THE CONTINUED ‘INSPIRATION’ OF GEORGE KENNAN:

MULTILATERALISM AND US NATIONAL SECURITY

Before an audience gathered at Princeton University in February 2004 to celebrate the 100th

birthday of George F. Kennan, Secretary of State Colin Powell praised the wisdom and insight of the famed US strategist, diplomat and intellectual. Powell noted the elder statesman “always had a remarkable gift for seeing the very weave of history as it was being made before him” and suggested that to resolve the international challenges currently facing the US, “our best tutor, our inspiration, is, once again, George Kennan.” The notion of Kennan as an “inspiration” to contemporary American officials was more profound than it appeared at face value. Like numerous politicians and commentators before and since, Powell was referring to Kennan’s reputation as a sage of US foreign policy and for expressing “a certainty in our international strategy” during the Cold War through a strategy of “containment.” While his impact on American policy in the mid- to late-1940s was undoubtedly significant, Kennan did not unequivocally establish a coherent strategy to guide the US through the next half-century, nor did he offer a definitive blue print on how to defeat the Soviet Union. More telling in this respect was the place of international organisations and multi-lateral initiatives in Kennan’s formulation of US foreign policy. Indeed, such a consideration reveals interesting parallels with the present as well as the broader issue of American power. Although he showed no open hostility to the United Nations or multinational coalitions, Kennan made it clear that they should never impede the pursuit of American national security objectives or the exercise of US strength. It was in the environment of postwar Western Europe that Kennan’s views were seen most vividly; a period that would prove the apex of his influence within government. The strategist was a key protagonist in efforts to restore economic and political stability in the region through the Marshall Plan. Yet when US officials debated the hypothetical scenario of a communist coup d’état in Italy in late 1947, Kennan proposed a dramatic demarcation of the peninsula and for the pro-western Italian government to invite the US military to occupy air bases in the south of the country. When colleagues in the State Department noted the likely opposition of allies at the UN, Kennan was unmoved and insisted the Truman Administration should work solely to further its own national security objectives. Kennan repeated the notion a month before the Italian national election of April 1948 while suggesting the Italian Communist Party be outlawed to prevent it from emerging victorious at the polls. Kennan was also lukewarm to the nascent Western Union when representatives from the UK, France and Benelux countries signed a mutual defence pact at the start of 1948. Fearful such an emphasis on military security would detract from his broader objective of regenerating the economic and political health of Western Europe in a manner conducive to US interests, Kennan looked to restrict the nations involved to those in the immediate vicinity of the Atlantic. By the time the initiative was formalised through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949, however, he had failed to prevent the inclusion of countries like Italy and others on the border of the Soviet sphere. As with the Italian segregation proposal, Kennan was ultimately overruled by less celebrated and lesser-known contemporaries. Indeed, the episodes revealed the limits to Kennan’s influence and demonstrated how, in spite of his fame, he was not above bureaucratic battles. Figures such as John D. Hickerson proved effective in encouraging senior officials to commit the US government to play an active role in NATO and engage at the UN.

It is therefore ironic that despite his open criticism of the National Security Strategy of 2002 and the invasion of Iraq in the following year, Kennan possessed opinions closer to George W. Bush, Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, than the UN-advocate Secretary of State singing his praises at his centenary birthday. That is not to suggest Kennan was an ultra-nationalist conservative like the most hawkish members of the Bush Administration (he was an IR realist), however, his view of US foreign policy and the role of multi-national organs shared some common traits. As such, they offer interesting insights into the issue of multilateralism in American foreign relations and the role of international coalitions. Kennan eventually acquiesced to the founding nations of NATO on the grounds it would bolster the anxieties of Atlantic allies. However, he continued to stand in opposition to further expansion (even in the post-Cold War era) because it detached the US from core national interests and risked an over-commitment in ensuring the protection of minor allies. Likewise the Bush Administration’s notion of core national interest – albeit one defined in very different terms to Kennan’s formulation – has also affected contemporary American approaches to international alliances. In the aftermath of 9/11, NATO’s Article 5 (“that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all”) was invoked for the first time ever, even if the US played the dominant role during the operation in Afghanistan. If an international consensus was easy to establish at this time – Le Monde famously noted “we are all Americans” on 12 September 2001 – the Bush Administration’s true priorities were exposed during the subsequent mobilisation to wage war against Iraq. Maintaining such accord and gaining UN approval proved of secondary importance to American national security interests. Indeed, the weight given to international alliances was aptly summarised by Rumsfeld’s delineation between ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Europe; in short, coalitions were suitable when consistent with American objectives. Nonetheless, problems in stabilising Iraq and Afghanistan after the initial invasions have seen some efforts by the Bush Administration to re-engage with the UN and NATO. On the one hand this is the result of a more modest American definition of ‘stability’ (especially in Iraq), while on the other, it is due to a realisation of the importance of international cooperation. Yet, rather than signalling major ideological shifts within the incumbent Administration, or a different view toward the UN, this has largely been the result of shifts in personnel and parties in governments around the world. As men like Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz have left office, less hawkish figures such as Condoleeza Rice and Robert Gates have assumed greater influence. Meanwhile, changes in governments in Spain, Italy, Poland, and recently Australia, have seen former-allies replaced by (reserved) critics of the Bush Administration. Yet other changes in Europe have seen the ascent of Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy, which have improved American relations with Germany and France respectively. (After significant early attempts to distance himself from his predecessor, Gordon Brown has also recently spoken of the importance of the UK’s relationship with America.) While tempting to suggest ‘Old Europe’ has returned as an important US partner, this should not detract from the independent motives fuelling such convergence. A key factor behind renewed cooperation is the mutual goal of stymieing the Iranian nuclear program (as opposed to greater British, French and German involvement in Iraq). European leaders have realised they cannot await a new American President to work on immediate issues of concern, while the Bush Administration has recognised the existence of greater international consensus in regard to Iran. This may not match the urgency with which Bush and Cheney view the matter, or the question of

what measures are required, although foreign opinion is more harmonious than over the previous Iraq issue. Nonetheless, as the latter enterprise showed, the US will bypass multi-national coalitions if they stand in the way of American national interest. Rather than a return to alliances, recent developments are continuous with longer-term trends in which the US will opt for international cooperation when it meets the desired end. Kennan’s legacy cast a long shadow over post-World War II US foreign policy, although some of his less-known “inspirations” – albeit coincidentally – continue to prove significant. Kaeten Mistry