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Essay for the module of International Relations Theory, 2010/2011 @ The University of Kent (Canterbury, UK)
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Federico Faleschini (ID 10902214)Module Convenor: Jonathan JosephModule: PO824 (International Relations Theory)18 January 2011
Essay 2 (word limit: 3000; actual words: 3032)
How Do Marxism and Liberalism Conceptualize the Role of an Hegemonic Power in the World Order?
Which Do You Find Convincing?
Introduction
Realism, Marxism and Liberalism have all given great importance to the figure of the
hegemonic power since the beginning of the '70s, under the lasting impression made by events
like the Oil crisis, the end of the Bretton Woods regime and the American defeat in the
Vietnam War (Rapkin 1990: 1). However, as Connolly (quoted in ibidem: 12) puts it,
hegemonic leadership is ‘an essentially contested concept’, i.e. the various schools do not
agree nor on the concept's connotations, nor on its denotation, nor on from what point of view
they value its practice (whether from a normative or a positive point of view).
The purpose of this essay is to describe how Marxism and Liberalism conceptualize the role
of the hegemonic power and to judge what approach is more convincing. In respect to
Marxism, the essay will focus on the Italian school, which draws from the work of Italian
Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci (Germain et al., 1998: 3); with regards to liberalism instead
it will concentrate mainly on neo and structural liberalism. My argument is that the approach
of the ‘Italian School’ of IR possesses better analytical tools to understand the current
historical moment, characterized by the consequences of the global financial crisis, but the
validity of each approach depend on the historical period taken into consideration.
The essay is organised as follows. The first part will summarize the most relevant definitions
of hegemony and give account of the uncertainty surrounding this concept. The second part
will expound liberalism's view of the hegemonic power: particular attention will be given to
the link between hegemonic leadership and international regimes. The third part will instead
turn to Marxist accounts of hegemony: the focus in this case will be on the use of Gramscian
categories to cast light on the links between social actors and international relations. The
fourth section concludes.
What Hegemony?
Robinson (2006: 16566) identifies four conceptions of Hegemony:
– Hegemony as international domination (theory of hegemonic stability): realist
conception: hegemony as dominance enforced by active, coercive domination;
– Hegemony as state hegemony: the most diffuse conception, refers to a ‘dominant
nationstate [the Hegemon] […] that serves to anchor the world capitalist system’
(ibidem: 7) and enforces the rules that sustain the interstate system.;
– Hegemony as consensual domination (ideological hegemony): the Gramscian
conception of Hegemony, it refers to the domination of a social class through the
permeation of a consensual ideology through the society and the state;
– Hegemony as the exercise of leadership within historical blocs within a particular
world order: a position associated with Cox's work (1983; 1987) and the Italian
School, it combines Gramsci's emphasis on social classes and the importance of
ideology with the role of hegemonic states.
The essay indeed will give an example of each conception: a ‘refined’ version of the first
conception will be expounded through Keohane's (1984) work, the second one through
Deudney et al.'s (1999) theory of ‘structural liberalism’, the third one is summarized in Cox
(1983) and finally the fourth one will be presented through the work of Cox (1987) and
exponents of the Italian School which focus on the analysis of globalisation.
Neoliberalism and structural liberalism: the importance of American Hegemony
The most important neoliberal text on the topic of hegemonic power is Keohane's
‘After Hegemony’ (1984). Keohane starts by defining two fundamental tenets of the classic
(realist) theory of hegemonic stability: ‘that order in world politics is typically created by a
single dominant power’ and ‘that the maintenance of order requires continued hegemony’
(ibidem: 34). Focusing on the realm of world political economy, he challenges the second
assumption: his aim is to prove that in the modern world political economy hegemony is nor a
necessary nor a sufficient condition for cooperative relations; in other words he wants to
explore the link between hegemony and international regimes.
To do this he refines the crude theory of hegemonic stability to include the influence of
‘domestic politics, political structures and decisionmaking processes’ (ibidem: 35): his point
indeed is that a state does not become hegemonic simply because it possesses more material
resources relative to other states but also because he faces incentives strong enough to take the
lead. The goal then is to understand what conditions affecting the Hegemon, domestic and
international, are conducive to the creation of international regimes and how changes in
hegemony affect those regimes.
Keohane's case study is the hegemony of the United States. He focuses on the relations
between the USA and the advanced industrialized liberal democracies of Western Europe and
Japan: in this way, he argues, there is no need to ‘continually taking into account the politics
of international security’ (ibidem: 137). Indeed although American leadership was strictly
connected to NATO, that is, to security issues, the relations between the USA and advanced
liberal democracies were based for a large part on economic issues: security issues remained
in the background (ibidem: 3941). He takes into account different cases of hegemonic
cooperation both in trade and finance and in oil trade (the two pillars of American hegemony)
(ibidem: 135181).
Keohane argues that the USA based the regimes they created on the ‘search for mutual interest
with their partners’ (ibidem: 138) in order to make the system more legitimate: this involved
also making concessions and accepting shortterm sacrifices, overcoming domestic
resistances. On the one hand, the USA were successful in creating international regimes for
trade and finance (above all the ‘General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’). On the other
hand, the creation of an international regime for oil failed due to the domestic opposition of
the major American oil companies: as a consequence, the USA lost part of the advantage in
terms of oil supply it enjoyed visàvis its allies, thereby eroding the material basis of his
hegemonic leadership. Overall, Kehoane concludes, the hegemonic power of the USA during
the golden age of the '50s strongly fostered ‘a pattern of asymmetrical [international]
cooperation’ (ibidem: 182) by reducing uncertainty about ‘future patterns of behavior’ thus
increasing the ‘willingness to make agreements’ (ibidem: 180).
Finally Keohane considers how the decline of American hegemony since the mid'60s has
influenced international cooperation (ibidem: 182240). The classic theory of hegemonic
stability states that when the concentration of power diminishes (that is, when the hegemonic
leadership vanishes because of a loss of material resources), then cooperation becomes
impossible. Keohane instead argues that since ‘the conditions for maintaining existent
international regimes are less demanding than those required for creating them […] the
decline of hegemony does not necessarily lead […] to their decay’ (ibidem: 51). Again, the
evolution in the issueare of trade and finance was different from the one of the oil issuearea:
in the former, the international regimes which had been setup under hegemonic leadership
continued to foster cooperation between states with shared interests; in the latter, instead,
where no international regimes had been built, the decline in American hegemonic leadership
provoked a reduction in cooperation (in accordance with the theory of hegemonic leadership).
Another liberal point of view over the concept of hegemonic leadership is provided by
Deudney et al.'s (1999) ‘The nature and sources of international liberal order’. To be more
precise, they focus on the relation between Western countries after the end of the Cold War.
They define five tenets of this ‘structural liberal order’ (ibidem: 181), in part drawing from
Kehoane et al.'s (1977: 360) notion of ‘complex interdependence’:
– Security cobinding: liberal states, it is argued, have created institutions to mutually
constrain the use of force between themselves, thus moderating anarchy without
needing a hierarchical order;
– Semisovereign & partial great powers: the status of Germany and Japan, whose
institutional structure is based on ‘peace constitutions’ and on constraints to external
sovereignty. As a consequence, the authors sustain that these two countries will never
again try to reach an hegemonic status;
– Economic openness: liberal states want to limit anarchy even in the absence of an
Hegemon for three reasons: first, the ‘prospects for absolute gains’ (ibidem: 190)
created by advanced capitalism are so high that states want to avoid worrying about
relative gains (as they should do in an anarchic environment); second, modern
economy is so complex that reducing uncertainty is even more imperative than in the
past; third, economic openness gives also political guarantees of a more stable
international order;
– Civic identity: refers above all to the set of values and beliefs common to all Western
world and distinct from ‘national, ethnic and religious identities’ (ibidem: 193), but
also to the common consumerist culture and to the ‘widespread circulation of elites
and educational exchange’ (ibidem: 194).
All the points above are meant as consequences of the ‘distinctively liberal cast’ (ibidem: 185)
of American hegemony. Indeed, the other tenet of the western political order is (American)
Penetrated hegemony. The authors claim that the high levels of ‘reciprocity and legitimacy’
which characterize American hegemony are a direct consequence of two factors (ibidem: 185):
1) ‘The structure of the American state’: the highly decentralized (federal) structure of
the USA offers numerous ‘points of access’ to different interests, whether domestic or
international. This openness allows governmental and civil groups from liberal
societies wide access to the USA's decisionmaking process and is ‘integral to the
operation’ of the international liberal order;
2) ‘The prevalence of transnational relations’: such relations are considered a
fundamental element of the ‘penetrated hegemony’, because they add legitimacy to the
system and shapes the preferences of the most important actors therefore reducing
differences and increasing cooperation.
Overall, liberalism gives to hegemonic leadership a positive connotation. Hegemony is
considered to have a fundamental role in the construction of international regimes but it is not
necessary for their survival and development. The essay will now turn to the Marxists
conception of Hegemony.
Marxism: Hegemony as a tool of inquiry into Capitalism
Cox (1983) was the first International Relations (IR) theorist to introduce the Gramscian
thought on Hegemony in IR theory (Germain et al. 1998: 3). In this article he first
summarizes Gramsci's conception of hegemony and then argues how it could be applied to the
study of IR.
Gramsci described Hegemony as the domination of a social class exerted by consensual
means through both the governmental apparatus and the institutions of the civil society (i.e.
the press, the schools, etc.): the hegemonic social order is thus based on a strong connection
between State and civil society, a structure defined blocco storico (historic bloc). The force of
this connection in each Western European society (i.e. country) varied greatly depending on
the history of each country; Gramsci distinguished between societies which ‘undergone
thorough revolution and worked out fully its consequences’ and others stuck in a ‘passive
revolution’, that is, a situation in which old and new forces balance each other. A country
standing in a condition of passive revolution can solve the stalemate in two ways:
– Caesarism: the intervention of a strong, charismatic leader (either progressive or
reactionary);
– Trasformismo: or the cooptation of the potential élites of the subordinate classes into
the hegemonic ruling class, to prevent the emergence of a counterhegemonic blocco
storico (which in Gramsci's communist project would have been formed by an alliance
between the hegemonic class of industrial workers and the subordinate classes of small
farmers and marginals).
Cox applies these Gramscian concepts, conceived as pertaining to the national level, to the
international level: an approach labelled ‘deductive or nomological’ by Finocchiaro (2006:
15). The first consequence is to match the deepest foundations of the power of a state/society
to the way it has worked out the consequences of social revolutions: so, states which are stuck
in passive revolutions are not as powerful as the ones which have ‘most fully worked out the
consequences of this revolution in the form of state and of social relations’ (ibidem: 134). It
follows that in an hegemonic world order, the hegemonic state and the states close to it belong
to the first category, while state in the periphery are usually experiencing passive revolutions.
Cox then turns to the role of international organization. These are considered the product of
the hegemonic world order and have four main tasks:
1) Provide rules that support the expansion of the hegemonic world order;
2) Provide an ideology which legitimises such expansion;
3) ‘Coopt the elites from peripheral countries’ (ibidem: 138)1;
4) ‘Absorb counterhegemonic ideas’ (ibidem).
While the first two tasks are attributed to international regimes and organizations also by
liberal theories (in the sense that international regimes are setup by hegemonic powers so that
they ‘suit their [i.e. of the hegemonic powers] interests and their ideologies’ (Keohane, 1984:
136)), the language used by Cox and the inclusion of the last two points show the different,
critical stance adopted by Marxists in respect to the role of the Hegemonic statesocietes
associated with the ‘monopolyliberal world order’ (Cox 1983: 140). The Gramscian concept
of blocco storico then becomes the chief tool to start an effective counterhegemonic dynamic.
Cox is best known for his work ‘Production, Power and World Order’ (1987). The most
important contribution of Gramscian concepts in this work is that they allow to link the level
of social forces to the level of the state and to the world level. Indeed the formation of classes
and historic blocs is considered ‘the crucial factor in the transformation of global political and
social order’ (ibidem: 357). The Gramscian concept of Hegemonic statesociety is thus used
again to understand how class structure (determined by production relations) determines
1 This point together with the fourth one are equivalent to the practice of trasformismo.
historic blocs, which in turn shape the state structure (ibidem: 67). The link to the world order
is made again through a neoGramscian framework of analysis: Cox argues that when the
world order is hegemonic the ‘production in particular countries becomes connected to […]
world systems of production’ (ibidem: 7) thus allowing the expansion of national classes into
wider, global classes.
Finally, another use of Neogramscians perspectives in IR theory is the analysis of the
process of globalisation. Scholars have focused above all on two research areas: the analysis of
the movements of resistance to globalisation (Rupert, 2003; Gill 2003) and the alleged
emergence of a transnational capitalist class which tries to gain hegemonic leadership
(Robinson 2006; Gill 1990).
Gill (1990a) analyses the work and demographical composition of the ‘Trilateral
Commission’, a very influential private IR council which was founded in 1972 to promote a
reform of the world political economy ‘compatible with the forces of transnazionalization’
(ibidem: 120). He argues that such an organization can easily be seen as a ‘Transnational
historic bloc’ (ibidem: 145) because it links the highest levels of the political end economic
sphere at a global level.
Robinson (2006), sixteen years after Gill's work, uses the concept of historic bloc to
steer away from the focus on the nation state, a focus which he perceives as inadequate to
understand capitalism during globalisation. In doing this he also criticizes Cox (1983) which
sustained that an historic bloc can develop only at the national level and only after expand
internationally. He instead argues that economic globalisation for the first time makes possible
‘Transnational Class Formation’ (ibidem: 169): indeed the ‘Transnational Capitalist Class’
(ibidem) has already tried to attain the global hegemony but has encountered strong resistance
not only in the Third World but also in the ‘Lockean heartland’ (Van Der Pijl 1998), i.e. the
AngloSaxon countries in particular and also Western Europe. Robinson (2006) predicts that a
counterhegemonic upheaval could happen in case of an organic global capitalist crisis, i.e. a
crisis not only objective (structural) but also subjective (‘of legitimacy of hegemony’) (ibidem:
178). In the light of the global financial crisis, this concepts gain relevant analytical leverage.
Conclusion
After having presented the position of different authors on the topic, a judgement on the
validity of each conceptualisation is due.
Keohane's conception of Hegemony draws heavily from game theory and has many points in
common with the pure realist theory of hegemonic stability. It is however more sophisticated
and the focus on the importance of domestic interests and decisionmaking processes helps to
include social forces and non governmental relations in the picture. The result is a coherent if
a bit rigid conceptualization that gives a convincing explanation of how American hegemony
has worked and is also correct in stressing the possibility of cooperation without hegemony.
Deudney et al. on the other hand emphasize the role of social forces as an integral part of the
American hegemony. Their description of the effects of penetrated hegemony is convincing
but it is limited only to the Western countries, therefore weakening its validity when applied to
the whole world (as is the case with Kheoane (1984)).
Cox's inclusion of Gramsci categories in IR theory has spurred a wide range of works.
Although this has not been clear of blame (see Germain et al. 1998 and the answer provided to
them by Rupert 1998), the considerable range of works that continue to analyse the changing
world of globalisation with Gramscian tools is a proxy of the richness of this approach.
Although it clearly has some limitations and dark spots (especially in overarching works as
Cox 1987), I do believe that the analysis of the dynamics of globalisation with Gramscian
concepts enables to bring in the element of society without forcing out the state. The analysis
on Transnational Capitalist Class and the individuation of counterhegemonic societies
demonstrates the validity of this approach (see e.g. the rise of far right parties throughout
Europe in accordance with Robinson's (2006: 177) prediction).
No theory of course can claim to be convincing on all topics and for every historical period.
Giving that IR Theory should help us analyse the world around us, I believe that the ‘Italian
school’ theory is the best equipped to analyse the contemporary world and the effects of
globalisation and is thus the more convincing.
BIBLIOGHRAPHY (in alphabetical order)
Cox R.W. (1983), Gramsci, hegemony, and international relations: an essay in method, in Cox R.W. (1996), Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 12443
Cox R.W. (1987), Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History, New York: Columbia University Press
Deudney D., Ikenberry J.G. (1999), The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order, Review of International Studies, 25/2, pp. 17996
Finocchiaro M.A. (2006), Gramsci, the First World War, and the Problem of Politics vs Religion vs Economics in War, in Bieler A., Morton A.D. (eds.) (2006), Images of Gramsci: Connections and Contentions in Political Theory and International Relations, London: Routledge, pp. 1325
Germain R., Kenny M. (1998), Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New Gramscians, Review of International Studies, 24, pp. 321
Gill S. (1990), American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Gill S. (1990a), The Emerging Hegemony of Transnational Capital: Trilateralism and Global Order, in Rapkin D.P. (ed.) (1990), International Political Economy Yearbook, 5, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 11946
Gill S. (2003), Power and Resistance in the New World Order, New York: Parlgrave MacMillan
Van Der Pijl K. (1998), Transanational Classes and International Relations, London: Routledge
Keohane R. (1984), After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, New Jersey (USA): Princeton University Press
Keohane R., Nye J. (1977), Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston (USA): Little, Brown & Co.
Rapkin D.P. (1990), The contested Concept, in Rapkin D.P. (ed.) (1990), International Political Economy Yearbook, 5, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 119
Robinson W.I. (2006), Gramsci and Globalization: From NationState to Transnational Hegemony, in Bieler A., Morton A.D. (eds.) (2006), Images of Gramsci: Connections and Contentions in Political Theory and International Relations, London: Routledge, pp. 16580
Rupert M. (1998), (Re)engaging Gramsci: a response to Germain and Kerry, Review of International Studies, 24/3, pp. 427434
Rupert M. (2003), Globalising Common Sense: A MarxianGramscian (Revision) of the Politics of GovernanceResistance, Review of International Studies, 29, pp. 18198