The Chilean Strategy for Assessing the Nuclear Power Option.

2006 / 2010

Juan José RivasMINISTERIAL COORDINATOR OF NUCLEAR CONSULTIVE GROUP

AND CHNEC

International Atomic Energy Agency TM/WS on Topical Issues on Infrastructure Development:

Managing the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power VIENNA, FEBRUARY 9TH .2010

Establishing National Statements Regarding a NPP 2006 to 2010

December 2005:• Chagual Agreement: 25 environmental

NGOs signed an agreement with M. Bachelet, who was running for the Presidency : “nuclear option will not be included in the national energy policy ".

• This was consistent with her personal anti-nuclear stand.

January 2010:• The NPP , is necessary for Chile starting

2024. NPP is:– convenient – competitive – sustainable

• At the same time we have important gaps to close

– Nuclear Infrastructure , – long term public support to NPP.

• The next government will be responsible to decide to invest in closing gaps, even if the decision is delayed to the following government

“Ya sea para empezar un programa nuclear o para descartarlo, es necesario conocer lo que significa y evaluarlo rigurosamente en toda su complejidad”.

“ Either for starting a nuclear power program, or for dismissing it, it is necessary to fully understand what it means and thoroughly evaluate all its implications”.

President Michelle Bachelet

November , 2007

What triggered the Government decision to start the current process?

1. The Perfect Storm: Energy crisis 2006 - 2008 • Significant decrease of Natural Gas supply from Argentina.• Severe drought had a strong impact over hydro plants generation capacity• Increasing and volatile prices of fossils fuels• An earthquake in the north that shut down some electrical generation plants

2. Concerns about the current electrical grid and the projection for the next decades• High dependency on external providers• Projected shortage of fossils fuels availability• Projected increase of marginal generation cost• Political and natural limits to build hydro power plants

3. Climate Change Challenge and the national and international responsibility• Increasing GHG emissions:

– CO2 footprint taxes– Environmentally irresponsible

Need for a Long-Term Energy Strategy and Public Policy

• We must discuss about what kind of grid will ensure our policy objectives and which role could the NPP play.

• Nuclear Power assessment process needs to be performed within a framework, considering the main objectives of our energy policy: – Secure Supply

– Efficiency

– Sustainability

What triggered the current process (2)

National Approach

1. In march 2007, President Bachelet established a working group (Zanelli’s Comission) to assess whether nuclear energy would be a possibility for Chile. Main conclusions of the group:

2. By the end of 2007, President Bachelet put the Minister of Energy in charge of conducting the studies identified as necessary for the next stage.

3. Minister of Energy established a Work Group to deliver the presidential mandate

Gobierno de Chile

• There are no reasons to discard the nuclear option for Chile.

• Before making any decision, further studies need to be performed.

National Approach (2)

Nuclear Consulting

Group

CCHEN-CNEWorking Group

CNE Studies and

Electric Departments

– NCG Role: Advise to minister

and lead the work. Include independent experts from different fields:

• Physics• Economics• Environmental Sciences

– NCG include representatives from key governmental institutions:

• Foreign Affairs Ministry• Defense Ministry• National Environmental

Commission (CONAMA)• Chilean Nuclear Energy

Commission (CCHEN)• National Energy

Commission (CNE)

Working Group for Nuclear Assessment

National Approach (3)Work definitions:

1. Clear mandate:“To advance in every necessary front, so in 2-3 years the country may be in conditions to make a decision on whether to proceed or not with a nuclear program”.

2. Clear and specific Objectives:• To produce a public government document with the assessment results.• To involve public stakeholders in the assessment process.• To start a public debate about the role of NPP in our future electric grid,

avoiding extreme positions (“Yes, of course”. “No, no way”).• To ensure continuity of the process during the next administration

3. Direct and Clear coordination with the minister through a Minister Senior Adviser

National Approach (4)

Work Strategy:

1. Work closely with IAEA:• Followed Self Assessment methodology• Workshop attendance • Requesting specific technical support (WS in Chile)• IAEA missions

2. Running energy models (MAED and MESSAGE provided and supported by IAEA), with different scenarios.

3. To hire studies calling for international bids.4. Scientific Visits (France, USA, Argentina and Brazil)5. Starting a public debate

• Seminars• Reports• Media

Strategic Decisions 1. To install Nuclear Power as an “energy policy strategy”

discussion, not as a “nuclear” discussion.

2. Permanent concern about transparency, public information, and building international and national trust.

3. To keep it as simple as possible :– Will not consider uranium extraction (even when we have it).– Will not consider fuel elements production (even when we can

do it).– Will follow the turn-key approach (even when we are able to

participate in several areas).

4. Not seeking agreements with any particular country, keeping our independence and avoiding commitments with a specific provider.

5. To include CCHEN in the evaluation process as support.

6. To work closely with IAEA. Using IAEA’s guidelines but adapting them to our local situation.

Current Status

Adjustments we made to IAEA’s suggestions:

• No formal NEPIO, but a working group with the same objectives and enough budget.

• Will not discuss possible locations and technology until decision to close our gaps has been taken.

• Adjust the work to be performed and the milestones to be reached in each phase according to our national situation.

• Working in closing gaps (Phase 2) is worthwhile even if we never decide to build a NPP.– Developing geological information is a good investment for

Chile.– Having an independent regulatory body is already required for

the correct operation of our nuclear facilities.

Operación/decomisionamiento

FASE 1

FASE 2

FASE 3

Ante-proyecto Toma de decisiones del proyecto

Construcción

Estudio de viabilidad

Proceso de Licitación

Licenciamiento

~ 10 a 15 años

Opción nuclear de potencia incluida en la estrategia energética

nacional

HITO 1Listos para tomar un

compromiso informado sobre un programa nuclear de potencia

HITO 2Listos para licitar la

primera Central Nuclear de Potencia

HITO 3Listos para licenciar y

operar la primera Central Nuclear de Potencia

Consideraciones previas antes de tomar la decisión de lanzar un programa nuclear de potencia

Trabajo preparatorio para la construcción de una NPP después de haber tomado la decisión de un programa nuclear

Actividades que se deben implementar para una primera NPP

Mantenimiento y mejoramiento continuo de la Infraestructura

Current StatusWhere are we in the IAEA programme?

Current Status (2)

Where we are today?

1. SELF ASSESSMENT PROCESS performed by CNE / CCHEN work group (10 people)

• We had a special mission from IAEA on Dec. 2009 to assess our process:– The exercise was well prepared– Good approach– Recommendations

• Sources to be used to close the gaps

• Work plans to close the Gaps,

• Self Assessment Phase 1 to be finished by mid 2010

1.- NATIONAL POSITION Phase 1Condition Status

1.1. Safety, security and non-proliferation needs recognized. No Actions Needed

1.2. NEPIO established and staffed. Minor Actions Needed

1.3. National strategy defined. No action needed

2.- NUCLEAR SAFETY2.1. Understanding of key elements of nuclear safety. Minor Actions Needed

2.2. Need of intergovernmental instruments on safety. Minor Actions Needed

2.3. Support through international cooperation. No Actions Needed

3.- MANAGEMENT3.1. Energy strategy and nuclear power compatibility analysed. No Actions Needed

3.2. Unique Member State conditions evaluated. Minor Actions Needed

3.3. Available nuclear technologies identified. No Actions Needed

3.4. Ownership options and operational responsibilities considered. No Actions Needed

3.5. Authorities and responsibilities established. Minor Actions Needed

3.6. Appropriate expertise and experience. No Actions Needed

3.7. The management systems of all participating organizations are used to promote and support a strong safety culture Significant Actions Needed

SUMMARY FORM (STATUS)

7.- REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

7.1 Development of an adequate regulatory framework planned Minor Actions Needed

8.- RADIATION PROTECTION

8.1 Hazards presented by nuclear power plant operation recognized.Minor Actions Needed

8.2 Enhancements to national regulations and infrastructures planned. No Actions Needed

9.- ELECTRICAL GRID

9.1 Electrical grid requirements considered Minor Actions Needed

10.- HUMAN RESOURCES

10.1 Necessary knowledge and skills identified. Minor Actions Needed

10.2 Develop and maintenance of human resource base planned Significant Actions Needed

11.- STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT

11.1 Strong public information and education programme initiated. Minor Actions Needed

11.2 Need for open and timely interaction and communication regarding the nuclear power programme addressed. Significant Actions Needed

13.- ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

13.1 Unique environmental issues recognized Minor Actions Needed

13.2 Environmental impact assessment production and communication recognized. Minor Actions Needed

13.3 An effective environmental framework for existing uses of radiation sources in place. Minor Actions Needed

14.- EMERGENCY PLANNING

14.1 Appreciation of the need for emergency planning, developed. Minor Actions Needed

14.2 Communication with and involvement of local and national government taken into account. Minor Actions Needed

14.3 Emergency planning for existing radiation facilities and practices in place Minor Actions Needed

15.- SECURITY

15.1 Requirements for security and physical protection acknowledged Minor Actions Needed

15.2 Necessary regulation identified. Minor Actions Needed

15.3 Effective security protection for existing uses of radiation sources in place Minor Actions Needed

16.- NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE

16.1 Knowledge of nuclear fuel cycle steps and approaches developed.

No Actions Needed

16.2 Need for site spent fuel storage recognized. No Actions Needed

16.3 Interim spent fuel storage considered No Actions Needed

17.- RADIOACTIVE WASTE

17.1 The burdens of radioactive waste from nuclear power plants recognized.

No Actions Needed

17.2 Current capabilities for waste processing, storage and disposal reviewed.

No Actions Needed

17.3 Options for ultimate disposal of high level radioactive waste recognized.

No Actions Needed

18.- INDUSTRIAL INVOLVEMENT

18.1 National policy with respect to national and local industrial involvement considered.

Minor Actions Needed

18.2 Need for strict application of quality programmes for nuclear equipment and services recognized.

No Actions Needed

19.- PROCUREMENT

19.1 Unique requirements associated with purchasing nuclear equipment and services recognized.

Significant Actions Needed

19.2 Consistent policies for nuclear procurement in place. Significant Actions Needed

Current Status (2)

2. STUDIES PERFORMED through bids lead by NCG and CNE

We’ve identified:• When it would be convenient to have the first NPP

operating• General adjustment required for the legal and regulatory

framework for nuclear activities and for the electric operation

• Natural risks and geological information • Relevant issues about public opinion:

– Current knowledge on energy and nuclear– Drivers to build the individual positions about nuclear

(clean energy v/s radiation danger )

Study Delivering Consultants

Status

Public & Private Role Adolfo Ibañez University Final report available

Regulatory Framework STUK (Finland) Final report available

Nuclear Fuel Cycle AMEC-CADE (UK) Final report available

Impacts & Risks Nuclear-Electric Corporation (Russia)

Final report available

Studies 2008

Study Delivering Consultants

Status

Public Opinion Tironi & Asociados (Chile)

Finalized. To be published in March

Legal Framework adjustment

Universidad de Chile & Barros y Errázuriz (Chile)

Final report in process

To be published in March

Natural Risks Departamento de Geofísica (U. de Chile)

Final report in process

To be published in March

Electric Regulatory Framework adjustment

SYSTEP (Chile) Final report available

Studies 2009

Current Status (2) 3. There is enough time for closing the gaps until the first

reactor would be dispatched

Next Steps

1. There is a new Government starting on March:

• The outgoing Government should:– Make it clear about the cost of stopping the

evaluation of the nuclear option.

– Help keeping the momentum.

• The next Government should:– invest in closing the gaps.

Next Steps 2. Main gaps to be closed during next Government:

• Regulatory body: needs to be independent from CCHEN.

• Regulatory and legal framework: changes regarding environmental impact assessment and licensing.

• Seismic studies: map of geological faults.

• Human Resources for regulatory body, intelligent customer, etc.

• Public opinion: education programs about energy options (not only nuclear).

Working in closing the gaps does not mean we`re in a “non-return journey”; is just the responsible approach to follow.

Good Pactices and Lessons Learned 1. Avoid rush decisions.

2. NPP should be a public policy discussion..

3. Simplify the discussion. Why make it more complicated that it already is?

4. Cooperation with IAEA is a key point:• Ask for their feedback.• Self-assessment exercises:

– Be rigorous in distinguishing assessment (interpretation) from evidences (facts, not opinions)

– Evidences should be something always verifiable and eventually measurable.

• Consider the local situation when using IAEA’s guidelines and be prepared to adapt them to the particular reality.

5. Set milestones: technical visits, documents, seminars.

NOVA VITA

– For the Countries: Need to assess NPP under their current political and security conditions and environmental concerns.

– For the Agency: Need to strengthen the flexibility for supporting countries that have established their own route and needs independently. Very far from being “recipients” countries.

NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE

The Chilean Strategy for Assessing the Nuclear Power Option. 2006 / 2010

Juan José RivasMINISTERIAL COORDINATOR OF NUCLEAR CONSULTIVE GROUP

AND NUCLEAR INSTITUCIONS

International Atomic Energy Agency TM/WS on Topical Issues on Infrastructure Development:

Managing the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power VIENNA, FEBRUARY 9TH .2010

Thank You

Fuente: CNE

050

100150200250300350400450500550600650700750800850

Gas Natural Carbón Petróleo Crudo

BASE 100

Actualizado a septiembre/08

810

556

440

Riesgo de Precios

Current Electric Generation Grid: 14 GW (2008)

COAL: 16%

Gas: 36%

NCRs: 2%

OIL: 9%

Hydro: 37%

Renewable 39%

Fossil 61%

Chile imports: 95% of coal80% of natural gas98% of oil

Installed Capacity by 2305 Without NPP: 38 GW

•Capacidad instalada al 2035 sin opción nuclear

•Carbón

•27,91%

•GNL

•10,84%•Hidro

•32,74%

•Mini Hidro

•2,34%

•Eólica

•12,25%

•Solar

•0,03%

•Geotermia

•5,14%

•Biomasa

•1,90%

•Petróleo

•6,85%

Riesgo de Suministro

Ministry of Energy

Minister

Vice -Minister

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Market Security &Economics

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INTERNACIONAL AFFAIRS

Nuclear Option Assessments