THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL

SOLUTION NO

THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL

Map Pn>bl«r-. No ?. S « H M .

LDIVIDUAL , . -^ i«vO

Ut CASE OP RBPLY ^0 BE RETURNED TO RECEPTACIJ: BY 0:00 A.M.

m - c A o. e. 6«b., Fcri u«»«o••«!)-1-ivt»-»y

• THE CQ7\jTIJJAND AND GENERAL s:r~~]' OOHOOL

Fort Leave_worth. Kanaa8 May 21, 1931.

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II llBMORANDTJM FOR: Th. Direotor. 2nd Y&ar Class. Command and General

staff f»hool. ]'ort LeaveJ1worth. Kusa••

SUBJ.oo~: A stud.y of the organizatio. of the Cavalry Divisloa.

I. PAP'EIiS AOCOM2 AHYINGI "" .

1. .A. bibliography' of' thia study.

2. Annex No.1, consisting of' charts numbered from 1 to 11 , incl

3. An••x 'No.2, oonsisting of a series of personal letters numbered from 1 to 14, inolusive. (2 omitted)

II. !1M fINIJ PUIllt., "I. the present organization of the Ca_lr Division satisfaotory? If not, what ohanges therein should be made. and why?

Ill. FACTS AND 00l~SlDERATIONS ~LAJING TO THE ~UDY:

1. Sl••8 tae renlt. of a study of this charaot.r are largely thear_tieal and dep.nd more on individual opinion than on concrete fact. it appear. de.irable attn. beginnin« to go very briefly into the mislio of cavalry general17. and the missiOB of the cavalry dlvisioa specifioall,-,1. order to get a olear conoeption of wut 1. required of the organizatioaunder eons1deratioa, and what it normal11 may be expeoted to accompli... The presoat Field 3erTl0' Regalatlona in ge~eral term., and Tae Cavalry Field Manual 1n _peoifio term. defines the mission of cavalry as fo 11oW8.

a. ,t The primary mission of cavalry 18 to provide the army with a highly mobile combat element. Typical oavalry m1ssions are sueh a. demaBdfor their efficie.t ex.cutioR the cavalry obaracterlstica--viz: superior mobility and the ability to fight both mounted and dismounted.."

b. "The charaoteristi•• of cavalry arc thu' the determinin« faotor. in the assi~~ent of speoifi. mission.. The.e miSSions, in addition to the primary misslOR of providing the arm; With a bighly mobile combat element, include:

(1) Heoonl1aissanoe and counter-reconnaissa.noe; (2) Slourity for other foreel, on the maroh, at th~ halt

and in the main battle; (3) Offensive and defensive aotio. in cooperation With

other arms in the main battle; (4) Delaying hostile force. or holding terrain of tacti

cal importance until the arrival of other friendly troops;

(5) L1a180a. (oj illxplo1tation of a break-thrOUgDl

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(7) P\1r.ult; I (8) CaTering a witkdrawal; I(9) Raid.; 1 I (lO) Pro.iding a mobile reserve.' I

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In the speoifi. refereice to tbe oavalry division, these same text. i!

n II.... rescrib.:

~ I e. It The Gavalry division consiat. of: division headquarters, I

division speoial troops, two or more brigades, one f~eld artillery I regiment (horse), one oombat engine,r battalion (mounted), one ar-i mored oar squadroa, one medical squadroB, and one di vi sion train:' I

d. I' The ".valr, division is a.n ad..l11inistrative and taotioal II

unit. It contains within itself means tor supply and for oombat asi & unit, and is the only oavalry or~~nlzation that organically in- ; eludes artillery, armored oars,and tanks. " (1) I 2. Tho present cavalry organization as outliDed in Table 40lW is I

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not one voluntarily prepared and approved by the Chief of Cavalry, and I adopted by the War Department on his recommendation. It i. not what the I cavalry service wanted. o. the other hand, it is a political expedient I brought about by the enforced annual ineremen~. in the air corps with- I out a corresponding increase in the authorized aggregate strength of tho I'

regular army. and by the .conomy program or the federal admlnistratl0.. i

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i 3. Under suoh circumstance. of origi., it is to be expeoted, I

therefore, that there 8hould be muoh left to be d••ired in the present !

lng supposed ~efiei.n.i•• in th. present organizatioa and component I

uni ta, but time and apace prevent. oonside.ration of all of th.a. Some .1-,-of the construotiv. ori tiaism. of the preseRt organizatioa, and th.{"~:~.e"oi+~".~"'pmenadat.ion. to eliminate or minimize the mostappa-rent defeot. are a...-----"\ '

or~~nizatio •• A very great many recommendation. have been made coneern-I

follow.: I

a. 'faetical Orga.nizatloa: II

(1) (a) TAe present organization of the troop and sqUadi !

ron 1a not adaptable to appropriate sub-division for I

combat in accordance with aocepted principles of cavalry tactie.. I

I (b) The balis of the above critici.m is that the ~i commander of a small cavalry unit will rarely,if ever want to divide his cormnand into equal parts for oomba, nor will he waat to use it three parts in one force I

. &.nd one in the other •. No other SU.b-diViSiOUS are pos1sible in the two and four unit organization. Without spli tting basic uni tl. I (c) TA8 recommendation to meet this objeotion is the triangular organizatiOR to include the regiment, i. e. a regiment of three squadron., of three troop., of tare. platooll', of three .quaa.. eacll. _

(2) (a) Tae variatio•• aa to detailed organization recommended are Dumerou., but the majority of opinion

meni, but a two unit formatioa above the regiment to lnelude the brigade and dlvl.io••

favor. tAe triangular organization to include the re

(b) T•• propOBent. of the trl&n~~lar orgdnization' recognize the logi. of extending it to the brigade and division and ••••iders it very deSirable from a

(1) 1: 17-19, 2: 2-4 -2

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I I ! I !taet18alviewpoi.t, but.believl such a comma.d, I

with ••c.llary iRoreaae. i. auxl11iary aDd servioe i unit. aad the eo•••quoDt increaled diftliultie. i. I supply ...4 traasportatiorl, would 10.8 it. molt d'.4 sirable eharaottriatil--high mobility, and abilit7 I to maneuver rapidl,. It 11 recognized t~t i. 01'- I del' to retain the desired mobility in the diviaiOJl, I 80me desirable point • .ust be aacrificed. I (0) Therefore t·he reeommeDdat10•• fawra divi.1oB I of two briga.de. of two regiment•••ell. (a)· 1

II (3) (a) TWo objeotioB' ar8 made to tae present rlfl. I

troop, o.t,tlaat the troop ia-too large and unw.ild1!I to be tffiQi.nily cO~ia.d.d by 0.' oaptai. or to I

have tlao high. dege. of mobi11 ty a troop InU.t have, iI ad two, the prese.t a.signment of two aapta,ins to IIi & troop violate. the prinoiple. of tn. h1erarohy ofl

command, 1. un-AmerioaB, &ad uusound psyeh010giOallf'I (b) TAe•• two oriticism. will be consldered togeth+I .r. It 18 pointed out that the mere fact that t~~!

,I captains are assigned to one troop i8 ~n admiaaion I II that the troop ia too large for on. troop oommandert I It il therefore neither one troop nor two, and has I

no place in the scheme of organizatioa. It 1. alsol pointed out that tAe maohine-rifle platoon mater- ! ially deereas•• tAe mobility and maneuverability ofl the troo, Without compensating advantages. !

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(0) apl_loB o. this point very strongly favor a I troop consisting of a headquarter. detaohment, end J thr•• platoo••, of three aquadl .ac., total sir,mgt. about 95 me.. If additional fir. pow.r is desired v With the troop, it should b. attached from higher echelon., either from a fourth (maohine-gun) troop I

I in the squadron, or from the reiimental machin.-~~nl I troop. (2) "!

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It b. Headquarter. and special Troop.: II'

(1) (aJ ~•• ~ank Company should be omitted from the I II special troops of the divisional organizatloa. (3)1

I (b) The present type of tank With its low mobilityl

II and limited radius of aotion is wholly unsuit.d to !I

the ale1 oombat mobility and wide radius of actiQ. required of modern cavalry. It 1s designed to sup-I

I port rand aoeOmpaJl1 dismounted attaokl apinst veryl strong, ooordinat.d opposition, a type of combat I'I cavalry will very rarely undertake, except 1. stab-,

I alizsd warfare when operatin, a. infantry. II'

I (oj It is proposed to replace this type of taakI with a .quadroB of light fast tank. with a mobility II of not lesa than 40 mile, per hour on roadl, 20-26 il mile. per hour aerosa oountry, amd an op~rating I

range of at lealt 100 mil,. o. on. fill of gasoline II IIII (1) A2: 1-2-6-9-12!i (2 ) A2: 1-2-5-6-8-9

(3) A2: 1-2-5-6-7II ! I I I -3I I

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(2) (al The field artillery regiment should be orgaD- ! ized into three battalion. of two or three batterie.l eack aDd maiRtalned aa borse artillery. (1) I (b) The baiia for tbe proposed reorganization and I inorease in the artillery regiment is much the lame ! a. in a. (1) (b) aboT'. In normal offonsive action l a oavalry oommand will be divided into a base of fir~ and a maneuvering forc.. The battalion i. the lowe8~

artil~ery echelo. ·with .,~let. fire eontrol and eom~

municationa equipment. Under the present orgaBizatid. if a. battaliOB i. attached to the maneuvering forel, I half the artillery i. out of the aetiOD during a cri~ieal time while the maneuvering. forc. is moving to ! position and preparing foz the attaCk. At the same j time the artillery support behind the pivot is so I weak th.re i. not sufficient fire to protect the man4 euveri.g foree, meet possible attaoks from unexpecte4 direotio••, cover target. of opportunl ty, or tor ! anti-taDk or armored car defense. qplitting a batt&1 lioR decreas•• effectiveness and oontrol and should I be avoided. !

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(e) Hence the propolal to add a third battalion to I the artillery regimen'. I

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(3) (a) It has frequently been suggested that one batta~ !

lion of the artillery regiment should be paCk artill~

ery, for use when the division 18 operating in an &_ I rea where Wheeled vehicles cannot go at all, or cann~t keep up with oardlry troop.. (2) I

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(b) TAil proposal is based on the assumption that I suclt instanoe. will frequently ooeur in tlte probable I theatres of operation of AmeriO&D eavalry on the ! Uorth Amerioan continent and in the insular 1'016868- I ions of the United St.te•• But it appears that the iI best thought among artillery officers of experience I is oppo••d to pack artillery as an organic l)a~t of I the divisional artillery. They maintain that instano~ es Where horae artillery cannot follow CU'ld keep up ! wi th the oavalry will be rare, and in the few cases I that do oocur, it can be foreseen long enough in ad- ! vance to ~llow pack artill~ry to be attached from I higher echelon.. I

iI (e) Final reoommendation. on this disputed POill_ II must c0!!18 , it a.ppears, from resulja ot' experiments I

now being conducted by the Cavalry Board. (2) IIi II (4) (a) Due to equipment and ~teri.l required to be !

carried and the time and labor involved in construct-iII iOD, wire communioation in all headquarters echelon.!'I below the division should be repl~ced by up-to-date !

Wireless equipment for cOlmllunioation.. (3) III " I

(b) For a light mobile foroe the equipment and mater~II iel for wire communioation. other th.4i.n hook-up sets I

for use of existing commercial linea, and the time 'II required for oOR.,ructio. eve. of short linea il out of a.ll proporti~. to the ad~antageB when considered II·II in connection wlth modern wlreless equipm0nt. I

II I (e) Radio, wireless telephone, mounted and motorized''I

I ,1 messenger. are the means of cO~TIunication most favor-I ably considered for Small cav~lry units. Hook-up

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1 A2: 1-2-4-9-12 (2) A2: 1-3-10 / (3) £2: 3-8 IIII -4II

• •et. for ettting in on existing oommercial lines will be carried by .11 communications echelons. The division signal troop will continue to c~rry

sufficient equipment and materiel for wire commuII nications with the usual establishments.

(5) (al The Ordnance Company should be omitted from I the division fPeoial troop. and such repairs as can~ not be done in organizations should be done by aam~

uni t. or sent to the cOIIDunicationa zone. (1) !

I(b) In active operations it is contended it would I be more. economical to send equipment to Ci.rmy uni t. ! or to the cornmunieationa zottCt for repair than to i ha.ve an ordna..e. company trail around a.fter a cQ;i.val!ry divisio.. I

(e) R.com~endation as indicated.

.!.. Train. and Tra.nsportatioa, !

(1) (a) The medical squadron should be provided with Ii

sufficient transportation to include a reasonable I reserve of medical supplies for use v.hen the di vi ... ! sion is operating at a distance from its base of I supply. (2) I!

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(b) Reasons apparent. ii

I (e) The addition of two or three light truck. for I

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transporting a small reserve of medical supplie. t would giTe the medical squadron greater indepen- I dence of actio.. . I

(2) (a) Traina of all eoneloll' should mave some organ-i i. equipment to repel attacks from hOltile a.iroraftl, tanka. and armored ear.. .Also all personnel of alll such units should be thoroughly trained in the use!

Iof suoh .~uipm$nt. (3) I

(bl Rea'onB appare.t. I

(e) The addition of hsavy machine-gun. at the rate! of 1 per squadron UBit, with one additional maohin.~ gun and one 37-mm guB per regimental unit, and a I ~latoo. of ~o seetio••, each oonsiating ot two I oaliber .50 machi.e-gaBa and one 37-mm gaB for the I division trains would giTe lome protection againstl attaCks on th••• element. which must oft.» move I outside the protection of their own combat troops. I

(3) (a) Motor-cyclos in all eo~elon. should be repl8c-1 I

ed by light motor ear.. (4) I (b) No oOUllluuai. j

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(0) ReoommendatioD as indicated. I 'I I

(1) A2.: 9-12 I (2) ..A2: 2-5-12 I

i I, (3) A2: 9-12 .1 (4) 12: 10-12 IIII Ii I

II ! ! I q -5- !

• (4) (a) Escort wagons t~'oPlaaed in all eahelons by

light wagons and light motor truoks. (1) I I

(b) Greater mobility of the trains whiOA ar~ now I the lealt mobile unit of the division would result I from replaelnt: the ••oelri wagon's wi th light wagons I where required, and the remainder with 11ght motor I truckl. I

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(0) It 1s proposed to provide one light wag-on per I. . troopaBd similar unit, two per _quadron, reglmen- I tal, aad brigade headquarters, and suoh additional I transportation i. light 'o~a.d-a-b&lf truck I a. i may be required. I

I (5) (a) A ••rvlee troop should be included as an or i

g'elnio part of eao. regime»t. (2) I I

(b) It lias be•• repea.tedly demonstrated that a !s.rvioe troop i» whieh all traBsportatioD can be p061ed, supervised by speoialists, and conserved Ifor emergencie. i8 for tbe best interest. of all. ! Prutloally all tae eombat and many 0 f the s.rVice i branok•• fo 11091 such. a plaa. It laa. always seem.4 I d.sirable i. tho past wi tlt .8cort wa.goll tra.apor- . I lat1oa; it appears all the more d••1rable if motorl trucks replaoe the ea.ort wagou.. Experie••• .has ~. SAo~t.at motlr vehicle., to be officient and reliable, must have mechanical care aDd attention re gularly. Allot1_!: two ormor. trucks to a troop, !

expeeting tae troop to keep tkem i. proper meebanl1 cal condi tio. is out of the question. A reg1men- ! tal garage or maohine shop which has the mean. but I not the responsibili ty for the ma,intainance of tb.. I truckS i. li ttle better. Some a.genoy must be goi v- I en both the mean. aud the responsibility for the I the proper maintainanoe of the motor train if it is to be maintained prop~rly and operate effiCient1 lYe And likewise, for eoonomy in maintainanee and I

administration, it appear. logieal to pla•• the I platoon of armored oar. a.lso in the s.rvi., troop . instead. of the h.adquarter. troop, thereby group- I ins all the mo~or vehiol.a in one organization for I . administration &ad malntainance. I

I (el The proposal is to add to the regiment a ser- ! vice troop cons1stinr of a troop headquarter" a I

transportation platoo., .a arrnored ear Platoon" and I,

the regimental band. Units attached to the regi- l,ment also to be atta.ohed to the service troop for I

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ration., ( medical detachment and miscellaneous I units). I

(6) (a) Beoauso of the 1'r41.o tical difficul ty of secur- ! iug trained packer. in emergenol.J, the Phillips I paok saddle should be adopt.d as standard equipmentfor all paok8 in the divisio.. (3) l (b) Healons apparent. I

I (1) A2: 3-5-6-6-10-12-13. (2.) .42: 9 (3) A2: 12

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• (e) ReoommendatiOD as indicated.

d. Al'Bl8lJleJl t ud Speoial Equlpm••t * (1) (a) lUI to its unltable baa. and fire charaoteri•• l

tie., the machine rifle i8 relatively less useful to oaTalry than a light &ir ...000184 machi•• gun ot only slightly greater weight and much s-eater fire eff8etivene8'. (1)

(b) The machine rifle has been freely critioised sinoe lis adoption in the cavalry service. and i tl retoutioB 1s not looked on favorably by a majority of oavalry officer.. Altaough a. an individual , weapoa the maohine rifle poslesse. considerable meri' it, the maohine rifle squadhaa not .ynchronized j well with the rifl. troop and result. have not bee_l entirely satl.factory. !

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i (e) It has been reoommended numerous tim•• that tn. machine rlfle be replaoed by a light air-cooled ma-I chine gaB. !

(2t (a) Even admitting the limited utility of the ma- I chine rifle, the inolusion of the machine rifle ! platoon as a part of th~ rifle troop is objeetion- ! a.ble beca-us.unquestionably it reduceBthe mobility! of the troop, aDd place. too meny weapons in the i troop for thorough training in the use thereot, Wit~-out compensating advantage.. (1) ;

I i(b) Retention in the troop i8 not favored. nor is !

it considered desirable to organize a IDaQhine rifl. I, troop as a fourth. troop in the squadron. !

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(cJ see recommendation in (1) (e), above. I I I

(3) ta) The inclusion 1. proper echelo•• of the dlViSl~. of heavy machine guns, caliber .50 or larger. il de; sirable to stop hostile armored ca:1 and tanka and ! for anti-air.raft proteetio.. (2) !

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(b) If the light machin. gun troop is added &. a I fourth troop in the squadroa, it has been suggolted I that the armament of the regimental maohine b~n I troop might very well be changed to the beaV7 ma- I ohine gun whioh would be effeotive against hiatil. I armored cars,axi tank•• and aircraft. see also G. (2) above. I

I (0) The recommendation is that i« the light machin~

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gun troop is added to the .quadron, the armament ot I the regimental maohine gun troop be changed to the I heavy (oaliber .50) gun; if the light machin. gun I troop is not added to the squa.dron, th•• change the I armament in not to exceed two platoons of tho reg1- I mental machine gun troop to the caliber .50 gun., I t.. other machine gun platoons retaining tho caliberl .30 gun_, and the 5th platooR composed of 37~ gun~ and a»ti-aircraft weapon.. I

I I(l ) A2: 1-2-5-6-7-8-9-11-13.

(2) A2, 1-2-4-6-8-9-10-11-13. ! I

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(4) (a) Provisl0. should be made for the UI' of smoke I alld gas by suitable eehelon. of the divill0.. (l) !

I lb) The feasibility of developing a simple, light,l derte. for use wi tn. armored cars and light fa.st I tank. for putiiag doWJl ga. and mok. soreen. is aP1 par••i_ Ga' eould be advantaieou.ly used to int.r~

dlet oertaln ar.aa, aDd smoke could be used very I advutageou.l7 in screening tllo movements of tAo i maneuveriDg fore. to attack pOlitio... It might I be pointed out in this conDeotio. that up to· the I present time asatiafactorymen. of protectinc I animals from gal hal Bot bee. de ...,loped. Th. dis- i' tribution of gas by armored car, or tank. 1. desig~ nated a.re•• would be a s.rious handioap to hostile!mounted troop., anlmal-drawn artillery and trains. I

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I (c) I t i. propo sed to dev.lop a device similar to I the one now used Oil aiJ'p1ane. for use wi tn armored Iears and light faat taDk. in putting doWJl gal and

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smoke conce.tratlo... ' ! I

(5) (a) Tlae 37-0111 gun sllould be retained, but the 1m.. I proved 'model sl10uld repla.oe' the presoRt type. Tla'il esaential oharaoteristios of this Weapon should be that it be oapable of going into action luiekly ; from maroh formaiioB, that it have a relatively I

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hig. rate of fire, that it be aocurate up to 1000 I yar~., and can be transported either by pack, on I a separate limber, or i. a wagpn or tru8k. (2) I (b I RealonB a.ppand. I (.. ) R••omme11dationl a 8 indicated. i

(o) (al Rolling ki~oheDs should be r.~ained ol1ly in I completely motorized unitl. In other unit., the I paCk sets should be standard equipment. (3) I

(bl The pr.o~i.abili~y of rolling kitohens With I cavalry i. the fi.ld sal)al..,. bee. questioned. I Tbeyhave be•• the sabjoet of more profanity than I any other single item of equipment used by cavalryl troop.. MeSI .erpant. do not like the., and Wl11J 1f permitted, voluntarily ~ buk to the old field! range and paCk .et. The rolling kitchen is bulky, ! heavy, and decidedly les8 mobile than the light I kitohen pack set that can be carried on the light II_

wage••

(0) aecommendatioDs as indicated. I

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(7) (a) Ea.k regimental headquarter. or service troop I should inolude as an organic part thereof a plaioo, of armored cars, consistiDg of a platoon headquartt erl with thr•• reserve car., and. three' sections otl four ears eae~, total in plaioo. 15 oafS. (4)

( 1) J2.: 12 I (2) Al: 1-2-3-6-8-9-12 (3) A2: 12 I (4) A2: 10-11.

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II (0) The .e.~ for a highly mobile reconnaissanoe a- ! geDcy in th~.gimellit capable of aggressiTe aoiio., I a.Dd of with.tandlnc fire of hoatile covering detaoh-I menta hal lone be.n felt. Inereased mobility and !I, fire power, partioularly the improvement i:a light I automatic weapoBI, improved mean. for observation

II and communicatio•• ~ve all tended to make the unI

I protected agenei•• 1esa reliable on reconnal.sanoe !

mi.~lOB'. The rocommendatioa for an armored earI p1atoo:a to be added to the regiment ia only in lineII with other development. towarda,mechanizatioJ1. II

I'J (.) Recommendatioa &'1 indicated. St. al.. o. (5) III Ii

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I(8) (a) T•• preseai oaliber .30 maeAi•• gun should be III rep1a••d by the oaliber .50 gaB iB the regimental II· !machine gaD troop. (1)

I II (b) Se. d. (3). above. 11 i

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II (e) See d. (3). aboft I j.

II (9) (a) The ThoDlpson sub-maChine gun should be adopted I aa ataadard equipmont for certain individual. in k"

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pOli tiOD' of euh organizatio:a. includiJlg a.ll troop. aad trai. unitl. (2) I

I (b) It is oontended that small u.it commandera a8 II

I well a. eomma.uder s of larger for••• should have a I reserve to throw into the fight at the -crucial tim'.lII A110 1t i8 pointed out that in overy combat thore I oome. a tim. when the leader haa done his bit 1n di~ recti.g the fitht, and there remains notbing furtherl for him to do to influence the fight. Equiplng I leaders of small unit. and men iB key positions Wit~ the sub-ms..hin. guJl. a short-range weapon Of great II shooking power, place. in their hands the needed re~ serTe, the added punoh to turn the tide at the orit~

II ioa1 moment. I iII (0) Ta. recommendation i8 to .quip each non-eommil1

sloned officer, and each enlisted maa in a key pOiilII tiOD wi th tll! s weapoa. !II I

(10) (al The present service rifle should be replaoed b~I a •••1-automati. shoulder r1fl. when sueh weapoB ca~I be produoed 1. sufficient quanti tie.. (3) I I "i I (b) The basi. althis proposal is the desire to in~ I ireasl the fire power of the cavalry unit. partiou- !

1&r1y ia the dismounted fire fight. With the hor.e~ left mobile, the dismounted fir1ne 1i.e i8 usually ! very thia. I

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(0) Reoommendation a. indicated. I (ll) (a) Tke saber should be retained for tradi tional I

reason. aDd for ceremonies &s garriaon equipment 0111 ly, but should be eliminated from the tables of field equipment aa a combat we.poa. (4)

I (1) AZa 1-2-4-6-8-9.10-11-13 I(2) A2: 10-11

I i(3) .1.21 10-11 !

(4) De frequently expressed opi.1oa of roa.y cavalry officers. i I I !I

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• (b) Increased f're power has decreased the probability of close physioal encounter 1. open warfare ei tuatiou.. The day of the ca.valry mounted charge I as a usual form of attack haa passed, in future war. in any country the mount.td attack will be infr.quen•• It followa, therefore, tha.t the saber will :&r"ly b~ .,ed. But, admitting the possibilities for it. 00-1 o&alonal us,, the average American can, With the ! same amount of time and effort, be made a muoh mor, I formidable adversary with an automati. pistol thaD ! he can wi th the saber. I

! (el Recommendation aa indicated. I

I 1 ! I

(1) (al A mechani••d regime.i, cOReistln, of two armor4 ed oar , ••di.. type) .quadro••, 0•• squadron of I light fait taBk', • regimental headetuart•••, and I headquarter. troop, ihould be added to the divisionl as auxilliary troops, under the control of the divi+ slon commander aDd used at his " ••rotion a. t.· ..w' done with the artillery &ad t~.. (1) I

I (b) The present tendencios in all modern coun-trie.l towards mechanization makes it expedient for the u. I

s. to keep abreast of suoh development. In aocordanoe with recent announcement. of the Chief ot staft

I a-d the Chief of Cayalry, a mechanized regiment i8 I II soon to become a reality. ~hen suoh a force is de-l II veloped, experimentation should be oarried out with I

it to determine if its organlzatioB is along sound I II taotieal line. before mechanizatio. is carried fur-l

ther and posaible errors needles817 multiplied. I~ III appear.logioal, therefore, that the mechanized 1'8-1 glment should be included i. the ca~~lry divisl0D, I wher.Jby the oonduot ot maneuvers and tactioal ex- iII ergis••}_ Boulld taotical pri.neiPl•• for the use of 'I·

suoh a force, and the use of present troops wi th suoh a force can be developed. fi~e• • ip.ri•••• ha.1

i demonstaa'e4 the proper employment of suoh a forc., !

I wke. a.'l....)l'.~... 11a"e be•• mad- in orga.niza- I II tl('Ul and'lqu1pme.i, ud whe. other troop. have de- I

veloped souad tactioal prinoiple. in operatio•• wit~

II a meohanls$l regime.i, it i. oonceivable that the I mechanized regimeBt might replaoe ODe mounted reg1-!

I

II

ment In one or botA 'brigad•• of the dlvis101l, or ! that Olle brigade be eo.po.ed of two meohuizecl r,g!-rI ment., the other brigade of two mounted regiment.. I

I (0) •

Recommendation && indicated. Ii

I I I

I i I I

I I

-10- I !

• IV. OPINIONS OF THE AUTHOR.

Diseusaio••

.AD ..a17111 ot ta. factors 1.vol....d indicate. all the aboTo reeommendatioa. merit seriou, co_sideratioa. Fiaal eoaelusio•• thereo. '1

dep.nd v.ry largo17 upon the relatiT' value. plaoed OD the conflioti_, 1

faotor.a involv.4. I In this short pap.r spa•• do•• !lOt pormit a <l.l •••81Q. of all the I

reeommendatiOB' listed. only a few of what are belleTed to be the mor'l 1mpo~taDt one. will b. di,cu8.ed bere. !

I .A. totbe subJeat ot uit or!t'111zatloa it i. believed the tri-I

angular orga»izatioa ia bett.r -.lted to preseDt-day conoeptions of oav-I a1ry taotics thaD are ~ither the daal 0: qua4ra.~lar organization. Thill applle. to all uBit. from the platoo. to the divi810_. but not in the I same degree. It i. believel that in uBit. up to include the regiment i the tria.gular organ1satloa 11 relatiyeI1 more important than in larger I units. S1ze and mobility affect· _aeh other adversely. The larger the I unit, the less mOb.ile it. i.. Mobi11tl deerea••• rapidly beyoDd a unit I of given siz., general11 aceepted to be the regimeDi. Tat type of or~~

izatioa for th.e or1&'84_ ad di'9'i810. therefor. resolve. itsolf into the I relative importa.e. of tactioal mObility and tactical organization. It! is not belei",ed that mobility ie .eriou.I, affected. by the triangular I organizatioa up to include the regiment, particularly if the troop il I & well balanced unit. But, Ihould the 3-unit organizatioB be carried i all the way to the divisioa. it 1. believed the dlvlaioa of three brlgad~s of thre. regiment. eack ~ould be deoidedly less mobile thaD is de.Irabler for modera cavalry. I

A divlsio. of two brigades of three regiment. each presents serious! difficulti•• in the matter of adjustment of auxil11ary and servi.. i troop. of other branches and service. over vvhich th. cavalry has no 01'- I gan1zational control. ~ I

It appearl, therefore. that the triangular forL~tion up;and lnclud-l lng the regiment, and the dual organization for the brigade and divisioal

II must remai. the compromi,ze 161utioB, the organization not Wholly UD&Q- I oeptabl. from either poi.' of Tie.. i

I I:,1Tae tlPe of trausporta'loafor unit trains eould be discussed for

houri. Increas.d mobility 11 hlgkly d••lrable, but posit~v. assurance I that supplies will arriT' t Iven somewhat later, 18 far more important,

,I Consta.nt improvement in road. favora ilu.reali.&, 11" of motor trans:porII.

tio.. But there are .tl11 numerou. va., areaa, and countl.sa smaller I one. in our country where motor tra.aportatio. oannot be reliod upon I 101.1, a, a m.aB. of SUPp17. It would app.ar that any plan for .tor- I iziar trains of low.r _nit. without providiac at the .as. tim. a pool of animal-drawa trallsportatiOD in the divi.lon trai. attttoie.t to meet thol demanda of all units in the dlvisloa w.en _torI are unable to funotioa i il fraught wi tn diffieu1tiel. I

I

In tae matter of armament, the baala for the propo..~ lnorea.. In I ..eapo•• i8 tla.1 urge.t •••4 to maintain the canlr1 relet1Tely near a pari with other arm, and oraDcAe. in amall-arm, fir. and proTide some defens,1 against Ao.tl1. meehanized and al~ for.... TAi. appli.s particularly tol the lower unit, and to the trai•• which aeretofore have had to rely oa I mobility aad disperaio. for the low.r ••it. aad to ChaBO' by the trai••• 1

Mobility &ad dispersIon will coatinue to be an ••t •• tive prot•• tioD a- I ~.in8t hoatil' .e.ka.ised and alr fert•• for tae aDa11 unit.', but sa•• l pasaiv. meaIV•• hTe WO. fe... Tittorl... WAat il .oil more to be d.'ir... 1. aa ag~esaiT' d.t•••• that '1'111 .at. ho.til. attaok. by .e.ka.la.4 I aad air for••, oa small uBits an4 trai.... u.profiiabl. basin.s. for ta_ ' ••my. I

I

-11- I I

org~n

Al-l refers to Annex

.'

A .ar.ful eo.sidoratio_ of the available facte and eo.slderatioD. involved appear. to justify the followias eonolusio.,:

lat. Tkat t.e pro.ent 01'&*Dlzatio. of tAe eavalry' division is not sati .fa. tory.

2nd. Taat 1. order to provide an orgaalzation bettor ad~ptod to sub division for combat nd of appropriate 1$.. for tlle eODm~uld.r eon.er.,d, to iRcrea'l tAe mobility of lower unit. and of unit traina, to inorea•• tAt fir. pow.r of tho division a. a whole .ad of its component unitl, and to provido for a.tiy. defe••e against ho.tile mechanized and llr force., it is bel.ived the pre.eDt orcanlzat1on a.ou1d be changed to provide for a division substantially a. follow'l

a. Divisio. Headquarters ·Al..l b. DivisioB Spe.!a1 Troop• .u-2 (a), (b), (0) to consist of:

Headq.arter. T~oop (a) Sipal Troop (b) Mllitary Poli., Troop (0)

..Two CaTalry Brigad... Al-3-4-5-6-7 d. Field Artillery R.gim••t Al-a e. M,oAanized Reciment Al-' t. Engineer SIuadroll .Al-8 g. U,dical S1uadron .Al-S k. Division Quartermaster Train Al-10 1. Attached Medieal Deta.hment. Al-8 J. Attaohed Chaplainl .u-e. k. Equipment aDd ArmamQnt Al-l1

For more detailed desoription of the above, see Annex No.1.

I

I Ii

It i. realize' the me••an1se' reg1m.at iD the dlvisioD ma,be looked UpOD by ·so•• individual.....w.ai ia t •• light of aa ill.gitimate herita«e. B.t si.e. 1_ t •• ,oura. of eTe.i. t •••e tAiac••a•• to ~" It wOlild •••·..tt.l' tllai till. offspr1••&oll14 b. }a1'1"_' liP ia t.e waf 1t should SO rat.er tllaate 1.a•• 1t to sraw.p by ......, po ••!)l, 1. a• ..trlaadl,aad ..de.1rable ••viro......

Ille 1'.al1...'10. of a •••11&.1••4. toro. a. ~. 01'__1. part of t.. I afll7 aad of ille tanlrr ara 11&7 bl al...4 tro. t •• 1'••••, a8U••••II••t. of t.. C.l.f of Staff &ad t •• Ckiaf of OaTal1'7' W. &1" 1••' .0."1'••4 wi til t.e tae~ tot tlll. .1. .re.tl0. 11 to b.. tlla. WI al'l w1 tll .!M!. 1t 1. to bl, ad lID. w. u. 101.« to \t.. It. Ifo 'b•.aa .ft••tl••, effiele.t fl«.tl.. a...t~ 0.... &1'IIJ. l' 1. at .uw.P to DOW oa1,. laow till •••• ud utrl.d forI. b.~, oppe,•• t •• '.'JI7~ but WI JI1llt allQ lalow laow be,.t it flutltio.' witll otlael' fri••l,. troop.. Co.lt&t taeti.,ra.t be d'Tel.. I

op.d fol' tlll,' .e. for•• , botA for laclapeade.t ...d • .,op.ratlve a.tloa. I Taere Ian be llttle do.b' taat a .e.ha.lald for•• aad moaate4 oavalry po••••a ,.staat.rl.tl•• ma~117 b••efieial o.e to t•• other, t.at will make ea•• mol" eff••tlft. Bat it 1. 80••ider.4 alp17 improbable tha.t dtTtlopm••t. alo_g tlli. 11.e will progr," ail,fa.tori17 if either for.. i. perIlltted to pro••'" iadep••d••tl, to work (nat ita own saltem. for op.ratl0. wit. t.e other. It i. therefore eo.aidered expedie.t to i.elude bot. for."UBcle%' a IOmmo. 10mm&nder i. tke lavalr, diviaiOD where nee••sary aad desirable adjustmente ean b• .ad. in the interelt. of tAo foreo a. a wAole.

• BIBLIOGRAPHY

K'7: (1. 17-19) r.f.rs to Text No.1, pap. 17 to 19. I(Al-1) r.fer. to An.ex NO.1, Chart No.1. i (J2-1-2-4-9-l2) refers to .Axu:l.x No • .2. Lett.r. No. 1-2-4-9-121

1. Field Slrvice Regulation•• United states Army. 192a.

TA' CaYalry Fl.1.. MaIlual (T••tati"). U. S. Arrq. 1929. I Ann.x NO.1. oonsiltinc ot a fll. of 14 p.rloRal l.tter. (2

Ii

are omitt.d) addr.s••d to the author from officers whos'l trai.l.~ and experi.a.e eover. a wid. fleld, and whose I idea.l qd Opi8ioD' art frequ.ntly sought and highly r.- I ape.ted not oBly i. the o&Talry ~.rvlej but in tbe army I a. a whol.. ad a E..po:rt on a Sid.J on C&"falry orga.i- I zatioa, ma4. by the Ca"falrl Board, Ft. nil.y, Kan.a.. I

Ann.x NO.2. consilting of as•.rle. of charts prepared by I the author to show in greater detail the organization of t.e eomponeat unit. of the proposed divisional organ-l iza~io.. I

I I I

In addition to the abOT' source., the author hal read numerOUI current America. and foreign ••rv1.. publications, consulted with a»d obtained the opinions of a great .anJ offiaers of all arma and branelte. represented. in tho oavalry divisio.. The oral d1seusaio•• are oonsidered • partioularl, valuable source of in- i formattoR for ihe reaso. that the, presented ldea. and opinion. I of offio,ra ot all branon,. with rec.at practical experience wit_l smaller units of tAe divisioa, and for the additional reason that they brouglli Ol1lt .. frau. ea.ndid '%'pre SSlOD of Opi81oB whi•• for obvi~•• r8&IO'•• a very few affi••ra would put ln writi.,.

-13- /

SOLUTION NO

jn:»&t i ;o . l

JJ i i - - 1 tO 11, SOPH IliJL.


M»p Problem No .^ Series

IN CASL Or REPLY TO BE RETURNED TO RECEPTACLE BY 9:00 A.M.

I l l - 0. B. R-H. Kort T^krtfiworti. 9-18-tS 15V

AflHiX IB. 1 « J

(Al-1)

TO i>4 or£uni*«A as abo ni in i'u^la* oi GrguniiutLon uO2Vi, with rtoh Editions in non-oomataîonad oli'U»rs« olerk» and

by th« «tudition of n»w 4oits in tho

- 1

iiv 1,0, l ~ J

(Al-2)

j»OOri>

i»lvi-lyn il«ad JUGI-t >r s Troopi

To l>s or£<o»l:;ed us tiiova iti Tab 10 6 of ( except that the military i\)lic& riutoon Le onitWd, anl uch additional clorlaal &ni hoadiaarturs pursonnol «.c i:.uj bo doslrotlo to cocount lcr thy lnor<»ai«d strû^th of tha division to *b* add^d.

(bj Divition&l uigu^l Troopi

To be organized as shov-u in Subl^s of 0rânl2ution 'jxoept that car ts , v.ire should b« liuLired, and tho &moant of v,lr« carried iu tho troop should ta inoroasud by an wscajt [to bo doter*

) sufficient to r»ot ordinary requirdnar.ts of louer ooh<>loui v,lr* eonnunloatioa v.ithln suah units la deoaed

(oj Ullltary I^lica Troop:

To b« orc«nizad to consist of u troop iiaudiuarldrs, and th2-»a platoons, of tv,o squads «&ch, Total stveugth about GO at>n and 3 offloors, ( 1 s&ptuln, aud 2 Lnd Li«uta.)

(A1--5)

CAYAIJIY BJiX 0*1)3

A cavalry brigade to c o n s i s t of:

u. Brl&ttdc Haodjuarxorc ani Hood{uarters Troop( l 0 ^3 orgun

n t i d i l y us «hov»n in Tutloc of Orgunizution i'c

b. T«> K-JKiônt* o f Cavalry.

i.v.'« fol lowing

(Al-4)

A H8£.l;unt oi C&vulry to coueirt of»

a* .: b. Food|uurtare Vroop o, i:o£inontal ^laohino-'un Troop d. L^rvloo Troop o* Throt Lquudroui of Cavalry

a. lioî rental imdiuartsrs and Ks&diuartars Troop to La urand o"l*odL s>abF,tuntiully us ahov.n in Tubl©6 o

b, 424W, axoept a« t"ollo%ii

Oait froa praeant Ubltt Supply motion, H<2* Plutoo.

to pre»8nt Ublo 12 >'rivaloft lor ("4 tc oaoh ftiuudron Hq.)

;td&im9ntul Maohln«-oun Troop to bo organized ktally as sho'Ain in Tublss 430J, sxoept as follows:

un platoons io be aûlp, od with oullbar •60

Th« intiuirnijft and On«-x'ound»r Caotione to It or£<:iizod Into a fourth rlutoon undnr oo^^nd of ono oi'flosr, Instead of oporatlng us Uo witolly s»parbto und dlktlnot soutlonSi (Doa« not ufi'out tactical istriyloy.usnt, but ai.pllos to udrainistrution and

d. Uttrvloo Troop to consist of:

1) Troop Houdiuartors to ba orûnlzad ially UB other troops in tho

(iij Juiijly i Dorvloo 1 lutoon to inoludo ui;>ply ^JOLion of Ilq. i'latoon, v.ith &aoh additional

i l bt> r

( i ) Vr^nsôrtation Platoon to oonaint oi" an /vni;ual^ druv.-n Coot ion ccipoBjd of a l l tho iui l^l- irawn tranu tort.ition in Ui9 re{.l|Jo"t, cxoladinp tits s ir inp waronsi and a ;.otor motion coîou^d oi' u l l ti.o .-.otor tiajitjortution in t;jo roîraont.

('•) ;o:.'norod O r Platoon to oonaibt o i 1'lt.toon H <iuartjr6 (»illi «) rooaivo o - i s ) and tijreo (JJ Oi lour (<i) oars «-oh, -ôoi-t Tor outt^rs ol' eu^^ly utu uJL-ilniutr-tlon, tiils platoon to oporuto dir-jotly uudor ..j^.iaoutul lio-d (u<-rtjrs,

Vhriis [6) Cavalry o

(11-5)

TUJ OAVALiiY 3

A sjaadron of cavalry to consist oft

(a | o^widron Headquarters j (b) Troop A (rifle troopj j

Troop fl I " M ) ) 1st Troop C ( M " j )

(cj Troop D ( Llcht U. G. Troop)

(a) Jûodron Keadjuartors } (b) Troop a (r ifle troop) )

Troop i1 j " " ) ) and Troop G ( " " J j

(o) i'root K (li^ht i.. G, Troop )

(aj (b) Troop I (riflo troop)

Troop K ( " " ) 3rd Troop L ( " " ) ijqauJrou

(o) Troop U. (Lifc'nt L, G, Troop

i a i iijuadron Hd;idûartor« to ba ac shov.n in of Organization 426W.

(b) Jt9 Ohart 6

(o) 'J99 Giiart 7

-5

l — CH.W\T I>O. 6

{Al-6}

A rlfla troop of cavalry to oonaist oft

(a) Troop Iliadiuartar»

(b) ?*r«o (3) Platoons

(aj Troop Headquarters to bt organized to consist ofs

1 Captain, Troop co;a u/.<lor 1 l3t Cer&eaut 3 ^rg«auts ( i*esst Jt&bl«t uud £ PriTaUi (Bucl«r«J Z » (Cookfl)

1 " (3adll»r) ( AIM driver of It v.uôn]

1 •» (Chauffer ] ( ior light truck)

To4*1 1 officer, and 12 enlisted nan.

(b) Xiu-eo Platoons, aach orguuized to cousist oft

(1) Plutoon

(1) Platoon Hwad,;uart«rB orc&ulzad to ooncitt oft

Platoon cownandor 1 Irlvat*, :.:«6««njor 2 Uorôanis 1 Plutoou s«r^9utit, 1 1'ilvi ciocor Total 1 officer, and 3 osillstod u

(£} Vhree [ii) Jqauda, each or&vnizod tj cotisl&t oft

1 Corporal, C u&d louder 7 Privates

Total in platoom 1 Offioor, and *7 unlisted son

Total in Troop: 4 Oi'liours, and 9o »nllst«d :&<?

- G

(A1--7>

ui; vv.oor

..achin»-uun Troop or«tiril;:cu to consist of

(aj Troop

{bj I'ijraa (.5) Platoons (Caliber

(a) Troop Head iuar lore to tiu orôriscd uhov;n iu Taulu'C of Orc,uni*:.tion 'ioO'i., o.aittiiig such personnel as port^lm to thj jrstout .uui-.-iicruft and 0uj-i<ourlor Cuctionc, and tho Lnd Liuutonu:.t, wup ly Ct'iiour. Th» let Lijal'jnai.t, second la coisina:ii uov; provided, to tiko over -lao th» dutias of uij^ly Oi

v.ith an auucistant, - soloctid eorêart*

(Lj VATAU lî ilutooas, ouch orftinlzod «ubeto.ntlully ehov,-:i ii; ' .alias of Organization 430.., vtxu c);anfios as t;io diffirenoo in the type oi n. .T.. rr*.iuira liassd on oxp«rl:.;onts now i i lr .s conluct:d v.ith this v\oapon.

lu the opinion of th« aat'nor i t is very dosirwtl* t'rat t'.iic Iroop not oxesod o "saxiicxua o f f ofl'icoro und 125 enlisted nan. ..w^thor this is yrao lie ..lift v.lthout uffoctlug tha •ffioioajy of tha troop r-ir&iuc to bo docouctrutod.

-7

.: 1:0 • 1—uii-»;.T ..0. 0

A l io ld a r t 11lory r s e l l o u t (horsoj 10 lo o r g a n i z e aO ihown ii: of Cii^.ini:".tlon '133.., v.itS tm uddi ' . ional li&Uallon A ro0i ' tont of tbbto ba t ta l i t ins of tl.roo b i t tor ins

— ClVillty DIVlBiOS

A11 .ûînaor i»;uu^rori («ao an ted) to to orfiunizad LS shovn Tal los of Cr i . in lz i t ion 4G6V.,

A ^JiilJ^l oquadrou to I© organized u3 8>io :i i;i Tablis of i s a t i ou 4b9i.,

:.:oiluul ]jiitaolun*Jntc to ho t t tôlicd to ur.lto of tho wt*valry divis ion u* choî in Tublot of C i v i l i s a t i o n 4COU,

ATIACU^D UiUu"1 LUHii -JAV*X»a DlVloiOl.

Ciu-plnin8 to la bttaahod to 'Juv..lry Division us shown in T of

Ai;.,j;; i.o. l —JH/4.T 1.0. 9

to 13 orônizod to consist of:

(a] ,.&t,iu3tttal Houdjuartirc

(b) lioai luartorc Troop

(oj Jqu&drous to consist of:

( l j Two (i:) l>ii'.alroiic of ;juoryd Oars

(i.} Cn» (1/ aiauiroii of 11 cht fast tiJ

lotej Tha dotîUl orûilzation of tl.Ls or^niaation is not for tlio roason that thlc^project is no* uudor oouclioration iii

connoo*iou ulth tho rccûtly announce 1 dooision tliut Jach u force is to to organized in th<> naar future, und ut iii«*coHt no d^ta is cs to tha propossJ

iU.;.ix 1.0. l—:J.^,T .,o. 10

(Al-10)

A i-iurtor.ia; tor Vralu to bo or^nizoJ cz ul.ovii in Tab la 8 of Or,V>nl3.tlou 'i91'.., d/.cort t>cit an addltioiu;l '..aôu <Jo:jpijny la addod to privldo ar.V'jal-dr.iVm transportation sufficient to mni the nor-MUI rsiulriTionts of £>uch elements of t'-o divloion ac v.ill ba affactod v.hon no tore cannot roaoh then—viz: the rjc

-10

,u,;..,:; no. 1 --UIU^T I,O. 11

(A1-11J

All li;,ht nac'nlno-;;anc of tho Li;;ht Muchlna-Jun Troop to le UuliLor t30, alr-coolad.

*11 maGhino-?,uns of tho l.^.l-iontal IluuMno-uun Troop to 1o Caliuor ,.r.O, uir-coolod.

Tuo O7-.TM i'aii to to tV.o i.9V.' taodol i,tiu, v.it"; necessary for pickitif, for aurryiuc ofl a waj,on or truck, or for aoviuc' on a horso-Jri.v.pn u^rt.

All uou-coMTlscionod oriicore and nan in koy pociti^ns nov/ ar;: od v,lt:i tbo J'iflo to 15 o iui^pod \ lth the su"b-ûc3-,luo--:un, Cul, 45.

/.ll u r i t trains to ta Q[aijpcd v.ith wonronc offoctlvj uû hostile uochaulzod and air torces.

Cauorc to Is o j l t t jd us an ita-a of l"iold eqal: aaut, Tuut rc t i in od for

Tioht motor truokc to "us substituted for oscort vvanonc in unit t ra ins , providod an uddition.il \\it£O»i conpany is allied to tUo r . i.. Train.

'..ira cor.irunlc^tion eiuiniuût (xor construction] to to orsitiod from t i l ooholons tolow tho divi3ion. Juprovod v.lrulsss jutctit ; ; t jd.

to l<8 roi 1-icol o;- ll^ht rtotor cixrc In &11 ec'iolono.

rifloc to to oi'.ittod ac un It?*?, of oquipnont In a l l achelons and roplJoad v.horo nocosc&ry Vy li;,ht uir-oooloi :-Lchl:io

kitajsanc onlttad from a l l ai.lts.

Jwvicot to lo duvjlopod for ue« on arir-orod cars anJ li,.l)t iu t inks for putting down â ooncjiitrcttions and erjoke ocrjous over

ctrs to to y.l&ceJ in th<> L'grvioo Troop i:.cUad of tha lloul juartore Troop of tita 2\0t.L:ACrnt to sLa;>lKy uduij.Vctratlor. and

-11

SOLUTION NO

AI^JA i:o. JJ

1 to 16, fcoth incl, oxcopt 13 and 14 oioittad


M*p Problem No 5. S e r i e c . X .

IN CASE Oi7 REPLY TO BE RETURNED TO RECEPTACLE BY 9:00 A.M.

W-C. « O. 8. <?th , Po

luulosuros i.ok. 1 to I-*, loth i l l u s i v e , »,o« I-, iro v. 1 liilrii>vii ij'o.i ti.it pa;-ax Loi'oia i t

i t 1iturnaJ for f i l e . Vbo abovj ^noloburos aro putôn l i t t e r* u.llrd5E*i to tii9 butlor, so.sa of which contaii, Iho cpeaiiia proviJicr* thut tht ; ure .ot for

A rro;<?ek stlons and

for changes In and Addition to tiii iXia&ent an.1 J i u l f ^ n t

of the UwYalry ."•.ejjl.io: t ;.ni the reason therafoi .

1. The eohool, RS a result of re3-j&rch, ubaervation .îd

sr-er lment, has come to the l'ollov in^j nujjr conoluniona:

n. Ti^t L-wause of c s i ta ln del 1C1<MI<JHS in >i• •^.,•1 t

aiil *quip:*ent, the cavalry todi'.y i s in a dl8udv^ntat:ooun position

in t a l i t l o n '.0 oertnln other oo-utct parta of the /jr-i.y, In S.»AI

tho c^ch'inized force.

\^. TiK'it the o:.valry i8 aj>proaohln{;, If i t ras not

reachel, a c r l t l a a l , probably deo i» l ' i c*.ape i«; Its ^jxlotance :.!*J

th'jt u ^rop*r change in i t s krnaisw'.t and c<iul; -.er.t ut the present

tiv.* wi l l dppply i:ifludnoe i t? i'uture ttatuo.

i... In reaching t)sj l*»st oor.aluuion, •'* Juhool iiar leer. ^1-:'..

ty t* cor.JiJ»r«ti3n of the i.ar ^pur *- tent d irect ive ts

y cal ls for ft den'^stration l>y tbe .MChanU'id rorco of it-8

abil i ty to tV.cs over th* rol i of cavalr;.. Tii* pvl.iury elusion of

the force, ao laid down by the ûr D>t)artr-etit, Is "To provid* higher

co/*..und vit>i a poverful v,aainn of tactictil rmd atj'cit j^loal

v.here th^ miessian lruUobt*& the Aealrutllily of enrlayl:^ a t'oroe

vhose r-haract-jrictloa uv* hl£h tuctlcal and ttr«-tnclo:tl mobility,

hturd hit tint; po^^r, hii;h mobile d'Jtsnslve pox.er, limited holding

til one which Irs oujiaVls of sustained ind«i^r.i!<?f:t aotlon."

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i t \lll be e*«o thftl the directive rsontalris uu exact and. excel-

l«>"t»P. V>ii of c-valry anl a full fctateaent of Ho uses and powera.

a ;l<in>.«<l for the ,.,echanlsed force include the enp 1\/aent

Inj, fors*,;iivux.oe uûrd f->r u lare^r f:rco Ie3s mobile,

vf; H:»!>jn »ri! v \ th'iruv.Lil froin act lot), flanlc euird of a. lirc»r

s, i A<it aff«5nalv<* conU.t atfiiiut :;5ChanlzeJ foroes ar.J cavalry,

; of L lreaj.*.hro>t*^ and ourautt. ":n9d are ull Lr»ov*:iint3

or jf-nrati^ns involvlnc ivflrv action of cavalry aotlag ).n conjunction

'••Jth j?}!.*r troc;» or ir.d«;ondnntl;..

Undoubtfftlly, the i^cûnlasd rorc«, unlaos it is aotjall;.

o;rocid, can M4 through tha «;x«rcla^8 a& iirojocted vilh u show of

•.•or.fle*.e cu^J4^8; or, if cavalry, r.l'.h i t s j.resent ^r mnent and

^{ulp-ftnt, Is actually plucsd on the ground ta operate afainct the

.r,9o?ur.isnd foroe, the aounted co.îand v-111 l>« &t u ^*reat disadvantage.

I:J elt.h'/r o*so, It i« to be expected that the ^-chanizid force on the

Co.- '•letl^n of tê exerclaes will be a l l s to .-wike & plausible clui-n to

rjty in the o&vilry rol*. The dan)u£;in{j effect that this vi 11

on Oftvalry Is iulLo:tt*i.

On the other han;!, if cavalry, arr.:ed und equipped as proposed

herein, It pirraitted to operiiti arainct the mechanised force atU-pt ing

'heoe cavalry missions, especially the indeâjidar.t nlstionr, or even

if the raachunUed force Is zi'jrely rejuir-sd ty usaojne an outlinsd cav&lrj

•>}!ts'iy so ur>ned und ejuipned, it ma,/ ki confidently expected thut i t v l l l

\* conclusively t'hov-n th..-t cavalry cannot be su^plunted in It3 Mi l l

l-<ll9vt(enu*bl» role by the mechanized forse, either on snacui or

r r^ l r .

»', Tiiio project consists of a jfflnoral conslJariition of the oattor

Of tactlct.1 und technical notes or. the nr'iax^nt an! e-iulpr.ent proposed;

of "able 8 of Organisation indicating certain shift3 in peraonnol from

on« organization to another, and the proposed arraaratf^t, neohanizutlon,

anl inotur au.^ly *«*]3iTF-es/ent', and of mm etulles of the requipped

anl rear^-ii cavalry beting Ljtilnst a mechar.lz«vl f.T ce. Tha reartnan^nt

anl rojiiu.Ipment of the ccvalty rosinsr.t only is dealt v HJi in thi

project for the reason '.hat the changes proposed Jo n^t necessarily

affect wiything else in th<» brl/jj-da or division,

4. 'Jhe *.hr<;* principal itsn;S or t .e Project LT*-.

Auti-tunk weapons

.j.'sorej cars for roconiKkl5sai>05

*_:otor transport for supply.

Cir these, th* anti-tank weapons are at the raoa-snt the most important

and esfientlol things under consideration although the oth?r two lt<jns

are oi" eventual e.jiial i^portanoe and inJlspensabl3Hy,

5. In building up the project certain principles or rules vere

adhered to. These were: f i r s t , that no change in or&unizatiori, beyond

a shift of r-ffn fron one troop to another, or increase in personnel

would be proposed; and, second, that added ejuip-.*nt vould be only

thtit v-hich was immediately available or that could te accur.alut<»d

vlthin a reasonable tiê without expenditures of sieclj.1 ^J

6. The Troject proposes to aubody armored cars for

in t.hi haai! quarters troop of the refi ;ent; to add to the eiulvirer.t of

the machine gu« troop 'light,£0 oaliber machine (r>ino; to cubstltuti

eventually th^ ThotrijBon submachino guns for thi r i f lea of a I^rga

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• •• •

number of noncommissioned officers In a l l unite; to t-bollsh the escort

Wiigon from the r«j";i-i9:ital train; to retain one light v.agon per organi

zation; ani to substitute for the escort vagons I1, ton oovraerci'.l trucks.

'/• In making up r.ev/ tublae of organization to iak? cure of the

foregoing subutltutlu.-ic wid additions, the present peace table of

organization for the cavalry reclr.ent authorizing 69C anlictad even

v:ia f i rs t used. cJhe only liberty taken with the table was to.:.iuka

small shifts of atn from oneôrjjanizatlon to another, to r^duoe the

nucter of rain in oertuiti sajtions, and lo taoka corns o ban can in rf.tingt.

Cirtaln chun^ss were raada alco in tha duties of noncomcaissljns'i off loirs ,

tut tfcs total nuinter of t:;ese and thsir nu;l>?re In grades r^Xkiaad the

oars. Having fix;J the authovlzed i>eaoa tl".e tabls, the prorocjd ad

ditions anfl subst Itutiono *era applied to \)\» presont reduced peace

atren^th regirent. This adjustment vas affected, not by ubolir-hlng1

anything in the first table, but by rendering inactive certain parts .

In this adjustment the number of anti-tank v.oapons, because of their

present i-iiportance, v.as kept the earr.e for th> reducs.1 table as fjr the

larfjjr t ibia , nanaly, eljjht guns in oar.)- inctince, Li-cevilse, the

number of motor trucks per troop lc the sauo In the nducsd table as

in th* lrirp-sr table,

t . Tho spcci.il rau.con8 for fne above cubotituttoTiS and additions

appear belo*:

(?.r>) Last year in a school problem u-.q following nitaation arose: ;k

ro(ji:rent of cavalry had l«iin in a wood durlne the day oonccaljd fron

air cbservution, vlth i tc armored c t r s out on distant reconnaissance.

About tvo hour3 before dark, the weather having driven off the ulr

corps, the r<v;r.ental Cowiandar decided to .*aove, ..t this H..-e t*o

cnerry armored oars moved inio a conoealod situation aoout 900 yurdj

distant, TiiO presenoe of these o-\r* effectively prevontod the

ret:lr.«nt:il movement until almost dark. Thay were finhlly driven off,

or rather, chose to r s t l r e , in thft f&ce of a vide turning ;nove.-ent

by a small bo'ly o'*<list»ounced men. ?hn Mxn cuns rtro ed'eotlv'j In

thIs iimfincu only to the extent of prevatitlnf: a closer dt*«ci «ppvoach

by ro^d of ti\<s ornursa Oiru. ii«id the roplmont t'ean tu^pnea v,Jti uii

f»i.U-tnnk rvichlre fiiin, It is moat protabla thtt the armored cars vould

hcve su.y>d out of trta v lc l r .Uy o r , i f th*y had cor.e in there th iy d id ,

thay could have been of fse t lve ly deal t v.ith.

A short ".hile ago, the U'th Juv&lry conducted a v.J thdruvui opera t ion .

J u r i n t one rha3», the machine gun troop V.QS i:i a fl.'ink pO3ltiJti; echeloned

to i t s lef t and front about l/i. mile Vd3 a oûadror:; ani &bout 1 rr.lie tc

t h i s squadron's l e f t and echeloned to the raur v,;ic another sjixidron.

Cults acc idsnt ly at t h i s oonent, an automobile appeared on the front of

each of tliflp© u n i t e . lMd '.he act ion b « n r ea l and these uu tonol i los lien

arniored vehicles , i t KIE evident to the observer t h i t th«y could have

up tho v.lthdrawal. On the other nat>i, had each of the u n i t s b«en

ad vi th e t i e c t i v e Lntl-trj ik wsaponc, t?.e oarfi could h^ve beun

a te ly Jrivan off or dePtro;,-ed.

. .acent ly , the 'Jo-x-uiAinc Cif ic^r of ^ ioo ' i\, let ^riiored Oar o^ci'lron,

ct ; . t*i that a s e c t b n of armored oars in the open need not pty any Ia<]:e G.

a t t e n t i o n to a troop of OJivr^lry. Asked >.>iut would le/ '-he e f f ec t , i f the So

t r o o p h a d o n e o r U o o a l . c a o h i n - j &JMS v . i t h i t , h>j r e v l i - d t h & t t h e

urncreJ cars uould make every effor t to wholly avoid the troop.

rxus for>coing aro c i t ed to i l l u s t i a t e typ ica l ly the pr^nant

of the oavi'.lry in i t 3 r e l a t i o n to a r.-chanised force. The ciivalry c t i l l

r e t a i n s an un'[uost ion^blf trap^rlor i ty i:: the p r inc ipa l chi-racter I s t i c so

necessary t ) the oar ry lnc out of i t s pecul iar r o l e , that i s maneuv>ruli l i ty

of f i re power, but i s r.eaV. lr. that i t l^cKu one neoaaa ry elenent of f i re

por-»r. i f t h i s element can I* sunylisd to the cavalry, that ar.-n can t t

once be r a loe i frora l t r . preoent poci t lon of coiaptiri^tive fi(;htlnc veakneac, ir.

r o l c t i o n to the aeclcmizad force, to one of (;r*etest ^trenfjth.

The antl- t i .nk vecipon far \.\.n oavulry should be u larê c o l i t e r

raaohire £jun, ra ther than & siiif.le chot or sen;i automiitio canon such as t'io

37 nr, cun> for t:ie ci-njlc reufon th. t wi th th j ;.v\chino gun h i t s on a

moving tarôt a r s nor.Tially a c^rtulr . ty; r.here^s, v.ith the oth«r type of

gun t h i s is not t rue, lu Juropi , s l roe the var , ef fect ive and in a

e te; \ t?r or lesaer do t ree , por table marhire ûnn, ranplnc in oallVar from

..'•0 to l.ri> inches c . l i l - j r , h/»ve cien made.

I t i s tha a i j ; earunc© of theoe anti-Vuik weapon- which io j.t t h i e

time t l v l l n c those i n t ? r * f t j d In tho devcloj «tm»nt of rr.eoliunizotion the

concert . A careful r U l y of tho l a t e r t thoufht co-nine

on th i s subject lftads tc the conclusion that nroser.t crmorisd

vsM^les intotded for independent fno7fl\v?nt cu:inot suf:oi"cfully i-ttaok

a lin> vher© a i"''estiva unti-tr .nk funs iro ^resont unices CD-.-;© tgonoy

ouU'id^ of the mochor.iEed force i t s e l f , such as tho a i r corus , or

EJOTJ'J nc:ins not vet daterr\ir.»3 within tho R.cchunizod fore? i t s o l f , h~c

1 reviously takon oa.ro 3f these antl-t&uk t;oaponc; vr c-t loact tho

r.ftchitniz«i forct cannot advance a£&it>3t too reoant ly di»valopod finti

t-.mk v.capons unless i t s v^liiolcs are so heavily ari:)orsud thfit tnny h.ivo

r<5ve>rted li; t^T"1 *o ^^° orl(;ini«l t.ink, clov tr-ovinc W)J. fonJorouo,

I-.o Jbin 1 zation devslop'f "iCiit has lon^; Vaen iuêiod h'j t)to varlouc

aua^tlcins of con t ro ] , u l r c r a f t e t t a o ^ , Mid d i f f i c u l t y of oak i re rood

speed v.lth la rc? convoys, but i t s developers have e s s e n t i a l l y ignored

un t i l vary rocsn t ly t?i«s unti-t.^nk v.^^pon •vaostlont liov- i t has forced

l ts i l t* upon tho.'.i. To the advocutec of tho uae of the mechanized force

as an inloner.dont a^joncy, \.ho luos t lun i s p a r t i c u l a r l y ea tar r . i ss ln^ .

Our own judpuent must t e l l us t h i t t h i s I s so, and tha t judfêrtt i s

confir nvl by ots>rvr>ro abroad^

'j?ho vhole rjuoction of mechanization is involved ii. t h i r t ipple

mat ter . The nachani /a t ion en thus iae ts huvt usca'aod ' ron thii flrs'c

that the i r V3M."1«G vould ' ' nnot ra te the snir.y's dfTunsx, rhoth'?r from

the front or flank, but in t h i s ossuarîf>n th^y heve fa i led to f l r c j the

powerful an t i - t ank teapor. In th» ener.-y'j l ino . Kow, weapon

raant haB compollod a Siu^re i'acir.g of t h i s l s s i e .

Teoont .;sit;lich opinion ran;/ V^ ro to J . ..Ing Co.u.Tiand?r V,L.]

i,:ullo:y, basing h i s Ideas ou vi.r exporJencaa atii Lh*j fiiitish ^

of 19:7-?.D, Ptat*8 Ihr t i t v i 11 I s ruoossi.ry for th» a i r corps to

an t i - t ank weapuns uifore the Bouh-snire I fore* (inOe]v»ndent) c?»n u

t . r t l l l e r y support v l l l be insuff l* '<nt for tlif» purjôee of u

anti-t;xnk voaponr,, ai.d t h i t i f th« o l r corps 1* not present , Kht

f o r o v l l l liavo to device r.?an8 of their o'vn to overcome

the an t l - t \ n ' c v«»ponr. 1'»/cu{'(••:>«na, in t" e l a t t e r cane Umt*

(fcj Vhn ll;;ht vehic les in the ilrtt v,av» v.lll develop und

drat; th*s i l t 'e -a.f tha a n t i - t a n k vouponr, or

( t j 'Jhj .T.'dlun t<»n>:8 v l l l s»nok* tho a n t l - t m k roar or n, or

(oj A corit 'Mat ion of (uj and (b; v l l l b^ a ^ l i y e d .

ih?ee ra-.edios ur* obviously unsound.

»or the a i r solut ion t> hn successful, the planns nuct d e f i n i t e l y

loaa te each ant i - tank vear.oit and then borb or machine gur. the crovc,

Che t,vno inc identa l ly must remain in j ' l ace , tuke no advantage of T.oods

or accidents of thu ground, and twaJce no e i ' t oc t l v ; 4. t tercet to defend

themselves.

.'or the drawing f i re rolut ion tho an t l - t cnk vaapono rauct cor.tluue

the i r l i r e on t>»3 l i ^ h t or front v;<;ve vehicles throughout the ac t ion .

t'jr the* FSOV.9 solut ion tho unti-tanj-: weapons raust I s d e f i n i t e l y

sr-jttnil, t;:e n.fttforolorlcal c ndi t ions oust Ve r i ^ h t , and the ewry

Lime aust r.ot chcirkce nool t lon Vat ri"jiiir. in the smoke un t i l tho;; - r e

L-teiui ro l l^ red .

Tho s i tua t ion appârB th^n to be Vnis - that ar-aorod forces ( jxcludin

th i rlov; moving tank) cannot close on troops provided with a n t i - t a n k

T.'emono unless theoe v.oaôns .r-s noutr&lized be for a the uttAcV..

This i s not offered merely as our t ? l l e f through thi c t a t e . e n t is "borne

ont tv u lo r icu l onalycic of present cond i t ions , but us the t c l . - i l ^ jn

Of fiert;.io nachanizatlon a u t h o r i t i e s Ihenselv^s,

Tho s i tua t ion i e , fur ther , t'uat the neann so far offered for

ng the an t i - t ank weapons - air coros utt&o',': - drav.ing f i r e

and crnoê - ure inudeiuate . A r t i l l e r y neu t r a l i su t Ion must presuppose

of guns on the mechanization sld^ end Rt thfct i t can

be but p u r t l a l l y e f fec t ive .

?he efficacy of th* lures Oitllber naohine gur.s ogni:int fcr.T'ired

velilcles v.Mcfl r e t a i n the chîracteriBtloo of l ightness nvd speed

necePR'.ry to th ' i i r use for extended, independent movements ("independent

cavalry", raove-nonts such {is the Dr i t l rh have at.tera])ted, and I lka the

recent f i r s t maneuver tit V'ort Jus t l s ) i s not to bo doubted. Juv h

vehlolec h&ve got to corê into the or^n and oe u tarc^t in the en^cs

cent , thRt i s \hy tn«ry are ur:r.ored, and they can bo ro.'idlly n i t v.ith

a nvichlns gar.. Thf» pun bus and r l J l continue! to have cur p r io r i t y o v ? r

the urwor of the vchiole . T);o analofy to the i.'avy, co far as urraor Is

concerned, cmiict be properly us r d , There ur-nor has f; . lr]y V.<*-t rnce

v.ith the gun hecaucc more r e ln t l ve v 4 i t h t , double bo11 >:rts, nnt l torpedo

bulb8 rud d iv is ion into v a t ^ r - t i ^ h t compart ,«>.t6 may be eaployovl on '.he

chl'.ip. On tha lard v c h l d e , the tHoknet-s of t>rnor cannot e::ceo.d a

ce r ta in H I t , i f the d»6lr«d mobil i ty io w t to be aaor i f iood.anl yrt

the cal iber of the machine £un can to grea t ly increased leyond the

c t l l o s r vhinh Is effect ive against thft ^rosittast usable thickness on

the ras t vehicle .

.•his v.Lolo question is of j;ri;ne LvfOrtiMjce to cavalry. Trie J:iv.-_lry

Jchocl Is unanimously of In 3 opinion tha t , if cavalry tr?opr, not merely

cuvalry arrnoi »d ca r s , \»re sufi'loi jv.tly equipped v.ith proper t.r.ti-tar;>.

v.eapons, that tJisy Can .so nnneuver PUCH reapans as to esnups or render

use less a i r reconn('.!s&.nco of thSm; that they can ao raanouvar inch

v:isar.ons uc t;i avoid blankfttln^ sraoVe; and that they can s.i ta-mex

rucn v.-o.-kpons In 1'orvurd or r e t i r ed posi t ionc or againr;t tha flanks "uô 104 of ft m(jchuiUz/;«i force ns tr> detent i t .

In th i s connect louche protect t h t t C'jrtjin Infantry of f l i e r s

are r M r i n p against Ihftir novly reorânlaod ba t t a l ion chouli be notod.

'2h*y ure do.uanding, and very properly, th&t the reorgoniiwtion should

contain flriti-tan>: guns in quanti ty - thct v/ithout tham inftntry is

h ' ; l"l5cs a^ i inc t t.inks, but v>i t!i them i t v.ill be the other v-ay cround,

Ths infantry is bqur.d to ad l tYn. rtntl-tanV. vtetipon to U-.oir O'nil'ouiont

nnl t)iat j»rol-lly very shor t ly . Tnd CMTilry of co'irso riaeJn the ut i t l

tc'.nk v.eupon not a vhl t 1-TR than the infantry.

V.ilhout th is v.-aapon the vuvulry cm do l J t t l a taore than i.void or

i.t b'jrt heiress tho me.:hnnia^d force,

•.lth th l3 v.oupon i t can unhositctwlr^ly Rnâ^1!^^)) a force v,inh

the uidoJ a'.* van tape of bringliiG t,) bear on h i s supporting personnel,

in t !"•;•" norrv.l case,1" a t i r . e r l o r i t y of support in*-, f i r e , i . -J» , Miftt of

.50 c&l . r i f l e s ar.l machlna gunr..

Cur n&rotil dl3:wuntel ntt>ick agftinct troopr io not rwt»?ial ly

affected by t!nr.« ant j- tank (,11ns - they are not ofi'odtive percoimol

- anl i t i s not necessary to (jo into a f.isousfion of th is matter

here, l ls i thsr 1." i t necsm'iry to t r i n e up ^ * rvtny l i i ' i t i n c fuctaro vl.ich - i t l o n

v l l l a f f l i c t llrrht rnechatila- in i t s -»ncr.oe-iant tjt!i Cavalry, surh as

sp?nd of the vehicle on the b ^ t t l e f l a l d due to i- iporlLUlity of

fast dr iving except on the road, if the driver murt look through a s]ov

or r>orlfceor>8; i'-\n eerio\}8 interference of thft march of t i e nochunizod

force by deviOlltlont, or c t o . i t c .

To re&oonubly ec t t b l i sh the ense for cr.v;.1ry ^r-ned v!th the proper

number of Gultible ant i - tank v-eupona as uc'^lnrt tho inechmiaal foroc,

i t Is su f f i c i en t to invi t* conciJ<«r.itlon of l i e comM;V.tlon of '-he

recent ly dwi l r rvy l , hi.*.?;; effect ive, port i l l * , larp* c M l b i r :r»fic}i in© cm

anl '-he supor'or mobility 01 cuvrury in t*> the*.t?r of '.ho cor.ibit (a

o r i t y <J:TC: l a l l y notsd V,.- B r i t i sh observers in the i r l a s t rj-«c!-.:.n

xp^rlT.orta, for in.sr.cnce, and by our Inf: ntrr: ii.tt.ic.h6 in ^2 if?,

l-ujor jaraes 3 . Ord, who s t a t e s "On th* othor huid i t i s c?rt; i in \truu

th-ja? n c n ^ v o r s (o'*i}t. 1930) huva sl.ovn up the l i j l tu t Irme of itiotoriaed

unl t3 as compared to mountel u n i t s in an unaxpe*ct?d rcir.n(*r. ,.hlle the

port^s dragoons are a nectjesary un-2 valuable addit ion ID th.: C-v-lry d i v i

sion, ths only re^l cross country uni t vUnout l imi t a t ions i s the ::;our.t'3d

u n i t , "

If the Cuvulry is supplied in 'Uicntity r l t h a maneuv^ruble a i t l - t a n k

weapon, i t v . m b« aolo to 3top and overcome armored forces a t t e s t i n g

tho er.ecutlon of un indev'fndent raovoT.ent. That is to sny,cavalry,civon

th* necessary î»jan3, enn forcibly and unequivocally demonotrate th^t

i t cannot be su^planwed in I t s ov.n r a n i c u l - i r ro les by nochanizutlon.

t n ^ sIn considerln(; flatter of anti-tanV: vsapons, the iv^.ibor to bo

provided is extr-»nei,v iôrx r t nv . Tact ioal confiJ?r . t ions ure th3 con

t r o l l i n g factors in f ixing ths propor t ion, v.hlch should be in the r i m o

ot uro p.xr)B por r i f l e troop t»ni tho machine cian troop, "ho troop i s

tr.ken as the l a s l c unit upon vhich to fix tbo r«>.wio UB \\> i s d i f f i cu l t

to conc-Mâ of an action where the pros«r°T of there f^ns v J l l not be

necer.oary with or in the v i c i n i t y 01 that un i t . They v i l l bo required

v.ith the troop v.hcn i t i s 011 an independent mission, or is act i i i f as a

foT\. or iir> vnol<5 of nn aiWar,ce or flank guard, or i s in a vithdr&wul or

pu r su i t , or in a t tack or defense a s , in tnas© l a t t e r cfvSec, the c lo t t ing

of the «"»rtponE v.lth i n t i r v u l s or ochelon?d v i l l hab i tua l ly I* of

vnlue th >n their onivloyir.ent in roass. The nu;.b«r fer troop la

fixed a t tv.o for the reasons that one per troop ?"OUJU rrot^Dly nut be

suf f ic ien t to ropel th* ut tack of noro than one armored vahiole, v.hlle

n o n than tv.o par troop would bo out of j ropor t ion ty tho eiz? of the

troop I t s ' j l l ' , thiit i s to cay, moro thun two vûl-1 lo in oxooao yf tho

nflodo of u un i t tfio s i t e of a trv)op.

Tho rvojibor, ltiipe or azul\, of autl-t . ink viaôna v l t h the ar.sorcd

ours of %)a r-Jtjinant or hij;;hnr unit ic not ooucllorol i:. l ixl.ig the

- 9

na.iber repaired v.lth troops clr.cj thaco guns vith the oars aro only

infreiu-jntly iivu!. Table for uca in tho iomodL:t« vicinity of the troops,

aui furthermore, tba troop weapon must normally i>a a ground weapon.

Tho abovo ratio would fix t;i© nii'der of anti-tank v.'isupons .-t ton

por resilient, l'U*« in tJ l° project, i t V.RO not practicable to provide for

f t%nonora than eight with the j rosont personnel ttr«nL"th ° ro£;l.r,ont a3

low a3 i t i s , und i t i s , therefore, this la t ter iu:t.?r ihd tho inojict

culls for. It ic strongly believad, howc-vjr, th>.t ciît t^"6 flould be

thfl vory !ol3i'i.raro,

i.'ha project aukes tlio antl-tanl: v;eapons v. pwl of tho laiChlno i in

trjop. ..iiil'5, us pointed out, tho liir.ployr.unt pi* tho fans v-111 nubituully

\i<3 vlth tho other trooop, and thsir uso in .xass vith tho laachina jjan

troop v.ill ba exceptional, and, thorofore, i t would a/poar that thay

chould lo raado a part of the other troops, .it111 the advantages of so

pluoln^ thim v.ould not, It is tollsvod, moot tho advantages of having

thorn in the machine tr-U1 trooo. Briefly, their addition to tho r i f le

troop ^X)uld further co^nplic^te tho troop co'.wandor'u prosout mixed . ut;o 13

weapon problem; an.l training in thoir use v.ould lo neither i.s efficient

or uniform In tho r i f l e troop as in the cuchino gun troop. Th'.'lr dotacn

aent from t)i» puohlne gun troop to other units i'or iactioal purposos

should not be diffioult ,

lio lees ktportant than the na'.i"bor of anti-tank v.-eupons 13 the

luostlon of tholr caliber. Very raoontly, tho Oav^liy Board called upon

the ,,chjol to JAib::ilt rooo.maendatlons us to a cavalry anti-tank v.oupou.

It is dômol iêrtlnjnt to û.ite h'?rt> that purl of the corre&pondonoe on

the ju.ttor vhicii dealt v.lth the luor.tion of c l i b o r .

" 1 . hjplying t j your lottor of ran, 1:0th, 1930, salject, "^

Catlons for u ,C>0 oallbjr aaohine caw for cavalry", ?aa u^

desiros to uncwor tho luostlon in subpuru^vijih Xi. P^ÊTu;'" »J» of your

let ter before taking u;> the other points oonlainod therein. Vho ^t'jf-Uon

i s , "la ,!'O oalibor concidorod the aoct suitable culli.ir for n vroaron i'or

uoe a ^ l n i t armored vchlclaav Ii" rot , v.hct cu\ Her lo ieco::rn-»nd jd?

. njv/er: I t io of pur&?.oitut ii'j.'ortanoo thit the cavalry l>» o iuli>pod ^ ! t^

an anti-tank v-oupon. It in truo th.it suoh a vâjon v.ill hi useful

lnc Uentally :.pai»:ct alroruft, but ito f irs t and oY*rv.h!.»l.-.lncly i;,irot t

* "notion is Ms u 3 o u^ inc t ar.Mor-jd v.»hlol»8 iml, thjreroro, i t io

»EB'.jcti.-l Uv-t I t be ef fec t ivo i»c;ui.i:-t iiw'-h vahlulas . It i j LJllevjd

t.hMt th* ,'Q Caliber i s -a;.S9et'jd l'or co . ia i i i ru t Lo:: a t -thin t l a j .oor<s i'or

the roiioon that ne h^ve d«jV'.ljped in UJJC countiy a machino tfau of thut

o&lib-jr only, ra ther than that v;o aro fun i l i a r v" *.h a different o - l i b ' r

v l l c h voul l more Sa t i s f ac to r i l y f i l l our u-jedt.

"C/13 .TO c . l ibor ca»i to considered & f a i r l y Bati&fuoUd.. weapon

a#a ln- t aiy tihsolOvl &rno*ed vahlolus so fur p r o - h o d or uniur production "U£9 14.

i:i th la count*„•; and, u l so , g a i n s t the i i ^ h t tanks of au yur l ior period.

i 'urtboraore, It 13 oxtroaely doubtful thi.t a -.-T.âlal va}:l?l3 vhivh v . i . l

roa l s t tho .TO c^llbor oan ho produced. l u a u o o of i t s fr-iEisnt j f foc t ivo

nost, and taouusc of the ear l ; / .necess i ty or eûlppiufl t}:o c .va l ry

with an linU-tunk Wtiapo.-;, and X'JT tho roason thut tho *IQ c - U t o r &m i s

t}.5 oiio tii.1 only v.oapon of i t s typo i iva l la t lo i:i the Ui.it JU 2tat'»3 i.t

•.hi? tl'-,e, ino "avilr;.- Johool le reoora-2ondin(j thut i t be used now in the

s av i l ry as un an t i - tunk weapon.

"ilowovt>r, tho cavalry in i t^ôorat ion auiy oxpoct to moot aruored

vehic l«r , e3j,oclull;/ truck 1 i^lng veiiiclos of u llprht t;:;>o, against vhlî

t>i© .50 cal ibar machine &\n w i l l not ba as effect ivo as v l l l t a d o c i r o l .

Tiioro can be md'!, far exuaple, a llvjlit t w k v.}iich v.lll offer very «o»

siderL-tle, if not coraplote, retlRtanOfl to tho ..'0 c - l i b j r .

"Our .f<) oal lber uucJiine gun *ao aa exporinont.il type, und I t i s

u'i ' lorstjod that no tfaut nunber of them v?ao b u i l t . .i3 i t uppouro that

we ura about to expend i\iads in the production of vh;.t ix ;• Ve coacldjr-id

an e n t i r e l y new tyê of l a r t * oalJVor Machine t,"un, wo should uira to get

a woapon of the \-$?y highest efficiency for tho \. KJOSO for «h i :h i t i s

int^nd^J, tijAt i s , for use aâliU-t armored voJ.i : loc. l lutural ly , the l l i f t

considera t ion in tho ilesicn of each ** v;?apon Is i t s c i l ibs i - .

"I'ne Cf.valry v.lll uao t h i s vaapon, .'.h^n i t i s provM^d v.lth i t , as

on acoonipuiviiie G i » I t T i l l t inusport the gun on thci nar^h l-y noane of

i t o horo^s, und from point to point in th i enfxe°[ : f t : i l by tl,a sivzt raoanc.

ror the actual operation of th^) c in i t wi l l bo nov>d local ly by lianO.

" Inc iden ta l ly , tho lnfi.nt.ry in faced v i t h tho nf>o*5rsity of

In thoir or f^nlzat lon *» weapon of -jxaotl^ tho 1! .

? r l s t i a r . How th«y v l l l mova U;e vearon fro:n point

beforo pu t t ing i t ii;t.i aot ion i« for th^n a proMftn. -«tf havo :io aliul

problem an vo have th« means ^t luind to IBOVJ the weapon -- the horne.

- 1 1

"iVo nood ^ raachin^ i?iu of larg* caliber, but not or; l.ireo th'.t v,o

will have difficulty in itovlnf' it i.bout. Kortunately, i t appears that

we can huva e weapon vlUi a caliber thtt is &t once iuite largo enoufh

to bo affective', and at the swa</.iot so lur^s th.it v.e can not

transpott Mil hand In i t ,

"His armored vehicles with v.hio); the cavalry Is root liable- to cono

into contact are those jossessint; characteri sties of eêed, endurance,

und lurgo cruising* radius, Vhoro is a definite lirrit to the thictenco

of i^rôr v};l:h can \t iluced upon vehicles poesossin{j thesa characteris

t i cs . 11 this thlcknsss la excoedod, ono or n»r<j of thi cJaractarletics

i3 cacrlfic-Jd. On the other hand, the oalilnr of tl.o nachina ( in can

ba increased cons!durably boyond that calitor Uiioh is oxuetly effective

agciinct this limited armor t)iiclnjess.

"L'p to a cert.-iin point, i t appears t'mt thosd larô caliber raachine

guns can V« mado v.lth l i t t l o less of the ct:se portabili ty ar.d I'andinoss

as the ,EO c:»llbor voapon. ..a have recoivod in Yhs Cavalry School des

criptions of hlchly effective v^ r t u^ lo £ ;ns produced nbtoad. Th? fc:Jv-n

ball i t tic Chirac tor let ios of one in purtioulur pf Iher.o weapons of .80

c . l i to r , Indicate thi-t t}ils calibir vould l>e completely effeotlvo againct

any lic^t araor^d vohlclos, vheolod or tr&okad, vhich the cavalry is

liubls to oncountor, and v.hlch hcv* so fur baen produoid or aro in

prospect of production.

"For the foro'oiug reasons, Tha Gutalry ochool utronf;ly "a£re 10. that no consideration be Giv'-n to the ,T.O caliber weapon, but that a

of . 0 caliber bo declL,«ul and produced, in answering belot;

t! a lueftiona propounded in your lo t tor , Vhe Cavalry Jchôl makes i t s

repUos on tKe basi3 that the gun undor consideration v i n bs of .30

v'rom the fpreôitiL", it v i l l be sear, thi.t The Cavalry School is

advocating in thin Tojact th* udortlon of the .50 cal l tar v.oapon as

a a t tor of exiieiUen^y only. The issue of those weapons to the cavalry

at this tlr.a, \')ille it would not ^Wo X\D th.o v;eaôn wo rov-,lly nood ajji

desire, vould provide a fairly effective ono for uso under prosei.t con

dition?, but v,}': t io oore ii iho point, it would se*vo to •sr.tiVlic'; the

important :md oosontial p» laciplo that anti-tank v.earu>no .-hould

fori a fixed part of cavalry umunent. Die provlr.ijn 51* a rnoro a

weapon could be wado the b u s i n e s s of the i 'u turo .

I t I s i r i fomul ly unders tood th .v the re uro on hand i t th« pr

time onsou^h .50 c a l i b e r naohine ûns t> aûly) the cuv Try on the b a t i s

of iiio'l-t r»J" rofi ' .Tsrt . ( I t I s not-id in a r e c a n t nu t.'-ir of -> n l l i l a r y

voekly t h . t so no TO of tho &iis h;.-vo l a t e l y bion iccucd to the J . . . *., '

The guns on hmi comprise seve ra l t,.poj>, w t o r o :o led and l'jn<; cind rtoi v

Var r? l .Mr o o l e J .

: . l l typos i:T9 d i f f i c u l t to pac>c [ivna ye t se« l lu te , ?J&<S 19] a n l HO

o t h e r r.ân3 hu£5 ye t b!en dev ised t> t rans ; orv then . ;;3V>Tthcless, or.rt

In vl»w ol ivll the n i rcumsv .noea , iv 12 r e c o n n a n l i l thi:t an -airly icsuo

of t \ ^ .. r0 c i l i b ' j r fun t o na l3 to the c v ^ l r . v . with the weapons In our

r o c s o o s i o n , we cr.n r i n h t f \ i l l y c l d i r a f ight ing: a b i l i t y , the r ôsen t

lacX of vhich ho lds us in a pos . ' t ion of relfctLv? w a k m s r .

Ti.at th-1; viaapons i»c i s s u e ! would be ol" somev.iu.t varying t , ( i ; cs , vould

ke r.o e s s e n t i a l dl'"i"'sror,C} a s t!iey a l l us? the s&'-o arr iurnt i >n.

The iu:?:;tLon o r t?;-? M'ansport of tuo weapons, uncolvod as i t i s , i s of

of i ri.-r.o l - .por tance , tin! v,oul t i.t f i r s t tiiou^ht a;rioar tp ^-ro

the i . a jd i a t e IHSUO. I t should not bo a l l o v . j i t i ctar.d in t jo v r y , i.

for t!T» follov. inf r>asor.»:

Fir s i , in 1*1* ev^nt of thu udoîioio ' r a s tandard a n i - t a r J c weapon

o a v a l r y , co:;^ aôrv:,. v i l l have to do t . ) mine hjv; i t v, i l l I s tiar.:;port'?(i. i t

in bo l i»voJ *.hj.t the c a v a l r y , a s p e c i a l l y the l ? t cava l r^ r i " . i - i o c , v o u l

v.fllco-.ii the o n o r t u n l t y of exper i r jent lng a l o n e t i n c e l i i i - c .

J jc j i id , though tho ; .îiy Ve c rude , u;iy «iOaus for transixirtii-.g the v.sajoro

deviced by t r 3 3 i 3 (ij .oluiiiiit ; th-s C^vaii;,- rvjaad «:tJ the Ouvolry oOhool) v . i i l

be i a t i & f a c t o i y in p r i n c i p l e in thc t th^y r i l l have l««n dev.*loved by the

evn.t . iAl US«J-8 of * he v.eapoi.'S,

L'n.Ju, whi le the ou t look for sat i r f a c t o r 11 v jaokiji j ; the . : 0 c u l i l o r ûn i s

not i-,ro::ilsir£:, t he re i c no reason 6> a l l why i t cannot bo \ laood un vhoc l s

and dra'-n V; u s i n g l e horse or a t»am, v i t : i the a - ^ j n i t Ion ii; i-ack.

i..i4 r o v i t i r . f J* c u r t for M\o ûr->ase should net be d i ' . ' r i cu l t or o:-p3n;Hve. »j

Kuv? :»v/:>rul under v.ay : " r e . Thojr w i l l bo MUJO U|. of r.alvaf.^J. i ' i ; 'Ni :.:otar»

c y c l e or a l r / l a n e l t . n d l r c i'.âr v .hiele , J7***KI vho-slad .-.o-irt , a r t i . , v a ^ u

a r t r , aul otf . ra t ,e 11. i'ho iiiount lr-c-a-rU v-11Ti tho t;"un w i l l bn adapted in a t l->a;t one ly,'O and Li . t l

n i r o r a f t ; i r > v l l l lo provided for in ano the r . ' r 1,'j.v) o-' the t-j in vv-^joct^d

. O u l t h , . : t . V u l x v U ; ; t l C E i» ' ;J t O O l n . i t u f , 1:.3 j i a r a : - t : ; ?„. T ' l a t e t o : t ; . o l c : f

a t t u O / . y f J* .J0."i.ViC5 c . ; i i i : . 3 t . n " ; : ; h i . . e d f o r r c * 8 ; . : ,d i r v r ^ i C u r f i ( u i . i t o t u - 9

2.<;t*?r.t a i r / : r o . « 8 j * i l l «*J .%Kt tj<>d n i J i e i l l y I . . U:=» i t . e l u s i o n •> >' - u . - . i t i - t ; . i i ;

v . » i . . . o n i - . t > . J , l u v u U y .*»••.:.. « ; . t , i t K o a i d Irs J a o l d < i d l y U ' . l v a : i t . . . ; ; ; V J { •., i i a v j i . l l

v ' u v u l r y > - ' ^ l ' r ^ n t s L V i S l l a r i . s t ? i - j , s ? l v ? 8 a s a o o t i u s ; - u E i ; i b l 9 v . l t h t ; . o H

•::x<t\ H i t i s a j t t:.-> n v o i i , a r ^ l t ;} . r . fo i : i t ! i e

w i l l s-3tv» to ier .ove, It. u j ' a s a T - / , afioth-ir Javalxy w'.iJ.r. I--, t h u t i t can I'r j^.iofctly la used as a n r o t ^ c t i o r . '-'if t*•-,o led horc«8 a ^ a i r s t a i i o r a i t (or yoccll»ly a l so a r ^ o r ^ J Gu thjc«j o c c a s i o n s v.fior. t'i> \ ûôn mud not bo p l aced I'OT-.•ui'd l^cuuBa an er.cu(;-j..vjnt v.lth wrr;or^d v^h i c l ^c i c not i : ' i l n > a t , I t oould ba ;-ut In a c u r o r t p j c i t i o n fro.a v h o r e , u n t i l riTO^snary tc dic;»laoo tha {ini forv.ar*/, i t could f i r s 3%i a i r c r u i t or a m o r ad c a r s t l r o t t i n i n g tlis l s d h o r 6 ^ 8 .

Iu a d d i t i o n to t h i s £:>octal l^J horce p r o t e c t i o n the* anti-t£.nV: voa.-on w i l l t i c o n s t a n t l y use fu l and va lua^ lo i ' o r

a o:i tJri» march, in ; o r i t l o u or in

d»velo;>"!'!nt of chances in

| n i s a t J.and to the a f i ' s c t t h a t the ~i^ti-. O t v a l i y r ; l l l pai 11 o i ; . a t« 1: o . t i i i s l v i conf ined rr.ar.-juv^rs t t r i ^ n . i uHt ry L'ohool In Aj'i'il Jf t i i i £. y s a r . J{aip.a'J^t of thu t r ^;;i 'o i . t v i t h

r 0. cal i t?>r £iuis v/oiild r?nove tha ^ r - a t dic~a-.lv:.:.tat;e undi r v/.ich i*. v i l l l a b o r , i f i t has no u o r s t h a t i t s or^corit nr-^mrAt t to or.po-o to tho nar,brou8 t anks and a r n o r a d c a r s v i t : , vh lch i t i s l ounJ t.-» cons In cd.'.^.'jnt in tho ' lanouVirc .

"Jiu.a prolhrtVly doas >?ot p ^ r . i i t o ' iMproviclng v-hosled raountr for t;-i<i f.yns, b u t , i f tha ilm of irsair;, '- th«n to the r - j ^ i ' - ^ . t chould bo ap 'Tovod, i'-io •j-.nrtlon of t h e i r t r a n s o r t aad use could l i har.dj.od in O- ^r.'-,e*ir».-il .-,ami?r t s d?c^riV3d b3 lo>:

"J.9 kKnu to lnj i seaod to bs of t h i a i r ici!>;d t;,.:o v.ith o i f ' .or l one or s h o r t b a r r e l , .?uch : -ro for ab ly th;j chor t b i . r r c l .

Thi a o u r t s *.o tct t r i r o d s irxido by tii« Vioiojrs Ton and : :axi C o . , und'-r u . ... p a t s n t s , fo? t'v» c a l l b j r . ' 0 uuto.-;;.* Lo r:».chir.3 ;.ur., "od'i l 190^. I t i J u. .d5rct l jod <!.c'. t-i^ Oiduanco r p . a r t - . « ' t h*~> so-.o of t l i jce oil bur.d. TiH:;.1 a ro t r i . c d .-.ouiits upo.i viilch tho ,:?0 C u l l l « r (un can l a i-îrn^d d i r - c x l y wi thout any adaM.'.-jn or c ] t > r a t i o n ir. o i tho r r jn wi ; i iôd, ai : l t h o / Aro i \ so^.o r a s t o c t s a noro si I ic f a c t o r y .'tnai t th; . t L.i f r e c o n t .CO caJ i t f i r on^ .

G^ i a ; t t i r o d can V) c a r r i e d In j'uci; a s f

Ko. 3. ~u-k. âck ,-u:i on n'?ar c i d e , ; r i x s to the i r ^ i t . Mal-.e l â t ' i a r p ck^t to ho ld '. L•-• i t ji" u .^- . in i t ion(î . r a to t-i vviok?1 on n?ar fid*! a love fun . iacr> Vi-Aor L.UAia trie*..! on off s i d e , . L . t i e to the froi . t and tu rned o\;t, t:-j? ? ljfja c^.i i : \r t h a n r > r . ' i u i . ^ r s can b^ ciadi by tla ' 'kJM.it?, , ; u i c i ; r ^ l s a ; * fcsVjncJ c can be t iken from : . . u . pa not in u s e .

o&D.na>:o c t r a i c.

C a i j . ; r . ; i i - - ' ^ d l - . l j . . 8 ; j h 3 T? l b s &r.d in »:

C k . > ' j u r ( ' i j U ^ . J B o f i f >.- i a 1 1 1 i n ( i ^ w r t : - J j , , r . u p - ^ r t v , o - i o ' . '. ^ r o e . • J i ' l i l ' ^ v ; ' ( ' o . * . i » > ; i t l - i n h t » \ i r r •*.,•. i " • T i t o i , ' .«. i r ^ i a - . l r » h » . i ] ! f . ^ v a J 1 9 . . . o . o . •••

V J I .• o - v u i r ^ v u l . u i t " t r . u v r e d c u r e 1 ' j r r - » c j i . : i a i ; . - j f i O 3 ';.. .* I »f»n n ? . . : I . h ' . ,

a ; . . i v > t ; - . * a f a r , b j v . v / . - r , ; V i l . ; c u . 1 i 5 d t v ! * « i a s a : • r l ; * ' . - .rn*<* . I t : V ; ,

t V « d i v i s i o n , r o r U c t l 3 r * l a r . . l t r ^ i . / i a , . - «? > ? • * « i : . \ a ' . . ; . l o v ; t ?

. ! v ! • • - , r a : . l ! < t - i , i u l ^ t v « f U .

( i j j o i c 3 > i ? 3 . l - . l o n i t . I " " ! / * r s i : u - : A r j " U v l r L i i i :'• . r '. • ; r- • • • • •

. r v K l f x l '

? » i v i s i o n o r ^ l ' i r c l a C C ' " ' a t . I / ? r 6 J \ ) J B . ' ^ ' l a l r - » ? J : . f t i r • ,>• r r « l . i i j i i i , w , ..: v

3 1 r .-.• f 1 ; ; r j : o c ^ d * o T h l t v t ? w r c r t h « ! V . ' © " I " ; r M i 5 o . , 8 i

T u ' J t l o ' . l l y , v ^ - ^ r • ; r l r i i ! i . t 3 / ) i l d c : > n t . J . t i o ? ; : V . B C ) ; ' ' . ; ' . u . * r ; / l r ; ; ..,..:

l u i i l i h ' j : a m o r - i d c ; , . r I s o n a o f t : , j c 9 ::•;.: ? j v o U i « i - * . • , r , ^ t ! j V r . 1 ' y t ' ; »

r - j n ; r . r c i 5 ? : t t i ' J ' 5 v j l l t ' « t i e d ? ' ) r M > v i r a r . t l c J > r j l r j ; . t r J . I . . '.'..' ; . * ' ] :,-t ' - t f t ,

t h - > r ^ - - i r « > - , t . o r t h i u n i t u f I t , - M I l o ; - i v « ! » u a . : v > r l : : - . . r - < » ' - f » v , • : ! • ? , *.

- n f l . i l ' s n t ) ] - . ? v f : j r : 3 u n l u J . v i i I J ! . a v * t * - - > < t T - \ w i c ^ i a t, > r , r r ' . ; . • ' - - l t h *-y.t :•*>)<>*

r T o ' v u . l r n a r . C ' j i r . - y a n s i n c a n y l n j - o - v ; r t > . e i l t ^ L ^ n . . . 1 1 l h » • i , . i . 8 » . ' j , . - ; < J

t h o n V a v o t > i r » £ ; t . - ) ; . o t ] i » r ; v , ! i " . r : ; i i S , i f l i l , ' ; ? r u - t ; , . ; * I t y i r ; » a ; r ' ^ r f » r r •' f

" i l r r t i n '.^ t v o d i s t i n c t u n J s s v r . r r r , ; ' * u n i t s , t h « r ; j i c r . o : - . i > . r - ; ' " . ' i r i ' » . j f :••• * ~ u

' . . i t i : t ' n rv l ••'!•!• *. f - ' 5 r . i r : l ' j t < . ' l y o i u l ; p d i t > c a r r v o u t l t ~ J E . ; ; : . ^ ; f a t ::;, • .

c a r r . a s a . a r t o f I t , h i . ' > t ^ j a ; ; t : , : > r l r v '. v u l a - ? r t i ; s a r i ] y ! i r - c ^ . r . r , .-_ ' r i . i i - > o .

r o ~ i r r ? r t o r o n o o f i * . s v u i t s , a n d l * } a v « t h $ d ^ t ^ l l s - j f 3 ; . ' ! ^ t t i o u t • > t i . - i r I t

O p t - o t i * I o n t > f ' l l O i r . " : f ' : r t T ^ r s i n ".' •> r j - i - r . t i s l a r o l ••• i r e c r - > r . l .

f a c t h c t f r » ) j u e t . t l ; , i f n o ' h a V l t i a l l y , ) > l r h « r M I V ; : j r 1 •.;.- w I T I J . - W * ... o : :• : .

r o c ' j n : i . " ! i i ; 8 a r . c o i r . i s s l o n ' . o r t*- ,^ u r o o r s d o u r s u f i d , t u f t t o f o r ? , 3 t i t : , M •? . . ; , " • ; }

r < ? c , i • . ? ! t a s r i - j c n s r a r y , V i J o a n s v o v * 3 t h i s i f j

7 ' i ' J ' - . s ; a l - i c r i o r . o f t h i s T i . " t v , 1 ] i l i >J.-A ,- i i l n t . . i t r - : ; , ;• a i - r . i 0 5 I : . ." • u

v i t l i t ' . i A i r " j r . , i ; . •".*;.0 ;:.: M r ^ c c ^ r s i t t ' 1 c . u ! r _ i i r " i , / ! > ' - r.

f o r t ' n ^ t i T ' o t ' . c .

?uf» i r .

' r '•, • . I : . . - . . - ' ! ' \ U . :.••*, ' 1 J . V ... t ] > r 1 1 y

• . . : i i* : . • : A i • \' - i • i. >.'-l .* \

\

' ' • • . , , ! • . : C ..: i t ; - ' J : f 1 ' ., 5 > i i r u

. . . . • i . i | • • s 5 - n : - r < I t U ». s <>r • H ^ ' l o ^ U

. : • * I t . ^ . t ' . ^ . - . l , r U '.'••« >•}, i r t : a / . ; ! ' ' \ r n

' , ' ' • • ; v - ' M ^ i . , • ' **• a . I t s '•!' : v r o r i f , r e

, : ? ; [ y , ; t • ; s - ».-. ' . r . . . ^ f r r t , \ } \ •..- k . r . 1 t ' . v . j l l ; /

;.• # J , t " . . o v i k i i *'. .. ; « . • ' ! ' v » ! S s r: ?«.•*•» I t s

i t s

. r : , M v « l ; ! . . ? • * nur*'j^*' ^ *. Cain, ;rouc<>d

' • v , ••»».'"•• t.-i*-.- , r » - ; l v * . ..As uu l ? r , w h i c h 'io-'JC n o t i n s l

' • *c i f f l ' i i i . t O u r # .'or t>i«j o r d i n a r y ' H s f l i o r : a n d

' . • ; , ; iv« :• • • ! «-> ,..- i11. r; 1 ' . -1th t h ? r ^ r '.•: i r . t u H E « V I o f

»< »V" • » 1 - r - ! l . ! r ..vr v . ! . » c t n l .

' • ' • » r ' t 1 ! u r f "••• l n c " > r ; i r a t M l a t ? t h > ; " • : : ) ; • , ii;:.»] ^ i - . r t »rfi

! . . t - - - , r , ".' r . r ,' : , r ; •.;•'• t U; • - r r t r v . r t h \r*y., . . r a r-..-niS9re'i

h t r o ' i . . V I . ' r I s - ri..>fJ<sct

."-.' • n - 1 ; '-> • • ; V- . fA ir-"V-*r>l»»d d r i v a , > \ i t th*s r<jE<»ni f o i i «

'•*•!'* 1 • • " * •' • * : r l v i » , ' .*•! !•.. > n f c t i r * > , j i ! i V y , r - ' i u i r o o (,T-rfc*. n o v . e r ,

" f•< •• ' " ? V .r ' U - :-.. i*l ." n'. - , ; - , \z c o - r H f ! n - i - i , . o i d n f t O H C i r i i y . v . t c t t <

'« *'•* - . ' . ! • « - I . ! . * ; • • - i l l ' - j ; t U , "•.',•» t T o - v h « i l * c l - I r j v i o a r P. , : I V?

id

four-vhe-.ilo.l ilrivo can; i t v. i l l lack s o u A Do o o c * >'.ou:itr}' ' . U H l y of the "up, i - <c.

fo;»r-vh<?t;led/ilrlve t u t , on the oth^r h m J , ! t cun be ''reduced in u .lr.i'iu.i of

t | a s ; i t ic al'i;.la in Jêlcn, t; J al*.» o;n bo V.-J. t lovn, unrt onso!t*v.;t ly, tr-o

*tu*ht nud "owarj I t c»n l>5 civen u lnrce oruUliif,* i ri41ua; i t is l u l l ** . ro t - 'Ot

ad ur.J b e t t j r adapted to th<? :nl6*lon because 01 *.K»II si innu'jt t^; fcil, «h t ie

nost l - r o r t i n t of a l l .'it thin t l : », i t oun to l u i l t on ;s oo-auroi;*! ohucois .*rd

v r y cl«3[ ly . Ctattir .^ rn ,n thf auppi.v of a f w v«rlol«j6 to r .oh reRl;nent, I t

p r u o t l c u l l * lecnusa of \n« lot; coct to a[uli> t^« cavalry from norrr.::i

froa t'.» ;uaj t i r r ias iar Corye uni OrJtir.nco Depart-.or.t v l i h lu a net

9xc«r-8iv»ly long: t i n* . ?h« oxnflues oouM fe« v«ry R.«torlu l ly r«duo<jd cy pl.'.olr.tf

roril urmur only on the vehlclsc sent to thfl to rdor . Ciijap nlafi could t«» uasd

on tha vohici iu imondmi l'or r«r lnir i t8 fii othar n a t i o n s In th*? United r:tiit-»3.

I t v.ould \>9 a OITJI>1O ?a;.411•.»r, In oas« of -jmar^ncy, to fnibsiit\nG i^rôur r ii».a

TV the aoft p la t« on t i*s« v e h i c l e . 7U9 tira« r-jûlred to do t h i s vould d-T'iod

al.-aoct en t i r e ly upon V:n vln» i t voulo t.iKo 'he armour j 1 ^tj :ianufact-.jr^ru to

fabrlo^.t) tha n o t a r i a l .

i.Villa tha recJr'.snt ie ava l t ln^ i t s eiolpr;?r.t vi tn 6f)nd«»ra aroorî cars it

cm .is? c.8 a s u b s t i t u t j for thod lu t ic t ios i l t ra lnJnn i*Ltx)?t a,;; kind of niOtdr

trar.ffport-ition avai l it>le In ih« pr^rrlsori. At tho Cuvulry School various corta

of tour lnr o.jr8 and rooonnalssanos sr.rs hnv« u?en e a loyod v Uh qaii<» f a i n ; ;

sa t i s fac tory r«8u l t6 , nnd i t 18 suipos'sd t\.t each of OUT Tuvalry us part lc Ire t i e

in V:,+ oo-nlncj nane*v*»rs ra the Infantry Cohool v l l l I s oupplisd with l^provieoJ

A c ir8 In a olrrll-»r v'uy that under t)ie>6o condiMonr of t ^ r r - i n or voj.ther

» i t wouli b» d&prlv^d of i t s raptor t ranspor t , the oner^y v«uld b« doprlvj i

a l to of M s .

?h')T"9 Is in U8o a t t h i s c t . t i o n a nu^tor of j r l v : i t e ly ov-nnd l l j h t '.ruokc,

«rach organizat ion hars h-vinr: on? ot these v*hlcl93. They have a capacity of

IV tons, a. ni the rx>r« o f f l cUn t once or-? aqui^pid v\ir\ «hr*l t i r a c l» rea r .

?h~lr i n i t i a l cor.t i s email ( in the ivjirhlorhood of (,,000.00), anJL they are

c-m^d;,-, swrdy and ©cor.oîcfil to oper, . to. The dut*l v.Jieel type have ucoonpsni;d

orpanlzat Ions it whlon th>y trtlonp on n^rchea ov>r d i r t rofcdo vhen tv.*ie roads

«ere In a very tad conUition. I t i s t h i s typa or v h l c i ; \)\i.i the r rojeoi

sik^reBts for the rcj-J -ient-.l t r a in , in the proportion of Uo par r i f l e trooj-,

v.!tr C3rta1n addi t i i n c l o^h^r ones for tna nachine gu:i t roop, headqaart »r r . - t o .

Ordlnt-rily, these t* VCY.B would t r t j i s for t Buf f l i ^c If the c o n J i t i o n a o f

the operation r equ i r r J ihe transport of . U t , p l l « in excess of thoir capaci ty,

-17

they oould be need tot more tran one trip per doy.opertiiTif; ceiween the divis ion

ul trains , or other points of tupyiy, and the rectnsmt.

?h*>ir epeolol use woula be for the transport of any loads v.hlon could te

taken fro"!i the horses' basics on thom oeousslona *h*n the operation re

the troops to ;ank» loni% rapid ranrcnts, These loads wuM oonai«w nrinci

of the liuUvidiK.l trooper'J packs (except orr.B wid ammunition J rind veapons and

aununluan normally oarrled In pack* It Is th«se velnhis vhloN hold doT.n the

Uuveiry -nflrcn to a point f'svr bslow the real oanat l l lUe« of Its animals.

The usutii oDt'eot of tba lorn*, ratud cwrch i s v> fralu contact vlththe ineny

or h»o lnstal lat lon» at sane distant, polnî ini the r~ttOK wedvone need not bi irn

available during the Daren.

.he 'rojoot proposes th« eliminaw lot 01 mules end esoort vo^.ons fron th9

ental train. Thi advent of it* atrpiune ura m-sonunlned forces hus brou^hi

upon the oarilry the neceesUy 01 b«»ing abl» now ln ire iue i t ly to majre lonrr, fast

marches over a period of several days. It 1» lrrrpr«ic ncauie lor Ji w

euch ui&rches and keep a mule train even in approximate proper distance » n n

column. Jrunnirnore, tne nornal every-duy march wi l l huve to be epeoded up

vhat, find this c«nnov be done, it the csvairy colann ID held dov.n to the 20 or £o

o l l eu por day 01 the *apon train, 'rnero rtas csen «or:e nvtenpt ntde $lnce the

V.orld Y.'ar to movorlte the regimental train, arid teats of cud) motorization hav;

batn conductoi. 1)r9 resul ts have teen un«atisraotory dae •frfajgfat-ifiJ>:#)y ^ one

rsaBQo, and thi-t reason v-as the type of vehicle ussd. It was ent ire ly too heavy.

The runitlve -UiieditloH Into woîoo in 191u v«ao suipliod lj truck trai" bat

only with thi greatest d i f f i cu l ty , t.hioii arose principally ;rou U a uoe oi" IJO

heavy vehic l i c , x fev; passape3 of the truck train ovjr tha road tht jlnsinoers

m^lntiimd served to tTind i t Into doep hindorin^ duct in dry weather, or convert

i t into clotJL'iflC; mad in v.et weatn«r. Hud i. lii;ht»r type of truck bsen used the t f f

ici^r.cy of the truns:ortatior system would h^vs oieti mi»*.irlal"ly lnorei.tod.

It 13 probable, under praoont coul i t lone of road^ and the kinds oi' l ight taotor

tr&ncport available, thut t}» cavalry could k:ep motor cupfly trulnc; with i t , in

, Vj iar th-j jyaatar part of the ti'Be. T)ie axceptlona voald occur v.hor« i t

bo operating in sapaciall.. /Uu'L d countr;,, or ia purtlaulirly ntvin weather.

It should be not)d, hov»;v»r, chat th<3 purpose *.' subati lat luc / for %ac,on trans];ort

i s to enable ti.r. oav;»lry to move v.ith Ui« ^ro^tjet sneei in rolatlon to i t s jnai.".y,.*nd

«• contact i . made or Is iai,ina:it the veuoons «oal l b« raplacod in j>fto*f siuc* the

-18

for lh> long novânt dtuti^ jars at this tl.Gd, bid the ihort r^pid

nova:nant of weapona In the. jn(>a^«.u)nt tak*« i t s pluoo.

Iu th» autt-ir of obtaining t ime vuhiol«8 for the ouv«*lry, it u<j,,tur* t>

a uorUln araoaut of tuofljy v,lU L« e,:»nt by th* , jar t ) i «Btir D-^^-it-o^.t thid

ye&r for niv; traok trwifloortut ioa for th« ursy, «id i-r*a» i j ^ r t e ur* i j th*

«ff$ct that thi ooiaittâo of Uougrafis huvs lion Auruad that .••i~>j t r - iu ror tu

n^s become vora out uiyl ubtol^ts, and that noxt ^«&r -Joiijraou v t i l bs uj.'proachaJ

tor larn« sums to «ff<sot -notor trun6p)rt rvlacouant. ''at t of tho iundc to b«

«x;'?nJ«i now or In thd l'aturo will b<> us?! to ro;lao« lh« ;f)3<}nt ouvt*lry .isotor

transport, and It is raa»ouatlu V oappot') thut tl.j cuv^lr^' •• i l l l« «blo to i;ot

tho kind of tr^neyortkUon it asks for ds^saially In vl«w of the taut tJu.t tho

li t;ht tyvi) of truck vhloh w« rîalro v l l l cost vory oonsid«rubly 1*588 t h ^ any of

ths li*rg«f tyyo« of vaJiloliB vhlch VJ ur<i no* aolnf,

Third U a r«al dangar to'Va vatcbad for aud uvoidal In thiB .TUttor of

obtulnlng ^*otor trtr.spoi t Xor cavalry rdgl:a9ntdl truint . Ii wd yo to raotor

trwiaport, w<» slouM havo a truoX of an actual caducity of ono and on<»-half torjpt

r ? f l l } n land this is not a pr<j8*nt oiay standard capacity, tho capacity of thn r

so called 1\ ton «rny trujJi Idini; i.i raali ty con si durably in ©XOOSB of this

urxiji.t. As our d«3lrod tmek is not of a standard capacity, and l>Doause of a

c<rtain waount of proûdioe ufrln^t thi iio'l'tsr truck, thara T.HI b« a strong

di slncllrutlon to latt infrus have I t . Our moasuity / raiulros, how^v-sr, a

vshlol* v,hich v. 111 hav» SOJO apO3d anl relulivsly low jjisoliaa consumption, and

above a l l oua thut ia able to nocotiuto poor d i r t roads. To get thaea essential

lual i t ioc, i t la r.ac^fisury to set a sharp liir.lt on tho actual capacity of the

truck, and that liralt lr. tho ono tjlv-jn, nanely 1,; tons. A tiyin of hauvlor

trucks for tho rîicout will te raora of a hinlr&nco than u holp.

A i.niou3 aconorr.13 ot,!ection tj ecrapînc t>io (jsoort v.af.-on is tr*it the

Govira-asr.t hue on hand a large nur.tar of thea and th';y should i<s us-»d u j , ii

possible. Jo iu» as th« cavalry is coneernod, hov.-?var, the usoort wa^ns could

e continued in u3o to so.- o oxt^.'it at l n u t i.i the dlviJion^l train:-, •.h<3r<3 th<v.

Couli hi capjajreil in a v;..y not to i r i t t rof>rj with V.K) rooMlity of tha • '4*1 ,13 £ ' • •

Thut Infantry or th»i unur:.:oral ::sau can no l<)n(;or, v/l

adv:.nco in the face of U.a trc.i2ndou8 r l f l a and ^lohina t>^" f iro of lu turo v,ui ,

ha.B "boot ao :r«JiUfi!itly s ta ted as opinion in rocsnt y»ars th.-.t i*. M i s f<•< 111 Ij

oad aa s- j t t lol convlct loi . . ?.JJ Idoa h^s l-^^n lout-.-rad by tv.e

of /-.'joh-nlaaUja v-ho point to th-.i armorod vahiolo au ti.) orl-- - - J r

-19- ' ""

by \hl?-h an u t t ' t o o ba i.îe economically ; )ocai t i>. A t in j r scun t i;,j.sont

6dv?ot of uu «jffouttv«i antl-t^nX vjuûn i'jr I tuuiitr; ;.\4 Juv^lry tj«. urJntly

th^ ur.norol vehicle to u oonfclcJ u ubls d<j{;roe, u i i v.j a: J brought

to an ax^nini"-ion of th ic i iua t i n t t in ui;-rr,uroi "i*n advance iu &o l o n ^ r ^.jc

n*rt th« na>;t var v.Hl lo t v.ur of ::.ove',)rt mid t h ^ L . l l l U •••!

«f tr.jnchjfl and vlr-,» vl 11 b j i ^ k l n j ; in tl.v . 'n r .v j cui-v. jy

. ianuvor the 'o t t aok v.ili bo bruu£M u^. iu: t a ::.VTQ or I J C S J ias t i l^ i roy^r id

pos i t lorit I t i s not ^robubls tjj^t tho f i ro ta bo ox;>iatad fi'ora uioh u ^ jo l t lon

n i i l b'J any jr.jr'} iLx.iaj;,'n£; Uuiii thot roouivad l'rou the s tuba l l^ id cntfjjv position.6

in tli> lus t JMMH*. Yoti up to th i c l jE in^ d. ; s of tho Ai.r, advisicou v.jro L.uda und

^ u t n ^ t ipos i t ions tuiien Vy Iho "uuai.jortvl" rruui. Loi-a-jo Viara i^;l<j«d l&it''1 " iu r

t>ia,Ji11£;", and I t Is i. tlf.iilfiât.t Tact Uiat wiCh loscos v.ara usual ly 1-; propor

tion to thu oifsovlvoiiaas of troop lâdir.^,. 11 .houlJ bo I ' i cu l l a l th^t c f t i r th'3

i-raotica v.aa ul j i . t )d of r o h o r s i n g u t t i c k s oa th • ^ r i u o l p l j of ihi .-ton u VJI of

tho tiaallost u n i t , loa*oa <lt3or8*s-)d . ' ôrtictiKitoly In orrani^. ' itldns £o

?h« JuvuLry «chjol ic toaahing atvl doaonctratiug Ly p rac t l su

tht>t suc»0E8ful advui.305 ov<jr p r t o t l o a l l y uiy torruin u<4n "be aadi oy w v,ot] t r t - lu

ed SiunJ it.'id l o u l i r , undtjr l'lro coudl t lons vhloh vouM to oxter ni.-.at inj; to a.

uni t lacking tho t r a l n l n j .

Iu Uiort, I t i s boliavod tlu^t the "auar.r.oraJ" natj oun ct i l l a i f i c* iv-jly

atâcK without for bidding ljse-js, provided h>i it, oarafully t r u l n o l , h is fir o

, ro "?rly co i i t rd l l sd , wid h;fi an.U is l ) d to tak<> ^1vui.t^[j>) of U.« ground and

c o o ^ u - t ) •. i t h o*.h »i .iiilt:^.

li» th<i Ca'/ulxy thin cîitoa of r.vtnjavor of anall uriit3 notjdc bo espooial ly

: t r an t^ l and tho uat tore of * :a l ) unitii thoroughly tr.-luod. I J . J B I l.-udor. uxi ipr

tho i-aOtt par t nonco^jicsioned o ' / f ioars . ihrjuGhout ti-o proctor â r t or th* a t t a c h ,

thÎr a i t j i i t ion v l l l b« confiu'Jd to Uv; coul'uct cf thol r *:ilt8 urd U.;..' v.i 11 not

Oiitor tha Tire fi^'lit ao indlv i lua ls r ith t?)8li* v.âûns unti 1 tli ? nessesi ty or

p r a o t i c a b i l i t y of cor.trollLnf; tholr u n i t s huv cjao^d l j uxist^ '•<.!:- cutiJi t iou, i f

i t ^riBije, v i 11 normally D;J tit th« shor ter ranfi^c.

l"nj ' j r j j jct proi'usos the auoatltutlv.-i of f;iij:3ôon eub-rruchiuo iuno for U;o

r l f l a e of u luvâ na^bjr of nonco:is.:i3SloneJ o f r ioa r t -n tho rofrlcont for Lho

;jrliiC LJL 1 r i a c ju that t h i s weapon of about the to.*-) v.î^ht ua tho s u v k i r i i ' l o , ^

v.oald U'.M murV to tho >>ffact lv^nots of tho f i ro il-^Jit, v'on uivJ i:1 i t in nacocsfiry

to uso i t thorolnt i t can la uwployod a i u 3int;l-.s shot, j r ao im uutocj-tic vo'-von,

in effect adding naehluo gjiaQ a t th'i rat-i of about 1^ or ror<i por 8|.Vid at th ;

c r l t i c . 4 i;«oje.'jt. '."he weapon it ' J i t r j o l y • U Y J O - I V * ut - i ^ _;il i v t y;<rdi ...JJJ

Ui.j f u l l y •»f:Vrt ive '.it I-J) jjid .'o'j y . i r l ; ; . I t v. i l l i r i d i l y l U ^ l o U* <-.lli a ra..r

!!>CS vf , /£-U.'j i J r ' v , foi th> J jvo ; u r j o C ' ) . .J*jul 1 i t IM ;idj;it ')J '.;.? JwV.ilry

- c i i ^ j l v^.il ' l r'jco . . •?!!•' y j r t . L n oLau^js lii l i lpot ' , r i.tji'r;, .'ij.d OJI r^/liif 8ai;.j to

Bi'fflct a ijtiving in \ # i . ; h t . Ao n o l i f i o d , thu t o t . i l v.bA J»t of jur; , C u i r y i n ^ <.\,i,i

- n i ICO l O i d i ; o f u T . r i u l f i o n , j r r l i u f u l l ^ ^ w ' - l n o s , v g a l d :.., rv/:t:.u.t<?2y i{Ui l

t \ > t y t a l wii^ 'nt j f thu r U l « , l>jot , a : J lfO tuur.da ef a. . v u i l t i u n in c l i o i . .

In udd l t lo i ) to t l i j xouzon uiv-t .ood t.bave fjr iho a d a p t i o n ;jf t h» T;»o;H' o**

«41J-::>acMu'! t^"» i t :'.u^f ) •i A u ii»t'?J out t h a t :

,'.t l j i i r t yn-J i.v).'jV;)r oi" jv.)ry p a t r o l j * ! ; t j u t •vjul-.l I ; ;>r^viJod \ i t i . i t .

I t ^ Valuo ir. i-v«trollIn^ vorV i s olviou. '^

.; c - ' r t a l u nu-ib ;r •..•jald J J a l v u y s - t hund v. i th tho 1<; 1 hurufl3 to ort '" ir u

v j r y conoid ' j r i\ I > i . - i o n s j u g a l n s t lov. f l t , inj.; a l r c r u f t .

v. i th t h j :>u<i)ilv.} <;anc of t h o . a o h l n ; p.w t roO| ' f t h a n.»l*-.:«iohiu;> (/ans

would f u r n i s h t v j mjc*. su t in i ' ivo tory i.Ind of I ^ C M I J u / n o r t . H 13 kr.jv; t h a t our

:r..iohlno i,\iam»r3 in th-3.. .oxld »«: v.ould i r o v i d a tli^rn s j l v a 3 \-),-m thoy could v.ith

a Y.ânot;, 9X'.-}. a s u .'r ^ncli C-vi»lry cc i rb ine , for t h i s ûri-os,- , w.d had iho

Gor'ânB hud u v.japon of t t j i s s o i t , our Cap tu ra o f so liuny a w . y rauohin«

v.ould no doubt have boen :aach a o r o d i f f i c u l t th^n i t v.at. add

7h-3y v.oald/tTO-it ly t j th-s «>ro t o o t l jn of tho oo lann ^ ^ l n s *

r3Oo;r-,-)ndutijn3 of t r e Tiui'u Bo^rd Q8 a r e s u l t of t - j c t s ! i»U L*. *ort -« "oc i i c , a r e r f l y o r t ^ j a s fol lov/a:

'.ê Turu. Bo.»rd Counl t h u l a s uu Iu.':->ntiy v.«u;>o!i, th« Vha:8;'Oon «!*».. ••-4< hln<s iîm Ls aa t l r j f . i c to ry v.hen usad o u t : i d o of tho t ank as a c i j s o run£;e y rs ' ,74 watipon ii-; »i n*: t n i j rBonn«l , and a l s o for use in oo'nnnr.d a n l raourjnM'. c -H3O c a r e . Th j boy.rJ conEtd-iro'l t ho t ^ n ^ c u a u u t i c t .c t o r y i»c an i n f a n t r y w»ji*t.>o.. *"">r U M i n t ank u : i l t ~ .

l'jv/ j l y i n g i . l r c r u f t .

In p o a s l c l ^ f a t - i r e c ^ s o s of dora j t t io d i c t u r t i o i c ^ , t h i i r^ j sence of t ê sa

weapons in u mob v ^ u l d 13 to t r o o p s Q rajnuce vh ieh cannot l& o v e r l o o k o J .

aajr i i : lne v - rUc lo r o c r t n t l y o a i - r i ^ i th^ c t ; to.ront thi : t UIT) i ' i r a in *'JV tor ; . Ci'.^

hud so ld 7,000 ViiOiupeoi: sv;b-.^Gchi!i*5 gunG - u l t ' n t o d o s t i n i . U j n l.»rj;oly unknown.

?or C I O C J in :i£-htin£"f tJio- l o t t enzvor to thoo« ^caj-oas i n t h ; h.iuds of nioyl- i

det*r:;]ined to U S J th«n v.ould to th-j voaôna tujr-icelvec in tho h u n i c of tha t ro^p

I n tho t - j e t j oonduotod h»r>}, tho T/ior.i^sou ca"b-:.uiohlno ^-u.is hi-V: f u i u t ljnjrt

p e r f e c t l y , ^xoopt \n Sufi's ini>t.incoe vh<jj o ih j ^n i t s e l f v;;/s .>AJi :\cA\,

i;o oir.mnlt icjn can, i l l a t i o n v. i 11 r « 3 u l t tro;i tho adop t ion of- ;!.» ^ y . o : . in

i t nays tha SUMO c a r t r i d g e ao t h ; .If- c u l l e r p L t o l .

he ov . ' n tu . l ;*Jo['tlo.» of tin) « e U - l o u l i : ; c r i f l e -.-Mid i»r>« : i . » t e ; / . l l y J ' ' \

f i r th* - l j ^ t l o n of t h s w i b - ; l

I I i a p r o l a t l y not to V«> )iD[>od tb&t i\iulo tot th J o - . - l .'to oiul;i . .ant J I ' \\.

with I>.as9 v-eaiono aould t « Jud a t DKCS, l u t th-; ^ i u i p />nt oûU t»

Aixnli.}jed crtvlually by purchase from nor .'.sal ui-propsriaUynB, if t)/>j ' . ro^Ki t lor:

"up^roval In [.rlnoJole1 .

•37 irtm g - g n e .

In lh» ' 'rojoct those tojns M J r-juJ^roJ £;o..ni--ii:actlV6 li;

i r ;£l ' r ,o: : t , as they uto not concid-jrod a b s o l u t e l y •:s:j.A\.:*t tVurdlit , .1

a l l t i - ^ c .

'Iht'j urt, h'jv/3Vr?r, r e t a i n e d UB p a r t of t'.<j r o ^ l ior.t

liito Borvloo' a.££/ln v.nfjn yorsonufll b o c o ^ s a v « l l u b l 6

fo l lowing i apor t . t n t roasons :

<a. Tiuy a r e e f f e c t i v e , undor favor . ; t lo clroiinMjyo--*s, apu inc t i-r;x>r jd c.ira

<Uid t J it; 0 •

V. Th^y ore nucn moro eff'octiVa t han oachire 'trans t i^t in-t dug in ma*

gun po f i t Ions .

_c. Th'?y huvo a hl£h !.ior^l va.lu« in op-)rt-tio/. afjcinr* on<5'y troops vho v i i i

not bo suppllad v. 1th & r>i:jllar v.eupon.

^J. Vluy aro highly offectivo agclnr.t a io le vaJ la or Iious^s such us v 111

j^jîy ' i iTij)^ ' -} in a CiT.pulgn \n l r . t ln c-ountiioc;. l'o oth-ir v/oav'on th: * v;3 hav-i

or propoe* to htvo cun uwroach tôia In th i s rospp.it . Ti» .• :3'-u-ln«fi In I.'

huve found the© mort ucsful f r thi pur:^'iso, ui>' i t i s r oca l l i d tl-i.t tl.a

Cossack cavr.lt;/ lti tho iiuasn-ûpunese ..^J.-, laGK.'wc a waan'ou of th lo tyê, V.UE

savorcly haraporod In both 11a t a c t l c u l tn<i sirs, liQlcal raovoionta by ar

of Jj.panooo In fur. t ry ported Wrind the.ou'l v a r i s of Cninoso vl l lapoa or compounds

on t )? ::anc!urlan p l ^ ln . /.

j3. lii3 "jiToctlvonoos of tho g\ft an! i i ^ unnaniUjn Is nov/ under^xiljig

irnpro vs.vint.

. . l f l e ; ; i T t i on^

i'ron a tuct lci .1 vi.j\v.:olnt tvvis T r o j c v ic opsn to c r l t l o i u n hi r'j{,;-rd to

•thj na'nbor of r if lcj plutoons lof t to th; r i f l o troop; or looking at i t in

i

anotv-jr way !„ ih9 propovtton j f r i f W 0 i a tho reGl-.»nt t-j tho nuirtnr-of

•;iv> v . i n l f o l d d u t l i O t h . . t f a l l t o t h e i l f l r t u : ; l t s l u c V j d - j i ; t i o i l {» .< , , u t ; ;• t

* . n d u i l v a n o c , I ' l u n k , r e a r f ^ i r < l -'Nd, I n t e r i o r i 7 J r . r d l u U B , • n d t h e . w i u t . - . l . i t '*•;

M i i t h o y f o r m t h n t ^ o i s *)f t h e d U e r w j n t ' v l n i t u j n , o r j f - p u r ^ i l t d e i j u e c , o r

* l t h J r a w u l . » i i o y i n s w b e i n d i f f i d e n t t u ' i b e r c , t h o i i , I n t > , 8 r o . l ^ n t , n c . r r y

o u t F r < 1 T < ' r l y i l l o f t h » s » i l u t l i j o t h - » t v a u l t ' n o r m a l l y f a l l t o u u n i t o f i h . M s i s f .

*'2i« proportion af ihrie r i f la platoons p*r vroop Is l»«liov*J to to ;• ] lopor nnd X.

lojlcvi oni tuctioQlly, Mid in th« ' roj ic t the r i f lo ttronf:tn li; U; .<!•••>fore l<?ft

» i tb>v t 'ropoTtivTU In t.t\* i r o o p o j trj'j u u v n n r l z t f i r e a o a ' J k r ^ n r l n r-)ji j . i t , i . - ' . ,

y r \ ; i . • 5Tit j f u9t) cj»n. l i i f;.« r s d u c i J , ' j i . cn t t r o r . { , t h t r o ' j > tVu !.-..; t ^ r o i r l f l o

plat:/f>!riS ^*r t r o o p i s r ^ ' i u o o d to t'.'-o. Vii ic ' i s n o t f u l l y t i c t l c a l l y suCf lei o r . t .

i a ' J trooy>, .nd 00U09 j u a u t l y t M r«f;lfr, » n t , vo \ i ld b« naoh V t t t t j r t ^ l - n c ^ d u n i t e

a n d f• r fctttr.* ^.ble t ) c a r r ; o a t t h a l i nor:-*-l t i . o t J . o a l i a i a c l o n s i f t h e r e v « n

t l i r « » r l f l i ; l i - t o a : \ » to t:.D t r o o y . ' l o v . ' v n r , vu huve no l ^ s a n u r . t j r o f r i f l o

f l i . t / i n c In t h 9 r ? i u c o d f r j n f r t h t r o o p o f t h n " i o j i c t , t h im v a u n ' u a l l y h i v e now r

Ii5 Vhi ]>ro¥9ut t r o o p , **Ld f i e j r ^ c a n t t r o o p d o e s nunuâ t j l u n c t i o n •« i l h o n l y t h e

t-\o :>. j o r . s , u l t s i t , i t d o e s BO u n d e r . t r a i n .

.aoa L ;h WJ u r » now r e j u l r e d to do v i t h o u t t h « t h i r d r i f l e i l . . t j o n in t^.«

t r j o p u n d e r r t d u o o d êuc-» - t r ^ n ^ ' h , v t t . t i i l c,^;. ^ i v e o u r c e l v a s t>ie niw v e ^ o n s

and a <ulp:i->r.t pro;-3B«'Ji i i ; t h « l o j o c t , w . ! havli ig1 t h « a ; V e c a n lecsor-e fa . ' fLH^r

v.lt.h UJ^T, and d o v d l o j ' th-) t ' j c h r . i ^ u s v f t h e i r wnr l ay . i« r t . ,,hn\ t h e r e f j i r . i i . t i o

p u t Uvik on t jifluCj l l :r .) t r nt(/-h l a s i s I t v i 11 t e ^ i c h lifer. , i i i f \ c y l t *o add

or.ft r i f l e y>l«,.tion to ouch t r o o p t h a n t o a d d s p e c i a l u n i t s v i t h new v.ei»j,ons o r

; l a o , vihil> t h s lack of tho t h i r d l i f l e i ] i t > o n in Ih.j troor, i s u n l o u l t t c i l

h »o k n e s c , i h l s voc.krieso 12 fur rrôre th?m o f f s * t \>y the added eôcli-.l a u l

l p p o v a r ^ i v e n b y i h o new w a u p o n e uh ' . e q u i p n w r . t p r o p o s o d i n tv-o l i o n

of ".. ik^3 ,.iO c >1 I I or And a n t i - t . i n k anciuui t l j n c a r r l j d for the

•.•••'>»!t i n t,),« roduoad peace i t r»n£; th roglin-jnt of the " r e d a c t I s the e f f e c t i v o

n.ininavr'. Hov.fvcr, t he ^r.oxu t of tenmuuit ion c a r r i e d Citn l o i n c r e a s o d by the

c o n p a r a t l v o l y lii .npis a^podioi . t of u.':l.li&£ a c-:uil 1 nunber of n e n , p a c k s , and ; ( ac^

I V •..!;•. y e 1 7 ; . ; u o ! i I ^ l r . v ! t j r v -. . • • i d U , ; t U ; * i - v ' i ' l y ; - r v 2 n j r c o n . e i . . - . • t l ; . i a

> > f t ' " j h i - 1 1 - > r t M i- t r j o . i V > r . : l i J 4 s l t j . i .; . . 1 - r J u . ^ t • . • ^ r r i r l v . I '.••> t ..• * <-.-r* o f

t h e i u . 1 ; ' v i ' . . J . ' r r i . , , / 1 ! j • t ; i i ? „ , - : . . t ' J > f I . : ) . • u . l J i . r t o l 5 ; ^ r ; J t h t u t a - . I ; 1

l l e s s l e l i ? V i d tha t t M c i r .> :.*ittJi t:( .t c a l l s i"or u 1,'uct'vMit In tn«

f vi l u r e .

.v v i n La aot-iJ ti.u'. th t r.iao of U:-V.a;'.d ;uart *rc tr-joji -.^! th-j r If 1*

t roop of Ui* igj '»ct r ^ v ^ i a s - r ^ c t l c t i l l y t}.-s su-,3 ae th» i r o s o u t Vjth R>r On:

p o a o »ni rijJucoJ I'OJ.C'S s t . r ^ n t * ^ , th»s Bizo of th« iaac.)iino QXW t ruoa iu.r, Veen

aa !e j r ^ u t s r i : 11;.» ? :o , ja - t in botV. i r u t u n c u . Tau c l - i of t.;.« rofluaeJ n?uci4 •*

j t f i n t ' ^ t r j on of U.« ?foj.»ct i s not uivlnly lurt'O f r a Caj.tuin'i . o u r ^ u ' l , t u t

U.i o iza of t);-> a u t h o r i z a J pâc-j Ltrnn^th t r o i p of t?,o " r o j * c t i» too lr-r^N •

Iv ha3 l>e»n poli:t;<l out U;..t lh*ro v,ac no CJO<1 t u c t l c - 1 re* ôu i'or ; 1 -oi:.i; the

ar.tl-taiiTc îins in th* rjuohin-? k"un t roop u& tha u i : t i - t : u i \ CJA . "^ c^-l. :-/iC',ina

KUCS v . i n cs ldon, i f fjvar, l e u s * i to'_'«th«r ir. isasc. 0:. the o U n r J ;^ r1 , 'Vur-i

uro o i r l u i n £ r v t udruiniutri»tlYo i.ni t r a i n i : i £ a Ivûtf-.^;! connect ; i v i t h t h ) l r

t tLn^' in tho . :aoljln-3 (;jn t r o o p . Vô Id* a of .T/iklui; »i soâr^t-j an i t of th<»

a n t i - t a n k we.vA:ons v.us on*- »r t u i n j j l u t t h lo would ::«-.iii y, r i o r ^ .n iz^t ion of U>:>

-^^ l)jsi<loa i t r.oalJ Lo ii:.;;usclbl» to x'ind i ^raoi.nsl for th.T

^ ovjrfrsad uiidir p r a e a n t r a i t r i o t l o n s .

D-Jc *U8O of thi s i2« of t i u troOi , l i n i , unJ bec-uco ulco of l i e t o l n c

oors>;-'osel of two t a c t i c a l l y cn-.a-rat.; j K c t s , U;o .30 c i l . ^-n:;hlno iîns ua i u ; . t l

tar.k v.japoriS [u l so tho .,7 r;ri p a n s ] , the " ' J o j j c t ;>lac-*s a :M.^Y in oom.-.inJ of th« l .achln? Tan ( " r o j ^ o t j t r o n o , uml a i d 3 u c a p t a i n to i t .

\i£© 36 . Or.- .ni

Vii<?r« UTQ f.i. ta<?v,».l h s r ^ t o t ^ M i s of or»,;n I c a t i o n vM •)• alicrw in •l^t'-.il

ivnoujit ;.nd <Jind of n?v; urrw^r.ent ,:nl Ojaiynoiit to b^ uddoi to ti:a r^^;i '.«;it,

this s h i f t s ir. ^'.jrsoriiiol n-scocsary to t:iko car a of the a>Mitloiis Lo 'h in th<

author lz f j i y^.:':* - t r in^th arxl r j ' l uca l p i a c j ^ t r ^ n ^ t h r^-l.-;*r.t.

wT Of' wTUUY OM

1. QtiiQt Of J

'2o Jhu^ce .ir.waaa»t and J of a Javalry ;.j£:i .ont la order to:

a. l;iorease ltd fire und ooobut pov.er so un to bo a l ia to "" nay noohanlôd foroe of oompuratle s l io ;

I.. Increase i t s iwMllty 80 us to neutralize the road rJoMHt;, of a ueohuuUed foroe.

v°v'

_a. yire

(1) Jhan^ o r ^ n i i a t l o u of Muohlne Gun 'iroop to include:

8 oui. ,:>o :iij't 10 O&l. ,JO UG's, (vator coolod) ii 37-ara ti^'io

i.'l Jtil. .15 Lut-^J'G Lcohiao f.iri««

r 4 rjr.tiored Oaru to r.e^t. Hi. Yxuop, «v j i : f«J v

'1 Cul, . *5 wat-l

(3J j.\ui:jplne certain w'-ir v.ith val-il

Sutst i tuts notor truoks for escort

Qatllno of , l in for Maklnr Jtudj-i

(ji, 'i'horo au3t b> no inorease in porsonnel over present T's of 0;

_b. Addad eûipTient mu::t ba e i the r ifttrrodinvjl^ a\*allulle, or could X>9 acaumlated in eeaaonalle ti-ae without the oxponditure of special funds.

•\, jjothods of ' roc??J j re ;

(t. Ci;angC3 to be mado in prosent peaoe Tul les of O r ^ n i a u t i u n ;

I;. 'Jha r^ducod peace utrauc.th to be reached \\, reudirlnt ; inôt ive cortain uni ts .

j.ote: ?ho .f:0 cal . LG's [anti-tankj ure not rendered inactive bo-causa of necessity of truiuins vith them.

Ahit,

1. V u l n e r a b i l i t y pf C a v a l r y ;

t.. Th« o u v a l r y rot;lii«rnt or t u a l l e r u n i t l a co» i . ^ o t ^ n t a . -a lna t ti.e o p e r a t i o n s of un ur.-oroJ f o r c e ;

_l. i f a c a v a l r y i o r c a I s s i u l ^ e d * i t h ii:. 11- tank v.jfu<ont, ~ r , a i f l vehi-1-JC "" v i U not u t t a o k i t v.itJi i

P r o r j s a d ijstt pf Antl-Tuuk Janet

t»». ^ J U O J J v l l l be us9d in ^ a a e ;

Jt. ; a r e l r o ^ u a n t u8« v l l l b e :

{1J . . i th t roop o r an i t l l e r util tK or. s e c u r i t y ::ji8i,ion8;

(2) ,.'ith t roop or arnallar a n l t o on dafonB*. (« . i i l l'e -o.âratad l y i n t e r v a l s , -schelonad, o r l o t h ; .

(3J Ajjli-AlBfcr6ti;-?Da09atfa of l«d i-ors«E, l i v o u a o c , <tc .

(4J In a t t a c k whanaver c i - a r a t l n g i f ;a lnst roroa « i u l . p ; d v-ith a r mored v«h lc l ' » r . *'j bs used a s an aocoxpany inc [,-un.

3 . Assi/.njsflrit of .

to la provided on lue ia of <f p^r troop (lu ^-acfl--^ sparosj

j;ot to l>» usrit .nul to r i f l e troop* because of conji 19xiij of problous in truinirii; I t vould &ld to troop coorjuiider, l i t to b« added to LG Viaop for t ra in ing aud ac<:::inl3tri.tloiit tr>d kttaohed to troaps for tuctiottl purposss.

lurf«r than .TO, - Oavulry Board rocoiaiands .30 Cal

.b. iieoormandad colibflr: .£0 oal lber aq H neas^ra of expediency. I t ia belelved by the Cavalry Johool there are a s u f l i c i - n t number of to (;ive S to each rec inor t . (13 r e c t s . x 8 e iuuls 104 funs n-i>ded)

I. ?ac',:lnp:

_a. Can be dovised ly troops usiti£- than;

JJ. A vheeled count can be devised;

5 . This question ehoald not cause a delay in isruinf theae v e ^ o n s .

C. ??o rr t Adoption ami is .ue ;:eooTi ^

^ . Viiul for JuViili*^ to be a l i a to couldt enthusiast ic ciui.is of a?chhniaed force.

J , Vho only cu'.ise for concern to nechanlzod ioroe is ~a t i - tank v.eapon.

ô. 6th Juvulry can demonstrate efficiency in Munuevars «t ôrt a«..ni:iC t! i s spr inc.

d. L'iio Cavalry Johool boleives i t iXijeruLiva thut so.ô'hing t<9 done now about t h i s .

should contain a l l nouns ox joconni»U^.nco . lthin It tolf;

\_. ;<j<4i work UUean mounted units and t-rr.iored oi>re v.iii la xuollUuted ly putting uruor^d oars in the regiment;

ror needs of hiîer units care cun Le us readily detached from the re^Lr.ent as they ar« at pracsnt attached to &nuller unito Trom the UvUloti.

n. II cars («i platoons) per r a t , i ^n t , *ar s

^ . 8 oars {'c j)lu'0)U8) rindared inactive for jieace o.id reJuc«d j

£. Honce, a psuce and reduced peace etrenith reticent v>ould have In the H troop the followlnB urmored oarss

(•* O a l . . . 0 I M G ' ^ 4 Armored Cars ( l i^h t ) - [> Ji*l, . !O Û'a

3 . ?;/!•• a o f Our;

-a. Primarily for ro&d reconnaicaance;

^,. /our vheel drive not necessary jlut desirfafcle--A.i>t)

^ . Light i-v.heel drive cor.tfaerclal chaesie ;:an ie easily

J_. Jui i for assi^tunent to bord«r units cliould te nr.Dor plated; for othar units soft p la t i can Le used unUl an sn^rcenry ariceu.

Uor.-ial appropr ia t ions from ^ and Ordnance should t e al4e to ejulp pre sent oavalry orgaii lzationa within a not excessively lon(;

\ni'\'i9r\cn of Atrpluie ai;d âohui ju t t ion on v

l o o s e s r.eeacsity of lîu{, able to :?.oke lone, fut t . ~r<::.et ov-r ; ?; iv.d of several Jayc Jurutior,; {

J_, Vho *very-Juy narch v. 111 .uva to be epeftdddi IN t3 .mi .oU (1 ao uat i« "" l ieve tTiis Jfll icUon is t(i>Uoabl« to oorrAaV trooj aj i t Ions b . i l ^ to

nJ admlu l t t ra t lve cervl;9B. --Ai.'...)

Tofita of l o t o r l z a t i o n thuB far Uii

; « s t s hav<5 bsan unsa t i s fac to ry for \)i".

_n. »otor t ru-ks UBOI for «xpftrlrr.*ntc t io h-uvy; X« " " w " M r o t j i iQier ty;.» ior t e o t i o n

of country in which used,

i ;otora Qaii bo Used Qi aa t^ r g a r t oi' U - t i

.a. ..jttds aro constant ly iaprdviog;

Jt. Lotor vohioloB ara oonetai.tly lnprovinc; G_, incept ions for u»o :.ay t« (jxpectid i:: unusually eever« âuthor, und

in os^flclally rue£od country.

;ir.d of Tragic Daslr*d>

. ii» Liti^t cora-nerciul l^puro p a r t s readi ly access lb lo l»i tny looalit%v*A'..hi

_t. J j t t about ^SOO.JO

£ . iXial t i r t B ou rear v hi el 3.

:..ore nearly continuous with znotorc than v.ith ar.ixiils indor good condit louc ,

, iS Caliber Uib-iachii.e yjn

Propossd Di- t i ibu'.lon:

_a, To furnish these v.eaponc to the following:

(1) Sûad to each corporal 1 —l (i-J Platoon to each of 2 sergeants CJ ^l^XXXXJUCJU" tJ 1 E9 0C9afj<Jr 1) - - 6

to each of 3 sjuad leaJej c 3} (o) Troop to 3 rifl-3 pl l toona 10)

to 1 li-ii Platoon - - 1) -19 (•tj .i2ti>11-Dt * i\ll'lo -roops 76}

1 ilaahine vjuu Iroop ---TA)

(•:>rot9: 1 each to 1 necs s^'-., 1 s tabl? s^ t . , 1 supply C£t., L b u . l e r c , ^ chauffer c, 1 u a none l , and -1 urnored car 8--11. J

*•• r.eason3:

j i . Aias to effectiveneco of f i r e fij;ht j j . Uaed by non-eoimisslon'sd o f f i ce r s a f te r p r a c t i c a b i l i t y of cont ro l in^

thei r un i t s in f i re fI,->it hua vu9Sddt —i.t olose rar»(-e to ener:;.. £ . To a,!dii lonfil v.eis;!t; r i f l e v l th 1G0 rounds in case about so.™ a3 ser

vice r i f l e with 1T0 roundc.

L-Q ';ioor--(lO oftlcarc-l S rnlUtii ^•£J

Hq,--tl

[ i. ,M) vialU-jr Flatoone, (1

f. ctrîif . thj . Captain COR[ r.'o.Jfi lo th i la t jonc .

;

: :

4

:

. r o j u ) i i - r

olatoonc.

i l « t j .

Platoon ;i . J l u t c o n ; • i^t . i rlat. jj . i-t.! ii

i i • f^ •

j t

1

it

L

l u t . 1 : I

8 . . ' 0 J a l . i . u ' u G , . * O < J f t l . t 10 . '.5 G a l . w^t V t i ' o

1 OJ i p t i - I n ;

1 1st Cerâiit 1 yjrr.orar* : '6 Liarâr.ts .. iJorsmhosr 6 : Z 2U;1»YB 1 Jaddlcr c. (Jhaaffors 1 i.aôT:ir Z Cooks

\

"latoonsj* (1 L.U-.'J I it.toon) Matoon PlutwOB*

1 .. 1 Liaut . 1 T.isut. 1 • •.: z-v.

• i;otc: I n u i c a t i s incot lva (3la:/ier,t3 a t reJucsd psuca r t r T i ^ t h . Total of 1 o f f i c - r , L'l nnl ic t«a nîi, .'1 tir.iraaie/ ' i i lJnj, utiJ 1 i.nI ;i..l, ; u inac t ive , /.otivo i:<*ao© ctr en^ t ]; i la toon oor.cictc of 1 o *:'icort C! rây . t3 , and .7 («nli;;t?J.

> i • • • t *

J J , . « : - ! . « ' . : t * r t Of ;

roon

. . i i l i a

, v ..-:. i - i u ' . i r i , ' i C e *

J , . : . » . , ' M (1*) L ..oruasho-Jia M

eacs

M

cvrir.rtl;

.: IK

•1 . v a * s U . l u i

i ter

supervised ty a Ca

Tlatoono

on IXutuOQ Platoon 1 ".is-. 1 Liaut. 1 M-Jut. 1 I.irjt.

filioa.—)l i

I u t ; i I 1 , -un

-fri TJ.i.V ID l-'3 .ullatod Lou

e 100

. 30 CALlB4i PLATOON

pla toon Htwl | gar tare? 1 / i r s t 1 fiutooa ^

r j Tatul i 1 Off.

a {L tûhds eaoh]; J Oorôru1B ) Z$ &l, ; 1 j

4 Bolos

o ; Platoon

,1'LATOON . . .

/ \ 1 s t L iout . i u comand

/ \ Vlutooa

J .UOOtiOB

I

0 0 0 0 u 0

v J V / \ / \ :,iri4B '\ o / \ ;>iilja 0A • '. M i l e s

:,uohiuo Juu Troop

juditcrti Total

1 âr^Qunt ) 1

10 rivutoc ij l

2 iiU'«»» *Jul. .£0

11 I its to la ~ Bolos

of Platoon

l.'it LioiV«iu:.t in

(J

T latoou

Jan 01) * ,

Jt . Gnr .*1 s t . G

Troop HauiMa 1 Juj'ta ..01.

r s i'l«*t.oo_ar U C 16 .

i

i 'I i i 1-t LUat. J 1

1 A Jniidlid -euj i G5 S. i

Ar.Lorii Jar i I Ut Lieat. ) II Jlul^ttJl -8B j

) /

1 C

'c Captains i 1 i-lid LiQut, )

(attuchod) J

GJ bar.U.itlon of i:o Troop

Ki. 1 Oolaui l , CoiaaanJiug .-••t,i ^cz.t 1 L t - O o l o n o l , /laiifl i ' . j . 6c ..3bt« -*»

[0 Gi l . at>sl,..n8cl, ] 1 (1 " uttaohed } 1 Oupiaiu, ,.9&i. -uypl;/ O i l .

Maadiaartors;

1 i.t:J L iû t . , l a t t J h ) Afi-t.t) HortaE, rl'-iiuE1; f> ; ' i - t o l s 1 Captain, OoaTUin.lin{j Troop

Per,

(1 Oiii-'jr a t s , (1 ett. t a l l e r , ê-;>, - tukl

3 TTtTTs l.B, 5 - 0 . J b l . ..50 /.J UeJtiantore, 1 ^ u d l i . , 1 ..

iioi.»93,(lo r i l i r . ( , i ajrui't, i ^0?.)

' . ' iuuU, lfr . j o. [ j . J . ^ i ^ . i r u t . .f . I

tors ?iatapu_ ax

I.i( u t . iu ouia'.u:il -'t Liout. in co.u .

n iiaad u.-ti'tors >.eot: . lutoou iload | . u tcr

1 . . . . 1 r i ivata {a5Sw'9r.êr j

L . i - t o i J .e>i.'iAt;3 Jact^r. ..qclioi s. ^di; «Q

J i s rk j Joi'.-iUl'al, w{aad ^Jad-U1

5 •lord's:;, r i J i (12 rjr: i ^4at.d i;o:.i .oU'lfld / ;.;,;i^..l êr^cît

1 . . j . .jiar.t (..eoord J . i',..tis (Cl^rico A ,,u.U.J J. . V I I J I ÔCt vale in j . a i t t ' i d iu i l a

: iajl-., If Ton; 0 r t j£).i l.-ai'ir 't. c . r ) _u 1 • ô^ tior.:

1 Co:; o ra l ( as,.kI section) Z- •.'Jlvv.tofl (1 ^hauf. 4 ...^J 1 -.u. J u l , . '0 G j'..)rso6,ll' ri.Uni.» 3 i^ci. i Jro-«> coj.itr,; jv*r

. i ^ ; : , I1 Ton; 5 Pi-tola S ' i sVj ls . . u . w u l . « ^ C , - L T - J J ..• 1 J d

i

« i'&U. rl O i l / . ih 1 id,. QLQ4} , i Pr jcont .» ! <Jf »oJ t 1'Jus i i 1 I

)tf<, i J . ', Jff. 4, : r M'lii . . ;_ i ) r i i < ,t hi O i l . t .{. */•• ' ; t 3 i t i i i 3 3 1

IL i i » Troop 1 4 « 11? h D j l lu i 1 3 - 1 — ; S 3 5 3 6 D 3 ; j j i J ( I i I . 3 J : I t : 3 3 i 3 • . i

4 p. Traopa I 3 3 - i •• 3 "« • — • - - J 12 1 — 3 — J ^ i ; i j 3 3 J j 1 S

3 ; i j ; ; ( I 3 ;

i 'J i 76 t 7 3 bD ; 3 • 3 I I 1^ i ; wo^Jj j

; f ( 3 t i i 3 j

; < t : ; i i : ;

C. : 4 ; IOC: 10 : 1J3: u J iib : t -- : 100 j I I i i i i » : i

i : 0 — 3 — I

Uait i Virp» ' t I j i-lUS ; : ;

i s j 3 3

i : I : ; ;

. . i i l « Txoop 3 Uorses-i; 1-4 : 1..0 • - 3 { |

i 9 3 10 i 1 s : :

; " -]) u 3 .; ; i - 3 :

; ...UltS e } 0 • 6 3 ;

3 : :

3 iiorsas-;.! 496 4C0 16

-Oi 1C 3 ûlea 3 G 3 • • • • j

n I J ; 78 • •»7 • • .51 i f

t 11 -J-J 11 • 6 3 3 5 J 11 - 0 3 fa • 3 ; _«. , ...ai<sc ; . 0 ; _ 3 12 I \

-. • u • r; •roop Hors8O-,".« 113

; U 5 3 7 3 t

3

3 i •» _i', £8 3 • • __ 3 1 : " -Oi 2 •i 1 3 __ ; 3 t '-.alls 16 0 J 1G 3 1 j • J ;

5 * J r.et • Korsas-,.1 £92 j 6f2 , •iO 1 .

„ , * i M - P i 75 s r i 3 • 3 j 3 1 t " - O J XL : 1-1 j 12 3 . 3 ; CO 3 0 3 - : 60 t 3

(fly Unit—Fiosant anJ.

; i I I i i i;j u i t • i 6tOIB sl . i i l O B ; CU>ers UG-AC s HO* <MO t ilC-AO t •I^G ..UCIJI ; 37- :.Tn I

rOUul • '*5 _i O u l . • r 0 * 1 < p-1I, JO I ,50 } .5 | ;.l:"lai 1 JUIiB .

. . l f l a j 1 t j ; 1 1 :

Troop t ; t i I : ; i

I C B S J l t U 3 <104 I 97 0 • 0 t 0 • 0 t t 0 ic . 1 0 n o S O l 1 .1 j . QZ | 95 6 1 0 \ 0 Zl ; 3 j (J f 4 Troops t j t t 1 1 i i

recent •192 i aG t 0 , 0 i 0 j U t ii4 0 ;0[ osed '184 j ^ 320 J 360 £4 1 0 1 p - 100 f l£ • 0 1

t I j : : i : Tl'OOP l ; 1 : i 1 : : :

_ l « 8 0 n t 1 iil I 47 5 LI j 0 i 0 • 0 0 j 0 s 0 . .to used, 76 J. 0 22 i 7 j 4 . 11 t 7 ip c . . . C . J : : i i J t j :

t i j ; t t i i

resent : 112 • 30 • 0 i 0 i 0 1 0 0 i 0 t t •Proposed 49 0 8 j \o f 0 f 24 s 6 i z

Totals s s t • • • t •

• • »• r j s e n t . 691 t t •a 5 0 J 6 S 0 t 0 i Li t.

703 : 377 t 402 39 • 10 \Z • 143 • j z j t S t I i s •

• 5 I i ;. ; : t j Plus Linus I lua t Plus 1 Plus Plus Has Jhinre i 12 t 1£4 f 13 i 39 j 2 » 12 I 143 i 1 I —

i j

I 1 1 >m t Present Proposed) Plus 1:1 uus ; j j

j V(a£ou», Escort 16 0 : 1 G t s iiagons, [bring' J 6 6 - - : i Trucks, 1-j- Ton : 3 20 17 > - - : j Cars, CrosB Oour.try i 3 c — : 1 i t Cars, Armored i 0 4 4 > - - : t Horses , a l l c lasBeb t i LlUlOB, Al l CluEEftB t 60 0 — 60 :

for

and llothod for Carrying

1 i t j 1 X »Preeem ; Mfle • Fifctol i O a l . ^L Cbl. tu t Vj u l . 4t > t 37-aa •

s t Col. 30 5 Cal. 4t> «G . . Gun t t : J i t

: 7.1 tn CUB 90 t 21 1730 t 1 __ t » t t Coasbai Tr • lOu t 0 AIM { t __ • * t t Aarn. C«otio» 1 _„ J __ lCÔ ! t t • t

1 t 1 I t :

: Totul \ 190 Zb 58 tv 1 I i • .

I j t X i i i propoosd 1 i 1 I t j

t i i I t j

i V.lth Gun t y « : 21 I 400 t lOu t • i

i Ann. Sootiont . . i — I 1 _- i * I

t True* No. 1 1 . . t iiDOU j iiOU I lOu t 120 •

i " Ko. i t i i l 'iJOUu I 20u X GO i_,. j 1 l t t

j To t a l { 90 1 4 2 0500 loco X 200 j i80__ —I

* l.'ota: undsteriniaed.

L^ctionj 8 Pack Horsos, v./Troop Truck No. 1 - - lior<aal loud: i:9i2 l t o . Truck No. 2 — VoTiUhl loud: L910 l b s .

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