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The Conservative Party and devolvednational identities: Scotland and WalescomparedMartin H.M. Steven a , Owain Llyr ap Gareth b & Lewis Baston ca Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion (PPR) ,Lancaster University , Lancaster , UKb Electoral Reform Society Wales , Cardiff , Wales , UKc Democratic Audit , Liverpool , UKPublished online: 13 Apr 2012.

To cite this article: Martin H.M. Steven , Owain Llyr ap Gareth & Lewis Baston (2012) TheConservative Party and devolved national identities: Scotland and Wales compared, NationalIdentities, 14:1, 71-81, DOI: 10.1080/14608944.2012.657086

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The Conservative Party and devolved national identities: Scotland andWales compared

Martin H.M. Stevena*, Owain Llyr ap Garethb and Lewis Bastonc

aDepartment of Politics, Philosophy and Religion (PPR), Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK;bElectoral Reform Society Wales, Cardiff, Wales, UK; cDemocratic Audit, Liverpool, UK

This article focuses on the role of national identity in the behaviour andperformance of the Scottish Conservative Party � the main voice of opposition todevolution in the 1990s. In particular, it will address the apparent flat-lining of itspopular vote, arguing that this is a direct consequence of the party doggedlyadhering to a more traditional form of ‘unionist nationalism’. This can becontrasted with Wales, where the party has adapted well to devolution, andenjoyed a steady improvement in its electoral performances.

Keywords: devolution; Conservative Party; Scotland; Wales; identity

After a decade of devolution, it is important to remember that a significant minority

of the Scottish population did not originally support this type of constitutional

reform. In the 1997 referendum, 26% voted against the creation of a parliament, 37%

voted against the premise that it should have tax-varying powers, while 40% did not

even bother to vote at all. Local government was wary of the move, fearing a dilution

of its own power (Bennett, Fairley & McAteer, 2002), media coverage of the

unexpectedly costly new building at Holyrood was consistently negative (Bain, 2005),

while much scholarly literature has been devoted to whether or not devolution has

actually ‘delivered’ or not (Bromley, Curtice, McCrone & Park, 2006). Turnout in the

three elections so far have been low � in 2003, it even dropped below 50%, hardly a

ringing endorsement of the new system of devolved governance. The contention of

the late Labour leader, John Smith, that devolution was the ‘settled will of the

Scottish people’ remains broadly accurate but perhaps not universally so. Despite

this, it would be equally wrong to ignore the fact that a comfortable majority of

the Scottish population endorsed the devolution option, and that voting patterns in

Scotland and England had begun to dramatically diverge (see Miller, 1981). While

the Conservatives went on to hold power for nearly two decades in London, Labour

had become the dominant force north of the Border.

This article focuses on the main voice of the ‘No’ camp, more than 10 years on �the Scottish Conservative Party. It officially opposed ‘home rule’, despite having been

in favour of it in the 1970s and having no Members of Parliament under the heavily

centralized Westminster system (see Seawright. 1999). In particular, it will address

the apparent flat-lining of its popular vote between 15 and 20%, arguing that this is a

direct consequence of the party’s deeper attitude towards the entire premise of

*Corresponding author. Email: m.steven@lancaster.ac.uk

National Identities

Vol. 14, No. 1, March 2012, 71�81

ISSN 1460-8944 print/ISSN 1469-9907 online

# 2012 Taylor & Francis

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2012.657086

http://www.tandfonline.com

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devolution, and its assumptions about Scottish national identity. While social survey

trends suggest a shift away from ‘Britishness’ towards ‘Scottishness’ (Rosie & Bond,

2006, 145), albeit with the former remaining consistently solid, the Conservative

Party has continued to project an image of ‘British first, Scottish second’. To argue

this is not, in any way, to suggest that the Conservative Party is somehow less

Scottish than any of its opponents � merely, that by continuing to doggedly adhere to

a more traditional form of ‘unionist nationalism’ (Morton, 1999), the party has notkept apace with wider public opinion.

Indeed, we can even go so far as to credit the Conservatives as being the

unintentional architects of the modern Scottish parliament. According to Keating,

‘[w]hile demands for Scottish home rule go back to the nineteenth century, their

intensification in the late twentieth century owed a great deal to opposition to the

new conservatism that had dominated British politics since 1979’. He goes on to

argue that there was a popular perception that many of the policies of Margaret

Thatcher’s administration were ‘violating . . . deeper conceptions of community and

solidarity embedded in Scottish self-understandings’ (2007, 9). Admittedly, such

sentiments never appeared to be explicitly reflected in the work of the Scottish

Constitutional Convention, the civic body set up to campaign for a parliament in the

1980s, which chose instead to focus on the objective of a ‘new politics’ for Scotland �consensus and accountability. Nevertheless, many of the leading players in the

process were less reticent � the first First Minister, Labour’s Donald Dewar, was

sometimes given the monicker ‘Father of the Nation’, about which he once quipped:‘No, this accolade does not belong to me but Margaret Thatcher can most certainly

be described as the mother, or to be more exact, the midwife of the nation!’ (see

Alexander, 2005).

Unfortunately for the Conservatives, that pre-devolution electoral unpopularity

has continued. From 1999 onwards, the party has had 17 or 18 MSPs consistently (18

in 1999; 18 in 2003; 17 in 2007), operating nominally as the third largest party but

well behind both Labour and the Scottish National Party (SNP). This is despite the

fact that the ideological proximity and coalition partnership of Labour and the

Liberal Democrats from 1999�2007 meant that distinguishing between the two

parties was, at times, difficult for voters (see Johns, Mitchell, Denver & Pattie, 2009).

Indeed, the election in 2003 of smaller parties like the Greens and the Scottish

Socialists was not repeated in the 2007 election, detracting further from the diversity

of representation (see Tables 1a and 1b). Also, with Labour in power in London and

the SNP in office in Edinburgh between 2007 and 2010, the Scottish Tories have even

enjoyed the appearance, almost by default, of being the main opposition party not

holding some sort of seat in government. They have the entire centre right ground tothemselves to put forward a distinctive position which inevitably attracts relatively

high levels of media coverage and public attention. Yet this has not yet resulted in

any increase in the party’s share of the vote.

The article analyses the reasons for this, offering a two-stage explanation: first,

Conservative politicians still do not really want to ‘get’ devolution � the institutional

structures and wider ethos of the Scottish parliament do not sit comfortably with

them. There remains the feeling in the Scottish party that the main political matters

are best handled by London. The Scottish parliament is funded by a block grant and

is highly restricted in terms of the areas of public policy that it can affect. In particular,

its main focus is social policy, namely health, housing and education � hardly the

72 M.H.M Steven et al.

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natural territory of political conservatives, in any case. Virtually no political

opportunity structures exist for them in relation to tax cuts, public expenditure

reduction � one in three Scots is now employed by the state (Buchanan, 2009) * nor

in the fields of foreign affairs or defence. Second, post-devolution Scotland does not

really ‘get’ the Conservatives. Scottish devolution was � and is � an explicitly anti-

Conservative project, the premise of which was that Scotland was voting Labour,

while England was voting Conservative, and that there was therefore a need for

‘Scottish solutions to Scottish problems’. Regardless of policy content, the

Conservative brand has become ‘contaminated’ due to its leadership’s lack of ability

to present a distinctively Scottish right-of-centre policy platform. Indeed, it is difficult

to think of one policy proposal or achievement since 1999 that is associated solely with

the Scottish Conservatives.

Introduce a comparative dimension to our analysis and, once again, we see the

complex and multi-layered nature of national identity in the UK. In post-devolution

Wales, the Conservative Party � far from being disheartened � has been enjoying a

much more successful period: in the 2010 General Election, it won nearly 30% of the

vote, and has also enjoyed a steady improvement in Assembly elections, almost

helping to form a governing coalition in 2007. Crucially, Welsh Conservatives regard

devolution as intrinsic to democratic renewal, and a process from which they

themselves can benefit. As a consequence, the party in Wales has embraced

devolution primarily as an improvement in democracy, rather than an overtly

Table 1b. Scottish parliament results 1999�2007 (vote).

1999 2003 2007

Constituency

% vote

Regional

% vote

Constituency

% vote

Regional

% vote

Constituency

% vote

Regional

% vote

Con 15.6 15.4 16.6 15.5 16.6 13.9

Lab 38.4 33.6 34.6 29.3 32.2 29.2

Lib Dem 14.2 12.4 15.4 11.8 16.2 11.3

SNP 28.9 27.3 23.8 20.9 32.9 31.0

Greens 0.1 3.6 0 6.9 0.2 4.0

Socialists 1.1 2.0 6.2 6.7 0 0.6

Others 1.7 5.3 3.4 9.0 1.7 9.6

Table 1a. Scottish parliament results 1999�2007 (seats).

1999 2003 2007

Constituency

seats

Regional

seats

Constituency

seats

Regional

seats

Constituency

seats

Regional

seats

Con 0 18 3 15 4 13

Lab 53 3 46 4 37 9

Lib Dem 12 5 13 4 11 5

SNP 7 28 9 18 21 26

Greens 0 1 0 7 0 2

Socialists 0 1 0 6 0 0

Others 1 0 2 2 0 1

National Identities 73

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nationalistic system of governance � a quantifiably different attitude from the one

displayed by their Scottish colleagues.

The focus of this article is also an important topic for scholars studying

devolution in the British context. Constitutional design matters to levels of politicalparticipation, healthy social capital, democratic engagement, and the ‘quality of

government’ in advanced industrial nation states such as the UK (see Lijphart,

1999). Analysing why party politicians hold the views that they do on political

processes, i.e. electoral systems, constitutional design, party funding and so on, is a

very worthwhile activity. Rational choice theory would argue that there is little

incentive for Conservative-minded politicians to engage with Scottish devolution in

anything other than a lukewarm fashion, given both the emphasis of the system and

the priorities of the party, as the rather insipid outcome of any cost-benefit analysis isclear.

Unionist and Scottish or Scottish and Unionist?

The overall strategy towards devolved politics by the Scottish Conservatives can

probably best be summarized as one of studied indifference. In relation to many of

the big social reforms of the first decade of devolution � introducing free personal

care for the elderly, abolishing upfront student tuition fees, reforming Scottishhousing law � they have been largely irrelevant and/or in tacit agreement. It would

appear the party is structurally unable and/or unwilling to propose consistently

distinctive manifesto pledges around election time, or policy proposals during the

term of the Parliament. The 2007 manifesto, for example, alluded to giving more

power to families and communities, and strengthening the criminal justice system but

appeared to lack a ‘big idea’ when it came to more economic issues (Scottish

Conservative Party, 2007). The first post-devolution party leader, David McLetchie,

even continued to work part-time as a partner with his Edinburgh law firm, and isremembered primarily for an amiable line in wit at First Minister’s Questions. He was

succeeded in 2005 by Annabel Goldie, a well-liked if not especially analytical West of

Scotland MSP, whose apparent inability to make an impact on the policy agenda of

the Parliament has been criticized by some of her party’s younger, more ideological

members (BBC News, 2007a). This has ultimately been to no avail, however � her

party’s lack of appetite for any sort of internal or external fighting quite apparent,

and from a rational choice perspective, this makes entirely perfect sense. Two former

MSPs have become MPs (Wallace, Mundell), others have also tried to replicate thisroute (Lamont, Johnstone, McGrigor) � more so than in any of the other parties,

Conservatives appear to quite openly view the Scottish parliament merely as a

stepping stone for bigger things, namely a career at Westminster where the policy

focus is more interesting for them, and, as far as they are concerned, real power lies.

All of this is exacerbated by the fact that the party continues to retain an

institutional memory of its reasonably ‘powerful’ Scottish past � and an era when its

brand of ‘unionist nationalism’ was widely popular. It is the oldest political party to

operate in Scotland and also the only one ever to receive more than 50% of the vote,winning 50.1% and 36/71 seats at the 1955 General Election. It is still well within

living memory when the party was relatively popular at the polls � in 1983, the party

won 21 seats and nearly 30% of the vote, comfortably the second largest party after

Labour. Crucially, they can even remember what it was like to run Scotland as

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recently as 1997 when the party was in power at Westminster under John Major’s

premiership, and Michael Forsyth, the then MP for Stirling, was Secretary of State.

Senior figures in the party such as Lord James Douglas Hamilton and David

McLetchie span(ned) the pre-devolution and post-devolution eras, serving in front-

bench positions before and after 1999. Its activists did not, therefore, take kindly to

its role being so aggressively challenged in the 1990s by the setting up of a new

institution in Edinburgh which was inspired � negatively � by the apparent

unpopularity of many of its London-centric policies. Even today, there are various

Scottish councils that they control and/or help to run in local government (they lead

or fulfil a significant role as partner in Aberdeenshire, Angus, Dumfries and

Galloway, East Dunbartonshire, East Renfrewshire, Scottish Borders, South Ayr-

shire and South Lanarkshire), and others where they are the main opposition, as well

as large swathes of Perthshire, the Borders, Dumfriesshire and Aberdeenshire where

they win substantial numbers of votes at national elections.

Moreover, conservatism as an ideology has deep roots in Scotland. Classical

liberal economic theory is a product of the Scottish Enlightenment, which centred

upon the cities of Glasgow and Edinburgh � the founder of capitalist economics and

the free market, Adam Smith, was a student and professor at the University of

Glasgow. The argument that Scotland is inherently more left-wing and commu-

nitarian-minded than England is not untrue but we must perhaps be careful not to

overstate this, in the way that some scholars have advocated in relation to social

policy and welfare priorities (Keating, 2007). The Scottish Conservatives were not

viewed as being the ‘English party’ until Mrs Thatcher came to power � one nation,

centrist politicians such as Alick Buchanan Smith (Kincardine and Deeside), George

Younger (Ayr), John McKay (Argyll and Bute) and, to an extent, Malcolm Rifkind

(Edinburgh Pentlands) were never entirely happy with the policy direction the British

government took, with an emphasis on wealth creation at all costs but the absence of

a social responsibility to then redistribute it. Mrs Thatcher’s branch of ideological

radicalism and love of large City profit margins, and claim (albeit slightly misquoted)

that there was ‘no such thing as society’ was not especially well received by the

Glasgow Herald reading bank manager in Ayr or the arable farmer in rural

Aberdeenshire.

The party had eight target seats across Scotland for the 2010 General Election,

where they lay a close second, with the aim of potentially once again nearly reaching

double figures, in terms of MPs. In the event, it fell well short of achieving this, but it

is that sort of ambition which harks back to an era when this number of MPs would

have been viewed as the bare minimum for which the party ought to aim. There are

clearly many Scottish Conservative politicians who hanker for a return to the days

when their party could win a national election and take back the trappings of power

in Edinburgh without having to do a deal with any of the other parties � while the

substance of such an aspiration is now literally the stuff of dreams, the underlying

objective is not entirely fanciful. If the SNP loses a referendum on independence

(whenever that may be), the party may well face a prolonged period of electoral

wilderness as a consequence, leaving the Conservatives to fill a gap, especially if

Scottish Labour has not yet made a full recovery from its electoral defeats in 2007

and 2010. But the official emphasis tends to be on governing alone (BBC News,

2007b) � the 2007�2011 model of minority of government operated by the SNP is

National Identities 75

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clearly one that the Scottish Tories aspire to replicate at some point in the future �and perhaps not surprisingly, given the absence of potential coalition partners.

The Conservatives opposed devolution in the 1990s, and while many of their

members would still probably rather the process had not been successful, theydiplomatically and pragmatically accept that it was the democratic will of the

Scottish people and that they now have an obligation to contribute to the project and

make it work. Perhaps, if starting from a blank sheet of paper, they would not choose

to create a Scottish parliament but they are democrats, and if it does exist, they want

to be represented in it (Cameron, 2009). Such a lukewarm commitment to devolution

provides us with one half of the explanation for the puzzle surrounding the inability

of the Scottish Conservatives to capitalize on the apparently favourable opportunity

structures with which devolution has provided them over the last decade. Quitesimply, their hearts lies elsewhere � and so, as a result, do those of Scottish voters.

Devolution, democracy and the rebirth of the Welsh Conservatives

Given the relatively simple ‘cause and effect’ argument presented above, it could be

suggested that none of this is especially complex � the British Conservative Partydoes not like devolved systems, so devolved systems do not like the British

Conservative Party. However, introducing a comparative dimension suggests the

picture is more nuanced and that, once again, we see the multi-layered nature of

British national identities. Intriguingly, in post-devolution Wales, the Conservative

Party has been positively rejuvenated: in the 2010 General Election, it won nearly

30% of the vote, and has also enjoyed a steady improvement in Assembly elections,

almost helping to form a governing coalition in 2007. At one point, an extraordinary

rainbow coalition between Plaid Cymru, the Liberal Democrats and the Welsh Torieslooked highly likely, but collapsed when the Liberals eventually pulled out. In 1999,

the party won nine seats, in 2003 eleven and in 2007 twelve � winning more votes

than Plaid Cymru, the party of devolution and home rule, which has enjoyed mixed

fortunes since 1999 (see Tables 2a and 2b).

So how has this been possible? First, Welsh Conservatives appear keen to view

devolution as part of a wider programme of democratic renewal from which they

themselves can benefit � an attitude noticeably absent from many Scottish

Conservative activists. As a consequence, the party in Wales has embraceddevolution primarily as an improvement in democracy, rather than an overtly

policy-orientated � or even identity-orientated � process. Devolution in Wales is

Table 2a. Welsh assembly results 1999�2007 (seats).

1999 2003 2007

Constituency

seats

Regional

seats

Constituency

seats*

Regional

seats

Constituency

seats*

Regional

seats

Con 1 8 1 10 5 7

Lab 27 1 30 0 24 2

Lib Dem 3 3 3 3 3 3

PC 9 8 5 7 7 8

*Excluding one Independent seat also won in these two elections

76 M.H.M Steven et al.

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not so much about changing Welsh society as it is about improving Welsh

decision-making, leaving the field clear for all Welsh parties, including the

Conservatives, to fully embrace the workings of the new Senedd. Significantly, the

Conservatives have no history of substantial success in Wales at all � during the

period of John Major’s government during the 1990s, they did not even possess one

single MP who could fulfil the role of Secretary of State, and there is no cultural or

intellectual tradition of Welsh conservatism. That is not to deny that many Welsh

people vote Conservative, or the fact that the party has come second in every

national election in Wales since 1922 (in 1979, it won 32.3% of the share of the vote)

but simply to analyse the different political histories that exist within the different

parts of the UK.

Second, Welsh devolution has been a much more ambivalent and ‘innocuous’

process; the powers of the Assembly are not as significant as those of the Scottish

parliament. It cannot vary tax or pass primary legislation, and is essentially a formal

forum for public debate. Indeed, an even larger proportion of the Welsh electorate

than the Scottish one, had serious doubts about its proposed benefits � 49.7% voted

against the Assembly’s creation in 1997. Welsh devolution has essentially been an

elite-led project, in much the same way as the proposed creation of regional

assemblies across England was ultimately one New Labour reform too far. The

policy communities and networks of England and Wales are much more closely tied

together than those involving Scotland � the deep antipathy of many Welsh voters

towards the Conservative government of the 1980s may have been as real as those

north of the border but the lack of a policy dimension in areas such as education or

legal affairs neutered that sentiment from becoming overtly connected to any type of

nationalist/self-determinist movement.

But crucially, it is this connection that the Welsh Conservatives have made

between devolution and electoral democracy that appears to be key. Senior Welsh

Conservative, David Melding AM, in his book, Will Britain Survive Beyond 2020?

(2009), indicates the disarray that the party was in at the point of the first Assembly

elections. It won only nine seats, on 16% of the poll � its worst performance in Wales

in modern times � while Plaid Cymru gained 17 seats. By the end of the year, a new

leader was in place and, much like the other major parties, the Conservatives would

attempt to steal Plaid Cymru’s electoral success by donning some Welsh garb of their

own in order to shake off its image as ‘the English Party’. This also meant a

commitment to devolution from many of the campaigners for a ‘no’ vote in the 1997

devolution referendum. Nick Bourne, who has been leader since 1999, has

encapsulated this pragmatism:

Table 2b. Welsh assembly results 1999�2007 (vote).

1999 2003 2007

Constituency

% vote

Regional

% vote

Constituency

% vote

Regional

% vote

Constituency

% vote

Regional

% vote

Con 15.8 16.5 19.9 19.2 22.4 21.4

Lab 37.6 35.4 40.0 36.6 32.2 29.6

Lib Dem 13.5 12.5 14.1 12.7 14.8 11.7

PC 28.4 30.5 21.2 19.7 22.4 21.0

National Identities 77

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As a party, we have certainly moved the furthest and the fastest. We had the furthest tomove, I suppose. The irony is not lost on me: here I am in an institution that I foughtto stop existing, elected by a system I disagreed with. Frankly, my views have changed,to be quite honest. I do not think people in Wales would be surprised to hear that. Thatis on record, and the view of the party has changed significantly here and it has alsochanged at Westminster. The group here certainly are probably all twelve in favour ofextra powers. It has changed. (House of Commons, 2008)

The party has even gone as far as to endorse a proportional electoral system as

part of a wider process of refreshing Welsh civic society. Electoral reform appears to

have been adopted as official party policy under the leadership of Nick Bourne. In its

Assembly manifesto of 2007, the party made the following commitment on

accountability for local government: ‘Welsh Conservatives would strengthen the

accountability of local government in a number of ways. We would: review the

arrangements for local government elections, with a view to possible referendums on

the form of election’ (2007, 31). This allowed considerable room for manoeuvre in

any prospective coalition talks; a position also later advocated by Labour leader and

First Minister, Rhodri Morgan. Morgan’s rationale emphasized the need to keep

options open when political positioning in relation to coalitions:

powerful and persuasive voices in the Labour Party were mobilised, in the aftermath ofthe May 2007 election, in favour of a coalition with the Liberal Democrats. Yet many ofthose who argued most forcefully for such an outcome . . . were also adamant that anynegotiation should preclude the one policy � reform of the voting system � which, formany Lib Dems, was the single sine qua non of any agreement . . . I believe we need tothrash out a position of our own in relation to local government voting systems. Not todo so will, inevitably, risk putting a Labour leader in 2011 in the same as we foundourselves in 2007 � faced with a demand to reach an end, but denied the means to secureit. (Morgan et al., 2008, 24�25).

The coalition deal ended up being between Labour and Plaid Cymru, but only

after deadlock on a deal between Plaid Cymru, Conservatives and Liberal

Democrats � the so-called ‘Rainbow Coalition’. Indeed, this outcome came so close

that, according to Nick Bourne, ‘[Liberal Democrat Leader] Mike German, [Plaid

Cymru Leader] Ieuan Wyn Jones and myself, had been due to shake hands on the

deal outside of the Senedd that weekend’ (2008, 32). Bourne has publicly defended

coalition government, stating that it is likely to remain the long-term feature of

Welsh politics:

Within the British political system coalition governments have traditionally beenapproached with much scepticism, often verging on contempt, and are viewed withdistaste by most politicians . . . However, I believe that our traditional hostility may belargely misplaced. Clearly, we don’t want a situation where the tail wags the dog butminority governments also risk equal amounts of instability . . . The most effectiveresponse is to remain constructive and to be open to all possibilities. (2008, 33)

All of this illustrates the open approach to constitutional issues which has

marked the development of a distinct type of Welsh Conservativism. Both arising

from coalition deals, the Commission on Constitutional and Electoral Arrangements

(the Sunderland Commission) and the Richard Commission were results of the 2000

coalition agreement Putting Wales First between the Welsh Labour Party and the

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Welsh Liberal Democrats. Indeed, McAllister and Stirbu (2008, 220) have noted how

the ‘Richard consequentials’ have framed debates through to the 2007 coalition; all

parties discussing numbers of Assembly Members (AMs), more powers, and the

desirability of a switch to Single Transferable Vote (STV). Such constitutional issuesremain a thorny but live issue in future coalitions. The pragmatic approach of the

Welsh Conservatives is also a means of remaining open to any future coalition deals

which will allow them a place in government.

Such a strategy makes rational sense, given that the Welsh Tories had already

greatly benefited from it in the National Assembly. After all, in 1999, only one of the

nine Conservative AMs was elected via a constituency seat, leaving eight AMs who

gained through the system. Proportional Representation (PR) gave the Conservatives

a foothold in the Assembly � and not merely low single figures � providing them abase from which to develop. Since 1999, it is the only party to gain representation in

each election. It won 11 seats in 2003 � again, however, with only one elected via a

constituency seat. The party won 12 seats in 2007 and, while the ratios have changed,

the balance remains at five constituency and seven list members. In December 2009,

Plaid Cymru South Wales East list AM, Mohammad Asghar, defected to the

Conservatives, bringing their total to 13.

We should not underestimate the significance of the Welsh branch of the party

being so openly pro-reform. Despite the fact the British party has benefited quitesignificantly from different types of constitutional change, it does not, in general,

traditionally like electoral systems of proportional representation. While it would be

wrong to over-state the ideological or philosophical roots of that stance, it is

primarily linked to the party’s twin distrust of unnecessary change or reform, and

predilection for ‘strong’ government. At times, the party has flirted with considering

options other than First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) � for example, in the 1970s, under the

leadership of Edward Heath, its position became much warmer after the party lost

the 1974 (February) election by a 301�297 seat margin, despite winning around200,000 more votes than Labour. Even more recently, despite the party actually

winning 65,704 more votes than Labour in England at the 2005 General Election, the

Conservatives remain today the least positive among the British parties towards

changing the Westminster majoritarian system.

Bale (2006, 28�30) argues that the party should now consider electoral reform as

an option, as that will help David Cameron’s attempts to re-brand the party as a

modern, democratic organization, as well as allow it to win more seats. This looks

unlikely, however � for example, the party will not be campaigning in favour ofthe 2011 Alternative Vote referendum. Yet many Welsh Tories see PR as a specific

part of the devolution settlement as a whole, rather than something in itself. Given

the Conservative Party’s traditional antipathy towards electoral and other constitu-

tional reforms, the Welsh approach is really quite remarkable and testimony to the

transformative effects of devolution on Conservative attitudes in the Principality �and it would appear Welsh voters are willing to reward that at election time.

Conclusion

The article analyses the reasons for the disparity between success in Wales and failure

in Scotland for the post-devolution era Conservative Party. The Welsh party’s

enthusiasm for democratic renewal, personified by its positive attitude towards

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reform, can be contrasted with the Scottish party’s stagnation and inertia. The

latter’s lack of incentive to engage fully with a political process is highly rational, as a

cost�benefit analysis clearly illustrates. In fact, both involve rational choice � for the

Welsh, the costs of devolution are far outweighed by the benefits; for the Scots, the

opposite would appear to be the case. In essence, it would appear that the ‘Scottish’

part of ‘Scottish Conservative’ has a resonance and a meaning that the ‘Welsh’ part

of ‘Welsh Conservative’ simply does not � creating a set of inhibiting political

parameters that prevent it from modernising further.

The consequences of this have been very differing levels of public support in the

last decade. Scottish devolution is based on the premise that Scotland has a social

democratic, left-of-centre consensus, so the scope for diversity of opinion, especially

opinion from the right of the political spectrum, is more limited, despite some

surveys suggesting that the Scottish voter is actually no more left-wing than his or

her English cousin (Rosie & Bond, 2007). One of the reasons why the standard of

debate at Holyrood has sometimes been criticized is because it is frequently

personality, rather than ideologically, driven � the SNP and Labour benches are

regularly and enthusiastically in vocal opposition to each other, yet actually agree on

many of the policy proposals being debated in the chamber (Johns et al., 2009, 214).

Nevertheless, this consensus reflects a wider popular sentiment and is highly rational

for vote-seeking party politicians to try and replicate.

That point is also of interest to national identity � if both devolution and Scottish

nationalism are concerned with policy content, and not just with territory or

sovereignty, we can criticize the established orthodoxy that the more identity-focused

side of Scottish nationalism is essentially irrelevant (see McCrone 2001; Rosie &

Bond, 2006). There exists the long-held view of many scholars that nationalists have

increasingly shied away from playing this type of political game, and chosen to focus

instead on a more open and inclusive socio-economic strategy. Such an argument is

clearly true, and the present authors would not wish to directly contradict it.

However, it is possible that there are also other dimensions to the issue � if

Scottishness can no longer be considered to be synonymous with Conservatism,

according to both public opinion and the fathers of devolution, that places a

question mark over whether or not the ‘new politics’ of Scotland exists for all to

participate in, and benefit from. That having been said, the challenge also remains

for the Scottish Conservatives to respond to the realities of devolution � including its

entirely appropriate emphasis on social policy areas such as education, health and

housing � with the type of renewed vigor demonstrated most effectively by their

counterparts in Wales.

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