The Concept of a Concept a k Warder

8/19/2019 The Concept of a Concept a k Warder

1/17

THE CONCEPT OF A CONCEPTAuthor(s): A. K. WARDERSource: Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, No. 2 (March 1971), pp. 181-196Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23437948 .

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2/17

A. K. WARDER

THE

CONCEPT

OF A CONCEPT

In

discussions about words

and

meanings (or

objects),

and in

logical

discussions

involving

terms and

their

extension,

a distinction comes to be

made between

objects

in the world and the

signs, symbols,

etc. used to

denote them. In some

philosophical

discussions it

may

not be clear

whether

what

is referred to is the words or their

objects,

but this

question

tends to

be

cleared

up

fairly

soon and

also to lead into

interesting

discus

sions

about what

'exists',

whether we can

go beyond

words

to

'reality'

and so forth.

In

the Buddhist

schools,

because of their initial

epistemo

logical

and

critical

preoccupations,

a

categorical

distinction was soon

perceived

between words and

objects.

Thus

it

was

found at the

outset

that some words

seemed to

have

no

objects

to

'mean',

though

apparently

perfectly

at home in

everyday language. Consequently

it was

concluded

that such

meaningless

words should be excluded from

philosophical

discussion,

implying

immediately

that there

were two

types

or

levels

of

discussion or

language,

everyday

and

philosophical,

with

problems

of

translation from

one to the

other.

For

example, pronouns

were

found not

to refer to

anything

which could

be

pointed

to as their

proper objects.

The Buddha

himself

appears

to

have been

responsible

for this

initial

depronominalisation

of Buddhist

philosophical

discourse,

moving

on

into a

thoroughgoing depersonification

of discourse. Thus

instead

of

posing meaningless problems

such

as who desires?

or

who

is con

scious? or is he who acts the same as he who experiences the result

of the

action? ,

one

must

substitute

the

proper

formulations

through

what condition is there

desire?

or

through

what

condition is there

consciousness? or

through

what condition does such and

such a result

occur?

(see

e.g.

Samyutta Nikáya

II 13

/

Taishô

99

section 15

No.

10;

75f./section

12

No. 18

/

Nidâna

Samyukta

ed.

by

Tripâthï,

pp.

165-7).

The doctrine of

'conditioned

origination',

without

any 'agent'

or

'subject'

or

'person',

is

fundamental to all schools of

Buddhism.

In

these discussions

the Buddha

rejects

all such terms

(which

we

would

call

'concepts')

as

'soul'

('self'),

'life-principle',

'person', 'being'

and so on

(in

Sanskrit

Journal

of

Indian

Philosophy

1

(1971)

181-196. All

Rights

Reserved

Copyright

©

1971

by

D. Reidel

Publishing

Company,

Dordrecht

-

Holland


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3/17

182

A.

K.

WARDER

átman,jlva, pudgala,

sativa-,

Pali

attanjlva,

puggala,

satta)

as not

meaning

anything, defying

his

opponents

to

point

out what

they

referred

to.

The word which we are about to translate as

'concept',

namely

Sanskrit

prajñapti

or Pali

paññatti,

because that

appears

to

be

the nearest

English

equivalent

to

it as

used in the Buddhist

schools,

rarely

occurs in the

presumed

discourse

of the

Buddha

himself

(primarily

the Sütra or Suttanta

Pitaka

as common to the available recensions of its

text).

However,

it

does occur there in some

significant passages

and thus

lay

at

hand

for

later commentators and

philosophers

to

develop

as a more

precise

tool

in

discussion. One

might

observe here that the

convenient word

iti

or ti

in

the Indian

languages, marking

the end

of a

quotation

or

quoted

word,

tended to make the overt

description

and

labelling

of

something

as a

'concept'

seem

superfluous.

The

development

of the

concept

of a

'concept'

by

Buddhist

philosophers

was

thus

not

inevitable and

might

itself seem

meaningless.

In this

paper

we shall

pursue

this

development through

the

work

of

several

philosophers.

First we

shall note

the

more

significant

occurrences

of

'concept'

in the Sütra Pitaka. After that

we

shall take

up

the

Abhidhar

ma

Pitaka,

with which we

clearly

leave the discourse of the

Buddha

himself and

enter the

discussions of the

schools which claimed to be

systematising

his

doctrine.

To

keep

our task

simpler,

we

shall confine

ourselves to one of these

schools,

the Sthaviravàda

(Pali Theravâda),

where we are in the favourable

position

of

having

intact at

least the litera

ture

which

they

considered

of

permanent

value

for

philosophical study.

It must be

noted,

however,

that

every

known school of

Buddhism

operated

with the same term

'concept' (prajñapti)

in its

discussions,

using

it

appar

ently

in the same

way

though

in order to lead sometimes to differenet

conclusions. Thus there was

actually

a

'Concept

School',

so-called

(Prajñaptiváda),

of

the

Mahâsanxgha

branch,

whose

special

doctrine

consisted in a

particular

set of

distinctions between what was

ultimately

real and what was

merely

conceptual

(see

Indian

Buddhism

p.

278).

The

Sammitïya

held their

peculiar

doctrine of the

'person'

as a

concept

based

on

the

groups

(Indian

Buddhism

p.

276),

which

the Sthaviravàda attacked

in

their Kathávatthu

(see below). Nâgârjuna's 'emptiness'

is itself

a con

cept

based on

(upádáya

prajñapti,

Mûlamadhyamakakârikà

XXIV.

18).

The

Abhisamayâlahkâra

distinguishes

the

imagining

of

'concepts'

from

that

of

'substances'

(so-called

but

false;

1.36,

V.6, 13,

30).

After the




4/17

THE

CONCEPT

OF A

CONCEPT 183

Sthaviravàda Abhidharma

(Pali

Abhidhamma)

we

may

look at

certain

post-canonical

works of the

school,

then the 'commentaries'

(Atthakathá)

as

put

into Pali

by Buddhaghosa,

the

work of his

contemporary

Budd

hadatta,

then the later writers

Ànanda,

Dhammapâla (II),

the two

Anu

ruddhas and

Kassapa.

We

may

add what

Aggavamsa says

from

the

point

of view of

linguistics.

1. Mahânidâna

(D

II

62ff.). By

whatever

features, characteristics,

signs

or summarised descriptions there is a concept of the body of sentience

(i.e.

in

a

'living

being',

in

everyday language);

in the absence of these

features, etc.,

there would be no contact discerned

between

the

designation

and the

body

of matter

(of

the 'same'

'living being').

By

whatever

features,

etc.,

there is a

concept

of

the

body

of

matter;

in

the

absence

of these

features, etc.,

there

would be no contact discerned

between

the

resistance

(i.e.

the

matter)

and the

body

of

sentience.

In the absence

of the

features,

etc.,

by

which there

is

a

concept

of

both

the

body

of sentience and the

body

of

matter,

there would

be discerned neither

contact

of

the

designa

tion nor contact of the resistance. In the absence of the features, etc., by

which

there

is a

concept

of sentience

plus

matter

(i.e.

a sentient

body,

a

sentient

'being',

human or

animal),

there

would, therefore,

be no contact

discerned

('contact'

here means a stimulus

arising through

the sense

organs

and

affecting

consciousness via the

complex

of 'sentience' : the

argument

is that without the

compound

sentience

plus

matter

no contact

or

stimulus

could arise

and

affect

consciousness).

...To

this extent there can be

being

born,

growing

old,

dying, passing

away

or

being

reborn;

to

this

extent

there is a

way

for

designation,

for

language, for a concept, there is scope for understanding; to this extent

the

cycle (of

the

universe)

revolves so that this world can

be conceived

(or

'discerned')

;

namely

to the extent that

there is sentience

plus

matter,

with

consciousness.

There is

a

similar

passage

a few

pages

further on

(p.

68), indicating

that

designation, language, concept,

understanding

and their

'ways'

are

coextensive with the

cycle

of the universe.

It

would seem that in these

passages, especially

the

first,

the word 'con

cept' (Pali

paññatti)

retains

much

of

its

apparent

original

meaning

as a

derivative from the verb (p)pa-(ñ)ñá, 'to understand', with causative

and

action noun

suffixes,

i.e.

'making

understood'. We

shall find

later




5/17

184

A. K. WARDER

that

a

'concept'

is a

technique

or

device

for

making

something

understood,

in

other words

for

conceptualising

something

so

that

it

can be

discussed.

In the above

passages

we

have

translated

the

passive

of

this same verb as

'be

discerned'. From

these contexts

we

can

see how the new technical

term

'concept' may

have

been

generated, requiring only

to be institutiona

lised

by

later

writers,

as we shall

see below.

Other

occurrences

of

concept

in

the Sütra Pitaka tend to

suggest

that

it is more or less

synonymous

with a series

of

terms

meaning linguistic

conventions of

everyday language,

which for the Buddha

generally

do

not refer to

anything

real but are

'pronominal'

in the

sense indicated at

the

beginning

of this

paper.

Thus the different

types

of

living

being

are

agreed usages

in the

world,

expressions

in the

world,

usages

in the

world,

concepts

in the

world

(D

I

202,

the

four Pali terms here

are

samaññá,

nirutti,

vohâra

and

pamatti).

In various texts

concept appears

approxi

mately

synonymous

with

'agreed usage' (samaññá,

M III

68),

'expression'

and

'designation' (nirutti

and

adhivacana,

S

III

7Iff.),

'denomination'

('reckoned as')

and

'agreed

usage' (samkhâ

and

samaññá,

same

passage).

In an

apocryphal

Sütra text of this school, the Niddesa, which is a lexico

graphical compilation

arranged

as

commentary

on certain old

texts,

these

and other terms have been collected

in a list of

synonyms:

'man' is a

denomination,

agreed usage, concept,

usage,

name,

making

of a

name,

putting

a name

to,

expression

(nirutti,

language),

expression (vyañjana),

appellation (abhilâpa) (Nd

I

124).

The same list

is

afterwards

applied

to

certain

proper

names

('Tissa',

'Ajita', etc.)

as

synonyms

for

'name'

(nâma,

Nd I

127, 140,

Nd

II

77).

The same text

applies

the term

concept

to

the

words

'Bhagavant' ('Master')

and

'Buddha',

as known because of his

enlightenment (Nd

I 143, 187, etc., Nd II 212-6). Returning to the

older

Sütra texts

we

may

note that

'Mâra'

('Death'

personified),

'(living)

being' (satta), 'unhappiness'

and 'the world'

(loka)

are

concepts (S

IV

38f.).

Again,

The Master

teaches the doctrine with

reference to the

concepts

of the

'spheres' (of

the

senses)

(D

III

102).

2. The

Abhidhamma

registers

the list

of

synonyms

for

concept

which we

have noted in the Niddesa

(Dhammasañgani p.

226

;

these are also

syno

nyms

for

'designation').

It further

speaks incidentally

of

'language'

or

'expression' (nirutti)

as

providing

a

concept

of the dhammas

('natures',

natural

objects

or

events)

referred

to

(Vibhañga p. 295).




6/17

THE CONCEPT OF A CONCEPT 185

It

is

with the

Puggalapaññatti

that the idea of

a

'concept'

is

really

estab

lished

in

Theravâda

philosophy.

Here

'concept'

is

institutionalised as a

technical term and here

is the

starting

point

for all later discussions. The

title

of

this book means

The

Concept

of

a Person

(anticipating

Professor

Ayer

by

more than two thousand

years), 'person' (puggala) being

one of

the most notorious

pronominal

concepts

which the Buddha had

rejected

from

philosophical

discourse. It is even

a

little

odd,

at

first

sight,

to

find

a treatise on an

unphilosophical concept

accorded a

place

in

the

philoso

phical Abhidhamma. The explanation for this appears to be firstly hat the

Buddha

had in fact often used the

concept,

as a word

necessary

to

every

day language,

in his

ordinary

teaching,

especially

moral

teaching,

and

secondly

that it was desirable somewhere in the Abhidhamma to define the

limits of

philosophical

discourse. In

introducing

its

subject

matter,

the

Concept

of a

Person

incidentally

stretches

'concept'

over both

philosop

ical and

unphilosophical

discourse,

thus

posing

the

problem

of

'concept'

afterwards worked out

by

the commentators on this text and other later

writers.

This

text itself does not elucidate the

problem

and

in fact has to

be completed by the text which immediately follows it in the Abhidhamma,

the

Kathàvatthu,

which we shall turn to

in

a moment.

This

Concept

of a

Person , then,

simply

lays

down

that

there

are six

concepts,

those of

'group', 'sphere',

'element', 'truth',

'faculty'

and

'per

son'. We are

not now concerned with the first

five,

except

to

note that in

Theravâda

they

are all

philosophical

in the sense of

being

the real stuff

n

experience,

as

opposed

to the

last

which is

pronominal

and not

ultimately

real. The

Vibhahga

has a

chapter

on each of the five but eschews the

'person'.

On the

ground

of

collation with the texts of other schools

of

Buddhists, it in fact appears that a chapter on 'persons' in some archetypal

Vibhahga

has

by

the

Theravâdins been excluded as

unphilosophical

and

set

apart

as a

special

treatise to

prevent

confusion with

properly philo

sophical

topics.

This

special

treatise,

having

remarked that

there

are six

concepts,

then takes

up only

the last and

presents

a review of the

different

types

of

'person' spoken

of in the

Sütra

Pifaka.

The

Kathàvatthu shows the technical term

'concept'

fully

fledged

and

represents

the furthest

development

of the

idea in

the

Abhidhamma. Its

first

discussion

(kathá)

is

precisely

on

the

'person'

left

unexplained

by

the

treatise preceding it. Criticising the views of those Buddhist schools

(including

the

Sammitiya,

but in the first

place

the

Vâtsïputrîya)

who

held




7/17

186

A. K. WARDER

that the

'person' spoken

of

by

the

Buddha was in some sense

real,

the

Kathâvatthu

affirms that it is not and

argues

that to affirm

t

would be

in

contradiction

with

the

generally accepted

doctrine

of the

Sütra Pitaka.

In

doing

this,

the text

brings

in a number of

subsidiary logical

discussions

in order to

clarify

the

meanings

of the terms

used,

whether

they

are

distributed in certain

propositions,

and

so

on,

and eliminate

equivoca

tions. One section is entitled

'Examination of

the

Concept'

(Paññattd

nuyoga, pp. 25-28).

Here it is asked whether

the

supposed 'person'

is

'material',

how it is

supposed

to

'transmigrate',

whether it is the same

thing

as

the

so-called

'life-principle' (Jlva),

and so

on. The

opponent

is

shown as unable to

give

any

account

of it

consistent with the

Buddha's

doctrine.

Much more

important

is

the

section

entitled

'Examination of

the

Concept

Based On '

(UpàdàpaMattànuyoga, pp. 34-45).

This

begins

with

the

question:

Is there a

concept

of a

person

based on matter?

The

opponent

assents to

this,

but is shown that 'matter'

gives

rise

only

to the various

properties

of matter as

really

connected with

it,

and these

are not the

properties

he wishes to attach to the

'person'.

The case is the

same with the other

'groups' ('sensation', 'perception',

'forces' and

'consciousness').

It is still the same with all five

groups

taken

together

(i.e.,

all the

constituents

of a

'living being',

of

'sentience

plus

matter,

with

consciousness').

It

is

equally

the same with

the

'spheres',

'elements',

'faculties',

'thought',

or

any

other

identifiable

constituent

of

a

living being.

The conclusion is that

there

is

nothing

which is

identifiable

as

a

'person'.

The

concept

is

popularly

based on

any

or

all

of

these

really

occurring

natural

phenomena

or

events,

but is itself

nothing,

disappears

under

examination.

One more Abhidhamma

treatise,

the

Yamaka,

has a

series

of

sections,

within its main

discussions,

entitled

'Concept

Section'

(Vol.

I,

pp.

16-19,

53-58, etc.,

Pannattivára

-

pannatti

is

simply

a

variant

orthography

for

paññatti).

Here the

concepts

concerned refer to real

objects

such as

the

groups

and the

purpose

of

the sections

is

their

clarification,

including

delimiting

the extension of

terms,

removal

of

equivocations

and so on.

3. The

post-canonical (except

in

Burma,

but

in

any

case

showing

a further

development,

leading

towards the

commentaries) Pefakopadesa

and

Nettippakarana

are in fact

two

versions

of

the same

work,

the second




8/17

THE CONCEPT OF A CONCEPT 187

improved

and

accepted

as

standard

in the school

(as

shown

by

Ñanamoli

in

his

translation,

The

Guide).

Here

there

are two

important

discussions

involving 'concept'.

In the

first

(Peiakopadesa

p.

5,

Netti

p. 9)

we have

enunciated

a

series

of six levels of

linguistic

analysis

of

Tripitaka

texts and

a

parallel

series of six levels of

'meaning'

or semantic

analysis.

Briefly,

the

six

linguistic

levels are

'syllable',

'word', 'sentence', 'section',

'analysis'

and'elaborate

exposition'.

The six

meaning (attha)

levels

are

'appearance',

'showing', 'opening', 'distinguishing',

'clarification'

and

'concept'.

It is

suggested

that these correspond, level for level, though pointed out that

they overlap.

The

important

point

for us is that

a

'concept'

is the

highest

level of

meaning,

attained

through

an 'elaborate

exposition' (niddesa)

setting

out a

complete

idea or

topic.

The other discussion

introduces

'adducing

the

concept'

as one of

six

teen

types

of

investigation

of

the

wording

of a

statement

(Peiakopadesa

96ff.,

Netti

56ff.,

where

we

incidentally

see

that the former

is

inadequate

and

hardly explains

the

idea).

This

investigation

is

explained

as that the

teaching

with

discussion

of 'nature'

(jpakati)

has various

concepts

under

lying

it, for

example

the 'truths',

'groups', 'spheres',

'elements' or 'facul

ties'.

A

text can therefore be clarified in the

light

of one of

these,

whichever

may

be

relevant. More than

one

may

be

relevant,

for

example

more than

one of the four

'truths',

in which

case further

types

of

'concept'

are noted.

Thus the same text

may give

rise

to a

concept

of

'full

understanding'

in

relation to

'unhappiness',

to a

concept

of

'abandoning'

in relation

to

'origination',

and so on.

In

other words we

have a second

series of

con

cepts

subordinate

to

the first. A

single

doctrine,

such as the

'groups'

or the

'truths',

is

thus

taught through

various

concepts.

4. We now

come

to

the commentaries on the

Tripitaka

of

this

school.

The versions we

have,

in

Pali,

were

mostly

prepared by

Buddhaghosa,

supplemented

by Dhammapâla

(I)

and others.

They

contain the

explana

tions,

accumulated

by

numerous

teachers,

of the texts

we

have so

far

examined,

the most fruitful

among

them

for

our

present study being

the

Abhidhamma. The

Visuddhimagga

of

Buddhaghosa,

a

systematic

review

of

the

doctrine

prefixed

to the

commentaries,

is to be taken with these

as

representing

the final

phase

of their

development.

On the

whole,

these

commentators,

Buddhaghosa

and his followers, use the term

'concept'

rather

rarely

in their

exegesis,

but

assume its

meaning

known.

No

doubt




9/17

188 A.

K. WARDER

they

follow

the

methods

of the

Nettippakarana,

but

they

do

so without

any pedantic

outward show

of

applying

its

armoury

of technical terms.

Where the word

'concept'

occurs in the Sutra Pitaka it is

generally

ex

plained simply

as

'making

known' or

'making

understood',

possibly

through

a

variety

of

synonyms

(e.g.

DA

pp.

504

and

885).

It

is

only

when

we

come to the

special

discussions

in,

or

implied by,

the

Abhidhamma

texts

that we find new theories

propounded.

The

impression

is that

these

are

not due

to

Buddhaghosa

(who

wrote our

present

commentaries on

all the Abhidhamma texts as well as on the main Sütra texts) but are

simply

recorded

by

him from the old

sources

he used. He does not

think

it worth

reviewing

them in his

Visuddhimagga.

The

commentary

on The

Concept

of a Person

offers

the

most

com

plete

account of

'concepts'

so

far

(pp. 171-176). Twenty

four

types

of

concept

are

defined,

beginning

with the six mentioned in the text commen

ted

on.

First,

'concept'

itself is more

fully

defined.

It is

showing

a

determined doctrine

(paricchinnadhammanidassana).

This

includes

mak

ing

understood

something

which is

being

taught

and

also

proposing

something already

well known. The

expression concept

of a name is

used for these

topics

proposed

for

showing

the

various doctrines. Thus

concept

of

a

group

is a

'name' in this

sense.

Outside

the

'Pâli'

(i.e.

the canonical

texts),

six

types

of

concept

accord

ing

to a

scheme

of

the

'commentaries' are defined

('commentaries'

means

here

certain sources used

by

Buddhaghosa,

or

possibly

a

predecessor).

Of these

six,

the first two are basic:

(1)

a

concept 'occurring'

(vijjamána),

(2)

a

concept

'not

occurring'. 'Occurring'

here means

that

there

is

a

reality

corresponding

to the

concept;

'not

occurring'

that there is no such

reality,

that the concept is in fact a pronominal term. We are already familar

with

both

types

of

concept,

only they

had

not

been named and defined:

the

concepts

of

'group', 'sphere',

'element',

'truth' and

'faculty'

are

'occurring';

the

concept

of a

person

is 'not

occurring'.

One

might

also

translate

that

'group',

etc.,

are 'instantiated' and

'person'

'not

instantiated'.

This

concept

of

'occurring'

and 'not

occurring' concepts

enabled Thera

vàdin

philosophers

to

cover the entire

range

of

discourse

conceptually

without

any inconsistency,

dividing

all

terms and statements into 'in

stantiated' and 'not

instantiated',

or in other words into the

two

levels

we noted at the

beginning

of this

paper.

The

other

four

types

of

concept

in this set of six involve

combinations




10/17

THE CONCEPT

OF A

CONCEPT 189

of

the first

two,

in other words

compound

ideas or terms which

might

not

be

purely

at

either

level. Thus :

(3)

a

concept

'not

occurring

with occur

ring'

is for

example

a

person having

the

three

sciences ,

where

'person'

is unreal

but

the occurrence of the

three

sciences is a real

event;

(4)

a

concept 'occurring

with

not

occurring'

is

for

example

'matter'

(real)

qualified

as 'woman'

(unreal); (5)

a

concept 'occurring

with

occurring'

is for

example

stimulus of the sense of

sight ,

where both 'stimulus' and

'sight'

are

real;

(6)

a

concept

'not

occurring

with not

occurring'

is for

example

'son of a warrior'

(neither real).

The

remaining

twelve

types

of

concept

are

introduced,

in two sets of

six,

as outside the commentaries

(evidently

as

they

once

stood)

but

according

to the scheme

of the teachers . The first is in fact the con

cept

based

on ,

which

we have

met in the

Pâli

itself,

in the Kathdvatthu.

Here the idea is

developed

with a

series

of

examples

of

interest,

presum

ably

due to the 'teachers'.

First there is the

example

we have met

already,

of a

'being' (satta)

based

on

matter, sensation,

consciousness,

etc.

(the

'groups').

Then

there is the 'school'

example

of

the

'chariot'

(as

a

whole)

based on its

parts.

A

'pot'

or a

piece

of 'cloth', and so on, are

concepts

based on

objects

seen,

or

registered

by

the other

senses,

i.e.

concepts

imposed

on sense data.

The

concepts

of 'time' and 'direction' are

based on

the revolutions of the Sun and Moon.

Anything

conceived as the

counter

part, having

the

features,

of

something

actually

observed is a

concept

based on . Such

a

concept,

it

is

added,

is not one which makes

something

understood but instead

one

which

itself

requires

to be made understood.

Secondly

we

have 'relative'

(upanidhi) concepts

;

for

example

the series

of ordinal

numerals,

'second' relative to

'first',

'third' relative to 'second'

and so on; also 'long' relative to 'short', 'far' relative to 'near' and the

like.

A vast

range

of

concepts

is covered

here,

extending

as

far

as charac

terising

a

village according

to

the social class of the

majority

of its in

habitants and other

usages

of

language.

A 'collective'

(samodhdna) concept

is for

example

an

'eight steps'

(i.e.

a

chessboard)

or a

'heap

of

grain'.

The series of cardinal

numbers

'two', 'three',

'four',

etc.,

exemplifies

the

'adjacent' (upanikkhitta) concept.

A

'produced by'

(tajja)

concept

is a

(real) property,

referring

to the

'own-nature'

(sabhdva)

of a natural element, for

example

'hardness' as

property

of

the element

'earth'.




11/17

190

A. K. WARDER

A

concept

of

'extension'

(santati)

refers to

the

absence

of a break in

continuity,

for

example

an

'eighty-year-old'.

Of the

preceding

six

concepts,

only

the

'produced by'

is

'occurring'.

The

concept

of 'function'

(kicca)

is for

example

of a

person

by

his

function,

such as

explainer

of the

meaning .

It

may

be

'not

occurring

with

occurring'.

The

concept

of

'shape'

or

'figure' (samthána),

which is 'not

occurring',

is for

example

'thin', 'fat',

'circular',

'square'

and

the like.

The

concept

of

'gender'

(liñga)

is

for

example

'woman' or

'man'.

This

is 'not

occurring',

but we

may

note here that

according

to this

school

'femininity'

and

'masculinity'

are

'occurring'

material elements

(dham

mas)

;

it is

thus

the

personification

which is 'not

occurring',

not the sexual

nature itself.

A

concept

of

'region' (bhümi)

is for

example

the

name

of a

country,

which

is

'not

occurring'

;

the

planes (avacara)

of

experience

and

meditation,

however,

are

'occurring'.

A

'proper

name'

(paccatta)

as

concept,

such as

'Tissa',

is of course

'not

occurring'.

Lastly

there

is

the

concept

of

the

'unsynthesised'

or 'unactivated'

(asañkhata),

a

reality

made understood

by

such words as

'extinction'

(nibbána,

Sanskrit

nirvana)

and 'cessation'

(nirodha):

this is

'occurring'.

The

commentary

on the Kathâvatthu adds little

except

an

explanation

of'based on'

(upàddya)

in the

expression 'concept

based

on',

namely

that

it means 'conditioned

by' (paticca),

'depending

on'

(âgamma),

'not

without that'

(na

virtá

tañí) (p.

26).

The Yamaha

commentary

has

nothing

but the

note

(pp. 60-61)

that outside the five

'groups'

there is

only

'extinction' and

'concept',

an idea

possibly

borrowed from

Buddhadatta,

Buddhaghosa's

elder

contemporary,

to whom we must

now turn.

5. Buddhadatta

(5th century

A.D.)

wrote an

Introduction

to

the

Abhid

hamma

(Abhidhammàvatàra),

as

an

independent

manual

summarising

the

doctrine of the Abhidhamma

and

introducing

students

to

it.

He

undertakes

his

exposition by following

the traditional

order

of

analysis

of

the 'ele

ments'

or 'natural

phenomena' (dhammas)

as

inaugurated

by

the Dham

masangarti.

Coming

to the end

of

this, however,

he asks : Is

this

as

much

as is to be

known,

or is there

something

else? His answer is that there is

'concept' (p. 83).

He

begins

his

exposition

of

'concept' by

saying

it is




12/17

THE

CONCEPT

OF A

CONCEPT 191

'requiring

to be made understood' as well as

'making

understood',

quoting

the

list

of

approximate synonyms

for it which

we have found

in

the

Niddesa

and the

Dhammasañgani.

He

defines

all

these,

making

clear

that

they

are

all

in effect

aspects

of

'concept'.

He

adds some further

explana

tions of

'concept',

making

its

range

of

meaning

more

general,

or

at

least

more

explicit.

Thus the

pronoun

T

(aham),

in the first

place

and

most

significantly

in view of

what we have said

above,

is

explained

as

a con

cept

based

on,

conditioned

by,

caused

by,

matter

and other

elements .

This is the type of the concept, established by the convention of the world

only

and

defying

the

transient nature

of

the elements it is based on.

Buddhadatta continues with an account

of

some of the

types

of

con

cept,

which

varies somewhat from that in the

commentary

on the

Con

cept

of a

Person ,

suggesting

he

had

used some of the same sources

as

Buddhaghosa

but not

exactly

the

same,

or had

interpreted

them differ

ently. Concepts

are of

three

types: 'produced by',

'based on' and

'relative'.

'Produced

by'

in this

case means

any concept

which arises

according

to

the scheme :

'sight', 'hearing',

'visible

object',

'sound', 'earth', 'heat',

'air',

etc. This is not

immediately

clear, but it

appears

to mean the

establishing

of

concepts

through

the

senses

or

empirically, resulting

in the sets

of

elements

recognised

in the Abhidhamma.

Concepts

'based on' are

firstly

of two

types,

'manifold'

(samüha)

and

'simple'

(asamüha).

A

'manifold

concept'

is

based

on a manifold of ele

ments,

for

example

'bear',

'hyena',

'elephant',

'horse',

'pot',

'cloth',

etc.

A

'simple concept'

is for

example

'direction',

'space',

'time',

'sign',

'ab

sence'

(abhâva),

'cessation',

etc. It is

concepts

based

on

which are now

divided

into the six

varieties,

'occurring',

'not

occurring',

and

so

on,

which

we have met already. An 'occurring' concept indicates something ulti

mately

real

(paramattha),

a 'not

occurring' concept something

which

is

a

mere

name

(námamatta).

A

'relative'

concept

is in fact a

variety

of

concept

based

on,

one

concept

depending

on

another,

'short' on

'long',

'long'

on

'short',

'human

misery'

on

'royal

or

divine

happiness'

and

so on.

After this

discussion,

Buddhadatta continues

appropriately

with a

chapter

on the

so-called

'agent' (kâraka),

which is another

pronominal

expression

equivalent

to

'soul' or 'self'. Both

chapters

conclude with an

affirmation of the two levels of statement or 'truth', 'ultimate'

(real)

and

'concealing'

(worldly conventions),

in other

words

concepts 'occurring'




13/17

192 A. K. WARDER

and

concepts

'not

occurring'

: there is no third

possibility.

With this work

Buddhadatta

added a new

topic

or

category

to the

standard

Abhidhamma

categories

classifying

the

recognised

'elements'.

The

traditional

categories

are four in

number:

'thought'

(citta),

'mental

phenomena' (volition,

etc.),

'matter' and 'extinction'

(nibbâna).

These include

everything ultimately

real. But it is

necessary

to discuss

what

is not

ultimately

real,

'concealing

truth',

'mere names'. Buddhadatta's

conceptualisation

of all

discourse

makes this

possible

within the Theravàda

system;

later

writes of the

school

followed his method.

6. Ânanda

(10th

century A.D.)

in his Mülatlká or

sub-commentary

on

the

Abhidhamma

distinguishes (p.

129)

two kinds of

concept: concepts

based

on ,

which

are

wordly usages 'requiring

to

be made

understood'

(paññápetabba),

and

'name-concepts' (concepts

of

names),

which

are

'making

understood'

(paññápana).

The latter

convey

the

former,

and

also

convey

the

ideas of the

real

elements such

as

'matter',

through

the

hearing

into consciousness.

Dhammapâla (II,

pupil

of

Ânanda,

10th

century A.D.)

in his

short

manual

Saccasañkhepa,

Summary

of the

(Two)

Truths ,

sets out the

doctrine of the Abhidhamma

under the two

general headings

'ultimate

truth' and

'concealing

truth',

where the second is

synonymous

with

'concepts'.

He thus

follows Buddhadatta's

arrangement,

abridging

the

older

work,

and

in

particular

the final section is an

abridgement

of

the

chapter

on

'concept'.

Dhammapâla

introduces the

topic by

saying

that

the

concealing

truth

speaks

of

things

which

are not real

(avatthu),

such

as

'beings',

etc.

(p.

24). 'Concepts'

are

in the first

place

of two

kinds,

'occurring'

and

'not

occurring'.

After brief notes on

language

and indi

cating

that

concepts (and

'concealing truth')

can be used

towards

ex

pounding

the

doctrine,

Dhammapâla

mentions

concepts

based on

matter,

etc.,

as

requiring

to

be

made

understood. He concludes with the

six

types

'occurring',

etc.

Anuruddha

(I,

of

Ceylon,

12th

century)

in his somewhat

similar,

but

fuller,

manual

Abhidhammatthasañgaha presents 'concept'

in a

different

way (p.

39).

The context is

a review of

'conditions'.

A condition

(paccaya)

is a kind

of

element

(dhamma),

hence

Anuruddha

goes

on

to

say

that

there

are

three

types

of

element,

namely 'concept',

'sentience'

(or

here

'immaterial' in

general, nâmà)

and

'matter'.

'Concept'

is of

two

kinds,




14/17

THE

CONCEPT

OF A

CONCEPT 193

'requiring

to be made understood' and

'making

understood'.

Concepts

of

the first kind are conceived on the

basis of

the

changing

features of

what is real

(bhüta). They

are

imagined (parikappiyamána)

on the

basis

of,

or

relative

to,

this

as

objects

in

thought

shadowing

real

objects.

The

second kind

are 'names'. Anuruddha concludes with the six

types

'oc

curring',

etc. His

apparently

original

idea that a

concept

is a kind of

element

is

surprising,

going beyond

Buddhadatta's

position

and

adding

an element to the received list in the Abhidhamma

and

its

commentaries.

It is

perhaps

a

logical

addition, since

originally

the elements were con

ceived as

including

everything

real,

but

hitherto

a

concept

could

be

real,

or

'occurring',

only

in the sense that the

object corresponding

to it

might

be

'occurring'.

With

Anuruddha,

'concept'

seems to have

emerged

as an

element

in its

own

right,

not reducible to others.

The

Námarüpapariccheda,

a much

more detailed and

comprehensive

manual of

Abhidhamma,

seems to

be the

work of

the same

Anuruddha,

since there are

significant agreements

of doctrine

between the two books.

Here he

says

(p. 53)

that there are three kinds of

condition,

namely

'con

cept',

'immaterial' and

'material',

and continues much as in the other

work.

The

Paramatthavinicchaya

of

Anuruddha

II

(of

Kâficï,

also 12th

century)

is much more elaborate on

'concept'

and on the other

hand

appears

as a

complete

working

out

of Buddhadatta's idea of the

topics

of

Abhidhamma. The book is in five

parts: 'thought',

'mental

elements',

'matter',

'extinction' and

'concept',

each divided into

several

chapters.

'Concept'

occupies

Chapters

27-29. This

Anuruddha

says by way

of in

troduction to his book that

ultimate

reality

(paramattha)

is of four

kinds

(the firstfour parts of his work) and 'concept' of two kinds, concept of

a

name

(námapaññatti,

cf.

the

commentary

on

The

Concept

of a

Person

above)

and

concept

of an

object

(or

of

a

'meaning',

atiha

paññatti) (verses

6 and

7).

Chapter

27 is on

'concept'

in

general,

Chapter

28 on

concept

of an

object

and

Chapter

29 on

concept

of a

name .

A

concept

of an

object

is a

conceptual

object

such as a

'being'

or a

'collection'

(sambhára,

of

parts

into a

supposed

'whole')

or

a

'shape',

and

so

on,

superimposed

by usage

on features

having imagining

as their basis

(1066).

A

concept

of a

name

is

a name

making

some

object (or

mean

ing)

understood. There are two kinds of

'object',

ultimate

reality

(para

mattha)

and

conceptual

object

{paññattattha)

;

in other

words

conceptual




15/17

194

A. K.

WARDER

objects

(and

concepts

generally)

do

not

overlap

with the

ultimately

real

elements discussed

in the

previous parts

of

the

book

but form a

distinct

category.

A

conceptual

object

or

concept

of

an

object

is

therefore

a

concept

based

on

(1070).

'Concealing

truth',

being concepts,

is

hence

of two

kinds,

conceptual objects

and

names.

These with 'ultimate truth'

make

up

three kinds

of

meaning

to be known.

Ultimate truth is

'not

contradicted'

(avisamvádaka)

by

the nature of

reality;

concealing

truth is

'not contradicted'

by

the

agreed

usage

of the

world

(1083-1084).

In other

words one discourses in

conformity

to the

linguistic usages

of the world

when

using everyday

language,

even when

teaching

doctrines which

are

true

(thus

teaching

them

indirectly).

On the other hand in

philosophical

discourse one

speaks

simply

in

conformity

to

reality.

The

conceptual

objects

or

concepts

of

objects

are for

example 'beings'

such

as 'human

beings'

and the

like,

also the

'agent'

or

the

'experiencer'

supposed

to

transmigrate

from existence to existence. This

'being'

is

imagined

as

the

'person',

'I', 'self',

'other',

'woman',

or 'man'. It

is

not

spoken

of

apart

from the

'groups'

(which really

occur)

and

is

thus

a

way

of

speaking

of the

groups

themselves. When we

speak

of a

person 'dying'

or

'being

born',

and so

on,

we

are

speaking metaphorically (upacáratas)

of

the

splitting up,

etc.,

of

the

groups.

A

'person'

cannot

be

spoken

of as

'one'

or

'manifold'

or

'annihilated'

or

'eternal'.

Besides

this

'being'

concept,

there

are nine other

types

of

concept

of

an

object ,

namely

'collection',

'shape',

'combination'

(e.g.

'chariot',

'house'), 'development' (transformation,

e.g. 'yogurt'), 'imaginary'

(vikappa, purely conceptual

entities such as

'time',

'space'

and

'direction'),

'copy'

('counterpart'

of

something

perceived),

'feature'

(e.g. 'lightness'),

'usage' (e.g.

a 'serious

transgression')

and

'superimposing'

(e.g.

'that is

the

universe',

'that is

my

soul',

'permanent',

'eternal',

etc.,

and

all

the

false

concepts

of other

schools of

philosophy).

The

chapter

on the

concept

of a name is

primarily

concerned

with

language

and

linguistic

categories,

such

as

types

of

noun and

how

they

originate.

The six

types

of

concept, 'occurring',

'not

occurring'

and so on

are

given

here, however,

as

types

of

concept

of a

name,

and the work

concludes with these.

The

Paramatthavinicchaya

appears

to

represent

the

culminating

point

of

Theravàda

discussion about

concepts.

Short

of

putting 'concept'

first

and

subsuming

the

discussion

of

the

ultimately

real

elements

under this

it




16/17

THE

CONCEPT

OF A CONCEPT

195

would

hardly

be

possible

to

develop

the

concept

of

a

concept

further.

The excellent and

comprehensive

manual

of

Kassapa,

Mohavicchedanl

(late

12th

century), though apparently

aware of

all the

preceding

discus

sions,

does not seem

anywhere

to

go

beyond

them,

and its

plan

as an

exposition

of

the Abhidhamma

itself,

with

its

commentaries,

hardly

allows

for

innovations.

Nevertheless

Kassapa brings

in

concept

of

a name

and

concept

of an

object

under the main discussion

on

concept

of a

person

(p. 246):

the former can be

'occurring',

the latter are

not

'occurring'.

This

was

perhaps

the best

attempt

which could be made towards

reconciling

the

two

Anuruddhas,

also towards

bringing

the

commentary

tradition

into line with the innovations

begun by

Buddhadatta.

Where

Kassapa

discusses

the six

types, 'occurring',

etc.,

in

detail

(pp.

110-111),

however,

he seems to

agree

with

Anuruddha

of

Káñci.

It

may

be

useful

to

summarise

the main trend of these discussions in

the

form of a

diagram,

following primarily

Anuruddha

of

Káñci:

KNOWABLE

REALITY

matter

f

ensations

rol

gji

perceptions

£

CONCEPTS

NAMES

CONCEPTUAL OBJECTS

(making

understood)

(requiring

to be made

understood)

forces

(volition,

etc.)

language

(usage of the world)

consciousness

|

'

(thought)

4

occurring

'being'

'person'

extinction

{.nirvana)

(including

synonyms

for

the same

reality)

not

occurring

►

'I

►'agent'

►

'man'

'horse'

'pot'

'time'

'square'

( collections, shapes, etc.)

('concepts

based

on')




17/17

196 A.

K. WARDER

There

remains

one

other

writer on

'concept'

whose

contribution

must

be

noted,

though

it

takes

us

into

linguistics

rather

than

philosophy.

Taking

the Netti

analysis

as his

starting point, Aggavamsa (middle

of the

12th

century)

in his Saddaniti

explains 'concept'

as

that which causes a

meaning

to

be discerned

(or

causes one to be

conscious

of

it) by sharpening

the

intellect and

producing

satisfaction in various

ways

(pp.

908-909).

He

then illustrates

'concept'

by

quoting

such manifold

explanations,

of ele

ments such as

'matter',

in

other words discourses

which are 'elaborate

expositions'

and of which

'concept'

is the

meaning (cf.

the

Netti,

above).

This is

'making

understood'

by

means of an

'elaborate

exposition'.

After

wards

(pp.

911-912)

he refers to Ânanda's distinction of 'name

concept'

(concept

of

a

name)

and

'concept

based

on',

but

appears

dissatisfied

with

it

since

all

concepts

are

by

nature names or

speech.

The

'meaning'

con

veyed by

a

linguistic

expression

cannot

ultimately

be

separated

from

'speech' (sadda).

University of

Toronto

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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and

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Nikàya,

M

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ut

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in

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Mohavicchedani

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A. K.

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Documents

The Concept of a Concept a k Warder