient reason for existing: God

Principle of Sufficient Reason


• Every contingent fact has an explanation.

• There is a contingent fact that includes all other contingent facts.

• Therefore, there is an explanation of this fact.

• This explanation must involve a necessary being.

• This necessary being is God.

Leibniz’s Argument


Issues

•Why can’t there be an infinite regress of grounds? Because: Turtles all the way down don’t ground anything.

•Why call the “something, I know not what” at the bottom God? Because, the ultimate ground is self-grounding, is its own sufficient reason for existing. Nothing other than God could be like that.


Paul (5? – 67?)



Paul’s Argument from the Part

•1. Something is natural iff the natural world includes it.

• 2. Something is natural iff it is not natural.

• 3. Everything includes itself.

• 4. Nothing natural explains itself.

• 5. If one natural thing includes another, something can explain the first only if it also explains the second.

• 6. Everything natural has an explanation.

• 7. Therefore, the natural world has a supernatural explanation.


The Natural World

TranscendentCause



Causes

•Paul seems to apply Aristotle’s four causes to get different versions of the argument

• The natural world has

• a transcendent efficient cause, a Creator;

• a transcendent formal cause, the Logos;

• and a transcendent final cause, toward which it is directed.


Four Causes


Four Causes of a House

•Efficient Cause:

• Final Cause:

• Formal Cause:

•Material Cause:


Four Causes of a House


Four Causes of the Universe


Four Causes of the Universe


One God?

•Why think these are the same being?

• It’s the simplest, most ontologically parsimonious explanation

•Argument from independence: if there are many gods, they depend on one another to achieve their aims. But God is independent, not needing anything or anyone else.


Documents

The Cosmological Argument - Daniel Bonevacphilosophical.space/philosophy/Cosmological.pdfThe Cosmological Argument •Aristotle: God is the prime mover of the universe •Aquinas: