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PrintPublicationDate: Feb2013 Subject: ClassicalStudies,SocialandEconomicHistoryOnlinePublicationDate: Jan2013

DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195188318.013.0017

TheByzantineSuccessorState JohnF.HaldonTheOxfordHandbookoftheStateintheAncientNearEastandMediterraneanEditedbyPeterFibigerBangandWalterScheidel

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AbstractandKeywords

ThischapterexaminesthehistoryofstateformationintheByzantineEmpire,ortheeasternRomanEmpire,duringthefourthcenturytothefifteenthcenturyCE.ItexplainsthattheByzantinesuccessorstateevolvedoutofRomaninstitutionalarrangementsstructuredasahierarchyofadministrativelevelsandthatitwasacomplexbureaucracywhichrequiredasubstantialdegreeofmore-than-minimalclericalliteracyforitsday-to-dayadministration.Thechapteralsochroniclesthegrowthofthetown-basedlandlordeliteorgentrythatwasassociatedwiththeeconomicexpansionandgrowthoftheperiod,andwhichhadcriticalimplicationsforstatecontroloverthedistributionofresources.Keywords:ByzantineEmpire,stateformation,RomanEmpire,Byzantinesuccessorstate,complexbureaucracy,landlordelite,institutionalarrangements,economicexpansion,statecontrol, distributionofresources

IntroductoryObservationsThetermByzantineempirerefersbyconventiontotheeasternRomanempirefromthefourth(orsixth,assomeprefer)centurytothefifteenthcenturyCE,thatistosay,fromthetimewhenadistinctivelyeasternRomanpoliticalformationbegantoevolve,withtherecognitionoftheculturaldivisionsbetweenGreekEastandLatinWestintheempirespoliticalstructure,tothefallofConstantinopleonMay29,1453atthehandsoftheOttomanSultanMehmetII.Andalthoughwithinthislongperiodthereweremanysubstantialtransformations,theelementsofstructuralcontinuityaremarkedenoughtopermitsuchabroadchronologicaldefinition.

StraddlingtheBalkanpeninsulaandAsiaMinor,withafewoutlyingterritoriesinsouthernItalyandtheAdriaticandAegeanareas,theByzantineempirerepresentedmerelyarumpoftheeasternpartoftheRomanempire(LaiouandMorrisson2005,822).Inmanyrespects,itcanbecalledanempireonlybecauseitpresenteditselftotheoutsideworldassuch,yetitwasterritoriallyalwaysquiterestrictedatitsheight,includingtheBalkansandmuchofAnatolia,butlittlemore.ItevolvedoutofthecollapseofeasternRomanpoliticalpowerfollowingtheArabattacksandconquestsoftheyears634650,themselveseventsthatformedpartofamuchbroaderprocessofeconomic,cultural,andpoliticaltransformationaffectingthelateancientworldfromtheAtlantictonorthernIndiaandbeyond.Bytheyear700,allitsNorthAfricanandwesternMediterraneanprovinceshadalsobeenlost,withthepossibleexceptionofatenuousRomanpresenceinthe(p.476) Balearics.Yettheregionsthatitretainedwereamongtheleastwealthyofitsformerprovinces,amongwhichEgypthadcontributedasthemostproductive,themainsourceofgrainforConstantinople,andamajorsourceofthestatestaxincome.FromfiguresgivenbyarangeoflateRomansourcesfortheeasternhalfoftheempire(thusexcludingItalyandAfrica,whichanywaycontributedonlyone-eighthorsoofthetotal),ithasbeencalculatedthatEgyptcontributedsomethinglikeone-thirdofthestateincome(bothgoldandgrain)derivedfromtheprefecturesofOriensandIllyricumtogether;thatthediocesesofAsiana,Pontica,Macedonia,andOrienstogethercontributedaboutfour-fifthsofthegoldrevenue,withPonticaandOriens(whichincludedthefrontierregionsandtheirhinterlands)providingafurtherproportionover50percent

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ofthegrainleviedforthearmy.Comparingthesefigureswithmoredetailedbudgetarydetailsfromthesixteenth-centuryOttomanrecords,itcanbesuggestedthattheincomeoftheBalkanregionuptotheDanubeandthatofOttomanAnatoliawereveryapproximatelyequal.WhiletherearesomedisparitiesincoveragebetweentheseregionsintheirlateRomanandOttomanforms,thisgivesacrudeideaoftherelativeeconomicvalueofthetworegions.InthelateRomanperiod,however,thebulkofthestatesincomeoutsideofEgypthadbeenderivedfromtherichprovincesofSyria,Mesopotamia,Euphratensis,Osrhoene,Phoenicia,Palestine,andCilicia,alllostafterthe640sandonlypartially,intheirnorthernperimeter,recoveredinthetenthcentury.WiththelossofEgyptandtheseeasternprovinces,therefore,andwitheffectivecontroloverallbutthecoastalperipheryofmuchofthesouthernBalkanslostduringthelatersixthcenturyandfirsthalfoftheseventhcentury,theoverallincomeofthestatecollapsedtoafractionofthesixth-centuryfigure:onefigureplausiblysuggestedisthatitwasreducedtoaquarter(Jones1964,462464;Hendy1985,164ff,616620;LaiouandMorrisson2005,2342;SeeMap16.1).

TheChurchandthetheologicalsystemitrepresented(fromthelatefourthcenturyChristianitywastheofficialreligionoftheRomanstateand,probablybythemid-sixthcentury,themajorityreligionwithintheempire)playedacentralroleintheeconomyoftheRomanworlditwasamajorlandowneraswellasinimperialpolitics,ininfluencingthemoralandethicalsystemoftheRomanworld,andindirectingimperialreligiouspolicy.Emperorswereinextricablyinvolvedintheconflictsgeneratedbytheologicaldisagreements,giventheprevailingviewthattheemperorwaschosenbyGod,thathehadtobeOrthodox(howeverthatwasdefined),andthathisrolewastodefendtheinterestsofOrthodoxyandtheRoman,thatis,Christianoikoumen(theinhabited,civilizedRomanworld).Thepoliticalimplicationsweresuchthatheresywasconstruedastreason,andoppositiontothe(orthodox)emperorcouldeffectivelybetreatedasheresy(Dagron1993,167296;Whittow1996,126133;Haldon1997,281286,324ff.).

ClicktoviewlargerMap16.1 TheByzantineEmpireandItsNeighborscirca840CE

TheByzantinesuccessorstateevolvedoutofRomaninstitutionalarrangementsoftheperioduptothefourthandfifthcenturies,structuredasahierarchyofadministrativelevels:atthetopwastheemperor,understoodtobeGodsrepresentative,surroundedbyapalatineandhouseholdapparatus,thecenterofimperialgovernmentandadministration.Civilandfiscalgovernmentwasdelegated(p.477) (p.478) untilthemiddleoftheseventhcenturyfromtheemperortothePraetorianprefects,whoseprefectureswerethelargestterritorialcircumscriptionsinthestate;eachprefecturewasfurtherdividedintodioecesaeordioceses,whichhadapredominantlyfiscalaspect;andeachdiocesewasdividedintoprovinciaeorprovinces,territorialunitsoffiscalandjudicialadministration.Thesewerefurtherdividedintoself-governingpoleisorcivitates,thecities,eachwithitsterritoriumorhinterland(whichmightbemoreorlessextensive,accordingtogeographical,demographic,andotherfactors).ThelateRomanstatewasthusacomplexbureaucracyrequiringasubstantialdegreeofmorethanminimalclericalliteracyforitsday-to-dayadministration,rootedinandimposeduponaseriesofoverlappingsocialformationsstructuredbylocalvariationsonessentiallythesamesocialrelationsofproductionacrossthewholecentralandeastMediterraneanandBalkanworld.Socialandpoliticaltensionswereexacerbatedbyreligiousdivisions,localeconomicconditions,imperialpolitics,andtheburdenplaceduponthetax-payingpopulationasaresultofthestatesneedsinrespectofitsadministrativeapparatusand,inparticular,itsarmies(Haldon2005).

ThelosstoIslamduringtheseventhcenturyoftheeasternprovincesthathadevolvedheterodoxtraditionsmarkedarealbreakwiththeRomanpast(Donner1981;Kennedy1986;Kaegi1992).Here,versionsofChristianityhadevolved(inparticularmonophysitism,thebeliefinasingledivinenatureofGod)thatdidnotconformtothedyophysitedogma(beliefintwoinseparableandindivisiblenatures)which,bythe630s,hadbecomethe

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orthodoxyoftheemperors.Theresulthadbeenacycleofpersecutionandopposition,andalthoughitisnolongerbelievedthatthesedifferencesmeantaneasiervictoryfortheinvadingMuslimarmies,suchdisaffectionclearlyplayedaroleinthegeneralsituation.Asaresult,earlyByzantinestateandsocietywereabletoevolveaseriesofidentifyingcharacteristicscrucialtotheirlaterhistory:neo-Chalcedonian(i.e.,dyophysite)orthodoxy,theGreeklanguageofbureaucracyandarmy,theconceptoftheRomansastheChosenPeople(aroleforfeitedbytheJewsfortheirfailuretorecognizeandacknowledgetheMessiah),andthegeopoliticalcoherence,centralizedbureaucraticadministrativestructure,andtraditionsoftheempire,aswellasthesymbolicfunctionofConstantinople.Allthesefeaturesactedasunifyingelementsthatenabledamuch-reducedlateancientstatesystemtosurvivewellintothemedievalperiod,andtoendowthesocialformationwhichthatstateshelteredwithaparticularcharacterandsenseofitsownspecialidentity,asensethatsurvivedthecollapseofthestateitself(Jones1964;Hussey1966,part1;Ostrogorsky1968;Brown1971;Winkelmann1980;Angold1984;Gray2005).

LateRomanandByzantinesocietyweredominatedthroughouttheirhistorybytributaryrelationsofproduction.Thatistosay,surpluswasappropriatedthroughavarietyofformsoftaxandrent,whichrepresentedtheprevailingandusualformsofsurplusvalueorsurpluslabor.Thisdoesnotmeanthattheyweretheonlyexistingformsofsurplusappropriationinthisparticularsocialformation.Slaverycontinuedtoexist,butevenasearlyasthefourthcenturyintheeastseemstohaveplayedonlyaverylimitedroleinproductionand,moreimportantly,inthe(p.479) productionofthewealthofthedominantclass.Thereisplentyofimperiallegislationtosuggestthatfromthistimeonagriculturalslaveswerebeingrapidlyturnedintotheequivalentofcoloniadscripticii,thatistosay,freepersonsnominallybutboundtotheirestateortenancy.Thelegaldefinitionofaslaveasanunfreepersoncontinuedinuse,ofcourse,andreductiontoslavestatusremainedapunishmentthroughouttheByzantineperiod.Butasagriculturalslavescametoapproximatemoreandmoretovariousdegreesoftiedbutfreetenants,theeconomicrealityofslaverydisappears:rentandtax,nottheintensive,plantation-basedexploitationofchattel-slaves,seemtobethemainformofsurplusappropriationfromthelaterthirdcenturyandafterward.Domesticandsmall-scaleindustrialslaverycontinuedtoexist,too,butthishardlyaffectsthedominantmodeofsurplusappropriation.Andevenwhenlargenumbersofprisonersweretakeninwarandenslaved,theywereoftenthengivenstateorotherlandtocultivate,andexpresslyfreedforaspecificperiodfromstatetaxationinordertoallowthemtobringtheirplotsintoproductionhardlythetypicaltreatmentofslavesintheclassicalsenseoftheterm.Inspiteofsomeexaggerationincertainsources,therefore,slavesdonotappeartohaveplayedasignificantroleinoverallproduction,andinparticularintheproductionofsurpluswealth,inthelateRomanandByzantineworldafterthefourthcentury.

Thevariousinstitutionalformsthatsurplusappropriationcouldtakeweremany.Privatelandlordsnormallycollectedrentincashorkind,accordingtothenatureofthecontractorleaseandaccordingtotheeconomicconditionsofthetimeorarea,orboth(availabilityofmarketexchangewasclearlyessential).Thereissomeevidence,althoughsparse,ofwage-laborerstiedtoestatesandpaidincashorkindalso,apartfromthejourneymenandday-laborerstypicalofurbanenvironments.Untilthelasttwocenturiesoftheempire,however,thissectoroftheeconomyappearstohavebeenfairlymarginal.Thestateexactedsurplusesinbothcashandkind(fortheregulartaxesonland,forexample),aswellasthroughavarietyoflabor-services:maintenanceofthepostalstationsandhorses,forexample,ortheproductionofironore,wovencloths,andsoon,whichwouldbecalculatedaccordingtocentrallydeterminedtablesofequivalence.Equally,localcommunitieswereonoccasionrequiredtohelpwiththebuildingofroadsandbridgesorfortifications,andtobilletandfeedsoldiersandtheirofficers,imperialofficialsandmessengers,andsoon.Bytheninthcentury,andprobablyfromtheseventhcentury,thestatedemandedtheproductionofweaponsandvariousitemsofmilitaryequipmentfromtheappropriatecraftsmenamongtheprovincialpopulations,imposedasadditionalcorves;extraordinaryleviesinfoodorgrainwerecommon;whilemilitaryserviceitself,thoughnotmeritingexemptionfromthechiefland-andhearth-taxes,didbringfreedomfromextraordinaryleviesandsimilarimpositions.Butthecrucialpointaboutalltheseformsofsurplusappropriation,exceptforthewage-laborsector,isthattheywereobtainedwithoutexceptionthroughnoneconomiccoercionwhethercustomaryobligationsandtheforceoflaw,asinmostcases,backedupultimatelybyimperialmilitarymight,orbysimplethreatsandbullyingbystateofficials,Churchmen,orprivate(p.480) landlords.Thiswasanagrariansocietyofpeasantsandruralartisans,andtheyweretheonlyrealisticsourceofsurpluswealthproductiononalargescaleforthestate.Privatecommerceandexchangewasextensiveaftertheeconomicrecoveryofthemid-ninthtoearlyeleventhcenturies,butthestateappearstohavehadonlylimitedaccesstoitsprofits.OnlyattheveryendoftheByzantineperiod,whenthestatewasreducedtoafewdistrictsinthesouthernBalkansandtheAegeanislands,didcommercebecomeasignificant

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elementinthestateeconomy.ButbythentheByzantineempirewasitselfaninsignificantpoliticalforceintheeasternMediterranean(Haldon1993,109ff.;1997;Oikonomides1996).

Political-HistoricalOverviewInspiteoftheproblemsfacedbytheeasternhalfoftheempireinthemiddleandlaterfifthcentury,itsgreaterstructuralcohesivenessandflexibilityenabledittosurvivebothexternalattacksaswellasthedisruptionofeconomicandtradingpatterns.Indeed,inthelatefifthandearlysixthcenturiesamajorreformofthebronzecoinagewasundertakenthatwastoprovidethebasicframeworkforthemonetarysystemoftheempireuntilthetwelfthcentury.Thestrengthoftheempireenableditduringthesixthcentury,undertheemperorJustinianI(527565),totaketheoffensiveandtorecoverlargeregionsthathadbeenlosttoinvadersorsettlers,includingNorthAfricafromtheVandals,ItalyfromtheOstrogothsandsoutheastSpainfromtheVisigoths.Althoughthecostofthisexpansionismwasverygreat,theeasternRomanstateintheearly630sstillembracedNorthAfrica,Egypt,modernSyria,westernIraq,andwesternJordan,alongwithLebanonandPalestine,Anatolia,muchoftheBalkans,Sicily,Sardinia,andconsiderableareasofItaly.MostoftheBalkanswasoutofeffectivecentralcontrol,dominatedbySlavorotherinvaders,albeitthisrealitywasnotrecognizedinofficialimperialpronouncementsontheregion.Butthesegainswereshort-lived:theLombardoccupationofmuchofnorthern,central,andsouthernItalyfromthelate560s,theinabilityoftheempiretomaintaineffectivemilitaryforcesinthewesternMediterranean,andthedistractionandthreatofwarfareintheeastmeantthatmostoftheseterritorialgainshadbeenlostwellbeforetheendoftheseventhcentury.AmajorwarwiththePersiankingdomoftheSassaniddynasty,stimulatedbytheusurpationofthetyrantPhocas(602610)andmurderoftheemperorMaurice,lasteduntiltheByzantinevictoryachievedbytheemperorHeracliusin627.Butbothstateswereexhaustedbythelongyearsofwarfareandeconomicdislocation.

When,therefore,theArabsemergedinthe630sfromtheArabianpeninsulaunderthebannerofIslamandtheholywar,imperialresistancewaslittlemorethantoken.By642allofEgyptandtheMiddleEasternprovinceshadbeenlost,ArabforceshadpenetrateddeepintoAsiaMinorandLibya,andimperialforceshadbeenwithdrawnintoAsiaMinor,tobesettledacrosstheprovincesoftheregionas(p.481) theonlyavailablemeansofsupportingthem.Withinaperiodofsometwelveyearstheempirelostsomethingoverhalfitsareaandthree-quartersofitsresourcesadrasticlossforanimperialstatethatstillhadtomaintainandequipaconsiderablearmyandaneffectiveadministrativebureaucracyifitwastosurviveatall.Whilemanyofthedevelopmentsthatledtothistransformationwereintrainlongbeforetheseventh-centurycrisis,itwasthisconjuncturewhichservedtobringthingstoaheadandpromotethestructuralresponseswhichfollowed.

ThedefeatsandterritorialcontractionthatresultedfromtheexpansionofIslamfromthe640sintheeast,ontheonehand,andthearrivaloftheBulgarsandestablishmentofapermanentBulgarKhanateintheBalkansfromthe680s,ontheother,radicallyalteredthepoliticalconditionsofexistenceoftheeasternRomanstateandestablishedanewinternationalpoliticalcontext.Theevolutionofthiscontextwascharacterizedbythepolitical,cultural,andeconomicrelationsbetweentheempireanditsneighbors,ontheonehand,andbythefluctuationsinimperialpoliticalideologyandawarenessoftheserelations,ontheother.Atthesame,theculturalimperialismofByzantium,andthepowerfulresultsofthisintheBalkansandRussia,hadresultsthathaveinfluenced,andcontinuetoinfluence,theBalkansandEasternEuropeuntilthepresentday(Obolensky1971;FranklinandShepard1996).

TheeasternRomanempirestruggledthroughoutitsexistencetomaintainitsterritorialintegrity.Itsgreatestproblemwasposedbyitsgeographicalsituation,alwayssurroundedbypotentialoractualenemies:intheeast,theSassanidPersianempireuntilthe620s,thentheIslamicCaliphates,andfinallytheSeljukandOttomanTurks;inthenorth,variousgroupsofimmigrantSlavs(sixthtoseventhcenturies),alongwithnomadicpeoplessuchastheAvars,Bulgars,Chazars,Hungarians(Magyars),andPechenegs;andinItalyandthewesterncoastalregionoftheBalkanstheLombardsandFranks,andlaterbothSaracens(fromNorthAfricaandSpain)andNormans(latertenthtomid-twelfthcenturies).Finally,fromthetwelfthcentury,variousItalianmaritimepowersviedincompetingtomaximizetheirinfluenceoverByzantineemperorsandterritory.Overambitious(althoughsometimesinitiallyverysuccessful)planstorecoverformerimperiallands,andalimitedandrelativelyinflexiblebudgetarysystem,werekeystructuralconstraintsthataffectedthehistoryoftheempire.Fromtheeleventhcentury,andespeciallyfromthelatertwelfthcentury,theempireseconomywasgraduallyovertakenbytherapidlyexpandingeconomiesof

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westernEuropeandtheItalianpeninsula.ThecaptureandsackofConstantinoplebythefourthcrusadein1204,andthepartitionofitsterritoryamongavarietyofLatinprincipalitiesandaLatinempire,arumpoftheformerByzantinestate,spelledtheendofByzantiumasaseriousinternationalpower.InspiteofthereestablishmentofanimperialstateatConstantinoplefrom1261,thegrowthofBalkanpowerssuchastheSerbianempireinthefourteenthcentury,andtheOttomansinbothAnatoliaandtheBalkansthereafter,weretopreventanyreassertionofByzantinepowerintheregion.BythetimeofitsfinalabsorptionintotheOttomanstate,theempireconsistedoflittlemorethanConstantinople,someAegeanislands,andpartsofthe(p.482) southernPeloponneseinGreece(Angold1984;Whittow1996;Haldon2000;Gregory2005).

StructureandDynamicoftheByzantineState:PoliticalSystemAsarepresentativetributarypolity,themajorsystemictensionwithintheByzantinestatewasthatbetweentheeliteandthecentralpoliticalauthority.Fortributarysystems,analyzingtherelationshipbetweenstatesandtheirelitesoffersparticularlyusefulinsightsintothewaysinwhichsuchstatesactuallywork,andunderwhatconditionscentralizedstatepowerandauthorityisliabletobreakdown.Unlikeinmodernindustrialstates,forexample,primarysurplusappropriationinpreindustrialsocialformationscantakeplaceonlythroughrentortax,intheirvariousforms,andisthusdirectlycarriedoutbythestateordominantelite.Inmodernstateformations,incontrast,taxationisthemeanswherebythestateredistributessurplusvaluealreadyproducedanddistributedbetweentheownersorcontrollersofthemeansofproduction,ontheonehand,andthosewhoselltheirlaborpowerinreturnforawage/salary.Inbothcases,thenatureofsocialandeconomiccontradictionsandtensionsbetweenexploitersandexploited,aswellasthenatureofthepoliticalrelationsofdistributionofsurpluswithinthedominantorrulingelite,isdeterminedbytwofeatures.First,bycompetitionoverthedistributionofresourcesbetweenpotentiallyantagonisticelementsinthisequation;andsecond,bytheinstitutionalformstakenbytaxandrent,andthroughwhichsurplusisappropriated.Bothstatecentersandrulingelitesinpremodernformationsthushaveanequallypowerfulvestedinterestinthemaintenanceofthosesocialandeconomicrelationstowhichtheyowetheirposition.Thestate(asembodiedinacentralorrulingestablishment)mustappropriatesurplusitself,orensurethatanadequateportionofsuchsurplusispassedontoit,tobecertainofsurvival.Buttherehashistoricallyalwaysbeenatendencyforthefunctionariesentrustedwiththesedutiestoevolve,howevergradually,theirownindependentpowerbase,thusrepresentingacompetitorwiththestateforresources.Therelationshipbetweentherulerorrulingeliteandthosewhoactuallyappropriatesurplusontheirbehalfisinconsequencealwayscontradictoryandpotentiallyantagonisticbecause,asindicatedalready,dominantsocioeconomicgroupsandstatesfunctionatthesamelevelofprimaryappropriation:sincethereisnorealdifference,exceptinscaleandadministrativeorganization,betweentheextractionoftax,andthatofrent,whatevertheformittakes.Theantagonismisastructuralantagonismitneednotnecessarilybeexpressedthroughanyawarenessonthepartoftheindividualsorgroupsinquestion.Furthermore,thisrelationshipisgenerallynotasimpleone-to-oneequation:thestatemaybeembodiedinaparticularpowerelite,whichmayormaynotoriginatefromadominantsocialclassoraristocracy,forexample,sothat(p.483) awholecomplexofinterwovensocial,economic,andpoliticalvestedinterestsisinvolved.Buttheabilityofthestatetoextractsurplusdependsultimatelyuponitspowertolimittheeconomicandpoliticalstrengthofsuchpotentiallycompetinggroups.Theonlyrealwaytoachievethishasbeentocreate,orattempttocreate,atotallyloyal,becausetotallydependent,governingclassthatisidentifiedentirelywiththeinterestsofthecentralestablishment.Byzantineemperorswereenabledtoachievethis,forawhile(althoughtheymaynothavehadthisintention),bythecircumstancespeculiartotheseventhcentury.Bywayofcomparison,itisworthnotingthatOttomanrulersattemptedthesameinestablishingthedevshirme(theconscriptionofboysfromChristianhouseholdstobebroughtupinanIslamiccontextanddraftedintotheJanissarycorps),justasearlierIslamicrulershademployedslavesasanonpartisanandloyalelitethroughwhichtheycouldexercisepowerineitherthemilitaryoradministrativesphere.ThisstructuredrelationshipwascrucialbothtothefailureoftheByzantinestatetoresisteconomicchallengesfromelsewhere(aconsequenceinpartoftheslowtransformationofthestateeliteofthelaterseventhandearlyeighthcenturiesintoaneconomicallyandpoliticallymoreautonomousaristocracybythetwelfthcentury),aswellastothesuccessoftheItaliancommercialrepublicsinrespectoftheirownsocialandeconomicorganization(Haldon1993).

ApparatusThelossofcontrolovermuchoftheBalkans,andtheconquestbytheArabsoftheorientalprovincessouthofAsia

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MinoraswellasthefertileCilicianregionbytheearlyeighthcentury,signaled,asisgenerallyrecognized,amajorchangeintheempiresconditionsofexistence.Thegovernmentwascompelledtorestructurethemethodsbywhichitextractedresourcesaswellasthemeansofdistributingthem.Italsohadtoreduceexpendituretoconformtothereducedresource-baseatitsdisposal.Theeffectsofinvasionsandwarfareonpopulationnumbersinthemostaffectedregions,andthereforeonproductivecapacity;onirrigationsystemsinmorearidregionsthathadbeenturnedovertoarableexploitationinHellenisticandRomantimes;andonlinesofcommunicationandthestatesabilitytomaintainasystemofpostalrelaystationsandheaviertransportationwereallfirstordershiftsintheconditionsinwhichtheRomanstatefounditself.Butawholerangeofsecondorderchangesfollowed:thebureaucraticprocessesforensuringtheextractionofresourcesweremodified,aswellasthatforthemaintenanceandsupportofmilitaryunits,whilethepowerrelationsbetweenthecentralgovernmentanditsrepresentativesatvariouslevelsintheprovincesalsochanged.Thefiscalapparatuswascentralizedandmanagedthroughtheevolvingmilitaryprovinces,namedforthearmiesnowbasedthere,withtaxescollectedincashandforwardedtoConstantinopleaswellasinkindandconsumedlocallybythelocalarmies.(p.484) Theolderdiocesanleveloffiscaladministrationfadedaway,althoughthetraditionalprovincialstructuressurviveduntiltheearlyninthcentury,subsumedwithinagroupofnewmilitarycommands(fromtheearlyninthcenturyknownasthemes[themata])reflectingtheregionsintowhichthefieldarmiesofthepre-Islamicconquestswerewithdrawnaftertheperiod640s660s.Romanlawstillprovidedtheframeworkfortheresolutionofissuesofinheritance,privateproperty,personaldisputes,andindividualandcorporateresponsibilitiesandrights,althoughincreasinglyinterpretedwithinaChristianmoralframework.AndalthoughtheChurchcertainlyplayedaninformalroleintheadministrationofjusticebeforethistime,itwasonlyinthelatereleventhcenturythattheemperorsformallytransferredlegalauthoritytotheChurchinmatterssuchasmarriageandrelatedlaw,andevenlaterthattheChurchadjudicatedincivilandcriminalmattersmorewidely.

Whiletherearesomedivergencesofopinionabouttheexactresultsofthepolitical,military,andconsequenteconomiccrisesthataffectedtheByzantinestateduringtheseventhandeighthcenturies,itisgenerallyagreedthatitwasonlyfromtheveryendoftheeighthcenturythatthebeginningsofarecoverycanbedetected.Butthetransformedpoliticalandsocialgeographyoftheempiremeantanexpansionofthestatesabilityeffectivelytotaxandaconsequentincreaseinimperialrevenues.Fromthelaterninthcenturytherewasanincreasinglysuccessfulmilitaryactionagainstexternalfoes,agradualrecoveryofurbaneconomiesintermsofmarketfunctionsandsmall-scalecommodityproduction,andincreasingmonetizationofexchangeactivity.Thedeurbanizationthatwasaconsequenceofbothlonger-termdevelopmentsandwarfareandeconomicdislocationwasreversed,althoughtheruralizationofByzantinesocietywasonlymarginallyaffected(Whittow1996,96133;Liebeschuetz2001;LaiouandMorrisson2005,4389).

Atthesametime,bothliteraryandarchaeologicalevidenceshowthepreeminentpositiontakenbyConstantinople.TheestablishmentofanewimperialcapitalonthesiteoftheancientcityofByzantionintheyear330,withtheimperialcourt,asenate,andthesocial,economic,andadministrativeconsequencesthereof,hadfar-reachingconsequencesforthepatternofexchangeandmovementofgoodsintheAegeanandeasternMediterraneanbasin,apointwell-attestedbythedistributionofceramics.Bythedecadesprecedingthepoliticalandeconomiccrisisofthemid-seventhcentury,theregionalizednatureofexchangeactivitywithintheAegeanandeasternMediterranean,focusedonanumberofkeycentersConstantinople,Alexandria,Antioch,amongthemostimportantwasbecomingincreasinglyaccentuated.IntheBalkansandnorthernandwesternAsiaMinor,withafewexceptions,socialinterestfortheinvestmentofpersonalwealthandtheaccretionofprestigeandstatuswasincreasinglyfocusedonConstantinopleasthebestwayofensuringanichewithintheimperialsystem.WiththelossoftheeasternprovincestoIslamthispicturebecameevenmorepronounced.FornoneofthecitiesorurbancentersofAnatoliaortheBalkanscouldcompetewiththeimperialcapital,whichwashenceforthanduntilthethirteenthcenturyatleastthesinglemostimportantcenterofadministrative,productive,andcommercialactivityintheregion(Mango1985).

(p.485) Inspiteofthecontinuedexistenceofastrong,centrallymanagedbureaucracy,powerrelationsintheByzantineworldwerestillhighlypersonalized.Patrimonialrelationswerefundamentaltosocialandpoliticaladvancement,althoughitisalsotruethatthesystemwasrelativelyopenuntilthetwelfthcentury,permittingpeopleofveryhumbleoriginstorisetogreatpowerandwealth.Fromthemiddleoftheseventhcenturythesocialeliteoftheempirehadenteredaperiodoftransformation.Theso-calledsenatorialaristocracyofthelaterRomanperiodwasreplacedbyastateeliteselectedbytheemperorsandtheiradvisers,anelitethatundoubtedly

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includedsomemembersoftheolderestablishmentbutwasmoredirectlydependentonitspersonalassociationwithemperorandcourt.Yetasaresultofitsincreasinggriponstatepositionsandthelandsitaccruedthroughtherewardsattachedtosuchservice,thisstatepseudo-meritocracysoonturnedintoanaristocracy.Duringtheeighthandninthcenturiesitwasstillverydependentonthestate,andduringthetenthandespeciallytheeleventhcenturiesitwasincreasinglyindependent.Kinshipandclanidentitybecameevermorecentraltoanindividualsidentity,theappearanceoffamilynamesbeingaclearindicatorofthisdevelopment.Thestatethatistosay,thepowerelitefocusedaroundtherulerandtheimperialcourthadhenceforthtocompetedirectlywithasocialclasswhoseenormouslandedwealthandentrenchedpositionintheapparatusesofthestatemeantthatitposedarealthreattocentralcontroloffiscalresources(Brandes2001;Haldon2004;Cheynet2006).

UrbanismConsequentuponthestabilizationofthepoliticalandmilitarysituationinAsiaMinoraftertheearlyninthcentury,manyurbancentersrecoveredtheirfortunes,chieflythosethathadanobviouseconomicandmarketfunctionfortheirlocality.ThebesinGreeceprovidesagoodexampleofanurbancenterthatmadeagoodrecoveryinthelaterperiod,forbythemiddleoftheeleventhcenturyithadbecomethecenterofaflourishinglocalsilkindustry:localmerchantsandlandownershadhousesthere,attractingartisans,peasantfarmerswithgoodstosell,andthelandlesslookingforemployment,thusfurtherpromotingurbanlife.Inaddition,thisurbanregenerationisalsoconnectedwiththegrowthofamiddleByzantinearistocracyorsocialeliteofofficeandbirthlaterreferredtoasagroupasarchontes(perhapslooselytranslatedasgentry)whichpossessedtheresourcestoinvestinagriculturalandindustrialproduction,inthecontextofcompetitionforimperialfavorandeconomicpreeminence(Angold1984;Bouras2002;Dagron2002).

Thusduringthelatertenthandespeciallyintheeleventhandtwelfthcenturiestownsbecameeconomicallymuchmoreimportant.Thisreflectsinparttheimprovedconditionswithintheempirefortrade,commerce,andtown-countryexchange-relationstoflourish.ItalsoreflectsthedemandsofConstantinopleonthecitiesandtownsofitshinterlandfortheprovisionofbothfoodstuffsandother(p.486) goods.Concomitantly,townsbegantoplayacentralroleinpoliticaldevelopments,sothatwhereasinthelatersevenththroughthemid-eleventhcenturymostmilitaryrevoltshadbeenbasedinthecountrysideandaroundtheheadquartersofthelocalgeneral,duringtheeleventhcenturyandthereaftersuchpoliticaloppositiontothecentralgovernmentisalmostalwayscenteredintowns,whosepopulacealsoappearinthesourcesasabodyofself-awarecitizenswithspecificinterests.Communalidentitydidnotgomuchbeyondthis(althoughByzantineItalypresentssomeexceptions,especiallyinconnectionwithlocaleffortstoattainadegreeoflocalself-determination:therevoltofBariin1009/1010,althoughledbytheimperialofficerMleh,wasclearlyassociatedwithlocalaristocraticandurbandesiresforagreaterdegreeofautonomy:Martin1993,520),forByzantinetownsalsofellundertheswayoflocalmagnateswhoheldbothlandedwealthaswellasandthisisparticularlyimportantintheByzantinecontextimperialtitlesandoffices.Initself,thisdevelopmentisnodifferentfromthatfoundelsewhereinItaly,forexample,whereitwasthelocalelitesthatwerethebasisfortheevolutionofurbancommunalidentities.InByzantium,itispartlyalsoareflectionofthemilitaryorganizationoftheempirefromthemiddleofthetenthcenturyandafter,whenmanytownsbecametheseatsoflocalmilitaryofficersandtheirsoldiers;inturn,itisalsoareflectionoftheimprovedabilityofthestateafterthecrisisoftheseventhandeighthcenturiestosupplyandprovisionitssoldiersthroughcashpaymentsonly,relyingupontheexistenceoflocalmarket-exchangerelationshipstodotherest.Finally,itreflectstheincreasingdominationofthecountrysidebythesemagnates,whograduallyabsorbconsiderablenumbersofformerlyfreepeasantholdingsintotheirestates.Theconsequencewasareversaloftheprocessofruralizationofeconomicandsociallifethattypifiestheseventhandeighthcenturies(Bouras2002;Matschke2002).Nevertheless,inthecontextoftheByzantinestateapparatusandpoliticalideology,andthecontinuedpowerandattractionofaConstantinople-centeredgovernment,court,andhierarchicalsystemofprecedence,aswellasthestatesfiscaladministrativestructure,theattentionsoftheByzantineeliteremainedfocusedinandonthestateanditsapparatus,hinderingtheevolutionofamorehighlylocalizedaristocracythatinvestedintheeconomyandsocietyofitsowntownsratherthanintheimperialsystem(LaiouandMorrisson2005,90165).

MilitaryOrganizationTheByzantinestatecontinuedtomaintainaconsiderablearmy,whichconsumedaverylargeportionofthestates

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annualrevenueincomeinoneformoranother.Duringtheperiodcirca640660theevidencesuggestsverystronglythatthestatealmostranoutofcash.Butitstillhadtomaintainitsarmies.Thesolutionwastodistributethesoldiersacrosstheprovinces,sothattheycouldbemaintaineddirectlythroughtaxesonagrarianproduceraisedandredistributedinkind,ratherthanbypayingsalariesthatcouldthenbeexchangedonthemarketorbygarrisoningthem(p.487) incitiesandbringingthesuppliestothesoldiers(anexpensiveprocessrequiringconsiderableorganizationalinvestment).Itshouldbeemphasizedthatthereisnoevidenceatallthatsoldiersweregivenlandbythestate,noreven,atthisstage,thatwheretheydidcometosupporttheirmilitaryservice,thestaterecognizedthiswithspecialprivileges.Onthecontrary,soldierscontinuedtoenjoytheprivilegestheyalreadypossessedassoldiersinrespectofexemptionfromextraordinarystateburdensandtaxes.Onlyduringthelaterninthandtenthcenturiesisthereanyconcreteevidencethatsoldierslandsmilitarylandsacquiredaparticularlegalstatus.Majorurbancenterswerefortifiedandgarrisoned,andsmallcashpaymentscontinuedtobepaidtoallsoldiers.Theformerfieldarmiesbecameincreasinglyprovincializedandlocallyrooted,becomingovertimeamilitiathatneededtobereinforcedbycentrallymaintainedprofessionalunits,basedatfirstinandaroundthecapitalandlater,astheirnumberincreasedinthecontextoftheoffensivewarfareofthetenthandeleventhcenturies,dispersedacrosstheprovinces.FromthemiddleofthetenthcenturymoreandmoresuchprofessionalunitswererequiredtoprosecuteoffensivewarfareintheeastandintheBalkans;theprovincialmilitiasbecameincreasinglyineffective,andwereonlyrevived,inamuch-alteredform,duringtheComnenianperiodandaftertheimperialrecoveryfromthelossofcentralAnatoliatotheTurksafterthe1070s(Haldon1999).Localmilitiasbasedintownsasstrongpoints,stiffenedbyacoreofmercenariesandprofessionals,bothforeignandindigenous,andbasedinandaroundthecapital,becamethenorm,bothduringthetwelfthcenturyandafterthefourthcrusadeinthesuccessor-statesofNicaea,Trebizond,andEpirosand,after1261,inthereestablishedbutterritoriallymuchsmallerByzantinestateuntilitsfallin1453.

StateandEconomyThestateplayedacrucialroleintheByzantineeconomy.Indeed,theeventsoftheseventhcenturyentailedareassertionofcentralstatepoweroverlateRomantendenciestodecentralization.Thestatewasbothlimitedby,andinturntoadegreedefined,thenatureofkeyeconomicrelationships,inparticularthosethatdeterminethenatureoftheappropriation,distribution,andconsumptionofsurpluses.Thisisparticularlyclearinrespectoftheissueandcirculationofcoin,which,evenifwetakeintoaccounttheconsiderablefluctuationsinboththepurityofthegoldnomismaanditsfractions,andthedistributionandqualityofthebronzecoinageofaccount,remainedthebasicmechanismthroughwhichthestateconvertedsocialwealthintotransferablefiscalresources.Coinwasissuedchieflytooilthewheelsofthestatemachinery;paidtomaintainthearmies,thefiscalapparatus,andtheelite;andthenpartiallyrecoveredthroughtaxation.Therewereperiodswhenthissystemwasconstrainedbycircumstancestheseventhcenturyinparticular.Buttheoveralleffectofthisstatemonopolyonthedistributionandcirculationofcoin,andtheweightofthefiscalapparatusontheproducingpopulation,(p.488) wasthat,inasocietyinwhichallformsofsocialstatusandadvancementwereconnectedwiththestate(includingtheself-identityofthearistocracy),itwasanimportant(althoughprobablynotthemostimportant)factorininhibitinginvestmentincommercialexchangesandtheexpansionofthatpartoftheeconomynotconnectedwiththefiscalprocess.Thissituationitselffluctuates,ofcourse:theincreaseinagriculturalinvestmentandinpopulation,andinconsequence,ofthetaxbaseofthestateduringthetenth,eleventh,andtwelfthcenturies,appearstohavebeenaccompaniedbyacorrespondingincreaseinlocalandlonger-distancecommercialactivityandpettycommodityproduction.Butevenherethedemandsofthestatesapparatusandthefactthatthesocialeliteremainedcloselyboundupwithitservedasadamperonthedevelopmentofmarketrelationshipsentirelyfreefromstateintervention.Theeffectsofthesurvivaloflateancientstatecentralismcanclearlybeseen(Hendy1985;Morrisson2002).

Thecentralpositionofthestateislikewiseevidentinthehistoryofitseffortstoretaincontrolofitsfiscalresources.Thetensionbetweencentralauthorityandlandowningelite,whichinflectshowthestatecouldassess,raise,anddistributetax,issymptomatic(Winkelmann1987;Cheynet1990).TheabilityofthestateintheseventhandeighthcenturiestoimplementfullcontroloveritstaxbasedirectlydeterminedthewayinwhichthemiddleandlateByzantinearistocracyevolved.Similarly,thecivilwarsandthefiscalcrisisofthecentralgovernmentinthelatertenthandeleventhcenturiesespecially,thecorrespondingshiftsinboththemodeofrecruitmentandsourceofmanpowerforthearmy,aswellaschangesinprovincialandcentralcivilandfiscaladministrationcanallbe

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connectedtothenatureofthestatesrelationshipwithitsfiscalbase.Therecanbenodoubtthatthedemandsofthestateanditsrelationshiptotheproducingpopulationandtothesocialelitesititselfmaintainedorevenengenderedweredeterminingfeaturesinthewaytheeconomyfunctioned.Socialtransformationandconflictsthatoccurredthroughandinthestate,therefore,wereindeedmadepossiblebecauseofthestate.Onecanexaggeratetheserelationships,andwemustrememberthatinapreindustrialsocietytherewereathousandwaysinwhichstatecontrolatthemicrostructurallevelofsocialexistencehadlittleobviouseffect.ButtheexistenceoftheeasternRomanstateprofoundlyaffectedthestructureofeasternRomaneconomyandsociety.Neithercanproperlybeunderstoodwithouttheother(Hendy1985,602ff.,662ff.;1989;Kaplan1992;Oikonomides2002).

PoliticalIdeologyandSymbolicUniverseTheevolutionofByzantinecultureandself-definitionwenthand-in-handwiththeevolutionofthesefacetsofeasternRomancivilization,ofcourse,andfundamentallyinfluenceditstrajectoryandappearance.ThestructureofChurchinstitutions(p.489) andthenotionofphilanthropywerepartofboththeideologicalaswellasthesocioeconomicpatternofrelationshipswithinByzantinesociety,fortheChurchwasbotharepresentativeofabeliefsystemandamajorlandlord,secondonlytotheimperialstateitself.Imperialpowerpoliticswereenmeshedwithecclesiasticalpolitics,issuesofdogmaandtheology,andtherelationswithinthedominantsocialelite,fromwhomthemajorityofhigherimperialandecclesiasticalofficialsweredrawnbythetenthcentury.Politicalloyaltywasunderstoodandinterpretedwithintheconfinesofnotionsoforthodoxythatonlyveryrarelyallowedprovincialchallengestocentralpowertosucceed.Theimpositionandmaintenanceofasingle,orthodox(i.e.,neo-Chalcedonian)Christianitywasalwaysacentralissuefortherulers,evenifinterpretationsofthisvaried,andevenifpragmaticsintervenedmoreoftenthannottodiluteimperialresponsestoheresy.Internalstrifeoverissuesofdogmacouldshaketheempiretoitsfoundations;whilethesearchforrightbelieforthodoxydirectlyaffectedindividualandgroupactionsandidentities.ConflictswiththepapacysimilarlyservedtoreinforceeasternRomancertaintiesabouttheRomanpastandtheirRhomaicidentity.RomewasConstantinople,thesecondRome,nottheseatofthepapacyinItaly,atraditionandheritagetransmittedtotheRussianOrthodoxChurchandstateatMoscow,whichafterthefallofConstantinopletotheOttomansin1453becamethethirdRome,underitsownversionofthedynastictraditionembodiedintheHouseofRomanov(Obolensky1971;Mango1980;Angold1995).

Itwasthroughthispoliticaltheologythattheextractionanddistributionofsurpluswhichistosay,ineffect,thecontinuedexistenceofthestatewaslegitimated:ineffect,asetofideologicalnarrativesthathighlightedthenecessarydutyofthestateanditsrulerstodefendthefaithandtopromotethevarietyofassociatedactivitiesthatthisentailed.Atthesametime,therulershadtobeseentoreinforceandreaffirmtheirparticularsymbolicuniversethroughritualizedexpressionsoffaithandtheredistributionofconsiderableamountsofsurpluswealthtoreligiousfoundationsofvarioustypesorthroughcertainideologicallylegitimatingritualactions.IntheByzantineworld,thecomplexceremonialoftheimperialpalace,thecloserelationshipbetweentheemperor(withthestate)andtheChurch,andthesupervisionbytheChurchofpopularbeliefsandkinshipstructurescreatedanimpressiveideologicalandsymbolicsystemoflegitimation.Thesocialeliteoftheempirefollowedsuitandwerethuslockedintoaparticularstructuralsystembybotheconomicandsymbolic-ideologicalmeans.Thisisnotunique,quitethecontrary,forsimilarnetworkscanbeseenintheIslamicworld,inwesternChristendom,intheChineseempire(s),andinIndiaamongmanyexamples.Furthermore,inthecaseofbothChristianityandIslam,ritualincorporation(thatistosay,conversion)servedasafundamentaltoolofpoliticalintegrationanddomination(Haldon1993).

Theiconoclasticcontroversy,overtheappropriatenessornotofveneratingiconsorholyimages,whileitdoesnotseeminthelightofrecentresearchtohavehadtheeffectsduringtheeighthcenturyascribedtoitbybothlaterByzantinewritersandmodernhistorians,neverthelessthrewupawholeseriesofquestions(p.490) abouttheByzantineidentityanditsRomanheritagethatproduced,intheninthcentury,areclamationoftheclassicalpastinahighlyinflectedlateancientform,shapingtheorthodoxByzantineidentitythereafterandinfluencingtheevolutionoftheOrthodoxChurchandGreekcultureuptothepresentday.Inessence,iconoclasmwasacomplexoffactorswhoserootslaywellbeforetheeighthcentury:theweakeningofimperialauthority,inideologicalterms,asaresultofpoliticalandmilitaryfailuresintheperiodcirca630700;theconcomitantgrowthofadebateabouttheefficacyofdivineinterventioninhumanaffairsandthevestedpowerofrelics,saintscults,and,derivatively,ofholyimages;therelatedquestionoffreewillasopposedtodivineforesight;thedependenceoftheemperorsonanarrowcliqueofmilitaryandcivilofficials;andthelocalrootsthatreflectedalsolocalbeliefsandfearsoftheformerfieldarmiesintheprovincesandaroundConstantinople.Allthesefactorscombinedtoproduceavarietyof

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responsestotheneedtodefinetheboundariesbetweenorthodoxandheterodox,betweenwhatwouldbringpeace,stability,andmilitarysuccesstotheempireandwhathadbeenthecauseofdefeatandhumiliation,seen,ofcourse,asapunishmentvisiteduponGodsChosenPeoplebytheCreatorhimselffortheirsins.TheviolentearthquakeanderuptionontheislandofTherain726wastakenasthefinalwarninginthissense.Butintheevent,itwouldappearthatLeoIII(717741)introducedarelativelymildformoficonoclasmatermcoinedonlybythosewholatervilifiedhimandhissuccessorsarguingthatimagesshouldberemovedfromthosepartsofChurchorpublicbuildingswheretheymightinadvertentlybetakentobeobjectsofveneration.InspiteofoccasionalpersecutionsandtheproclamationofanofficialiconoclasmatachurchcouncilheldbytheemperorConstantineVin754,iconoclasmseemstohaveremainedanentirelyimperialphenomenon,attractingthefullsupportofthechurchbecauseitwasimperialpolicybutapparentlylittlepopularinterestorindeedopposition.OfficialimperialiconoclasmfadedawaywithoutresistanceafterthedeathoftheemperorTheophilosin842.Inthemeantime,however,ithadservedastheideologicalvehiclefortherecoveryofimperialfortunesinwarfareagainstbothBulgarsandArabs,forthestrengtheningofaspecificallyByzantineconceptofGod-givenimperialauthority,andforthedevelopmentofamorepoliticizedmonasticcommunitywithintheByzantineorthodoxworld(Mango1977;Stein1980;Speck2003;Auzpy2007).

OneofthemoststrikingdifferencesbetweenthepositionoftheleadersoftheEastRomanorByzantineChurchandtheremainingChristiancommunitiesinthemedievalworldafterthesixthcenturywasthesimplefactthatduringthecourseoftheseventhcenturythemajorseesofRome,Alexandria,Antioch,andJerusalemfelloutsideofRomanpoliticalauthorityandpower,sothatthesefourpatriarchateshadtodefendtheirinterestsindependentof,andsometimesinoppositionto,thestatepower.Thishadadvantages,ofcourse,sinceitmeantthattheChurchcould,wherenecessaryorappropriate,pursueapolicyindependentofthestateinissuesofdogmaandecclesiasticalpolitics.InthecaseofRomeinparticular,thismeantinthelongtermasuccessfulassertionofecclesiasticalpoliticalprimacy(andledtotheformulationbyByzantinetheologiansandchurchmenofthetheoryofthe(p.491) pentarchythenominalequalityofthefivepatriarchates).Incontrasttotheothersees,however,thepatriarchatConstantinoplewasabletocallonthefullauthorityandforceofthestatetoimplementChurchpolicy;yethealsolaboredunderthedisadvantageofhavingconstantlytomaintainapragmaticmodusoperandiwiththesecularauthority.TheemperorwasGodsvice-gerentonEarth;andwhilehewasresponsiblefordefending,maintaining,andexpandingtheorthodoxcommunity,hewasnotresponsibleforactuallysettlingissuesofdogma,whichwastheresponsibilityofthetheologicalauthoritywithintheecclesiasticalhierarchy.Fromthelatereighthcenturyamonasticvoicewasalsotobeheard,oftenveryloudly,insuchmatters;butthisdivisionofresponsibilitybetweenaseculardefenderoforthodoxyandareligiousauthorityinevitablyledtoclashes,symptomsofastructuralorsystemictensionorfaultlinebroughtintotheopenbyavarietyofpossiblemoments:aclashofpersonalities,differencesbetweenConstantinopolitanandotherecclesiasticalauthoritiesinwhichinterestsofChurchandstatewerenotseenasconsonant,andsoforth.TheByzantineimperialChurchneverthelessrepresentedaremarkablycloseand,forthemostpart,successful,ifoftenveryconservativeandbackward-looking,partnershipbetweensecularandreligiousauthority.Butitwasnocaesaropapism,aconceptthatradicallymisconstruesthepositionoftheChurchinByzantiumandthepowerandauthority,prestige,andwealthitcoulddeploy.EmperorscouldnotmanipulateorbendtotheirwilleithertheChurchasawholeorChristiandogmaandtheology,nomorethanthereligiousandspiritualleadersoftheeasternChurchweremereinstrumentsofimperialpower(Hussey1986,297368;Dagron1993,167240;256279;).

TheFailureoftheStateThefailureoftheByzantinestatecanbetracedtoacombinationofthreekeyfactors.First,theorganizationaladvantagesithadpossessedvis--visitsneighborsintheBalkans,inItaly,andincentralEuropehadbeenerodedastheyhadevolvedthepoliticalcontrolandmilitaryresourcestoenablethemtocompeteeffectively.Intermsofresourcemanagement,effectivepoliticalcontrolandmilitaryorganization,andideologicalself-representation,statessuchasthekingdomofHungaryandtheNormankingdomofSicilywereeasilytheequalsoftheByzantinesbythemiddleofthetwelfthcentury.Second,thechangingpoliticalenvironmentintheIslamicworld,notablythearrivaloftheSeljuks,theriseoftheFatimidsinEgypt,and,later,oftheOttomansinnorthwestAnatolia,impactedonByzantineabilitytomaintainequilibriumonitseasternfront.Therewerealsoeconomicimplicationsintermsoftradeandcommerce,butthisfactorinparticularrepresentsthethirdcrucialfactor,namelytherisetopoliticalandeconomicindependenceoftheItalianmaritimecities,whoseabilitytoeffectivelymonopolizethecarryingtradein

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theeasternMediterraneanbasin(Veniceinparticular)andlaterintheBlack(p.492) Sea(Genoa)damagedbothByzantinestateincomeandseabornecommerce.Thisrisewasinpartfacilitatedbytheempire,whichcametodependonthepoliticalloyaltyandnavalresourcesofVeniceinparticularinitswesternforeignpolicy,andinreturnformilitarysupportawardedvariousconcessionsinrespectofcommercialprivilegesquiteminimalatfirst,increasinglyimportantastimewenton.GenoaenteredthepictureasByzantinerulersfoundtheyneededacounterweighttoVenetianpowerandinfluence.Eventhoughtheimperialgovernmentuntiltheearlyyearsofthefourteenthcenturyatanyratewasstillabletoexertsomeinfluenceoverthedistributionofresourceswithinthelimitedterritoriesitcontrolled,itnowcompetednotjustwithanindigenousaristocracyorlandedelite(underwhichheadingwemustalsounderstandtheChurchandmonasticlandholders)but,muchmoreimportantly,withthecommercialandshippingactivitiesoftheItalianmaritimecities.Indigenousmerchantswereanactiveandimportantelementinurbaneconomiesbytheeleventhcentury,playinganimportantroleinthedistributionoflocallyproducedcommoditiesasillustratedbythefactthatmonasticlandlordswerekeentoprotecttheirrightstoshiptheirgoodsuninhibitedbystaterestrictionsandcorves.Butalthoughtheyappeartohavegainedanincreasinglysignificantroleintheprocessofwealthredistributionasawhole,theyplayednoroleinideologicaltermsinthemaintenanceoftheempireandinthesocialorderasitwasunderstood.Thecloseassociationbetweentheimperialcourtandthesystemofsocialprecedenceandesteem,andtheenormousfinancialrewardsthatcouldaccruetoindividualsthroughtheimperialsystem,meantthatinvestmentincommercialwealthwasseenasneitheraneconomicnoranideologicalpriority.Thesocialelitehadnointerestincommerce,exceptasasourceofluxuryitems,ontheonehand,andasameansofsellingoffthesurplusesfromtheirownestatesinlocaltownsorregularfairs,orinthecapital,ontheother.Andtheevidencemakesitclearthatitwasmoreoftenthannotthelandlordsownagentswhodidthesellingandbuying,ratherthanindependentmiddlemen.Inotherwords,itwasthestructureofthestateanditsfunctionalrequirements,inconjunctionwiththerelationshipbetweenthestatecenterandthedominantsocial-economicelite,whichrenderedcommercemarginalinbothpracticaleconomicandideologicalterms(Laiou2002;Matschke2002;LaiouandMorrisson2005,133165).

Thattherewasaflourishingcommerceisclear.Tradeacrossthebordersofthestatecouldbeconsiderable:BasilIIsthreattoimposeanembargoontheexportofByzantineagriculturalproducetonorthernSyriainthelastyearsofthetenthcenturywasenoughtoextractafavorablepoliticalandeconomicdealoutoftheFatimidrulersoftheregion(Farag1980).Andithasalsobeenarguedthatlong-distancetradebyByzantinemerchantsbefore1204musthavebeensubstantial,giventhenumberoftradingportsaroundtheBlackSea,forexample,fromwhichItalianswereexcludedbeforethefourthcrusade(Hendy1985,561ff.;Harvey1989,208f.;Ferluga1992b).Nevertheless,exchangewasdominatedbythepresenceofacomplexandexploitativestatefiscalapparatus,bythestatesrequirements,andbytheexistenceofConstantinople(Harvey1989,235236;Lilie1984,285f.,291;Hendy1985,570590;Laiou1990;Ferluga1992b;1987;LaiouandMorrisson2005,200230).(p.493)Investmentincommercewasthusideologicallymarginalized.ThereiseveryreasontothinkthatthereexistedaflourishingandsuccessfulmerchantclassintheByzantineempireduringmuchoftheninth,tenth,andeleventhcenturies,butlittleisknownaboutit.Yetwhateveritspositionwithregardtointernaltrade,thereisnoevidencethatitactivelycolonizedtraderoutesandmarketsoutsidethelimitsoftheimmediatepoliticalinfluenceoftheempire,exceptpossiblyinthebriefperiodfromthe1030sto1080swhenmerchantsandcommerceattainedaslightlyhigherstatusthanhadbeenusualunderemperorswhoneededtobuildupametropolitanpoliticalbase.EvenintheBlackSea,itwasstatepolicythatprotectedByzantinecommerce,notmerchantsthemselves(Lilie1984,136144).

ThismarksacrucialdifferencefromtheItalianmaritimemerchantcitieswithwhichtheByzantinesdidbusinessinthelatereleventhandtwelfthcenturies,especiallyVenice,Genoa,andAmalfi,whereeliteinvolvementintradebroughtsocialstatusandwealthandwasintimatelyassociatedwithaccesstopoliticalpower(Lopez1937;1938;Hussey1966,251274;Hyde1973;Martin1988;Abulafia1987).Theeconomicandpoliticalwell-beingofthecityasstatewastoalargeextentcoterminouswiththatofthesocialeliteanditsdependents,thetwoinextricablyboundtogetherthroughthemyriadmarketrelationshipsthatsuccessfulcommercialinvestmentsgeneratedinthehomecontext.ItaliancommercialinfiltrationoftheByzantineeconomicandexchangesphereduringthetwelfthcentury,culminatingintheconcessionsachievedundertheemperorsfollowingManuel1,wasfacilitatedbecauseItaliancommercewasonasmallscaleandregardedasunimportanttotheeconomicprioritiesofbothstateandaristocracy.DemographicexpansioninItalystimulatedthedemandforByzantinegrainandotheragrarianproduce,whichmeantthatVenetianandothertradersslowlybuiltupanestablishednetworkofroutes,ports,andmarketbases,originallybasedoncarryingByzantinebulkaswellasluxurygoodsandItalianorwesternimportsto

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Constantinople,laterexpandingtoalonger-distancecommercetomeettheneedsofagrowingItalianmarket(Lemerle1977,309;Lilie1984,290302;Ferluga1988,4041;Martin1988).

Byzantinefailuretoevolveasacommercialpoweratatimeofwidespreadeconomicandcommercialexpansionwastheresultofacomplexinteractionofstatistculturalandpolitical-economicstructuresandtheinterestsofthedominantsocial-economicelite.Indeed,fromasociologicalperspective,itoffersaclassicexampleofthewaysinwhichsetsofestablishedsocioculturalpracticesrootedinperceivedvestedinterestsanddeterminedbyaspecificculturallogicfailedtocompetewithmorepowerfulanddynamiccompetitors,andinwhichperceptionsofhowtocompetemisrecognizedthedynamicsandpotentialoftheestablishedarrangements.GiventheparticularproblemsfacedbyByzantinerulersbothbefore1081andafterthereorganizationofcentralgovernmentandfiscaladministrationunderthefirstrulersoftheKomnenosdynasty(especiallyAlexiosI,10811118),Byzantinewaysofunderstandingtheworldrenderedaninterestincommercebotheconomicallyandpoliticallyirrelevant.Whilethismayattimeshavebeenaconsciousorwilledrejection,itisimportanttounderstandthatitwasconditionedbytheparticularevolutionarytrajectoryofByzantinesocietyandstatestructures(p.494) overseveralcenturies.Itislessthefactthatinterestintradeandcommercedidnotexist,becauseatsomelevelsofsocietyitclearlydid;butratherthat,forthoseatthetopofthesocialscale,itwasperceivedasbotheconomicallyunimportantandsociallyandculturallydemeaning,whileforthosewhowereinvolvedintradeitbroughtnosocialadvancement.TherearenoByzantinemerchantaristocratsintheperiodbeforethefourthcrusade.

Theeventsof1204shatteredtheoldorder;andwhenafter1261areconstitutedcentralimperialstatewasrevived,itinhabitedaverydifferentworldindeed,notsimplyintermsofthewell-establishedpoliticalpresenceofwesternpowersintheeasternMediterraneanandAegeanregionsbutalsointermsoftheabilitytomaintainitself.Thereducedincomederivedfromtheappropriationofsurplusthroughtaxonamuchsmaller,andconstantlyshrinking,territorialbase;thefragmentationofterritoryandpoliticalauthority;andthelackofaseriousnavalpowerwithwhichtodefenditsinterestswerefundamental.Incomederivedfromtaxesoncommerceplayedaproportionatelylargerroleinrealtermsaswellasintheeyesofthecentralgovernment.Yetthetraditionalelite,withfewexceptions,wasstillbasedontheincomefromland,whilethestateitselfwasunabletocompetewithItalianandothercommercialcapitalandshipping.ByzantineattemptstochallengeVenetianorGenoesepowerweremetwithaggressionandthedestructionofByzantineshipsandfacilities.Onthewhole,andwithafewexceptions,ByzantinesorGreeksplayedagenerallysubordinateroletoItalians,asverysmall-scaleentrepreneurs,asmiddlemen,andaswholesalers;rarelyasbankersormajorinvestors,stillmorerarelyinmajorcommercialcontracts.AndinthecourseofthethirteenthcenturythemarketdemandsofItalian-bornecommercebeganalsotoinfluencethepatternsofproductionwithintheempire.Byzantinegovernmentsnolongerhadanyeffectiveroleinmanagingordirectingtheproductionofwealth(Lilie1984;Angold1984a;Laiou1990;LaiouandMorrisson2005,155165,224230).

ConclusionInabroaderperspective,theinternalarticulationofrelationsbetweencentralgovernmentsorpower-elites,andelitesmoregenerally,isespeciallyrelevantwhentheeffectsofanexpandingeconomyuponthefiscalstructuresofcentralized(orrelativelycentralized)bureaucraticstatesareconsidered.Thisisespeciallysowheretheremaybeanincreaseincommercialactivitybothwithinand,muchmoreimportantly,acrosspoliticalboundaries.IntheByzantinecase,tobeginwith,thegrowthofalocal,town-basedlandlordeliteorgentrythearchontesoftheeleventhcenturyandafterwardhasbeenreasonablyassociatedwiththeeconomicexpansionandgrowthofthatperiod.Suchdevelopmentsclearlyhadcriticalimplicationsforstatecontroloverthedistributionofresources.Thecentralgovernmentanditsfiscalapparatuswerefacedwithamorediverse,and(p.495) thereforemorecomplex,taxbase.Theywerealsopresentedwithachallengeovertheappropriationofsurpluswealth,thedistributionofsuchsurpluses,andthewayinwhichtheymightbeinvested.Thestatewantedasmuchasitcouldlayitshandsontosupportitsownapparatusandexistence.Privatelandlordsandotherswerethusincompetitionwiththestate,evenifthiswasnotalwaysexplicitlyso(Angold1984b;Harvey1989,74f.,216f.).Anditwastheformtakenbythecompetitionbetweenstatecenter,localgentry,andmagnateeliteintheparticularcontextoftheinstitutionalorganizationandideologyofByzantineeconomyandsocietythatdeterminedthepossibilitiesopentorulerstoreorganizethefiscalapparatusandmethodsofdirectcontroloverresourcesandterritory.TheByzantinestatesurvivedaslongasitdidbecauseitsestablishedstateeliteandaristocracyaswellastheevolvingprovincialandurbanelitesoftheperiodfromtheeleventhandtwelfthcenturiesonwardfullyboughtintothevaluesofthe

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established,imperialorthodoxandConstantinopolitan-centeredpoliticalandideologicalsystem,withalltheadvantagesaswellasalltheconstraintsthatfollowed.

Itisclearthattheempiresinternalhistorycanonlybeunderstoodinitsinternationalcontext.Therefore,thedissolvingeffectsofcommercialactivityonaheavilybureaucratizedstate,withrelativelyinflexiblecommandeconomymethodsofassessing,collecting,andredistributingsurpluswealthbasedpredominantlyuponagrarianproduction,contraststronglywiththedynamicoftheItaliantradingcities.Butthelatterdidnotthemselvesescapethesamestructuraldifficulties.Duringthesixteenthcentury,andasaresultoftheirsuccessandthegrowthoftheirinternationalpoliticalandculturalidentity,thesemerchanteliteswereincreasinglydrawnintoanaristocraticandanticommercialculture,adevelopmentthathadimportantconsequencesfortheirlaterdevelopmentinrespectoftherelationshipbetweenfinance,trade,andpoliticalpower(Davis1962;Georgelin1978;and,inawidercontext,Braudel1972,esp.725ff.).

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JohnF.HaldonJohnF.HaldonisProfessorofHistoryandHellenicStudiesatPrincetonUniversity.HisresearchfocusesonthehistoryoftheearlyandmiddleByzantineempire;onstatesystemsandstructuresacrosstheEuropeanandIslamicworldsfromlateancienttoearlymoderntimes;andontheproduction,distribution,andconsumptionofresourcesinthelateancientandmedievalworld,especiallyinthecontextofwarfare.

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