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New Ideas in Psychology 36 (2015) 38e49

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New Ideas in Psychology

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/newideapsych

The challenges and opportunities of first-person inquiryin experimental psychology

Ulrich Weger a, *, Johannes Wagemann b

a Department of Psychology, University of Witten/Herdecke, Germanyb Alanus University, Alfter, Germany

Keywords:Experimental psychologyMethodologyFirst person exploration

* Corresponding author. University of Witten Hrhausen Str. 50, 58448 Witten, Germany. Tel.: þ49 (þ49 (0)2302 926 783.

E-mail address: Ulrich.Weger@uni-wh.de (U. We

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2014.09.000732-118X/© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

a b s t r a c t

Psychology is concerned with outward (behavioural) and inward (mental and experiential)dimensions of inquiry. To study behaviour, psychologists are equipped with a compre-hensive repertoire of measurement instruments. These instruments are not well suited tostudy the qualitative nature of inner experience, however: they yield data which, by theirvery nature as symbolic representations, abstract away from the primary phenomenon. Tostudy qualitative experience, it would hence appear logical to engage a first-person,introspective method of inquiry. Psychology has a turbulent relationship to introspectiveresearch, however. In this article we review the concerns regarding the introspectiveapproach; delineate the strengths e and also the limitations e of the experimentalmethod; and, critically, outline a hybrid approach towards studying experience byexploring how important ingredients of the experimental approach can be transferred tothe study of qualitative experience. This approach is a methodological proposal rather thanan epistemological or ontological defence of introspection.

© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Most definitions of psychology include two centralcomponents that feature prominently not only in theexpert literature but even in many undergraduate text-books: psychology is the science of behaviour and thehuman mind. In a recent volume, three eminent psychol-ogists define these two components to the point: Behaviourrefers to the “observable actions of human beings andnonhuman animals”; mind refers to “our private innerexperience of perceptions, thoughts, memories and feel-ings” (Schacter, Gilbert, & Wegner, 2011, pg. 5).

The study of both behaviour and experience has been e

and continues to be e prevalent in the psychological

erdecke, Alfred Her-0)2303 926 776; fax:

ger).

1

sciences. But while theoretical conceptions (and questions)in both domains have radically developed over the pastyears, themethods used to address them have not kept up acorresponding pace and in many ways are still firmlygrounded in the behaviourist tradition: evenwhen it comesto studying experiential qualities, our methodologicalrepertoire focuses on describing and evaluating the asso-ciated observable expression e i.e. their behaviouralsignature. Be it by measuring real-life actions, error rates,eye movements, cerebral blood-flow or the firing pattern ofnerve-cells (to name only a few), we still capture facets ofbehaviour, irrespective of whether they are more macro- ormicroscopic in nature. With this class of measurements weare in an excellent position to intercept the most subtle andintimate expressions of behaviour but inevitably focus ouranalysis on a certain category of phenomena e namelythose that can be expressed as behaviour and becomeobservable to the outside world as action patterns in oneway or another. Traditionally we take, for instance, a third-

U. Weger, J. Wagemann / New Ideas in Psychology 36 (2015) 38e49 39

person approach to studying qualitative aspects of con-sciousness and this can without doubt be meaningful inmany cases but often enough it is also a limitation: theactual experience is translated or encoded into a symbolicformat (data and even linguistic expressions are symbols)that inevitably abstracts away from first-hand experience.

To be sure, there is nothing wrong with looking at thephysiological signature or behavioural correlate of suchprivate inner experiences, in particular as long as the studyof first-person experience is still a tentative endeavour.Whether or not it has to be, is a question of its own that wewill return to shortly. What is important to realize, how-ever, is that with this form of research we still take abehavioural approach to studying human experience: anapproach that is designed to capture facets of outerbehaviour is now used (or more precisely: misused) tostudy inner experience. It is this latter aspect which inmany ways is reductionist and problematic. By reducingour inquiry into human experience to a measurement ofbehavioural expression, we risk leaving a significantdimension out of sight and in turn work with a one-sidedpicture of reality.

In this paper we will explore how the study of experi-ence can be approached by complementing a third-personwith a first-person mode of inquiry. Rather than providingan ontological or epistemological defence of introspection,the goal of this article is to illuminate the potentials ofenquiring into first-person experience as a methodologicaltool that can be used to advance the understanding of apsychological concept or process. Our account is structuredinto different sections: In the section following this intro-duction we will explore the historic tensions surroundingfirst-personmethods and outline the potential promise of arigorously conducted form of first-person research (Section2). To examine what such a rigorous form could be, we willthen refer to the four central paradigms that experimentalresearch is based on and discuss how these can be appliedto first-person research (Section 3). We will next use aconcrete example to illustrate areas where exclusive third-person research is one-sided (Section 4). Following this, thecenterpiece of the article is a proposal for a systematicextension of experimental research towards a first-personmode of inquiry in five steps (Section 5). A practice-trialis provided as an example to illustrate this approach (Sec-tion 6).

We begin, however, by outlining why we see this topicto be of particular relevance to experimental psychology.

1.1. The relevance of the theme to experimental psychology

As experimental psychologists we work with phenom-ena that partly manifest as behaviours but that also have anexperiential side e such as the already referenced “privateinner experience of perceptions, thoughts, memories”(Schacter et al., 2011, pg. 5).

In dealing with the behavioural side of a psychologicalphenomenon, we often refer to cognitive processes thatsupposedly account for these behavioural expressionse forexample processes of “attention regulation”, “executivefunction” or “regulatory control”. But in speaking of suchprocesses, we already venture into the territory of

experience because these processes cannot be directlyobserved. We can only gain further insight into them via a)first-person experience e and this is the direct form ofinsight; or b) via third-person observation e and this is theindirect form of insight because the processes are nowinferred from behavioural observations and data. As long aswe work only with behavioural observations and theresulting data, we first have to consult our own experienceto understand what such observations/data really mean.Without this reference to our own experience, third-persondata would remain a closed book. This subject is ratherimportant because it points to a fundamental issue: That apsychological phenomenon cannot be understood withoutcalling on our own first-person experience to begin with. Itis important to take note of the categorical distinction be-tween the dimensions inwhich physical phenomena can bedescribed (blue, red, heavy, etc.) and in which experientialphenomena can be described (e.g. ideas are vague,confused etc.). It would be a fundamental error to try anddescribe one aspect with the labels and categories of theother. In this same sense, it is misleading to pretend to bedescribing the full scope of a psychological phenomenonwhen in reality only describing the physiological/behav-ioural expression or facet of the phenomenon. We will notactually know what we are talking about when we onlyconsider the behavioural expressions of experience, not theexperience proper. When we really know what we aretalking about, we have inevitably consulted our first-person experience. And yet we typically do not name it assuch e and instead of working with the reality of experi-ence, we designate a psychological entity (e.g. “workingmemory”) to take on this role. But these entities remainabstractions as long as they are not grounded in an actualinsight into the reality of the phenomenon and remain inneed of further clarification of their own. Such circularity iswidely known as the homunculus argument (e.g. Logan &Bundesen, 2004).

Here we argue that the application of this homunculus-logic is more widespread in cognitive and experimentalpsychology than is commonly thought and is particularlyevident in the use of those abstractions. Popular examplesof such abstractions are: “mental representations”,“cognitive routines”, “executive control”, “working mem-ory system(s)”, “attentional control settings”, “top-downinput”, “cognitive regulatory mechanisms”, “task-switchingmodule” or “neural mechanisms”, among many others, areidentified as the sources of observed effects (and we haveto admit: our own prior work is no exception). In manyarticles the use of such abstractions even implies them tobe active agents in the sense that they “do” things e they“drive” effects, they “prioritize” certain information, they“regulate” processes, they “cause” behaviour. In doing so,however, we assign agency to things that in reality do nothave it (Holth, 2001; Ryle, 1949). Such category mistakesare tacitly accepted in much of cognitive psychology andhelp us bridge the gap that emerges because we do notinquire into the other pole of the phenomenon e our ownactivity that we inevitably contribute when we try to gethold of and make sense of a phenomenon. While we haveexpelled from much of psychology the idea of an experi-menter who can actively describe and scrutinize her

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experience, we have entrusted this active role to abstractentities that are hypothesized to function as the sources ofbehaviour.We have expelled our own activity frommuch ofthe experimental work and it is coming back in the form of‘animated’ abstractions e the ‘ghost in the machine’. Asexperimental psychologists we should consider claimingthis active role back and scrutinize our own experiencemore directly e not to replace third-person experimentalresearch but to exploit more of the available data thatconstitute a phenomenon. This exploration of individualexperience might provide a useful guiding compass e inparticular at the early and more phenomenological/descriptive stages of this process where the scope for hy-pothesis generation and combination is otherwise all toobroadly unconstrained (Thompson, 2008).

In this context, note the historic distinction within theresearch process between a context of discovery and acontext of justification (see Hoyningen-Huene, 1987, for acritical discussion of this distinction). In experimentalpsychology, the former is the context of conceptual devel-opment, of the search for ideas and attempts to advanceour understanding of a given matter. The latter, the contextof justification, is the realm of empirical investigation andscrutiny of those ideas and concepts developed during thefirst stage. Our proposal is to place the introspectiveenquiry at this first stage to begin with, and then follow itup with the methodological repertoire of the empiricalsciences in the second stage. In other areas, however, aninward-directed first-person mode of research may be theonly appropriate form of inquiry (see Weger & Edelh€auser,in press).

Many academics will note that this is what they doanyway e introspect to come up with a new idea orconcept. But the point here is that it should not be done in aspontaneous and intuitive way, as is often the case e

because such spontaneous reflection is often one-sided andpre-mature and can all too easily divert the research pro-cess in a subjective direction (see Reisberg, Pearson, &Kosslyn, 2003 who describe an example of this problem).Rather, it should be done with methodological rigour of itsown to be of maximal benefit to the process of discovery.

2. Opportunities of e and historic tensions around e

first-person research

With the third-person experimental approach we havea solid ground and methodological basis to address andstudy a diverse range of psychological phenomena and itwould in many ways be foolish to move away from thiscertainty. At the same time, theoretical developments anddebates over the years (perhaps most notably regarding thequalitative dimensions of consciousness) are pressing andit would be equally unfortunate to leave the possibilities fornew discoveries and ways of understanding unexplored. AsWegner and Gilbert put it already 20 years ago: “One keytask for future research is to develop a better understand-ing of the nature and characteristics of subjective experi-ences. …Additional and more sophisticated measures areneeded to empirically assess the features of subjective ex-periences…” (Wegner & Gilbert, 1994, pg. 388). It still re-mains to be seen how these “more sophisticated measures”

will eventually look like e but it is unlikely that they wouldbe found in yet more intricate technological developmentsthat capture ever more subtle facets of outwardlymeasurable behaviour.

Apart from this, there are a number of compelling rea-sons that highlight the need of finding a way to systemat-ically study first-person experience. Here we willsummarize the ones that seemmost prominent to us (someof which have been allude to already above; see also Jack &Roepstorff, 2003, for further ones) and thereby point oncemore to the methodological nature of our proposal (asopposed to an epistemological or ontological one):

a) Exploring first-person experience in a principled andsystematic way can lead to more advanced questions orinsights that can inform and guide the theoreticaldebate in an unprecedented way e and can subse-quently lead to new advances and third-person exper-imental work that could otherwise never have beenconceived (or only with a delay).

b) At the beginning of a new theoretical debate, oftentriggered by an unexpected experimental finding,different accounts and perspectives tend to emerge inan effort to make sense of the emerging data. When thestate of art is still provisional, it is not straightforwardfor a researcher to make an informed decision as towhich theoretical camp or school to align herself with:not enough data do exist yet to allow such a decision. Inthese cases researchers tend to use their best guesse ormore precisely: their introspection e to gain clarity forthemselves as to which position to take (Reisberg et al.,2003). When this “best guess” is intuitive and unre-flected and based on an ad-hoc or one-off experience, itcan be rathermisleading and can even divert the road ofdevelopment of a discipline, especially if such unre-flected intuition begins to guide and occupy the sub-sequent experimental work. Primas (2002) calls this the„inflationary fascination“ of research-guiding ideas. It isin these cases when it would be particularly useful for aresearcher to systematically scrutinize her introspectivesearch before aligning herself with a theoretical campand launching a series of experimental studies thatinevitably set the stage in a certain direction.

c) Due to the nature and target of study in psychologicalresearch (behaviour and the human mind), using andworking with introspective “evidence” is rather com-mon. Such introspection is often inevitable in the day-to-day routine of research e but when it is done in anintuitive and unreflected way it can actually becomecounterproductive as it can bias the experimenter into apremature interpretation or conception of a new idea orstudy; this is why we are proposing a more careful andscrutinizing approach to first-person inquiry in thecurrent paper. To illustrate an example of misguidedintrospection: researchers often search for the psy-chological mediators of an effect. Candidates for suchmediators are sometimes not immediately obviousfrom the experimental outcome and the need to iden-tify them often comes only after an unexpected effecthas emerged. What tends to happen is that theresearcher introspects as to which mediators might be

U. Weger, J. Wagemann / New Ideas in Psychology 36 (2015) 38e49 41

most plausible and reruns the experiment and includesthose mediators for assessment. When this does notyield any meaningful outcome, the process is repeatede and can go through costly and time-consuming iter-ations if nomediators are found. In these cases, it wouldbe advantageous if the researcher carefully scrutinizedher own intuition in deliberate and detailed innerreflection before rushing into a premature proposal of amediator that she tests in a new set of experiments. Thissystematized form of introspection that we advocatehere, in contrast to the spontaneous and reflected use ofintuitions, is another reason why a framework of care-ful, self-scrutinizing introspection would be useful.

Given these considerations, it may sound plausible topropose a road of first-person research into exploring theterritories of human experience e but the reality of thediscipline's history speaks a language of its own that ap-pears to convey a clear message: that introspection isdifficult and unreliable. We will not review these concernsin depth here, as they have been pointed out in great detailelsewhere, and instead refer the reader to work by otherauthors, for example the reviews by Petitmengin & Bitbol,2009; and Schwitzgebel, 2008 (see also Dennet, 1982).

Instead, we wish to acknowledge the two central con-cerns that researchers often bring up in their criticism ofintrospection:

a) Introspection represents a privileged and in some re-spects even exclusive way to access the phenomenalstates of first person experience. Thus, introspection isassociated with questionable characteristics such asincorrigibility or infallibility (Schwitzgebel, 2010). Toillustrate: My present experiences, e.g. regarding theaesthetics of a piece of art or my anger at a speedingticket, occur in the realm of my own, private experience.In this sense the content of introspective findings („Ithink it is pretty“, „I am annoyed“, „There is a face in themoon“) appears to be neither verifiable nor falsifiable atfirst sight. This places introspection instantly within therealm of non-empirical statements, which cannot beexamined with common empirical measures1 (seePiccinnini, 2003). Note already at this point, however,that we can provide a description of howwe arrived at agiven introspective findings e and then seek to repli-cate it later (or let others replicate it). In this sense, first-person experiments are in principle as verifiable asthird-person experiments are.

b) A second main objection concerns the fact that intro-spective findings can all too easily be influenced e andeven deceived e by external psychological and physi-ological manipulations, as has been shown repeatedlysince the first report by Nisbett & Wilson (1977). Roth(2003), for instance, gives an example of patientsshowing spontaneous movements (e.g. lifting theirarm) in response to electrical stimulation of the brainduring surgery; subsequently the patients claimed thatthey had intended the movement. Examples like this

1„If you can't be wrong, then you can't be right either.“ (D. Armstrong

cited from Kind, 2005, p. 4).

suggest that introspection only allows limited insightinto our current mental states, their underlying pro-cesses and origins. In research we are not only inter-ested in the mere recording of phenomena, however;we are interested in their causes and sources of origin.Introspection does not seem to yield reliable data to thisend (see also Carruthers, 2010).

These reservations are substantial and important andthey cast the scientific viability of introspection more andmore into question. Note, however, that e at least for themoment e we place the promise of introspection lesswithin the context of justification than within the contextof discovery (see Hoyningen-Huene,1987). Moreover, thosereservations were criticized in turn and proposals havebeen made on how introspection can be safeguardedagainst these limitations. Once again we do not wish toexhaust the arguments in full detail and instead refer thereader to existing in-depth reviews that address these andother issues directly (e.g., Danziger, 1980; Jack& Roepstorff,2003; Piccinnini, 2003).

The rejection of introspection was not only based onmethodological issues e but rested additionally on a cen-tral metaphysical concept: that ideas cannot be causes e

only material (brain) processes can be causes; the enquiryinto psychological phenomena from a first-person point ofview was thus only seen of secondary importance to beginwith, because it was understood as an enquiry into therealm of consequences. Note, however, that this meta-physical assumption rests on our understanding of the lawsof classic physics and the way substances interact; outsideneuroscience, this view is now considered to be “seriouslyout of date” (Schwartz, Stapp, & Beauregard, 2004) andfundamental concerns are being raised regarding the viewthat experiential phenomena are not only informed butcaused by physiological processes (for reviews, seeMajorek, 2012; Wagemann, 2011; Weger & Edelh€auser, inpress).

The problems with introspection never appearedinsurmountable in principle, neither back then nor fromtoday's perspective. Rather, on the background of thereductionist thinking style, it seems that there was lessinterest in introspective psychology than in the emerging“behaviouristic revolution”. As Danziger (1980) concludes:

„An examination of the relevant psychological literaturedoes not lead to the conclusion that the radical rejection ofintrospection per se was the result of the internal diffi-culties that the method encountered. The classical diffi-culties were well known and had not prevented thecombination of a limited form of introspection with thevigorous growth of experimental psychology […] The totalrejection in principle of all forms of introspection was not arational conclusion in the light of the problems that hadarisen at the time”. (Danziger, 1980, S. 259).

And Jack and Roepstorff (2003), in a very illuminatingcomment, come to the conclusion: “Most scientists do nothave, or at least cannot coherently formulate, any princi-pled objection to introspective reports; rather, they simplylack faith that introspective reports are reliable in practice.”(pg. vi).

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We wish to add here that we see this lack of faith as asymptom of the natural evolution of human's scientificapproach to their environment. While people until aboutthe 15th century lived in more or less unquestioned unisonwith their environment and wondered at e rather thanaboute the laws of nature that they found themselves to bepart of, they subsequently began to emancipate themselvesmore andmore from this state of unity and began to look atthe phenomena around them from outside, rather thanfeeling part of them. In the context of this development,human consciousness began to juxtapose itself with itsenvironment and established a categorical distinction be-tween the subject e the “I” e and the object e “the world”(Kiene, 2001; Steiner, 1923). As a result, the researcherexperienced a need to question and to investigate thephenomena independently and “objectively” e and toachieve this, she needed to control the variables and factorsof her environment. In the eyes of many researchers, con-ducting introspective research will pose the risk of sur-rendering this authority and this, we argue, is part of thefear that Jack & Roepstorff refer to.

In the following section we will briefly review thistransition process and the history of the evolving scientificapproach. In a first step (Section 3.1.) we will characterizethe four methodological pillars that experimental psy-chology stands on. In a second step (Section 3.2.) we willcharacterize how these methodological principles can bedirected not only to phenomena on the “outside” but alsoon the inside and thereby can become the toolbox for aninquiry into human experience. These inwardly directedprinciples of experimentation will then form the basis ofour proposal for a systematic inquiry into first-personexperience.

2 Taken from: http://www.constitution.org/bacon/nov_org.htm.3 Taken from: books.google.de/books?isbn¼0495094927.

3. The paradigms of experimental research and theirapplication to the study of experience

The principles and paradigms that a scientific disciplineabides by are in constant development. They do not emergeout of a spontaneous association but grow out of traditionsthat inform and shape the prevailing approach in a givenepoch. A current scientific paradigm is hence not an abso-lute truth but a picture of our current thinking, piece ofwork in evolution. It is by many accounts the best guessthat we have regarding our approach to advancingknowledge. It typically emerges out of an insightful pro-posal that is made by an individual or group of individualsand considered valuable and meaningful by colleagues andcontemporaries. It is more of a picture than an absolute orinfallible truth as such (Kuhn, 1969).

In many areas of science, including experimental psy-chology, the experiment is the prevailing methodologicalparadigm. To illuminate the evolution of this experimentalapproach, Kiene (2001) identifies its four important pillars(or paradigms) and outlines their historic tradition. As hisfindings are noteworthy and because, unfortunately, hisbook has so far been published only in German, here wewill briefly summarize his main points as the basis tosubsequently illustrate their use as a method for first-person investigation.

3.1. The four methodological paradigms of experimentalresearch (according to Kiene, 2001)

The first paradigm that Kiene highlights is the paradigmof experimentation proper, first outlined in its contempo-rary rigour in Francis Bacon’s classic opus “NovumOrganun”. In the experimental approach Bacon saw anopportunity to overcome the fallacies of uncritical experi-ence: “… men of learning, but easy withal and idle, havetaken for the construction or for the confirmation of theirphilosophy certain rumours and vague fames or airs ofexperience, and allowed to these the weight of lawful evi-dence. And just as if some kingdom or state were to directits counsels and affairs not by letters and reports fromambassadors and trustworthy messengers, but by thegossip of the streets; such exactly is the system of man-agement introduced into philosophy with relation toexperience.” (Bacon, 1620 2).

For Bacon the experiment was an “instrument of themind” that could be used to sharpen the lense of deliberateinquiry and supply the critical observer with informationthat would otherwise go unnoticed: “Neither the nakedhand nor the understanding left to itself can effect much. Itis by instruments and helps that the work is done, whichare as much wanted for the understanding as for the hand.And as the instruments of the hand either give motion orguide it, so the instruments of the mind supply eithersuggestions for the understanding or cautions.” (Bacon,1620). Over the change in attitude from naively accepting,passive observation to an experimental, i.e. critically eval-uating form of research that involves deliberate interven-tion and active control, a new symbol of the individual'sgrowing self-awareness was born (cf. Witzenmann, 1987).Instead of accepting the natural occurrence of phenomena,the experimenter places himself independently in relationto these phenomena and through his active interventionisolates specific effects that can be systematicallycontrolled and analysed.

In a second step, Kiene points to the increasing occu-pation e especially in the philosophical tradition e withthe question about causality: How canwe become aware ofwhat is causing a particular effect? It was David Hume whoin his work An Inquiry Concerning Human Understandingnoted that single observations are not suitable to identify apattern of cause and effect and that rather a sequence ofobservations is needed to form a firmer insight into e andunderstanding of e how things are related. As Hume put it:“It is only after a long course of uniform experiments in anykind that we attain a firm reliance and security with regardto a particular event.” (Hume, 2001, Section IV, Part 23).

Since Hume's days, the principle of replication hasbecome a core ingredient in the process of experimenta-tion: a pattern needs to be replicated in a certain percent-age of individuals to be considered (statistically) reliableand to inform our understanding of cause and effect. Linkedto this understanding is the subsequent realization thatreplication alone is not diagnostic of a causal effect, as the

4 Note that this criticism is tendential to begin with, as we do permitthis introspection in participants, while not permitting it inexperimenters.

U. Weger, J. Wagemann / New Ideas in Psychology 36 (2015) 38e49 43

co-occurrence of an effect might merely be a correlate of anotherwise unrelated process (Atmanspacher, 2012).

Another factor was subsequently added e the paradigmof a control; this was the third step in the process ofpenetrating and understanding the principles of causationvia experimental inquiry. It was John Stewart Mill in hisbook A System of Logicwho introduced this concept into thescientific repertoire: If an experimental manipulation leadsto a certain effect when the experimenter adds oneelement in one condition; while this effect is absent whenthe experimenter leaves out this e and only this e elementin a similar condition: then there is a much higher certaintythat the respective element is actually causing the observedeffect. In Mill's ownwords: „The difficulty, however, is thatnature only rarely produces such similarities, making itnecessary, according to Mill, to artificially construct simi-larities between cases.“ (according to Kiene, 2001, S. 14).

A fourth important milestone was the recognition thatcause and effect can be studied even more systematicallywhen a pattern is emancipated from the normal process ofdevelopment and thereby further dissociated from poten-tial confounds. To achieve this, the experimenter in-troduces an a-causal (incidental or randomized) method ofassigning experimental manipulations and thereby assertsan even greater degree of controlled, experimenter-guidedactivity: the experimenter does not leave the introductionof a manipulation to given coincidences or the naturalevolution of a trial but controls this introduction himselfaccording to a randomized, a-causal principle. This para-digm of randomization, first introduced by Ronald Fischerin his book The Design of Experiments in 1935, allowed foran unprecedented level of control in dissociating causalfactors from mere correlations and has become a firm cri-terion for experimental research in the laboratory andbeyond.

3.2. Applying the four experimental paradigms to the study offirst-person experience

The four paradigms listed here provide an ingenuousmethodological repertoire to assess causal factors andallow the experimenter to penetrate deeply towards theroots of mental processes; they have hence become thebenchmark criteria for research in the psychological sci-ences and should never be dismissed by an approach thatseeks to study human experience. The important questionthen is how these paradigms can be extended in a mean-ingful way to become applicable to research on first-personexperience. In beginning to answer this question we arenow approaching the issue of how to systematize aframework of first-person inquiry that extends the ele-ments of the experimental paradigm to the territory ofinward observation.

Towards the end of his analysis, Kiene already mentionsthat the four paradigms of experimental study can also beturned inward, i.e. be applied to first-person research. Herewe will take up this suggestion and use it to extend andenhance the methodology of introspective research. Ourwork is in linewith other accounts that have complementedthird-person experimental work with a systematic inquiryinto first-person experience. This includes the work by Lutz

and Thompson on what came to be known as Neuro-phenomenology e a principled and systematic approach toalign first-person participant reports with experimentaldata (e.g. Lutz & Thompson, 2003; Thompson, 2008); andthe work by Varela and collaborators on studying humanexperience using first-person methodologies (e.g. Varela &Shear, 1999; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1992).

In our account we will make a proposal for theresearcher to scrutinize her own experience and direct hermode of inquiry from outward to inward observation, usingthe four principles of experimentation outlined above.

Regarding Bacon's paradigm of active intervention, thistransformationwould mean that the researcher's activity isdirected inwards and is systematically controlled in a waysimilar to how it is controlled in the usual experimentalsetting. By re-directing the research activity towards itsown source, the inquiring mind becomes a focus of study initself e now without using the external vehicle of a mea-surement tool that produces symbols (data) that first haveto be interpreted by the observingmind. In the sameway inwhich the outwardly observing experimenter generates,analyses and interprets data according to his conventionalunderstanding of methodology, so does the inwardlyobserving experimenter, when directing the approach in-ward in a self-reflexive manner, may encounter contents ofmental statese and the experiential equivalent of raw data,namely perceptions of experiences.

Second, to make introspective findings replicable (cf.Hume), the approach would also require appropriate e

perhaps even formalised e means of communication (i.e.symbols) between researchers e paired with a roadmapthat other researchers can use to follow a similar path andarrive at similar results in her own experience. This road-map approach is our response to the criticism of the lack ofinter-subjective verifiability often raised in response tointrospective enquiry4 e and developing and advancingsuch a roadmap is a goal of this paper. Through a dialogueamongst colleagues, a replication of introspective scenariosand experiments could become possible that in principledoes not lack behind the externally conducted andobserved (but internally conceptualized and constructed!)studies of conventional experimentation. Third, in intro-spective pilot studies, the researcher should test the needfor alternative explanations and the relevance of controlconditions (Mill) and then move on to develop corre-sponding hypotheses. This knowledge e for example theinsights from taking an opposing perspective and thendeveloping an alternative hypothesis e should subse-quently be used in refining the study method. Such anapproach would include control conditions not primarily asexternally applied but as mentally produced study pa-rameters, for example by using mental simulation tech-niques to test an experience under different mentalconditions (or mindsets, cf. Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001).

In the sense of this expanded approach, the fourthaspect, the aspect of randomisation, should not be limited

U. Weger, J. Wagemann / New Ideas in Psychology 36 (2015) 38e4944

to assigning participants to different experimental or con-trol groups. For the researcher who employs an intro-spective method, an additional type of randomisationbecomes possible: she does not only include systematic butalso random situational aspects into her study designe andthis does not only happen in the laboratory, i.e. in thecontext of artificial conditions, but also in a field-context.For example, if a researcher is studying mental processesin a perceptual psychology experiment, the participantwould be called to react in a predefined way to randomlyoccurring situations in everyday life e e.g. through thegeneration of certain images. It is in this way that oneproduces randomly generated raw data e but not via therandom assignment of participants but via the randomassignment of situational factors. This form of randomiza-tion is already characteristic of certain longitudinal or fieldstudies e but typically occurs in a context where partici-pants respond to externally applied cues, for example froma portable electronic device.

Taken together, the proposed approach seeks to turn themethodological tools of the experimental paradigm backtowards its source, the inquiring mind. As this method ofinquiry is, ultimately, also a form of behaviour (theimportant difference being that it is directed towards aninternal, mental behaviour which cannot be assessedwithout a conscious researcher) one might refer to this asan inward reversal of the behaviourist paradigm. How sucha reversed approach might look like in practical applicationwill be illustrated using the following example.

4. An example: mindful maths e our earlier study andsuggestions for a conceptual extension

To illustrate the process of extending the experimentalparadigm from a study of behaviour to a study of experi-ence, we would like to use a concrete example and, in aneffort to use one where we have a sufficient degree ofinsight, consider it wise to take a study that has come out ofour own laboratory.

In a recent experiment (Weger, Hooper, Meier, &Hopthrow, 2012) we explored whether the psychologicalpressure that people experience when confronted with anunfavourable comparison (so-called stereotype threat) canbe alleviated via a mindfulness manipulation. The classicexample of a situation inducing stereotype threat is onewhere female participants are administered a math testthat is introduced as investigating whether “women arereally worse at math than men”. Such a cover story typi-cally creates a strong performance anxiety due to thepressure that is caused by an unfavourable comparison andwomen usually perform worse in such a situation thanwhen no mentioning of the menewomen comparison ismade (for overviews, see Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999;Steele & Aronson, 1995). The reason why stereotypethreat is hypothesised to lead to this performance decre-ment is because the anxiety of an unfavourable comparisondraws on the same mental resources that would be neededfor the very task they are being examined in. In our study(Weger et al., 2012) we investigated whether mindfulnesscan reduce the performance decrements caused by ste-reotype threat. Mindfulness is a psychological state (and

trait) in which the individual exhibits “receptive attentionand awareness of present events and experiences” (Brown& Ryan, 2003). “When people are mindful they are open toexperience the present moment non-evaluatively andnondefensively. […] Positive and negative thoughts areallowed to ‘stream by’ unfettered….” (Heppner et al., 2008,pg. 487).

In our mindfulness study we hypothesized that when ina mindful state, individuals are more likely to focus theirattention on the here and now and get less carried away bythe thought of an unfavourable comparison, therebyconcentrating their available resources more systematicallye and hence being able to subsequently use them moreeffectively in the math task. As a matter of fact, in our studywe found that when under stereotype threat, people in amindful state achieve higher scores than non-mindfulcontrol-participants. We concluded from this finding thatmindfulness may hence be a strategy that can be used bypeople to concentrate available resources and alleviate thestress of stereotype threat.

On the one hand we were intrigued by this finding andconsider it important that a strategy that is more or lessunder the individual's immediate control can have such apowerful effect.

On the other hand, in having started to work on thecurrent piece, we are also beginning to realize that theapproach followed in our study can be advanced andextended.

One limitation that we are only now beginning to fullyrealize is that while the earlier study combines theoreticalapproaches, it does not actually advance our theoreticalunderstanding of whatmindfulness is or how it achieves itseffect. We already knew beforehand (and cited this in ourpaper) that stereotype threat hijacks working memory re-sources (Schmader & Johns, 2003). Likewise, we alreadyknew beforehand that mindfulness enhances workingmemory resources (and also cited this in our paper e Jha,Stanley, Kiyonaga, Wong, & Gelfand, 2010). What weadded to our study was to put these two elements togetherand explore the impact of mindfulness on stereotypethreat.

Our approach e and our understanding of the nature ofmindfulness e could be advanced if we took the followingaspects into

- To get a sense of how mindfulness achieves its effects,the research would benefit from an inquiry into what itreally is that we ask our participants to do during themindfulness task. As any researcher will benefit frombeing in the laboratory with the participants andwatching how they really deal with a task and subse-quently updates and improves the study/experimentalprocedure on the basis of these observations, so will aresearcher asking the participant to do a certainmentaltask likewise benefit from exploring it in his or her ownexperience beforehand (see Tart, 1972). Ideally, thisself-inquiry will also prompt more realistic intuitionsabout psychological mediators of mindfulness. Thesemediators could be tested in follow-up experiments inan effort to explain how and why mindful participantsactually experience reduced pressure from stereotype

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threat. Any work on psychological mediators has beenabsent from our published study.

- An inquiry into the actual first-person experience whilebeing in a mindful state would be a useful theoreticalcontribution to our understanding of what mindfulnessreally is. Without this self-inquiry, one could still comeup with certain speculations about mindfulness e e.g.that mindfulness is effortful, that it is an activity ofconcentrated attention, that it is calming etc. (althougheven these speculations can only be deduced from somesort of introspection in one way or another, unless theyare collected from the existing literature and in thatsense would not be novel contributions in the firstplace). In order to set up an experiment that couldexplore a novel conceptual issue and goes beyond theboundaries of current conventions, one needs to have asense of where to go, unless one waits for the unex-pected outcome that typically takes a much longer timeand is then often seen initially as an anomaly.

5. Moving towards a methodological extension in fivesteps

To pave the road for better-informed and more rigorousstudies, we therefore propose to prepare the designing andconducting of experiments that are meant to addressexperiential phenomena (mindfulness being only oneexample) with a set of five steps that we outline below andsubsequently illustrate with a concrete example.

a) Identifying one's own agenda: When conducting first-person research it is important to remind oneself ofthe constraints of the research setting that provides thecontext for conducting the work e and to remain awareof the fact that this inevitably informs and shapes theresearch process (see Ericsson & Simon, 1980 for anearly proposal of this point). The pressure to producepublishable findings (outputs) easily misleads theobserver towards certain (anticipated) effects e anissue that is as much of a problem for first-personresearch as it is for third-person research. Where suchan agenda has been identified and named, it will benecessary to reflect on whether adjustments can bemade to avoid falling into its trap. The typical outcomeof such a reflection will be to observe longer, i.e. tocollect more information before proceeding to theactual study stage. In fact, we deem it crucial to extendthe observation phase beyond a few sporadic impres-sions to a systematic immersion into the respectivephenomena.

It is true that one may not be fully aware of one'sagenda; the imperative deduced from the current proposale more careful (self-)reflection; longer observation; col-lecting more information before formulating a hypothesis,designing an experiment, or even publishing a proposedinterpretation e would nevertheless hold true. This prin-ciple has also been made use of in approaches that sys-tematically sample and then describe inner experiences e

as reflected, for instance, in the technique of descriptive

experience sampling (e.g. Heavey&Hurlburt, 2008;McVay,Kane, & Kwapil, 2009). This observational approachimmediately leads into the second stage:

b) Trying out a task before administering it to participants.Prior to having a group of participants work with theirinner faculties (e.g. doing a concentration exercise, amindfulness task, a mental simulation activity) theresearcher is called to pilot this task carefully herself,scrutinizing her own engagement with it and takingnote of any observations that might motivate upcomingstudies in order to be able to draw the necessary con-sequences to make the study maximally informativeand efficient (see also Petitmengin & Bitbol, 2009). Thismay initially take an intuitive/associative format; butsubsequently it must also take a systematic directionand here the researcher should start to consider thefour paradigms of inward-directed experimentationdescribed above: She begins to look for patterns oflawfulness in what triggers an inner experience; and toactively manipulate these patterns, for example viawithdrawal or re-exposure to the process or phenom-enon that triggers the experience (cf. the deliberateintervention paradigm, Bacon). The researcher will bewell advised to take note of unexpected insights andobservations, in particular; and to scrutinize them byway of replication and the inquisitive and inwardlydirected mindset described above (“Can this be reallytrue?”).

c) Speaking with colleagues about it: Ideally theresearcher is not alone in conducting and replicatingthis process of self-inquiry but collaborates with col-league(s) who can be used as a mirror for the outcomesof one's own self-inquiry (cf. the replication paradigm,Hume). There is the legitimate concern of whether allcolleagues are speaking about the same thing whenthey share their insights; but upon closer investigation,this concern is no more or less substantial than it is inthe case of third-person research e and in neither caseit is compelling enough to derail the approach in itsentirety; within the context of first-person research thisconcern finds acknowledgement in the fact that theapproach introduced here leads to a roadmap regardingthe process of self-inquiry that can be independentlyscrutinized by others (see Piccinnini, 2003). What canand should still be extended in terms of an introspectiveapproach is the development of a proper terminologythat facilitates the scientific exchange about mentalexperience in as transparent a way as possible (cf.Adams, 2012).Where possible, this dialogue should alsobe extended to the participants of the research processso as to gain additional information and relate it to thebehavioural outcomes of the study.

d) Generating a hypothesis: A methodologically soundapproach will not rely on a singular hypothesis derivedfrom a set of observations but will require multiple e

ideally diametrically opposed e hypotheses that arepondered, tested and refined under comparable cir-cumstances so that they have the same chance ofinforming and guiding the research process (cf. com-parison/control paradigm, Mill). As it does in third-

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person research, the availability of only a single hy-pothesis poses the risk of reducing the research ques-tions to a binary scheme (significantenon-significant)and quickly becomes suggestive and misguides theresearch process. If there are multiple opposing hy-potheses, a wider range of options and perspectives isencouraged that will ultimately open up space for theinquiry into more complex phenomena.5

e) Breadth of inquiry: Following on from the criterion ofmultiple hypotheses, it would be important to considernot only cognitive, but also emotional and volitionaldimensions. Emotions, for instance, can be located be-tween functional poles such as sympathy and antipathy(Steiner, 1919); volitional impulses (wishes, motivationsetc.) can be researched through their relationship withbasic forms of activity (production/reception orexpansion/contraction). And ideally, this breadth ofinquiry happens under different and not previouslydetermined situational constraints so that the observercan rely on the spontaneous observation of an authenticmoment (cf. Fischers randomization paradigm).

6. Reconfiguring the original study on the basis of theproposed steps

In our own effort to follow this process we began byreminding ourselves of the obvious constraints of the aca-demic setting in which publications are produced in thecontext of the standard credit and remuneration schemethat is in place for rewarding more and higher impactpublications. Our original mindfulness paper was designed,prepared and developed in this context. We wereconvinced of the importance and rigour of our study andhence decided to submit it for publication. If, on the otherhand, there had been no production pressure we mighthave conducted an additional, more systematic study toinvestigate whether and how the effect of mindfulnessgeneralizes beyond the immediacy of the moment. Wename constraints like the credit- and remunerationframework for publishing research here, not to lament overthe currently existing publication regulations, but to pointto the reality that in one way or another they inform theway hypotheses are formulated, studies are prepared andresearch is conducted.

The idea to predict that mindfulness would reducestereotype threat via clearing up working memory spacewas not born out of observation; neither was it motivatedby any form of preliminary evidence of our own. Rather itwas generated by merely combining already existing ele-ments that we had encountered in the literature (‘ante-cedents’) and from there derived a statement (‘conclusion’)that motivated our research question. In looking back, wesee in the circularity of such ‘syllogistic theorizing’ anelement of intellectual playfulness that could be grounded

5 Note that we are not trying to disqualify explorative research withthis call for a hypothesis. But where a hypothesis does not exist, it wouldbe all the more important for the researcher to deeply immerse herself inthe phenomena before launching a potentially costly experiment, so as toconstrain the ultimately infinite directions of enquiry.

by the breadth and gravitas of more genuine questions. It isa form of theory- and hypothesis-development that tendsto yield rather predictable results and in that sense oftenlacks genuine novelty. In being sensitized to such syllogistictheorizing in our own work, we subsequently becameaware that it is quite common in the psychologicalliterature.

In a next step we decided to try out the task ourselves.Over a period of 2 weeks we engaged in two mindfulnessexercises that we conducted for approximately 3 min each.Subsequently we noted any insights or experiences and e

where applicable e formulated a question for the exerciseson the next day. The first exercise was the raisin task, avariant of which we also used in our initial study. Wecarefully observed the perceptual qualities of the raisin(including smell and taste) and also observed experiencesfollowing the consumption of the raisin. The second exer-cise was a purely mental task e imagining or “mentallyobserving” a match (JW) or a paperclip (UW). Our trialhence included a task that was aligned along perceptualexperiences and one that was directed towards purelyintrospective/mental processes. From the host of observa-tions, here we report only the following three that wereimmediately related to our research question:

- Paying careful and systematic attention to a small,apparently insignificant and unspectacular object like araisin can trigger qualitative experiences of surpriseand wonder. Imaginatively evoked objects e here apaperclipewere far harder to come by and left a senseof abstraction and generality.

- With more practice, both exercises yielded a two-foldstructure. A first phase, characterized by moreelementary impressions and imaginations, was fol-lowed by a more integrative, holistic phase. Thissequence was more evident in the first exercise wherethe perceptual experience naturally receded uponremoval (consumption) of the object and was followedby a non-perceptual resonance of the experience; but italso occurred in the second exercise e namely whenthe mentally produced images were actively inhibited.

- Upon starting the trial, the expectation was that thetask would become easier andmore efficient with timeand that conducting a mindfulness exercise repeatedlywould hence amplify the positive impact of the task. Inreality, the task quickly lost its “appeal”, became moreeffortful and appeared to turn more into an exercise inself-control than in cultivating unbiased and non-judgmental attention. The task took on more of aroutine nature, perhaps because the mental activitiesthat first were newly initiated were gradually merelymemorized. We hence realized that the one-off prac-tice of a mindfulness exercise is not particularlyrepresentative and that, for instance, the difficulty inidentifying mediating variables in experiments thatuse a mindfulness paradigm might stem from the factthat the initial encounter with a mindfulness tasktriggers different responses than a more prolongedone. At the very least, it would therefore be worthexploring the trajectory of mental and volitional ac-tivity beyond a one-off attempt, before generalizing therole and benefit of a mindfulness exercise.

U. Weger, J. Wagemann / New Ideas in Psychology 36 (2015) 38e49 47

It becomes evident from these observations that con-clusions about the temporal process of mental exerciseswill surface only with repeated practice. This does notmean that an unprepared one-off practice of such exercisescan already be quite effective. But in trying to identifymediating variables in psychological experiments, a one-offexercise informs more about the existence of an effect,rather than the “how” and “why” of its impact. In order notonly to identify the mediating effect of a mindfulness ex-ercise but also to explain it e without recurring to con-structs that are in need of definition and delineation oftheir own e it appears advisable to examine the temporalprocess of such mental exercises.

Two months after this trial we decided to repeat it in aneffort to explore whether other useful findings would sur-face. The trial was repeated under the same conditions, theonly difference being that we always did it in the morninge to enable us to study potential transfer effects during theday and thereby enrich our picture of what mindfulnesscould achieve. We made the following observations:

- No transfer-effects were noticeable other than theemergence of faint memories when similar objectswere encountered during the day.

- It became more and more evident that the purelymental version of the task was rather effortful andrequired so much cognitive activity that one couldhardly speak of a mindfulness task where one is in amore receptive mode of attention, according to ourunderstanding. This was an important and unexpectedinsight and prompted two further steps: First, it madeus realize that such an effortful task might not be themost appropriate intervention to induce mindfulnessin our future work. Second, we re-examined themindfulness literature to gain a clearer picture of howmindfulness is defined e and were surprised to realizehow fuzzy the border between a more active and amore receptive form of attention really is e and howthis is hardly addressed in the mindfulness literature.Investigating the type and extent of mental activityinvolved in mindfulness has since emerged as a topicfor potential follow-up first- and third-person researchfor us.

- In attending to the raisin, penetrating it with ourattention and then consuming it and becoming onewith it, the subject-object distinction appeared torecede into the background. Our attentionwaswith theobject and this was the bridge that span over thedivide.

A next step would now be to translate these observa-tions and hypotheses into an experimental paradigm thatcould subsequently involve a behavioural or even physio-logical component e or other so-called “objective” (overtlymeasurable) outcomes. This final link is missing from ourpaper in its current forme it will require an additional stepto be undertaken towards empirical validation and we arein preparation to design a corresponding study to close thisgap. Importantly, however, we agree with Jack andRoepstorff (2003) who point out: “Where experientialphenomena are concerned, it is objective measures that

must seek validation by establishing their correspondencewith introspective measures, and not vice versa.” (pg. xiii).Based on our introspective trial, in a first step towards thisgoal we began to scrutinize the Toronto Mindfulness Scalethat we used in our earlier investigation. We noticed thatthe items of this scale are primarily directed at capturingaspects of detachment; while our trial had yielded adifferent gesture: one of unification with the target of ourmindfulness trial (the raisin), at least with more practice. Itseems curious that a process of intense attentionalengagement with an object would only yield a detachmenteffect e and we were hence wondering whether this maybe just one facet of the construct of mindfulness; andwhether other added facets would yield a more completepicture. We are currently translating these insights into atestable format to be scrutinized in a follow-up empiricalinquiry.

7. Extending the approach to basic psychologicalscience

We would like to conclude our exploration by pointingto the relevance of the approach outlined here to psycho-logical experimentation and theorizing in more generalterms. Summarizing and adding to the aforementioneddiscussion, we see three such dimensions of relevance. Thefirst regards the already mentioned insight into newquestions that can lead beyond the status quo in a way thatwould not be possible e or would be possible only with adelay e if the approach operated within the demarcationsof the existing third-person framework. The promise andvalidity of the approach proposed here can e and should e

still be scrutinized from the perspective of the existingmethodological framework and can be expected to lead toconsistent results as long as it is based on an accurateobservation of the respective phenomena.

The second dimension of relevance e closely related tothe firste is an access to contents and areas of research thatwould remain elusive without being anchored in questionsabout their nature and existence. An example is the innerexperience during the practice of self-control and medita-tive work. The behavioural consequences of these practiceshave been investigated in numerous studies but enquiriesinto the qualitative experience of what can be achieved e

and how e is still largely limited to self-help books ratherthan informing a systematic and rigorous scientific debate.And yet, systematic roadmaps into how inner work is to beconducted do exist e and so do detailed descriptions ofwhat the results are when such work is conducted (e.g.work by Aquinas; Steiner; Assaglioli).

Finally, the development of inner modes of observationcan be expected to fine-tune faculties of inner perceptionand subsequently bring unknown insights or “treasures” tothe surface e in the same way in which, for instance, thecultivation of auditory perception skills develops facultiesof outer perception (e.g., a “musical ear”).

We also wish to highlight that the approach we areproposing may be more suitable for some phenomena thanfor others. In an attempt to propose a preliminary taxon-omy, we see it useful to distinguish between conscious andunconscious processes as one dimension of relevance e

U. Weger, J. Wagemann / New Ideas in Psychology 36 (2015) 38e4948

with conscious process being more open to systematicscrutiny and investigation than others. Note, however, thatthis distinction is not necessarily a binding characteriza-tion, as objects may move in and out of consciousness e soeven objects that are considered unconscious at point T1may become suitable for introspective enquiry at T2. Thesecond dimension is the degree of cognitive control that weexercise, i.e. the extent to which a cognitive phenomenoncan be deliberately manipulated or not (e.g. exogenous vs.endogenous attention). The labels intentional vs. uninten-tional, active vs. passive, controlled vs. automatic all cap-ture facets of this second dimension. When a person candeliberately manipulate a certain process or phenomenon,first-person enquiry is likely to be more meaningfulbecause the person exercises deliberate control and is morelikely to be able to link causes and effects. When theparticipant cannot intervene in this way, it is more difficultto take a systematically enquiring, “experimental”approach to the study of experience. Substantiating and/orqualifying these dimensions will need to await furtherresearch e and it is also possible that altogether differentdimensions play a role.

A second and final aspect we wish to highlight is thatsuch first-person research can be effortful and time-consuming e an inconvenient attribute at a time whenmany researchers are pressed for tangible results in narrowtime frames. At the same time, we are convinced that on alarger scale, the proposed approach will speed up the fact-finding effort in the research process and will save re-sources that may otherwise be invested in unnecessary andcostly diversions.

8. Conclusion

Psychology studies phenomena that manifest as ex-pressions of behaviour but that typically also have anexperiential reality. In concluding our discussion, we wishto reiterate the following three points:

- To exhaust the wealth of available data, we propose tocomplement the study of behaviour via standard third-person inquiry with a study of experience via first-person inquiry. First-person inquiry is crucial becausethey are the only road to the qualitative component eand without this component, psychological phenom-enawould be reduced tomuch less than they really are:theywould be reduced to behavioural phenomenaonly.

- We have referred to the four paradigms of scientificresearch e experimentation, replication, control,randomizatione and have illustrated how it is possibleto turn these inward and apply them to the systematicinquiryof the experiential dimensionof a phenomenon.

- We have indicated how at present we see it as partic-ularly useful to employ such a first-person mode ofinquiry as a more descriptive introduction into theearly phases of a research program in order to betterground and refine one's research agenda. With moreroutine and with further development of the method,however, we expect it to also qualify for moreadvanced forms of exploration.

Acknowledgement

We could like to thank David T. Wilkinson for usefuldiscussions and Ellis Luise Gootjes-Dreesbach for her helpin translating portions of this article from German intoEnglish. We would also like to thank the reviewers for theirhelpful comments on an earlier version of this manuscript.

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