The contextual factors that shape social accountabilitysiteresources.worldbank.org/.../ESW...Annotated_Bibliograpy_FINAL.pdf · Annotated Bibliography ... The contextual factors that

Annotated Bibliography – The contextual factors for demand-side social accountability

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The contextual factors that shape social

accountability

Badru Bukenya

Sophie King

Institute for Development Policy and Management

School of Environment and Development

The University of Manchester, UK

June 2012


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Abstract There has been a growing recognition over the past decade that demand-side social

accountability initiatives often face significant constraints in achieving their intended

objectives, both as a result of contextual difficulties and a failure to design strategies and

approaches that are suitable for such contexts. Commissioned by the World Bank’s Social

Accountability and Demand for Good Governance Team, this annotated bibliography

explores first political economic, and then empirical case study literature, to attempt to draw

out critical contextual and approach-based factors and the interrelationships between them,

which shape the effectiveness of social accountability initiatives in preparation for a

systematic literature review.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Dr. Simon Carl O’Meally, Governance Specialist, at the

World Bank’s Social Accountability and Demand for Good Governance Team for providing

the terms of reference and comments on an earlier draft, and Dr. Sam Hickey for giving

advice and support throughout the development of this paper.

Badru Bukenya and Sophie King are PhD candidates at the University of Manchester.


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Contents

Abstract..................................................................................................................................ii

1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1

2. Social Accountability and Political Economy...................................................................... 3

2.1 Africa studies ............................................................................................................... 3

2.2 Asian studies ............................................................................................................. 13

2.3 Latin America ............................................................................................................ 18

2.4 Generic or Cross-region studies ................................................................................ 20

3. Approaches to Social Accountability ............................................................................... 35

3.1 Literature reviews and synthesis papers ....................................................................... 35

3.2 Transparency initiatives................................................................................................. 63

3.2.1 African Transparency initiatives .............................................................................. 63

3.2.2 Asian Transparency initiatives ................................................................................ 67

3.2.3 Multi Regional Transparency initiatives ................................................................... 75

3.3 Protests and other citizen contentious actions ............................................................... 80

3.3.1 African studies of contentious actions ..................................................................... 80

3.3.2 Asian studies of contentious actions ....................................................................... 81

3.3.3 Latin American studies of contentious action .......................................................... 88

3.3.4 Multi Region studies of contentious action .............................................................. 94

3.4 Participation in formal spaces........................................................................................ 96

3.4.1 African studies of participatory initiatives ................................................................ 96

3.4.2 Asian studies of participatory initiatives................................................................. 100

3.4.3 Latin American studies of participatory initiatives .................................................. 113

3.4.4 Multi Regional Participatory studies ...................................................................... 119

Bibliography ...................................................................................................................... 122


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1. Introduction Achieving higher levels of accountability, whereby governments deliver goods and services

as per their policy promises, is critical to achieving development outcomes. Development

policy and practice has experimented with first supply-led and more recently demand-led

approaches to promoting accountability over the past two-three decades of attempts to

promote ‘good governance’, with the latter often celebrated as a more likely route towards

ensuring improved levels of government performance and also the empowerment of citizens.

However, there has been a growing recognition over the past decade that demand-side

approaches often face significant constraints in achieving their intended objectives, both as a

result of contextual difficulties (e.g. the nature of the state and state-society relations) and a

failure to design strategies and approaches that are suitable for such contexts. An example

of this recognition is the recent debate within the World Bank around the importance of

moving away from ‘best-practice’ reforms to those that can achieve the ‘best-fit’ with local

and national contexts on the ground.

This annotated bibliography, commissioned by the Social Accountability and Demand for

Good Governance Team at the World Bank, represents the first stage of a systematic review

of the development literature focused on the interrelationship between context, approach

and effectiveness in relation to social accountability. Literature has been selected and

assessed according to its relevance to the key questions in the Terms of Reference (ToR),

the weight of the evidence presented in terms of numbers of cases and contexts examined,

and the strength of the methodology. It has also necessarily been led to some extent by

limits on the availability of robust comparative empirical case studies - one of the key themes

arising from the literature is the lack of research focusing on the relationship between

context and approach, or context and effectiveness (e.g. Gaventa and Barrett, 2010). The

key questions guiding the selection process from the ToR have been:

What are the major contextual factors that we need to consider when designing demand-

side/social accountability interventions and why?

What are the ‘conditions’ under which social accountability has been more or less

effective?

Based on such ‘conditions’, what are the contextual variables we should consider?

To aid consideration of these questions in preparation for the systematic and rigorous

literature review to follow, two principle types of literature have been compiled. Section 2 of

the bibliography comprises both empirical and literature review references from the political

economy literature which raise key ‘context’ and ‘condition’ factors for analysis, and is

organised according to geographical region. In section 3, empirical case study analyses of


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specific social accountability interventions are summarised and key ‘approach’ and ‘context’

factors identified. For present purposes, a ‘case’ is an intervention, focused at least in part,

on increasing state accountability to citizens. According to the studies gathered, we found it

useful to categorise studies by looking at the activities that citizens engage in order to extract

accountability from the state (Joshi and Houtzager 2012). It is argued that citizens can

engage in a) transparency-related activities involving the collection, analysis and

dissemination of information related to government policies/programmes; b) contentious

action such as public demonstrations, protests, advocacy campaigns, and public interest

lawsuits; and c) they can participate in policy making and deliberation. Synthesis studies

are those studies that looked at various interventions involving a combination of the three

categories.

Movements for social accountability and related debates have moved beyond the

state/citizen dichotomy in recent years to focus on relationships of accountability which cross

national boundaries, or sectors, such as those involving national or multinational

corporations and global development agencies (e.g. Newell and Wheeler, 2006). The

present review does not venture into these debates, being guided by the definition of social

accountability provided in the TOR as: ‘the extent and capability of citizens to hold the state

accountable and make it responsive to their needs’. In fact, the review focuses more heavily

on the first part of this definition including issues of responsiveness only within the realms of

existing state commitments and legislative frameworks. A thorough focus on state

responsiveness to citizen needs or interests would involve inclusion of a much broader

literature on policy influence and legislative reform which was beyond the scope of the

present study.


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2. Social Accountability and Political Economy

2.1 Africa studies

Booth, D. (2011 a). Working with the grain and swimming against the tide: Barriers to

uptake of research findings on governance and public services in low-income Africa.

Africa Power and Politics Programme, London. Working Paper 18

Abstract/Summary:

‘Research into the governance of public goods provision in sub-Saharan Africa confirms that

bottom-up pressures from voters and service users are a weak factor at best in improving

performance. It suggests placing emphasis on how different types of political regime

approach the provision of public goods, and on the enduring importance of working with

service providers as well as clients. However, getting ‘uptake’ of these findings into

development policy and practice is difficult, and this paper asks why. Obstacles exist at two

levels. At an intermediate level, the dissemination of WDR 2004 and related studies through

teaching, guidelines, blogs and books has systematically over-sold certain simple messages

about information and community monitoring. More fundamentally, incentives, ideologies

and vested interests stand between research and the adoption of its findings by the

development business. This aspect of the problem of research ‘uptake’ needs to be taken

more seriously by all concerned.’

Methodology:

An analysis of findings from the African Power and Politics Programme research stream

which is investigating institutional sources of variation in public goods provision at the sub-

national level in Malawi, Niger, Rwanda and Uganda.

Key findings:

Neo-patrimonial regimes can have positive top-down effects on service-delivery if they

are able to centralise rent-seeking and have a long-term vision

In ‘low-income Africa’ voter pressure and client pressure are weak factors for improving

service-delivery in the absence of top-down incentives. Differential distribution of power

between providers and users, linked to social status and skills, are key limitations on

demand-side pressure in these contexts.

Development interventions need to ‘work with the grain’ in terms of recognising and

adapting to actually existing institutions and processes, rather than focusing on

widespread reforms.


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A combination of top-down and bottom-up pressures which combines the following

conditions can result in greater social accountability: ‘emergence of a political leadership

with an enhanced interest in winning elections on a public-goods basis; interest within

the professional organisations of providers in improving their public reputation; linkage of

social movements to political parties; and client and voter interest in improved

performance’ (5).

The article concludes with a section on ‘the political economy of uptake’ which details

how ‘incentives’, ‘ideologies’, and ‘interests’ within civil society, donor agencies and

governments obstruct the uptake of research findings into policy and reform, preventing

interventions from having a greater impact on the effectiveness of local governance.

Booth, D. (2011 b). "Towards a Theory of Local Governance and Public Goods

Provision." IDS Bulletin, 42(2), 11-21.

Abstract/Summary:

‘Under-provision of essential public goods is making development in Africa slower and more

inequitable than it needs to be. A good part of this problem concerns the governance of

provision at sub-national levels. This article provides a mid-term report on a multi-country

research effort to shed light on the institutional sources of variation in local public goods

provision. The particular focus is on key bottlenecks to improvement in maternal mortality,

water and sanitation, facilitation of markets and enterprise, and public order and security.

Drawing on fieldwork evidence and secondary literature, it identifies three clusters of issues

and associated explanatory variables which seem to account for much of the variation in

intermediate outcomes. They concern the extent of policy-driven incoherence in the

institutional framework, the strength of corporate disciplines in provider organisations and

the degree to which self-help is able to be ‘locally anchored’ in two particular senses.’

Methodology:

An analysis of findings from the African Power and Politics Programme research stream

which is investigating institutional sources of variation in public goods provision at the sub-

national level in Malawi, Niger, Rwanda and Uganda.

Key findings:

Identifies three explanatory variables to account for much of the variation in public goods

provision: ‘the extent of policy-driven incoherence in the institutional framework’; 2. ‘the


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strength of corporate disciplines in provider organisations’; 3. ‘the degree to which self-

help is able to be ‘locally anchored’’ (19).

The first manifests as ‘persistently ill-defined mandates’; ‘overlapping jurisdictions among

organisations’; inappropriate incentives; and the ‘simultaneous pursuit of several

conflicting policies’ and can be caused by successive reforms linked to donor influences,

and ‘populist’ policies linked to the re-election imperatives of the ruling leader or party

(13). The second involves ‘rules not being clearly laid down or enforced’; ‘instructions not

being followed’; ‘vital jobs not being done’ and is linked to the lack of incentives for

elected representatives to enforce rules and practices in case such behaviour loses them

votes. In contrast they give the example of Rwanda’s combination ‘controlled political

inclusion and authoritarian democracy’ which ‘depends on both rewards and sanctions,

some of them drawing on neo-traditional concepts of honour and shame (14). The third

involves a critique of donor sponsored civil society/local associational attempts at self-

help or community provision of services, suggesting that the evidence points to

ineffectiveness and lack of sustainability within these initiatives; they also however

highlight the value in local-level, locally developed reforms of service provision which are

grounded in local traditions and culture and which seek to build on existing practices.

Crook, R. C. (2003). "Decentralisation and poverty reduction in Africa: the politics of

local-central relations. ." Public Administration & Development, , 23, 77-77.

Abstract/Summary:

‘Decentralisation advocates argue that decentralised governments are more responsive to

the needs of the poor than central governments and thus are more likely to conceive and

implement pro-poor policies. Recent evidence from a selected group of sub-Saharan African

countries is reviewed in a comparative framework that highlights factors associated with

success in poverty reduction. It is argued that the degree of responsiveness to the poor and

the extent to which there is an impact on poverty are determined primarily by the politics of

local–central relations and the general regime context—particularly the ideological

commitment of central political authorities to poverty reduction. In most of the cases, ‘elite

capture’ of local power structures has been facilitated by the desire of ruling elites to create

and sustain power bases in the countryside. Popular perceptions of the logic of patronage

politics, combined with weak accountability mechanisms, have reinforced this outcome. The

conclusion from these African cases is that decentralisation has not empowered challenges

to local elites who are resistant or indifferent to pro-poor policies. Thus, decentralisation is

unlikely to lead to more pro-poor outcomes without a serious effort to strengthen and

broaden accountability mechanisms at both local and national levels.’


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Methodology:

A comparative analysis of cases where decentralisation has successfully contributed to

poverty reduction, relevant here because ‘empowerment and responsiveness’ form one of

five dimensions of poverty reduction examined. Case selection was practical in terms of the

‘best documented’ African cases: which are found to be Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria,

Kenya and Tanzania, others are referred to where relevant. The evidence base was largely

provided by an earlier research study: Crook and Sverisson, (2001) but the details of this

methodology are not provided.1

Key findings:

Elite capture is a fundamental constraint to meaningful participation in decentralised

governance and associated pro-poor development. This is reinforced by popular support for

patronage politics. It is observed that if the regime suspects that decentralisation might

strengthen competing power centres at ‘sub-national, regional or ethnic political rivals or

even potential separatists (e.g. if the regime depends upon maintaining a fragile coalition of

ethnic interests or is based on a single dominant but not demographically majority group),

then it will often adopt a decentralisation scheme that deliberately fragments potential local

power bases into smaller, weaker, politically insignificant units’ (p.86).

DEININGER, K., and MPUGA, P. (2005). "Does Greater Accountability Improve the

Quality of Public Service Delivery? Evidence from Uganda." World Development 33(1),

171-191.

Abstract/summary:

‘It is now widely realized that in many developing countries, the low quality of public services

and governance can limit the scope for poverty reduction and growth. Empirical micro-level

evidence on the scope for improved accountability to help reduce corruption and improve the

quality with which critical public services are provided is, however, limited. Using a large data

set from Uganda to address this issue, we find that household knowledge on how to report

inappropriate behaviour by bureaucrats and unsatisfactory quality of services does help to

not only reduce the incidence of corruption but is also associated with significant

improvements in service quality.’

Methodology:

1 Crook R, Sverrisson A. 2001. Decentralisation and poverty alleviation in developing countries: a comparative analysis or is West Bengal

unique? IDS Working Paper 130, June 2001


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The research uses econometric measures based on a nationally representative sample of

12,190 households of Uganda’s 2002 second National Integrity Survey to analyse the

determinants of individual anti-corruption behaviour.

Key findings:

The study suggests that increasing public awareness about how to report misbehavior and

low delivery standards could reduce corruption and improve the quality of public services in

Uganda. This would only work if appropriate incentives and sanctions were also introduced

within the services concerned. On people’s levels of awareness the researchers report that

‘those who know how to report corruption are significantly less likely to have to pay a bribe’

and also that ‘the single most important reason for not reporting corruption cases is lack of

knowledge on the necessary procedures’. Perhaps due to the quantitative nature of the

study, limited explanation on how incentives and sanctions unfold is provided.

Devas, N., and Grant, U. (2003). "Local government decision-making—citizen

participation and local accountability: some evidence from Kenya and Uganda."

Public Administration and Development, 23(4), 307-316.

Abstract/Summary:

‘The current fashion for decentralisation is built on the assumption that it will result in

decisions that reflect local needs and priorities. Yet representative democracy, through

periodic elections, is a crude mechanism for establishing these needs and priorities. Most

local government systems offer few other opportunities for citizens to participate, particularly

for the poor, and few mechanisms of accountability. This article reviews the literature relating

to local level decision-making, citizen participation and accountability. It then presents the

findings of a study of decision-making about the use of resources in a sample of municipal

governments in Kenya and Uganda. Local governments in Kenya have traditionally offered

minimal scope for citizen participation or accountability, but this is beginning to change,

mainly as a result of performance conditions applied through the recently introduced Local

Authorities Transfer Fund (LATF), together with an increasingly active civil society. In

Uganda, which has undergone a radical decentralisation, there is much greater scope for

citizen participation at the local level but there are still many of the same problems of local

accountability as in Kenya. The article reviews some of the examples of, and reasons for,

good (and bad) practice. It concludes that factors like committed local leadership, central

monitoring of performance, articulate civil society organisations and the availability of

information are critical. But even with these, there is no guarantee that decentralised

decision-making will be inclusive of the poor.’


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Methodology:

A literature review of key issues affecting participation and accountability, and analysis of

empirical data about local government decision-making in Kenya and Uganda.

Key findings:

The enforcement of performance conditions has probably had a greater impact on

improving local government performance in Uganda and Kenya than has local

accountability through the electoral system. Upward accountability, through performance

monitoring and grant conditionality, plays a crucial role but there is also a risk that the

emphasis on upward accountability impedes the development of downward

accountability, as local officials and elected representatives devote their attention to

meeting external performance conditions and can hide behind central government

funding requirements as an excuse for failing to deliver to local citizens. The capacity of

both local governments and civil society organisations needs to be strengthened if they

are to be able to engage, in an inclusive manner, in real debate about resource use and

service delivery. Information needs to be shared widely and strategically.

The study highlights three key enabling factors in cases of limited success: a committed

and effective local leadership, and particularly, good working relationships between local

officials and councillors; external pressure—from civil society organisations, from the

media, especially local radio (in Uganda), from central government monitoring, and from

donors; and increased availability of information.

Devarajan, S., Khemani, S., and Walton, M. (2011). Civil Society, Public Action and

Accountability in Africa. The World Bank, Washington DC. Policy Research Working

Paper 5733

Abstract/Summary:

‘This paper examines the potential role of civil society action in increasing state

accountability for development in Sub-Saharan Africa. It further develops the analytical

framework of the World Development Report 2004 on accountability relationships, to

emphasize the underlying political economy drivers of accountability and implications for

how civil society is constituted and functions. It argues on this basis that the most important

domain for improving accountability is through the political relations between citizens, civil

society, and state leadership. The evidence broadly suggests that when higher-level political

leadership provides sufficient or appropriate powers for citizen participation in holding within-

state agencies or frontline providers accountable, there is frequently positive impact on

outcomes. However, the big question remaining for such types of interventions is how to

improve the incentives of higher-level leadership to pursue appropriate policy design and


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implementation. The paper argues that there is substantial scope for greater efforts in this

domain, including through the support of external aid agencies. Such efforts and support

should, however, build on existing political and civil society structures (rather than

transplanting “best practice” initiatives from elsewhere), and be structured for careful

monitoring and assessment of impact.’

Methodology:

A review of conceptual and empirical literature on social accountability in Africa.

Key findings:

The authors argue that civil society-led social accountability initiatives have potential even in

semi-authoritarian regimes, however power and politics are more important determinants of

accountability than these initiatives, in terms of appropriate incentives for politicians to

enforce state accountability. Only when this kind of political will exists can civil society

influence state accountability to citizens.

Francis, P., and James, R. (2003). "Balancing Rural Poverty Reduction and Citizen

Participation: The Contradictions of Uganda’s Decentralization Program." World

Development, 31(2), 325-337.

Abstract/Summary:

‘Uganda’s ambitious decentralization program is analyzed in terms of a ‘‘Dual-Mode’’ system

of local governance. Under a ‘‘technocratic mode,’’ conditional funding from the center is

earmarked for particular programs but with little local participation. In contrast, the

‘‘patronage mode’’ is an elaborate system for local ‘‘bottom-up’’ planning, but with limited

resources, which are largely consumed in administrative costs and political emoluments.

Along with the spoils of a committee system controlling contracts and appointments, these

resources provide the means for building political alliances and loyalty. In the absence of a

culture of transparency and civic engagement to assure downward accountability, it remains

to be seen whether decentralization can promote both efficient service delivery and local

empowerment simultaneously.’

Methodology:

Presentation of findings from empirical research undertaken as part of the LADDER

(Livelihoods and Diversification Directions Explored by Research) research project

undertaken jointly by the School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia and the

Economic Policy Research Centre, Kampala, Uganda, and funded by DFID. No detailed

methodological information is provided.

Key findings


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The structure for decentralisation is in place in Uganda but not functioning effectively.

Factors constraining effective governance / participation include: a weak local revenue

base (poor enforcement of taxation by politicians and conditional nature of central

government transfers); high costs of participatory planning processes and lack of

capacity for effectively facilitating a participatory planning process; and the existence of

two modes of governance – a technocratic mode funded by conditional grants from the

centre, and a patronage mode funded by locally generated revenue and unconditional

grants but which is mostly consumed by the costs of participation. Accountability works

mostly upwards for the technocratic mode and there is very little accountability in the

patronage mode – ministries have little control over local level bureaucrats and citizens

lack information about resources and processes to exercise their power to hold

politicians accountable by the vote.

The authors suggest three strategies for increasing the effectiveness of participation and

accountability mechanisms: increase the resources available for local decision-making,

‘build capacity for planning, and ‘ensure firmer accountability for resources’, but there is

no discussion of how this might work in practice.

Keefer, P., and Khemani, S. (2011). Mass Media and Public Services The Effects of

Radio Access on Public Education in Benin. Policy Research Working Paper 5559.

The World Bank, Washington DC.

Abstract/Summary:

‘Does radio access improve public service provision? And if so, does it do so by increasing

government accountability to citizens, or by persuading households to take advantage of

publicly-provided services? Prior research has argued that citizens with greater access to

mass media receive greater benefits from targeted government welfare programs, but has

not addressed these questions for public services such as in education and health. Using

unique data from Benin, this paper finds that literacy rates among school children are higher

in villages exposed to signals from a larger number of community radio stations. The effect is

identified based on a “natural experiment” in the northern communes of Benin where within-

commune variation in village access to radio stations is exogenous to observed and

unobserved village characteristics. In contrast to prior research, the authors find that this

media effect does not operate through government accountability: government inputs into

village schools and household knowledge of government education policies are no different

in villages with greater access to community radio. Instead, households with greater access

are more likely to make financial investments in the education of their children.’

Methodology:


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Analysis of data from a survey of over 4,000 households and 210 villages, spread across 32

of the 77 communes in Benin, and a literacy test for 2,100 children in second grade (on

average, eight to nine years old) in village schools. Sample villages include natural variations

in access to community radio. Data generated information on learning among children,

school inputs and PTA activities in village public schools, and on household education

investments.

Key findings:

Correlations were found between radio access and literacy, and household education

investments but there were no correlations with PTA activity, school inputs, or levels of

awareness about education policies suggesting that access to radio in and of itself has

no or little impact on social accountability.

Another paper on the same study (Keefer and Khemani, 2012)2, also finds that access to

radio does not result in a greater ability among citizens to claim benefits from

government programs.

Kelsall, T. (2011). "Going with the Grain in African Development?" Development Policy

Review, 29(1), 223-251.

Abstract/Summary:

‘Responding to the disappointing results of the Good Governance agenda, the Africa Power

and Politics Programme is exploring the scope for approaches which attempt to ‘work with

the grain’ of African societies. This paper explores what this might mean. It identifies a core

set of beliefs and values – concerning power, accountability and social morality – that are

widely observed across sub-Saharan Africa, have proven extremely durable and remain

powerful drivers of behaviour. Generally speaking, Western institutions sit ill alongside these

traditions, while the institutions that work well in solving collective action problems and

providing public goods are those that harness the motivating forces of family, ethnicity or

religion. This confirms the relevance of the question: how might development efforts be

redirected so that they stop working against, and start to build upon, the extant notions of

moral obligation and interpersonal accountability in the region?’

Methodology:

Review of conceptual and empirical literature.

2 Keefer and Khemani (2012) ‘Do Informed Citizens Receive More…or Pay More? The Impact of

Radio on the Government Distribution of Public Health Benefits’, Policy Research Working Paper 5952, World Bank


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Key findings:

Making particular reference to Schatzberg (2002), the paper suggests that pre-colonial

traditions and discourses of family, ethnicity and religion continue to influence values and

behaviours in contemporary African society. Citizens conceive of the relationship

between people and government in familial and paternalistic terms. In contrast with the

West, African concepts of corruption can be focused on benevolent patrons sharing the

dividends of their position with their clients/constituents. The significance of the occult

and fatalistic beliefs to perceptions of politics is also emphasised.

Colonial and post-colonial political-economic dynamics have resulted in an

‘externalisation of accountability’ in terms of colonial chiefs being accountable to the

colonial administration rather than their subjects, and in the present day, governments

being accountable to Western donor governments rather than their citizens. The formal

state is a façade for an informal shadow state where the real decisions and politics

happen meaning that the ‘formal institutions of the state are working against the grain of

society’s more dynamic forces’ (11). The paper also highlights the continued support for

strong, generous, patriarchal and disciplinarian’ leaders and the relatively recent and

unfamiliar introduction of democratic election and short-term limits on power.

The author suggests that the extended African family is one of the most accountable

institutions in contemporary society, and some of the most effective development

institutions are faith-based or small scale and associational like savings groups.

Industrial capitalism in the West originated from family enterprises. While people in the

West conceive of themselves as individual members of a nation state, Africans conceive

of themselves as members of extended families, and beyond that clans and ethnic

groups before members of a nation state. Yet service provision is targeted at individuals

or territorial units. The article raises the question as to whether, if African administrations

are run along kin lines it would be better to formalise this reality rather than trying to

challenge it.

It concludes by adding the caveat that African society and culture is constantly changing

partly through the dynamics of capitalism and modernisation so that any attempt to

change development approaches to fit the realities of African context must focus on

studies of effective institutions and development processes and build on these.

Swidler, A. (2009). "Dialectics of patronage: Logics of accountability at the African

AIDS-NGO interface", in D. C. Hammack and S. Heydemann, (eds.), Globalization,


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Philanthropy and Civil Society: Projecting institutional logics abroad. Bloomington:

Indiana University Press.

Abstract/Summary:

‘The AIDS catastrophe has justified huge projections of Northern philanthropy, power, and

resources into the Global South. I focus here on both the influence and the limits of that

power; by looking at the influx of AIDS organisations in sub-Saharan Africa, I examine how

differing institutional logics interact. Using evidence from a larger study of responses to AIDS

in sub-Saharan Africa, I ask how NGO interventions in Africa are inserted into existing

patterns of social and institutional life’ (Extract: 92).

Methodology:

Literature review and reflections on interviews and observations with NGOs in a variety of

contexts in Africa.

Key findings:

Interventions should focus on how to make traditional forms of power more responsive and

accountable rather than trying to introduce new means of organisation, or at least how to find

‘cultural match’ between the institutional forms being introduced and those already existing.

Analysis of the structure of patron/client ties; practices that adapt culturally meaningful, local

institutional forms to new purposes – building on and extending local patterns of

organisation; and the identification of local brokers/international actors (priest, missionaries,

NGO workers) with long-term local knowledge and contacts are all key to learning how to

make existing structures more responsive and how to embed interventions within a particular

community or locality.

2.2 Asian studies

Aslam, G. & Yilmaz, S. 2011. Impact of decentralization reforms in Pakistan on service delivery—an empirical study. Public Administration and Development, 31, 159-171.

Summary

‘By bringing decision making closer to people, decentralization is expected to improve

governance and service delivery outcomes. Yet, the empirical evidence on the impact of

decentralization on macroeconomic performance and public sector size presents a mixed

picture. However, the findings of cross-country studies in the literature are sensitive to the

way decentralization is defined, and how its extent and impact are measured. This article

avoids the unwanted effects of incomparability and aggregation in cross-country analysis.

We use a unique panel data set from 183 villages in Pakistan to analyze the impact of

decentralization reforms implemented in 2001 on the provision of services—street paving,


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construction of water canals, sanitation sewer lines, and school facilities. Our results show

that the magnitude of provision of all services increased significantly following

decentralization reforms. We further show that the four services are impacted differently and

service delivery improvement is not uniform, but not in ways that conform to the hypotheses

of patronage theory’.

Methodology:

This study seeks to test the influence of ‘patronage theory’ on the effectiveness of the 2001

decentralization policy in Pakistan. It does so by examining 4 service types a) street paving,

b) sanitation sewer lines, c) provision of school facilities 4) provision of water canals.

According to the patronage thesis, provision would be biased towards street paving and

sanitation sewer lines which are ‘divisible and can be targeted to specific sections of citizens’

than the latter two service categories especially education facilities which benefit a larger

population and are non-excludable in nature. The study uses a ‘comprehensive panel data

on service delivery’ comprising of 183 villages and covering a 6 year time period. However,

one weakness of this study is that it did not disaggregate service provision according to the

presence of political figures in a particular village – an important indicator of ‘patronage

theory’ that Mohmand and Cheema (2007) advance.

Intervention type:

Decentralization/Political economy study

Single country case study focusing on Pakistan

Effective

Main findings:

It is reported that decentralization significantly increased the supply of all service

categories.

Although the researchers find that ‘the provision of services is skewed across villages

and across sectors, the results do not support the hypothesis of patronage theory’

adding however that their data cannot allow them to provide a clear explanation for

this conclusion.

The authors also find that:

Variations in the size of the population in different communities positively influenced

service provision especially for street paving and sanitation sewer lines.

The presence of non-state actors e.g. NGOs implementing rural support programs

(RSPs) in the area did not have a significant influence on the provision of street

paving, sanitation sewer lines and school facilities. It is only in the case of water

canals, that ‘RSP provision is highly significant with a negative sign’ suggesting that

the provision of water canals by non-state actors acts as a substitute for government

provision’ P.168.

Beck, L., Mendel, T., and Thindwa, J. (2007). The Enabling Environment for Social

Accountability in Mongolia, Washington DC: The World Bank Social Development

Department, Sustainable Development Network.


15

Abstract/Summary:

‘The purpose of this study, therefore, is: 1) to analyze conditions that influence the ability of

citizens and their organizations to promote accountability of public institutions in Mongolia; 2)

to identify priority areas for policy, legal, regulatory, and institutional reforms to improve

these conditions; and 3) to identify areas in which the capacity building of civil society

organizations and the Government of Mongolia may be promoted to enhance social

accountability for improved governance, social and economic development, and poverty

reduction. Despite numerous studies on related topics of governance, development, and civil

society in Mongolia, many of which are cited in this document, few have considered and

none have focused on issues related to social accountability. The study applies a civic

engagement analytical framework to assess the enabling environment: the factors and

conditions that would allow CSOs to promote public accountability. This framework,

represented by the acronym ARVIN, recognizes five enabling elements of civic engagement,

namely, the ability of citizens to: Associate to further their purposes; mobilize appropriate

Resources; exercise their Voice; gain access to Information that is relevant, timely, and

accessible; and Negotiate with government through established mechanisms and rules of

engagement’ (Extract: vii).

Methodology:

This is a nation-wide study seeking to analyse whether the enabling environment for social

accountability exists in Mongolia. It is a mixed methods research combining survey methods

with key-informant interviews and FGDs. The study also included four case studies of SA.

Key findings:

Overall, the study finds that social accountability in Mongolia is weak due to the following

constraining factors: a weak civil society due to poor working environment in relation to

regulation, funding, CSO distribution (urban/rural); low citizen rights-awareness; stringent

regulation of freedom of expression, which influences media vigilance; social-cultural

barriers that limit speaking out; and absence of access to information guarantees rendering

government income and expenditure records “top secret”.

Haque, M. S. (2008). "Decentering the State for Local Accountability through

Representation: Social divides as a Barrier in South Asia " Public Administration

Quarterly, 32(1), 33-58.

Abstract/Summary:

‘In recent decades, in line with the ethos of democratization and market-driven reforms,

there has emerged a growing trend towards decentering the state and transferring its power


16

to various non-state actors, including local government institutions. In the developing world,

although the principles and processes of decentralization have been introduced in order to

enhance local-level accountability, the realization of such accountability has been greatly

constrained or compromised due to various forms of social divides based on class, caste,

and gender. This article explores these issues and concerns with special reference to

selected South Asian countries.’

Methodology:

Review of literature identifying class, caste and gender-based constraints on local state

accountability in South Asia.

Key findings:

Elite capture of local governments results in poor accountability to landless and other low-

income groups, these groups suffer from low capacity to participate and high costs from

participation, particularly women. This is also reflected in the caste structure in that higher

castes make up the local elites who have political representation and government posts

while lower caste participation is low due to social hierarchy and economic status.

Keefer, P., Narayan, A., and Vishwanath, T. (2006). "Decentralization in Pakistan: are

local governments likely to be more accountable than central government?", in D.

Mukherjee and P. Bardhan, (eds.), Decentralization and Local Governance in

Developing Countries: A Comparative Perspective. Massachusetts: MIT Press, pp.

285-304.

The study assess the extent to which the ‘politically-driven policy failures’ of the central

government in Pakistan particularly in the provision of social services could be mitigated by

the decentralization policy. ‘The analysis suggests that although special interest influence –

driven, for example, by voter ignorance – is likely to be less pronounced in Pakistan, other

sources of distortion may be greater in local governments’.

Methodology:

Single country case study

Literature review

The prospects of the decentralisation policy in Pakistan are likely to be dampened by:

1. The nature political competition in terms of


17

a. Lack of credibility of pre-electoral promises of candidates. In Pakistani, the

absence of national parties with a clear strategy on public policy and

commitment to broad public good provision, suggests ‘limited prospects for

the credibility of pre-electoral promises to improve’. In a context where the

electorate does not believe that candidates will deliver on their electoral

promises, it is ‘difficult to replace even poorly performing incumbents,

because voters do not believe [their opponents] will do better’.

b. Voters do not directly elect key decision makers – the district nazims – and

yet elected local government decision makers (union councilors) have little

control over important aspects of policy making and implementation.

2. Partial devolution of administrative and financial authority rendering decision making

at the local level ineffective.

3. Decentralisation may not significantly challenge and might instead exacerbate social

inequalities based on locally entrenched social norms and practices such as the

lower preference to girls’ education. Thus the authors suggest that a strong central

government is still essential to intervene where such problems occur.

The researchers suggest the following:

1. Make public officials in particular the district nazims to be subjected to direct election

2. Institutionalize decentralization policy into the constitution

3. Provide clear and understandable information to voters regarding ‘the actions of local

officials and their responsibility for public policies that impinge on voter welfare’.

4. Encourage politicians to commit themselves to the political/electoral as opposed to

relying on their personal/clientelist connections to voters.

Paler, L. (2011). "Getting the Public to Grasp the Purse Strings: An Experiment in

Taxation and Transparency ". City: Department of Political Science, Columbia

University.

Abstract/Summary:

‘Transparency is widely considered essential to enabling citizens to hold politicians

accountable. Research on the resource curse, in contrast, focuses on what makes citizens

willing to do so, claiming that citizens care more about performance when government is

funded by taxes rather than revenue windfalls. This paper presents two over-lapping

experiments designed to provide among the first micro-level causal evidence of how

transparency and taxation affect political action directly, as well as whether taxation actually

strengthens the effectiveness of transparency in making citizens become more active and


18

demanding keepers of the public purse. The experiments were embedded in a budget

awareness campaign conducted with 1863 randomly sampled citizens in Blora, a resource-

rich district in Indonesia. Impacts are measured through participation in a postcard campaign

and an original survey. The results show that both transparency and taxation strengthen the

overall propensity to demand good government but also reveal a surprising negative

interaction on citizen willingness to sanction politicians for poor performance.’

Methodology:

Analysis of findings from a budget awareness campaign with embedded revenue and

transparency experiments, with treatment and control groups including 1863 randomly

sampled adults from 93 villages around Blora district, Indonesia.

Key findings:

The study suggests that taxation motivates citizens to demand better government

performance more than revenue windfalls. Extrapolating from this, the author suggests

similar principles may apply within externally funded development projects, in that, unless

people have had to contribute themselves towards production of a public good, the

incentives for holding implementers accountable are weak.

2.3 Latin America

Di John, J. (2007). "Albert Hirschman's Exit-voice Framework and its Relevance to

Problems of Public Education Performance in Latin America." Oxford Development

Studies, 35(3), 295-327.

Abstract/Summary:

‘This paper applies Albert Hirschman’s exit-voice framework to the problems of education

coverage and quality in Latin America. It argues that the combination of low direct taxation

and high levels of private primary enrolment provides exit options for the wealthy and

reduces their incentive to exercise their “voice”, or protest mechanisms, in the face of poor

education performance. It also argues that fragmented and clientelist political party

structures limit the provision and monitoring of public education, and also reduce the political

capacity of the poor to exercise their voice regarding public education coverage and quality.

The main policy implication of the paper is that good governance in education cannot

realistically be addressed without analysing how the structure of power and voice, and of

conflicts of interest within civil society, affect the actual political pressures that state

institutions face.’


19

Methodology:

Review of comparative literature on public education performance, and issues of ‘exit’ and

‘voice’ within education in Latin America.

Key findings:

The wide availability of private schools and low levels of taxation result in a lack of incentives

among upper-income groups to apply pressure for improved public education in Latin

America. The fragmented and clientlistic nature of political parties in Latin America results in

a lack of effective organisation and mediating channels for lower-income groups to voice

concerns about poor quality education. Lower state funding of non-state schools reduces

exit options for upper-income groups.

Fox, J. (2004) Empowerment and Institutional Change: Mapping “Virtuous Circles” of

State-Society Interaction in Alsop, R. (Ed) (2004) Power Rights and Poverty: Concepts

and Connections, World Bank, Washington D.C.

Abstract/Summary:

‘The conceptual framework developed here is based on the proposition that pro-poor reform

initiatives are likely to have broader and deeper institutional impacts if they are accompanied

by processes of strategic interaction between policymakers and civil society counterparts

that helps the latter to target and weaken obstacles to change. This framework recognizes

the interaction between formal and informal power relations in the process of institutional

change, based on an interactive approach to state-society relations. In practice, institutions

operate based on combinations of formal and informal power resources. Formal power

resources refer to official mandates, including the administrative, legal and political authority

and resources assigned to carry them out. At the same time, these de jure mandates and

authority structures are also influenced by de facto, informal power relations. While the

former may be quite visible, the latter are often deeply embedded and well hidden from

outsiders. In other words, officials administrative incentive structures may compete with

alternative and often conflicting incentive structures to determine patterns of actual

institutional behaviour. For this reason, the analytical distance between underperformance

and corruption is less than the ethical distance between them. Both sets of institutional

behaviours are driven by tensions between official and de facto incentive structures. This

approach suggests that public institutions whose leadership attempts to transform them in

more pro-poor directions will have limited results if they rely solely on their own formal

authority’ (Extract: 3-4)

Methodology:


20

Review of conceptual literature and empirical findings of studies of regional variation in pro-

poor change in rural Mexico.

Key findings:

Cross-sector coalitions between state and society on the basis of shared interests are key to

pro-empowerment institutional reform. These coalitions need political capital, protection and

incentives from pro-poor policy-makers. To create an enabling environment for

empowerment, transparency, accountability and participation reforms are all needed

because they are mutually reinforcing. Deliberative power-sharing institutions need conflict-

resolution mechanisms. Encouraging an enabling policy environment requires donors to

identify and support existing public sector reformers within their existing institutions.

2.4 Generic or Cross-region studies

Anand, P. B. (2011). "Right to Information and Local Governance: An Exploration."

Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 12(1), 135-151.

Abstract/summary:

‘This paper attempts to explore issues related to right to information (RTI) and RTI laws, in

the context of local governance. The paper focuses on four case studies—namely, India,

Indonesia, Uganda, and Nicaragua—to highlight some of the complexities in campaigning for

RTI laws and in implementing them. Based on these, a framework is developed as a tool to

map alternative approaches to making local governance more effective and accountable. At

present, there are two schools of thought: one focusing on supply-led or state-led

mechanisms such as public expenditure tracking surveys, and the other focusing on a

human rights-based approach with RTI law at its centre. The framework developed here

suggests that these alternative approaches need not be considered mutually exclusive

approaches but can be seen in terms of Dreze and Sen’s argument of democratic institutions

and democratic practice. Thus, activists can choose approaches that best suit a context at a

given point in time as intermediate steps in the journey towards developing just and inclusive

institutions.’

Methodology:

Analysis of secondary sources and semi-structured questionnaire surveys with selected

programme officers of Oxfam GB and its affiliates. Purposive case selection to highlight

divergences in local government institutions and the potential role of RTI.

Key findings:


21

RTI legislation alone is not enough to secure improvements in local governance but is a

key enabling factor.

In India, evidence suggests RTI legislation has empowered grassroots citizens and

organisations to make information demands from local governments, and the presence

of a history of judicial activism in India has facilitated enforcement of RTI law.

It is too early to evaluate impact of the 2010 act in Indonesia, but the weakness of

parliamentary oversight of government is expected to be a constraining factor.

In Uganda, discussion of the Local Government Act 1997 and RTI legislation suggests

that local participation in governance has been captured by wealthier and more educated

elites but has nonetheless resulted in improvements in local services and therefore

highlights the importance of finding elite champions of rights agendas. It suggests that

ministries with responsibility for reporting on RTI requests have been unresponsive.

The article finds a lack of evidence on the effectiveness of RTI legislation in Nicaragua

but finds evidence that decentralisation of resources to local government has not

increased government accountability to citizens due to ‘institutional under-development’

There is no formal RTI legislation in Bolivia yet better outcomes for accountability

because of more effective political and civil mobilisation for participation in local

governance.

Blair, H. (2000). "Participation and Accountability at the Periphery: Democratic Local

Governance in Six Countries." World Development, 28 (1), 21-39.

Abstract/Summary:

‘Democratic local governance (DLG), now a major subtheme within the overall context of

democratic development, promises that government at the local level can become more

responsive to citizen desires and more effective in service delivery. Based on a six-country

study sponsored by USAID (Bolivia, Honduras, India, Mali, the Philippines and Ukraine), this

paper analyzes the two topics of participation and accountability, finding that both show

significant potential for promoting DLG, though there seem to be important limitations on

how much participation can actually deliver, and accountability covers a much wider range of

activity and larger scope for DLG strategy than initially appears.’

Methodology:

Comparative analysis of findings from a six country research study consisting of key

informant interviews, document review, and field visits to a sample of local government units

in each country. The sample is purposive and illustrative with a focus on successful cases.


22

Key findings:

The paper categorises seven accountability mechanisms: elections, political parties (e.g.

enforcement through competition), civil society (e.g. advocacy, associational action),

media (e.g. public exposure, shaming, access to information), public meetings, formal

grievance procedures, and opinion surveys; and finds that a mix of several of these

instruments is necessary for the realisation of genuine local government accountability

The research counters the assumption that effectiveness is linked to the length of time

reforms have been in operation. The country with the most recent DLG program in place

(Bolivia) has the most accountability instruments up and running, while the system with

the longest experience (Karnataka) has done less well’ (32). It also claims however that

many mechanisms will take a long time to begin to function effectively, if at all, because

of contextual constraints like entrenched local networks of power.

No apparent sequencing of appropriate mechanisms arises from the findings but finds

that civil society and political parties are the most important accountability mechanisms,

with civil society actors critical to the facilitation of cross-class coalitions.

Political opportunity can arise in the form of intra-elite conflict whereby either old elites or

new elites seek out alliance with poor groups to form a stronger political force citing

mobilisations of dalit groups in India as one case where this has had some success.

The research finds a suggestion of substitutability between civil and political society as

critical actors in moves towards accountability. Where civil society is weak, political

society may be the key actor and vice versa (e.g. Bolivia/Philippines/Bolivia respectively)

Brett, E. A. (2003). "Participation and accountability in development management."

Journal of Development Studies, 40(2), 1-29.

Abstract/summary:

‘This article critically reviews the role of participatory theory in managing development

projects and programmes in poor countries. Participation has emerged in response to global

demands for greater individual and social control over the activities of state and private

agencies, and especially to the manifest failures of traditional ‘top-down’ management

systems in LDCs. Claims made on behalf of these participatory methodologies are critically

reviewed and a distinction is drawn between strong and weak versions of the theory.

Empirical evidence is then considered to evaluate the effectiveness of these methodologies,

using long-standing insights of social science theory to show that participation can succeed

for specific kinds of projects and programmes in favourable circumstances, but is unsuitable

for many others. It commonly fails in contexts where local conditions make co-operative and


23

collective action very difficult, or where it is manipulated by implementing agencies to justify

their own actions or poor performance.’

Methodology:

Review of participatory theory literature and analysis of some official evaluations of

participatory practice, including some examples of success.

Key findings:

The author concludes that participatory approaches to accountability must combine

strong top-down mechanisms with bottom-up pressure and that effectiveness is

dependent on ‘the scale and complexity of the service, the nature of the intermediate

institutions linking agencies to users, and their capacity to monitor and sanction the

behaviour of agencies’ (18).

Introducing participatory approaches within hierarchical and deferential cultural contexts

– where social differences based on social class, customs and tradition and gender are

pervasive – in the belief that facilitators merely ‘enable’ local people to do what they

would have wanted to do anyway will lead to failure because this constitutes a Western

concept and approach. People must develop their own sense of the benefit of

participation for a participatory approach to be sustained and effective.

Key conditions for effective social accountability are: mechanisms of accountability that

give users the leverage to impose sanctions on providers including ‘strong democratic

institutions, market competition and civil society organisations’; appropriate incentives

are in place for good performance; and providers having sufficient expertise and are

empowered to exercise the ‘professional autonomy’ and ‘authority to perform their roles’.

Cornwall, A., Robins, S., and Lieres, B. V. (2011). States of Citizenship:

Contexts and Cultures of Public Engagement and Citizen Action. Institute of

Development Studies, University of Sussex Brighton. Working Paper 363.

Abstract/summary:

‘Drawing on case studies from the Citizenship Development Research Centre, this paper

contends that mechanisms aimed at enhancing citizen engagement need to be

contextualised in the states of citizenship in which they are applied. It calls for more attention

to be focused on understanding trajectories of citizenship experience and practice in

particular kinds of states. It suggests that whilst efforts have been made by donors to get to

grips with history and context – such as DFID’s Drivers of Change analyses or Sida’s Power

Studies – less attention has been given to exploring the implications of the dissonance

between the normative dimensions of global narratives of participation and accountability,


24

and the lived experience of civic engagement and the empirical realities of ‘civil society’ in

diverse kinds of states. By exploring instantiations of citizenship in different kinds of states,

the paper reflects on what citizen engagement comes to imply in these contexts. In doing so,

it draws attention to the diverse ways in which particular subject-positions and forms of

identification are articulated in the pursuit of concrete social and political projects.’

Methodology:

Literature review of empirical literature from the Citizenship DRC at the Institute of

Development Studies, Brighton.

Key findings:

Conceptualisations of citizenship differ across and within contexts and an understanding

of these conceptualisations is important for understanding citizen/state relations.

Development actors seeking to understand or act upon citizen/state relations need to

analyse the history of colonial and post-colonial institutional reforms and how these have

been shaped by or have impacted upon changing notions of citizenship. In many

developing country contexts, people identify with a communal sense of belonging which

is at odds with Western models of individualised rights-bearing citizens, and it is the

vulnerability of the poor in these regions that strengthen systems that are reliant on this

sense of interdependency and commonality like clientelism. Citizens can hold leaders to

account by working within these informal/traditional systems. Histories of state formation

also matter for current strategies for change e.g. in South Africa, street protest continues

to be a popular means for exercising voice.

Citizens in developing countries have multiple identities linked to class, gender, ethnicity,

religion etc, which shape the ways in which they engage in collective or individual action

which usually involve multiple strategies for accountability and security. Depending on

their situation, the issues in hand, and the networks of power relations they are engaged

within, a rights-based approach may also be adopted. Citizens of developing countries

may lack a sense of national citizenship and identify first and foremost with their ethnic

group. It is therefore important to analyse different forms of solidarity in asking what

might work for social accountability.

DFID. (2011). The Politics of Poverty: Elites, Citizens and States: Findings from ten

years of DFID-funded research on Governance and Fragile States 2001–2010.

Department for International Development (DFID), London.

Abstract/Summary:

‘The Centre for Future States and the Citizenship, Accountability and Participation

Programmes (Institute of Development Studies, Sussex); the Crisis States Research Centre


25

(London School of Economics); and the Centre for Research on Inequality and Ethnicity

(CRISE, Oxford University) have been funded by DFID over the past ten years. This paper

provides a brief overview of what these different programmes have told us about

governance, fragility and conflict in the developing world. The key message from all four

research programmes is that to understand development we must understand the politics

that shape it. Ultimately it is political decisions that will shape whether or not the Millennium

Development Goals are reached, revenues are raised to fund investment, and growth

occurs.’ (Extract: Executive summary)

Methodology:

An overview of lessons learned from ten years of DFID funded research at the Centre for

Future States and Citizenship, Accountability and Participation Programmes (Institute of

Development Studies); the Crisis States Research Centre (London School of Economics);

and the Centre for Research on Inequality and Ethnicity (CRISE, Oxford University).

Key findings:

Political settlement that does not exclude powerful players is likely to prevent conflict and

security is a precondition for development. Governments that are more inclusive are more

stable, the exclusion of some groups from the rights of citizenship creates conflict [chapters

2-4]. Local associations and social movements bring benefits to both state and society

[chapters 5 and 6]. Services work better for the poor when poor citizens participate in reform

of service delivery and service delivery targeting excluded groups can reduce political

tensions and improved security [chapter 7]. Taxation plays a central role in building effective

states: taxes build political legitimacy, offer an exit strategy from aid, allow states to provide

public services; tax reforms can encourage interest groups to mobilise politically [chapter 8].

Donors need to consider the ‘political dynamics of growth’ and recognise ‘forms of informal

relationships between business and state’ that can generate and sustain high levels of

growth in developing countries [chapter 9].

Heller, P. (2001). "Moving the State: The Politics of Democratic Decentralization in

Kerala, South Africa, and Porto Alegre." Politics & Society, 29(1), 131-163.

Abstract/Summary:

‘The purpose of this article is to explore the conditions under which a distinctly democratic

variant of decentralization – defined by an increase in the scope and depth of subordinate

group participation in authoritative resource allocation – can be initiated and sustained.

Because such a project is tantamount to fundamentally transforming the exercise of state

power, it requires an exceptional, and in most of the developing world improbable, set of


26

political and institutional opportunities. In South Africa, the Indian state of Kerala, and the

Brazilian city of Porto Alegre, new political configurations and underlying social conditions

have converged to create just such a set of opportunities. Most visibly, left-of-center political

parties that were born of popular struggles have come to power and inherited significant

transformative capacities... the democratic empowerment of local government is critically

dependent on the associational dynamics and capacities of local actors. Again, the cases

examined here are quite exceptional. All three boast a rich and dense tapestry of grassroots

democratic organizations – the historical legacy of prolonged mass-based prodemocracy

movements – capable of mobilizing constituencies traditionally excluded from policy-making

arenas, and dislodging traditional clientelistic networks. But the building of local democratic

government, even under the most favourable of conditions, is anything but linear. It requires

not only that a favourable political alignment be maintained but that a delicate and workable

balance between the requirements of institution building and grassroots participation be

struck. Subtle differences in political configurations and relational dynamics can thus

produce divergent trajectories’ (Extract: 133).

Methodology:

Political-economy analysis of decentralisation in three regions.

Key findings:

Identifies a strong central state, a well developed civil society, and an organised left of centre

political force (a party or social movement) as key to effective participatory governance. The

author attributes the ineffectiveness of participatory governance in South Africa to the limited

political competition – ‘electoral hegemony’ – that the ruling ANC party enjoys. In addition,

the nature of social movement - ruling party relations is quite different in the successful and

less successful contexts whereby in SA it is characterised by ‘incorporation’ whereas in India

and Brazil parties and movements cautiously cooperate to maintain each other’s autonomy.

Joshi, A. (2008). "Producing Social Accountability? The Impact of Service Delivery

Reforms." IDS Bulletin, 38(6), 10-17.

Abstract/Summary:

‘This article argues that the key to understanding the potential of accountability mechanisms

for improving service delivery are the processes through which collective actors engage over

time with the state in shaping policy. When collective actors participate in service delivery

reforms, they are more likely to engage in social accountability actions that monitor reform

implementation as well as increase the uptake of reforms by people. To make this argument,

this article draws upon an approach which focuses on the iterative processes of state–


27

society interaction through which the nature and capacity of state and collective actors are

shaped: the polity approach. Polity-centred analyses suggest that the way state institutions

are organised will influence who engages in collective action and around what types of

issues (Skocpol 1992; Houtzager 2003). Reforms of the state – including pluralisation,

decentralisation and institutionalised participation – can have significant impacts on the

incentives faced by potential collective actors. By tracing who participates at foundational

moments of policy changes, we can see how the reform process enables some actors to

‘engineer’ an ‘institutional fit’, while constraining others (Houtzager 2003). The recent

literature on social accountability provides a good analytical frame to see the ways in which

collective actors can hold states to account through non-electoral mechanisms (Peruzzotti

and Smulovitz, 2006). While this literature offers promising insights into the conditions under

which social accountability is likely to be successful and the mechanisms through which it

operates, it has said less about who engages and why collective actors demand social

accountability under some conditions and not others. To understand the processes through

which social accountability emerges and is sustainable, we need to analyse the impact of

recent changes in state institutions on collective actors and trace the dynamics of their

involvement with the state in policy reforms, implementation and subsequent efforts at

sustaining social accountability.’

Methodology:

Review of social accountability literature.

Key findings:

The central argument is that by tracing the trajectory of reforms and how they have

shaped collective action and outcomes it is possible to draw conclusions about likely

scenarios of success for social accountability. Collective actors that participate in the

process of service delivery reform are also more likely to engage in holding providers

accountable. Joshi advocates a focus on collective action for engagement with the state

rather than individual/consumer action like complaints systems or citizens charters

because they don’t cater for the category of poor who have no access to services at all,

they often lack any mechanisms for enforcement of sanctions, and they assume that

citizens will use them just because they exist. Joshi also suggests a separation of

analysis between spaces for participatory planning and collective action for social

accountability suggesting that there is a danger that by combining the two functions

people become co-opted.

The article describes a number of factors or conditions that can influence the nature and

success of social accountability initiatives. They often privilege participation by middle

classes rather than the poor which means that the interests of the poor are often


28

neglected. Private or non-governmental service provision tends to be more concerned

with profit or lacks ‘leverage within the state to initiate pro-poor reforms’; while new

participatory spaces within the state can create incentives for beneficiaries to engage

with providers and policy-makers. If citizens/service users have an awareness about

rights there is more chance they will engage in collective action. Cross-class alliances

and those that cut across the public-private divide are more likely to achieve

improvements in accountability and service provision, and that these are often formed

during critical ‘moments of opportunity’. The author does not divulge details of these

moments although his recent work with Houtzager (Joshi and Houtzager 2012) describes

them as external events such as public sector reforms and political crises that increase

the likelihood of citizens’ engagement with the state producing increased accountability.

Joshi, A., and Houtzager, P. P. (2012). "Widgets or Watchdogs?" Public Management

Review, 14(2), 145-162.

Abstract/summary:

‘Strengthening ‘social accountability’ is emerging as a key strategy for improving public

services and attaining the Millennium Development Goals. Yet current conceptualizations of

social accountability have tended to focus on it as ‘mechanisms’ or ‘widgets’, a view which

tends to depoliticize the very processes through which poor people make claims. We

propose an alternative conceptualization which focuses on disaggregating social

accountability actions, and viewing them as part of a long-term ongoing political engagement

of social actors with the state. Such a conceptualization can advance understandings of

when the poor engage in social accountability and the impact it might have’.

Methodology

Theorizing and literature review.

Main findings:

One of the central arguments in this piece is that social accountability should not be

conceived in terms of specific initiatives such social audits or report cards (widgets)

but rather as a process of ‘on ongoing political engagement by social actors with the

state [which is] part of a long-term pattern of interaction shaped both by historical

forces and the current context’

Social accountability is ‘shaped in part by the legacies of previous engagement

between … collective actors and state actors’ and that ‘each iteration of this

engagement alters the capabilities of the actors and sometimes the political


29

institutional landscape in which the next engagement will take place’ (p.155). The

outcome of previous engagement i.e. whether it elicited positive or negative

responses from the state influences future engagements.

Social accountability action is more likely to be effective during ‘moments of

opportunity’ which emanate from external events ‘such as public sector reforms, or

political crises that shake loose the commitment of important actors to a particular set

of policies or related institutional arrangements, or lead new influential actors to enter

a policy domain, including the introduction of widgets’ (p.155-6).

Whether collective actors exploit these ‘moments of opportunity’ depends on the

context and the capacities and repertoires of the actors. For instance collective

actors may not bother to take part in these moments if they are already engaged in

other activities that they believe to have more potential for success or if they are

involved in other forms of engagement with the state (e.g. holding contracts for

service provision).

Jütting, J., Corsi, E., Kauffmann, C., McDonnell, I., Osterrieder, H., Pinaud, N., and

Wegner, L. (2005). "What Makes Decentralisation in Developing Countries Pro-poor?"

The European Journal of Development Research, 17(4), 626-648.

Abstract/Summary:

‘Decentralisation has been advocated by donors and development agencies as an

instrument to ensure broader participation of citizens as well as to improve local governance

leading to poverty reduction from the bottom up. On the basis of a comprehensive review of

nine case studies documented in the literature, this study questions this assumption.

According to our findings, a clear link between decentralisation and a reduction in poverty

cannot be established. Two important policy lessons emerge from this study. First, in an

environment where the central state barely fulfils basic functions and is not interested in

giving power and resources to local tiers of government, decentralisation should not be a

priority for donors as it could be rather counter-productive. Second, in countries that fulfil

basic prerequisites, decentralisation could be a powerful tool for poverty reduction.’

Methodology:

Literature review of cross-country case studies covering nine countries in order to identify

determinants of pro-poor decentralisation.

Key findings:


30

There is a lack of evidence in the literature for clear links between decentralisation and

improvements in access to services and empowerment. What evidence there is suggests

that these links are weak.

There is some evidence of improved access to services and empowerment in Bolivia and

some Indian states, the evidence suggests poor results in most African countries where

decentralisation has been limited to administrative deconcentration.

Decentralisation of decision-making power and large-scale resources is unlikely in

countries with weak governance systems and capacities but key success factors for pro-

poor decentralisation are a real devolution of power and resources while establishing

accountability systems.

Pro-poor decentralisation can only be achieved with strong commitment from central

government and political leaders because it involves a redistribution of power and will

generate opposition from those losing power. Even if power is devolved there is a danger

that it then becomes captured by local elites.

Manor, J. (2004). "Democratisation with Inclusion: political reforms and peoples

empowerment at the grassroots." Journal of Human Development, 5(1), 5-29.

Abstract/Summary:

‘This paper reviews recent approaches by developing country governments to include

ordinary people, particularly the poor, in democratic processes so as to benefit the people

and protect democracy itself. Three issues currently characterise all aspects of government:

centrist approaches, fiscal constraints, and resistance to reform. There have been five types

of approaches to political reform, including elected councils, user committees, and other

mechanisms, as well as efforts to engage civil society and elites in the process. This paper

discusses how these efforts can be facilitated, and how to tackle resistance to reform, before

going on to look at ways to measure the impact of such reforms.’

Methodology:

Literature review.

Key findings:

The author finds that political reforms for empowerment need support from ‘enlightened

sections of civil society’; that encouraging elite competition for the support of poor and

excluded groups can support effectiveness; that cross-class coalitions between poor and

non-poor groups create stronger pressure for responsiveness; and highlights the need for

both incentives and disincentives within institutions and accountability mechanisms.


31

Mansuri and Rao (forthcoming) Localising Development: Does Participation Work?

World Bank Policy Research Report - DRAFT

Abstract/Summary:

‘While it is clear in principle that a more engaged citizenry can achieve a higher level of

cooperation and make government more accountable, we do not know how best to foster

such engagement. Can participation be induced through the type of large-scale government

and donor-funded participatory programs which have become a leitmotif of development

policy? It is this question which is at the heart of this Policy Research Report… Our

emphasis is on assessing the impact of large-scale policy driven efforts to induce

participation and, for the most part, we do not examine the literature on organic participation;

by which we mean participation that is spurred by civic groups acting independently of

government, and often in opposition to it… we limit the report’s focus to participatory

development, and pay much less attention to the important supply-side aspects of

governance – fiscal decentralisation, taxation policy, local government procedures, and

bureaucratic inefficiency’ (Extract: ii)

Methodology:

Review of econometric analysis of large-scale participatory projects evaluated on basis of

representative samples of target populations.

Key findings:

‘Induced’ programmes are subject to elite capture and benefit elites and men more than

the poorest. They fail to bring strong and resilient organisations, associations are formed

only in the expectation of financial gain from the programmes. Isolated and poorer

localities benefit less from programmes due to capacity barriers and limits on access to

information and media. Co-financing can reduce benefits to the poorest and worsen

horizontal inequalities.

Enabling factors for more positive outcomes are also presented. The scope for elite

capture is ‘dampened’ under decentralised governance frameworks but this is dependent

on electoral incentives and capacity of higher levels of government to enforce

accountability on lower level bureaucrats. Greater community involvement in the

management of local resources improves sustainability and infrastructure quality overall

but inequality, limited local management capacity and the importance of clear

mechanisms for downward accountability are all key considerations. In the case of

health, projects involving community participation in service delivery have positive

outcomes for maternal and infant mortality, use of facilities and behaviour modification;


32

programmes managed by local government have better outcomes than by NGOs.

Information provision about service quality and government standards improves

outcomes even without additional investment of resources. Credible and open elections

continue to be a better mechanism of accountability than informal deliberative forums,

and participatory and deliberative councils encourage citizen engagement. Mandating

the inclusion of disadvantaged groups in participatory processes helps to tackle social

inequalities and acts as an ‘incubator for new political leadership’ such as by women or

previously excluded groups (xii).

Some preconditions for successful induced participatory programmes are also

presented: ‘Reforms that enhance judicial oversight, allow for independent audit

agencies and protect and promote the right to information and a free media’ are

necessary pre-conditions for local oversight (xiii); a responsive central state with the

capacity to monitor the use of funds at the local level; sensitivity and adaptability to

context; and realistic expectations based on an understanding of the unpredictability and

infinite variability of local conditions.

Robinson, M. (2007a). "Introduction: Decentralising Service Delivery? Evidence and

Policy Implications." IDS Bulletin, 38(1), 1-6.

Abstract/Summary:

‘Improvements in democratic accountability and better service delivery outcomes are not

mutually exclusive but can have complementary and mutually reinforcing effects. The

problem is that decentralisation policy initiatives are often premised on strengthening local

democracy without considering fully the conditions under which service delivery

improvements can be achieved. The challenge confronting proponents of decentralisation is

that the evidence to support the case for decentralised service delivery is fragmentary and

inconsistent and the conditions for successful devolution of services are poorly understood.

The articles in this IDS Bulletin seek to throw light on these issues by marshalling evidence

on service delivery outcomes from a range of developing countries that are engaged in a

process of democratic decentralisation and highlighting the implications for designing

reforms that maximise the prospects for improvements in the quality and access of services

for the poor’ (Extract: 1).

Methodology:

Synthesis of findings from seven papers focused on service delivery in Asia, Africa, and

Latin America.

Key findings:


33

The synthesis draws out a series of enabling conditions for decentralised, accountable,

service provision: stable political contexts with steady economic growth and relatively

capable local bureaucracies; political commitment; effective channels of accountability;

effective oversight by non-state actors; and ‘steady, incremental and well-resourced

initiatives that build capacity and increase accountability’ (6). Constraining conditions are

also presented and include: local governments where power is contested and resources are

controlled by elites; decentralising service delivery without building the capacity of local

government or non-state actors; inadequate resourcing including limitations on local

taxation; short-term and time bound interventions – positive results take a long time to

mature.

Robinson, M. (2007b). "Does Decentralisation Improve Equity and Efficiency in Public

Service Delivery Provision?" IDS Bulletin, 38(1), 7-17.

Abstract/Summary:

‘This article focuses on substantive development outcomes, centred on how far

decentralisation produces improvements in service delivery for the poor, drawing on

evidence concerning equity and efficiency and the political and institutional conditions which

give rise to these outcomes. The literature on democratic decentralisation and service

delivery generally falls into two distinct categories: opportunities for enhanced popular

participation and increased accountability of local authorities, or on forms of service delivery

involving a plurality of actors. A major problem with the empirical literature is that there is no

systematic or comparative evidence on whether increased participation in decentralised local

governance generates better outputs in terms of improvements in the provision of health,

education and drinking water and sanitation services for poor and marginalised people. The

available evidence draws either on examples from single countries and sectors, or is

anecdotal, temporally specific and highly localised, thus rendering the task of generalisation

problematic’ (Extract: 7).

Methodology:

Literature review.

Key findings:

The study identifies the following enabling political and institutional conditions for equity and

efficiency as outcomes of decentralised service delivery: political commitment and


34

leadership; political mobilisation of the poor; institutionalised participation; adequacy of

financial resources; and technical and managerial capacity.


35

3. Approaches to Social Accountability

3.1 Literature reviews and synthesis papers

Ackerman, J. (2004) Co-Governance for Accountability: Beyond ‘‘Exit’’ and ‘‘Voice’’

World Development Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 447–463

Abstract/Summary:

‘This article explores the theory and practice of society’s participation in strengthening

government accountability. It argues that both ‘‘exit’’ solutions based in marketization and

‘‘voice’’ solutions grounded in ‘‘coproduction,’’ social protest or consultation are insufficient.

The best way to tap into the energy of society is through ‘‘co-governance,’’ which involves

inviting social actors to participate in the core activities of the state. By way of demonstration,

the article examines case studies from a wide range of contexts (Brazil, Mexico, the United

States, India) and policy areas (poverty reduction, infrastructure provision, school reform,

electoral administration, police reform).’

Intervention type:

Participatory governance

Multiple levels

Effective

Methodology:

A comparative case analysis on the basis of a review of empirical literature covering:

participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil; a ‘federal electoral institute in Mexico; police

and school reform in Chicago; and grass roots anti-corruption initiatives in India.

Key findings:

The author finds that effective co-governance requires reformers to ‘trust and actively involve

societal actors from the very beginning of the process’; that ‘the best ‘‘entry points’’ are...

those issues and locations where there are previously existing social demands and practices

surrounding a specific accountability issue’; a clear legal framework for participation; and

that decentralization alone does not automatically lead to an increase in societal participation

or an improvement of government accountability’ (459).


36

Lardiés, C. A., and Claasen, M. (2010). "Conclusion", in M. Claasen and C. Alpín-

Lardiés, (eds.), Social Accountability in Africa: Practitioners' experiences and

lessons. Affiliated Network for Social Accountability (ANSA-Africa).

Abstract/Summary:

‘The case studies presented in this book have illustrated the diversity and the richness of

current initiatives used to improve governments’ accountability. Substantial progress has

been made since the pioneering initiatives on social accountability: those on participatory

budgeting by the municipality of Porto Alegre, Brazil, on budget analysis by Idasa in South

Africa, and the report card on pro-poor services by the Philippines’ Department of Budget

and Management. There is, however, a long way to go before these initiatives become

widespread on the African continent, and some of the common challenges that have

hindered progress are examined here.’ (Extract: 210)

Methodology:

Synthesis chapter for this edited collection of 13 social accountability case studies in Africa.

Key findings:

The chapter details a series of contextual and strategic factors which have facilitated

social accountability initiatives. These are the presence of political will for social

accountability among government officials and politicians; the ability to form strong

partnerships including intra-sector and cross-sector alliances; having access to a free

media and clear communication strategies; the need for robust research evidence to

back up claims-making; the need for good leadership among CSOs and government

actors; and the importance of individual champions of reform.

A number of challenges initiatives have faced are also described including absence of

political will and poor CSO/government relations; an inability to sustain or scale up

initiatives both on the part of CSOs and government; poor prioritisation and allocation of

resources by government – leading to under resourced public services but also under

resourced pro-accountability institutions and mechanisms; and a low level of

enforcement powers among accountability institutions.

Citizenship DRC. (2011). Blurring the Boundaries Citizen Action Across States and

Societies: A Summary of Findings from a Decade of Collaborative Research on

Citizen Engagement. IDS, Brighton.

Abstract/summary:

‘Governments often become more capable, accountable and responsive when state-led

reform and social mobilisation occur simultaneously. This briefing note highlights this and


37

other key findings, especially those that link to the debates surrounding policy statements

and projects that have proclaimed to support bottom-up participation and citizen-led

development for the last two decades. In the pages that follow, we elaborate our ‘seeing like

a citizen’ approach. In the subsequent section, entitled ‘Destinations’, we draw on our

evidence base of more than 150 case studies to give an overview of the contributions made

by different forms of citizen engagement. The benefits of engagement often begin with the

strengthening of citizenship itself, but there are other, more commonly measured outcomes

documented by the Citizenship DRC’s research related to development, to building

responsive and accountable states, and to realising rights and deepening democracy, which

are each described in turn.’

Methodology:

Synthesis paper of findings from over 150 case studies.

Key findings:

The authors summarise 6 factors that will affect the success of citizen engagement

strategies:

1. Prior citizen capabilities – in order to mobilise citizens need knowledge about their

rights and entitlements plus how to the government system operates. They also need

skills to mobilise to engage in collective action. The authors however note that

citizens’ knowledge and skills for collective action are cumulative and enhanced with

engagement.

2. Institutional and political context – a democratic environment characterised with ‘the

presence of free and fair elections and the existence of independent government

institutions with a mandate to protect citizens’ rights’. The study observes that ‘in

regimes where essential freedoms are entirely absent, for instance, citizens have a

more limited repertoire of actions’.

3. The strength of internal champions – cognizant of the fact that the entire government

cannot be expected to support citizens’ cause, the study argues that what is needed

is ‘the presence of [a few] influential officials who are committed to holding open the

door for citizens’.

4. The location of power and decision making – since decisions making authority

effective is spread over several levels from local, to national and sometimes to

international levels, effective citizen engagement requires employing multiple

strategies that can touch upon these multiple stages of the policy process.

5. The history and style of engagement – the authors highlight the need for building on

those actions that were successful in the past for they may be pointers to what

citizens are comfortable with.


38

6. The nature of the issue – ‘whether the issue deals with questions of science, whether

it is socially and culturally contentious, whether it has been framed by global actors or

whether it has already been acknowledged as a political matter, a variety of these

questions can drive the form of engagement, as well as the nature of the response’.

They also make a series of recommendations for development actors. Civil society

actors should assess the benefits and risks of various strategies of engagement; develop

clearer strategies and policies for mediating and linking across actors; and develop

approaches that build constituencies for change to ensure sustainability. Government

officers and politicians need to recognise the links between citizen engagement, effective

governance and better leadership; go beyond a simple ‘invitation’ to participate; and

reach out to champions in other levels and arenas of government. Donors need to think

vertically as well as horizontally; help to protect the space for citizen engagement,

including for social movements; and allow more time for citizen engagement in the

initiatives they support.

Coelho V. S. P. and Von Lieres, B. (2010) “Mobilising for Democracy: Citizen

Engagement and the Politics of Public Participation”, in V. S. P. Coelho and B. v.

Lieres, (eds.), Mobilizing for Democracy: Citizen Action and the Politics of Public

Participation. London: Zed Books.

Abstract/Summary:

‘What are the conditions under which citizen mobilization strengthens democratic institutions

and cultures? In exploring that question, this book introduces eleven original empirical case

studies of how different forms of citizen mobilization have generated democratic outcomes in

seven countries of the global South. It highlights the limitations of one-size-fits-all

approaches to addressing the challenges of building democracy, and it demonstrates how

the prospects for achieving democratic outcomes depend on a combination of forms of

mobilization and distinctive political and institutional contexts… The case studies examine

three forms of mediated citizen mobilization: associations, social movements and citizen

involvement in formal governance mechanisms. The case studies provide examples of

citizen mobilization that has had democratic outcomes in political contexts that vary

significantly in terms of constitutional and legal frameworks, state capacities and histories of

citizen mobilization. Each of these contextual factors leaves distinctive traces of how citizens

and their organizations mobilize for democracy, and also shapes the choice of forms of

mobilization. Sometimes, in fragile states or emerging democracies, the most important

outcomes of engagement are the construction of democratic citizenship, the capacity to


39

press for rights, and the deepening and expansion of the practices of democratic

participation. Where there is a longer history of citizen mobilization, there is a better chance

of larger-scale gains – such as the crafting of new agendas for citizen participation or

sustained access to economic resources, rights and accountable institutions.’ (Extract: 1)

Methodology:

A synthesis chapter drawing out lessons learned across the seven country contexts. Three

case interventions are examined: associations, social movements and citizen involvement in

formal governance mechanisms.

Key findings:

Findings relating to associational mobilisation in Kenya, Bangladesh and Angola relate

principally to processes of citizenship-building. NGOs can help to foster civic virtues,

teach political skills and nurture ‘ability and willingness on the part of grassroots leaders

to check abuses of power at the local level.’ NGO members have greater involvement in

local politics, local institutional spaces, more interactions with politicians and bureaucrats

than other citizens. In contrast, they find limited capacity among associational

mobilisations to influence public policy or broader political systems which is linked to an

absence in these countries of ‘robust institutionalised spaces for citizen-state interaction,

linking local and national politics’.

Findings relating to social movements in Brazil, South Africa and Nigeria are related to

outcomes of contesting political authority and building state responsiveness. Social

movements in ‘strong state’ contexts like Brazil and S. Africa can influence public policy

in ways that create greater access to health and housing for marginalised groups. In

Nigeria, where there are relatively unaccountable state institutions but a long history of

citizen mobilisation, gains have also been made on electoral policy. Party-political

patronage networks and political cliques had an obstructive effect in S. Africa.

Redistributive gains have been harder to make than policy and procedural changes.

Findings relating to citizen involvement in formal governance mechanisms are drawn

from case studies in India, Brazil, and Kenya. Dalit mobilisation by local CSOs has

ensured effective redistribution of resources within panchayats in India. In Brazil, local

contexts with strong histories of social mobilisation have more inclusive and participatory

health councils and stronger cross-sector networks with positive outcomes for

accountability. Their Kenyan case demonstrates how strong links between civil society

and political parties can lead to a progressive national agenda. Overall, they find that it is

when participation in formal participatory mechanisms is combined with citizen

mobilisation through associations or social movements that participation is most

effective.


40

Other key findings relate to the ways in which context shapes forms of mobilisation and

democratic outcomes; or the ways in which different forms of mobilisation shape different

kinds of outcomes. Styles of activism are shaped by the past political experiences and

historical trajectories of individual citizen leaders; norms and cultural habits; the state in

terms of shaping political opportunities; and the nature of networks and ties the activist

organisations have established. ‘90% of the outcomes achieved by associations are

related to the construction of citizenship’ including rights awareness and increased

capacity for action. 58% of the outcomes achieved by social movements relate to state

responsiveness to citizen demands for rights, services or agendas. Citizen involvement

in formal governance processes had strong outcomes for building citizenship and

increasing state responsiveness to citizens while also achieving greater political inclusion

in policy processes for citizens. Social movements and citizen involvement in formal

governance therefore had the biggest outcomes for state responsiveness and effective

cases are both dependent on a history of citizen mobilisation, so therefore were strongly

supported by associations. In weaker democracies, associations are very important for

citizenship building and processes of political learning, while social movements are less

common and often focus on a single issue e.g. elections. In stronger democracies, social

movements and participation in formal governance processes become more important

and social movements have a stronger focus on accountability and policy. There are no

linear processes of democratisation in particular contexts and citizen mobilisation

involves complex negotiation of alternative political authorities like clientelism .

Institutional solutions favour the ‘organised marginalised’ rather than marginalised

groups with poor links to civil society/ poor levels of self-organisation.

Cornwall, A. and Coelho, V. (2007) ‘Spaces for Change? The Politics of Citizen

Participation in New Democratic Arenas’, in Cornwall, A. and Coelho, V. (Eds) Spaces

for Change? The Politics of Citizen Participation in New Democratic Arenas London:

Zed Books

Abstract/Summary:

‘We seek to contextualize themes emerging from the case studies presented in this book

with regard to broader debates on the politics of participatory governance. We begin by

highlighting some of the promises of participation, and consider some of the complexities of

realizing them in practice. We go on to draw on the case studies presented in this book to

explore what they have to tell us about the multiple interfaces through which citizens engage

with the state and the new configurations of actors and practices of participation that animate

the participatory sphere, and what this implies for democratization and development.’ p.3-4


41

Methodology:

Analysis of key themes arising from the case-studies presented in the remaining chapters of

this edited book which cover a variety of interventions operating at different levels and

achieving mixed levels of effectiveness.

Key findings:

The authors suggest that maximising access to participatory governance spaces is

dependent on a ‘conjunction of enabling policies and legal frameworks, committed and

responsive bureaucrats, well-coordinated, articulate social actors and inclusive

institutional designs’ (22) but stress that it is rare to have all these factors in place

In Bangladesh and Angola, ‘ineffective, under-resourced and corrupt state structures

fracture the possibilities for responsiveness.’ While in India, South Africa and Brazil

where the state is relatively strong, ‘a fear of letting go of control, high levels of

bureaucratization and embedded aspects of political culture’ are key obstacles to

effective citizen participation.

An understanding of the history of state/society relations is key to any analysis of present

political opportunity.

In contexts where the state is under-resourced and there is widespread corruption, or

which can be described as paternal, neo-patrimonial or authoritarian, the authors stress

the importance of new political practices and the creation of new spaces for citizen

claims-making that enable citizenship building to occur

Alternative spaces become critical for citizen mobilisation in contexts with an absence of

political will or reform champions within government and political society.

Across the cases there are some key enabling factors: mobilized collective actors;

political will among state actors; institutional designs that tackle inequalities of resource-

base and capacity among participants and create meaningful opportunities for influence

over resource allocation and policy.

The authors present three areas of focus for designers of future participatory governance

endeavours: ‘catalysing and supporting processes of social mobilization through which

marginalized groups can nurture new leaders, enhance their political agency and seek

representation; instituting measures to address exclusionary elements within the

institutional structure of the participatory sphere’; and ‘articulating participatory sphere

institutions more effectively with other governance institutions, providing them with

resources as well as with political ‘teeth’ (24-25).

FOLSCHER, A. 2007. Appendix: A Primer on Effective Participation. In: SHAH, A. (ed.)

Participatory Budgeting Washington DC: The World Bank.


42

Abstract/Summary

‘Civic engagement in public affairs can increase state effectiveness. When citizens have the

opportunity to make their needs known and hold public institutions to account, it is argued,

public resources are likely to be used more efficiently and to deliver public goods and

services that are better aligned with citizens’ needs. Local communities have the best

knowledge of their needs and preferences and of local conditions. Public policy and

advocacy organisations outside of the state often give voice to needs and preferences that

are not heard in closed budget processes. Citizen participation in decision making reduces

the information gap between citizens and the state and makes it more likely that funds will be

used to deliver the most-needed goods and services, improving government effectiveness’

p. 243.

Methodology

Literature review

Main findings

The article identifies two broad categories of citizens’ participation in the budgeting process:

the first type is when citizens undertake initiatives to promote transparency of governments’

actions and accountability of state actors, without engaging in decision making of how

resources are allocated. The second set of initiatives involves citizens directly engaging in

the decision-making processes of public agencies. The article argues that the effectiveness

of both types of citizens’ participation depends on the following factors:

the openness and democratic depth of political and governance systems.

the existence of enabling legal frameworks, including guarantees of basic freedoms.

This also includes the legal basis of participatory initiatives – whether they are

granted real powers to make decisions.

the capacity for participation both inside and outside government. Within government,

participatory initiatives require human resources and systems – to plan, budget, and

manage the delivery of public goods. The article also argues that these initiatives

need CSOs with capacity to collect, analyse and disseminate information as well as

to mobilise citizens. Individual citizen capacity especially knowledge of their rights is

highlighted as key.

the existence of functional and free media institutions

the willingness and capacity of the state to make budget information available


43

Gaventa, J. and G. Barret (2010). So what difference does it make? Mapping the

outcomes of citizen engagement. IDS working paper 347. Brighton, Institute of

Development studies the University of Sussex.

Abstract/Summary:

‘In this paper, we report on a meta-case study analysis of a ten-year research programme on

citizenship, participation and accountability which analysed a nonrandomised sample of 100

research studies of four types of citizen engagement in 20 countries. By mapping the

observable effects of citizen participation through a close reading of these studies, we

created a typology of four democratic and developmental outcomes, including (a) the

construction of citizenship, (b) the strengthening of practices of participation, (c) the

strengthening of responsive and accountable states, and (d) the development of inclusive

and cohesive societies. We find that citizen participation produces positive effects across

these outcome types, though in each category there are also examples of negative

outcomes of citizen participation. We also find that these outcomes vary according to the

type of citizen engagement and to political context. These findings have important

implications for the design of and support for participatory programmes meant to improve

state responsiveness and effectiveness.’ (Extract: 3)

The most relevant section of the paper is chapter six which details how intervention strategy

and national political context shape the outcomes of citizen engagement.

Methodology:

Systematic review and meta-case study analysis of over 100 research studies of multiple

sites in 20 countries which analyse four types of citizen engagement: participation in local

associations; participation in social movements and campaigns; participation in formal

participatory governance spaces; and multiple approaches, which employ several of these

strategies. These forms of engagement were analysed for their effects on four kinds of

outcome: ‘construction of citizenship’; ‘practices of citizen participation’; ‘responsive and

accountable states’; and ‘inclusive and cohesive societies’.

Key findings:

Overall the authors find that associations and social movements have a much bigger

effect on development and democratic outcomes than recent donor discourse focused

on formal participatory mechanisms suggests. 44% of outcomes produced by multiple

strategies were concentrated in the ‘responsive and accountable states’ outcome

category which was supported by qualitative evidence from the case studies. Social

movements and campaigns also had a high number of positive outcomes within this

category.


44

The study highlights the lack of research focused on the interaction between context,

strategies and outcomes.

The findings contradict the assumption that ‘positive outcomes of engagement are linked

linearly to the level of democratisation in a given setting’ as the least and most

democratic contexts have a higher proportion of positive outcomes from citizen

engagement strategies than contexts which fall into their middle category of democratic

context. In contrast, strategies employed to gain democratic outcomes do vary widely

according to political context. In the least democratic contexts, local associations were

the dominant form of engagement; in middle tier contexts there was a fairly even

distribution; and in the most democratic contexts, social movements and formal

mechanisms were the most common strategies.

Goetz, A.M. and Gaventa, J. (2001) ‘Bringing citizen voice and client focus into service

delivery’. IDS working paper 138. Brighton, Institute of Development studies the

University of Sussex.

Abstract/Summary:

‘This paper examines over sixty case studies of both public sector reforms to foster stronger

client focus in service delivery; and civil-society initiatives to demand improved services. This

work was concerned to identify means of amplifying citizen ‘voice’ such that engagement

with the state moves beyond consultative processes to more direct forms of influence over

policy and spending decisions... The study concludes with policy-relevant findings on ways

of enhancing citizen voice in decision-making, planning, and monitoring of public services.

For citizen engagement with public service providers to move beyond consultation to real

influence, citizens must enjoy rights to a more meaningful form of participation. This would

include formal recognition for citizen’s groups, their right to information about government

decision-making and spending patterns, and rights to seek redress for poor-quality service

delivery. Public sector providers, for their part, need assurances regarding the mandate and

internal accountability of such groups.’

Methodology:

A synthesis of lessons arising from sixty case studies of public sector reforms or demand-

side initiatives.

Key findings:

These findings relate only to the demand-side or polity approaches reviewed in the paper.

Some generic contextual factors are found to shape the effectiveness of voice and client

focus initiatives. These are: the level of political competition and whether this creates

incentives for reform and accountability; citizen perceptions of participation and the roles


45

of citizens and state actors (citizens may prefer a focus on top-down solutions to

improving trusteeship within the public sector than bottom-up participation); patronage

systems which may undermine a drive for tackling internal accountability issues; the

strength of weakness of civil society. The authors find that institutional and bureaucratic

reform may be a pre-requisite for effective demand-side initiatives in states with low-

levels of democratisation

Institutional conditions that may increase the effectiveness of these interventions are

found to be: external and local monitoring systems and combined with pressure from

mobilised constituencies; legal standing or formal recognition for non-governmental

observers over policy-making or public service provision; a continuous presence for

observers throughout the process of the agency’s work; structured access to the flow of

official documentary information; observer/user rights to either issue dissenting reports

directly to legislative bodies, or demand formal investigation and/or seek legal redress for

poor or non-delivery of services; the presence of internal champions/reform

entrepreneurs; ‘vertical slice’ reforms i.e. that are followed through at all levels of the

agency; incentive systems rewarding participatory processes and client focus;

involvement of front-line workers in policy-making and planning service delivery; the

linking of incomes to performance; and investment in attitudinal change (but this must be

linked to changes in accountability mechanisms and performance incentives).

Service-specific factors that can shape level of effectiveness are: the level of service

complexity (lower technology services may be easier for citizens to engage with and

influence or co-deliver); the cost of services or service disruption to the client (which may

trigger greater client interest in influencing how fees are spent or collective action for

improved quality); the presence of a strong private market for the service (creating a

greater chance of ‘exit’ pressures for responsiveness); whether the service provides an

individual or a collective good (the latter being more likely to provoke collective action);

and whether the service is delivered face to face (thereby creating greater opportunity for

engagement on both sides)

Hossain, N. (2009). "The Local Politics of Public Action: Relationships, Bargains and

the Question of ‘Impact”." IDS Bulletin, 40(6), 87-98.

Abstract/Summary:

‘The concluding contribution to this IDS Bulletin draws together the themes and findings from

the eight country case studies. It reflects on the choice of the framing notion of ‘public action’

as distinct from a focus on ‘civil society’, as an alternative and more appropriate frame of

reference for the hybrid forms of change in local governance witnessed through these cases.


46

Three main wider contributions of the research are identified. First, as action research, some

of the cases offer fresh perspectives on processes of change, often from the valuable

perspectives of insiders or engaged practitioners. Second, the cases collectively provide

striking new insights into how relationships are built to bolster alliances, strike bargains, and

develop trust between actors engaged in local governance reform. Third, the article draws

together the case study findings to develop a working typology of the impacts of local

democratic governance reform on poverty, inequality and exclusion.’

Methodology:

Synthesis of lessons learned from 8 country case studies.

Key findings:

The synthesis emphasises the centrality of relationships negotiated between actors and

informal interactions and pressures over institutional forms or stated objectives or

intentions behind local governance reforms.

The findings suggest that a focus on informal, face-to-face strategies for accountability,

ongoing processes of negotiation and bargaining within state/citizen interactions and the

conflicting interests and pressures on local officials can provide useful lessons on

processes of change and may have been under-emphasised in the literature to date.

A number of facilitative factors for social accountability are raised including links between

local actors and larger policy networks; embeddedness and dependency of local civil

servants within and upon the communities they serve; alignment of interests between

administrative officials and local agents of accountability and the importance of informing

or consulting local administrative officials when engaging in social accountability

initiatives.

Social unrest is also found to be a potential driver of local government willingness to

engage in ‘new spaces’ and ‘negotiation’ with citizens/civil society.

Houtzager, P. P., and Joshi, A. (2007). "Introduction: Contours of a Research

Project and Early Findings." IDS Bulletin, 38(6), 1-9.

Abstract/Summary:

‘The study, which acquired the title ‘Modes of Service Delivery, Collective Action and Social

Accountability in Brazil, India, and Mexico’, henceforth BIM (for Brazil, India and Mexico),

therefore focuses on the potential of different types of state reform to enhance social

accountability rather than individual forms of accountability. The research traces changes in

the relations between collective agents (or actors) representing the poor, policymakers and

service providers in the areas of healthcare and social assistance. The study examines three


47

ideas. First, an idea which is gaining currency: that the participation of actors that represent

poor and underserved communities in policy negotiations and in direct accountability

relations with providers are critical to extending basic public services to those communities.

Second, the idea that derives from institutionalist analyses: that different types of institutional

reforms of public services will create distinct opportunities and barriers to participation in

policy and accountability. And third, the idea that emerged from the slow accretion of when

actors who represent poor and underserved communities have been a party to negotiating

reforms knowledge about network analysis: that local actors will be more likely to establish

relations of social accountability with service providers in their communities when they are

part of larger networks of actors who negotiate public policy. We agreed, finally, that the

study should also look at outcomes: does social accountability lead to better service

coverage and quality?’

Methodology:

Synthesis of early findings from the BIM research study (a series of country case-studies).

Key findings:

The synthesis identifies a number of cross-context enabling factors in relation to

collective actor strategies for social accountability: ‘institutional fit’ between the type and

level of collective action and the state’s decision making centres; moments of significant

state reform make this fit more likely; and the entry of civil society actors into state roles

can facilitate the formation of alliances across the public-private divide which are key to

effective social accountability endeavours.

The case studies also seem to contradict that claim that participation in both policy-

making and accountability institutions results in cooptation finding that these roles are

‘mutually reinforcing’.

The cases also stress the importance of ‘reformist public sector professionals’ to the

development of effective social accountability mechanisms.

LEE, T. & ODUGBEMI, S. 2011. How Can Citizens Be Helped to Hold Their

Governments Accountable? In: ODUGBEMI, S. & LEE, T. (eds.) Accountability

Through Public Opinion: From Inertia to Public Action. Washington D.C: The World

Bank.

Abstract/Summary

‘International development has… taken an accountability turn. But the turn remains

uncertain, and a sense of unreality still lingers regarding how to help citizens hold their

governments accountable. Now, although we do not and cannot claim to have all the

answers, many useful lessons can be drawn from the contributions to this volume. Our


48

intention, in this concluding chapter, is to draw out the insights without repeating what our

learned contributors have already said’ 415.

Methodology

The chapter synthesises the main lessons from the different articles in the volume.

Main findings

That ‘the macrolevel governance context’ is important. The chapter argues that

different accountability initiatives work in different contexts and thus policy makers

need to choose them depending on ‘whether a country is a functioning democracy,

an authoritarian state, or, as is often the case, something else in between’.

The chapter identifies key ‘structural essentials’ that are necessary to produce

accountability as:

- access to official information

- presence of civic activism

- independent media

- inflamed/activated public opinion

It is argued that absence of any of those structural elements makes it difficult for

citizens to hold public officials accountable. Where they do not exist, the chapter

suggests that policy makers can:

1. Support the transparency agenda through efforts and laws that give citizens

access to public information,

2. Support building of free, plural and independent media systems, and

3. Support the institutional strengthening of civil society.

McGee, R. & Gaventa, J. (2010) Review of Impact and Effectiveness of Transparency

and Accountability Initiatives: Synthesis Report Institute of Development Studies /

www.transparency-initiative.org

Abstract/Summary:

‘The scope of the research as established by the ToR is the accountability and transparency

of government decision-making and the delivery of public services, and five sectors are

prioritised: public service delivery (especially health and education); budget processes;

freedom of information; natural resource governance; and aid transparency. Our Terms of

Reference (ToR) set us the following key research questions:

http://www.transparency-initiative.org/


49

What strategies for engaging government actors and state institutions are most effective

in securing improvements in accountability and transparency?

Which structural and organisational features promote improvements in transparency and

accountability and under what conditions?

What are the key explanatory factors that shape the impact of specific transparency and

accountability interventions in various sectors?

Which indicators are most readily applicable in measuring the impact and monitor

progress in accountability and transparency initiatives?

What kind of evidence is available to support research findings and what methods have

been used to generate this evidence?

Our initial scan of the transparency and accountability (hereafter T&A) literature to date

revealed a large mass of very diverse literature, but almost no ‘meta-literature’ on issues of

impact and effectiveness of TAIs… This being the state of the evidence available, the clear

implications were (i) a need to re-calibrate some of the research questions, as well as (ii)

invert their order so as to proceed logically from describing and systematizing the available

evidence..., to drawing what conclusions the evidence does afford on analytical questions…

We thus re-framed the questions as follows:

What do we know about the impact and effectiveness of TAIs? How do we know it?

What are the approaches used and methodological challenges encountered?

What factors make a difference? What institutional and political factors shape the impact

of citizen-led initiatives for improving transparency and accountability?

What knowledge gaps are there for future research?’

Methodology:

Specialist researchers from UK, US, South Africa, Brazil and India, ‘scanned published and

unpublished literature and in some cases interviewed key informants’ (10).

Key findings:

Key political economic factors within a particular context affecting state responsiveness

were found to be the level of democratisation; level of political will; and the nature of

broader enabling legal frameworks, political incentives and sanctions.

Citizen voice factors were identified as: citizen and CSO capabilities for take up of T/A

Initiative opportunities; the degree to which T/A Initiatives interact with other mobilisation

and collective action strategies; engagement of citizens in the ‘upstream’ as well as

‘downstream’ stages of T/A Initiative processes (i.e. policy formulation as well as

implementation)

Factors linking state and society accountability mechanisms were: the importance of

combining demand-side pressure with access to strong sanctions for enforcement of


50

accountability ; and the importance of cross-sector collaboration ‘getting the right people

around the table’ from civil society, political society and the state.

The study also emphasises the need for analysts to think beyond the state-society model

by recognising the influence of actors that don’t fit into this dichotomy e.g. donors and

international institutions; the salience of informal as well as formal networks of

accountability; and the need to focus on linkages across scale and level, e.g. what works

at national level may be different to what works at local level but how can different

approaches be integrated into vertical lines of accountability?

McNeil, M., and Malena, C. (2010). "Demand for Good Governance: Lessons from

Social Accountability Initiatives in Africa". The World Bank: Washington DC.

Abstract/Summary:

‘This volume is written primarily by and for social accountability practitioners. Case study

chapters are authored by civil society and government practitioners who describe their first

hand experiences in designing, promoting, and applying social accountability strategies in

the African context. The authors share the growing conviction that enhanced social

accountability is fundamental to achieving good governance and development in Africa.

These practical experiences demonstrate that social accountability approaches have the

potential to bring important benefits to African citizens and governments, but that such

approaches also face significant challenges and require a demanding mix of technical

expertise, outreach, and sustained commitment to overcome obstacles. The book seeks

answers to the following questions:

What kind of social accountability initiatives are being pursued in Sub-Saharan Africa?

What are these accountability initiatives achieving?

What obstacles do these initiatives face?

What factors are critical to the initiatives’ success?

What can be done to promote social accountability in Africa?’

Methodology:

Comparative analysis of seven case studies selected from a wider group of sixty studies

from two multi-country social accountability ‘stock taking exercises’ commissioned by the

World Bank. Selections were made on the basis of the results and lessons offered, variety of

approach, strategy and objective and to ensure a range of political, social, cultural, and

organizational contexts. Although the study claims to have selected cases on the basis of

variety of approach all the initiatives presented are related to budget monitoring and

expenditure tracking.

Key findings:


51

The concluding synthesis chapter identifies three strands of contextual factors that shape

social accountability outcomes in the cases compared. These are ‘political context,

culture, and will’; ‘legal and policy frameworks’; and ‘socio-cultural and economic factors’.

These are summarised as follows:

‘Opportunities for social accountability initiatives are clearly greater where the political

regime is democratic, the rule of law is respected, power is decentralized, and basic

political and civil rights (such as access to information and freedom of expression,

association, and assembly) are guaranteed. The initiatives’ success often depends on

the “political will” of leaders, defined as their willingness to commit to certain actions over

time.’

‘Promoting or requiring public access to information, consultation, and citizen

participation and oversight can also be essential to enabling and sustaining social

accountability.’

‘A country’s underlying socio-cultural and economic characteristics have an important

collective influence on factors such as citizens’ expectations of, and relations with, the

state; their willingness to question authority or speak out; and the capacity and means of

citizens and civil society leaders to organize and act.’

A series of challenges and success factors arising from the case studies are then

elaborated upon in relation to these key themes.

Menocal, A.R. and B. Sharma. 2008. Joint Evaluation of Citizens’ Voice and

Accountability. Synthesis Report. Overseas Development Institute. London: DFID.

Abstract/Summary:

‘The purpose of this evaluation is to deepen understanding of what works and what does not

work in donor support to CV&A interventions, and to uncover the reasons why. In the first

phase of the evaluation, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) prepared a literature

review, conducted an analysis of 90 CV&A donor interventions, developed an Evaluation

Framework to assess CV&A interventions and piloted the Framework and its accompanying

methodology in two countries, Benin and Nicaragua. In the second phase, ECG donors

commissioned five country case studies in Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of the

Congo (DRC), Indonesia, Mozambique and Nepal, from other independent organisations.

This synthesis report pulls together the findings of all the outputs from this evaluation and

seeks to identify common themes and lessons, core principles and key recommendations for

improved donor practice, and areas worthy of further research.’

Methodology:


52

As detailed above.

Key findings:

Key findings are presented on page v. The study finds that context awareness has not

been enough to tackle ‘key challenges posed by the interaction between formal and

informal institutions, the prevalence of the latter over the former in many instances, and

underlying power relations and dynamics.’

Positive impact has ‘remained limited and isolated, and have so far proven difficult to

scale up.’

‘Donor expectations about what such work can achieve are too high, and are based on

misguided assumptions around the nature of voice and accountability and the linkages

between the two’

‘There is a tension between the long-term processes of transforming state-society

relations and donors’ needs/desires to produce quick results’.

‘Scaling up and sustainability are...not currently sufficiently addressed within intervention

design and implementation.’

Newell, P. and J. Wheeler (2006) ‘Rights, Resources and the Politics of Accountability:

An Introduction’, in Newell, P. and J. Wheeler, eds. (2006). Rights, Resources and the

Politics of Accountability. London: Zed Books

Abstract/Summary:

‘Many conflicts in development can be understood as struggles by the poor to hold the

powerful to account. Contests over the rights and responsibilities of actors in development

are increasing in intensity amid clashes between the promotion of a rights-based approach

to development and market-based notions of access and entitlement to resources. How

these conflicts are played out has enormous implications for efforts to tackle poverty and

achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Understanding how the poor claim their rights

and demand accountability for the realisation of those rights becomes critical. This book

contributes to such an understanding by exploring how poorer groups mobilise around rights

to resources in a diversity of settings, employing a broad range of strategies to achieve

accountability. It places accountability at the intersection between rights and resources,

asking: what is the relationship between greater accountability and people’s ability to claim

their rights to resources? Struggles over key livelihood resources such as health, housing

and labour, as well as natural resources such as water and oil, provide the backdrop to an

enquiry into the ways in which poorer groups hold powerful state, corporate and civil society

actors to account. (Extract: 1)


53

Methodology:

Introductory chapter synthesising key themes from a collection of ten case studies of citizen

mobilisation for rights, resources or accountability arising from the ‘Rights and

Accountabilities’ programme of the Development Research Centre on Citizenship,

Participation and Accountability. Only four case studies in part one of the book are relevant

for the current study and the chapters are structured to answer the following questions: ‘does

the strategy used achieve greater accountability in relation to access to resources?; When

does it work? Under what conditions? (Historically, institutionally, economically, culturally?);

For whom does it work? Who benefits?; What are the implications for contemporary debates

about accountability in development?’ (4).

Key findings (themes):

Rights are not de facto accountability tools they have to be claimed, legal frameworks

are not always accessible to the poor who have to access rights through less formal

negotiations and mobilisations, and competition over resources is often tied up with

conflicting rights claims e.g. livelihood vs environmental clashes

Accountability challenges differ according to the resource in question e.g. in terms of

access, process and redress

Institutional complexity of shifting actors and interests involved in a struggle can

undermine progress

Legal traditions and institutions can shape strategies e.g. in terms of how accessible they

are, how coherent or independent they are

Institutional reforms are not enough to secure rights for the poor, they have to be

translated into lived realities in ways that overcome social inequalities

Cultural understandings of accountability are also key to shaping what strategies will be

effective e.g. is there a consciousness of power relations? How are notions of

accountability manifested in local cultures and practices?

Advances in claiming rights and securing accountability are non-linear and it is important

to consider set-backs as well as gains, and issues of tractability of changes achieved.

The interaction between formal and informal strategies for accountability can be a key

success factor

Non-engagement in accountability spaces can be a form of accountability in terms of

contesting the terms of participation, inclusion or process.


54

PUBLIC AFFAIRS FOUNDATION, SIRKER, K. & COSIC, S. 2007. Empowering the

Marginalized: Case Studies of Social Accountability Initiatives in Asia. Washington,

D.C.: World Bank Institute.

Abstract/Summary:

‘Empowering the Marginalized reveals the power of demand-side approaches in enhancing

governance through the concepts of citizens’ voice, accountability, and responsiveness. It

seeks to provide lessons on the establishment of social accountability mechanisms, thereby

empowering the marginalized, who represent a majority of society not only in Asian

countries, but in most developing countries worldwide. Since most of the projects

documented in the case studies are fairly recent, the studies offer valuable practical lessons

on program design and operation, establishment of partnerships and networks, and project

management… the cases are organized under the four broad thematic heads described

below, but note that these are not rigid categories and that many initiatives cut across the

thematic boundaries:

Undertaking informed budget advocacy.

Engaging and empowering communities for service improvements.

Monitoring by public watchdogs.

Other initiatives’ (Extract: vii).

Methodology:

Synthesis paper on lessons learned from analysis of 13 case studies. Selection criteria

included: representing a wide spectrum of motivating factors; a range of agents -

governments, the World Bank, NGOs / CSOs; interventions covering a wide geographic area

within their region; innovative concepts and tools; successful in achieving their objectives.

Key findings:

The paper outlines the following ‘enabling factors’ which shaped the largely positive

outcomes from the cases reviewed: state and community partnership/cooperation;

access to empowering information; presence of local/internal champions; gaining political

buy-in; focusing on local capacity building for ownership and sustainability of initiatives.

Key contextual factors which placed limitations on the outcomes achieved were: low

levels of access to information and political opposition; culture of protection among state

actors e.g. unwillingness to investigate corruption; no history of mobilisation around

financial information meaning a lack of capacity, relationships and alliances; reprisals on

activists; low numbers of women legislators meaning a lack of champions for gender-

based reforms; interference of patronage networks in the allocation of resources; poor


55

levels of confidence at national level in local level bureaucrats capacity to manage large

scale resources and lack of political will to build their capacity to do so; lack of

awareness, engagement, interest in local governance systems among communities

partly attributed to socio-economic gap and corresponding social ties between providers

and users, and low levels of education in some areas. Correspondingly low levels of

collective action; centralization of government structures and resources and associated

lack of avenues for interaction between citizens and government officials in some

contexts; lack of enabling legislation such as right to information laws; lack of training for

government officials / politicians in how to facilitate participatory processes or

accountability processes like monitoring.

A number of constraining intervention-based factors are also recounted: poor partnership

working and alliances across different CSOs or between CSOs and government both

within area of intervention and nationally/internationally in that region; challenges of

scaling up leaving civil society efforts as ‘a drop in the ocean’ again linked to constraints

of donor funding; low levels of faith in chance of success of initiatives leading to low

levels of participation – the need for short-term wins as well as longer term processes of

change; weak links with grassroots groups and communities and inability to challenge

local power relations to engage poorest/most excluded especially women; difficulties

building alliances with socio-political movements – sometimes poorly organised or single

issue or lack of strong political competition; and limits to organisational capacity in terms

of skills and experience and uncertain or project-based rather than programme/agenda

based resources from donors (skills for research, skills in translating complex

policy/budget information, capacity and confidence building skills for overcoming socio-

cultural barriers to using information for advocacy; capacity to translate research

evidence into effective advocacy).

Ringold, D., Holla, A., Koziol, M., and Srinivasan, S. (2012). Citizens and Service

Delivery: Assessing the Use of Social Accountability Approaches in Human

Development, Washington D.C.: World Bank.

Abstract/Summary:

‘Donors, governments, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have been

experimenting with various social accountability tools that aim to inform citizens and

communities about their rights, the standards of service delivery they should expect, and

actual performance. They also aim to facilitate access to formal redress mechanisms to deal

with service failures. But what is known about how these approaches actually work in

practice? Can giving people information and opportunities to use that information actually


56

improve service delivery? And what are the implications for development agencies such as

the World Bank? The objective of this book is to explore what is currently known about the

opportunities and limitations of these types of social accountability approaches in the HD

sectors. The book reviews how citizens, individually and collectively, can influence service

delivery through access to information and through the opportunities to use it to hold

providers—both frontline service providers and program managers—accountable’ (Extract:

2).

Methodology:

A literature review of information-based strategies for social accountability, with a focus on

evaluations of World Bank social accountability initiatives.

Key findings:

Findings are mixed and highlight a number of contextual and intervention-design factors

that must be taken into consideration when thinking about how to make social

accountability interventions effective. At the most basic level, it is fundamental to

consider whether political will exists among government actors and service providers for

the intervention, and whether they will assume ownership of it. If not, implementation

may be slow and require additional technical assistance and support. Availability of data

(and the ability to generate data) is another important precondition. Investment of

sufficient resources to properly staff and manage the social accountability mechanisms is

also critical.

Social audits and scorecards rely on CSOs for implementation and on local government

officials or program officers to facilitate relationships between citizens and providers and

to monitor follow-up actions. Employing social accountability mechanisms as isolated

strategies is likely to be ineffective, a combination of strategies is preferable.

Mechanisms also need to be sensitive to language and culture, and consider how to

overcome social inequalities and hierarchies that will make citizens reluctant to challenge

providers over performance issues.

Finally, the existence and strength of civil society and an independent media are

influential success factors.

ROWLANDS, J. 2009. The right to be heard: an overview. In: VAN DER GAAG, N. &

ROWLANDS, J. (eds.) Speaking Out: Case studies on how poor people infl uence

decision-making. Oxford: Oxfam GB.

Abstract/Summary:

‘This book draws on Oxfam GB’s global programme of work on the theme of ‘the right to be

heard’. The focus of the chapters is on how the right to be heard can strengthen the


57

participation of people in poverty in formulating public policy, and enable them to hold

decision-makers accountable… The right to be heard is about the right to be an active

participant in political processes; it is about being able to speak up and be listened to by

those in power. Put a different way, it is about enabling people to actively draw on their

civil and political rights to achieve their social, economic, and cultural rights. It is about

finding ways to ensure that governance structures are responsive to the needs and wishes

of poor people. This book touches on some elements of how this can be achieved… The

case studies described in these chapters attempt to show how poor and marginalized people

can become powerful enough to break through the material, organizational, systemic, and

psychological barriers and obstacles that prevent them from being heard’ (Extract: 1-2).

Methodology:

A synthesis chapter drawing out key lessons from the book’s 11 case studies.

Key findings:

The findings are more intervention-focused than context focused and this chapter

summarises a number of key lessons. Legal citizenship does not equate to the attainment of

full citizenship rights; developing self-confidence and belief is key to being able to claim

rights; collective action is much more effective than individual action; access to information is

essential to making rights a reality; for lasting change there must be political will within

government; analysis of the attitudes and beliefs of different stakeholders that need to be

engaged in a process of change is critical to success; multi-level, cross-sector alliances are

key as is the use of multiple strategies for influence; bringing people face to face has proven

to be an effective strategy for influence; language matters – ideas must be communicated in

a language that people understand and want to respond to.

Sarker, A. E., and Hassan, M. K. (2010). "Civic Engagement And Public Accountability:

An Analysis With Particular Reference to Developing Countries." Public

Administration and Management, 15(2), 381-417.

Abstract/Summary:

‘The role of civic engagement in ensuring public accountability has become a catchword in

recent years. Over the years, there has been dissatisfaction with formal state mechanisms

as well as newly introduced market mechanisms. Now there is a consensus that social

accountability mechanisms based on civic engagement can hold public officials accountable

by complementing state accountability mechanisms. However, there are a number of

contextual factors facilitating as well as inhibiting the effectiveness of social accountability.

This paper intends to (a) explore and analyze cross-cultural evidence of social accountability


58

in the developing world and (b) evaluate the claims of the advocates of social accountability

in view of the socio-economic and political dynamics.’

Methodology:

Synthesis paper of findings from 8 empirical studies of accountability initiatives in Africa,

Asia, and Latin America with 7 out of 8 studies reporting positive effects.

Key findings:

All 8 studies had either ‘encouragement’ or ‘strong backing’ from the state and the study

lists a number of success factors by intervention: For participatory budgeting initiatives:

donor interest and the active presence of the donor agency; the small scale of the

intervention; and an incentive structure (for Sirajgong, Bangladesh); or in the case of

Brazil, political mobilization and a vibrant civil society. For a participatory land distribution

service in Bangladesh: the presence of pro-poor NGOs and donor pressure. For two

anti-corruption initiatives in India: a vibrant civil society; a supportive political and policy

environment including right to information; champions within the state/a reformist

bureaucracy; executive responsiveness. For a citizen report card initiative in Bangalore:

a vibrant civil society; supportive political environment; champions within the state and a

reformist bureaucracy. For participatory governance of an HIV/AIDs initiative: strong

social capital among the community groups involved was a key factor.

Overall the authors stress the importance of strengthening state and political institutions

for accountability and the fact that civil society mobilization works best alongside

functioning state institutions.

TEMBO, F. 2012. Citizen voice and state accountability: Towards theories of change

that embrace contextual dynamics. Working Paper 343. London: Overseas

Development Institute (ODI).

Abstract/Summary:

‘This Working Paper provides a critical analysis of a series of citizen voice and accountability

(CV&A) cases from the Mwananchi Governance and Transparency Fund (GTF) programme

in order to develop some patterns of observation and thought lines which, when put together,

form an analytical framework for developing theories of change (ToCs) for CV&A projects.’

The cases are based in the following African countries: Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Sierra

Leone, Uganda, and Zambia.

Methodology:

A synthesis and policy paper.


59

Key findings:

It is not possible to draw up theories of change for voice and accountability initiatives that

can be applied across different contexts, they have to emerge from the particular

initiative in the particular area of operation.

Analysis of a number of key contextual factors which are significant across the countries

examined here will aid the development of particular theories of change however. These

include: the different types of platforms and mechanisms through which state and

citizens interact and how accessible these are to different kinds of citizen; the incentives

and interests acting on both citizen and state actors ; the ‘prevailing forms of citizenship’

and language used to frame citizenship that shape interests and incentives; cultural

practices; the type of national political regime.

The report notes that citizen voice is’ rooted in social norms such as ‘respect for elders’’,

hence policy makers need to identify which ones might support or hinder demand for

accountability.

The report observed that ‘in neo-patrimonial governance contexts, citizens’ actions per

se might not lead to significant changes to the prevailing rules of game to enable and

sustain the desired V&A outcomes and impacts’.

This calls for identifying interlocutors (individuals, organisations or groups of

organisations) within civil society, private sector or inside the state ‘that work with or

alongside ordinary citizens in engaging with state actors at various citizen– state

interfaces’.

The report observes difficulties of sustainability associated with civil society brokering of

citizen–state interfaces due to their reliance on project funding.

THOMPSON, L. 2007. Introduction. In: THOMPSO, L. (ed.) Participatory Governance?

Citizens and the State in South Africa. Western Cape: African Centre for Citizenship

and Democracy.

Abstract/Summary:

‘This book presents, in a distilled form, some of the major findings of the research

undertaken by the South African team, based at the Centre for Citizenship and Democracy

at the School of Government, UWC. It raises certain key issues and dilemmas around

participatory governance processes in South Africa, including the ways in which we

understand these processes themselves. The ways in which we understand citizenship and

the rights of the citizen in participatory processes is a key theme. In particular, the book


60

draws out some of the policy implications of problems encountered in implementing the

notion of participatory democratic government in South Africa.’

Methodology:

A synthesis chapter drawing out key themes from the book’s five cases-studies

Key findings:

Cross-cutting conditions for effective participation are summarised as: the need for

citizens to see concrete results from their participation; the need for leadership from

NGOs; tolerance of dissent within participatory spaces from government actors; political

will for capacity building with communities to enable more effective participation; and

acceptance of the need for and commitment to dialogue with social activist type

organisations on the part of government.

Robins case of a men’s HIV/AIDs support group which has eschewed both participation

in invited governance spaces and confrontational social movement strategies highlights

the key role that local associations play in citizenship and social-identity building as a

necessary pre-condition to effective participation in other structures and strategies

Williams highlights the limitations of participation in health facility boards focusing on how

power relations, the exclusion of local communities and privileging of elites preserve and

legitimise the status quo.

Von Lieres highlights the failure of the state to create new institutionalised spaces for

poor citizens, but that social movement activity like that of the Treatment Action

Campaign (TAC) has given meaning to participation but only in some sectors with land

rights still not realised for the poor. TAC’s success is linked to their ‘powerful network of

social actors mobilising at the local and global levels’ (5).

Tapscott draws attention to public frustration at the failure of municipal councils to put

participatory governance into practice, and the gap between civic and state

conceptualisations of citizenship; and suggests ‘multiple layers of participation, starting

at community level, are needed over a prolonged period to sustain more formal

processes of participation’ (6).

Thompson details how government interests have dominated participatory spaces

around water policy, by constricting the space for discussion of alternatives, and treating

participation as an exercise in legitimisation of a pre-existing strategic direction.’

Unsworth (2010) An Upside Down View of Governance Centre for the Future State

UNSWORTH, S. 2010. An Upside Down View of Governance, Brighton, Center for the

future state, Institute of Development Studies.


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Abstract/Summary:

‘This paper draws together findings from a five-year research programme by the Centre for

the Future State. It explores in an open-minded way how elements of public authority are

being created through complex processes of bargaining between state and society actors,

and the interaction of formal and informal institutions. …the research suggests a list of

questions that seem particularly salient in understanding causes of bad governance and

identifying ways of supporting more constructive bargaining between public and private

actors. They are likely to be relevant in a great variety of circumstances. What is shaping the

interests of political elites? (Sources of revenue are likely to be critical.) What is shaping

relations between politicians and investors, and might they have common interests in

supporting productive investment? What might stimulate and sustain collective action by

social groups to demand better services? What informal local institutions are at work, and

how are they shaping development outcomes? Where does government get its revenue

from, and how is that shaping its relationships with citizens?’ (Extract: 7).

Methodology:

Chapter four is the most relevant for the present study entitled ‘Mobilising for better public

services’. It is based on the research component of the CFS that explored three in-depth

cases of successful reforms of public services that are now contributing to large-scale

poverty reduction – the universal provision of healthcare and conditional cash transfers in

Brazil, and the passage of Right to Information legislation in India and its use to monitor the

Public Distribution System (PDS). A fourth case looked at major reforms that changed

approaches to women’s reproductive health in India.

Key findings:

Individually-focused mechanisms such as complaints systems, citizen charters, are of

little help to categories of poor with no access to services in the first places, or who are

too vulnerable to make challenges that could provoke reprisals

Service delivery design/models can shape collective action by the poor, but not always in

a negative direction. The research suggests that participation in formal spaces does not

always lead to a loss of autonomy for civil society actors and groups with strong ties to

the state and political parties were often more effective at giving poor people a voice.

The health sector tends to have higher levels of social accountability than other social

services because there are lots of points of interaction between citizens and state

providers; programmes like cash transfers have fewer physical or institutional points of

contact that people can mobilize around.


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Broad-based, cross-sector alliances (and in the case of the Right to Information

movement in India particularly cross-class and caste) were critical to all successful cases

of citizen influence/engagement.

Where citizen groups lack the power of formal sanctions, public challenges to individual

reputations can be an effective alternative mechanisms and can trigger formal

mechanisms like judicial processes

Local associations are particularly key for poor and minority groups because they can act

as the link to public officials and service providers.


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3.2 Transparency initiatives

3.2.1 African Transparency initiatives

HUBBARD, P. 2007. Putting the Power of Transparency in Context: Information’s Role

in Reducing Corruption in Uganda’s Education Sector. Working Paper Number 136.

Center for Global Development.

Abstract/summary:

‘One of the popular stories told (and taught) in development circles is how corruption was

slashed in Uganda simply by publishing the amount of monthly grants to schools. This paper

takes a deeper look at the facts behind the Uganda story and finds that while information did

indeed play a critical role, the story is much more complicated than we have been led to

believe. A dramatic drop did occur in the percentage of funds being diverted from Uganda’s

capitation grant. But to attribute this leakage solely to the monthly release of grant data by

the government risks ignoring the major funding in which this transparency campaign was

imbedded.’

Although this is a supply-side intervention and therefore beyond the scope of this study, the

findings refute certain claims about information campaigns within the social accountability

literature that are relevant to discussions about polity and demand-side approaches.

Intervention type:

State information-campaign

National level

Mixed effectiveness

Methodology:

The article reviews empirical and policy literature to question the validity of the claim by

Reinikka and Svensson (2004) that the state publication of information about capitation

grants to schools was the most significant factor in a reduction in leakage of funds out of the

primary education sector in Uganda.

Key findings:

Hubbard finds that information played a key role but that other factors were just as, if not

more important to the reduction in corruption. These include the restructuring of

capitation grants from block grants to conditional grants, the introduction of universal

primary education which removed school fees making the capitation grant a more

important component of education funding, and the widespread attention on UPE

resulting from political campaigning.


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KEEFER, P. & KHEMANI, S. 2011. Mass Media and Public Services The Effects of

Radio Access on Public Education in Benin. Policy Research Working Paper 5559.

Washington DC: The World Bank.

Abstract/Summary:

‘Does radio access improve public service provision? And if so, does it do so by increasing

government accountability to citizens, or by persuading households to take advantage of

publicly-provided services? Prior research has argued that citizens with greater access to

mass media receive greater benefits from targeted government welfare programs, but has

not addressed these questions for public services such as in education and health. Using

unique data from Benin, this paper finds that literacy rates among school children are higher

in villages exposed to signals from a larger number of community radio stations. The effect is

identified based on a “natural experiment” in the northern communes of Benin where within-

commune variation in village access to radio stations is exogenous to observed and

unobserved village characteristics. In contrast to prior research, the authors find that this

media effect does not operate through government accountability: government inputs into

village schools and household knowledge of government education policies are no different

in villages with greater access to community radio. Instead, households with greater access

are more likely to make financial investments in the education of their children.’

Methodology:

Analysis of data from a survey of over 4,000 households and 210 villages, spread across 32

of the 77 communes in Benin, and a literacy test for 2,100 children in second grade (on

average, eight to nine years old) in village schools. Sample villages include natural variations

in access to community radio. Data generated information on learning among children,

school inputs and PTA activities in village public schools, and on household education

investments.

Key findings:

Correlations were found between radio access and literacy, and household education

investments but there were no correlations with PTA activity, school inputs, or levels of

awareness about education policies suggesting that access to radio in and of itself has

no or little impact on social accountability.


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Another paper on the same study (Keefer and Khemani, 2012)3, also finds that access to

radio does not result in a greater ability among citizens to claim benefits from government

programs.

REINIKKA, R. & SVENSSON, J. 2011. The power of information in public services:

Evidence from education in Uganda. Journal of Public Economics, 95, 956-966.

Abstract/Summary:

‘In this paper we argue that innovations in governance of social services are an effective way

to improve outcomes such as attainment of universal primary education. To test this

hypothesis we exploit an unusual policy experiment: a newspaper campaign in Uganda

aimed at reducing the capture of public funds by providing schools (parents) with systematic

information to monitor local officials' handling of a large education grant program. Combining

survey and administrative data, we show that public access to information can be a powerful

deterrent to the capture of funds at the local level and that the reduction in the capture of

funds that resulted had a positive effect on school enrolment and learning outcomes.’

Intervention type:

Information campaign and community monitoring

National and facility level

Effective

Methodology:

The conclusions drawn here have been questioned by Hubbard (2007) and building on

Hubbard’s arguments, also by Booth (2011). The authors explain the methodology employed

as follows: ‘Using the survey data and administrative data from the Ugandan Ministry of

Education, we link school enrolment and average primary leaving exam scores with data on

the capture of funds and distance to the nearest newspaper outlet.’

Key findings:

The principle finding is expressed as follows: ‘Exploiting variation over time (before and

after the newspaper campaign was initiated) and across space (distance to a newspaper

outlet), we find that public access to information can be a powerful deterrent to the

3 Keefer and Khemani (2012) ‘Do Informed Citizens Receive More…or Pay More? The Impact of

Radio on the Government Distribution of Public Health Benefits’, Policy Research Working Paper 5952, World Bank


66

capture of funds at the local level and that the reduction in the capture of funds was

associated with an increase in enrolment’ (956).

Key enabling contextual factors raised are the history of parent mobilisation around

education and the value households place on education over other social services in

Uganda; and the introduction of universal primary education alongside widespread

political campaigning on the policy resulting in high levels of public awareness about

primary education issues.

WILD, L. & HARRIS, D. 2012. The political economy of community scorecards in

Malawi. London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI).

Abstract/summary:

‘Citizen-driven accountability measures, such as community scorecards, are increasingly

being implemented to complement and reinforce conventional mechanisms of accountability

such as political checks and balances or accounting and auditing systems (Joshi 2010).4

While they have been supported and promoted by the international community (including the

World Bank and, more recently, bilateral donors such as DFID), there is still a limited

evidence base for how scorecards have worked in practice and regarding what sorts of pre-

conditions need to be in place for them to be effective (Joshi 2010). This research,

supported by Plan, seeks to contribute to this evidence base, using political economy

methods to understand how community scorecards have worked in Malawi and what some

of the wider lessons might be. We find that the scorecards programme is realising changes

in service delivery in a number of ways. In particular, they have helped to facilitate forms of

collective problem solving by actors across the supply and demand side and reignited

communities’ own capacity for self help. This helps to shed new light on an initiative more

commonly associated with citizens’ demand and empowerment, and suggests they refocus

these tools on the extent to which they can help build links between state and society

actors.’

Intervention type:

Community scorecards

District (Local Government) and facility level

Effective

Methodology:

4 Joshi, A (2010) Review of Impact and Effectiveness of Transparency and Accountability

Initiatives: Annex 1 – Service Delivery, Prepared for the Transparency and Accountability Initiative Workshop, Oct 14-15, Institute for Development Studies.


67

Analysis of a single case intervention. The findings are based on a review of academic and

programme literature, over 30 qualitative key informant interviews over a two week period

with an emphasis on programme staff, and were generated in two fieldwork sites (two out of

the programme’s eight pilot districts) and focused on two sectors (agriculture and education).

Key findings:

Economic crises, political tensions and increasing centralisation of power in Malawi are

creating a constrained environment for effective service delivery

Despite this context, the citizen score card initiative has brought significant

improvements in relation to local level accountability

Scaling up changes to systemic and national levels is still a challenge

Aspects of the programme that have encouraged collaborative working across state and

civil society actors and local problem solving are the most promising

In a constrained context like Malawi, it is important to place emphasis on community self-

help as well as the state as duty-bearer

The quality of leadership and the capacities of implementing partners in terms of political

skills and networks at different leadership levels from local to district to national are key

enabling factors

3.2.2 Asian Transparency initiatives

AIYAR, Y. 2010. Invited Spaces, Invited Participation: Effects of Greater Participation

on Accountability in Service Delivery. India Review, 9, 204-229.

Abstract/summary:

‘India too has witnessed a slew of reforms aimed at carving institutionalized spaces for

citizens to participate... Despite this profusion and diversity of invitations, many questions

regarding how these spaces actually work in practice remain: Who participates and how?

Does simply creating new spaces bring about meaningful participation? And, perhaps most

crucially, can participation improve accountability for service delivery? This article is an effort

to contribute to the small but growing body of work that addresses these questions. Through

an analytical review of India’s participatory landscape, and by drawing on existing empirical

research as well as new research on citizen participation, this article analyzes the

effectiveness of and further potential for invited spaces to enhance accountability for service

delivery. Through this review, some preliminary thoughts on lessons learnt and measures to

strengthen these spaces are also offered. Finally, in lieu of a conclusion, this article

highlights some of the bigger questions, concerns and risks that the new emphasis on


68

participation comes with and argues for the need for more research to understand the

implications of these new approaches.’

Intervention type:

Social audits

State-level

Effective

Methodology:

Literature review of empirical research on citizen participation with particular emphasis on

social audits.

Key findings:

The key findings relate to research into social audits of the National Rural Employment

Guarantee Act (NREGA) in Andhra Pradesh, India as detailed in the next reference entry

Aiyah and Samji (2009). They contrast with findings by Banerjee et al (2008) and

Shankar et al (2010) who find social audits to be an ineffective accountability

mechanism. Here, the author finds that social audits of the NREGA scheme have

increased awareness about the scheme among villagers and particularly disadvantaged

groups like women and members of scheduled castes, improved implementation, and

labourers found them an effective process for grievance redressal.

Enabling factors for participatory interventions like social audits in India are:

decentralisation has opened up spaces for deliberation that have encouraged the

formation of associations by poorer groups of citizens which is contributing to an

incremental process of citizenship building; right to information legislation supported the

development of the audits, but this framework also needs to have practical enforceable

aspects to it rather than just giving people rights by law; government partnership with

civil society for community mobilisation; the presence of an activist state; access to non-

technical information for lay people

Constraining factors include the hindrance of elite capture of social audits –including

cooptation of the auditors themselves - and poor follow up; elite dominance of Indian civil

society; and the obstruction of the social audit process by local politicians outside Andhra

Pradesh, suggesting the importance of political will to intervention effectiveness.

AIYAR, Y. & SAMJI, S. 2009. Transparency and Accountability in NREGA: A Case

Study of Andhra Pradesh. AI Working Paper No. 1. New Dehli: Accountability

Initiative.


69

Abstract/summary:

‘This paper documents the Andhra Pradesh experience of institutionalizing social audits into

the implementation of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, and uses it to analyze

the social audit process. It draws on empirical work aimed at measuring the effectiveness of

social audits conducted in Andhra Pradesh between March and December 2007.’

Intervention type:

Social audits

State level

Effective

Methodology:

This is a single case study which draws on empirical work aimed at measuring the

effectiveness of social audits conducted in the state of Andhra Pradesh between March and

December 2007. No further information is supplied as to the methodology applied to the

study.

Key findings:

The social audit approach resulted in significantly increased awareness about NREGA

among local communities; significant improvements in implementation processes;

provided an avenue for grievance redressal and strengthened the ability of participants in

the scheme to interact with government officials.

A key enabling factor was political will within the state government to open itself up for

scrutiny and proactively mobilize citizens to monitor its programmes.

Partnership working between the state government and civil society organisations like

the MKSS from planning through to implementation has also facilitated effective

mobilisation and protected against cooptation of participants.

In conclusion, the study finds that social audits are most effective when they are

conducted regularly; have inbuilt feedback mechanisms; are undertaken in partnership

with the state to ensure grievance redressal.

GOETZ, A. M. & JENKINS, R. 2001. Hybrid Forms Of Accountability: Citizen

engagement in institutions of public-sector oversight in India. Public Management

Review, 3, 363-383.

Abstract/summary:


70

‘The public sector institutions which are responsible for monitoring government performance

are not normally open to citizen participation. Yet there is widespread dissatisfaction with the

capacities of states to exercise self restraining functions effectively, and a growing interest

amongst citizens to inform, monitor, or participate directly in the workings of these oversight

institutions. This paper examines two citizen initiated efforts in India to engage with public

sector oversight functions. In one case, citizens attempted to engage with administrative

accountability institutions (monitoring efficiency and quality in the food subsidy system), and

in the second, citizens challenged official auditing systems in local government by producing

parallel accounts of local spending which contradicted official versions. Both cases involved

citizens breaking away from the ‘vertical’ channels of accountability traditionally open to civil

society (lobbying, voting), and insinuating themselves to previously closed ‘horizontal’

accountability functions (the state’s internal procedures for administrative review or financial

auditing). We argue that for such ‘hybrid’ forms of accountability to be effective, it is

important that citizens be given legal standing within institutions of public sector oversight, a

continuous presence within the oversight agency’s work, structured access to official

documentary information, including spending records, and the right to issue dissenting

perspectives directly to legislative bodies.’

Intervention type:

NGO-led citizen auditing and monitoring of state practices and expenditures

Village / local level

Effective

Methodology:

An analysis of two cases of NGO-led auditing and monitoring of government in India, namely

RKS in Maharashtra state and MKSS in Rajasthan state. No methodology information is

provided.

Key findings:

The paper suggests that efforts to engage in horizontal accountability functions will be

most effective when carried out in collaboration with the state.

Five conditions ‘for effective state–citizen co-operation for improved accountability’ are

summarised as:

1. Legal standing for non-government participants,

2. regular presence of these outsiders,

3. clear procedures for meetings,

4. the right to information and


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5. the right for outsiders to issue a dissenting report to legislative bodies.

A number of key enabling and constraining factors can also be drawn out of the analysis.

These sorts of confrontational strategies have a high risk of reprisals for citizen

participants especially the poor; state-led participatory initiatives may simply be attempts

to ‘pre-empt the emergence of new forms of citizen engagement’ which are typically

unproductive and lack any authority for decision-making or enforcement of answerability

or sanctions on the part of public officials e.g. ‘citizens’ juries, consultative forums, focus

groups, citizens’ charters’; the presence of these state-led mechanisms ‘constrains the

ability of the more radical experiments launched by the people’s organizations to

proliferate more widely’.

The authors also stress that fact that some of these approaches may only be relevant to

local levels of engagement particularly if they are dependent on local knowledge and

accounts. Beyond this level, they may lose legitimacy and not provide a function that is

significantly different to the function of existing auditors.

PAUL, S. 2011. Stimulating Activism through Champions of Change. In: ODUGBEMI,

S. & LEE, T. (eds.) Accountability through public opinion : from inertia to public

action. Washington DC: The World Bank.

Abstract/Summary:

‘During 1993–94, a small group of citizens in Bangalore prepared a report card on the public

services in their city, based on feedback from the users of these services. The reason for

this unusual initiative was the dismal state of essential services in the city and the public

perception that government was mostly indifferent to this problem. The report card initiators

hoped that their effort would stimulate citizens to demand greater public accountability from

the service providers or, at a minimum, give wider publicity to the problem’ P.349.

Intervention type:

Transparency initiative (Report card)

City level

Effective

Methodology:

Practitioner’s experience of the Bangalore Report card for the period 1993/4 to 2003

Key findings:


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In explaining the success of the initiative, credit was given to the following:

The role played by the Bangalore media houses that published weekly features

highlighting the findings about individual agencies over several months.

The presence of reform-minded bureaucrats within and outside the assessed agencies.

For instance, following the first survey the municipal commissioner decided to create a

joint forum for service providers and civil society to deliberate on how public agencies

can improve service delivery while after the second survey the new chief minister of

Karnataka state announced the creation of a Bangalore Agenda Task Force (BATF) to

improve the city’s services and infrastructure, with greater public participation.

The presence of civil society organizations united in their displeasure with the prevailing

quality of public services. By the time of the second survey in 1997, the civil society

coalition had more than 200 members.

The author concludes that, ‘the drivers of change in Bangalore can be divided into two

categories. On the one hand, demand-side factors such as citizen and media pressure

sparked and sustained the change. This required the context of an open democratic

society with institutionalized tolerance of dissent and debate. On the other hand, supply-

side factors, in the form of government action to implement reforms, were also

indispensable. The government response made possible the interaction between citizens

and agencies that led to positive outcomes in improvement of services’ (p.352).

Based on this experience the author highlights the following policy recommendations:

Strategic use of the media can strengthen collective action

Choose the problem for collective action with utmost care

Involve civic groups early in the process

A democratic society that permits dissent is a prerequisite

Credible champions are essential to sustain citizen activism

RAVINDRA, A. 2004. An Assessment of the Impact of Bangalore Citizen Report Cards

in the Performance of Public Agencies. ECD Working Paper Series - No. 12.

Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

Abstract/Summary:

‘The purpose of this study is to independently assess the contribution of these Citizen Report

Cards to the following five potential outcomes: 1. Improved quality of services; 2. Increased

civic activism concerning public services; 3. Increased public awareness of the quality of

services and the fact that citizens have the right and the power to demand better services; 4.


73

Increased client orientation on the part of public service agencies; 5. Replication of the

Citizen Report Card in other cities and countries’ (Extract: 1).

Intervention type:

Citizen report cards

City/sectoral-level

Mixed effectiveness

Methodology:

Analysis of a single case intervention. The evaluation was conducted using key informant

interviews with 19 senior staff of the major agencies covered by the report cards; 5 senior

state officials; 7 NGO or citizen group representatives and media representatives from 2

national and 1 local newspaper.

Key findings:

The report cards have initiated improvements to service delivery and public sector

reforms; resulted in increased citizen activism and increased responsivness to media

reporting among government officials

Strengths and weaknesses highlighted within the intervention include subjectivity of

issues such as ‘satisfaction’ which are influenced by service-user expectations, the

attitudes of peers, household characteristics; the report cards only collect views of users

rather than officials or providers; they exclude industrial or commercial users of services;

and some doubts have been expressed over sample size.

The paper does not contain any analysis of contextual factors shaping the outcomes

achieved other than to state that some degree of democratisation is necessary for the

effective running of this kind of intervention.

SHANKAR, S. 2010. Can Social Audits Count? ASARC Working Paper 2010/09. ASARC

Abstract/summary:

‘This paper discusses the conceptual and operational problems associated with the social

audit of a government scheme. It argues that social audits have not performed well in the

National Rural Employment Guarantee (NREG) scheme because of three problems. First,

conceptually, it has been unable to resolve the question of hierarchy. In a social audit, the

relationship between the auditors (who include villagers and NGOs) and the bureaucrats is

weakly hierarchical; the NGOs and villagers are part of the citizenry who elect political

representatives, and these politicians in turn oversee the bureaucracy implementing the


74

scheme. Second, operationally, the feeble hierarchical relationship weakens the

enforceability of sanctions against errant officials and produces a disconnect between the

substantive goals of the scheme and the procedural standards followed by bureaucrats.

Third, the assumption underlying the social audit that given a chance, the community will

monitor such schemes is also problematic. The paper highlights the arguments by assessing

the performance of NREG social audits in three states — Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan and

Madhya Pradesh.’

Intervention type:

Social audit

State-level

Ineffective

Methodology:

Analysis of a single case intervention across three Indian states based on primary survey

data, qualitative interviews and focus groups, and a review of official audit reports (for details

see notes 21-22 on page 8).

Key findings:

The main conclusion is that these social audits failed because they focused to much on the

audit itself and not enough on the community mobilisation and communication of results –

the public shaming – that made the original MKSS approach in Rajasthan so successful.

SINGH, R. & VUTUKURU, V. 2010. Enhancing Accountability in Public Service Delivery

through Social Audits: A case study of Andhra Pradesh, India. New Delhi:

Accountability Initiative, Centre for Policy Research.

Abstract/summary:

‘The paper examines the effectiveness of social audit as a tool to enhance accountability by

measuring the impact of social audit on the implementation of National Rural Employment

Guarantee Scheme, the flagship employment guarantee program of the Government of

India, in the state of Andhra Pradesh, using a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods’

(Extract: 3).

Intervention type:

Social audit

State-level

Effective


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Methodology:

Analysis of the same single case intervention as the previous reference Shankar (2010) but

presents contrasting results.

Key findings:

In contrast to Shankar (2010), the authors find the initiative to have been a success on the

basis of the following factors:

A devoted team at the state level comprised of senior bureaucrats and members of the

civil society (esp MKSS) sent a strong signal that the government was committed to the

process of social audits.

A very strong IT backing which ensured that important information (e.g. works,

expenditures wages paid etc.) was being available in a consolidated and comprehensible

manner.

Buy in of the lower bureaucracy: Right from the beginning, there was recognition that

government functionaries like the mandal development officers would feel threatened by

the entire process and so there was a concerted effort to reach out to these officials,

sensitise them to the process of social audits and a clearly communicate that they were

key members of the audit teams.

An incremental approach: They first successfully piloted the audit process in 3 villages in

February 2006 and then had a massive social audit in September 2006 involving 1500

volunteers from 31 NGO’s who carried out the audit in 600 villages of Anantpur district.

3.2.3 Multi Regional Transparency initiatives

ANAND, P. B. 2011. Right to Information and Local Governance: An Exploration.

Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 12, 135-151.

Abstract/summary:

‘This paper attempts to explore issues related to right to information (RTI) and RTI laws, in

the context of local governance. The paper focuses on four case studies—namely, India,

Indonesia, Uganda, and Nicaragua—to highlight some of the complexities in campaigning for

RTI laws and in implementing them. Based on these, a framework is developed as a tool to

map alternative approaches to making local governance more effective and accountable. At

present, there are two schools of thought: one focusing on supply-led or state-led

mechanisms such as public expenditure tracking surveys, and the other focusing on a

human rights-based approach with RTI law at its centre. The framework developed here


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suggests that these alternative approaches need not be considered mutually exclusive

approaches but can be seen in terms of Dreze and Sen’s argument of democratic institutions

and democratic practice. Thus, activists can choose approaches that best suit a context at a

given point in time as intermediate steps in the journey towards developing just and inclusive

institutions.’

Methodology:

Analysis of secondary sources and semi-structured questionnaire surveys with selected

programme officers of Oxfam GB and its affiliates. Purposive case selection to highlight

divergences in local government institutions and the potential role of RTI.

Key findings:

RTI legislation alone is not enough to secure improvements in local governance but is a

key enabling factor.

In India, evidence suggests RTI legislation has empowered grassroots citizens and

organisations to make information demands from local governments, and the presence

of a history of judicial activism in India has facilitated enforcement of RTI law.

It is too early to evaluate impact of the 2010 act in Indonesia, but the weakness of

parliamentary oversight of government is expected to be a constraining factor.

In Uganda, discussion of the Local Government Act 1997 and RTI legislation suggests

that local participation in governance has been captured by wealthier and more educated

elites but has nonetheless resulted in improvements in local services and therefore

highlights the importance of finding elite champions of rights agendas. It suggests that

ministries with responsibility for reporting on RTI requests have been unresponsive.

The article finds a lack of evidence on the effectiveness of RTI legislation in Nicaragua

but finds evidence that decentralisation of resources to local government has not

increased government accountability to citizens due to ‘institutional under-development’

There is no formal RTI legislation in Bolivia yet better outcomes for accountability

because of more effective political and civil mobilisation for participation in local

governance.

ROBINSON, M. 2006. Budget Analysis and Policy Advocacy: The Role of

Nongovernmental Public Action. Working paper 279. Brighton: Institute of

Development Studies.

Abstract/Summary:

‘This paper examines the impact and significance of independent budget analysis and

advocacy initiatives that are designed to improve budget transparency and the poverty focus


77

of government expenditure priorities. It draws on case study research of six budget groups in

Brazil, Croatia, India, Mexico, South Africa, and Uganda, which include non-governmental

organisations, research institutions and social movements. The findings demonstrate that

civil society budget initiatives contribute to improvements in the transparency of budgetary

decisions and the budget process, increased budget awareness and literacy, and deeper

engagement in the budget process on the part of legislators, the media and civil society

organisations. While the structure of the budget process makes substantial changes in

expenditure priorities difficult to achieve, budget groups directly contribute to positive

impacts on budget allocations and improved implementation, thereby increasing the

accountability of decision-makers. Tracking of budgetary expenditures and impacts was also

found to be effective in ensuring effective utilisation of education and health expenditures.

Increased budget allocations and improved utilisation of public funds that benefit poor and

disadvantaged groups can ensure greater equity in budget priorities and further social justice

objectives. The activities of budget groups strengthen democracy by fostering accountability,

enhancing transparency and deepening participation and voice.’

Intervention type:

Civil society-led budget analysis and advocacy

Multiple levels

Effective

Methodology:

Methods and data sources included analysis of quantitative data looking at trends in

government spending on social welfare, education and health as areas of expenditure that

matter most to the poor. A key difficulty was in attributing changes to the activities of budget

groups. To ascertain influence on budget process qualitative data generated in the form of

key informant interviews and focus groups with politicians, government officials and CSO

representatives. Secondary documentation and media reports were used to supplement

interview data.

Key findings:

Key findings are detailed in the abstract however the paper also makes some limited

comments on context and intervention-based factors affecting outcomes from these

initiatives. Important contextual considerations are the depth and extent of legislative

engagement in budget deliberation and review and the degree of openness and flexibility

within the budget process. Important intervention factors are the legitimacy acquired from

quality analysis and timely and effective dissemination; the strength and flexibility of broader

alliances in civil society; and the quality of relationships established with government and the

legislature.


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SUNDET, G. 2008. Following the money: do Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys

matter? U4 Anti- Corruption Resource Centre, 2008, 1-26.

Abstract/Summary:

‘Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys, or PETS, are recognised as an effective tool to

improve accountability in public finance and service delivery. A Ugandan success with PETS

is one of the most cited anti-corruption success stories. Expenditure tracking has also

become a popular activity among civil society organisations engaged in accountability issues

at the local level. This U4 Issue Paper takes a closer look at the experience of expenditure

tracking and argues that its successes may have been overstated. It suggests that an

uncritical acceptance of the effectiveness of expenditure tracking has hindered the

development of a more nuanced approach that is better suited to the particular

circumstances of each case. The paper proposes some principles of engagement on how to

track expenditures more effectively’ P.6.

Intervention type:

Transparency Initiative (PETS)

Multi-regional

Ineffective

Methodology:

The article is based on the author’ experience with the PETS in Tanzania supplemented with

a literature review of similar initiatives in Uganda, India, Philippines, and Malawi. The author

also makes comparisons between state-led and civil society led tracking surveys.

Key findings:

The paper finds that PETS is not a well suited tool for CSOs, and that they would be better

advised to concentrate on other methodologies, such as ‘report cards’ and ‘social audits’.

This is mainly because CSO often have limited technical capacity to undertake budget

analysis and have less ability to produce the type of outputs which PETS is meant to be

doing, i.e. accurate data capturing financial flows and showing the extent of leakages in the

system. They also face problems extracting reliable financial data from the authorities.

Key contextual factors:


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PETS depends on co-operation from authorities, both in terms of getting access to

financial data and in terms of initiating co-operation and support in the follow-up of the

findings.

The 2004 PETS findings in Tanzania were ignored by the state. The author reasons that

the state could have been ‘concerned about publicly tackling powerful vested interests

at the central and local level in the run up to the national elections in 2005’. The

governments may not be happy to share uncomfortable findings with the public if such

revelations ‘perceived to threaten the political balance and status quo in even seemingly

progressive policy environments’.

Donors also did not press the state to act on the findings in order to avoid conflict with

their partners in the government ‘especially as these [findings] conflicted with earlier

reports of progress and success’. Instead of promoting cooperation among CSOs, in

Tanzania donors funded numerous CSOs to conduct PETS in various locations. The

effect was that none of these had visible impact on accountability.

The author revisits the points made by Hubbard (2007) on Uganda’s PETS especially in

relation to the view that PETS and the public information campaign were accompanied

by top-down reforms in government.


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3.3 Protests and other citizen contentious actions

3.3.1 African studies of contentious actions

NYAMU-MUSEMBI, C. 2006. From protest to proactive action: building institutional

accountability through struggles for the right to housing. In: NEWELL, P. &

WHEELER, J. (eds.) Rights, Resources and the Politics of Accountability. London:

Zed Books.

Abstract/Summary:

‘When are struggles for basic rights by weak social groups able to have an impact on public

institutions and make them more responsive and accountable? This chapter responds to this

question by drawing from the experience of an ongoing struggle by council tenants in

Mombasa, Kenya for decent housing conditions, secure tenure, functioning urban services,

and an end to the grabbing of public land in the municipality. Lessons from social movement

literature suggest that in assessing the impact or effectiveness of such struggles it is

necessary to pay attention not only to internal factors such as how the movement is

organised, what resources it is able to mobilise, and the terms in which it articulates its

claims, but also to external factors such as the nature of the state, the configuration of public

institutions and the broader political context (Tarrow 1998; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001).’

Intervention type:

Social movement

City-level

Ineffective

Methodology:

Analysis of a single case intervention in Mombasa, Kenya. Details of the specific research

project are not provided but the analysis is based on data generated by the Tenants

Associations from historical profiles, collective mapping exercises and key informant

interviews for a workshop in 2003 co-facilitated by the author.

Key findings:

The tenants associations have not been able to influence policy or institutional change

for greater accountability although they have been able to keep business interests at

bay.


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A number of explanatory factors are provided, summarised as: ‘the group’s fluctuating

social and cultural power and narrow economic base; inability to sufficiently distance the

group from a politics of patronage and ethnicity and cultivate a new way of engaging;

and a bureaucracy in which accountability systems have broken down and public officials

have not incentive to be responsive to service users.’ (140)

The associations have also struggled to scale up their demands to a national level to

tackle land-grabbing.

They are also struggling to maintain the commitment of members in the absence of

significant short-term gains.

3.3.2 Asian studies of contentious actions

CHHOTRAY, V. 2008. Political entrepreneurs or development agents: An NGO's tale of

resistance and acquiescence in Madhya Pradesh, India. In: BEBBINGTON, A. J.,

HICKEY, S. & MITLIN, D. C. (eds.) Can NGOs make a difference? The challenge of

development alternatives. London: Zed Books.

Abstract/Summary:

‘Using case study evidence, I will argue that NGOs that seek to be effective in meeting their

development objectives need not, indeed cannot, be either political entrepreneurs or

development agents. I will show how, over an entire decade, one central Indian NGO has

been able to combine development work regarded as legitimate by the state with practices

resisting state action in development in general. In the process, I will demonstrate how and

why the ‘depoliticization’ of development is not always a successful state project with

predictable consequences... It will focus on key factors – of composition, location, legislation,

organizational interrelationships and politics – all of which contributed to this NGO’s power

and effectiveness.’ (Extract: 263)

Intervention type:

NGO-led community mobilisation

Village, district, and state level

Effective

Methodology:

A single case-study of NGO-led community mobilisation in Madhya Pradesh, India, based on

analysis of empirical data from a qualitative post-doctoral research study involving a two

month stay with the NGO in 2000, key informant interviews, and a review of local

documentation.

Key findings:


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NGO able to tackle malpractice among the local revenue bureaucracy and sub district

magistrate of the revenue division who were benefiting financially from imposition of

incorrect rates for land transactions and out of date land records. ‘These junior state

officials had also acquired near autocratic status locally.’

By combining development successes with changes in local bureaucratic practice, and

building relationships with senior officials, NGO able to scale up influence and gain state-

level recognition and resources for implementation of development projects.

A number of enabling conditions and strategic factors are described:

o The location of the NGO in a valley region where there was less inter-caste tension

because of a majority of ‘tribals’ rather than the plateau region where ‘upper castes...

dominate the district’s politics and political economy’ was a facilitative factor.

o Eight founding members of the NGO were high caste, highly educated and left-

leaning elites and were not from the original area where they founded the NGO

although they all spoke Hindi the main regional language, the NGO was founded with

the personal savings of these founders – this suggests some of the discourse about

agents needing to be closely connected to the community misleading – strategies

that ensure development of close relations also effective

o Began small, focused on just one village with one of their earliest activities was

working on the individual plots of land of people in the village building/improving on

wells – direct benefits to local population and direct relationship building with local

population. Individual benefit as roots of collective solidarity.

o Principle objective was building a ‘people’s organisation’ with guiding ideology of an

‘explicit belief in development’ and in the state as ‘the principal guarantor of rights’ –

this ideology won favour with district officials and gave it legitimacy in dealings with

all state actors i.e. only trying to ensure their own rules are enforced

o Introduction of an innovative public action of direct economic benefit to marginalised

group – ‘land records camp’

o Gaining the support of a senior district official with the authority to impose sanctions

upon corrupt junior officials – elite high caste status facilitating relations with higher

level officials with more enforcement power

o Highly transparent and accountable organisational practice acting in popular interest

giving legitimacy in making accountability claims for local people, protection from

attempts by local officials to have the organisation dissolved, and attempting to act as

a model of good practice for local bureaucracy to emulate e.g. public accountability

meetings about its own practice, progress, and taking feedback/suggestions from the

community.


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Hossain, N. (2010). "Rude Accountability: Informal Pressures on Frontline

Bureaucrats in Bangladesh." Development and Change, 41(5), 907-928.

Abstract/Summary:

‘This article is about ‘rude’ forms of accountability—the informal pressures used by citizens

to claim public services and to sanction service failures. Rude accountability is characterized

by a lack of official rules or formal basis and a reliance on the power of social norms and

rules to influence and sanction official performance. The article draws on evidence from

Bangladesh, a state which has not reformed its social sector governance, to explore when

and why poor citizens resort to ‘rude’ accountability, whether they have a comparative

advantage in the use of informal mechanisms, and whether these work, in terms of gaining

better service. It asks what informal accountability mechanisms imply for governance reform

in social services, and discusses lessons for other ‘unreformed’ states like Bangladesh.’

Intervention type:

Informal citizen pressure

Local-level

Effective

Methodology:

A single case-study of informal pressures employed by citizens in Bangladesh in pursuit of

service provider accountability. The research on which the article is based was focused on

formal rather than informal mechanisms for accountability and draws upon secondary

literature reviews of governance in the social sectors in Bangladesh; and primary research

using qualitative and quantitative methodologies including a survey of elderly and widowed

people eligible for pension schemes; large-scale public expenditure tracking surveys;

institutional case studies of schools and clinics; service-user focus group discussions and

exit interviews; service-provider career histories and in-depth interviews; and non-participant

observation.

Key findings:

Bangladeshi citizens may employ rude accountability in the absence of formal

mechanisms for complaint or for the enforcement of duties to provide a service

Rude accountability is possible because of social ties between bureaucrats and the

communities in which they work which mean that officials have to take any threats to

their reputation seriously.

Rude accountability can be tied to acts of violence or a perceived threat of violence


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Local media plays a key role in these informal dynamics as the fear of being exposed in

the media and either damaging their reputation or facing punitive measures from higher

authorities can result in improved behaviour or performance

The author cautions that the gains made through these informal pressures are short-term

and reversible and can only impact upon limited aspects of service provision. Frontline

officials can rarely affect the material conditions in which they work, doctors for example,

usually lack discretion over medical supplies and drugs.

Kabeer, N. (2003). Making rights work for the poor: Nijera Kori and the construction of

“collective capabilities” in rural Bangladesh. Working Paper 200. Brighton, Institute of

Development Studies (IDS).

Abstract/Summary:

‘Whilst there is a formal commitment to rights in Bangladesh, spelt out in its constitution, its

legal framework and its ratification of various international conventions on rights, the reality

for its citizens is one of violations as much as the observance of rights. For the poor, in

particular, who rely for their survival on relationships which position them as dependent on

more powerful patrons, there is little prospect of demanding justice. The NGO sector in

Bangladesh has sought to compensate for various deficits which characterise the lives of

poor and marginalised groups. However, few attempt to directly address the “rights deficit”.

One of the few to do so exception is Nijera Kori [NK] whose strategy is to build the capacity

of the poor to mobilise in defence of their rights and in pursuit of justice. Its focus therefore is

on “collective” rather than individual capabilities. The paper concludes by drawing out what

Nijera Kori’s experience tells us about processes of social change and its challenge to the

linear logic that characterises donor agency approaches to accountability.’

Intervention type:

NGO mobilisation

Local / project level

Effective

Methodology:

The paper presents an analysis of the experiences and lessons learned by a single case-

study NGO focused on rights-based mobilisation of the poor in Bangladesh. The paper is not

based on a formal evaluation but draws on ‘a variety of published and unpublished sources,

including NK’s own annual reports’, the author’s long-standing personal knowledge of the


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organisation and its members’ and ‘a brief period of fieldwork carried out in a number of NK

areas in 2000’ (3).

Key findings:

The paper provides details of both political economic and organisational strategy related

drivers and constraints on the effectiveness of NK members mobilisations or their

capacity to mobilise. In terms of political economy the author finds that:

‘The extent to which the local configuration of power is dominated by a few powerful

landlords rather than many smaller ones, the degree of factionalism which characterises

it and the ease with which NK groups can get justice from the higher courts in Dhaka

rather than the more corrupt district magistrates’ courts are all factors which affect the

capacity of the landless to mobilise on a sustained basis’ (37).

Levels of mobilisation are also affected by severe economic disadvantage such as areas

subject to frequent flooding, with low employment opportunities and high outmigration; a

high degree of activity by micro-finance NGOs which divert attention from rights-based

mobilisation; the type of issue and whether it constitutes a ‘life-or-death’ scenario or

more incremental forms of disadvantage like corruption

In terms of drivers and constraints relating to organisational strategy, the fact that NK is

not focused principally on economic development and cannot offer significant material

benefit, while also involving public challenge to existing power structures, tends to make

long-term participation unrealistic for the poorest. A key strength has been the

willingness of staff to live and work in similar conditions to the poor communities they

work within and the culture within the NGO sector in Bangladesh whereby NGO workers

often earn more than government officials makes staff retention a challenge.

Kabeer, N., Kabir, A.H. and Huq, T. Y. (2009) Quantifying the Impact of Social

Mobilisation in Rural Bangladesh: Donors, Civil Society and ‘The Road not Taken’,

IDS working paper 333. Brighton, Institute of Development studies the University of

Sussex.

Abstract/Summary:

‘This paper reports on the impact of an NGO, Nijera Kori (NK), in rural Bangladesh on its

members’ democratic knowledge, practice and engagement. Unique among its peers, NK’s

work with the landless poor prioritises rights, social mobilisation and solidarity over more


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individualistic forms of democratic participation. The study carried out a survey of randomly

selected members of NK, along with a randomly selected ‘control group’ from the same

socioeconomic background of the NK membership. Statistical analysis of the data confirms

much higher levels of political awareness and participation among NK members. More

surprisingly, given that NK does not distribute microfinance, NK membership was also

associated with a number of material impacts, including more diverse household diets, a

higher likelihood of asset ownership and higher levels of economic activity relative to non-

members. Levels of ‘trust’ in local power structures and public institutions were significantly

lower amongst NK members compared to non members, challenging some of the dominant

assumptions about the positive correlation between social trust and political participation.

We propose that NK’s intensive focus on education, information-sharing and social

mobilisation instils a level of political consciousness in members that qualifies trust in public

institutions, with implications for enhanced democratic accountability and an alternative civil

society approach to improving democratic citizenship.’

Intervention type:

NGO mobilisation

Local-level

Effective

Methodology:

A quantitative survey developed in partnership with NGO staff with two comparative field

sites – one deemed successful in terms of group members engaging in collective action for

their rights and deemed less successful in these terms. A sample of 250 NGO members

from ten villages were compared with a random sample control group of 250 non-members

with the same socio-economic characteristics.

Key findings:

The findings suggest that NK members were more likely than non-members to: know

their constitutional rights; vote; campaign in local and national elections; interact with

locally elected representatives and government officials; be elected to informal village

committees; have engaged in various forms of collective action on behalf of themselves

and others, protesting such matters as wrongful distribution of government social

transfers, land rights, violence against women, gender justice and collective wage

bargaining; and to be critical of both traditional and formal power structures and officials.’

(48)

Members have also experienced improvements in their material conditions which is likely

to have facilitated their commitment to more politicised collective action


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There is no detailed discussion of the contextual factors that have enabled or

constrained NK interventions, however, key strengths of the NK approach are described

as: a strong ideological vision based on a conceptualisation of poverty as the result of

unequal power relations; the savings group methodology which reduces vulnerability to

crisis and provides a small amount of funds for collective action; an emphasis on the

Frierian-model of collective analysis and action; education on rights, entitlements but

also income-generation activities building members financial security; and regular review

and reflection by members.

A key weakness of the NK approach is donor-dependency – members are too poor for

membership fees to be a viable sustainability strategy and their challenges to state

actors plus low levels of state resources make government funding unlikely even in the

longer term. Yet donor funding is increasingly geared towards service-delivery/micro-

finance organisations in Bangladesh and towards projects that can offer linear,

teleological, log-framed results.

Tsai, L. L. (2007). "Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public

Goods Provision in Rural China." American Political Science Review 101(2),

555-572.

Abstract/Summary:

‘Why would government officials in authoritarian and transitional systems where formal

democratic and bureaucratic institutions of accountability are often weak ever provide more

than the minimum level of public goods needed to maintain social stability? Findings from a

unique combination of in-depth case study research and an original survey of 316 villages in

rural China indicate that even when formal accountability is weak, local officials can be

subject to unofficial rules and norms that establish and enforce their public obligations.

These informal institutions of accountability can be provided by encompassing and

embedding solidary groups. Villages where these types of groups exist are more likely to

have better local governmental public goods provision than villages without these solidary

groups, all other things being equal.’

Intervention type:

Social pressures / Local associations

Village-level

Effective

Methodology:


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Analysis of detailed village case studies and survey data from 316 villages in rural China.

The survey measured the impact of formal and informal institutions on village governmental

public goods provision and provinces were selected to reflect differences in levels of

economic development as well as regional differences between north and south China in

terrain, institutional history, and social organization.

Key findings:

Solidary groups that are structured so that they overlap and mesh with government

structures can provide local government officials with important incentives to provide the

public goods and services that citizens demand even when democratic or bureaucratic

institutions do not work effectively… Solidary groups which are not both encompassing

and embedding may still be able to mobilize their members and provide some public

goods and services themselves—–but they are less able to hold the government

responsible for providing these goods and services.

The right kind of social group for governmental performance and public goods provision

in authoritarian and transitional systems are not necessarily the ones that increase trust

or are autonomous from the state. Without formal institutions that incorporate citizen

participation in the policymaking process, it is not clear how much of an impact social

organizations which help citizens voice their opinions and develop organizational skills

can have. Under these conditions, solidary groups that incorporate agents of the state

and offer moral standing as an incentive to contribute to the public good can provide

informal institutions of accountability that substitute for formal ones.

However this kind of informal system may be difficult to “scale up” and may only work at

local levels for towns and villages. In cities or at the national level, encompassing and

embedding solidary groups may be both less relevant and less likely to exist.

3.3.3 Latin American studies of contentious action

Cortez, C. and Paré, L. (2006) ‘Conflicting rights, environmental agendas and the

challenges of accountability: social mobilisation and protected natural areas in

Mexico’ in Newell, P. and J. Wheeler, eds. (2006). Rights, Resources and the Politics

of Accountability. London: Zed Books

Abstract/Summary:

‘This chapter explores the contradictions between the agendas and accountability strategies

of different social actors in two protected natural areas (PNAs) of rainforest in Southern

Mexico. Different interests and perceptions over the actors’ rights are at the root of these


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contradictions, which undermine the construction of accountable practices around

conservation and sustainable development strategies in PNAs. The two case studies are

both situated in south-east Mexico: the Tuxtlas Biosphere Reserve in Veracruz, and the

Montes Azules Integral Biosphere Reserve in Chiapas. These cases highlight questions

about how to establish formal accountability mechanisms for defining development policies

for environmental resources. Divergences over land rights and knowledge rights have

resulted from historical power imbalances, institutional complexity, and the different political

and economic interests of the actors involved. Conflicts over land rights centre on disputes

about how land rights are guaranteed and how land is used. Conflicts over knowledge rights,

on the other hand, have emerged from different views about ‘traditional’ or ‘indigenous’

knowledge, who has the right to knowledge about plants, medicine and other resources in

the rainforest, and how these resources should be used. Given these conflicts over land and

knowledge rights, and the institutional and historical complexity that underlies them, this

chapter explores the difficulties in building meaningful accountability. What this chapter

shows is that divergent and contradictory views of rights over resources can lead to and

sustain conflict that makes building accountability extremely difficult.’

Intervention type:

Social movements

Local-level – forest reserves

Mixed effectiveness

Methodology:

Analysis of the role of social movements and community mobilisation in securing greater

accountability for forest reserve management in two field sites. No methodology information

is provided.

Key findings:

A high degree of community mobilisation has been critically important in moving the state

towards greater responsiveness to community demands but the government continues to

obstruct access to information to large scale development projects

Accountable models for sustainable development of forest reserves cannot be achieved

without the participation of local actors and a process of consensus building over

conflicting interests and priorities

Obstacles to effective accountability mechanisms in this case were: the web of

conflicting claims and interests in forest resources; the lack of consultation or


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participation of local communities and associations from the beginning of the process of

establishing forest reserves; an absence of a sense of co-responsibility or trust between

different actors; and institutions without the capacity to fulfil their functions

Paré, L. and Robles, C. (2006) Managing water sheds and the right to water:

indigenous communities in search of accountability and inclusion in Southern

Veracruz in Newell, P. and J. Wheeler, eds. (2006). Rights, Resources and the Politics

of Accountability. London: Zed Books

Abstract/Summary:

‘This chapter will examine the different strategies used by indigenous communities to realise

the right to water and, in seeking compensation for water transfer, to build accountability in

the way that the watershed is used and managed. It considers the governance issues,

changes in perceptions of water and rights, mechanisms for participation and accountability

(or their absence), and the conditions that prevent or lead to successful mobilisation for

accountability. What this chapter reveals is that building accountability and co-responsibility

between numerous actors with diverse and contradictory interests requires an ongoing

process of negotiation and engagement through both formal and informal channels. For the

rural indigenous groups living in the watershed, establishing accountability and protecting

their right to water involves new challenges in establishing horizontal relationships of co-

responsibility. These have to emerge within the communities themselves around the

responsibility for maintaining the watershed, as well as between the indigenous

communities, the urban municipalities and the reserve management. Our argument about

accountability, therefore, is that the governance of (scarce) water requires a variety of

mechanisms that can help to reconcile competing notions of accountability and correlate the

associated rights and duties. This chapter will show how traditional indigenous values can

provide the basis for constructing a new, more solidly grounded culture of accountability.’

(Extract: 80)

Intervention type:

Mobilisation / public action by local indigenous associations

Local

Mixed effectiveness

Methodology:


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Analysis of a single case study of local watershed management and community mobilisation

for access to water based on action research conducted jointly with the communities in

question. Data generation activities included ‘fora, workshops, focus groups, training

programmes and community resource mapping.

Key findings:

Direct action strategies such as cutting off the water supply to the nearby town has

achieved short-term gains but ultimately alleviated pressure for broader or more

substantive changes.

Action research by neutral academics has facilitated dialogue between state actors and

indigenous groups and enabled the development of a strategy for co-management of

water resources including a legal framework and mechanisms for monitoring and audit.

Traditional principles of reciprocity and cooperation were an enabling factor in laying the

foundations for a reframing of water management for the common good.

The short three year terms in the municipal government were a significant obstacle in

seeing through necessary long-term institutional reforms based on consensus-building

Strengthening of alliances across different levels and forms of government has been a

key part of the process

Peruzzotti, E., and Smulovitz, C. (2002). "Held to Account: Experiences of Social

Accountability in Latin America." Journal of Human Development, 3(2), 209-230.

Abstract/Summary:

‘The present paper does not attempt to analyze the overall state of democracy in Latin

America. Rather, it focuses on the new emerging mechanisms that could help to consolidate

democracy in Latin America… We begin by reviewing the concept of societal accountability

and its relationship with other mechanisms for making governments accountable. We then

discuss the appearance of two actors that greatly contributed to shaping the agenda of

accountability in the region: civic associations and movements organized around demands

for due process, and a new form of investigative or watchdog journalism. The present paper

provides an analysis of the workings and achievements of this politics of accountability, as

well as of the methods and strategies employed to make public officials accountable’

(Extract: 209-210).

Intervention type:

Social movements and the media

Multiple-levels


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Mixed effectiveness

Methodology:

Analysis of two types of case intervention which ‘stems from a research project supported

by the Ford Foundation.’ No methodology is provided.

Key findings:

The authors identify three principle strategies employed by social accountability agents:

judicial process, community mobilization, and media campaigns. Movements that employ

all three strategies together have greater success in achieving accountability because:

‘the likelihood of postponing or ignoring legal demands is reduced’; ‘the task of control is

distributed among different agencies with autonomous interests’; and because ‘the

number of ‘external eyes’ overseeing the problem increases’ (226).

Although many of the community mobilisation and media interventions lacked any

enforcement capacity they were key to the activation of mechanisms with teeth such as

judicial processes or ‘congressional investigative commissions.’

The paper identifies a number of contextual determinants of different strategies and

outcomes. Social accountability initiatives were more influential in countries where the

democratic transition has involved the forming of political pacts such as in Chile and less

important where these political pacts have not been key to the regime such as in

Argentina. In Colombia, ‘a political context characterized by widespread violence and

high levels of contestation of the state authority has restricted the expansion of the

politics of accountability’ (225). Accountability initiatives face greater difficulty in

authoritarian contexts where ‘the legitimacy of the right to petition was usually

questioned, and actors willing to oversee governmental actions or policies faced

additional difficulties due to the secret nature of the exercise of authoritarian power’. In

these contexts, ‘the struggle for access to information becomes a pre-condition for any

initiative oriented at controlling governmental behaviour’ (226). Threats to the reputation

of public officials was an important lever of accountability in contexts where their political

survival rested on public support.

Shankland, A. (2010) “The Indigenous People’s Movement, ‘forest citizenship’ and

struggles over health service in Acre, Brazil”, in V. S. P. Coelho and B. v. Lieres,

(eds.), Mobilizing for Democracy: Citizen Action and the Politics of Public

Participation. London: Zed Books.

Abstract/summary:


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‘Participation as self-provision or co-production of outsourced state services – the mode of

engagement favoured by neoliberal approaches – may divert the energy mobilized by rights-

claiming strategies into management, and muddy once-clear accountability relations

(Dagnino, 2008). Participation as the exercise of voice in shaping public policy – the mode of

engagement favoured by deliberative approaches to democracy – may require minorities to

frame their arguments in ways that devalue their own discursive logics and to acquiesce in

notions of citizenship that tend to reject their rights claims as special pleading (Williams,

1998; Young, 2000). Given these tensions, it is unsurprising that minorities often choose to

avoid engagement with state-sponsored participatory arenas, preferring a path of strategic

non-participation (von Lieres, 2006; Robins et al., 2008) ...This chapter seeks to explore

these issues by focusing on movement dynamics in Acre State over a period of some eight

years after 1999, when a new state government took office with a pro-indigenous agenda

and when changes in federal government policy led to widespread outsourcing of indigenous

health services. This period saw the focus of the Acre Movimento Indígena shift from an

emphasis on rights-claiming mobilization outside the state to direct participation in the

management of outsourced government health services – and then back again’ (Extract:

100).

Intervention type:

Social movements

State-level

Mixed effectiveness

Methodology:

Analysis of a single case intervention. Findings based on an action-research project

undertaken between 2005-2008 with a health rights NGO. Aimed to facilitate a process of

critical reflection among representatives of Acre’s Indigenous Peoples’ Movement on their

experiences of engaging with the state on health policy and services, with a view to mapping

out strategies for future action.

Key findings:

The movement achieved greater political inclusion and increased investment in

indigenous health services and important political learning has occurred through the

diversity of strategies used by the movement ‘from formal participation... to use of the

media and the courts, to clientelistic bargaining and party-political manoeuvring, to online

activism and ‘unruly’ direct action’.

In contrast, there is continued poor access to health services for many indigenous

people; and no significant improvements in quality; indigenous leaders with

accountability demands can still suffer threats and reprisals; participation in policy-


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making spaces has legitimised state cooperation without gaining any influence; and

gains have benefited the most visible indigenous groups over others and contributed to

internal inequality within indigenous peoples

The study highlights a number of key contextual factors affecting these outcomes:

decentralisation of health services created an opportunity for mobilisation around this

issue by guaranteeing representation for indigenous people; the history of grassroots

mobilisation against a ‘common oppressor’ – the rubber barons - in the forest region; the

support of Brazilian NGOs and academics assisting the formation of a ‘forest people’s

identity’; the change in state government to a more pro-indigenous administration and

links between the ruling PT party and the movement; and populism of the issue among

non-indigenous groups and external funders – creating political will among the state

administration

3.3.4 Multi Region studies of contentious action

CAMPBELL, C., CORNISH, F., GIBBS, A. & SCOTT, K. 2010. Heeding the Push from

Below How Do Social Movements Persuade the Rich to Listen to the Poor? Journal of

Health Psychology, 15, 962-971.

Abstract/summary:

‘This article discusses three successful pro-poor social movements: the Brazilian Landless

Workers’ Movement, the Indian wing of the People’s Health Movement and the South

African Treatment Action Campaign. These have mobilized poor people to demand access

to land, health services and life-saving medical treatment respectively. We show how each

group has succeeded not only through building the ‘voice’ of the poor to make forceful

demands, but also through facilitating the development of ‘receptive social environments’ in

which the rich are willing to take these voices seriously. Community psychologists need to

pay more attention to the latter challenge.’

Intervention type:

Social movements and public action

National-level

Effective

Methodology:

This is a single case study of a social movement approach to social accountability across

three countries on the basis of analysis of published academic literature and the author’s

personal experiences of working with the movements in question.


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Key findings:

A key enabling factor for building ‘voice’ is the promotion and facilitation of critical

thinking which has resulted in a conceptualisation of poverty and disadvantage as the

result of social inequalities. This creates drive and motivation for participation in

collective action.

The provision of education and capacity-building has strengthened the commitment of

participants

Strategic horizontal and vertical alliances have been key for gaining receptivity to

movement demands among power-holders and building the strength of the movements

through numbers. Alliances between interest groups bring the numbers and legitimacy

necessary to get the attention of decision-makers while alliances with elite political and

legal networks have assisted communities to use legal challenge and constitutional

frameworks.

All three movements have used media presence and strategic moral, legal or economic

discourses to gain the moral high ground and mobilise a broad base of support around

the issues they are promoting – creating this receptive social environment has been

critical to their success.

International discourses ‘open and close spaces on which social movements can

capitalize’ p.969

While the cases are all of national movements, the authors suggest that more local level

movements could succeed using similar strategies.


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3.4 Participation in formal spaces

3.4.1 African studies of participatory initiatives

Björkman, M., and Svensson, J. (2010a). "When is community-based monitoring

effective? Evidence from a randomized experiment in primary health in Uganda."

Journal of the European Economic Association, 8(2-3), 571-581.

Abstract/Summary:

‘Evidence from recent randomized field experiments on community-based monitoring reveals

substantial heterogenous treatment effects. Using data from a randomized experiment in

primary health in Uganda, we test whether social heterogeneity can explain why some

communities managed to push for better health service delivery while others did not. The

results suggest that income inequality, and particularly ethnic fractionalization, adversely

impact collective action for improved service provision.’

Intervention type:

Community-based monitoring

Facility level (but national sectoral project)

Mixed effectiveness depending on context

Methodology:

This study explores whether social heterogeneity, in income and ethnicity, can explain

differential social accountability outcomes by linking data from their previous 2009 study to

data on ethnic and linguistic composition at the sub-national level and income data from the

Uganda National Household Survey 2005 (UNHS, 2005).

Key findings:

The study concludes that social heterogeneity, especially ethnic fractionalization, has an

adverse impact on collective action for improved service provision; that interventions need to

be designed with sensitivity to local social composition; and that more research is needed

into how to make demand-driven accountability interventions effective in socially

heterogeneous environments.

Bjorkman and Sverrisson (2009b) ‘Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized

Field Experiment on Community-Based Monitoring in Uganda’

Abstract/summary:


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‘This paper presents a randomized field experiment on community-based monitoring of

public primary health care providers in Uganda. Through two rounds of village meetings,

localized nongovernmental organizations encouraged communities to be more involved with

the state of health service provision and strengthened their capacity to hold their local health

providers to account for performance. A year after the intervention, treatment communities

are more involved in monitoring the provider, and the health workers appear to exert higher

effort to serve the community. We document large increases in utilization and improved

health outcomes—reduced child mortality and increased child weight—that compare

favourably to some of the more successful community-based intervention trials reported in

the medical literature.’

Intervention type:

Community-based monitoring

Facility level (but national sectoral project)

Effective

Methodology:

This paper presents a randomized field experiment on community-based monitoring of public

primary health care providers in Uganda.

Key findings:

The study suggests that ‘community monitoring can play an important role in improving

service delivery when traditional top-down supervision is ineffective’.

Ngulube, T. J., Mdhluli, L., Gondwe, K., and Njobvu, C. A. (2004). Governance,

participatory mechanisms and structures in Zambia’s health system: An assessment

of the impact of Health Centre Committees (HCCs) on equity in health and health care.

Regional Network for Equity in Health in Southern Africa, (EQUINET), Lusaka.

Abstract/Summary:

‘The policy to attain equity in health through greater community participation in health had

not yielded the intended results by the time we concluded our monitoring work in 1998. The

attempt to introduce HCCs as an interface between the health system and the community

was faced with many challenges before any meaningful outcomes could be realised from its

activities. The studies undertaken by CHESSORE and other research groups identified

several problems in the implementation of community participation for leadership,

accountability and partnership in the Zambian health system. While many HCCs had failed

to assume their rightful roles, there were few that, despite problems encountered, managed


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to innovatively find their way to exert perceptible positive impact both at the health centre

and in their communities. This study undertaken by CHESSORE, as part of a collaborative

multi-country study through EQUINET was designed to assess whether these perceptible

positive gains were sustained; and if so, what factors contributed to this outcome. In

addition, the study compared the performance of these four ‘successful’ HCCs with four

poorly performing HCCs in districts with matching socioeconomic characteristics. The study

also sought to identify the ideal desired features to successful community participation in the

Zambian health system.’

Intervention type:

Participatory governance committees

Facility-level

Ineffective

Methodology:

Analysis of one case intervention – Health Centre Committees Comparative. The study

compares four ‘successful’ health centre committees (HCCs) with four poorly performing

HCCs in districts with matching socioeconomic characteristics, including a sample of 574

community interviews using a semi-structured questionnaire, 47 in-depth interviews, 35

further key informant interviews, a stakeholder workshop, 10 PRA sessions. To assess the

impact of HCCs on the poor and vulnerable groups in the community four special group

discussion sessions were held with representatives from marginalised groups (widows,

orphans, the disabled and the elderly). SPSS analysis by frequencies and cross tabulation of

variables.

Key findings:

The HCCs had positive outcomes for awareness raising on public health but had not

directed increased resources towards poor and vulnerable groups or improved health

service responsiveness to or health worker behaviour towards local communities

Constraining conditions included: professionally trained health workers were harder to

influence than informally trained workers particularly over staff discipline issues; health

workers (and also the members of an HCC) lacked the necessary capacity to appreciate

and undertake some of the roles and responsibilities brought to them by the

decentralised structures of governance in health; health managers had poor control over

staff and used transfer rather than sanctions to resolve problems with particular staff.

Enabling and constraining factors related to the intervention were: HCCs acting as a link

between community and health workers gave them privileged access to the health

workers and a mandate to address complaints to them (legitimacy); communities saw


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high performing HCCs as legitimate and viable channels for complaints because they

provided communities with health education information; both communities and health

workers looked down on low performing HCCs as having low level of professional

knowledge and information asymmetry a problem in relations between the majority of

HCCs and workers; HCCs could offer incentives to the health workers in the form of

‘presents’ but there was a ‘lack of motivation and appropriate incentives’ for HCC

members. The election/selection process affected how HCCs were viewed – if process

managed by health managers seen as serving their interests, where reporting structure

was redirected to the local chief and villagers HCC seen as more legitimate.

Roque, S., and Shankland, A. (2007). "Participation, Mutation and Political Transition:

New Democratic Spaces in Peri-Urban Angola", in A. Cornwall and V. S. Coelho,

(eds.), Spaces for Change? The Politics of Participation in New Democratic Arenas.

London: Zed Books.

Abstract/Summary:

‘This chapter argues, that significant ‘invisible’ processes of democratisation may be

underway – including the emergence of new leaders at the local level and shifts in citizens’

expectations of their interactions with government. It examines the role of NGO-sponsored

participation processes in contributing to this trend in the capital, Luanda, through case

studies drawn from the Luanda Urban Poverty Programme (LUPP). The analysis argues that

while the ‘invited spaces’ created by these NGOs may begin as conventional participation-in-

development models, in the particular social and political context of Luanda they mutate into

other forms of participation. These forms reflect the interests, agency and strategies of local

actors, their encounters with and adaptation to a changing context, and the release of

repressed political energy which follows the opening up of new participation spaces in a

setting long characterised by lack of responsiveness.’ (Extract: 202).

The article examines three cases of civil society mobilisation:

the federation of local water committees into Associations of Water Committees (ACAs):

formed to try and overcome difficulties of water committees in dealing with state

institutions and to monitor and supervise the water committees

the formation of the Kilamba Kiaxi Development Forum (KKDF) in Kilamba Kiaxi

municipality (a multi-stakeholder forum of local administrators, residents and local CBO

representatives): intended to provide an interface between state and citizens for

discussion, integration, coordination of development projects and to encourage

engagement; and


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the formation of area-based development organisations (ODAs): formed to articulate and

represent the vision of residents of a particular area

Intervention type:

Management committees

City-level and lower

Mixed effectiveness

Methodology:

‘This chapter is based on the authors’ work in Angola and elsewhere over a number of

years, but draws specifically on a series of consultancy studies carried out between

September 2003 and December 2004 for the Luanda Urban Poverty Programme (LUPP)’.

No further methodology information is provided.

Key findings:

There have been small improvements in water management, rubbish collection and

sanitation; new spaces have created opportunities for citizens to deliberate on matters of

public concern which are also matters of policy debate; ACA leaders have relationships

with state institutions where before they had none at all; KKDF meetings suffer from

male and elite dominance, and lack teeth but having the space for deliberation at all is a

significant development in the context of Angola; the municipal government remains

largely unaccountable for improvements to service delivery and is sometimes dismissive

of local residents but there has still been an increased in association members making

complaints and raising questions with local authorities and a set of new leaders has

emerged from new structures and spaces.

In terms of key contextual factors that have shaped the type of outcomes achieved, the

absence of a policy framework for decentralisation to back up the KKDF pilot means it is

in danger of becoming a space for discussion of minor localised issues while the

municipal council remains a closed space for deliberation of more important issues; the

authors find that in post-conflict or fragile political contexts, allowing room for civil society

initiatives to mutate and experiment is important to the process of democratisation and

that NGOs can play a key role as sponsors of new spaces and providers of resources for

this experimentation and negotiation to occur.

3.4.2 Asian studies of participatory initiatives

Banerjee, A., Banerji, R., Duflo, E., Glennerster, R., and Khemani, S. (2008) Pitfalls of

Participatory Programs: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in education in India


101

NBER Working Paper No. 14311, National Bureau of Economic Research

http://www.nber.org/papers/w14311

Abstract/Summary:

‘Participation of beneficiaries in the monitoring of public services is increasingly seen as a

key to improving their efficiency. In India, the current government flagship program on

universal primary education organizes both locally elected leaders and parents of children

enrolled in public schools into committees and gives these groups powers over resource

allocation, and monitoring and management of school performance. However, in a baseline

survey we found that people were not aware of the existence of these committees and their

potential for improving education. This paper evaluates three different interventions to

encourage beneficiaries’ participation through these committees: providing information,

training community members in a new testing tool, and training and organizing volunteers to

hold remedial reading camps for illiterate children. We find that these interventions had no

impact on community involvement in public schools, and no impact on teacher effort or

learning outcomes in those schools. However, we do find that the intervention that trained

volunteers to teach children to read had a large impact on activity outside public schools—

local youths volunteered to be trained to teach, and children who attended these camps

substantially improved their reading skills. These results suggest that citizens face

substantial constraints in participating to improve the public education system, even when

they care about education and are willing to do something to improve it.’

Intervention type:

Participatory management committees

Village/facility level

Ineffective

Methodology:

This is an evaluation of a randomized experiment in the state of Uttar Pradesh to improve

participation in village education committees (VECs) that compares the effects of three

different interventions within the same setting. It employed a baseline and follow up survey

with both treatment and comparative groups including 1,029 VEC members.

Key findings:

None of the three intervention methods managed to increase control over public

schools, in terms of participation by any of the players (the parents, the VEC, the

teacher), nor did they improve school performance. However, the volunteer teaching

component of the third intervention succeeded in mobilizing a large number of

http://www.nber.org/papers/w14311


102

volunteers from the villages, who signed up for training and then set up reading classes

in their village.

Teachers in Uttar Pradesh are not subject to informal social pressures: teachers

‘generally come from outside the village, belong to upper social strata compared to

parents, and are powerfully unionized.’

Voluntary action involving small groups of people is easier to mobilise for and sustain

than collective action by large groups.

Local communities need to believe the intervention has a chance of success before they

are willing to participate and the benefits of direct individual action like teaching are

highly visible.

Corbridge, S., Williams, G., Srivastava, M., and Veron, R. (2005). Seeing the state:

Governance and Governmentality in India, Cambridge: Cambridge University press.

Abstract/Summary:

‘It will be one aim of this book to interrogate the optimism of the government’s account of

recent developments in the fields of governance and governmentality... we believe that the

lives of poorer people in rural India are being changed perceptibly, and in some cases for the

better, by... new technologies of rule... An exclusive emphasis on the shadow state, or on a

relentlessly ‘vertical’ political society, sometimes fails to point up the spaces of citizenship

that are being created, or perhaps widened, in the wake of the good governance agenda

and the popular mobilizations to which it can give rise... a second aim of this book will be to

document these changes, and to explain their differential spatial impress. ...We draw on two

research projects that we carried out in rural eastern India in 1999-2000 and 2000-2001…

[which] allowed us to investigate the income support, empowerment and protective functions

of the state. Five hundred households (400 poor and 100 non poor) in Bihar, Jharkland and

West Bengal were kind enough to provide us with information on the Employment Assurance

Scheme, primary education, and legal struggles, respectively, and on how different groups of

rural society encountered ‘the state’ in these arenas.’ (Extract: 3-5)

Intervention type:

Employment Assurance Scheme (demand-led) and Village Education Committees

Village-level

Mixed Effectiveness

Methodology:

The findings presented here relate to two case interventions with social accountability

aspects: the Employment Assurance Scheme (EAS) and Village Education Committees


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(VECs), across three states. Data is analysed from two research projects involving an

extensive questionnaire survey with 500 households (400 poor, 100 non poor);

conversations between the authors and field assistants who lived in the sample villages from

March 1999 to March 2000; and ‘more than 280 taped interviews with teachers, Block

Development Officers (BDOs), District Development Officers (DDOs), engineers, trade

unionists, contractors, politicians, brokers and other key informants at the Block, District and

State levels’ (10-11).

Key findings:

Most unemployed villagers from poor households did not demand work from local

government as they were intended to do under the EAS; while there were mixed results

for Village Education Committees (VECs) depending on the field sites. In West Bengal

these were complemented by School Attendance Committees (SACs).

The authors stress the importance of recognising the significance of incremental

changes in highly unequal, hierarchical societies/localities and the unpredictable nature

of politics; and the key role played by political parties as the key sphere for agenda-

setting in relation to issues of participation, governance and accountability.

A number of key contextual factors shaped the outcomes of the two schemes: Local

people want to see tried and tested benefits of participation before committing time;

social tensions/conflicts were brought into participatory spaces e.g. inter-caste tensions;

education is of questionable benefit to families with no assets in areas where there are

no jobs for the educated; in some cases, people had ‘learned the rules of the game’ so

that not-so-poor people were masquerading as the poorest; the CPI-M party have been

responsive in part because of a highly competitive political environment; the level of

resources invested in the public sector is a greater determinant of effective governance

than institutional designs; social pressures on local officials from family and community

are greater than any top-down pressure for good-governance; and a move away from

the state to private provision leads to ‘looting’ of the state by private companies and

contractors

Key intervention factors shaping outcomes were as follows: poor information circulation,

targeting, and demand-management by local administrators; the EAS suffered from

corruption because there were significant amounts of money involved in awarding the

contracts that require the labour; villagers hear about the scheme or access the scheme

through traditional channels like village leaders rather than making demands of the Block

Development Office as intended. These mediators have personal interests in the

resources. A lack of adequate training and capacity building for participants in VECs but


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also for local administrators charged with organising and facilitating public meetings

where decisions about the EAS contracts get discussed has also limited effectiveness.

Heller, P., Harilal, K. N., and Chaudhuri, S. (2007). "Building Local Democracy:

Evaluating the Impact of Decentralization in Kerala, India." World Development, 35(4),

626-648.

Abstract/summary:

‘Historically, local rural governments in India have enjoyed very limited powers and citizens

have been afforded very few opportunities to shape local development. In 1996, the state

government of Kerala initiated the ‘‘People’s Campaign for Decentralized Planning’’

devolving new authority and resources to panchayats and mandating structures and

processes designed to maximize the direct involvement of citizens in planning and

budgeting. In both its scope and design, these reforms represent the most ambitious effort to

build local institutions of participatory democratic governance ever undertaken in the

subcontinent. This paper provides a detailed evaluation and analysis of the formative period

of the reforms based on extensive survey data collected in 2002 from a sample of 72

randomly selected panchayats.’

Intervention type:

Decentralised participatory governance

Village-level (administrative structure over a group of villages)

Effective

Methodology:

A single case study of decentralisation reforms in the state of Kerala. Findings are presented

from a survey focused on ‘the characteristics of the panchayat (local social and political

relations, social movement history, level of development); the process of the campaign (how

participation and decision making evolved); and the impact of the campaign on development,

civil society, and social inclusion. Data was collected from 72 out of 990 rural panchayats

selected through stratified random sampling designed to produce a sample representative of

regions and of the distribution of ruling political coalitions. 858 key respondents were

interviewed including government officials, politicians, and civil society actors.

Key findings:

92% of respondents felt elected representatives had become more responsive as a

result of the decentralisation reforms and 75% felt the same of government officials.

Positive outcomes were also reported for increased transparency and reductions in


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corruption and a majority of respondents felt that development projects had become

more effective and appropriate.

The article does not identify key explanatory contextual factors for the success of

decentralisation in Kerala. However, a number of specific points are made about the

background context in general. These include a long history of highly partisan politics,

high levels of political competition at panchayat and state level; high levels of electoral

participation with voting along party lines; and a history of active social movements and

civil society activity.

The author also finds that a history of land reform and lower social inequality than other

parts of India have guarded against elite capture of local governance bodies.

Mahmud, S. (2007). "Spaces for participation in health systems in rural Bangladesh:

the experience of stakeholder community groups", in A. Cornwall and V. S. P. Coelho,

(eds.), Rights, Resources and the Politics of Accountability. London: Zed Books.

Abstract/Summary:

‘This chapter examines two experimental initiatives that sought to bring about more ‘people-

centred’ public health provisioning. It seeks to identify barriers in establishing people’s

participation, as well as factors and processes that contribute to making participation

effective, even if in a very limited fashion. Analysis of this experience finds that the absence

of prior mobilization is liable to make these spaces ineffective in realizing the right to health

and promoting citizen participation. Additionally, although citizen participation is adopted as

a strategy by the state, forms of participation that fail to engage public providers and local

state officials may offer little prospect of holding the state to account at the local level. Simply

creating spaces will not lead to participation if people are not also sufficiently motivated to

engage in them, but participation without engagement with providers may not be adequate to

bring about the anticipated change in provider attitudes and behaviour vis-à-vis citizens… In

1998, two distinct types of invited institutional spaces for people’s participation were initiated

experimentally by the Bangladesh government. In one case, village community groups

(CGs) were mobilised for local essential healthcare provision by the elected local

government body with support from local public health providers. In the second case, Health

Watch Committees (HWCs) were established at Upazila (subdivision) and Union (lower than

subdivision) levels with the support of non-state agencies such as NGOs working in the

community.’

Intervention type:

Co-production and community monitoring committees


106

Local/village level

Ineffective

Methodology:

Analysis of two case-study interventions. The CG case involved research with 7 community

groups across three regions of Bangladesh, including interviews with CG members, user and

non-user residents of the service, and health personnel. Research into outcomes from the

HWCs involved analysis of secondary data in the form of case studies produced by the

support NGO. These case studies included 53 in-depth interviews with HWC members,

NGO workers, user and non-user residents and health care professionals.

Key findings:

CGs had negligible positive impacts or outcomes and both CGs and HWCs lacked the

authority to enforce decisions relating to staff appointments at the clinics. In communities

with HWCs, people became more aware of what services were available; health

awareness and the number of people accessing the services has increased; and doctor

punctuality and attendance has improved in some clinics but no quantitative evidence is

presented. Elite members of HWCs still do more of the talking during meetings and are

the ones who go to represent the group with hospital staff when there is a problem

The presence of a government discourse of rights and participation gave the HWCs

legitimacy but the absence of laws to regulate the performance of providers meant that

providers could ignore HWCs or even take a hostile stance.

A lack of strong and visible official support undermined initiative effectiveness. There

was no devolution of decision-making/authority over workers in either case so their

authority and legitimacy declined. No funds were allocated for CG meetings or any

further support to ensure they could function; some small funds for HWCs from Ministry

but only for initial meetings and reporting to the Ministry. Ministry also promised legal

backing which did not emerge.

In both cases there were poor levels of mobilisation and awareness raising about the

intervention, most community members didn’t know about the existence of the CG or

HWC or how to interact with them. In contrast, motivations for participation in CGs were

mixed – some thought it might lead on to a job, others joined after being asked by a

representative from local government, while motivation to participate in HWCs was

strong because many members had received previous training in participation in social

spaces by a particular NGO.

Selection to CGs was biased towards better-off and professional classes and lacked

transparency or participatory principles while HWCs were elected by public meeting

attended by a variety of social classes e.g. representation of landless groups comprised


107

about 50% in HWCs. HWCs were more inclusive and participatory in their operations the

more socially homogenous the group

Rules for deliberation and negotiation in the CGs were not explicit and existing

hierarchical social relations were re-created in these spaces, meetings were infrequent

and poorly attended. Rules for deliberation and negotiation in HWCs were explicit and

set by participants in the initial public meeting that elected the members, included

relationships of accountability to each other.

Trainings were provided for landless group members to close the capacity gap with more

educated members, meetings regular and effective, including action points on holding

medical staff accountable on issues of punctuality, and supplies, clear records taken and

structured agendas.

CGs suffered from poor leadership and motivation from the local government representative

who acted as chair of the group. In HWCs, the local NGO representative acted as group

secretary and played a crucial facilitator role, while other NGO staff provided extra support.

Mohanty, R. (2010). "The Infinite Agenda of Social Justice: Dalit Mobilization in the

Institutions of Local Governance", in V. S. P. Coelho and B. v. Lieres, (eds.),

Mobilizing for Democracy: Citizen Action and the Politics of Public Participation.

London: Zed Books.

Abstract/Summary:

‘This chapter presents the findings of a study conducted in Sabarkantha District Gujarat,

where the deep-rooted practice of having certain people marked as ‘untouchable’ has left the

dalits on the margins of society and polity. There will be a discussion of dalit mobilization in

panchayat institutions – spearheaded by local civil society organizations (CSOs) – aimed at

securing social justice for them. This is one of the critical tasks that local governance

institutions must undertake to ensure local democracy. I will critically examine the interaction

between panchayats which have been promoted by the state as participatory democratic

institutions and the mobilization of poor, low-caste people seeking social justice. This will

illustrate the democratic deficits that continue to plague institutions despite large-scale

mobilization, and will show some of the democratic gains that can be achieved when the

most marginalized of groups mobilize. The central question of this chapter deals with the

democratic outcomes that flow from mobilizations for social justice that take place within

institutions created by the state to promote democracy. By analysing the democratic

outcome of the dalit mobilization in panchayats in Sabarkantha, I will focus on three critical

dimensions that constitute a democratic outcome: democracy within local governance

institutions, democracy in social relations and democracy in the distribution of development

resources to dalits.’ (Extract: 160)


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Intervention type:


Sub district-level

Mixed effectiveness

Methodology:

Analysis of a single case intervention of Social Justice Committees (SJCs) within panchayat

participatory governance institutions in Sabarkantha district, Gujurat state. The analysis is

based on primary participatory research in the form of a series of reflection workshops with

members of SJCs, CSO network members and members of dalit communities.

Key findings:

A CSO network mobilised dalits and gave training to ensure that non-existent or inactive

Social Justice Committees (SJCs) became organised and active within the panchayats in

the district. SJCs became active at sub-district, district and state level and have now

ensured access to key services for dalit households through redistribution of

development resources that were earmarked for these communities but captured by

higher castes. However, ‘institutions have been resistant to accepting dalits as equals,

and the occasional dalit attempt to equalize social relations has yet to make an impact

on the institutions.’ (Extract: 160)

Key contextual conditions shaping these outcomes were the decentralised system of

governance including decentralised resources which has provided institutional space for

dalit participation and enabed local influence over distribution; a lack of political will for

dalit participation beyond formal institutional provisions which has meant no

training/information/resources provided to encourage participation of poorer or

marginalised groups in local governance processes; and the history of the caste system

itself which has catalysed agency among this marginalised group

Key intervention-based factors shaping outcomes have been the framing of their struggle

in terms of a ‘dignity’ agenda, described as ‘a piece of radical political imagining’ which is

not part of the discourse of formal democracy but enables a focus on social justice

alongside pursuit of a democratic agenda; and the mediation/partnership role for CSOs

and the SJCs who have taken on responsibility for complementing state institutional

reform by providing information and training to make these structures work more

effectively. In this case they have managed to combine this partnership approach with a

social justice agenda, the authors warn of the danger of CSOs becoming co-opted within

these arrangements in other cases.


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Mohmand, S. K., and Cheema, A. (2007). "Accountability Failures and the

Decentralisation of Service Delivery in Pakistan." IDS Bulletin, 38(1), 45-59.

Abstract/summary:

‘…In 2000, the new military regime of General Musharraf announced local government

reforms, operationalised as the Local Government Ordinance 2001 (LGO 2001), which

appeared to recognise these accountability failures. The LGO 2001 sought to redesign

political, electoral and administrative structures at the local level to increase the

accountability of service providers to local citizens. However, have these reforms been

effective in improving the magnitude and quality of provision of essential public services?

This article attempts to explore the answer to this question by looking at survey data on the

post-reform provision and quality of education and health services in four villages of Punjab.’

(Extract: 46)

Intervention type:


Local government

Ineffective

Methodology:

Analysis of a single-case intervention of local government reforms to increase citizen

participation and government accountability. The research involved a village-level survey

into pre and post reform perceptions of provision and quality in health and education

services in four villages in 2005. The analysis also incorporates the findings from a Pakistan

wide social audit conducted in the same year.5

Key findings:

The reforms, which included representation for women and minority groups within local

councils, have not led to improvements in provision or quality in health and education

services.

There was elite capture of resources especially for services that are tangible/visible

thereby directly attributable to individual local politicians.

Decentralisation was only partial and did not devolve sufficient decision-making power to

local level councillors who have to go through the Executive District Officer to hold a

teacher accountable for example which means a long and complicated process.

Citizen oversight committees are also ineffective due to internal factions in the villages and

the partisan nature of the committees

5 Cockcroft, A., Andersson N., Omer, K., Ansari, N., Khan, A., Chaudhry, U.U. and Saeed, S. (2005) ‘Social Audit

of Governance and Delivery of Public Services – Pakistan 2004/05’, National Report, Community Information Empowerment and Training (CIET) and Devolution Trust for Community Empowerment (DTCE), Islamabad


110

Pandey et al (2009) Community participation in public schools: impact of information

campaigns in three Indian states Education Economics Vol. 17, No. 3, 355–375

Abstract/Summary:

‘This study evaluates the impact of a community-based information campaign on school

performance from a cluster randomized control trial in 610 villages. The campaign consisted

of eight or nine public meetings in each of 340 treatment villages across three Indian states

to disseminate information to the community about its state-mandated roles and

responsibilities in school management. No intervention took place in control villages. At

baseline there are no significant differences in school outcomes. This paper reports on the

first follow up survey that took place two to four months after the intervention.’

Intervention type:

Information-campaign and community monitoring

Village level

Effective

Methodology:

Analysis of a single case intervention in 670 villages across Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh,

Uttah Pradesh further methodological details are provided in the abstract.

Key findings:

‘We find that providing information through a structured campaign to communities had a

positive impact in all three states. However, there are differences across states in where

the impact occurs. The most notable impacts occurred on teacher effort, while impacts

on learning were more modest. Some improvements also occurred in the delivery of

benefits entitled to students (stipend, uniform and mid-day meal) and in process

variables such as community participation in each of the three states.’ (Extract: 355)

Differences in impact were accounted for largely in terms of differences between the

local interventions than differences in context.

A key enabling factor was the ability to enforce sanctions among principal agents of

accountability, for example in some locations, teacher salaries were linked to verification

of attendance by school committee members

The authors link the contrast in results compared to Banerjee et al 2008, as attributable

to the ‘structure, intensity and uniformity of the campaign’, and identify the type and

detail of information given, how it is communicated (the medium used) and whether

those delivering it are perceived to be credible and reliable sources as important

success factors (374).


111

Pradhan et al (2011) Improving Educational Quality through Enhancing Community

Participation: Results from a Randomised Field Experiment in Indonesia

Abstract/Summary:

‘This study evaluates the effect of four randomized interventions aimed at strengthening

school committees, and subsequently improving learning outcomes, in public primary

schools in Indonesia. All study schools were randomly allocated to either a control group

receiving no intervention, or to treatment groups receiving a grant plus one or a combination

of three interventions: training for school committee members, a democratic election of

school committee members, or facilitated collaboration between the school committee and

the village council, also called linkage. Nearly two years after implementation, we find that

measures to reinforce existing school committee structures, the grant and training

interventions, demonstrate limited or no effects; while measures that foster outside ties

between the school committee and other parties, linkage and election, lead to greater

engagement by education stakeholders and in turn to learning. We see test score

improvements in Indonesian by 0.17 standard deviations for linkage and 0.22 standard

deviations for linakage+election. The election intervention leads to changes in time

household members accompany children studying per week, but this does not lead to

learning. Linkage is the most cost effective intervention, causing a 0.13 change in standard

deviation in Indonesian test scores for each 100 USD spent.’

Intervention type:

Randomized field experiment – school committees

Facility-level

Mixed effectiveness

Methodology:

Provided above.

Key findings:

The findings suggest that the manner in which members of the committee are selected

(elected or appointed) and whether or not committees are linked to political institutions such

as village councils is a defining factor for the effectiveness of oversight committees.

Mohmand and Cheema (2008) similarly report that in Pakistan these oversight committees

are affected by the selection mechanism.


112

Williams, G., Srivastava, M., Corbridge, S., and Véron, R. (2003). "Enhancing pro-poor

governance in Eastern India: participation, politics and action research." Progress in

Development Studies, 3(2), 159-178.

Abstract/Summary:

‘This paper uses the experience of a recent programme of action research in Eastern India

to reflect on the use of participatory ideals within governance reform. In a situation where

there are profound difficulties in local governance, it assesses the potential for participatory

forms of stakeholder engagement to begin a process of reform. It criticizes views of reform

put forward by both the World Bank and Robert Chambers, and argues instead that critical

self reflection and the construction of alliances among a variety of reform-minded actors are

important first steps in building political capabilities to challenge structural blockages to pro

poor governance.’

Two case studies are presented of relevance to accountability discussions based on the

same research as the findings presented by Corbridge et al (2005) above:

Employment Assurance Scheme (EAS): project decisions and reporting made through

village open meetings

Bihar Education Project (BEP): this involved the participation of lay villagers in

monitoring school performance through village education committees.

Intervention type:

Public meetings and community monitoring (participatory governance)

Village-level (administered at state level)

Ineffective

Methodology:

As detailed under Corbridge et al (2005)

Key findings:

Village education committees were not functioning and residents were not managing to

make claims of the EAS or hold administrators accountable for effective delivery

A number of constraints are identified: new requirements were made of lower level civil

servants without adequate training; poor incentives for good performance for lower level

civil servants such as limited career progression opportunities; poor information

dissemination and means to do so e.g. only 10% of unemployed labourers in the area

knew that they had the right to demand work from the EAS; poor communication


113

between government, NGOs and social activists – these other actors didn’t know about

the scheme so couldn’t help communicate the information.

The authors find a range of constraints were linked to what they term ‘dysfunctional

politics’: political parties maintaining culture of patronage and caste-based competition;

villagers have no sense of holding politicians accountable; relations with state services

brokered through middlemen causing information blockages; and disillusionment in face

of widespread corruption among NGOs and local people meaning they had no drive for

reform of existing processes and were mainly focused on alternatives to state-led

development.

3.4.3 Latin American studies of participatory initiatives

Coelho, V. S. P., Ferraz, A., Fanti, F., and Ribeiro, M. (2010). "Public Involvement and

Social Mobilization: A win-win game?", in V. S. P. Coelho and B. v. Lieres, (eds.),

Mobilizing for Democracy: Citizen Action and the Politics of Public Participation.

London: Zed Books.

Abstract/Summary:

‘In order to explore the possibilities and limits of mobilization and design in fostering citizen

involvement in the decision-making processes of public policies, we have researched the

dynamics of conselhos locais da saúde (CLS – local health councils) organized in peripheral

areas of the city of São Paulo, Brazil. The aim was to understand the relationship between

the forms of mobilization that emanate from the citizenry, the architecture of these

governance structures and the public-health debates taking place in these areas. CLSs were

introduced by the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, which established the formal transition to

democracy after more than twenty years of military regime. The so-called ‘Citizen

Constitution’ defined health councils as mechanisms responsible for bringing civil society

organizations (CSOs), service providers and public officials together in health governance.

Today, there is a national health council as well as state, municipal and, in large cities, local

health councils. Health councils operate in all twenty-six states and nearly all 5,561

municipalities, addressing core issues of priority-setting and accountability.’

Intervention type:

Participatory health councils

Sub-municipality level

Mixed effectiveness

Methodology:


114

Analysis of empirical research focused on six CLSs located in poor regions of the city of São

Paulo, each with a different history of social mobilization. Council dynamics were compared

according to inclusiveness, connections, participation and the debates held.

Key findings:

A history of social mobilisation was a key factor ‘in promoting more vibrant CLSs’;

increasing participation among more vulnerable citizens, the presence of more

contentious and demanding debates; and importantly for social accountability in

promoting higher performance on planning, monitoring and innovation

The level of social mobilisation was also important for higher levels of cross-sectoral

connections between civil associations and politicians or civil servants for example which

facilitated the forming of connections between the poor and state actors and institutions

Participation led to increased satisfaction with CLS performance and accountability of

councillors to the organisations they represent however councillors generally just

reproduced agendas of the organisations or movements they were attached to.

A weaker history of social mobilisation is linked to a broader range of associations and

greater political plurality in the CLSs (because associational organisation less

entrenched and controlled by prominent movements); and to more proposals for

changes to procedural issues e.g. election process to the CLS / process for running

meetings

The findings demonstrate the ‘non-linearity of gains from participatory processes’ (196).

Cornwall, A. Cordeiro, S. and Delgado, N. G. (2006) Rights to health and struggles for

accountability in a Brazilian municipal health council, in Newell, P. and J. Wheeler,

eds. (2006). Rights, Resources and the Politics of Accountability. London: Zed Books

Abstract/summary:

‘This chapter is about how citizens in the small north-eastern Brazilian municipality of Cabo

de Santo Agostinho, in the state of Pernambuco, have sought to realise the right to health

through efforts to exact accountability from their municipal government. It tells the story of

the evolution of the town’s municipal health council, and reflects on some of the challenges

for the realisation of the right to health that persist. It begins by introducing the health

councils, their structure and functions, and the political context out of which they arose. It

then goes on to explore the origins and evolution of the municipal health council in Cabo.

Focusing on some of its successes and shortcomings in the pursuit of accountability, the

chapter reflects on some of the challenges faced by citizen actors in pursuing the right to

health through these institutions.’


115

Intervention type:

Participatory health council

Municipal-level

Mixed effectiveness

Methodology:

Analysis of a single case intervention. The findings are based on a participatory research

project as part of a wider DFID-ActionAid Brazil project. One of the authors is the former

Chair of Cabo’s Municipal Health Council. No further methodological information is provided.

Key findings:

Councillors have had a limited impact on accountability – issues are raised during

meetings and complaints or problems recorded but the study suggests little enforcement

action is taken against officials or workers. Despite these limitations, all respondents felt

the health council was critical to accountability and that problems and challenges could

be addressed in the future. There is some indication that the health councils are shaping

the culture of local politics, further opening up spaces for citizen participation after a

history of authoritarian and centralised rule.

Councillors have been able, with some success, to form alliances with social movements

in order to promote particular issues

Conflicting allegiances among councillors make them vulnerable to co-optation by state

actors e.g. along party, church or neighbourhood lines

Councillors can lack the technical knowledge to tackle some issues within the health

service and there is an ongoing lack of respect among managers for service-user

councillors.

There is a need for greater resources to support council processes and the training of

councillors

GOLDFRANK, B. 2007. Lessons from Latin America’s Experience with Participatory

Budgeting. In: SHAH, A. (ed.) Participatory Budgeting. Washington DC: The World

Bank.

Abstract/summary:


116

‘Within a relatively short period (1990–2005), participatory budgeting has evolved from an

obscure process of popular participation championed by a few leftist parties in South

America to a “best practice” for reducing poverty and improving governance. Depending on

how strictly participatory budgeting is defined, it has expanded from about a dozen cities,

most of them in Brazil, to 250–2,500 locales in Latin America alone. Whether this diffusion of

participatory budgeting is seen as cause for celebration or alarm depends on both how

participatory budgeting is interpreted and how it is implemented. Interpretations of

participatory budgeting, especially as practiced in Porto Alegre, the Brazilian city that named

and publicized it, abound. Yet studies of how participatory budgeting is practiced, especially

outside of Brazil, are only beginning to appear. Systematic comparisons of the ways in which

participatory budgeting is designed and implemented are rare. This chapter analyzes recent

efforts to introduce participatory mechanisms into local government budget processes in

Latin America’ p.91.

Methodology:

Systematic review of participatory budgeting literature in Latin America with a specific focus

on Brazil, Bolivia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru.

Intervention type:

- Participatory budgeting

- Multi-country comparisons

- Mixed effectiveness

Main findings:

The author finds that ‘national legal mandates for participatory budgeting have not created

widespread local success in encouraging citizen participation, fiscal transparency, or

effective municipal government’. This is ‘partly because of local obstacles, including reluctant

mayors or opposition parties, the weak fiscal and administrative capacity of municipal

governments, and fragmented, conflict-ridden civic associations’ p.116.

The chapter identifies the following pre-conditions for participatory budgeting with a caveat

that more research is still needed to identify the most effective combination of these factors:

Political will – ‘the incumbent party and especially the mayor should have a

commitment to opening channels of citizen participation in order to share decision-

making power’ 98,

sufficient resources - ‘the municipal government should control revenues sufficient to

enable investments in public works projects and social programs’ p.99,


117

political decentralization – ‘municipal officeholders should be democratically elected’

p.99, but opposition from political elites should either be weak or nonexistent.

the decision-making units of participatory budgeting should not be so large as to

discourage collective action,

bureaucratic capacity – ‘the municipal administration should be staffed by a

substantial number of technically qualified employees’,

preexisting societal organization – in terms of the availability of ‘society associations,

preferably disposed to participate in municipal affairs, organized in networks, and

relatively autonomous p.99.

legal foundation: Existing laws should allow and preferably promote citizen

participation in budget decisions.

The author cautions that even if PB is well executed, ‘it does not dramatically reduce poverty

(especially income poverty) on its own’.

The author recommends that in order ‘to strengthen the future chances of successful

participatory budgeting at the local level, its original principles [transparency, direct

participation, redistribution toward the poor] should be applied to higher levels of national

and international governance.

Komives, K. (2011) ‘Institutionalizing Social Accountability? Participation and the PRS

Process in Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua’, European Journal of Development

Research (2011) 23, 302–318.

Abstract/Summary:

‘This article examines whether the formal structure of the PRS process in Bolivia, Honduras

and Nicaragua managed to institutionalize this form of ‘social accountability’. The PRS

process had a different character in each country, and different participatory bodies were

formed, but common patterns emerge in the three cases. Civil society actors used the PRS

process to engage in policy dialogue with government officials (and in some cases donors)

and showed comparatively little interest in monitoring implementation of the strategies or

evaluating performance in producing development results.’

Intervention type:

Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) processes

National

Ineffective

Methodology:


118

Analysis of a single-case intervention of PRS processes across three countries. ‘The article

draws on research conducted between 2003 and 2007 to monitor and evaluate the PRS

process in Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua. Each year during this period, the research

team conducted an extensive series of interviews with government officials, donors and civil

society leaders in each country, as well as reviewed key laws and documents produced by

the three groups of actors’ (303).

Key findings:

Formal participation in PRS processes did not produced the anticipated results for

accountability in any of the sample countries.

Strategies did not reflect civil society priorities, were largely decided in consultation with

donor agencies and government actors, and did not in any case reflect the actual

political strategies followed by central regimes. These factors combined contributed to a

lack of motivation among civil society actors to engage in monitoring and auditing at

implementation stage.

These problems were compounded by a lack of technical capacity and resources within

respective civil societies

Positive outcomes included the sparking of public debate over issues that were sidelined

from the strategies or at implementation stage and a process of political learning among

civil society actors in terms of skills for participation in national policy deliberations.

Montambeault, F. (2011). "Overcoming Clientelism Through Local Participatory

Institutions in Mexico: What Type of Participation?" Latin American Politics & Society,

53(1), 91-124.

Abstract/Summary:

‘This article addresses the relationship between institutionalized citizen participation at the

municipal level and clientelism. It argues, contrary to what the literature has suggested, that

the institutionalization of local citizen participation does not necessarily lead to the erosion of

clientelism. Drawing on a comparative case study of participatory experiences in two

Mexican municipalities, León and Nezahualcóyotl, this study argues that participation does

matter, but that not all types of participation have the same effect on state-society relations.

Institutional design is important in assessing the significance of popular participation in

defining the relationship between the state and its citizens, but informal practices are even

more important determinants of citizens’ level of autonomy in institutionalized participatory

mechanisms. This level of autonomy, in turn, determines the potential for such local


119

institutions to become a means to overcome clientelism as the mechanism traditionally

characterizing state-society relationships in Mexico.’

Intervention type:


Municipality-level

Ineffective

Methodology:

Analysis of a single-case intervention through a comparative study of participatory

institutions in two municipalities. Interviews and ‘extensive fieldwork’ with government

officials, politicians, and civil participants in governance institutions.

Key findings:

Social accountability mechanisms have no enforcement power in contexts where

traditional accountability is weak.

The ‘level of autonomy enjoyed by participants’ is a key determinant of the degree of

influence they achieve and ‘controlled forms of participation are more likely to sustain

patterns of clientelism, and even to reinforce them’ (92).

Attitude of politicians towards citizen participation and their behaviour ‘inside and outside

the formal institutions’ are identified as key considerations for assessing the performance

of participatory mechanisms.

Local networks of social and political power and levels of political competition are more

significant determinants of positive or negative outcomes than the party in power itself or

any history of social mobilisation.

3.4.4 Multi Regional Participatory studies

Hickey, S., and Mohan, G. (2008). "The politics of establishing pro-poor

accountability: What can poverty reduction strategies achieve?" Review of

International Political Economy, 15 (2), 234-258.

Abstract/summary:

‘The Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) experiment, along with other innovations promoted

by the international financial institutions over the past decade, has promised to secure pro-

poor forms of accountability in relation to development policy-making. New consultative

processes and new forms of conditionality each promise to re-order relationships between

poor citizens and their governments, and between governments and donors respectively.

Using evidence from Bolivia and Zambia, we identify three critical problems with these


120

claims. First, there is a tendency to focus on promoting accountability mechanisms that are

largely discretionary and lack significant disciplinary power, particularly those reliant on

certain forms of civil society participation. Second, donors have failed to overcome the

contradictions regarding the role of extra-national actors in securing accountability

mechanisms within particular states. Third, there is a tendency within the PRS experiment to

overlook the deeper forms of politics that might underpin effective accountability

mechanisms in developing countries. Ensuring accountability is not simply a technocratic

project, but rather is critical for a substantive politics of democratization which goes to the

heart of the wider contract between states and citizens. The PRS experiment, as located

within a broader project of ’inclusive liberalism’, reveals little potential to address this

challenge.’

Intervention type:

PRSP reforms

National-level

Ineffective

Methodology:

For present purposes, this paper represents a single case-study of PRSP reforms in two

countries. The methodology combined desk-based research with primary research including

interviews with key informants in government ministries, provincial and district

administration, local government, donor agencies, traditional authorities in Zambia and both

business and workers associations in Bolivia. A household survey was undertaken in

Zambia using a purposive sampling method, involving 200 households in urban, peri-urban

and rural districts. In Bolivia, 42 interviews were carried out in six municipalities, two located

in the highlands, two in the valleys and two in the lowlands.

Key findings:

The PRSP reforms examined have promoted mechanisms that lack disciplinary power

The role of the media, judiciary and research institutions has been under played

Stronger forms of accountability have been achieved by building on existing forms of

accountability via political party activity and competition rather than donor-driven

strategies

The different degrees and types of decentralisation have shaped the extent to which the

PRSP experiments have been able to enforce accountability down to the local level in

the two countries


121

The authors suggest that longer term processes of citizenship and state building are

linked to more positive accountability outcomes from PRSP initiatives but stress that they

do not find that this operates in a linear evolutionary fashion.

Deeper forms of politics are more important for the development of social accountability

than ‘technocratic’ initiatives, such as class-formation and political party development

and competition.

The authors suggest that legislative review such as enshrining the PRS process in the

constitution and greater involvement of strong research-based agencies plus the media

to publicise the PRS processes can improve this state of affairs.


122

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