The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 10 | Issue 6 | Number 1 | Article ID 3685 | Feb 04, 2012

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“The Coming of a Second Sun”: The 1956 Atoms for PeaceExhibit in Hiroshima and Japan’s Embrace of Nuclear Power　「もう一つの太陽」ーー１９５６年の広島原子力平和利用展と日本の原子力受容

Ran Zwigenberg

"The Coming of a Second Sun”: The1956 Atoms for Peace Exhibit inHiroshima and Japan’s Embrace ofNuclear Power1

Ran Zwigenberg

In November 2011 when asked about the TokyoElectric Power Company’s (TEPCO’s)deteriorating finances, a Japanese officialcommented, “This is a war between humansand technology. While that war is being fought,we should not talk about bankruptcy.”2 Theunnamed official, perhaps inadvertently,alluded to something more than the financialissues here; the fact that technological fixes areno longer an option and that Japan, sixty-sixyears after the bomb and fifty-five years after itwelcomed atomic energy, finally is beginning tocome to terms with the true cost of over-reliance on nuclear power.

Following the March 2011 Fukushima disaster,a host of commentators, in Japan andinternationally, decried the corruption,smugness and shortsightedness that led Japanto choose nuclear power in the fifties. Thesecritics more often than not draw a picture ofJapan’s entry into the atomic age as acombination of American imposition and elite(conservative) complicity.3 On the other side ofthis picture stand the hibakusha (A-bombvictims) and other activists who resisted thismove. Drawing on the historically powerfulsymbolism of Hiroshima, Ōe Kenzaburō talked

about Japan as becoming a fourth time victimof the atom, alluding to Hiroshima, Nagasaki,and the Bikini victims aboard Lucky Dragon #5.4 Speaking of Japan’s postwar history inthese familiar black and white terms of thepeople falling victim to the machinations ofpowerful Japanese politicians in collusion withAmerican imperialism, though not withoutcredence, obscures the balance of forces of thefifties moment in which Japan went nuclear.

Nothing demonstrates this better than thereaction of the city of Hiroshima to theintroduction of the Atomic age.5 On the 27th ofMay 1956 the Atoms for Peace exhibitionopened in the peace memorial museum inHiroshima. The exhibit was a key component ofthe American plan to present the atom as apositive force for progress and overcome theJapanese “nuclear allergy.” The exhibit provedto be an enormous success, drawing well over100,000 visitors and enthusiastic pressreception. Significantly, the museum, whichhosted the exhibit, one year earlier, had hostedthe equally successful World Congress AgainstA- and H-Bombs, and it was also the museumthat exhibited the horrors of the bombing.6

The Atoms for Peace exhibit was not acceptedwithout some debate and resistance fromactivists. But opposition was overcome. When afew months later Hidankyō, the principalhibakusha organization, was formed, itenthusiastically embraced nuclear energy.7

The Atoms for Peace exhibit serves as a lens

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through which Japan’s nuclear energy policiescan be examined. The exhibit was instrumentalin solidifying the dominant Japanese view thatatomic energy was a legitimate, indeedessential, source of energy in a Japan thatrelied heavily on imported oil and natural gas.This was especially clear in light of the fact thata similar initiative to use Hiroshima as asymbol ic s i te for domest icat ing andrepackaging of the atom, in the shape of aproposal to build an American-financed nuclearpower station in Hiroshima, had failed only ayear earlier. In the wake of the exhibit,opponents of the introduction of atomic powerfaced an uphill battle against an overwhelmingpolitical, economic and media campaign insupport of atom power. If in 1955 opponents, atleast in Hiroshima, could draw on theexperience of Atomic victimhood, it was muchharder to do so in 1956 when the exhibit cameto Hiroshima. As Yuki Tanaka recentlydemonstrated, many hibakusha supportednuclear energy, calling it "energy for life" (incontrast to the deadly energy of the bomb).8 Infact, not only did the experience of Hiroshimaand Nagasaki failed to prevent Japanese fromembracing nuclear power, on the contrary, itwas seen by some contemporaries as ajustification for Japan to accept this technology.

Fight Poison with Poison: Atoms For PeaceComes to Japan

Following the 1954 Lucky Dragon # Fiveincident and the radiation scares that came inits wake, the anti-nuclear movement in Japanreceived a tremendous boost.

Millions of Japanese signed petitions, marchedand showed solidarity with Hiroshima,Nagasaki and the Lucky Dragon victims. Thesudden rise and the massive size of the anti-nuclear movement came as a surprise to manyin Japan and outside of it. Some on theJapanese right, and within American diplomaticcircles worried about the incident’s impact onUS-Japan relations. The United States wasalready engaged, following PresidentEisenhower’s December 1953 “Atoms forPeace” United Nations address, in a worldwidecampaign to present the atom as a force forgood.

Pres. Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace Address”to the General Assembly of the United Nations

The incident seemed to wreck these efforts inJapan and beyond. Louis Schmidt, then head ofthe United States Information Agency (USIA) inTokyo recalled, “All the effort we painstakinglyput into it seemed to get lost…[as] The LuckyDragon Five incident turned the Japaneseagainst the program.”9 It was, Schmidtconcluded, a “very unhappy time.”10 InWashington the incident prompted NSC adviserE.G. Erskine to write a memo to the NSC’sOperations Coordinating Board (OCB) onmarch 23rd warning of Japan Communist Party(JCP) propaganda benefiting from the

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incident.11 Erskine proposed to build a reactorin Japan (and another in Berlin).“A vigorousoffensive on the non-war uses of atomicenergy,” he concluded, “would appear to be atimely and effective way of countering theexpected Russian effort and minimizing theharm already done in Japan.”12

A number of official initiatives followedculminating in a proposal on April 28th 1954that the USIA organize exhibitions on thepeaceful uses of atomic energy and promotecontacts with Japanese scientists and engineersas well as with media figures and politicianswho held favorable views of the United States.13

The U.S turned to a coalition of Japanesepoliticians and media people, which includedthe Kaishin-to’s Nakasone Yasuhiro and ShōrikiMatsutarō, owner of the Yomiuri Shinbunnewspaper, who were trying to promotenuclear power in Japan, and who were alsoworried. These figures already had a historywith nuclear energy. As Evan Osnos hasobserved, nobody in Japanese politics was moreinspired by nuclear power than Nakasone.Nakasone, who had witnessed the Hiroshimablast, wrote: "I still remember the image of thewhite cloud...That moment motivated me tothink and act toward advancing the peacefuluse of nuclear power." Nakasone believed thatif Japan did not participate in "the largestdiscovery of the twentieth century," it would"forever be a fourth-rate nation."14 Even beforeEisenhower’s speech, in mid-1953, Nakasone

visited Berkeley’s nuclear labs and cultivatedpolitical and economic connections in the U.S.In March 1954, Nakasone proposed in the DietJapan’s first budget for nuclear research andcooperation.15 The Lucky Dragon # Fiveincident, however, risked the success of themeasure which had passed the Diet but not yetbeen implemented.

Nakasone’s move faced serious resistance fromthe left and from some Japanese scientists whofeared Japanese dependency on the UnitedStates. This did not mean that the scientificcommunity opposed nuclear energy. Manyscientists did, however, oppose Nakasone’spreference for importing technology, therebydenying budgets (and prestige) for domesticresearch and assuring technologicaldependency.16 The vice chairman of the JapanScience Council (JSC) Kaya Seiji, who was incontact with Nakasone, proposed as early asJuly 1952 that Japan form its own atomicenergy commission, modeled on that of theU.S.17 (During the occupation the Americanshad explicitly prohibited nuclear research.)This and other proposals were opposed bysome scientists. Mimura Yoshitaka a physicistand a hibakusha argued, drawing on hisexperience, that “Japan should not embark onnuclear research until the tension between theU.S. and the USSR is eased... If that meantthere is a delay to Japanese civilization, so beit.”18 Supporters of nuclear energy, however,could also use the experience of victimization.A leading scientist, Taketani Mitsuo, wrote “theJapanese being the casualties of atomic warfareare entitled to have the strongest say in thedevelopment of atomic power…[and] possessthe greatest moral right to carry out research.Other nations are obliged to help Japan'seffort.”19 Eventually it was Taketani’s ratherthan Mimura’s argument that won the day asthe JSC endorsed the pro-nuclear agenda. Adelay in civilization was out of the question formost scientists and, it turned out, for mostJapanese as well.

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Indeed, the JSC had little choice in the matteras government and industry quickly moved toforge ties with U.S. industry and governmentcircles that made the introduction of nuclearpower almost inevitable. The first nuclearcooperation agreement was signed inNovember 1955 and Japan moved ahead tobuild its first reactor. Opponents were alsofacing a huge public campaign to promotenuclear energy. Shōriki Matsutarō, who wouldsoon become responsible for nuclear powerdevelopment in the Hatoyama administration,led this campaign. Shōriki’s principal interestin promoting nuclear power was to resistcommunism. Shōriki had a long background ofanti-communist activity and, as Yuki Tanakaand Peter Kuznick have demonstrated, anti-communism was at the core of his cooperationwith the Americans and the worldwidecampaign. Shōriki had previously cooperatedwith American industry and government inimporting Television technology to Japan forsimilar reasons. As Simon Partner has argued,Shōriki brought American television technologyto Japan, like nuclear power, despite the factthat it made little technological or economicsense and overrode domestic technology.20

Shōriki’s main lieutenant in promoting bothtechnologies was Shibata Hidetoshi. Shibata,who started his career by successfully breakinga strike at the Yomiuri Shinbun, first becameinvolved with nuclear power when visiting theU.S. as part of the television campaign. Thehead of General Dynamics, Vernon M. Welsh,introduced Shibata to William Halstead, who inturn introduced him to John J. Hopkins ofGeneral Electrics. Hopkins called in December1954 for an “atomic Marshall plan to countersoviet advances into Asian countries.”21 Theseconnections, and the U.S government’s owncampaign through the USIA, led to a meetingbetween Shibata and Daniel S. Watson, analleged NSC operative in Tokyo. According toShibata’s memoirs, he told Watson that“nuclear power is a double edged sword. Wehave a saying in Japan doku wo motte doku wo

sei suru (to control poison one must usepoison); we can use the good side of nuclearpower to smash anti-nuclear sentiment.”22

Watson and Shibata, with Shōriki’s blessing,invited a high level delegation of leadingscientists, headed by Hopkins, to Japan. Shōrikiagreed to launch a campaign to promote thevisit in conjunction with USIA efforts to launchthe Atoms for Peace exhibit.23 This gave theUSIA a powerful ready-made local PRnetwork.24 Meanwhile, the power industry hadformed five main groups for developing nuclearpower; all were connected to former zaibatsuconglomerates. The groups had contacts withGeneral Electric and Westinghouse dating tothe prewar period. These connections ledsmoothly to the adoption of the American lightwater reactor (LWR) type despite serious safetyconcerns. That reactor was the one that failedin Fukushima.25 When in mid-1955 the USIAand Shōriki launched their Atomic energyexhibit, the combination of powers that backedAtomic power seemed to possess almostirresistible momentum.

A Dramatic Christian Gesture: Hiroshima(almost) gets a Nuclear Plant

The Atoms for Peace campaign opened in Japanin April 1955. Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiroand MITI minster Ishibashi Tanzan formallyendorsed it. Ishibashi, in what became amantra, spoke of Japan’s right to nucleartechnology “as the country which was baptizedby the ashes of Bikini.”26 The campaign wasnotable for some of the biggest exhibitions andPR campaigns in Japan to that time. It receivedthe backing not only of Shōriki’s Yomiuri andNihon Terebi (TV station) but also of manymajor regional and national newspapers. Theresult was over 2.5 million visitors nationwide.The media blitz presented nuclear energy as asource of “unlimited energy and the mostmodern of technologies,” which “will open the

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way for a new industrial revolution” and supply“unlimited possibilities for mankind.”27 Thistapped long-held fears among Japanese aboutbeing poor in resources. Many commentatorsused language reminiscent of the thirtiescampaign to present Manchuria as a treasuretrove of unlimited resources and a lifeline. Thecampaign also played on the general fiftiesfascination with science and futuristictechnology. Almost daily newspaper articles inthe Yomiuri and other papers spoke of atomicplanes and trains, space travel and of the atomas “another sun.”28 This did not mean that thecampaign was accepted without debate. Themomentum was almost irresistible, but thedebates in Hiroshima also reveal Japaneseanxieties. Even supportive writers wondered,“Whether there is a hint of evil fire mixed withthis force which will enable Japanese to make abright future.”29

These anxieties were illustrated by the fiercedebates over an earlier proposal, unrelated tothe USIA-Shōriki campaign, to construct anuclear reactor in Hiroshima. This proposalwas made by Congressman Sidney Yates in theform of a motion introduced in the congress inJanuary 1955.30 Yates explicitly connected thebomb and nuclear energy, calling for: “usingatomic energy for life rather than death.”31 Hecalled for “giving preference for Hiroshima,which was the first victim of the atomic bombin access to the resources of the peacefulatom.”32 Yates also proposed to construct aspecial hospital for the thousands of citizens ofHiroshima who were exposed to the bomb andhad medical issues as a result.33 Yates was notthe first to make this connection. In October1954 the Atomic Energy Commission’s (AEC)Thomas E. Murray, in almost identical terms,called on the U.S to give a reactor to Japan . . .

"The only land which has been engulfed in thewhite flame of the atom. Now, while thememory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remains sovivid, construction of such a power plant in . . .Japan would be a dramatic and Christian

gesture . . . a lasting monument to ourtechnology and our good will. We woulddemonstrate to a grim, skeptical and dividedworld that our interest in nuclear energy is notconfined to weapons."34

According to Asahi journalist Kanari Ryūichi, asimilar proposal was made by Lewis Strauss,chairman of the U.S. Atomic EnergyCommission, and by Representative SterlingCole of New York, in mid-1955.35

Although the Eisenhower administration didnot support these offers, they produced heateddebates in Hiroshima. On January 29th twodays after Yates’ proposal, Hiroshima’s mayorHamai Shinzō, said, “the fact that Hiroshimawill become the ‘first nuclear power city’ willcomfort the souls of the dead. The citizensthemselves, I think, would like to see deathreplaced by life.”36 In a symposium organizedby the local newspaper, Hamai’s stance wassupported by leading scientists from HiroshimaUniversity as well as by other leadingHiroshima figures. It gained the support also ofsome in the city assembly, who hoped to get ashare of Japan’s nuclear budget, and thesupport of Hiroshima’s new mayor WatanabeTadao.37

The acceptance of the offer by major Hiroshimafigures was not an aberration. Rather, it was acontinuation of the city’s deep relationship withthe U.S. and its self-portrayal as a modern city.The commemoration of the bomb, from veryearly on, emphasized Hiroshima’s urbantransformation and the discourse of science.From the end of the war, American andJapanese elites actively directed Hiroshima'sgaze toward the future. This culminated withthe 1949 Hiroshima Peace City law thatequated building a city of peace with building arational metropolis. Much of Hiroshima’smessage was about change and transformation.In its most extreme form, Hiroshima politiciansspoke of the city of Hiroshima “being bornanew on August 6th 1945.”38 The message of

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renewal was embedded in the very shape of thecity by the architects and city planners who re-built Hiroshima as a new modern city. KenzōTange, who was responsible for Hiroshima’scity plan, as well as the building of theHiroshima memorial museum, saw his work asone of spiritual transformation. Spiritualrenewal would come through “the making ofHiroshima into a factory for peace” (heiwa wotsukuridasu tame no kōgyō de aritai).39

Hiroshima’s wide avenues (some as wide asone hundred meters) and rational city plan,with the peace museum’s modernist design ofexposed concrete, was an expression of thisideal drawn from Le Corbusier and highmodernism. Accepting nuclear energy, whichwas presented as a “key to the future” was anatural extension of this trajectory.

Many hibakusha embraced this message ofpeace as progress and modernity. This was truefor leading hibakusha and peace activists, suchas Osada Arata who welcomed the idea ofnuclear power, though not without somereservation. Osada stated, “I hope for apeaceful people’s nuclear power researchwhich is not connected to the U.S.”40 Inaddition, as Yuki Tanaka noted, Mayors Hamaiand Watanabe and many other politicians, whowere hibakusha themselves, fully embracednuclear power.

Not all activists agreed. The Hiroshima branchof Gensuikyō (The Japan Council Against A- andH-Bombs) almost immediately came out againstthe proposal.4 1 Moritaki Ichirō, in theaforementioned symposium, voiced his concernabout radiation. Both sides in the debateclaimed to speak in the name of Hiroshima’scitizenry and, furthermore, both used theexperience of the bombing to justify theirposition. Moritaki stated that, “the opinion ofthe people of Hiroshima who were baptized(senrei shita) by the world’s first nuclear bombis that nuclear power should not be usedwithout proper consideration.” HiroshimaGensuikyō sent a memorandum to the press

listing five main objections to the nuclear plant.What most concerned the activists was thepossibility that the reactor would be used formilitary purposes and that it might become atarget of a nuclear strike in a future war.Radiation concerns came second. Interestingly,the organization listed “danger to the prospectsof Japan’s electric power industry” as one ofthe grievances.42 The local media was alsodivided on the issue. The local paper featured aseries of articles by scientists and doctors whowarned against the dangers of radiation andnuclear waste.43

As it became clear, however, that Yates’proposal was not endorsed by the Eisenhoweradministration, the whole initiative became anon-issue. The anti-nuclear camp had won. Yetwithin a year, Hiroshima was experiencing anuclear energy boom following the USIAexhibit of May 1956.

The Exhibit in Hiroshima

What led to this change in Hiroshima was acombination of factors. At the national level,Yomiuri and the USIA launched theirformidable campaign. Locally in Hiroshima,almost all major players, Hiroshima’s mainpaper the Chūgoku Shinbun (where criticalarticles disappeared), Hiroshima City,Hiroshima Prefecture and HiroshimaUniversity, endorsed and sponsored the exhibit.This endorsement may be credited in part tothe tireless work of American diplomat AbolFazl Fotouhi. Fotouhi was an Iranian immigrantto the United States and a former Marine. Likemany of the principal actors in the Hiroshimadrama he embodied many contradictions andambivalences, which make casting the story ofnuclear energy in Hiroshima as a black andwhite morality play impossible. Although heactively promoted the exhibit, Fotouhi wasclearly uncomfortable with some aspects of theState Department’s approach. Fotouhi servedfrom December 1952 as the head of the

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American Culture Center in Hiroshima.Together with his wife and daughter, whoattended a Japanese public school, heimmersed himself in Japanese culture andbecame immensely popular in Hiroshima.

Abol Fazl Fotouhi, Agnes Fotouhi, and Farida Fotouhi(Age 6) in front of an American Cultural Centerexhibit (circa.1953): photo courtesy Farida Fotouhi.

Fotouhi’s papers reveal that the USIA firstcontemplated the Hiroshima exhibit inDecember 1954.44 The idea was rejected,however, as "there were compelling reasonsagainst both showing it in 1955 and itsinauguration in Hiroshima. We felt that in anycase the exhibition might be closely identifiedwith the bomb, thus defeating the real purposeof President Eisenhower's atoms for peaceprogram."45 The real purpose was of course todisassociate the bomb from nuclear energy.The Yates' and other proposals were rejectedfor similar reasons. Even before 1954, Fotouhi,working with another American institution theAtomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC),brought materials pertaining to medical uses ofthe atom into the peace museum.46 This, andthe larger exhibit, met no resistance initially.Nagaoka Shogō, the director of the peacemuseum – where the city planned to hold theexhibit – told the press, “until now the exhibitwas only about the suffering [brought by thebomb] but now I am really delighted that withthe cooperation of many we can have a proper

world level exhibition on the benefits of nuclearpower.”47 Fotouhi’s main difficulty withsponsors was financial. They feared losingmoney on the exhibit (the USIA and Yomiuripaid only part of the expenses).48

Suddenly, however, “all hell broke loose inHiroshima.”4 9 Local residents and theHiroshima Gensuikyō expressed alarm as thecity, against Nagaoka's wishes, removed overtwo thousand articles from the atomic bombmuseum to make room for the exhibit. The cityexplained that the museum was the only placebig enough to accommodate the exhibit andthat the removal of the items was onlytemporary. Gensuikyō explained, “we are notagainst the exhibit as such [but against the useof the museum for that purpose]. Behind thesea-bomb artifacts there are the 200,000victims…these are more important than theexhibit and should not be moved.”50 Otherswere more indignant. Fotouhi reported themain grievances quoting newspaper reports.“The energy which destroyed the city,” claimedone survivor, “ is now used as a tool to removeour most sacred relics from their permanenthome with the possibility of never putting themback again." Another resident declared, "Wecannot sit idly by and let the Americanscontaminate our city." The most prevalentcomplaint, however, voiced by Moritaki andothers, was, “if the city and prefecture havefunds for this they should pay for hibakushawelfare.”51 At no time did the United Statesprovide funds for hibakusha relief. At the timethese were being provided exclusively by thestricken cities themselves. The Japanesenational government did not recognizehibakusha needs until 1957.

Responding to critics, the exhibit sponsorsorganized a public symposium in March wherethe issue was debated. The editor of theChūgoku Shinbun spoke first, saying,“hundreds of thousands of people have seen theexhibition which depicts the miraculous use ofthe destructive atom in many peaceful ways,"

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and urged Hiroshima residents not to lagbehind. Fotouhi then similarly told the meetingthat, “as a friend of the Hiroshima people andas a member of the community I felt that theHiroshima people should not be deprived of theopportunity to see the many benefits that theatomic energy is now providing the mankind(sic.) My government therefore agreed toinclude Hiroshima in the scheduled showings."These conciliatory statements were followed bya representative from the Hiroshima mothersorganization which voiced concerns overradiation. These were met by a ProfessorFujiwara from Hiroshima University, who,unaware of the historical irony of his words,said "it is absurd to think that an advancednation like America would knowingly bringunprotected fissionable material to anycountry." When another resident spoke of theitems in the museum as relics, Fujiwaraprotested, "What is the museum? Is it a shrine?Is it a place like our Miyajima? If that is so, whythen don’t you have the marking of a shrine?Why should our ancestors object to anything ifit means the future welfare of mankind? ... Weneed to understand the basic principles ofpeaceful living. We must see what the futurepromises..."According to Fotouhi, following thisexchange, survivor organizations removed theirobjections.52 This was only partially true at thetime, but survivors’ organizations soon formallyendorsed nuclear energy.

The USIA did all it could to promote nuclearpower along the lines of the discourse of peaceas modernity. The words “peace” and “modern”are repeated again and again in theprofessional literature, interviews with experts,and pronouncement by politicians. In theofficial brochure for the exhibition, aremarkable document, Joseph Evans the headof the USIA Tokyo branch told visitors, “[I]would like to show Japanese and make themunderstand the true role of the atom intomorrow’s world… How [the atom] cancontribute for economic development increasedleisure, the welfare and lengthening of human

life… [and] contribute to the achievement ofpeace.” The brochure went on to explain theuses of the atom in agriculture, medicine,industry and transportation with splendidillustrations of futuristic looking machines,never once mentioning the word genbaku(atomic bomb).53

The layout of the exhibit as depicted in exhibitofficial brochure. Visitors walked through thefuturistic exhibit examining the application of theatom in agriculture, medicine, space travel and otherfields. Source: genshiryoku heiwa ryo noshiori (Tokyo: USIS, 1955).

The local media praised the exhibit on itsopening day, speaking of “a new humancivilization,” and, echoing the Yomiuri, on mangaining control over “a second sun.”54 Localdignitaries interviewed after a VIP preview ofthe Atoms for Peace exhibit were equallyecstatic. The head of the prefectural chamberof commerce told the papers, “we are enteringa splendid era (subarashii jidai)…it is good thatI achieved old age [to see it]. [This era] is full ofwonder and [we are laying] the infrastructureto make it happen.”55 Others, especiallyscientists, again stressed the importance ofunderstanding the atom. Nakaizumi Masanori,from the ABCC, commented, “the region ofHiroshima has an inseparable relationship withnuclear power and thus should have a correctunderstanding [of it].” Former (and future)Mayor Hamai took a similar approach. “I heardmuch about th is . I t i s good to see i t

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firsthand…it is the first step that people shouldtalk of deepening our understanding of nuclearpower.”56 The equation of American scienceand ideas of progress with neutral or positivevalues was, of course, a peculiar cold warnotion. Susan Lindee has shown how thesenotions played out in another Hiroshimacontext, that of medical research performed bythe ABCC.57 To judge from the local media andother reports, the majority of visitors to theexhibit accepted this ideology, albeit notwithout some major reservations. On thesecond day of the exhibit another group of highprofile visitors was interviewed. An educationadviser for Fukuyama prefecture was typical,“we all had quite a bias towards atomic powerbut now that we see it concretely we havebright hopes for it and [it left a] strongimpression. I recommend that everyone see it,even if they are critical.”

Many were indeed critical. Tanabe Koichirō,from the Japan Pen Club, a liberal writersgroup, responded, “ I am fundamentally inagreement with atomic power… it will bringhuman civilization to a new stage. It is highlyadvantageous. But,” Tanabe added, “ there isalso one problem: radiation. After being usedfor electricity, there is a lot of residualradiation. I heard that in the US they buryradioactive material deep in the earth. There isalso the idea of dumping it at the bottom of thesea…[where] it is a danger to water and oceanlife…[the exhibit] does not dispel my uneaseover the problem of the ashes of death.” FujiiHeiichi, the head of the prefectural hibakushaorganization, was cautious: “if used for peace,nuclear power can bring us closer to a future ofhappiness and peace for human kind… if usedproperly, atomic power could promote humanwelfare. But,” Fuiji added, “we who saw atomicpower first manifested as evil, and knowingmany people who are still ill because [of it],think that the priority should be on preventionand treatment of A-bomb disease…[and]complete eradication of nuclear weapons.”Moritaki, interviewed again, was even more

adamant: “the people of Hiroshima aree s p e c i a l l y s e n s i t i v e t o e f f e c t s o fradiation…[thus] before we have atomic powerwe should better understand radiation.[Furthermore] how will they treat the waste?Why is there no explanation of it…They do notshow what they will do in case of a malfunctionin the reactor, or what they will do with thewaste (kasu)…[and] the ashes of death. I wouldvery much like them to address these issues.”These critical views show that not all inHiroshima were convinced. However, theseviews were the minority. And as the exhibitprogressed they were heard less and less.T h e s e r e s e r v a t i o n s a n d c r i t i c i s mnotwithstanding, most survivors acceptednuclear power, at least in principle.

Peace Forever: Hiroshima City's poster for the 1949August 6th peace day.

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The Atoms for Peace exhibit was quite an eventfor Hiroshima. In the fifties when mostJapanese still lived in poverty (Fotouhi recalleddriving through mounds of rubble in 1954,almost ten years after the bomb) the exhibitbrought color and a view of another world tothe city. The papers reported women’sparticular attraction to the event, “whichlooked like a fashion show.” They wereespecially attracted to the guides who weredressed in the latest American fashions.58 Thevisitors saw what they were told was the latesttechnology, and were showered withinformation and brochures, all with futuristicimagery and bright colors. The big banners forthe exhibition, and the flags of many countries(who were part of the atoms for peaceprogram) above it, lent the museum “a festiveatmosphere.”59

The newspapers magnified the celebration withdaily features (including cartoons) on theexhibit, visitors’ reactions, and various items onit. The items on display included, among others,a full-scale model of an experimental nuclearreactor, a model illustrating a nuclear fissionreaction that used electric lights and paneldisplays that introduced nuclear physics.Significant attention was given to the role thata t o m i c p o w e r w o u l d s o o n p l a y i nrevolutionizing daily life and leisure for theJapanese. Another theme was the atom’smedical benefits and its uses in the space race.A special hit was the “magic hands” display, atype of mechanical arm. Visitors operated thedevice, which was originally designed to handledangerous materials, to pick up a brush andwrite “heiwa” (peace) and “genshi ryoku”(nuclear energy) with the arms.60 KawamotoIchirō, a noted peace activist, wrote in his diarythat the magic hand display was “indeedimpressive” and that the exhibition as a wholereally “impressed me.”61 A group of atomicbomb maidens, another symbol of Hiroshimaand the peace movement, who visited the

museum, was similarly moved. The women,who had been brought to the United States forplastic surgery at American expense, wrotethat, “At first, as we were victims of the bomb,we were anxious about [the exhibit]…but aftergoing through the exhibit we understand thatAtomic Power can be used not only for war butalso can be useful for the advancement ofmankind.”62

"Magic Hands" Demonstration in Berlin. September26 1954.

Perhaps the most dramatic evidence oftransformation came when the millionth visitor(in all Japan) was to visit the exhibit inHiroshima. The lucky visitor, who was aschoolboy – organized groups were the bulk ofthe visitors – was to receive a television, aprecious gift at the time. This was anotherreference to the modernity of the exhibit and,unintentionally, also a very fitting gift given theinvolvement of the principal actors withtelevision. The TV set, however, did not comefrom the Yomiuri or Nihon Terebi, but from alocal merchant, a hibakusha, who contactedFotouhi. He told Fotouhi, “My parents andchildren were all killed by the bomb. I haveseen the exhibition and am thrilled with whatatomic energy can do for the future welfare ofmankind. I wish therefore to offer a largetelevision set to be awarded the millionthvisitor.”63 This was more than the Americans

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and their local supporters could have dreamed.

The exhibit was so successful that HiroshimaCity chose to continue presenting atomicenergy materials in the museum even after itfinished. This presented an opportunity forsome Americans and others who were criticalof the museum content. Visiting Americansconstantly harassed Fotouhi about it. Touristsand officials complained about the place “beinga horror museum…[which] aimed at shamingAmerica.” “One group of visitors,” he wrote,“even went so far as to tell me that it was myduty to see to it that the entire collection wasremoved and replaced by more appropriatematerial related to the peaceful uses of theatom.”64 Fotouhi had little patience for thesearguments. “Can we let Germans or British,” hewrote, “tell us to remove our monumentsbecause they put them in unfavorable light?! Sohow can we ask it of the Japanese?”65 Still,when the nuclear power exhibit ended, Fotouhi,together with Mayor Watanabe, forced thereluctant museum director, Nagaoka, to acceptit as permanent. Nagaoka protested, "this is aplace to show the history of Hiroshima'ssuffering…. [not] to sing the praise of peacefulnuclear power.”66 But Watanabe made clear tohim that this is what the city wanted and hewas forced to accept the order. Nuclear powerwould continue in the museum making the“Atoms for Peace” agenda an official part ofHiroshima’s own quest for peace.

Conclusion

In 2009, during the early stages of thisresearch, what had become of the formidableexhibit remained a mystery. Almost no one atthe museum had ever heard of it and themuseum’s official history did not mention iteither.67 After all the fanfare of 1956 (and evenmore of it in a second run of the exhibit as partof the 1958 Hiroshima Recovery Expo), a singleline from a 1967 article simply reported, “the

city decided to take the atoms for peace[exhibit] materials out of the museum as thefirst step in making it a place to learn aboutpeace and Hiroshima’s suffering, and in linewith the museum character.”68 What made theexhibit suddenly “out of character” was notexplained. Further research later revealed thatthe model nuclear airplane and ship ended upin a Hiroshima playground.69 Subsequently, thewhole affair was consigned to oblivion. This didnot mean that Hiroshima suddenly turned anti-nuclear power. If anything it becameambivalent, but no more. The anti-nuclearpower movement, as Yuki Tanaka pointed out,only began after Three Mile Island andChernobyl, and even then many hibakusharefrained from taking part in it.70 By that timeJapan had constructed dozens of nuclearreactors and the industry became firmlyentrenched as a central element of Japaneseenergy policy.

Much of the failure of the anti-nuclearmovement to rally against nuclear power canbe attributed to Hiroshima’s support. Perhapsthe major coup for promoters of nuclear energycame when even the newly formed Hidankyō,the main hibakusha organization came outstrongly for nuclear energy. Even MoritakiIchirō came around and, in Nagasaki in August1956 proclaimed, “Atomic power…mustabsolutely be converted to a servant for thehappiness and prosperity of humankind. This isthe only desire we hold as long as we live.”(Moritaki later regretted this statement andcame out against nuclear energy.)71 This waspartially politics. Hidankyō was campaigningfor compensation for hibakusha and could notafford to alienate the conservative backers ofnuclear power. But as the difference betweenreactions to the reactor proposal and theexhibit show, there is good evidence to supporta change of heart following the campaign bymany former opponents of atomic power. This,as we saw, came after heated debates and not alittle friction. These debates show how complexthis moment was. But the logic of nuclear

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energy as progressive and beneficial eventuallywon. Japan went nuclear.

The USIA, Shōriki, Nakasone and the otherbackers of nuclear energy of course hadenormous resources at their disposal. Morethan just money, however, what promoters ofatomic power had was the confidence that theywere marching with the time. The Atoms forPeace exhibit was part of a much larger effortby elites in both Japan and the United States topresent the horrors of World War II, the atomicbombings, the fire bombings of 64 Japanesecities, and Japan’s Imperial Army’s atrocitiesbeing the chief ones, as an aberration. The pathJapan took, the argument went, its embrace ofmodernity (even more so after the war) andWestern ideas of progress, were fundamentallygood. This was true for both left and right. AsSheldon Garon wrote, “So powerful was theJapanese belief in modernization and progressthat neither the contradictions of the wartimecampaigns nor the nation's disastrous defeat in1945 rent [it]…For all the contention inJapanese political life most progressive groupsjoined forces with the conservatives in themodernization of Japanese daily life.”72 Indeed,with its focus on the modern, and especially thepromise of the coming improvement in daily life(Television sets being a fitting example), and asa solution to Japan’s lack of resources, thecampaign hit all the right spots with Japanese.Other motives for the exhibit like fightingcommunist propaganda and promoting thefledging nuclear power industry’s economicinterests, not to speak of radiation issues, were,of course, concealed behind the shiny façade ofthe energy of the future with its promise tosend man to space and cure diseases. Inpresenting Atoms for Peace as the wave of thefuture, the organizers of the exhibit utilized thevery logic that underlined Hiroshima’s ownmessage. As Fotouhi commented, in anuncharacteristically blunt remark, ”was notHiroshima boasting for being the ‘peace city’,so why not Atoms for peace?”73 When the atomcame to Japan, Japanese were, supposedly,

presented with a rational choice between the“bad” atom and the “good” one. Thereasonable, modern liberal – the kind of personHiroshima appealed to in its numerouscampaigns for peace – could only choose thelatter. As Japan learned in Fukushima thischoice was false.

Recommended citation: Ran Zwigenberg, '“TheComing of a Second Sun”: The 1956 Atoms forPeace Exhibit in Hiroshima and Japan’sEmbrace of Nuclear Power,' The Asia-PacificJournal Vol 10, Issue 6 No 1, February 6, 2012.

A native of Israel, Ran Zwigenberg is a Ph.D.candidate in history at the City University ofNew York. His research focuses on thecommemoration and reaction to the Holocaustin Israel and Europe and the Atomic bombingof Hiroshima in Japan.

Notes

1 I thank Miriam Intrator and Samuel Malissafor reading and commenting on this paper. Iwant to also thank Mark Selden for his editorialand substantive suggestions. I wish to thankKoide Madoka and Shimosaka Chikako for theirvaluable help with translation of sources.

2 “Japan’s nuclear conundrum: The $64 billionquestion,” The Economist, November 5th2011. Accessed November 22, 2011.

3 Criticism of nuclear energy turned into acottage industry after Fukushima. One canenter any Japanese bookstore and find a wholecorner devoted to it. See, for instance, TakagiJinzaburo, Hangenpatsu demae shimasu:genpatsu jiko eikyo soshite mirai wo kangaeru –Takagi J inzaburo ko g i roku (Tokyo,Nanatsumorishokan Shinso Han, 2011).

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An earlier example, much quoted, is ArimaTetsuo, Genpatsu, Shōriki, CIA: Kimitsubunshode yomu Shōwa rimenshi (Tokyo: Shinchōsha2008).

4 Kenzaburō Ōe, “History Repeats,” in The NewYorker, March 28, 2011. The address ofHiroshima’s mayor, Mitsui Kazumi, in theAugust 6th ceremony after Fukushima followedsimilar lines, accessed December 30th 2011

5 I will deal here almost exclusively withHiroshima. The Nagasaki case is slightlydifferent.

6 The museum, established in 1955, served asthe central exhibition space and was situatedon Nakajima Island, which was turned in theearly fifties into the Peace Park, Hiroshima’smain commemorative space. The park was alsothe symbolic center for the post 1945 anti-nuclear and peace movements that came out ofthe reaction to the Lucky Dragon # Fiveincident, discussed below.

7 Hidankyō declaration.

8 Tanaka Toshiyuki, “Genshiryoku heiwa ryō toHiroshima: senden kōsaku no tāgeto ni saretahibakushatachi,” in Sekai, No. 25 (August2011), p. 257.

9 Interview for NHK documentary Genpatsudōnyū shinario (1994) text and Germantranslation here, accessed December 10th 2011

10 Louise Schmidt interview in The Associationfor Diplomatic Studies and Training, ForeignAffairs Oral History Project Information Series(1988) accessed November 20th 2011.

11 President Eisenhower created the OperationsCoordinating Board (OCB) to follow up on allNSC decisions. The OCB met regularly onWednesday afternoons at the Department ofState, and was composed of the UnderSecretary of State for Political Affairs, DeputySecretary of Defense, the Directors of the CIA,

the United States Information Agency, and theICA.

12 Yamazaki Masakatsu and Okuda Kenzou,“Bikini jiken go no genshirō dōnyūron notaito,”in Kagakushi Kenkyū, Vol. 43 No. 280(2004).p. 84. The directive is reproduced in“Japan and Atomic Tests” accessed October25th 2011.

13 Ibid.

14 Quoted by Evan Osnos, “The Fallout” in TheNew Yorker. 87.32 (Oct. 17, 2011): p.49.

15 Yoshioka Hitoshi, “Nuclear Power Researchand the Scientist’s Role,” in Yoshioka Hitoshi(ed.), A Social History of Science andTechnology in Contemporary Japan: Vol. 2 Roadto Self-reliance 1952 - 1959 (Trans PacificPress, 2005), p. 110.

16 Ibid., p. 104.

17 Morris Low, Shigeru Nakayama, and HitoshiYoshioka, Science, Technology and Society inContemporary Japan (Cambridge UniversityPress, 1999), p.72.

18 Yoshioka, “Nuclear Power Research,” p.109.

19 Low et al., p. 71.

20 See chapter 3 in Simon Partner, Assembledin Japan: Electrical Goods and the Making ofthe Japanese Consumer (University ofCalifornia Press, 1999).

21 Yamazaki and Okuda, “Bikini jikogo,” p. 85.

22 Shibata Hidetoshi, Sengo masukomi kaiyuki(Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1985), pp. 346-347.See also Yamazaki, “Bikini jikogo,”p. 83.Yamazaki doubts the meeting was as dramaticas Shibata portrays it, but ascertains, usingNSC documentation, that Watson did work inJapan at the time and had a role in the USIScampaign. Watson himself talked of the

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meeting and Shibata in the ‘94 documentary.

23 Shibata, p. 377.

24 Schmidt Interview.

25 Nakayama Shigeru, “Forming a Nuclearrégime and Introducing Commercial Reactors,”in Yoshioka Hitoshi (ed.), A Social History ofScience and Technology, pp. 86-87. Along theway, GE and Westinghouse disregarded safetyconcerns to sell the LWR as the safer option.See the BBC documentary Atomic States(2011) accessed December 15th 2011.

26 Yomiuri Shinbun, April 29 1955.

27 The industrial revolution quote is fromChūgoku Shinbun, November 26 1954. Similar,if more hyperbolic sentiment (and the secondand third quotes) can be found in YomiuriShinbun, April 291955.

28 Chūgoku Shinbun, May 31 1956.

29 Editor’s introduction to the special edition,“Kaimaku shita nihon no atomiku eiji,” inEkonomisuto (June 1955), p. 8.

30 Chūgoku Shinbun, January 27 1955.

31 Ibid. Also Hiroshima shi (hen), Hiroshimashinshi: rekishi hen (Hiroshima: Hiroshima shi,1984).

32 Quoted in Tanaka, “Genshiryoku heiwa ryō,”p.251.

33 Chūgoku Shinbun, February 5 1955. Alsocited in Tanaka, Genshiryoku heiwa ryo, p. 251.

34 Time Magazine, October 4 1954.

35 Link accessed January 3rd 2012

3 6 Hiroshima Shi, p. 208. Also ChūgokuShinbun, January 29 and January 30,1955. AsTanaka noted, Hamai had also already accepteda similar offer by Bern Porter, a nuclear

scientist who visited Hiroshima in January1954. By the time these deliberations tookplace, Hamai was replaced by Watanabe Tadaowho was also a survivor and a ferventsupporter of nuclear energy.

37 Chūgoku Shinbun, January 29 1955.

38 Hamai Shinzō et. al. to President of CarrollCollege, June 30 1950, Letter attached toHiroshima Rehabilitation and ReconstructionCommittee., Hiroshima (Hiroshima City Japan:The Committee c/o Hiroshima Chamber ofCommerce and Industry, 1948). CarrollUniversity library, Waukesha, Wisconsin.

39 Kenzō Tange, “Hiroshima heiwa kinen tōshini kankei shite,” in Kenchiku zasshi, (October,1949), p. 42. Le Corbusier famously used thephrase a “machine for living.”

40 Quoted in Tanaka, “Genshiryoku heiwa ryō,”p. 252.

41 The all Japan Gensuikyō was formallyfounded in September 1955. The Hiroshimaorganization, which went by the same name,was founded earlier. Similar organizationswere formed all around Japan following theLucky Dragon incident.

42 The major power companies came together inMarch and drafted a request for more details,which was sent to Yates. See Chūgoku Shinbun,March 3 1955.

43 See for instance the covering of the specialsymposium about the issue on in the January29th and 30th of the Chūgoku Shinbun.44 I thank Farida Fotouhi for her generouscooperation and, especially, for giving meaccess to her fathers’ unpublished papers(Hereafter, Fotouhi papers).

45 Fotouhi papers, p.194.

46 Ibid., p.186. The ABCC donated a film and aprojector as well as other materials.

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47 Chūgoku Shinbun December 11 1955.

48 Fotouhi papers, 196.

49 Ibid., p. 197.

50 Chūgoku Shinbun February 8 1956.

51 Fotouhi papers, p. 198. See also ChūgokuShinbun, February 14 1956 and Hiroshima Shi,p. 209

52 Fotouhi papers, p. 200. See the ChūgokuShinbun, March 22 1956 for the full text of themeeting

53 The quote is from the exhibit’s officialbrochure Genshiryoku heiwa ryō’ no shiori(Tokyo: USIS, 1955). The brochure can befound in Hiroshima Peace Museum library, atthe Genbaku shiryō hozon kai collection.

54 Chūgoku Shinbun, May 26th 1956.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.

5 7 Susan Lindee, Suffering Made Real:American Science and the Survivors atHiroshima, 1st ed. (University Of ChicagoPress, 1994).

58 Chūgoku Shinbun June 10 1956. Moritaki andFuji responses are also quoted by Tanaka.

59 Chūgoku Shinbun sha, Honō no hi kara ni jūnen (1966 nen), (Hiroshima: Miraisha, 1966),pp. 263-264.

60 Chūgoku Shinbun, June 19th 2011.

61 Kawamoto Nikki, Hiroshima Peace MemorialPark Archive (HPMA), Kawamato Collection,Folder 9, No. 8.2.03.

62 Chūgoku Shinbun, May 29 1956. Also quotedby Tanaka.63 Fotouhi papers, p. 201.

64 Ibid., p. 187.

65 Ibid., p. 188.

66 Chūgoku Shinbun sha, Honō no hi kara ni jūnen, p. 265

67 The museum’s librarian Kikuraku Shinobuhowever was very knowledgeable and provedvery helpful in this research. The museumdirector, Steve Leeper, as well, was verysupportive of my research. I thank them as wellas other members of the museum’s staff fortheir help.

68 Chūgoku Shinbun, May 7, 1967.

69 Author’s interview with Ogura Keiko, 28January 2010.

70 Tanaka, “Genshiryoku heiwa ryō,” p. 260.

71 Ibid., p. 256. Also Hidankyō, “Message to theWorld,” 10 August 1956, accessed 29 October2011.

72 Sheldon Garon, “Rethinking Modernizationand Modernity in Japanese History: A Focus onState-Society Relations,” in The Journal ofAsian Studies, Vol. 53, No. 2 (May, 1994), p357.

73 Fotouhi papers, p. 201.