The challenges to Mexico in times of political change

Crime, Law & Social Change 40: 7–20, 2003.© 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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The challenges to Mexico in times of political change

MARCOS PABLO MOLOEZNIKAdministradores #5093, Colonia Jardines de Guadalupe, 45030, Zapopan, Jalisco, Mexico(e-mail: [email protected])

Abstract. Mexico is making the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic society. Ithas significant criminal justice and public security challenges in this new era of its politicalhistory. Mexico’s law enforcement institutions still lack accountability and the trust of thepeople. Although President Vicente Fox has declared that he will improve public securityand reform law enforcement, he had failed to produce significant results thus far. In order forFox to achieve these goals, he must implement institutional accountability and transparency,improve intelligence collection capabilities to combat organized crime and drug trafficking,and develop a more broad based economy that will benefit all of Mexico.

Mexico in times of transition

This analysis intends to identify the challenges that the Mexican nation haswith respect to criminal justice and public security in this new era of its polit-ical history, marked by the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. It isfirst appropriate to focus on the deep transformations that, in recent years andin different dimensions of public life, allow us to ascertain the developmentof an era of transition in Mexico.

Demographic and social transition

The Mexican population has gone from 81.2 million in 1990 to 97.5 millioninhabitants in 2000, and from 17.2 million Mexicans who reside outside thenational borders, to 18 million. This means that the average annual populationgrowth rate has risen only 1.9% in the last decade, compared to 3.2% from1950–1970 and 2.6% from 1980–1990. We are dealing with a first stageof demographic transition in which population growth is slowing and theexisting population is living longer.

However, Mexico still has structural social traits among which povertystands out, affecting 55% of its population.1 In addition, the distribution ofincome has worsened in recent years. The chart below shows the expansionof the wealthiest 20% of the population at the expense of the middle 50%over the past 16 years.

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Participation in the national income by deciles2

Poorest (30%) Middle class Largest income (20%)

(I-III) (IV-VIII) (IX-X)

1984 8.1% 40.6% 51.3%

1989 8.1% 38.3% 53.6%

1992 8.0% 37.8% 54.2%

1994 8.0% 37.4% 54.5%

1996 8.7% 38.6% 52.6%

1998 7.8% 38.1% 54.1%

2000 7.8% 37.5% 54.8%

The genesis and development of civil organizations respond to this situationof marginality and social inequality. This constitutes a second tendency fortransformation in the community due to the consolidation of social move-ments and non-governmental organizations fighting for equality of opportun-ity and treatment. Women in particular represent a growing role in this changein community life.

Political and administrative transition

This social transition has had a political impact, significantly altering powerrelations. Towards the middle of the last decade, most of the Mexican popu-lation was led, and its wealth administered by, non-official political entities.Thus, power sharing did not really happen because of the presidential elec-tions of July 2000, but much before, when the opposition parties gained powerin the most important municipalities and in the economically most powerfulstates.

This third stage of political transition comes hand in hand with morereliable electoral institutions and more transparent and competitive elect-oral procedures. As a result, a new style of public management has brokenthe inertia of an authoritative political culture embodied in the InstitutionalRevolutionary Party (PRI), which dominated the nation for 71 years.

In reality, the new authorities must choose between the federalism estab-lished by the Constitution and the legacy of real centralism imposed on therelations between the governed and those who govern. Mexico is still far fromreversing the institutionalization of the saying that “God is everywhere, butworks in Mexico City.”

Mexican national security policy also requires change. The 1995-2000National Development Plan recognizes drug trafficking, money laundering,

THE CHALLENGES TO MEXICO IN TIMES OF POLITICAL CHANGE 9

arms trafficking, and terrorism as “modern threats to national security.” Like-wise, the document that announces the 2001-2006 development plans of theFox Administration warns that “there are threats and risks in internal factorscombined with others from outside which derive from illegal activities such asdrug trafficking, organized crime, terrorism and environmental deterioration.”

The national development plan: Excerpts on important problems thatMexico faces3

• Drug trafficking and organized crime represent some of the mostimportant sources of violence and insecurity for society andthreats to Mexico’s institutions. They cause corruption, reducedlegitimacy, and loss of national and international trust and prestige,all of which damage Mexican sovereignty and foreign relations.

• The traffickers of weapons and people and networks of interna-tional terrorism take advantage of the ease of communications andtransportation inherent in globalization.

• Deficiencies and failures in poor areas require social, educational,and health programs.

Consolidation of the economic model

In contrast with these changes in political and social sectors, there seems to beno tendency for change in the economy. The neo-liberal model, initiated bythe Miguel de la Madrid administration (1982–1988), continues to determinethe instruments of current economic policy. It is a competitive and exclusivemodel that has become stronger thanks to the globalization process, a processthat does not respect sovereignty or national borders.

This is a fourth stage of transition from which only the strongest will man-age to survive to the general disadvantage of dependent workers and salaryearners. The consolidation of the neo-liberal economic model implies that thegreat earners are the rich and the macro-economy. This, so far, has hardly anyequivalent meaning in the pockets of the people and in the microeconomicfield. This scenario, in other words, characterizes itself in the dehumanizationof the economy, which becomes an end in itself.

Competitiveness of Mexico in the concert of nations

During the recent conference of the World Economy Forum held in Davos,Switzerland, a prestigious corps of economists recognized that the Mexicaneconomy is the thirteenth strongest in the world, but that it ranks 36 out of 47

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in the competitiveness index of nations. This weak competitiveness is basic-ally a result, according to these same sources, of five factors: noncompliancewith the law, shortcomings in the financial and taxation systems, the lowquality of technical education, and public insecurity. These five aspects ofthe national reality constitute an obstacle to the competitiveness and to thefuture of Mexico. It is worthwhile to analyze each one of them.• Non-compliance with the law is the recognition that Mexico is not a

country with respect for “the law,” and where even the authorities re-sponsible for assuring respect of the law systematically contravene thelaw.

The culture of legality in Mexico4

Agree Disagree

a) People respect the law in Mexico. 14.6% 57.7%

b) One must always obey and respect thelaw.

82.4% 9.6%

c) The laws must be respected only whenthey are fair.

65.8% 24.5%

d) If the government does not succeed inmaking the law respected, the peoplehave the right to take justice into theirown hands.

65.8% 19.6%

f) Offenders of the law must always bereported.

86.0% 6.1%

g) If someone in my family commits acrime, I have the moral obligation toreport it.

29% 45.6%

h) If one witnesses a crime, the best thingto do is not to intervene.

42.5% 27.0%

• The financial system does not exactly contribute to development, but onthe contrary is an obstacle to it. Credit institutions have virtually dis-appeared and been substituted by usury. The Mexican financial systemdoes not fulfill the social function of supporting development.

• The taxation system is regressive in nature, because it penalizes the mostvulnerable social sectors. Due to the high rate of tax evasion, the stateis forced to impose direct taxes, which affect consumption. In otherwords, in Mexico, the wealthy do not pay taxes (or at least they do notpay according to their income) and the tax collecting capacity of thegovernment is focused on the backs of the poor.


• Technicians are required in today’s information and technology intens-ive era. The deficit in qualified workers and technicians demanded bycontemporary productive processes is substantially due to the seriousdeterioration of technical schools, high schools and higher educationalinstitutions.

• Public insecurity is one of the main preoccupations of citizens. Crimin-ality and the feeling of defenselessness are the results of the impunityand corruption that permeate the police and administration of justice.

Criminal justice and public security

In the Mexican republic, the average impunity index varies from 94% to96%. One can say that, unfortunately, “crime pays.” According to the specialcommentator for the United Nations on the Independence of Judges and At-torneys, “Maybe the most serious problem that Mexico has to pay attention to,and solve, is the one of justice. There is high impunity and little credibility.”5

According to the Mexican Ministry of the Interior, only two out of ten peopleguilty of a crime appear before the authorities and receive a prison term.According to the CIDAC, 95.7% of crimes in Mexico remain unpunished.6

We also have to consider so-called “undeclared crimes,” those not reportedto the authorities. According to the results of a recent survey done by theNational Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), an estimated 69% ofall crimes that are committed in the Mexican Republic are not reported.7

Most of the crimes committed every year in Mexico are civil violations;Federal crimes represent only 6% of the total. Of these federal crimes, thoseagainst public welfare (29%) and those related to the bearing of arms des-ignated for exclusive use by the Armed Forces (19.6%) are associated withthe largest number of interventions by the Mexican Attorney General’s Office(PGR), particularly in the states of Baja California, Sonora, Jalisco, Chihua-hua, the State of Mexico and in Mexico City.8 Recently, Attorney GeneralGeneral Rafael Macedo de la Concha displayed to the media a map developedby the PGR of organized crime in Mexico. According to the results, the statesof Sonora, Chihuahua, Sinaloa, and Durango have the greatest number ofdrug trafficking offenses in the first six months of the year 2001, and Sonora,Baja California, and Jalisco, have the greatest number of drug possessionoffenses in this period.9

This means that the crimes that are under the authority of the states ofMexico represent 94% of the total. Of these crimes, theft in its various mod-alities and assaults have the highest occurrence rates, particularly in the statesof Veracruz, Mexico, Michoacan, Jalisco, Tamaulipas, and in Mexico City.

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Finally, comparing the increase in crime to the growth in population, thestates presenting the greatest criminal incidence are Sinaloa, Baja California,Chihuahua, Tamaulipas, Jalisco, Mexico City, and the State of Mexico.10

The popular view of public safety in the last few years believes that “alot still has to be done in order to achieve our goals” but posits that “demo-cracy will be useful to the fight against crime, corruption and injustice.” Thisoptimistic point of view has at least some basis in that the crime index hasevolved from 15.7 crimes for every 1000 inhabitants in 1997, to 14.3 in 1998and to 13.4 in 1999.21

With regards to the penitentiary system, the population in prisons roseby 70,045 inmates from 1994 to 2000, which means an increase of 81.1%.At present, the National Penitentiary System has 156,371 inmates, of which114,923 correspond to the civil crime category (74%) and 41,448 to the fed-eral one (26%). Of these prisoners, 65,712 are still on trial and 90,659 havealready been sentenced.

This situation explains, on the one hand, why public security is nowadaysone of the main concerns and demands of the Mexican society and, on theother hand, why citizens distrust the institutions responsible for public safety.The police are particularly distrusted as can be seen in the following chart.

World Values Survey 2000: Trust in institutions12

For each one of the groups, institutions or people mentioned in thislist, can you tell me how much trust you have; a lot, some, a littleor nothing at all?

(Percentage in Mexico that mentioned, “a lot” or “some” trust)

The Church 80%

Army 51%

Large Companies 41%

The Press 40%

The National Government 36%

The Police 29%

Unions 26%

Political parties 24%

The Congress 20%

The Bureaucracy 20%

This survey shows that only 3 out of 10 Mexican citizens trust the police, butthat 5 out of 10 citizens trust the Armed Forces.13


Perhaps, this negative perception that the population has of their law en-forcement authorities is due to the high levels of corruption in Mexico, in-cluding the judicial system and its auxiliary institutions, such as the publicsecurity forces. International Transparency, a non-governmental organizationthat every year reports a “Corruption Perception Index” provided this rankingin the year 2000.

Corruption Perception Index 200014

(Selected countries)

Country Score Country Score

Finland 10 Brasil 3.9

Denmark 9.8 Senegal 3.5

New Zealand 9.4 Argentina 3.5

Sweden 9.4 Zambia 3.4

Canada 9.2 Mexico 3.3

Singapore 9.1 Colombia 3.2

Holland 8.9 China 3.1

United States 7.8 India 2.8

Germany 7.6 Philippines 2.8

Chile 7.4 Bolivia 2.7

Japan 6.4 Venezuela 2.7

Costa Rica 5.4 Ecuador 2.6

South Africa 5.0 Russia 2.1

Italy 4.6 Cameroon 2.0

Perú 4.4 Ukraine 1.5

Belarus 4.1 Yugoslavia 1.3

South Korea 4.0 Nigeria 1.2

A recent survey of the Mexican chapter of International Transparency addsthe following results on the culture of corruption prevailing in the country.15

• 2 out of 3 Mexicans (64%) believe corruption is not serious.• 1 out of 20 (5%) think it is a minor problem and that it helps the system

to function.• 1 out of 4 (25%) considers it natural.• 1 out of 5 (20%) is convinced that corruption has always existed and will

prevail, no matter what type of government there is.It is important to emphasize, moreover, the financial costs of corruption.According to an investigation by the Mexican General Accounting Office(SECODAM), the cost of corruption is estimated to be the equivalent of 15%

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of all federal, state, and municipal taxes (30 billion dollars annually). Fran-cisco Barrio Terrazas, the head of the SECODAM, and responsible for theanticorruption campaign initiated by Fox, stated, “This is the size of the heavyburden we Mexicans take on because of corruption, a cancer that hinders andimpedes national development.”16

To sum up, in Mexico, impunity constitutes the main criminal factor, dueto the confidence among criminals that the possibility of a crime being in-vestigated, solved, and effectively punished is very low, and that, because ofthis, in Mexico, “crime pays.” This negative situation is compounded if weconsider corruption, the culture of legality, and the distrust of citizens in theinstitutions that are responsible for watching over justice and public security.

Trends

It is possible to identify the following tendencies in the field of criminaljustice and citizen security in the Republic of Mexico:• Militarization of public safety. Mexico is experiencing a greater pres-

ence of military personnel in the conduct of activities of police character.“In Mexico the military helps from time to time solve the problemscaused by the absence of police leadership, and by political favoritism.In this country, the police have a negative reputation, due to their lack ofprofessionalism, inefficiency and corruption.”17

• Privatization of security. Like militarization, the privatization of secur-ity responds to state failure. Since 1994, there has been the creationand development of a great number of companies and private securityservices.

• Minimization of citizen participation. A state-centered conception ofsecurity militates against a citizen-centered concept, and reinforces thelogic of social exclusion that marginalizes the participation of citizensnecessary for the prevention of crime and antisocial conduct.

• Consolidation of organized crime. Specific cities in the country, such asTijuana, Ciudad Juarez, Culiacán, Guadalajara and Nuevo Laredo, havebeen consolidated as centers of organized crime, especially drug traf-ficking. These organizations, unlike the state machinery, have extremelyflexible operations, capable of adapting to the changing circumstancesof their environment.

• Cooperation with other countries. The consolidation of organized crimein certain cities has led to the establishment of a more active presenceof security and intelligence agencies of other countries. Specifically, thepresence in Mexico of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and


the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) of the United States are visibleproof of an accelerated process of internationalization.

• Public policy priorities reflecting quantitative factors. In the short andmedium term, the police vision of public security privileges quantitativefactors over qualitative ones. Emphasis is on an insufficient number ofhuman resources, weapon systems, and vehicles. And certain aspectswill be left aside such as leadership, career opportunities in civil ser-vice, self-esteem, the image and quality of the police, its formation andspecialization, conscious and deliberated planning, and the evaluation ofresults from a framework of objective indicators, among others.

• Disorganization, organizational rigidity and impunity. It will be verydifficult to improve upon the prevention and combat of organized crimeif the institutions in charge continue to suffer from disorganization andlack of leadership. Institutional changes are not foreseen, since it iseasier to legislate than to carry out reforms of structural character. Andagain, corruption reduces the quality of the personnel.

Public policies of a government in transition

The first federal government of an opposition party in the history of Mexico,voted into power in July 2000, has assumed as its own the World Bank re-commendations made public in May 2001 on the urgent necessity for Mexicoto achieve an efficient, responsible, and transparent government.” In otherwords, it recognizes that “the only existing antidote against insecurity is theculture of legality”.18

Ruling principles of the Vicente Fox Presidency19

• Principle of Change: A government working for results will generatetrust.

• Principle of Transparency: Government decisions will be open topublic scrutiny.

• Principle of Legality: Citizens must have certainty, security, and trust.

• Principle of Accountability: The system must detect those respons-ible for inefficiency or corruption.

• Mission of the Government: The transition must be led with respons-ibility, democracy and participation.

• Objective: Government and society must collaborate to eradicate,once and for all, the scourge of our country – corruption.

Unfortunately, only 8 months into the new administration, disappointmenthas arisen as indicated in the following survey.

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What is the most important thing done by the government?20

Nothing 29%

Dialogue with the EZLN/negotiations 23%

Support to people in need 7%

Combat of corruption/impunity 6%

Jobs/salaries 6%

Support to the retired and elderly 4%

Continued relations with United States/open markets 4%

Thus, nearly 30% of those interviewed do not perceive any improvementsfrom the government headed by Vicente Fox. And still, according to theresults of the quarterly evaluation survey on the president, conducted by thegroup Reforma; his approval rating has already suffered a decline from 70%in February to 64% in August 2001.21

Do you approve or disapprove of the way in which Vicente Fox is workingas President?

Approve

February: 70% May: 65% August: 64%

The public policies of Vicente Fox regarding criminal justice and public se-curity are characterized by continued militarization with the designation ofBrigadier General Rafael Macedo de la Concha as the person responsiblefor the Mexican Attorney General’s Office (PGR) in particular. In addition,a whole range of positions in the Federal Public Ministry, including leader-ship positions in the inter-institutional coordination, maritime interception,territorial interception, air operations, coordination of operations, the federaljudicial police, computer science and telecommunications, and confiscatedgoods are staffed by active military personnel.

Fox also created the position of Presidential Advisor on National Security“as a resource of assessment and technical support to aid in giving coherence,unity and wide vision to the decisions on national security to be taken by thePresident of the Republic.” This responsibility was given to a civilian, AdolfoAguilar Zinser.22

This new consultant to the President decided to carry out two actionswhich have no precedent in modern Mexican history: to create a special-ized working group to evaluate the activities of the Center of Investigation


and National Security (CISEN), an agency charged with “establishing andoperating an investigation and information system for the security of thecountry”,23 and to write a project proposal for a National Security Law, toprovide the necessary legal framework for these affairs, including a reportingrequirement.

This first opposition government also created a Security Ministry dealingwith the responsibilities and functions of law enforcement. This includes theorganization, direction, administration and supervision of the Federal Pre-ventive Police, which until last November was housed in the Department ofthe Interior.24 Afterwards, in early 2001, the new Security Minister renewedthe protocol with the National Defense Ministry authorizing members fromthe Third Military Police Brigade to continue to serve in the Federal Prevent-ive Police in order to guarantee the correct conduct of the Federal SupportForces.25

In sum, the winds of change in the democratic transition in Mexico arereaching the totality of the criminal law system – intelligence, penal justiceand public security.

The challenges of a nation in transition

These previously mentioned processes of transformation in Mexican nationallife imply a series of challenges that must be overcome to improve the generalwelfare of the population. A public expression of pending priorities for thegovernment is contained in a recent survey.

What is the most important thing to do?26

Create more jobs 30%

Help poor people 21%

Combat crime 17%

Improve salaries 16%

End Corruption 12%

Improve education 8%

Stabilize the economy 5%

Fight drug trafficking 4%

Improve public services 4%

Socio-economic issues (generating jobs, fighting poverty, and improving salar-ies) are at present the ones that most concern Mexican citizens. Still, more

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than 30% of the people interviewed in this survey prioritize the fight againstcrime, drug trafficking or corruption.

What can be done when it is well known that resources do not abound?Economic theory and administrative science recommend that the problems behandled in the following hierarchical order.• First, the rule of law must be consolidated, which means respect for the

law, for fundamental civil liberties and rights, for the principle of the di-vision of powers, for the principle of legality of the administration. Thisalso implies a profound judicial reform that guarantees an independentand efficient judicial system.

• Second, the state of affairs must be reported to the people, which meanstransparency, minimizing corruption, and recovering citizen trust in thefundamental institutions of the republic and democracy.

• Third, the high volume of impunity must be reduced, by the design, exe-cution and evaluation of an integrated strategy of public security, whichshould include prevention, deterrence, administration of justice, socialreadaptation and support to the victims of crimes.

• Fourth, an intelligence system must be developed to fight organizedcrime and drug trafficking that, “preserves the integrity, stability andpermanence of the Mexican State”.27

• Fifth, a true humanistic economy must be developed capable of com-bating poverty and reducing the social inequities in a country where theaverage educational achievement is 7.6 years. The economy must be aninstrument for the common welfare of the great national majority. Socialpolicy and a properly functioning economy provide the best antidote tooccasional and situational crime.

Preliminary conclusions

1. The first nine months of the Fox presidency, which started on 1 Decem-ber 2000, were characterized by the development of a novel concept ofnational security with regards to real and potential threats, and by a dif-ferent vision for intelligence with regards to democracy and the judicialsystem. The formulation of a law on national security and the evaluationof CISEN remain to be completed.

2. The new President has abandoned his previous agenda and allowed thearmed forces an increasing role. Their expanding prerogatives are separ-ating them more and more from the society that provides for them and towhom they are responsible. In this respect, military reform continues tobe pending on the Mexican agenda.


3. In terms of public safety, the Fox Administration has opted to follow thepath forged by Ernesto Zedillo, including: constitutional reforms; struc-tural changes in federal executive power; creation of new institutions; theopening of new forums for public participation; and the allocation of alarge part of the budget to subsidize the purchase of arms, vehicles, tech-nology and the hiring of corrupt police officers. In other words, quant-itative factors are still privileged to qualitative factors. These policies,strategies, and other forms of actions constitute a punitive model in termsof public safety. Vicente Fox has left behind the humanistic doctrine andmodel of preventive security of the PAN in favor of the doctrine of “theheavy hand.”

4. There has been neither a real or perceived reduction in organized criminalactivity. Organized criminals continue taking advantage of their impunityand first hand information due to their multiple informants or establishedties with members of all levels of law enforcement. Although impunitycontinues to be the major criminal factor, corruption also remains a threatto the survival of the Mexican nation and measures must be taken toconfront it.

5. The Mexican people do not feel any safer than under the PRI regime,which has led to the first symptoms of disillusion. Although Fox’s ap-proval rate is still high, public opinion polls that were taken after the laststate of the union show that people feel not much is being done in termsof public safety or what is being done is not working.

6. Finally, the tragic acts of terrorism that were inflicted upon the UnitedStates confirm the need to develop a more active foreign policy that in-cludes international cooperation to find solutions to the problems thataffect bordering nations: drug trafficking, money laundering, illegal armstrafficking, terrorism, climate change, contamination of the global eco-system, human rights violations, and other problems. One nation, nomatter how powerful, cannot alone successfully prevent and combat thesenew threats that are of transnational character.

Notes

1. This situation is reflected by the 51st position given to Mexico in the Human DevelopmentIndex, from a total of 162 countries. See, United Nations Organization, Program of theUnited Nations for Development (PUND), Human Development Report 2001.

2. Each decil of income represents 10% of the families in the country. Decil I is the groupof families with the lowest income and decil X represents the group of families withthe largest income. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Instituto Nacional de Estadística,Geografía e Informática (INEGI), Aguascalientes.

3. Federal Executive Power, National Development Plan 2001–2006.

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4. Nelia Tello y Carlos García, “The culture of the illegality, antidote to insecurity,” in EstePais Magazine Noviembre 2000, Number 116, 39.

5. See Reforma & El Financiero, Mexico, 14 Mayo 2001. In both newspapers, the MexicanAttorney General’s Office (Procuraduría General de la República, PGR) admits to havinga backlog of 54,000 police proceedings.

6. See Guillermo Zepeda Lecuona, Center of Investigation for Development (CIDAC), “To-wards a Better Endeavor of Justice,” August 20, 2001, page 3, based on World Bank, “Sur-vey on Urban Victimization, 1998); and INEGI (Bureau of Statistics), “Statistical Year-books on the States of the Republic of Mexico,” Aguascalientes, several yearly volumes,and INEGI, “Statistical Judicial Notebooks,” Aguascalientes, several yearly volumes.

7. National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), “Survey on Social Perceptions andPublic Security,” Institute of Social Investigations, Unit of Social Violence, Mexico, 30Octubre 2000.

8. Ernesto.9. El Financiero, Mexico, 25 Agosto, 2001.

10. El Informador, Guadalajara, 11 Mayo 2001. For this source, the crimes of “greatestsocial impact” in the Mexican Republic are: violent theft, kidnapping, rape, intentionalhomicide, and vehicle theft.

11. Ernesto Zedillo, op. cit.12. World Values Project survey, coordinated by Ronald Inglehart, University of Michigan.

For Mexico, the survey is nationally representative of the opinions of those 18 years orolder and was administered between January 14 and February 7, 2000.

13. 1034 home interviews were given to people older than 18 years in 166 cities in the country,selected through a stratified sample by the size of the population of the localities, with atrustworthiness average of 95%; see the “Millenium Survey” in Público, Guadalajara, 5Diciembre 2000.

14. International Transparency, Berlin, 2000.15. International Transparency, Mexico, May 31, 2001.16. El Financiero, Mexico, 17 Agosto 2001.17. Rico, Jose Maria, “Penal Justice and Democratic Change in Latin America,” Siglo XXI

Editors, Mexico, 1997, 86.18. Leoluca Orlando, Mayor of Palermo (Sicilia, Italy), in Excelsior, Mexico, 28 Julio 2001.19. National Development Plan 2001-2006, op. cit.20. BANAMEX-ACCIVAL, with data from the Socio Political Pulse of Populations survey,

May 2001 in Financial Group BANAMEX-ACCIVAL, Analysis of the economic situationof Mexico, number 906, volume LXXVIII, June 2001, page 256.

21. National Survey applied by the Research Department of the Group Reforma, 14/15 Julio2001, to 1,196 Mexican adults at home. See Reforma, Mexico, 6 Agosto 2001.

22. Graduated in International Relations from the Colegio de Mexico, with an M.A. fromHarvard University. He has been national representative twice, as well as senator.

23. Federal Register, Mexico, 8 Diciembre 1988.24. Amendment to the Public Federal Administration Law, Article 30 bis, particularly see

Fraccion X; Federal Register, 30 Noviembre 2000.25. Reforma, Mexico, 12 Enero 2001.26. BANAMEX-ACCIVAL, op. cit.27. “Order and Respect Chapter,” National Plan of Development 2001-2006.

Documents

The challenges to Mexico in times of political change