THE COLONEL ROBERT D. HEINL, JR.1983 MEMO IUAL AWARD

IN MARINE CORPS HISTORY

Texts of the Winning Article and ThoseReceiving Honorable Mentions

History and Museums DivisionHeadquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

Washington, D.C.

THE COLONEL ROBERT D. HEINL, JR.1983 MEMORIAL AwA1U)

IN MARINE CORPS HISTORY

Texts of the W/inning Article and ThoseReceiving Honorable Mentions

History and Museums DivisionHeadquarters, U. S. Marine Corps

Washington, D.C.1983

PCN 19000410100

Previous Heini Awards

2981 HEINL AWARD

"Ouster of a Commandant"U. S. Naval institute Proceedings, November 1980

Lieutenant Colonel Merrill L. Bartlett, USMC

1981 HONORABLE MENTIONS

"The U.S. Marine Corps; Strategy for the Future"Naval Review, 1980

Lieutenant Colonel William M. Krulak, USMCR

"Political Perceptions of the Marine Forces: Great Britain, 1699, 1739, and the United States, 1798, 1804"Military Affairs, December 1980

Dr. AlfredJ. Marini

"Chosin Reservoir Remembered"Marine Corps Gazette, December 1980

First Lieutenant Joseph R. Owens, USMC (Ret)

"Peleliu, A Neglected Battle"Marine Corps Gazette (in three.parts), November 1979, December 1979, January 1980

Dr. Eugene B. Sledge

1982 HEINL AWARD

"Teddy Roosevelt and the Corps' Sea-Going Mission"Marine Corps Gazette, November 1981

Jack Shulimson and Dr. Graham A. Cosmas

1982 HONORABLE MENTIONS

"Land the Landing Force Where It Will Do the Most Good: A New Look at an Old Mission"Naval Review, 1981

Colonel John 3. Grace, USMC (Ret)

"Lejeune of the Naval Service"U.S. Naval institute Proceedings, November 1981

Colonel James W. Hammond, Jr., USMC (Ret)

"Iwo Jima"American Heritage, June/July 1981

Alvin M. Josephy, Jr.

"New Research Could Alter Aces List"Fortitudine, Summer 1981

Dr. Frank 3. Olynyk

Lt

Preface

This pamphlet reprints with permission of the original publishers the article which won the 1983 Co!-one! Robert D. Hem!, Jr. Memorial Award in Marine Corps History and those which gained honorab!ementions in the competition. On the facing page of the pamphlet are listed the winners and honorab!ementions of previous Hem! Awards in 1981 and 1982.

The awards jury consisted of Brigadier General Frederick P. Henderson, USMC (Ret), Mr. 3. RobertMoskin, and Co!onel Al!an R. Mi!!ett, USMCR. All are charter members of the Marine Corps HistoricalFoundation, the presenter of the awards. General Henderson, since retirement after a distinguishedMarine Corps career, has pursued an equally distinguished career as a military ana!yst. Mr. Moskin, formerforeign editor of Look magazine and present!y senior editor with Aspen Institute, is the author of thehigh!y regarded The U.S. Marine Corps Story as well as other books. Co!one! Milletr is a professor ofhistory at Ohio State University and, in addition to numerous academic publications, is the author of theacclaimed institutional history of the Marine Corps, Semper Fidelis.

This award is an annual one given for the best article pertinent to Marine Corps history published in agiven year. The award commemorates Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., the distinguished Marine Corps of-ficer, journalist, and historian who died in May 1979. Probab!y the best known of his many publishedworks is his history of the Marine Corps, Soldiers of the Sea. He was a founder of the Marine CorpsHistorical Foundation. An appreciation of his !ife and work, previously published in Fortitudine,Newsletter of the Marine Corps Historical Program (Summer 1979), has been added to this pamphlet.

The winner of the 1983 award, Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Mattingly, USMC, received a bronzedplaque and a check for $1,000 from the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Genera! Robert H. Barrow.Honorable mention plaques were given to Captain Richard S. Moore, USMC, and to Mrs. AliceWilliams, the widow of Brigadier Genera! Robert H. Wi!liams, USMC (Ret), who died in February 1983.

The Heinl Award was made possib!e by gifts to the Marine Corps Historical Foundation for that pur-pose. Continuation of the award program is dependent upon further donations to the fund. Persons desir-ing to contribute shou!d write to the Heinl Memorial Award Fund, Marine Corps Historica! Foundation,Building 58, Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. 20374.

E. H. SIMMONSBrigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret)

Director of Marine Corps History and Museums

III

Table of Contents

Previous Heini Awards . iiPreface

1983 HEINL AWARD

"Who Knew Not Fear"

Studies in Intelligence, Summer 1982

Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Mattingly, USMC 1

1983 HONORABLE MENTIONS

"Ideas and Directions: Building Marine Corps Amphibious Doctrine"

Marine Corps Gazette, November 1982

Captain Richard S. Moore, USMC 15

"Those Controversial Boards"

Marine Corps Gazette, November 1982

Brigadier General Robert H. Williams, USMC (Ret) 26

APPENDIX

Tribute to Colonel Hem!

"Director's Page," Fortitudine, Summer 1979

Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret) 33

V

1983 HEINL AwARD WINNER

"Who Knew Not Fear"Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Mattingly, USMC

As published in Studies in Intelligence, Summer 1982Reprinted by permission

Odyssey of an OSS Officer

Who Knew Not Fear*Robert E. Matlingly

In southeastern France lies a rugged region called the Haute Savole.Today the area is largely known for the imposing Cathedral of Notre Dame atGrenoble and the chic ski resort of Val d'Isere. But during the long dark nightof German occupation, Frenchmen came to the Haute Savoie not to pray orski, but to fight. There, on a high plateau surrounded by mountains, amelancholy drama was played out during 1943-44.

Vercors plateau is 30 miles long and about 12 miles wide, A forebodingnatural fortress, 3,000 feet above sea level, it is covered by one of the largestforests in all France. On its windswept top live 5,000 farmers and a few ofWestern Europe's last surviving wild bear.

Vercors was of special interest to General de Gaulle as well as theclandestine warfare planners of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE)and the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS), for in addition to thebears, 3,000 Free French Maquisards were lying low there. "A vast plan wasbeing worked out to turn Vercors into a redoubt against which enemy attackswould beat in vain and which, by its example, would summon the entireAlpine resistance to the colours. From it raiding parties would descend into theplain and it would perhaps even form a corner of liberated France, the'Vercors Republic'."'

Contracting and arming this group would be difficult but it was deemed avital task. Special men were required and SOE decided to form an inter-alliedteam: British, French, and American. The mission was to be called UNION.The job of organizing it fell to SOE's 'Section RF' headed by Sir CohnGubbins, the real "M" " of British secret operations.

RF was located in London's Dorset Street near the offices of Free Franceat Dorset and Wigmore. It was there that the three men chosen for UNIONassembled. The British member was H. H. A. Thackwaite, a pre-warschoolmaster who had become a clandestine warrior by way of St. Paul's andCorpus Christi, Oxford. As radio operator, the French-supplied "Monnier"was one of the best in the business. The American was Marine Captain Peter J.Ortiz, last seen in North Africa. It was to be a "first team" effort in point ofquality as well as chronology.

UNION had a singular task: determine the military capabilities of znaquisunits reported active in Savoie, Isere, and Drome. Its ordre de missionemphasized that the leaders of such units should be impressed with the factthat "organization for guerrilla warfare activity, especially after D-Day, isnow their more important duty." 2

Excerpted Irom Herringbone Cloak—Cl Dagger: Marines of the OSS.James Bond afficianados will recognize the fictional "M" as 007's boss.

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Who Knew Not Fear

On the moonless night of 6 January 1944, five months before OVER-LORD, a Briton, a Frenchman, and a US Marine jumped from a RAF bomberin their own personal invasion of Fortress Europe.

The members of UNION followed the standard SOE practice of para-chuting in civilian clothes, This time however, each carried his militaryuniform. Once they linked up with the maquis reception committee at thedrop zone, Thackwaite made it clear that they were military men on amilitary mission. The small band thus became "the first Allied officers toappear in uniform in France since 1940." In this regard, Thackwaite was laterto write: "Ortiz, who knew not fear, did not hesitate to wear his U.S. Marinecaptain's uniform in town and country alike; this cheered the French butalerted the Germans, and the mission was constantly on the move."

UNION found several large groups of maquisards itching to fight;however, only about 500 had weapons and it would take considerable time toarrange for clandestine arms drops and training. Thackwaite, Ortiz, andMonnier took their time, maintaining a running contact with London by radio.

It might reasonably be supposed that the team remained hidden in thehigh country, but this was not the case. Ortiz in particular was fond of goingstraight into the German-occupied towns. On one occasion, he strolled into acafe dressed in a long cape. Several Germans were drinking and cursing themaquis. One mentioned the fate which would befall the "filthy Americanswine" when he was caught. This proved a great mistake. Captain Ortiz threwback the cape revealing his Marine uniform. In each hand he held a .45automatic. When the shooting stopped, there were fewer Nazis to plan hiscapture and Ortiz was gone into the night.

When he was not emptying bars and training partisans, Captain Ortizdisplayed yet another remarkable talent—stealing Gestapo vehicles from localmotor pools. The citation from King George VI which made him a member ofthe Most Honourable Order of the British Empire reads in part:

"For four months this officer assisted in the organization of themaqu'is in a most difficult department, where members were inconstant danger of attack . . . he ran great risks in looking after fourRAF officers who had been brought down in the neighborhood, andaccompanied them to the Spanish border. In the course of his effortsto obtain the release of these officers, he raided a German military ga-rage and took ten Gestapo motors which he used frequently . . . he

procured a Gestapo pass for his own use in spite of the fact that hewas well known to the enemy

UNION found an extremely confused situation in its operational area."Lack of transportation and money were serious problems and security at theregional and departmental levels was poor. UNION used its influence tocoordinate several resistance organizations with divergent political views andloyalties. The rnaquis threat to German occupation forces grew proportion-ately." 6 Clashes became more frequent as the resistance forces appeared inareas formerly thought safe by the Nazis.

3

Who Knew Not Fear

4

SOUTHEASTERN FRANCE 1944-45

loternaonaI boundaryDepartment boundaryRailroadRoad

AOO99

Who Knew Not Fear

Despite the winter weather, three Panzer Grenadier battalions attackedVercors in February, 1944. The French, ill-equipped though they were, foughtback with such skill and determination that the Germans eventually wereforced to employ two full divisions in sealing off the plateau.

While the maquisards were brave, they lacked not only heavy weaponsbut also blankets, field equipment, mess gear, uniforms, ammunition, andradios. They could fight hit-and-run actions but their increasingly defensiveposture did not bode well for long term survival.

In late May, UNION was withdrawn by Lysander utility aircraft. Withintwo weeks however, two new missions—JUSTINE and EUCALYPTUS—weredropped into the same area.

German Countermeasures

By July a general mobilization of all Vercorswas in progress and so wereGerman countermeasures. As the French well knew, these would be heavy. LaChapelle en Vercors was heavily bombed on 12 and 13 July. The followingday to celebrate France's greatest national holiday, Bastille Day, AmericanB-17's parachuted nearly 1,500 canisters of arms and ammunition into thefields near Vassieux.

"The inhabitants ran out in the streets shouting and waving to thefliers as the Fortresses circled over the roofs. Thirty minutes later theGermans began bombing and strafing the town. This continued frommorning to evening and prevented the men from collecting thecontainers. Only at night was it possible to gather 200 of them. TheGermans also started the destruction of La Chapelle en Vercors. Thetown was ablaze and fighters machine-gunned people endeavoring tosave their belongings from their homes."

On 19 July, the Germans launched a glider-borne assault directly intoVassieux. Two companies of Waffen SS seized the town and held it againstfour violent inaquis counterattacks. During the bitter fighting, the SS lostnearly 60 percent of their strength but the French, lacking artillery, could notdig the survivors out of the town, which was almost completely destroyed.Those civilians who had not fled were rounded up by German relief forcesand executed on the spot.

Thus, while the Allies were breaking out of the Normandy beachhead, inthe Haute Savoie action was going largely in favor of the occupation forces. Itwas into this deteriorating situation that Ortiz' second UNION missionparachuted.

UNION II was one of a new type OSS mission: the Operational Group.OG's were heavily armed contingents whose mission was direct action againstthe Germans. The most militarized of OSS units, their jobs involved not onlysabotage but also seizing key installations to prevent the retreating Germansfrom destroying them. Members always operated in uniform.

UNION II took off from Knettershall Airfield in England aboard B-17's ofthe USAAF's 388th Heavy Bomb Group. With Ortiz, who was carrying one

5

Who Knew Not Fear

million francs for the resistance, were Air Corps Captain John Coolidge,Gunnery Sergeant Robert La Salle, and Sergeants Charles Perry, John l3odnar,Fred Brunner, and Jack BusIer, all US Marines. Another member of the missionwas a Free French officer, Joseph Arcelin (codename Jo-jo), who carriedfalse papers identifying him as Sergeant George Andrews, US Marine CorpsReserve.3

The mission began badly. It was a daylight drop into a good zone near thetown of Beaufort, but despite ideal conditions tragedy struck the team at once.Sergeant Perry's steel parachute cable snapped six inches from the drogue.UNION II, jumped with British-style chutes—backpacks with no reserve.Perry was dead on the drop zone.9

In addition to the men of UNION II, the 388th dropped 864 containers tothe French "Bulle Battalion" which was operating in the Col d'Arecle. Whilethe supplies were being gathered, Ortiz and Captain Bulle began working outplans to attack German security forces in hopes of taking some pressure fromthe Vereors.

During the next week, UNION II was busy instructing the members of theBulle Battalion on the functioning and maintenance of the weapons which hadbeen parachuted to them. Then they began a series of patrols designed to linkup with other resistance groups believed to be operating around l3eaufort,

"On 14 August we proceeded to Beaufort where we made contactwith other F. F. I. companies and from there went on to Montgirodwhere we were told there were heavy concentrations of Germans. Wewere able to enter the town but had no sooner done so than we wereheavily shelled by German batteries located in the hills around thecity. We were forced to retire and hid out in the mountains nearMontgirod with the Bulle Battalion. The Germans quickly surroundedthe area." 10

As soon as the mission left Montgirod, German security forces entered thetown. They found two wounded maquisards in the parish church, shot them,and burned the building to the ground. Then they took hostages.

Meanwhile, UNION II came under heavy fire and was forced to retreatdeeper into the hills. The Germans cleverly maneuvered Ortiz and his meninto an unfamiliar area of steep ravines and blind canyons. By mid-dayUNION was surrounded.

Ortiz had been in tight spots before and, after conferring with Coolidge,Bulle, and F.F.L. Captain Escande, he decided to make an attempt at sneakingthrough the German cordon. As the sun sank below the surrounding mountainpeaks, the trapped party crawled past the enemy and got cleanly away.

Crossing the Isere River at Centron, the party moved along the woodedsoutheast slope of the Isere Valley and by the next morning was well hidden inrocky ground about a thousand meters from the small village of Longefoy.Leaving Coolidge in charge, Major Ortiz set out on another one manreconnaissance mission.

• Forces Era accUses de I'Interieur.

6

Who Knew Not Fear

Carefully working his way into the village, Ortiz noted there were noGermans about. Feeling a bit more at ease, he next learned that OperationANVIL—the invasion of Southern France—had begun and that Germanforces had passed through earlier heading northeast toward Airne.

'.1 contacted the Mayor and requested food; he was understandablynervous at first, but as his confidence returned he and others becamevery hospitable. Food and drink were brought to us at our hideout. Ifound an excellent 0. P. and spent much of the afternoon observingenemy movement in the valley. At nightfall, UNION entered Longe-foy and was comfortably lodged by the inhabitants."

It was to be the last good night's sleep for Ortiz and several others for monthsto come.

A Risk, and Consequences

The team was now far from its operational headquarters and everyonewas anxious to return there as quickly as possible in order to coordinateoperations in support of ANVIL. Ortiz explained it would be risky to moveduring daylight but all agreed that time was vital.

On 16 August 1944, UNION II moved slowly back across the valley,crossed the same bridge at Centron and proceeded into the town. Coming outthe other side, disaster struck.

As the group ascended a ramp leading to the main highway, a Germanconvoy roared round the corner. Spotting the Americans, who were armed anduniformed, the German trucks screeched to a halt and soldiers tumbled outfiring. Brunner later recalled:

"Major Ortiz, Sergeant Bodnar and Sergeant Risler withdrew into thesouthwest section of the town; Major Coolidge, 'Jo-Jo' and I took thesoutheast. We retaliated as best we could, working our way tinder firetoward the east. I called out to 'Jo-Jo' to follow us but he remained inthe town. At this time Captain Coolidge received a bullet in the rightleg but he kept going. By then we had reached the bank of the Isere, Idived in and swam across under fire. I had some difficulty as the cur-rent was very swift. It was then that I became separated fromCoolidge and did not see him again until we met at the Col d'Arecleon 18 August," 12

Ortiz, Risler, and Bodnar were receiving the bulk of the Germanattention. As they retreated from house to house, French civilians imploredthem to give up in order to avoid reprisals. Ortiz ordered the two sergeants toget out while they could but neither would go without him. As the enemy lireincreased, Ortiz remembered the hostages from Montgirod and the massacreat Vassieux.

"Since the activities of Mission Union and its previous work were wellknown to the Gestapo, there was no reason to hope that we would hetreated as ordinary prisoners of war. For me personally the decision tosurrender was not too difficult. I had been involved in dangerous

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Who Knew Not Fear

activities for many years and was mentally prepared for my numberto turn up. Sergeant Bodnar was next to me and I explained thesituation to him and what I intended to do. He looked me in the eyeand replied, 'Major, we are Marines, what you think is right goes forme too'."

Ortiz began shouting to the enemy. He tried English, French, and German,but the fire did not slacken, Finally a brief lull developed and lie yelled again,saying he was coming out. As he stepped into the street, an old Frenchwoman,ran to him and tried to cover his body with her own. Disengaging liimseli fromthis human shield, he walked calmly toward the German lines, machine gunbullets kicking up dust around him. Finally the firing ceased.

The German commander was suspicious but agreed to Ortiz' proposal thathis men would surrender if the townspeople were not harmed. When only twomore Marines emerged, however, the enemy major became agitated anddemanded to know where the rest of the company was. It took a half-hour'ssearch before the Germans were satisfied that three men had been holding offan entire battalion.

Bodnar and Risler were quickly disarmed but before they could saymuch, Ortiz called them to attention and directed that they give noinformation other than that required by the Geneva Convention. This greatlyimpressed the Germans, who began treating them all with marked respect. Afew hours later, Arcelin was caught in a nearby field.

The four prisoners were taken to the main enemy headquarters at BourgSt. Maurice. Ortiz told his men to claim they were paratroopers from theANVIL operation and that Arcelin should hold to the story that he was aUS Marine of French ancestry. This ruse worked well, despite the fact that"Jo-Jo" could not speak a word of English.

Later iii the afternoon, while being transferred to Moutiers, Ortiz workedhis cigarette lighter from his pocket and tried to set the back seat of the staffcar on fire, hoping to escape in the resulting confusion. The attempt succeededonly in infuriating the Germans and ruining some velour. But it was a portentof things to come.

At the Komniandantur, Ortiz was searched arid relieved of his identifica-tion card, some papers, and 35,000 francs. He managed to conceal another65,000 francs, however, and demanded loudly to be treated with the samerespect due a German field grade officer. Soon he met Major KoIb, his ne%%'guardian, who was tasked with delivering the prize catch to Albertville,Progress on the road was slow. The enemy now so feared the maquis that acompany of motorcycle troops was employed to escort Ortiz' car. Ortiz waspleased to note that the little column stopped at every possible ambush siteand sent out patrols.

Koib, a veteran soldier who had won the Iron Cross in both World Wars,treated Ortiz like an indulgent father.

"He quickly proved that he knew a great deal about me. En greatdetail and accurately he described our air operation, the burial

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Who Knew Not Fear

ceremony for Sergeant Perry, various engagements and the mannerand position of our movements since leaving Montgirod. These, hesaid, had been reported by a shepherd who was one of his fieldagents."

The maqzzis of the Savoie had learned the lesson of Vercors well. The taskof the guerrilla is to delay, to disorganize, and to panic, not to defend in place.As Ortiz and the rest of UNION were moved progressively eastward, they hadthe satisfaction of watching their captors struggle with a succession ofambushes. It took the 157th Division three full days to move 40 miles throughan area which it allegedly controlled.

Presumptuous Prisoner

On one occasion, Ortiz found himself in a small village which theretreating troops were systematically looting. Townspeople, seeing him sur-rounded by German officers and wearing an unfamiliar uniform, ignored hiscaptors and begged him to discipline the unruly soldiers.

On 21 August, Ortiz was in Chambery. Sensing that the situation wasbecoming increasingly critical, he asked for an opportunity to see the localcommanding general. Surprisingly the request was granted and the Marinemajor marched in, saluted, and proposed that the 157th surrender to UNION!Unfortunately, General Flaum was not about to do any such thing. At least ithas been worth a try.

By early September, Ortiz, Bodnar, Risler, and Arcelin were in thenorthern Italian city of Bessoleno. Here they received their first reallyprofessional search.

"They examined every body hair, every orifice, and found the 65,000francs I had concealed as well as my map and compass. On or about 3September, Germans escorted us to the Kommandantur and lockedus in an office for a few minutes while the guards were being detailedto take us to Torino. I rapidly searched the office and pocketedseveral useful maps."

At Turin (Torino), the members of UNION were thrown into a stinkingcivilian prison which already housed 25 US Army officers and men from achemical battalion. After a week in this pesthole, the entire group was movedto a German POW transit camp near Manjova. On the way, Ortiz tried to per-Ssuade the Army officers to join him in rushing the guards and commandeeringthe bus. They turned him down flat, saying that the war was almost over andit was not worth the risk.

From Manjova, the journey continued by rail. The POW's now numberedseveral hundred—British, French and Americans—most of whom had beencaptured in Italy. Crammed into boxcars of the famous French 40 hommes/8chevaux variety, the prisoners began a three-day trip to southern Germany viathe Brenner Pass. On the way, Ortiz attempted to escape by twisting open abarbed wire barrier rigged along the boxcar's sliding door. He had almostcompleted his task when the train unexpectedly stopped and an alert guardfound his handiwork. For that, the major received a beating and promises offuture "special" treatment.

9

Who Knew Not Fear

Finally, on 29 September, Ortiz and the other members of UNIONreached their final stop: the Naval POW camp Marlag/Milag Nord located inthe small German village of Westertimke outside Bremen. Happily, this wasone of the best Stalags in all of Germany. Except for periodic searches andthrice daily roll calls, the Germans were content to merely guard their guests.

Marlag 0, the officers camp, contained about 400 men. Counting Ortiz,three were Americans. The senior Allied officer was a Royal Navy captainwho made it plain to the new arrival that escapes were out, Ortiz promptlyproclaimed himself 'senior American POW' and announced he voukl set hisown rules. On 18 December 1944, he made his first try, accompanied by NavyLieutenant (jg) Hiram Harris.

Ortiz spent more than an hour cutting away at a series of wire fences andmanaged to reach an open field beyond the camp. Harris, however, wascaught by a patrol and the alarm sounded. Searchlights picked up Ortiz. Heand Harris were kicked around a bit before being thrown into solitaryconfinement. Since getting caught was nothing new for Ortiz, he merely bidedhis time waiting for the right moment to try again.

Adventures of Lieutenant Taylor

By February 1945, the small American contingent at Westertimke hadgrown. One new arrival was just the sort of man to work with Ortiz: SecondLieutenant Walter W. Taylor, USMCR.

Taylor had participated in OSS operations in Corsica. In August 1944, liejoined the Strategic Services Section attached to the US 7th Army for ANVIL.He reported to the headquarters of the 36th "Texas" Division along withArmy Captain Justine L. Greene, a noted New York psychiatrist, and CorporalJames S. Sweeney, USMC.

The 36th was the right flank division in General Alexander Patch's drivenorthward. Greene, Taylor, and Sweeney were directed to determine theextent of German defenses near Grasse, an area which had been bypassed.

Leaving the American lines, the reconnaissance party drove to Mons, anideal observation post perched on a hill about twenty miles from Grasse. Therethey were welcomed by the local maQuis who offered to provide an agent forinfiltration of the German-held city.

The next day, Taylor and a Frenchman drove out of Mons in a liberatedCitroen. The plan was simple. Taylor would take the agent as far as the lastmaquis outpost, drop him there, and await his return.

"The agent had been leading the resistance fighting ever since ourlanding and was absolutely exhausted, falling asleep time and timeagain while I briefed him. . . I headed for the town of Saint Cezaire,which was declared to be in the hands of the Resistance. However,during the night what evidently was a company of Germans hadtaken up positions in Saint Cezaire. On approaching the dead-stilltown by a steep and winding road, we ran into a roadblock of landmines; we both thought it was the Resistance and the agent took my

10

Who Knew Not Fear

carbine and jumped out of the car to walk toward the lines of mines.He lasted just about 10 feet beyond the car and died with a bulletthrough the head."

Taylor still thought it might be a trigger-happy ma quis ambush but thenhe spotted what appeared to be a German forage cap. Backing up as fast as hecould, the lieutenant slammed into the roadside coping. Rifle fire beganperforating the Citroen.

Just as Taylor reached for the right door handle, a German leaped from anearby ditch and flipped a potato masher grenade under the car. It blastedTaylor out into the road unconscious. When he came too, he was looking up atthe stony faces of his ambushers. Grenade fragments had chopped up his leftleg and mangled his left hand.

After being strafed by American planes during the trip, Taylor and his es-cort arrived in Grasse. On the way, the lieutenant managed to shred anincriminating document and stuff it behind the car seat. At Grasse, Taylor was"subjected to intensive interrogation which ended when he vomited on theuniform of his inquisitor."

During the same period that Ortiz and the members of UNION werebeing shunted about, Taylor experienced a similar odyssey. He passed throughsix different hospitals before reaching the medical prison at Freising nearMunich. A month later Taylor was shifted to Moosberg. In January, 1945 hiswounds were considered sufficiently healed to allow confinement at MarlagNord.

Despite the pleas of some of their fellow POW's, both Taylor and Ortizwere perversely impenitent. They immediately began planning another escapeattempt.

Air Raid Opportunity

With Allied forces drawing closer each day, the pair began collectingcivilian clothes, maps, food, and other items which they could obtain throughthe well organized black market system operating in and around the camp.But suddenly, on 10 April, the commandant ordered all prisoners to prepare tomove within three hours. Their destination was the port city of Lubeck, a jour-ney of at least eight days on foof.

The column left with such haste that many POW's were simply leftbehind. Ortiz, however, was singled out for special observation and his plan tohide in Westertimke was foiled, About three hours after leaving Marlag Nord,opportunity beckoned in the form of marauding RAF Spitfires.

As the planes roared in low to shoot up the motley mass streaming north,Ortiz, Taylor, Air Corps Lieutenant Donald McNaughton, and Royal MarinesWarrant Officer Stancombe made for a nearby wood. Panic reigned. The fourescapees worked themselves deeper into the trees and waited. As the aircraftdisappeared, the column moved on, leaving them behind unnoticed.

Ortiz expected Allied troops to pass through the region within a day ortwo but the progress of fighting was much slower than that.

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Who Knew Not Fear

"We spent ten days hiding, roving at night, blundering into enemypositions, hoping to find our way into British lines. Luck was with us.Once we were discovered but managed to get away, and several othertimes we narrowly escaped detection. Fortunately, most Germansseemed to have a bad cough. By the seventh night we had returnednear our camp. I made a reconnaissance of Marlag 0. . . Thereseemed to be only a token guard and prisoners of war appeared tohave assumed virtual control of the compounds."

The little band was now in bad physical shape. A combination of littlefood and swamp water had made McNaughton and Stancornbe ill. Taylor wascovered with boils and Qrtiz was very weak. On the tenth day, disgusted at theslow advance of the British Army, the four men decided it might be better tolive in their old huts than starve to death outside. With Ortiz in the lead, theywalked back into the camp. No commotion was raised by the guards and theremaining POW's gave them a rousing welcome. Among the receptioncommittee were Arcelin, Bodnar, and Risler, all of whom had hidden whenthe evacuation commenced.

At last on 27 April, the battle reached Westertimke. German troops werestill stoutly resisting the advance of the British 7th Guards' Armored Divisionand much of the small village was destroyed. Reasoning that the Allied Forceswould not fire on the POW camp, an 55 unit parked several self-propelledguns there. The prisoners dug in. Soon the fighting was all around thecompound and Arcelin was wounded by flying shrapnel.

On 29 April, Marlag Nord was liberated. Most POW's were only toohappy to board trucks for the rear. Not Ortiz.

Along with Bodnar, Risler, and Taylor, he presented himself to LieutenantWebb, a Navy radar officer who was attached to a Royal Marine commandobattalion operating with the Armored Division. Ortiz later explanied, "WeMarines wanted to join this unit in order to bag a few more Germans beforehunting season closed." 20 The offer was rejected by the POW repatriationofficer and all went to staging areas behind the front.

Ortiz was evacuated to Brussels, where he reported to the 055 officer-in-charge and requested assignment to further combat duty. When the warended, he was in California being briefed for a mission to Indochina.

Admiral H. K. Hewitt, 1JSN, Commander of the Twelfth Fleet, recom-mended Major Ortiz for a second Navy Cross. The citation reads, in part:

"On 16 August 1944, during the conduct of a special missiondesigned to immobilize enemy reinforcements, Major Ortiz and histeam were attacked and surrounded. Disregarding the possibility ofescape, which course of action would have certainly caused severereprisals to be taken upon the villagers, Major Ortiz surrendered andthe townspeople were thereby spared.

"The story of the self-sacrifice of Major Ortiz and his Marines hasbecome a brilliant legend in that section of France where acts of

12

Who Knew Not Fear

bravery were considered commonplace. Subsequently imprisonedand subjected to numerous interrogations, he divulged nothing SI

In 1946, When Ortiz returned to civilian life and the film industry, he wasthe most decorated Marine officer to serve with OSS.

In addition to the Navy Cross with gold star, he had also received theLegion of Merit and Purple Heart from the United States. Britain had madehim a member of the Military Division, Order of the British Empire. But itwas France which recognized the "hero of the Haute Savoie" most prolifically.Ortiz was made a Member of the Legion of Honor and awarded the Croix deCuerre (two palms, gold star, silver star, and five citations), the Croix deCombattants, the Ouissam Alouite, and the Medaille Coloniale.

REFERENCES

1. Flenri Michel, The Shadow War (New York: 1-larper & Row, 1972) p.325.

2. M. B. D. Foote, SOE in France, p. 357.

3. Ibid. See also Smith, p. 174. It shouki be noted that Smith, while calling Orliz ''the firsi full—

fledged 055 member" into France, is two weeks in error on the date of UNION's drop.

4. Digest MS, p.6.

5. A copy of the complete citation is lodged in FRC Files.

6. Wor Report, Vol. 11, p.194.

7. Ibid. p.195.

S. Activity Report of Sergeant Frederick J. l3runner USMC, OSS (SO) W. E. Section dated 4October 1944. (Copy provided to author by Central Intelligence Agency.) Hereafterreferred to as Brunner Report.

9, Sergeant Perry was buried in the Catholic cemetary on the Col dc Saisies. His time of deathis listed as 1445, I August 1944 in OSS records.

10. Rrunner Report, p. 2.

11. Major Peter J. Ortiz, USMCB, "Chronological Report of the Capture and SubsequentCaptivity of Members of Mission Union," dated 12 May 1945. (Copy provided by CentralIntelligence Agency.) 1-lereafter referred to as Ortiz Report. Both the Brunner and Ortiz.reports were classified 'Secret' until released by CIA.

12. Brunner Report, p. 4.

IS. Ortiz Report, p. 2.

14. Ibid. p. 3.

15. Ibid. p. 5.

16. Lieutenant Commander Richard NI. Kelly USNB, "Spy Work Ahead," Blnehook (August,1947) pp. 90-92. Captain Greene also became a POW. In late October, 1944 he and ArmyLieutenant Jack Hemingway (Ernest Hemingway's son) were wounded and captured duringa mission beyond the American lines near Vosges. Corporal Sweeney was unluckier still. Hewas killed in action near Mannheim, Germany on 29 March 1945.

13

Who Knew Not Fear

REFERENCES

17. Letter, Walter W. Taylor to Head, Historical Branch. Heackiiiarters, L'. S. Marine Corps,dated 31 May 1966. (Copy lodged in Marine Corps 1-listorical Center Archives, WasliiiigtoiiNavy Yard.)

18. Benis M. Frank and 1-lenry 1. Shaw, History of Marine Corps Operations in \\7orkl War ii(Historical Branch, C-S Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 196S) Vol. \'. p. 7-IS.

19. Ortiz Report. p. 13.

20. ibid. p. 15.

21. A copy of the complete citation is lodged inInterestingly, the story of Peter Ortiz is difficult toShaw give it the besi albeit limited treatment inSoldiers of the Sea does not mention Ortiz namehas only a few lines 'cribbed' from the official history.

14

F/IC Files. See also, Digest MS p. 6.

6 rid in Marine Corps history. Frank a ridtheir sect ion on Marine POW's. I lcii l'sand N'loskin's U.S. Marine Corps Story

1983 HONORABLE MENTION

"Ideas and Directions: Building MarineCorps Amphibious Doctrine"

Captain Richard S. Moore, USMC

As published in Marine Corps Gazette, November 1982Reprinted by permission

15

The institutional and intellectualfactors that led to the developmentof amphibious doctrine are ofgreater importance than the doc-trine itself.

Ideas and Directions:Building Amphibious Doctrine

by Capi Richard S. Moore

The Marine Corps, for over 50 years, hasdevoted the bulk of its training, organi-zation, and doctrinal thought to deve!-oping and improving the techniques of

amphibious warfare. The Tentative ManualforLanding Operations, published in 1934, estab-lished the first clearly defined amphibious doc-trine and continues to be the foundation ofMarine tactics. Throughout World War 11, thetenets in the manual were tested in combat andrevised. In the postwar decades, new technolo-gy, embodied in helicopters and improvedlanding vehicles, has further modified am-phibious doctrine. Yet, the basic tacticsestablished in 1934 remain substantially un-changed.

The Tentative Manual for Landing Opera-tions is a memorial to a relatively small groupof Marine officers who, during the decadesprior to World War 11, dealt with and over-came complex doctrinal problems. Despitebudget cuts, widespread disagreements both in-side and outside the Corps over proper mis-sions, and even threatened dissolution of theCorps itself, these officers developed a sound,efficient tactical doctrine. More importantly,they developed a process by which doctrinecould be formulated and tested. This articlewill analyze this process. If the essentialelements that enabled the Marine Corps toperfect amphibious doctrine in the interwaryears can be identified, they may provideguidance to Marines faced with adjusting pres-ent day doctrine to the relentless demands ofever-changing technology and shifting mis-Si ons.

Marines returning home from World War Ifaced many of the same dilemmas encounteredby their grandsons 55 years later. Newtechnology and concepts of modern war, thrustupon them on the Western Front, haddrastically altered prewar perceptions. Tacticslearned in the remote Latin American coun-tryside during the years from 1912 to 1916 hadproven ineffective against the well-equippedand well-trained German Army. Even therecently developed Advanced Base Force, withits primarily defensive mission, seemed inade-quate in the context of new global strategies.Marine officers, caught between their tradi-tional naval heritage and the experiences ofmodern land warfare, felt out of step withboth.

Marine tactical doctrine in 1920, or what ex-isted of a doctrine, reflected the amorphousnature of the Corps' recent past. Much of thedoctrine rested on that of the Army and on theexperiences of the European war. Manualspublished at Forts Benning and Leavenworthextolled the virtues of fire superiority. Infantryremained king, although now backed by a hostof artillery pieces. New weapons such as tanksand aircraft, while of obvious importance,were mere auxiliaries. Naval coloring to thisdoctrine emanated from the Landing ForceMunual. This manual set down organizationand rudimentary tactics necessary for a force ofMarines and Navy bluejackets to motor theirway to a beach (hopefully unopposed). Onceashore, the landing force was expected toquickly dispatch whatever natives had thetemerity to offer resistance and get on with the

Marine Corps Gazettet November 1982

16

diplomatic mission at hand.Into this general organizational and doc-

trinal confusion strode a newly appointedCommandant, MajGen John A. Lejeune. Hewas determined to rebuild the Marine Corps.Lejeune's career eminently qualified him forthe task. Prior to World War I he had playedan integral part in the formation of the Ad-vanced Base Force, commanding Units thatranged from the 1903 "floating battalion" tothe brigade that landed at Vera Cruz. In be-tween, he graduated from the Army War Col-lege. From 1915 to 1917 Lejeune served asassistant to the Commandant, where he learnedthe intricacies of Washington political life.Following several months as commander of theOverseas Depot at Quantico in 1917, Lejeunesailed for Europe. In France, he had suc-cessively commanded an Army infantrybrigade, the 4th Marine Brigade, and, finally,the 2d Infantry Division. On his return to theUnited States, he assumed command of thenew Marine training center at Quantico, theMarine Corps Schools. MajGen Lejeune, byearly 1921, had fused his experiences into firmbeliefs concerning the future course of theMarine Corps.

The new Commandant's ideas centered onan intense desire to instill in Marines a sense ofpurpose. This sense of purpose could only beachieved through establishing an importantmission, backed by an educational and trainingsystem ensuring that each Marine possessed aminimum level of professional competence.Throughout his tenure, which lasted nineyears, the Commandant repeatedly stressed,

BGen Butler's Quantico-basedMarines take a break frommaneuvers to talk with CivilWar veterans at the Wilder-ness battleground.

Photo courtesy CR Shuman,,

Marine Corps Gazette t November 1982

17

both to Marines and to the Nation, the impor-tance of a militarily efficient Marine Corps.The foundation of his program lay with thenewly created Expeditionary Force, based atQuantico, whose efficiency, training, and doc-trine would be ensured by the Marine CorpsSchools and the Division of Operations andTraining.

The Expeditionary Force, a direct descend-ant of the Advanced Base Force, was consider-ed by the new Commandant as "the heart ofthe Marine Corps." First suggested by theChief of Naval Operations in 1920, itS primarymission, and that of the Corps, concentratedon providing the Navy with an immediatelydeployable landing force. The mission of theforce differed from its primarily defensivepredecessor, for within a capability to react im-mediately rested an implied ability to conductan opposed landing. Marine planners recogniz-ed this subtle change. Maj Earl H. Ellis, abrilliant strategist even if behaviorally erratic,postulated in 1921 that, in the event of aPacific War, Marines would have to seizeheavily fortified islands from Japanesedefenders. The Expeditionary Force designedto carry out this task consisted of two brigades.The 4th Marine Brigade, the main combatpower of the force, contained infantry. Sup-porting units, such as artillery, engineers,signal, and technical troops, as well as heavyadvanced base assets, formed the 3d Brigade.Although personnel shortages prevented thesetwo brigades from ever attaining full strength,they remained for many years the focal point ofMarine Corps activity.

The concept of a landing force ready to lucer's Courses, often directing the studentsdeploy on short notice attracted opposition,both military and civilian. The Gallipoli fiascoin 1915 had steeled much military opinion, asignificant proportion of it Marine. against am-phibious operations. In 1921, Army schoolsproclaimed that opposed landings offered littleprospect of success. Unopposed landings couldeasily be conducted by Army troops withoutany special preparation. This being the case,continued a number of Marines, the LatinAmerican interventions still provided the realmission of the Corps, one that required priorityof scarce personnel assets. In addition, theprospect of maintaining a force of questionableutility did not appeal to the budget consciousCongressmen in Washington. In his first ap-pearance before the House Committee on Ap-propriations, Lejeune found himself fighting alively skirmish with hostile politicians, at timestestily defending his concept of a force-in-readiness. He refused to alter his position.

The Marine Corps Schools, collocated atQuantico with the Expeditionary Force, pro-vided the means for Lejeune to achieve his sec-ond aim, ensuring that all Marine officerspossessed a sound professional education. TheCommandant, an Army War College graduate,firmly believed in the benefits of militaryeducation. Eventually, he hoped to graduateevery younger Marine officer from the schoolsbefore they received promotions to the nexthigher rank, while he sent the older officers tohigher level courses at the Army and Navy WarColleges. Only in this manner could MarineCorps officers achieve unity of thought. Thecurriculum at the Marine Corps Schools con-sisted of two courses, the Company Officer'sCourse, teaching company and battalion leveltactics, and the Field Officer's Course, in-structing staff techniques at the battalion andregimental level. Both courses, taught primari-ly by veterans of the AEF, disseminated Armydoctrine, using texts and problems largely bor-rowed from the Army's infantry and staffschools. As the Marine Corps Schools maturedafter 1921, the two courses placed increasingemphasis on adapting Army doctrine to Marinerequirements.

To coordinate Marine Corps training andeducation, Lejeune created the Division ofOperations and Training at Marine Head-quarters in Washington. Part of the Comman-dant's executive staff, the division closely in-teracted with the two organizations at Quan-tico. The division's education branch supervis-ed the curricula of the Company and Field Of-

Marise Corps Gazette f November 1982

18

and faculty to examine new ideas. Many ofthese ideas then were tested by the Expedi-tionary Force, whose operations and trainingalso came under the division's purview. TheMarine Corps entered the l920s with a rejuve-nated sense of purpose and an educational andoperational triad to guide its development.

Almost immediately, the Marines at Quan-tico, under the direction of flamboyant BGenSmedley Darlington Butler, launched the firstof a series of annual maneuvers that, in addi-tion to meeting training and developmental re-quirements, became masterpieces of publicrelations and showmanship. In September1921, the Expeditionary Force, set Out fromQuantico for the Civil War battleground of theWilderness. The long column included infan-trymen, tractor-drawn field artillery, antiair-craft guns, searchlights, and heavy basedefense artillery. Early on 29 September, close-ly supervised by umpires from the schools, in-fantry assaulted an enemy held beach(delineated by a small Stream), supported by ar-tillery and machineguns. Once established"ashore,'' the Marines quickly constructed ad-vanced base defenses. Two days later, whilePresident Harding and a host of dignitaries, in-cluding the Secretary of the Navy and theChairman of House Naval Affairs Committee,watched, the Expeditionary Force conductedseveral attacks incorporating, in addition toground tactics, a series of aviation exhibitions.

For the next three years, the ExpeditionaryForce maneuvers were an annual social andmilitary event. The 1922 exercise took place atGettysburg, again observed by President Hard-ing, whose entourage included Gen John H.Pershing and the Assistant Secretary of theNavy, Franklin D. Roosevelt. The pattern re-peated itself in 1923 at New Market, Va., andin 1924 at Antietam, Md. Long columns ofMarines converged on their objectives, closelywatched by political and military dignitaries, amultitude of critical Civil War veterans, and in-terested civilians. After carefully reenacting theCivil War action, the Marines wheeled intotheir own conception of how the battle wouldbe fought with modern weapons, sometimes, asat Antietam, delighting the onlooking crowdwith an occasional aerial or tank atlack. By late1924, the Marines had sold Lejeune's Expedi-tionary Force.

In addition to their marketing value, themaneuvers also enabled certain training and ex-perimentl goals to be met. Most obvious, theExpeditionary Force meshed together each year

_i_j, Pr.

Marines unload 75mm gun from armored motor lighter during maneuvers at Culebra in 1924.

and trained as a unit. Equally important, newentities within the force were allowed to dem-onstrate, and test, their roles. Since World War1, Marine aviation had been clamoring for awider role. Proponents argued that Marineaviation should be an integral part of the Ex-peditionary Force, citing its value not Only as areconnaissance asset, but also as a ground sup-port bombing weapon. At the Wilderness,Marine pilots had their debut. Flying 180 sor-ties, including day and night bombing attacks,they greatly impressed observers. Succeedingexercises expanded the role of aviation so thatby 1924 aircraft were carrying out extensive cx-perirnéntation specifically scheduled into themaneuvers. Tank tactics received similar atten-tion during the maneuvers, culminating at An-tietam, with an independent armored attack,which moved freely without any mobility con-straints from accompanying infantry. Moresignificant, students from the Marine CorpsSchools participated in the maneuvers as um-pires and members of the Expeditionary Forcestaff. In these capacities they applied recentlylearned Army principles to unique MarineCorps problems. The practice of using thestudents began in 1921 as a training device tosupplement classroom work and evolved dur-ing the next three years into an experimentalvehicle for testing new concepts. The annualexercises substantially improved Marinereadiness while keeping the public fully awareof the Corps' capabilities.

Marine Corps training and testing during theearly 1920s did not confine itself to the dustybattlefields of an earlier war. In 1922, two com-panies from Quaritico practiced embarkationand debarkation of troops and heavy equip-ment, including 155mm guns, at Culebra. Twoyears later, the Expeditionary Force, reducedby personnel shortages to an infantry regimentand a defense regiment, carried Out landings atPanama and Culebra as part of Fleet Problem4. The Panama phase of the exercise confineditself to a traditional advanced base operation.Al Culebra, however, the infantry regiment as-

19

saulted beaches occupied by their defensivelyoriented comrades. The ensuing fiasco includ-ed lost boats, ineffective gunfire, and troopsstranded along the beaches. Two newly design-ed landing craft proved unwieldy, as did agangly amphibious tractor designed by WalterChristie. The Marines involved, however,learned valuable lessons in this early doctrinalgroping; lessons that clearly impacted on theconduct of the following year's massive fleetproblem.

Joint Army and Navy Problem 3, held in1925, signaled a major change in Marine doc-trinal thought. In addition to an Army divisionand the Pacific fleet, the exercise included the4th Marine Regiment (recently designated theWest Coast Expeditionary Force following itsreturn to San Diego after four years police dutyin Santo Domingo), elements of the East CoastExpeditionary Force, and the students andfaculty of the Marine Corps Schools. TheMarines' task involved simulating a force of42,000 Marines—two divisions plus supportingtroops—assaulting the island of Oahu. EachMarine division included infantry, artillery,tanks, engineers, and an aviation element ofobservation and attack planes. Officers fromthe Marine Corps Schools made up the variouslevel staffs, while the troops from the 4thMarines and Quantico imitated much largerunits. Detailed plans spelling out every facet ofthe landings from embarkation to operationsashore were written by the student/facultystaffs. The assault, carried Out against Armydefenders from Schofield Barracks, barely suc-ceeded in establishing a lodgement ashore.Within a few hours, however, enough Marineshad concentrated inland from the beaches tomake umpires feel that defenses of the islandcould be seriously threatened. Although thelandings displayed many of the weaknesses ofearlier exercises, they did demonstrate the rootsof a newly emerging doctrine.

Back at Quantico following the exercise, theofficers of the Marine Corps Schools gatheredto assess their experiences. In a report issued by

Mari,w Corps Gazrtte Novernbr 1982

the Commandant of the Schools, Col RobertH. Dunlap, the officers put forward severalrecommendations. The report declared thatwhile basic Army doctrine remained relevantthere existed a definitive need for uniqueMarine Corps equipment and training. Curric-ulum at the Marine Corps Schools should beimproved to include a progressive series ofproblems leading to a final month-long prac-tical application, all geared towards landingoperations, in order to adapt Army methods toMarine needs. Perhaps the most importantrecommendation, for it paints a clear picture ofMarine thoughts on doctrinal education, calledfor a "School battalion" to be used for bothdemonstrations and practical application.Students at Quantico would use the battalionto apply, in a laboratory environment, theprecepts learned in class. Additionally, the bat-talion could be divided into several head-quarters units where students, acting as staffofficers, would practice "the maneuvers in-volving . . . the capture, defense, andwithdrawal of [an] island position."

As Lejeune's fifth year as Commandant end-ed, he may well have looked on the MarineCorps with a guarded sense of achievement.Through his dogged stressing of peacetimereadiness, embodied in the Marine CorpsSchools and the Expeditionary Force, andsupervised by the Division of Operations andTraining, he had created an efficient militaryforce. New concepts had begun surfacing, anda new spirit animated many Marines, as evi-denced by a growing intellectual outpouring in

Mail robberies in 1925 interrupted peacetimemaneuvers.

M.rinc Corps Gazettef November 1982

20

Secretary of Navy Edwin Denby with GensLejeune and Butler at Quantico in 1922,

the pages of the Marine Corps GAZETTE. Yet,these accomplishments only signified changingperceptions. The Oahu fleet exercises couldonly be regarded as a limited success; manymistakes had been made by inexperienced of-ficers. The Marine Corps Schools, attemptingto give all Marine Corps officers a commonlevel of professional knowledge, still taughtArmy doctrine using Army texts. Progress hadbeen made, but Marines still remained distantfrom any new doctrine.

Five years of peacetime development abrupt-ly succumbed to operational exigencies. A rashof domestic mail robberies in late 1925 andl926 led to Marines guarding postal servicerailroad cars and trucks. In total, almost 2,500Marines from the East and West Coast Expedi-tionary Forces provided mail security. Addi-tionally, approximately 900 Marines continuedto serve in Haiti's national police force, a dutyundertaken by the Marine Corps since 1916. In1927, almost every available Marine, includingthose recently released from safeguarding themail, found himself in foreign territory. Re-sponding to a rapidly deteriorating situation inNicaragua, the 2d Marine Brigade, organizedfrom the East Coast Expeditionary Force,established itself in the turbulent LatinAmerican nation. Thousands of miles away,Smedley Butter, commanding the 3d MarineBrigade, whose nucleus consisted of the SanDiego based 4th Marines, stepped ashore atTientsin, China to protect U.S. interests fromthe devastation of a renewed civil war. Within ayear, five infantry regiments backed by anequal nuniber of aircraft squadrons, as well as

Marines in Haiti: training under combat conditions.

artillery, tank, and engineer Units, haddeployed overseas. Demands for officers reach-ed such a critical level that the Marine CorpsSchools closed in the spring of 1928, the Com-pany Officer's Course not reconvening untilSeptember 1929. Quantico's doctrinal educa-tion and testing had been supplanted by moreurgent requirements.

The brigades in Nicaragua and China tookadvantage of the opportunity to train and ex-periment under expeditionary, and often com-bat, conditions. The 3d Brigade, following hec-tic embarkation at San Diego, settled into aroutine alternating between guarding the inter-national settlements and training. Exercises in-tegrating artillery, aircraft, tanks, and infantrymaintained and sharpened professional skills.The Marines in Nicaragua received the majori-ty of their training while chasing Sandinistaguerrillas. In hundreds of small unit actions,usually involving no more than a dozenMarines, some Nicaraguan National Guards-men, and a few pack mules, the stark realitiesof combat confronted the members of the 2dBrigade. Although these encounters, with a fewexceptions, involved at most a large patrol anda few aircraft, they provided invaluable experi-ence to hundreds of Marine officers, many ofwhom would play a major role in doctrinaldevelopment a few years later.

Marine aviation particularly benefited fromthe crisis in Nicaragua. On 17 July 1927 twoaircraft, flying a routine scouting patrol, ap-proached the village of Ocotal. The pilots,startled, looked down to see a major battleunderway; a small garrison of Marines and Na-tional Guardsmen had retreated into their bar-racks while around the building swarmed hun-dreds of Sandinistas. Quickly returning toManagua, the aviators' report immediately

21

cause five bomb-laden aircraft to be dispatch-ed. Arriving at Ocotal, they dove on the guer-rillas, guided by Marines using signal panels inthe besieged barracks' grounds. Droppingbombs and strafing, the five planes producednear panic in Sandino's troops, many of whomthrew away their weapons and fled. An esti-mated 3(X) died. Marine aviation had carriedout history's first combat dive bombing attack.During the ensuing months, the 2d Brigade'saircraft grew increasingly effective. Divebombing attacks on the stronghold of ElChipate and on large guerrilla forces attackingMarine columns near Quilali in 1927 and 1928improved the efficiency of aviation. Patrolscame to be accompanied by armed aircraft,ready for instant retaliation in the event of anambush. By 1929, when the 2d Brigade beganwithdrawing from Nicaragua, Marine aviationhad earned a permanent combat role.

Not all new developments emanated fromNicaragua and China. Al the Marine CorpsSchools, despite personnel shortages, greatstrides had been taken towards articulating aseparate Marine Corps doctrine. Spurred on byincreased emphasis on landing operations inNavy War plans and a 1927 edict by the JointBoard of the Army and Navy declaring that theMarine Corps held responsibility for providingfleet landing forces, the schools instituted ex-tensive curriculum changes. The Field Officer'sCourse, formerly devoting only two hours tolanding operations, offered, in 1926, a majorsubcourse entitled "Overseas Operations,"covering aspects of naval warfare ranging fromthe Washington Conference limitations on shipbuilding to the theories of naval gunfire in sup-port of an amphibious landing. Instead ofUsing texts borrowed from the Army, "Over-seas Operations" texts originated at Quantico.As a further illustration of the intellectual ad-vancement at the schools, short texts appearedcontaining reprints of articles from the Journalof the Royal United Services lnslittae, thehighly respected British military publication.These articles, written by such men as J.F.C.Fuller and MajGen Sir George Aston offerednew ideas to the Marine students, as well as asolid historical foundation for further study.Significantly, some of the maneuver ex-periences from the early postwar years foundtheir way into the new curriculum. Studentswere tasked with planning landing operations.A lecture entitled "Naval Gunfire'' dealt, inpart, with the mistakes made during the 1925Oahu exercise. Late in 1927, the Division ofOperations and Training directed that a re-

Marine Corps Gazette t November 1982

duced strength training battalion be formed atQuantico, whose functions included support ofinstruction at the Marine Corps Schools, Inshort, the Educational Center at Quantico,though hamstrung by manpower losses, con-tinued to expand the ideas of the MarineCorps.

The Division of Operations and Trainingstrove to ensure that all Marine officers keptabreast of the innovations and lessons beinglearned at Quaritico and in Nicaragua andChina. Through a series of articles published inthe Marine Corps GAZETTE, doctrinaldevelopments reached officers even in remoteoutposts. Each issue of the journal included asection entitled "Professional Notes'' thatdetailed new ideas and changes within theMarine Corps, as well as the experiences fromNicaragua and China. The formation of thetraining battalion at Quantico was announcedto Marines in September 1927. In 1928, theDivision of Operations and Training discussedthe importance of tanks, recounting theachievements of the light tank platoon in Chinato support its argument. Three months later,the "Professional Notes" included a series ofcombat after-action reports from Nicaragua,which elaborated the important achievementsof aviation. These articles and many othersdisseminated new doctrinal developments,helping the Corps to reach Lejeune's educa-tional goals.

The low priority of the Marine CorpsSchools rapidly changed in 1929 in response totwo events. First, the disbanding of the 2d and3d Brigades, released officers to return to theEducation Center. The Company Officer'sCourse reopened; enrollment in the Field Of-ficer's Course increased. Officers with newlyacquired combat and expeditionary experienceassumed posts as instructors. Second, and ofmuch greater consequence, Col J.C. Breckin-ridge was appointed commandant of theschools. Although he would remain at Quan-tico for only a year (to return again in 1932),the new director of Marine officer educationinstilled a sense of intellectual urgency in thefaculty and students at Quantico.

Breckinridge brought to the Marine CorpsSchools fierce convictions concerning the pro-per role of military education. Abhorring rotememorization of maxims and principles, hesought to encourage analytical thinking bystudents. Facts existed only to form a commonbase of knowledge. He envisioned militaryeducation as providing a sequence of progres-sive intellectual steps beginning with basic con-

Marme Corps Cazette t November 1982

22

cepts taught to newly commissioned lieuten-ants. Proceeding to the Company Officer'sCourse, officers would be confronted withproblems that required more than regurgitationof data. The next step, the Field Officer'sCourse, began a series of applicatory exercisesdesigned to force officers to analyze and solvecomplex military problems. As a final link inthis educational chain, Breckinridge hoped toopen a War Planning Course aimed atchallenging older officers by requiring them todevelop strategic plans without directives toguide their work. Breckinridge's goal throughall this was, as he stated, "to cultivate curiosi-ty, encourage investigation, stimulate discus-sion, and inspire criticism that will result in im-provement."

MajGen Fuller wasa member of theGuantanamo socie-ty that foundedMCA.

Officers reporting to the Marine CorpsSchools in 1930 encountered an intellectualbeehive. In addition to changes in the Field Of-ficer's Course, emphasis on landing operationshad extended to the Company Officer'sCourse. The Allied failure at Gallipoli attractedincreased attention from students and faculty.Texts and map problems emphasized historicaland hypothetical analysis of the operation.Naval gunfire, always an unknown variable inan amphibious landing, received particularscrutiny. Under Breckinridge's guidance,answers to tactical questions, instead of beingpromulgated, were arriv.ed at through investi-gative reasoning. Students soon examined am-phibious Operations ranging from the ChileanRevolution of 1891 through the Russo-Japa-nese War to Germany's seizure of the BalticIslands in 1917. As one Marine later exclaimed,"they looked at everything with a questionmark."

Although Breckinridge left Quantico afteronly a year, his sense of urgency continued.

MajGen Ben H. Fuller, appointed to head theCorps in 1930 when Wendell C. Neville diedafter only a year as Commandant, had been aclose associate of Lejeune. A member of theoriginal Guantanamo society that founded theMarine Corps Association*, he firmly support-ed the developments begun in 1921; indeed, hefaced a similar situation. Budget slashes dic-tated by the Depression threatened the MarineCorps with large cutbacks. As had becomealmost an historical certainty, threats of cut-backs engendered new questioning of Marineroles and missions. With the contingencies ofthe late twenties greatly reduced (althoughsome Marines remained in Nicaragua until1932 and the 4th Marines would remain inChina through 1941), Quantico again assumedcritical importance. To emphasize this fact, theCommandant upgraded the billet of comman-dant oF the Marine Corps Schools from colonelto brigadier general.

Maf C.D. Barrettproduced the firstmanual for landingoperations.

Fuller, recognizing the need for a clearlystated doctrine, directed the Marine CorpsSchools to produce a manual for landingoperations. A board, headed by Maj CharlesD. Barrett, an instructor at the Field Officer'sCourse, convened. Included on the board,known as the Landing Operations Text Board,were Majs Lyle Miller and Pedro del Valle andNavy Li Walter C. Ansel, an instructor in navalgunfire support. Proceeding slowly, the board

* in 1911 a group of officers at Guantanamo Bay,bothered by what they saw as a lack of foresight and pro-fessionalism, founded the association. Three future Com-mandants were among its initial members: Fuller, JohnA. Lejeune, and George C. Barnett. Their goat wa.s 10promote discussion and free debate among Marine of-ficers. Five years after its founding, ii itad accumulatedenough money to begin publishing a professional journal.the Marine Corps GAZETTE.

23

conducted exhaustive historical research, at-tempting to assimilate past lessons. In 1931,under the co-authorship of Barrett and delValle, concrete results emerged in the form of atreatise entitled, appropriately, LandingOperations. Although still not a Statement ofdoctrine, the paper brought the Marine Corpsmuch closer to the Commandant's goal andwould serve as a basis for furl her examination.

Barrett's concepts were subjected to somepractical experimentation during 1932. A bat-talion of infantry, reinforced by an artillerybattery, participating in joint Army and Navyexercises off Hawaii, found thai, unless allServices adhered to the same tenets, the pagesof a Quantico treatise became worthless. As inearlier fleet maneuvers, cooperation betweenMarines and sailors proved difficult. Coordina-tion among naval gunfire, air support, andassault troops was almost nonexistent, witheach arm establishing its own priorities. Whiledisappointing, the 1932 maneuvers highlightedthe need for a comprehensive doctrine.

As Barrett and his committee continued itsdeliberations, the intellectual pace at Quanticosignificantly increased upon reappointment inApril 1932 of BOen J.C. Breckinridge as coni-mandant of the Marine Corps Schools. Since1929, the Marine educator had expanded hisideas. His concept of progressive military educa-tion, containing the same school steps outlinedin 1929, aimed at building an officer into a"Statesman Soldier," a Marine who, although amilitary man, fully comprehended the broad po-litical framework into which armed force fit. Toachieve this goal, the Marine Corps required afirm doctrine built from a common understand-ing of mental processes and allowing for con-tinual readjustment of tactical and strategicprinciples. Doctrine, according to Breckinridge,rested on a "unity of comprehension" whichimplied intellectual dynamism.

Intellectual dynamism could only be achiev-ed by instilling into each Marine officer a senseof skepticism. Breckinridge believed three keyprofessional attributes were necessary: origi-nality, initiative, and openmindedness. TheMarine Corps Schools offered Breckiriridgeand his newly appointed assistant, Col E.B.Miller (who shared his commander's views) thevehicle with which to inculcate officers with thenecessary mental skills. Words such as ''teach"and "examination" became taboo at Quanti-co, as they implied a requirement for rotememorization. Tactical principles became"guides," tools to be used or ignored by prob-lem-solving students. Through a series of

Marine Corps Gazette t November t982

essays, written by Breckinridge and handed outto students, the director of education hoped toencourage open debate. Additionally, hedirected Army texts still in use at Quantico tobe discarded and replaced by new, Marineoriented texts. At the bottom of these innova-tions lay Breckinridge's hatred of blind adher-ence to precedent.

As Breckinridge set about revamping theMarine Corps Schools, pressure for a concretedoctrine grew more pronounced. Respondingto fiscal constraints, the Secretary of the Navyestablished a board to investigate possibilitiesof money-saving consolidations within theNavy Department. The possibilities to be in-vestigated included amalgamating the MarineCorps into the Navy, in essence, eliminatingthe Corps. Exhaustive hearings began, callingon testimony from Marine and Navy officers,not all of which was favorable to the Corps.The General Board, however, responded with aclear statement entitled "Functions of theMarine Corps in National Defense," attackingany attempts to disband the Corps. CitingMarine efficiency and training, the paperdismissed ideas that the Army could assume alanding force mission. A keystone of the argu-ment rested on historical Marine-Navy cooper-ation, describing failures of combined opera-tions with the Army. Indeed, the four-pageessay devoted three and a half pages to con-trasting Marine capabilities against Armyweaknesses in regard to landing operations.Given the renewed threat to the Marine Corps,with only a nebulous treatise entitled LandingOperations to show for what the GeneralBoard described as "150 years of close associa-tion and service with the Navy." the need for abetter expression of the emerging Marine doc-trine seemed imperative.

Late in the year, after urging by the Com-mandant, Breckinridge closed the Schools anddirected that a landing operations manual bewritten. To supervise the writing, and to editthe final draft, he appointed Maj Dewitt Peck.Peck quite possibly knew more about amphibi-ous operations than any other Marine officer.As an instructor at the Naval War College, hehad used the college's library to study over 250landing operations conducted throughouthistory. Each became the subject of a card keptin a reference file. Using this file and the resultsof three years of study by Barrett and theMarine Corps Schools, as well as recently com-piled student and instructor outlines, severalcommittees convened to flesh out a draftoutline approved by a board of officers from

Manne Corps Gazette t November 192

24

Quantico, the Fleet Marine Force,* and theDivision of Operations and Training. Develop-ment proceeded rapidly. One seminar, headedby Peck and responsible for developing landingtactics, reflected Breckinridge's intellectual em-phasis. Alter each member researched a par-ticular topic, ideas would be written on ablackboard, scrutinized, and left overnight.The next morning, additional changes wouldbe made and the concept incorporated into themanual. Within six months, the Tenta/iveManual for Landing Operations, followingfinal editing by Peck, was a reality.

The new manual, a concise statement ofMarine Corps amphibious doctrine, underwentevaluation and practical testing throughout therest of the decade. At the Marine CorpsSchools, it served as a text for the 1934-35academic year, where students subjected it todetailed examination. Each year, from 1935 to1941, Marine units took part in Fleet LandingExercises, specifically designed as doctrinaltests in addition to providing valuable training.The Division of Operations and Training,through a liaison officer posted at Quantico,kept pace with any recommended changes andinserted ideas from Washington. Yet, FM3I-5,the official Army copy adopted in 1940,reflected very few changes from the original1934 draft.

The manual that enabled American forces tosuccessfully assault Guadalcanal in 1942 andcountless other islands during the followingthree years represented over 20 years of syste-matic development. Beginning in 1921, in theforests of the Wilderness and progressingthrough the surf at Oahu and Culebra into theclassrooms at Quantico, Marines had beendevoting much of their intellectual energies todeveloping a tactical amphibious doctrine.While, at times, they appeared to be groping,particularly in the early 1920s, they continuedto approach the problem empirically. Thequestion, however, remains: why were Marinesable to develop a singularly effective doctrinein an era when competing operational and in-stitutional priorities should have fragmentedtheir attention?

The reason for the successful doctrinaldevelopment of the Marine Corps prior to 1935is embodied in three key factors: a clearlydefined sense of direction, a solid organizationthat maintained that sense, and widespread in-tellectual stimulation. In 1921, MajGen John

Partiatly in response lo the 1933 prcssurc, thc txpcdi-lionary Force had been redesignated the Fled MarineForce, wih expanded tanding force duties, in December.

A. Lejeune, had stepped in to end nearly 20years of uncertainty. He clearly stated that themain function of the Marine Corps lay in pro-viding a ready expeditionary force for servicewith the Navy. This being the case, declaredLejeune, Marines must be trained and educatedinto a truly efficient military force, capable ofconducting amphibious operations. For nineyears, despite operational commitments thatdispersed assets and attention, the Comman-dant adamantly maintained his stand that the

The Marine corps GazetteVOLUME XIV MARCH t529 N. 1

Extract From the Hearing Before the House CommitteeOr, Appropriations, February 12. 1929

MR. FRENCH: There is one observation I would like wmake: At the time. Mr. Chairman, when General Lejeunc wasbefore our sub-committee a few weeks ago, we were not awarethat he would not be viIll us the coming year. although weknew his immediate detail was coming to an end. I just wantto say this (or the Record; That lie has been the Major GeneralComniandant of the Marine Corps for the entire period of sixyears that I have been Chairman of the Naval AppropriationsSub.Committec. and during that period he has won the absoluteconfidence of the members of that comislittee. He has done thatthrough his intense earnestness, liii tint ring zeal, his fine in teg-ricy. and his most wonderful efficiency. As he leaves this de-tail for another under the Marine Corps. he carries v. i th him hesincere respect. good will, and heartiest good wishes of everymember of the Committee, as I am sure he does of the member.ship of our entire Appropriations Cornniirtee. as we has'c Cometo know him as an officer and as a man.

Mg, 'Moon: So say we all. General.

primary duty rested with the fleet. The direc-tion provided by Lejeune was reinforced by theever-present threats to the existence of theMarine Corps. Manifested by budget and per-sonnel cuts and, in 1933, the Navy Departmenthearings, the specter of organizational dissolu-tion added urgency to the Commandant'sideas.

To implement his ideas, Lejeune establishedthe organizational machinery necessary toallow methodical planning, experimentation,analysis, and promulgation of doctrine. TheMarine Corps Schools and the ExpeditionaryForce (later the FMF) at Quantico, and theDivision of Operations and Training formed atriangle in which ideas became doctrine. TheDivision of Operations and Training ensuredthat the activities at Quantico conformed withthe ideas of the Commandant, and that eachMarine received at least a minimum level oftraining and education. The Marine Corps

Schools conceived and promulgated ideas,establishing a common educational and doc-trinal bond among officers. The ExpeditionaryForce provided a practical testing ground fornewly learned, or developed, concepts.Together, these three units served as an avenue,through which the Commandant maintainedthe direction of the Marine Corps. More thanthat, however, these elements became an em-pirical vehicle, whereby ideas could be conceiv-ed, tested, analyzed and, ultimately, developedinto definitive doctrine.

Command direction and sound organiza-tion, however invaluable, constituted static en-tities, unable of themselves to produce results;intellectual flexibility instilled a dynamic quali-ty to Marine Corps doctrinal development. AtQuantico and in the pages of the Marine CorpsGAZETTE in the early 1920s, Marines began tovoice their ideas. Muted, but not eliminated, bythe necessity to bring all Marines up to a com-mon level of experience following the war,these ideas budded in the late twenties, as land-ing operations drew increased attention at theMarine Corps Schools. In 1929, Col Breckin-ridge removed all constraints. Marine officers,allowed to run intellectually rampant, attackedthe problems of landing operations. Barrett,del Valle, and later Peck, offer excellent cx-arnples of the type of inquisitive, searching of-ficers Breckinridge hoped to produce. Throughthem, and many others, the complexities ofamphibious operations were subjected to ex-haustive research and analysis. Doctrineassumed a dynamic quality. The lasting appli-cability of the Tentative Manual for LandingOperations can be attributed to Breckinridge'sdetermination to instill in every Marine officerinquisitiveness and flexibility of thought.

While Marine Corps tactical amphibiousdoctrine continues to be a notable contributionto the military art, the institutional and intellec-tual factors that led to its development are ofconsiderably greater importance. For any mili-tary organization to remain doctrinally sound,it must be capable of questioning establishedprinciples and of synthesizing new ideas. Whenthat ability is lost, the military force becomes astagnant dinosaur, ready to be destroyed. TheMarine Corps, in the years preceding WorldWar 11, developed a dynamism that resulted ina singularly effective and flexible doctrine. Thelessons of that doctrine lie not in its tactics, thedetails of which are applicable only to a specifichistorical era, but in the institutional and in-tellectual forces from which it was created.

USMC

25

Marine Corps Gazcttc November 1982

1983 HONORABLE MENTION"Those Controversial Boards"

Brzgadier General Robert H. Williams, USMC (Ret)

As published in Marine Corps Gazette, November 1982Reprinted by permission

27

Those Controversial Boards

by BGen R. II. Williams, USMC(Ret)

When the war to makedemocracy ended, anothertradition-locked corridors ofCorps.

Major General Commandant Geurge Barneit

In the spring of 1919 Headquarters MarineCorps moved from the Walker-JohnsonBuilding on New York Avenue to the newNavy Building on the Mall, fronting on

Constitution Avenue between 17th and 19thStreets N.W. George Barnett was the MajorGeneral Commandant. The immediate taskfacing him was demobilization, and it came lessthan a year after Congress had authorized awartime strength of 75,000—a figure not quitereached when the war to make the world safefor democracy ended on 11 November 1918.

Marine Corps Gazelle November 1982

28

the world safe forfight began—in theHeadquarters Marine

A more formidable task, however, also con-fronted Gen Barnett. This was the reconstitu-Lion of a postwar corps of regular officers.Prewar authorized enlisted strength had been17,400. Authorized commissioned strength was4 percent of this, or nearly 700, but the Corpshad nowhere near that number of officerswhen war was declared on 6 April 1917. Therehad not been time enough to commission sec-ond lieutenants to fill all the vacancies resultingfrom the increase in enlisted strength authoriz-ed by the National Defense Act of 1916.

The immediate need for hundreds of secondlieutenants was met in two ways: (I) by givingtemporary commissions to meritorious non-commissioned officers (thereby weakening thebackbone of the Corps at the outset of expan-sion), and (2) by offering either permanent orReserve commissions to graduates of militarycolleges and to university graduates havingsome military experience. Many of the lattercategory opted for a Reserve commissionbecause they were anxious to get into uniform.It took several weeks to process a permanentcommission, whereas a second lieutenant of theMarine Corps Reserve could be sworn in on theday he appeared before a naval examiningboard for brief physical and oral examinations.

After war was declared, so many universitygraduates and undergraduates enlisted in theMarine Corps that Headquarters adopted apolicy of commissioning second lieutenantsonly from the ranks. Those chosen receivedtemporary commissions after completing thecourse at the officers' training canp at Quan-tico or in the case of the 4th Brigade, an Armyofficers' training camp in France. During 1917,however, more than 200 second lieutenantswere permanently commissioned. Althoughtheir subsequent promotions were temporary,as were those of all regular officers, the factthat they possessed permanent commissions assecond lieutenants was to pose a problem.

recommended to the Secretary of the Navy thata board of officers be convened with Col JohnH. Russell as president to select the officers tobe retained.

Col John H. Russell believed promotionsthould go only to "officers and gentlemen."

The Naval Appropriations Act for fiscal year1920 (passed in July 1919) provided tentativelyfor an increase in authorized enlisted strengthfrom the prewar 17,400 to 27,400. This meantan authorized officer strength of nearly 1,100.There were actually more vacancies in the com-missioned ranks than there were officers holdingpermanent commissions.

To reduce enlisted strength was not difficult.It soon reached a low of barely 15,000. Nor wasit difficult to reduce officer strength. Reservistscould be returned to inactive status and tem-porary commissions revoked at any time, butto select those to be retained and permanentiycommissioned presented problems with whichtwo commandants and two selection boardswrestled from the armistice until the spring of1921.

When war was declared, there were only afew more than 400 regular officers and a fewInactive Reserve lieutenants. Commissionedstrength of all categories peaked at 2,130 soonafter the armistice. What remained of the pre-war regular officer corps, after normal attritionand losses in France, formed a solid block fromthe Commandant on down to include the top100 of the 329 captains authorized in thepostwar Corps.

Gen Barnett, the first Commandant to be ap-pointed for a specified period, had been reap-pointed when his four year term expired inFebruary 1918. In a circular letter published inJanuary 1919 he invited all officers serving intemporary or Reserve status to apply for a per-manent commission. In that same month he

Col Russell was said to have advised themembers of the board to bear in mind that theywere selecting the young officers whom theywould invite into their quarters and whom theirdaughters might marry. This could be inter-preted to mean that young men of educationand good family background as welJ as ex-cellent service records—in the terminology ofthe day, officers and gentlemen—should begiven preference over former enlisted men,especially the prewar NCOs with title formaleducation.

The Russell Board reported its findings inAugust 1919. It recommended those officers tobe retained in their present temporary rank,those to be retained but with lower commis-sioned rank, and those to be discharged or of-fered warrant or NCO rank. All commissionswere to be probationary for one year.

One of the few wartime officers to be pro-moted to major before the war ended, Leroy P.Hunt, who had distinguished himself as a com-pany and battalion commander in France, wasplaced almost at the top of the list of captains.There were others who had served in the 4thBrigade who also were retained in the rank ofcaptain. Among them were Lemuel C. Shep-herd, Jr., John W. Thomason, Jr., the writer,and Alfred H. Noble, but they were notgenerally high on the list. This was owing inpart to the temporary captains who had beencommissioned permanent second lieutenants in1917 and whose seniority was not subject torearrangement. Many temporary captains whohad served in France with distinction wererelegated to the list of first lieutenants. Amongthem were Clifton B. Cates and Graves B. Er-skine. Louis Cukela, a temporary first lieuten-ant at war's end, headed the list of secondlieutenants.

The last was not out of line, but the failure toplace Cates high on the list of captains is puz-zling. No Marine officer who served in Francewas awarded more decorations for gallantry inaction, and his background was in keeping withCol Russell's announced ideas. His selectionafter the armistice to command the Marinecompany in Pershing's picked regiment and,after his return to the United States, to be oneof Gen Barnett's aides as well as a White Houseaide attested the high opinion of him held byhis superiors. In all, special recognition was un-doubtedly due about 20 officers (almost all of

29

Maxine Corpa Gazette t November 1982

them college graduates) for their outstandingservice in France. The board's findings did notprovide this recognition.

MajOen John A. Lejeune had commandedthe famous 2nd Division of the American Ex-peditionary Force after Soissons in July 1918.Under him BGen Wendell C. Neville had com-manded the 4th Brigade of Marines which com-prised half the infantry of that division. Theyand other senior officers who had served inFrance were understandably dissatisfied with theboard's treatment of Cates and others, par-ticularly of former enlisted men of the 4thBrigade who had won their commissions inFrance. The fact that none of the Russell Boardmembers had served with the 4th Brigade inFrance aroused further suspicion and undermin-ed the credibility of the board's actions. Alsothere were those who seem to have exploited thisdissatisfaction for their own purposes.

In the spring of 1920 a secret scenario wasput together for an ugly little drama. Whenstaged it would humiliate Gen Barnett andenable his successor to scrap the Russell Boardand redo the selection process with some newtwists. To understand the circumstances sur-rounding the convening of the second board wemust backtrack.

Secretary of the Na'y Daniels appears tohave played the part of dissembler. An egalitar-ian who scorned inherited wealth and socialposition, he apparently disliked Mrs. Barnettwho was amply supplied with both as well with

flashed amusingly and some-at the expense of pretentious

a ready Wit thattimes scathinglypoliticians.

Much decorated Louis Cukela was reduced in rankby the Russell Board.

Maxine Corpi Gazette November 1982

30

President Wilson and Secretary Danielsteamed to both make and break Gen Barneft

Before Barnett's first appointment inFebruary 1914, Daniels had interviewed,among others considered for the post, John A.Lejeune, then the senior lieutenant colonel ofthe Corps. Thus far no Naval Academy gradu-ate had ever been Commandant. During theRoosevelL and Taft years, ill feelings haddeveloped at departmental level between thetwo Services. Daniels wished to restore mutualregard. Both Barnett and Lejeune had gone tothe Naval Academy. Although Daniels consid-ered the latter to be the best qualified officer inthe Corps, he recommended Barnett to Presi-dent Wilson on the basis of seniority.

The Secretary gave Barnett outstandingfitness reports and praised his performance ofduty as Commandant in his annual reports tothe President. Two weeks before Barnett's firstterm ended, Daniels announced his reappoint-ment in glowing phrases. Soon afterward hepresented the Commandant with the Distin-guished Service Medal.

But the Secretary gave the Commandant ahint. On the day of his reappointment he askedhim to sign an undated letter of resignation.Daniels believed that officers should not servelonger than four years in Washington. Al-though he had made exceptions of the bureauchiefs and the Commandant during the war, itwas with the understanding that their reap-pointments might be terminated after peacewas restored. Barnett objected to signing theblank resignation. The Secretary let the matterdrop

On 18 June 1918 while the fight for BelleauWood was in progress, General and Mrs. Bar-neil were sitting in the gallery of the House ofRepresentatives when an amendment to a navalpersonnel bill, increasing the rank of the Com-mandant to lieutenant general, caine up forconsideration. The amendment was expected topass until Representative Thomas S. Butler,Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Commit-tee, rose to speak. He blasted it unmercifully,calling attention to the presence of Gen Barnett

Thomas Butler—"words to provoke aduel."

in insulting terms that a century earlier mighthave provoked a duel. The amendment, whichDaniels had not endorsed, was defeated. Itwould take another generation and a secondWorld War to make the Commandant of theMarine Corps a lieutenant general.

Congressman Butler was the father of therestless and ambitious Col Smedley D. Butler,then impatiently waiting in Haiti for orders tocombat duty in France which he was unlikely toreceive. For years the elder Butler had been in aposition to exert pressure to further his son'scareer. Before the year was out Smedley Butlergot to France, but not to see combat.

Gen Barnett must have resisted the efforts offather and son (and probably SecretaryDaniels) for several months to persuade him toorder the younger Butler to France. The latterhad probably used his father's influence to getto Haiti, the likeliest expeditionary post for alittle action before the United States enteredthe war against Germany, so the Commandantlet him stay there.

On 4 June 1920 the Naval AppropriationsBill passed, making permanent the hithertotentative authorized strength of 27,400, thusfirming postwar officer strength at 1,093. Italso contained enabling provisions for conven-ing a second board that so broadly definedeligibility for a permanent commission as tonullify the Russell Board. It is difficult to relatethis legislation to any initiative or recommen-dation on the part of Gen Barnett.

From 5 May to 8 June the Commandant hadbeen absent from Washington, inspecting postsand stations on the West Coast. Soon after

31

returning to his desk in the Navy Building, hemust have learned from Daniels of the Secre-tary's intention to remove him from office. On12 June he wrote, in his own hand and not onofficial stationary, a confidential letter of pro-test to Daniels, on the rather weak premise thathe had not signed an undated letter of resigna-tion as the bureau chiefs who were reappointedduring the war had done. This letter clearlyestablishes that the sensational turn that eventsin the Navy Department would take within aweek did not come as a complete surprise toGen Barnett.

After lunch on Friday, 18 June 1920, justtwo years after Congressman Butler's speechon the floor of the House, a messenger enteredthe aide's office at Headquarters Marine Corpswith a note from the Secretary to Gen Barnett.lstLt Clifton B. Cates took it into the Com-mandant. The note informed him that Danielshad decided to replace him, the office tochange hands the following week on whateverday would be convenient. And would the gen-eral let him know immediately whether he wish-ed to retire as a major general, or remain on ac-tive duty as a brigadier general?

After hurried consultations with his principalstaff officers and a telephone call to Mrs.Barnett, the Commandant replied that he wish-ed to remain on active duty. He refused toresign. Daniels obtained Barnett's dismissalfrom President Wilson.

Gen Lejeune replaced .9arnett as CMC.

Marine Corps Gazette t Novembet 1982

. •. :7'

MajGen Neville headed new selection board. BGen Harry Lee commanded 6th Marines.

Since his return from Europe in 1919 Gen Le-jeune had been commanding general at Quan-tico with BOen Smedley Butler as his chief ofstaff. Twelve days after the delivery of the note,on 30 June 1920, Lejeune relieved his old friendas Commandant in the presence of only the twoaides. It was simpler than the relief of a sentryon post, except that when Lejeune began to sitdown after entering the Commandant's officeBarnett said, "John, stand up there just aminute." After reminding him of their years offriendship he asked why he had not let himknow about what was going on.

"George, my hands were tied," said Le-jeune.

"All right," replied Barnett. "I stand reliev-ed. You're the Commandant." HeadquartersDepartment of the Pacific, a contrivance, real-ly, was established for Barnett in San Franciscowhither he went, wearing one star and takingwith him lstLt Clifton B Cates, who loyallyvolunteered to accompany him as his aide.

Gen Lejeune, the most distinguished officerof the Corps, had been a certainty to succeedBarnett. Before the war he had been Barnett'schoice for Assistant Commandant. Barnettordered him to France, recommended him fora second star. Had it not been for GenLejeune's great prestige, the ouster of a servingCommandant, so foreign to Corps tradition,would have aroused tremendous criticism.

During those last days of June before therelief, Congressman Butler and his son wereseen arriving several times at the 18th Street en-trance to the Navy Building to go to theSecretary's office. We can conjecture that the

Marine Corps GazetIe November 1982

32

scenario called for Gen Butler to succeed Le-jeune as Commandant.

When Gen Lejeune took office on 30 June1920, he and Daniels lost no time in moving torevise the work of the Russell Board. Onlythree days later the Secretary signed the preceptconvening another board. This time MajGenNeville, just promoted, was named president.Among other members were BGens Butler andHarry Lee. The latter had commanded the 6thRegiment after the first day of Belleau Wood.

The provisions of the Act of 4 June 1920made all officers serving under temporary orReserve commissions in the grades of captainand below eligible to fill vacancies in the per-manent authorized strength. It went further,making eligible also wartime officers who hadleft the Service. The Judge Advocate Generalof the Navy ruled that the board could rear-range the rank and order of precedence ofthose temporary captains who possessed per-manent commissions as second lieutenants. Itwas his position that since the Act of 4 June1920 stated that all officers who had served inthe Corps during the waT were eligible for con-sideration, preference to those with permanentcommissions would be illegal.

The process of reselection dragged on formonths, a time of extreme uncertainty for com-pany officers, particularly captains retained bythe Russell Board who had not fought inFrance. Such a company commander in Quan-tico or Haiti might well wonder, as he talked toa lieutenant who wore the ribbons of decora-tions won in France, whether he might notsoon be changing places with him.

In March 1921 when report of the NevilleBoard was approved and published, it was ap-parent that the second board's approach hadbeen simplistic. Officers who had demonstrat-ed leadership in battle were accorded prefer-ence, regardless of education or other criteria.Of 219 selected in the grade on captain, 122had served in the ranks; of 276 first lieutenants,187; of 253 second lieutenants, 180.

Leroy P. Hunt was number one on the list tofill captain vacancies. (By this time there were92 prewar regulars ahead of him, and he wouldnot again put on the gold leaves of a major formore than 10 years.) Clifton B. Cates wasnumber two, gaining years of seniority by mov-ing up from number 49 on the list of firstlieutenants. Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., wasnumber six. In December 1920, after more thana year in France mapping the battlefields of the4th Brigade, he had returned to become an aideto Gen Lejeune and at the White House.

Graves B. Erskine moved up from number 18on the list of first lieutenants to captain number28, and Alfred H. Noble from captain number129 to number 11. Louis Cukela jumped onecomplete rank, from the top of the list of secondlieutenants to number one first lieutenant, tan-tamount to giving him a captaincy.

Except possibly for Cukela, all mentionedabove were officer material under any criteria,but farther down the list of captains andamong the lieutenants were many from theranks who were either too old or without theformal education needed to be effective careerofficers. Despite Prohibition, some drifted intoalcoholism during the long years of slow pro-motion that followed. Since many eligible ap-plicants had not had an opportunity todemonstrate their leadership under fire, theoveremphasis on battle experience did not seemfair, nor necessarily in the best interests of theCorps over the long term.

Gen Barnett was not without congressionalsupport. On the day after the Harding Ad-ministration took office in March 1921, he wasmade a permanent major general, thus delayingButler's promotion to that rank. Lejeune wasreappointed then and again reappointed in1925 by President Coolidge. He retired in 1929.Neville succeeded him, but was a sick man anddied after a long illness in 1930. His death madeMajOen Butler the senior officer of the Corps.Butler fought for appointment as Comman-dant, but had alienated the senior officers ofthe Navy. Without his father, who had died in1928, he had no chance of winning the posi-tion. BGen Ben H. Fuller who, as Assistant,

had acted as Commandant during GenNeville's illness, was appointed.

After leaving public life Josephus Danielspublished an autobiographical account of theWilson years. After retirement Gen Lejeunepublished his autobiography, and a biographyof Geri Butler appeared to which he had con-tributed substantially in personal interviewswith the author.t The silence of all three con-cerning events leading up to Gen Barnett's dis-missal is probably significant. The changedeligibility criteria in the Act of 4 June 1920 toinclude those who had left the Service, thelanguage inserted to require officers havingpermanent commissions as second lieutenantsto compete for rank and seniority with the rest,together with the haste with which the NevilleBoard was convened all suggest collusion.

Perhaps some sound general conclusionswith respect to the boards are possible and inorder. The Russell Board virtually ignoredcombat records to select on a peacetime basisapplicants who had served as officers only inwartime. Some had fought in France; most ofthem had not. The Neville Board, determinedto reward battle performance, overcompen-sated by downgrading normal criteria for theselection of career officers to favor many whohad passed the test of battle, regardless oflimited education or age in grade. A properbalance between the two legitimate but oftenconflicting considerations seems to have eludedboth boards.

It must be noted that in the end Cot Russell'sphilosophy of selection was in some measurevindicated. During his brief tenure as Com-mandant in the mid-l930s, Congress finallypassed legislation, which previous Comman-dants beginning with Gen Lejeune had urged,to replace promotion by seniority alone with aselection system. The first two such selectionboards for middle-grade officers, meeting inJune 1934 and in January 1935, passed overmany captains considered for promotion tomajor and many first lieutenants consideredfor promotion to captain who had beenselected for permanent commissions by theNeville Board. This caused their involuntaryretirement. Many were simply too old, butothers had demonstrated unfitness by inferiorperformance of duty. USMC

t Both Gen Lejeune 's autobiography, TheReminiscences of a Marine andLowell Thornas'ac-count of Butler's life, Old Gimlet Eye have beenreprinted and are available as part of MC'A'SHeritage Library Series. See Books.

33

Marine Corps Gazette November 1982

APPENDIXTRIBUTE TO COLONEL HEINL

"Director's Page"Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)

As published in Fortitudine, Newsletter of the Marine Corps Historical Program, Summer 1979

35

Director 's

Page

Col Bob [-leini and his wife Nancy were on a wind-jammer cruise in the schooner Polynesia and that mor-ning, Saturday, 5 May 1979, they had come to St.Barthelemy in the French West Indies. About noonthey went for a swim on an empty beach and Bob diedin the surf of a heart attack. It was probably the kind ofdeath that he would have chosen for himself—nearlyinstantaneous, hopefully painless, and at the water'sedge of a foreign shore. But it came much too soon.

Thinking back over the life of Robert Debs Heini,Jr., I am struck by how closely it fits the advice hisfriend Samuel Eliot Morison gave young writers:

Dream your dreamsAye, and write them,But live them first.

Bob was born on 12 August 1916, not inWashington, D.C., as he was prone to let people think,but in New York City. His mother had gone there forspecialized medical attention and he would be an onlychild. After birth he was brought back to the Districtof Columbia. His father had come to Washington in1907, was a White House correspondent, and in1924 would pioneer a radio news service. Bob's fatherbuilt the Heinl home, a handsome Georgian-styledhouse in the embassy section of NorthwestWashington, in 1919 and it would know five genera-tions of the family.

The "Debs" in his name was for his father's uncleEugene Debs, the long-enduring Socialist presidentialaspirant. Bob remembered vividly his great-uncle'sstaying with them after his release by President Har-ding on Christmas Day, 1921, from Atlanta peniten-tiary where he had been sent for pacifist activities inWorld War I. Bob's father, far from being a pacifist,had been chief of the publications section of the U. S.Emergency Fleet Corporation—the government agen-cy pushing the building of ships—and in the processhad become a friend of bandmaster John Philip Sousa.

Another of Bob's early, vivid memories was of be-

36

BGen Simmons

ing perched on his nurse Delia's shoulder to see GenPershing on a handsome horse leading the victoryparade down Pennsylvania Avenue. This would havebeen in 1919 and Bob would have been barely 3 yearsold, but from any age his memories were always vivid,always sharply detailed, and always brightly colored.

Inevitably an Episcopalian, he was baptized and con-firmed in the Bethlehem Chapel of the NationalCathedral and sang in the boy's choir. He went to St.Al.bans School on the cathedral grounds, finishing in1933 and, after a year at George Washington, went onto Yale. Here he majored in English and enrolled inone of the few Naval Reserve Officers TrainingCourses then in being. He also belonged to a NavalReserve battalion that met in the Washington NavyYard. A summer cruise in 1936 in the old Idahoqualified him evermore as a "battleship sailor." Hegraduated cum laude in 1937, received his commis-sion, and went to The Basic School, then in thePhiladelphia Navy Yard, Class of 1938. One of his in-structors—and an officer for whom he would have alife-long admiration—was Capt Lewis B. Puller,already wearing two Navy Crosses from Nicaragua.

In May 1938, on graduation from TBS, he wasassigned to the Marine detachment in the 8-inch guncruiser USS Tuscaloosa. The detachment commanderwas Capt Donald M. Weller, destined to become theCorps' recognized expert in naval gunfire support andnow a retired major general and President of theMarine Corps Historical Foundation. The new lieute-nant, with his round face, pink cheeks, and bright blueeyes, looked all of 16 years old. As he saluted thequarterdeck, resplendent, he thought, with his boatcloak and sword, he heard one old barnacle-encrustedbosun's mate say to another, "I saw him first." Or atleast that's how Bob would tell it in later years. To agehimself a bit he grew a guardsman's mustache; itwould be a lifetime fixture. While serving in theTuscaloosa Bob would qualify to stand officer-of-the-

deck watch underway, distinguish himself with his5-inch battery in local control battle practice, and havehis first piece published in the Marine Corps Gazette,"Naval Africa Expedition, 1915" (June 1938),followed by "The Naval R.O.T.C.: A Vein Unwork-ed" (September 1938).

He caine off the Tuscaloosa in May 1939, a firmbeliever in naval gunfire and with the conviction thatall young Marine officers should go to sea. He wasdetailed to the 5th Marines, then at Quantico, andserved as a company officer until November when hewas transferred to the 4th Defense Battalion then for-ming at Paths Island. While a senior at Yale he hadmet Nancy Gordon Wright, originally of London, at aWashington cocktail party. In September 1939 theywere married in the Bethlehem Chapel of the NationalCathedral. Don Weller was the best man. There weremore articles for the Gazette: "Cameroons CoastCampaign" (September 1939), "Hilton HeadMarines" (March 1940), and "The Big Wind at Par-ris Island" (September 1940).

In February 1941, the 4th Defense Battalion wentto Guantanamo, Bob's first Caribbean duty station.Nancy went with him and they lived in a tent.Daughter Pamela was born 10 August 1941 in theGuantananio dispensary and Nancy nearly died ofchildbed fever. There were more Gazette articles:"Hilton Head and Port Royal, 1861" (March 1941),"Guns or Butter?" (September 1941), and "Onthe Mobility of Base Defense Artillery" (also

September 1941). There were now articles for theU.S. Naval Institute Proceedings: "Damage ControlSchool" (March 1941), "Training the LandingForce" (October 1941), and "The Slouch and theSpring: A Footnote on Discipline" (December 1941).

With war clouds gathering in the Pacific, the 4thDefense Battalion was sent to Pearl Harbor inNovember 194 1 Bob, now a captain, commanded abattery in the defense against the 7 DecemberJapanese attack and was in the aborted expedition thatwas sent to relieve Wake Island. In March the bat-talion went forward to Efate in the New Hebrides.There was still time for writing for the Gazette:"Fighting and Writing: The Two 'G's?" (March1942) and "The Future of the Defense Battalion"(September 1942).

Back in the States in December 1942, he had a yearof flight training at Dallas and Pensacola. There wereproblems of recurrent attacks of malaria contracted inthe New Hebrides and a minor aircraft accident. Hedid not get his wings but he would always believe the

37

year not wasted; that it gave him special insights intoNaval Aviation. From Pensacola he went to Camp Le-jeune and the 13th AAA Battalion (the defense bat-talions, shorn of their beach defense capability, hadbecome antiaircraft battalions).

In August 1944 it was time for him to go overseasagain. He was destined for another base defense assign-ment, now very much in the backwaters of the war.He was rescued from this by the recommendation ofhis former commanding officer, now naval gunfire of-ficer for V Amphibious Corps, LtCol Weller, that hebe assigned to the 3d Marine Division as naval gunfireofficer. The two old shipmates worked together on thepre-D-Day naval gunfire bombardment plan for IwoJima. His expertness not only in planning but also indirecting and coordinating naval gunfire brought hima Bronze Star.

After Iwo he succeeded Weller as V Corps navalgunfire officer at Maui and, with the end of the war,again followed in his mentor's footsteps, succeedingWeller as naval gunfire officer on the staff of FMFPacon Oahu. After a dry period in 1943-44, the Gazettewas again studded with his articles: "Iwo DarkHor" (August 1945), "Naval Gunfire Support inLandings" (September 1945), "First Cruise Train-ing" (December 1945), "Our Future DL?' (March1946), "We're Headed for Wake" (June 1946),and "Let's Use Our Dress Uniforms" (November1946). For the Proceedings there was "A FieldDecontamination Station" (May 1944) and "NavalGunfire, Scourge of the Beaches" (November 1945).

All those articles made it almost inevitable thatwhen he returned to Washington in November 1946he would be named head of the Historical Section,then in the Division of Information. It was thefulminating period for World War II official historiesand it was Bob, now a lieutenant colonel, who concep-tualized (how he would have scorned the word; hewould have struck it out and substituted"conceived") the monograph series geared to theisland campaigns. As he wrote in a letter to a friend inEngland:

"We are just getting down to execution of a historicalprogramwhich will eventually culminate in preparation of

an official history ot the Marine Corps in this war. As a

preliminary measure, we are producing a series of detailedhistorical monographs, to be published separately, on eachmajor operation in which the Corps participated, and thesemonographs will support corresponding chapters in thefinal history."

From his own typewriter came three monographs:The Defense of Wake (1947), Marines at Midway(1948), and, completed later by LtCol John A. Crown,

The Marsha/Is: Increasing the Tempo (1954). He alsobegan his note-taking for a history of the MarineCorps.

I was managing editor of the Gazette in those daysand it seemed that every mail brought us another arti-cle from LtCol Heini, so many, in fact, that when themanuscript for "Thin Line of Tradition" (July 1947)arrived it was accompanied by the suggestion that thepseudonym "LtCol John Corbin" be used. "Corbin"went on to write "Thin Line of Tradition, 11" (April1948), but the real author appeared for "Thin Line ofTradition, III" (July 1949). Other Gazette articlesduring this prolific period were: "Minority Report on(J)ASCO" (July 1947), "Combat Historians?"(September 1947), "Rising Tide of Administration"(January 1948), "Naval Gunfire Training in thePacific" (June 1948), "Exhume the GunnerySergeant" (June 1949), "How Would You Do It?"(November 1949), and ''Marine CorpsHistory—Report to the Stkholders" (March 1950).

His by-line also continued to appear in the -Pro-ceedings: "The Most Shot-at Island in the Pacific"(April 1947), "The U.S. Marine Corps: Author ofModem Amphibious War" (November 1947),"What Happened to the Royal Marines" (February1949), and "Marine Cvrps: Here to Stay" (October1950).

In these years he was very much mixed up in the"unification" fight that was taking place incident tothe passage of the National Security Act of 1947.Growing up in Washington and tagging along in hisfather's footsteps had given him many bridges to thenews media. As he wrote to a Pittsburgh newspaper-man in February 1947:

''Functionally speaking. I think some degree of unifica-tion on afair basic is desirable. I think that almost everyonewith good sense wants to see coordinated procurement,non-competitive budgeting, unified intelligence operationsand unified operational commands for respective theaters.These are the major tasted aims of present merger legisla-tion. . . . To me, the most objectionable aspect of the plansnow bruited is that, ostensibly to facilitate achievement ofseveral laudable ambitions, it sets up cabinet and administrative machinery which can without reference toCongress, public wishes, or even the President, make, inour military structure, vital changes which are notnecessarily stated or projected on the face of the plan.One of the major points at issue, which threads through thewhole controversy is whether or not our national defensestructure should be absolutely pyramidal, with a chain ofcommand running down from an all-powerful secretary andmilitary chief of staff at the top, or whether, at the very top,there should not be some latitude for the interplay ofnaturally differing viewpoints between the interested par-ties, namely, ground, sea, and air."

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A second most objectionable feature of the mergerplan, in his opinion, was the creation of a separate AirForce, which, while stated as being part of "unifica-tion," he found in fact divisive. In the 32 years thatfollowed, he would never waver from these judgments.

In Julie 1949 he left HQMC. His next duty stationwould be Quantico, but before reporting in, therewould be a trip with Nancy to Europe, made possibleby a small inheritance from an aunt. It was his firstvisit to Europe; he particularly wanted to see Londonand all its history. He also "fell madly in love" withParis.

At Quantico he again relieved his old friend, ColWeller, this time as Chief of the Naval Gunfire Sec-tion, Marine Corps Schools. These were the dayswhen the Navy's ships were still plentiful in number,amply armed with guns, arid there was a nice sym-metry to naval gunfire support: battalions had 5-inchdestroyers in direct support, regiments had 6- and8-inch cruisers, divisions had 14- and 16-inch bat-tleships. The years at Quantico saw the writing for theGazette of "Small Wars—Vanishing Art?" (April1950), "And Now the ANGLICO" (January 1951),"The Old Slouch Hat" (June 1952), and "MarineCorps Glossary" (November 1952). The Heinls kepttheir apartment in Washington rather than takingquarters in Quantico. Son Michael was born inWashington Hospital on 3 February 1950.

Bob's turn for Korea came in October 1952. Thefront had settled down to a war of position. Bob wasmade Commanding Officer, East Coast IslandsDefense Element, Wonsan. He gloried in the assign-ment. He was virtually an autonomous island com-mander and he waged almost a private artillery andnaval gunfire war against the mainland NorthKoreans. After six months of this he had a stint as Ex-ecutive Officer, 11th Marines, and for his service inKorea he received a Legion of Merit with Combat"V.,,

Detached from the 1st Marine Division in July1953, he was sent to England to serve as MarineCorps Representative, Amphibious Warfare Center,Fremington. The parade of articles for the Gazettecontinued: "FSCC: Two Schools of Thought"(January 1953), ''NCOs—A Challenge fromWithin" (November 1954), "The Case Against theCloth Belt" (June 1955), and "Sensible SummerUniform" (September 1955).

England was a very special tour for both Bob andNancy. He came home in August 1955, as someoneput it, "The only Royal United States Marine," and

IJLLLUME COLONEL HEJNL USN1C

MR.TRUS1 AND ONFIDE CE

looking more British than American with swaggerstick, mustache, gloves, and non-regulation SamBrowne. He was assigned to Plans Branch, G-3 Divi-sion at Headquarters, Marine Corps, and proceeded toscandalize I-LQMC by having beer with his noontimesandwiches at his desk. (I was his opposite number inPlans Branch, G-4, and in a position to observe). Hecontinued to wear high-top "fair leather" shoes of atype that had long before gone off the uniform list anda barracks cap whose individuality attracted the per-sonal attention of the Commandant, Gen Pate. Hewrote the script for the expanded pageant at the Birth-day Ball. Most of the words have stuck and are stillheard each 10th of November. He was one of thechampions of the newly-discovered tradition of MessNight. (See Fortitudine, Winter, 1978-79.)

In June 1954 the Proceedings had printed "TheCat with Nine Lives," the story of the Corps' unend-ing struggle for survival, and in May 1956 it publish-ed Bob's best-known magazine piece "Special Trustand Confidence," a bitter commentary on the erosionof the status of the uniformed officer. He was pro-moted to colonel in September 1956. In Novemberthe Gazette reprinted ''Special Trust andConfidence."

It was in 1956 that the U. S. Naval Institutebrought out the first edition of The Marine Corps Officer's Guide, jointly written with Gen Gerald C.Thomas and RAdm Arthur A. Ageton. A perennialbest-seller, particularly at The Basic School, the Guidehas gone through second (1964), third (1967), and

fourth (1977) revised editions.In spring 1957 he took "an Eighth and Eye drill

platoon, the Parris Island Band, and a chunk of theMarine Corps Drum and Bugle Corps" to the Ber-muda International Tattoo. In late summer the follow-ing year he repeated the performance with a similardetachment that went first to the Edinburgh Tattooand then to the Brussels Worlds Fair in "the first ap-pearance of Marine ceremonial troops in Europe sincethe Paris Exposition of 1889."

Next came Haiti: Bob went there in January 1959to establish a naval mission and on 1 March was of-ficially designated Chief of the U.S. Naval Mission(mostly Marines) and the Military Assistance Ad-visory Group. Characteristically, Bob and Nancy, bothfluent in French, plunged themselves into a study ofHaitian culture and history. Bob also found time tofinish his history of the Marine Corps.

"The Right to Fight," a spin-off article from theprojected book, was sent by the Proceedings inSeptember 1961 to the Pentagon for clearance.Clearance was refused because the piece was sharplycritical of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, GenOmar Bradley, Adm Forrest Sherman, and formerSecretary of Defense Louis Johnson, all of whom werepresented as being anti-Marine and dedicated to down-grading or abolishing the Corps. Gen Shoup, thenCommandant, concurred that the article should not bepublished.

The matter might have ended there except thatabout this time the Senate Armed Services Committee

Twenty-two years after its publication, Guantaimmo Marines remembered "Special Trust and Confidence"when Col Mark P. Fennessy and his officers, in January 1978, turned out to honor Col Heini.

-A.-

was investigating charges that the Pentagon wasmuzzling expression of opinion by military officersand, as a case in point, suppression of the Heinl articleattracted national attention. Bob was summoned backfrom Haiti to meet with Arthur Sylvester, then theAssistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. On30 March 1962 the Pentagon reversed itself andreleased the article. "The Right to Fight'' appearedin the September 1962 Proceedings and publication ofthe entire book, Soldiers of the Sea, followed, ap-propriately, on 10 November.

The dust had scarcely settled on this controversybefore Bob was once again in the national news.Despite strenuous efforts as mission chief, he had beenunable either to turn the clock back in Haiti or to turnaround the increasingly oppressive government ofFrancois ("Papa Doc") Duvalier. Life magazine askedhim to do an article on the Haitian situation. Bobwrote a 2,000 word piece. Again there were problemsgetting Pentagon clearance. Meanwhile he had wornout his welcome with the Haitian government and inlate February 1963 was asked to leave. He ignored thesuggestion until 1 March when he was declared of-ficially persona non rat4 and given 12 hours to getout of the country.

Days later the 8 March issue of Life appeared withan article "It's Hell to Live in Haiti . . . with PapaDoc." Bob, on leave in Bogota, Columbia, was calledto Washington and stood before an Article 15 investi-gation headed by BG'en Bruno A. l-lochmuth. Thehearing convened at 1000, 24 April at HQMC. Hewas asked to sign a statement indicating his willing-ness to accept non-judicial punishment. He refused,stating that if the findings of the investigation wereadverse he would demand a general court martial.

Assistant Secretary Sylvester testified that he hadkilled the article personally on the recommendation ofthe State Department. Witnesses from Life said thatnone of the Heinl material had been used in the Lfearticle which had been written by two Life cor-respondents. Bob was the final witness. Testifying on1 May, his defense was that there had been no offense;he had insisted that his article not be published untilclearance had been obtained.

The Hochmuth investigation found that Bob had"failed to comply with regulations by agreeing to pro-vide and providing a manuscript" to Life "withoutprior approval of proper authority." It was a weakcharge. As Commandant, Gen Shoup ruled "that ColHeini ' s failure to comply with regulations was not anintentional action effected to accrue benefits to

40

Port-au-Prince provides the backdrop for Cal Heinlwho cerries a traditional Haitian cocomacaque.

himself." Shoup gave Bob a private "chewing out"and the case was closed.

Bob then proceeded to Norfolk were he was assign-ed as G-2, FMFLant. The promotion boards met thatsummer and he was passed over for brigadier general.A physical examination revealed a hitherto un-suspected heart condition. Bob submitted his letter re-questing retirement, effective 1 January, at whichtime he would have completed 26 years and 6 mqnthsof active service. He was retired on that date with 40percent medical disability.

Bob started off the New Year and retired life with aseries of press conferences in which he suggested thatthe Air Force be abolished, because the "militaryusefulness of manned aircraft is waning," and thedefense establishment be returned to two departments,Army and Navy, eliminating "the requirement for to-day's enormous coordinating bureaucracy" headed by"iron-handed" Secretary of Defense Robert S.

McNamara.Free to write and talk "without supervision" he

embarked on a six-month campaign leveled against theregime in Haiti, as, for example, in an article for the16 May 1964 New Republic in which he describedDuvalier as "cruel, devious, xenophobic, hyper-suspicious, today a virtual recluse, utterly ruthless andself-consecrated to power.''

There was also more time for books. His Dictionaryof Military and Naval Quotations was published in1966, followed in 1968 by Victory at High Tide, hisbrilliant operational history of the Inchon landing andre-capture of Seoul.

Articles in the Gazette were now less frequent, butthere had been "So Acquainted with Maritime Af-fairs" (November 1957), "Fitness Reporting—SomeAdverse Remarks" (April 1959), "Hell in China"(November 1959), "An Association Was Formed"

(April 1963), "Marines and Their Traditions"(November 1964), "Inchon" (September and Oc-tober 1967). and "Safari to Scotland" (November1968). For the Proceedings there was "Target: Iwo"(July 1963), "The Gun Gap and How to Close It"(September 1965), and "Hong Kong: Communismand Colonialism in Collision" (December 1966).

During 1967 and 1968 he acted as a consultant onlong-range gun systems for the Navy Department,working on the improved 8-inch round and thelightweight 8-inch gun and being as much or moreresponsible than any other single individual for gettingthe 16-inch battleship, USS New Jersey, out ofmothballs and onto the gun line off Vietnam.

In mid-1968 Bob went to work for the DetroitNews as military correspondent, succeeding theesteemed BGen S.L.A. Marshall. He also began a syn-dicated military column, distributed by the NorthAmerican News Affiance and appearing in some 60newspapers. In September 1968 he went out to theFar East to see the Vietnam war for himself. He hadbeen out there once before in 1965 and would goagain in 1969 and 1971.

In 1970 his Handbook for Marine NCOs waspublished. His columns, usually pungent, were beingwidely read. There was a series in November 1972charging that the "permissive" policies of Adm ElmoZumwalt had resulted in more "mutinies" than theentire previous history of the Navy. The seriesangered VAdm Stansfield Turner, then the presidentof the Naval War College. Turner called in his seniorMarine and told him that he didn't want Heini invitedback as a lecturer. Bob chose to regard the ban as an"interdict" comparable to his expulsion from Haiti.Eventually, though, he "negotiated" a modus vivendiwith Turner.

A year before this I had become the Director ofMarine Corps History and Museums, a newly-createdbillet. One of my chief advisors on what needed to bedone was Bob Heinl. I was searching for a site wherethe diverse and scattered activities of the new divisioncould be consolidated. It was Bob who suggested that Ilook at the Guard Company Barracks in theWashington Navy Yard. That was in December1971. Three years passed before the Guard Companymoved into its new barracks and the conversion of theold building into the Marine Corps Historical Centercould begin.

After the Center was opened on 12 May 1977, Bobbecame a regular and frequent visitor. He was also aregular reader and frequent critic of Fortitudine, using

the transparent nom de plume of "Careful Reader."In July 1978 he retired from the Detroit News butcontinued to write his column for NANA. He andNancy had collaborated on a history of Haiti, Writtenin Blood. More definitive than anything else writtenon Haiti, either in English or French, it was publishedin the fall of 1978.

Bob's last appearance in the Gazette was a three-part series, "The American Occupation of Haiti"(November, December 1978; January 1979) drawnfrom the new book. By that time Bob, Nancy, and sonMichael (who is fluent in Mandarin) were off on amemorable trip to Red China.

His last full-fledged article for the Proceedings was"Welcome to the War" (March 1969), a joyfulreport on the New Jersey 's opening salvos off Viet-nam. It was followed by a shorter piece, "Instant SeaControl Ships" (September 1972), in which herecommended the conversion of the four Iowa classbattleships into a combination heavy naval gunfireship, assault transport, and V/STOL aircraft andhelicopter carrier.

Other magazines that used his work through theyears included American Heritage, AmericanRfleman, Armed Forces Journal, Combat ForcesJournal, Military Affairs, Military Review, NATO's25 Nations, and Sea Power. He was particularly proudof his contributions to Brassey 's Annual, Dictionaryof American Biography, Dictionary of AmericanHistory, and Encyclopaedia Britannica. He lecturedwidely, at such places as the Marine Corps schools,most of the war colleges, the Foreign Service Institute,and Yale and Brown Universities. He was also a cor-respondent for Fire Engineering, a fireman'smagazine, and a short wave radio in his study and of-fice was usually tuned-in to fire calls.

Town clubs and professional societies were verymuch part of his life style. In Washington he was amember and staunch supporter of the Army-NavyClub and the National Press Club; in New York, theYale Club and the New York Yacht Club (he andNancy kept a 27-foot Tartan sloop at Port AnnapolisMarina); and in London, the American Club. He wasa Fellow of Yale's Pierson College, a founder of theMarine Corps Historical Foundation, and a member ofthe Institute of Strategic Studies, the AmericanMilitary Institute, the White House CorrespondentsAssociation, and the Military Order of the Carabao.

That last Caribbean vacation was actually a footnoteto a journalistic foray into Nicaragua which was thenentering the final stage of its recent revolution. Bob

41

and Nancy had spent 10 days there as guests of then-President Anastasio Somoza and toured much of thecountry in a presidential helicopter. (Somoia toldthem that he was perfectly willing to step down if andwhen proper elections could be held. A Sandinista vic-

42

tory seemed inevitable to Bob.)Four days after Bob's death, a memorial service fill-

ed the Bethlehem Chapel in the National Cathedral. Itwas done with high Episcopalian style and outside thecathedral the scarlet-coated Marine Band played.