The Awakening of Faith, Attributed to Aśvaghoshaby Yoshito S. Hakeda

The Awakening of Faith, Attributed to Aśvaghosha by Yoshito S. HakedaReview by: Leon HurvitzJournal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 89, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1969), pp. 429-433Published by: American Oriental SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/596533 .

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Reviews of Books 429

pertise was essential because of the complex responsibilities of a state that recognized no bounds to its concerns and responsibilities, yet where on the other, there prevailed a deep Confucian suspicion of professionals and a belief in government by the example and sound instincts of moral, in- doctrinated men. Mr. Folsom concludes that when the Empire fell, "After 2000 years, the basic issue of the Confucian-Legalist controversy still had not changed-were men utensils or an end in themselves?"

I would suggest that although the terms of the argument have changed, there is more than an echo of this ancient controversy in the Red and Expert controversy of a few years ago and even more clearly in the recent Cultural Revolution, which marked the most formidable effort to date in world history to assert that society must be guided by men of belief, forever on guard against the loss of faith inherent in the professional orien- tation of technocrats.

MARY CLABAUGH WRIGHT YALE UNIVERSITY

The Awakening of Faith, attributed to Asvaghosha. Translated, with commentary, by YOSHITO S. HAKEDA. Foreword, Preface, Introduction, Notes, Bibliography, Index. Pp. xi + 128. New York and London: COLUMBIA UNI- VERSITY PRESS, 1967. $5.00.

Columbia College's sponsorship of the translation of the Ch'i hsin lun in its Program of Transla- tions from the Oriental Classics is a welcome step, but there is some room for question where the particulars are concerned. This means, specifically, that the Program is designed to make these works available to American college undergraduates, which is to say that, ideally, the translations should be made by Occidentals rather than by others. This is not an idle consideration.

In the case at point, the translator is a Jap- anese, i.e., a man attempting to translate a text from one foreign language into another. Apart from this, he reads the text in kambun kundoku, which colors his interpretation. This would be all

right for translation into Japanese, but not into English, whose sentence structure is much closer to that of Chinese. More important yet, the translator has no way of knowing the peculiar dif- ficulties confronting an Occidental who has grown up in a culture totally devoid of Buddhist influences. This is particularly relevant where the authorship is concerned. The likelihood is that the Ch'i hsin lun is a work of Chinese origin, but the Occidental reader does not care whether it is or not. The Japanese likely to read the Kishin ron, on the other hand, is no less likely to be a pious Buddhist, whose piety requires him to pay at least lip service to the notion that it is the work of Memyo bosatsu (Asvaghosa). Thus Mr. Hakeda alludes to the suspicion that it is not the work of Asvaghosa and that it may, in fact, be Chinese to begin with. Yet he consistently speaks of the "translations" of Paramdrtha and Siksdnanda, thus contriving to have it both ways at once. In other words, the present translator wishes to be "scientific" and a pious Buddhist at one and the same time-a wish about which his English-speaking readers could not care less. Thus he never pronounces himself with finality. This may possibly be because he cannot make up his own mind; if so, he should say so.

The method pursued is to translate the entire text, interspersing the translation with comments, thus reducing the annotation to a minimum. Yet there are, as was hinted above, a number of notes at the end of the book, 36 to the Introduction, 56 to the text proper, a goodly fraction of them consisting of references to primary and secondary sources. The translation, broadly speaking, is not inaccurate, but in sum tells nothing to the very person at whom it is aimed, because it wrongly gauges his background knowledge.

At the top of p. 37 is an explanation of the eight vijianas of the Yogdcqra system that is very misleading. It speaks of "the five sense perceptions, vijiana (mind), mano-viJAWana (ego-consciousness), and alaya-vijAiana (Storehouse Con- sciousness)." The five sense-perceptions, each of which is one vijfiana, are fine, but mano-vijnana is the sixth sense in a system far antedating the Yogdcara. Thus the sixth is mano-vijnana rather



430 Journal of the American Oriental Society, 89.2 (1969)

than simply vijfiana (a generic term applying to all eight) and the seventh, which indeed is "ego- consciousness," is manas, not mano-vijnidna. "Con- sciousness," by the way, is not very good for vijiiana, since the suffix -na indicates an act, while -ness indicates a state. "Storehouse consciousness," if it comes to that, is something of a monstrosity, at least as far as the English language is concerned. The French do much better with connaissance and connaissance de fonds, respectively, but one cannot use them if one is writing English.

The principal faults in the translation, such as they are, may be subsumed under three headings: (1) inaccurate grasp of Yogacqra ideas, (2) mis- construction of the text (the kambun tradition has come upon hard days in Japan), and (3) ineptness in the use of English. Two or three examples must suffice: 1) PP. 36 f.

B. The Mind in Terms of Phenomena

1. The Storehouse Consciousness The Mind as phenomena (samsara) is grounded on

the Tathagata-garbha. What is called the Storehouse Consciousness is that in which "neither birth nor death (nirvana)" diffuses harmoniously with "birth and death (samsara)," and yet in which both are neither identical nor different. This Consciousness has two aspects which embrace all states of existence and create all states of existence. They are: (1) the aspect of enlightenment, and (2) the aspect of non- enlightenment.... a. The Aspect of Enlightenment

(1) Original Enlightenment. The essence of Mind is free from thoughts. The characteristic of that which is free from thoughts is analogous to that of the sphere of empty space that pervades everywhere. The one (without any second, i.e., the absolute) aspect of the World of Reality (dharmadhdtu) is none other than the undifferentiated Dharmakaya, the "Essence- body" of the Tathdgata. (Since the essence of Mind is) grounded on the Dharmakaya, it is to be called the original enlightenment. Why? Because "original enlightenment" indicates (the essence of Mind a priori) in contradistinction to (the essence of Mind in) the process of actualization of enlightenment; the process of actualization of enlightenment is none other than (the process of integrating) the identity with the original enlightenment.

In the first place, samsara (and why this omis- sion of diacritics from romanized Sanskrit?) corresponds to sheng ssu, not to the sheng mieh of

the text; in the second place, samsdra does not mean "phenomena"; in the third, "phenomena" is a plural noun. The context demonstrates that sheng mieh is here being used in contradistinction to chen ju, which presumably corresponds to Skt. bhfitatathata. The latter is a Yogacdra notion, while the former goes back to the Abhidharma, sheng mieh being used to characterize all the dharmas, including citta (hsin). Here, in other words, having just said that citta may be viewed as bhfitatathata, our text now goes on to say that it may also be viewed in the traditional fashion as something that emerges and submerges every moment, being rooted in (not "grounded on") tathagatagarbha; that, finally, there is no difference between these two aspects. Now nien corresponds to smrti, which means "mindfulness" rather than "thought." A being unaware of anything is as untrammeled as air. The remainder of the translation is not so much inaccurate as clumsy. Let us now attempt a new translation, in the sad expectation that it too will be infelicitous in places:

What is meant by "the mind in a constant state of emergence and submergence" is that there is a mind born out of and perishing in the Buddha-in-embryo, in which it is rooted. What is called "unborn and unperishing" coalesces with what is born and perishes, so that they are neither the same nor different: this is called alaya-cognition. This cognition has two senses under which it is able to embrace all dharmas and produce all dharmas. Which are these? The first is the sense of enlightened intuition; the second is that of abstention from enlightened intuition....

The idea of "enlightened intuition" means that the substance of mind is free of mindfulness. The quality of freedom from mindfulness is, like open space, absolutely all-pervading. The Dharma-sphere has a single mark, that is, it is the undifferentiated Dharma-body of the Thus Come One. What is based on this Dharma-body is called the quintessentially enlightened state. What does this mean? It means that the "quintessentially enlightened state" is counter- posed to the "state of enlightenment that has a beginning." Yet the latter is identical with the former.

What Mr. Hakeda has rendered "thoughts" and I "mindfulness" is nien, which corresponds, as said above, to Skt. smrti. "The characteristic of that which is free from thoughts" (my "freedom from mindfulness") renders 1i nien hsiang, which,




if this text were a translation from the Sanskrit, might correspond to something like apagatasmrti- tva. "The original enlightenment" is clumsy Eng- lish, but there can be little doubt that Mr. Hakeda and I understand pen chiieh in the same sense. "Actualization of enlightenment," on the other hand, while again not inaccurate for shih chiieh, is a bit misleading. For pen chaeh is quintes- sential, it is heedless of time and space; in the sense of pen chiieh, everyone is enlightened in a state that has no beginning and no end. Shih chiieh is a state of enlightenment that has a beginning; in the sense of shih chiieh, a person begins unenlightened, then acquires enlightenment at a specific point in time. While on the lower level the two are distinct, on the upper level there is no difference between them. The relation between them and pu chiseh ("non-enlightenment") is a complex one, as the Ch'i hsin lun goes on to explain. Mr. Hakeda's comment on p. 38 sums it up with admirable succinctness:

Original enlightenment is intrinsic, but nonen- lightenment is accidental. The latter is the unac- tualized state of the same original enlightenment. That is to say, man is originally enlightened or saved, but suffers because he does not realize that he is enlightened or saved and continues on as a blind or faithless man, groping for enlightenment or salvation elsewhere. The premise is that if man is not enlightened or saved originally, there is no possibility of his attaining enlightenment or salvation at all.

2) PP. 63 f.

This permeation through the influence of the wisdom whose essence is one (with Suchness) is also di- vided into two categories (according to the types of recipients).

The one is yet to be united (with Suchness).... The other is the already united (with Suchness):

Bodhisattvas who realize Dharmakaya have obtained undiscriminating mind (and are united with the essence of the Buddhas; they, having obtained free acts,) are united with the influence of the wisdom of the Buddhas. They singly devote themselves with spontaneity to their religious disciplines, on the strength of Suchness within; permeating into Suchness (so that Suchness will reclaim itself), they destroy ignorance.

Permeation" renders hsiin hsi, which as a verb corresponds to vasayati, as a noun to vasana.

While "permeate" will do for the verb, "permeation" will not do for the noun if it means "the act of permeating," since the English word "permeation" usually signifies a state rather than an act. The first sentence renders tz'u t'i yung hsiin hsi fen pieh fu yu erh chung. The text has just said that the Buddhas and bodhisattvas, with the force of a wisdom of identical substance (t'ung t'i), perform acts in accordance with what the respective beings should see and hear, having permeated them with influences in an act that has no cessation and that is "spontaneous" (tzu jan), i.e., that comes as naturally to a Buddha or bodhisattva as breathing comes to you and me. It goes on, however, to speak of t'i yung hsiin hsi, which must signify a permeation in terms of both substance and act. (9iksdnanda lacks the hsi, but on the t'i yung both versions are unanimous.) In other words, the Buddhas and bodisattvas permeate the beings with two sorts of influence, the former not identical with both the substance and the function of Buddhahood, respectively, the latter identical with them. "Identical" repre- sents hsiang ying, which does not mean "united" in this context. While hsiang ying may represent Skt. samprayukta, it clearly does not in this context. The former is the property of prthagjanas, the Two Vehicles, and callow bodhisattvas, whose avenues of permeation are manas and manovijnana and whose religious acts are based on faith. They are not to be identified with the substance of Buddhahood, since their minds are not free of discrimination (wu fen pieh, avikalpa), nor with the function of a Buddha's wisdom, since they are not the masters of their own acts (tzu tsai yeh), i.e., since their acts are still subject to the influences of karman.

The second is identical (with Buddhahood). This means that a bodhisattva of the Dharma-body has got a mind free of discrimination, thus being identical with the substance of the Buddhas; he has got com- plete freedom of deeds, thus being identical with the functioning manifestation of the Buddhas' wisdom. He acts spontaneously, and in accord only with the force of Dharma. For he is permeated with Suchness and has extinguished ignorance.



432 Journal of the American Oriental Society, 89.2 (1969)

G L O S S A R Y

a Y ~

chen ju t'ung t'i

ch'i hsin lin 4 i tzu jan

hsiang ying tz 'u t 'i yung hsuin hsi fen pieh fu yu erh chung

hsi 0 , ;Ft g H e

hsi kn penZJ tsai yeh

hsin ken pen dcg ;X$ wei i fa 1i3i

hsuin hsi _ wu fen pi eh 4 I)

i hsin li ku wu yu nien

kambun yuini en wu

kambun kundoku

kishin ron g

kumabe jimyo 5;8

kunmdoku p

li nien hsialg

memyo bosatsu

nien

pen chuieh

pu chuiehl

sheng mieh >

sheng ssu

shih chuieh

t'i yung ?

t'Ii Yung hsulm lisi te




The phrase "whose religious acts are based on faith," above, paraphrases i hsin 1i ku, while Mr. Hakeda's "they singly devote themselves with spontaneity to their religious disciplines" (my "in accord only with the force of Dharma") renders wei i fa Hi. What this seems to mean is that, whereas the former perform their religious acts without understanding but simply out of the simple religious belief that those acts are salutary, the latter act in accord with Truth itself. Mr. Hakeda's rendition of this last paragraph certainly seems erroneous. Not only that, but "permeating into Suchness so that Suchness will reclaim itself" is quite unintelligible. 3) P. 66. "All things are originally of the mind only; they in fact transcend thoughts." This is glossed on p. 114, n. 36, as follows: "The original for 'transcend thoughts' is wu-yu-nien, literally, 'not to be in thoughts.' This implies that all things are beyond what they are thought to be by the unenlightened mind, namely, they are not real, since they are falsely predicated by the deluded mind alone. In other words, Reality defies any thought determinations." Now wu yit nien cannot possibly mean "not to be in thoughts." Not even in kundoku, in fact, can it be read nen ni oite nashi (which would have to be yit nien wu, clumsy as that would be). The yii, as a matter of fact, is nothing other than an expletive in this case, whose sole purpose is to convert into a four-syllable phrase an expression that would otherwise have only three. The Ch'i hsin lun is very fond of four- syllable phrases, and the present one occurs in an uninterrupted series of eighteen of them. The whole passagea comes to about this:

Now in what sense may one say that distinctions are manifested through the signs of origination and extinction, which are rooted in the sense of deeds: In what way are they so manifested? Since all dharmas are at bottom only mind; since there is in fact no awareness (of anything outside the mind); since there are unwarranted thoughts, which unbeknown give rise to awareness, so that one sees the realms of the several objects of perception: therefore one speaks of "ignorance" (or "nescience").

If pressed to read this in kundoku, I should read it this way:

Mata nani no gi o motte ka shabetsu wa gosshiki ni yoru shOmetsu no so o motte shimesaru to toku o uru? Kore ikanga shimesarurut Issai no ho wa honrai tada shin ni shite makoto ni nen nakeredomo shikamo moshin arite fukaku ni nen o okoshi, moro-moro no kyokai o miru o motte no yue ni mumyo to toku. nen ni oite nashi,

The reading in spite of the syntax and in ignorance of the fact that the yiu is an expletive, indicates that the kambun tradition has indeed come upon hard days. 4) P. 92. "Briefly, there are four kinds of faith. The first is the faith in the Ultimate Source." "The faith in the Ultimate Source" renders hsin ken pen. My own text, as punctuated by Kumabe Jimyo, similarly reads it kompon o shin-zu, but this is almost certainly mistaken. For the text goes on to specify three kinds of faith, viz., faith in Buddha, Dharma, and Samgha. This leads one to believe that hsin ken pen means "the root and source of faith," viz., the wellspring of faith, from which the three specific varieties just mentioned flow, i.e., shin no kompon.

In sum, it is recht gewagt-and, in most cases, highly inadvisable-for a person to undertake the translation of anything into a language other than his own.

LEON HURVITZ UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

The Nine Ways of Bon. Excerpts from gZi-brjid. Edited and translated by DAVID L. SNELL- GROVE (vol. 18 of the London Oriental Series). Pp. vii + 312, 11 plates, 22 figures. London and New York: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1967. 5 pounds 5 shillings, $16.80.

The term Bon has been used by various scholars as a general reference to the pre-Buddhist, sha- manic religious practices of early Tibet; however, Snellgrove points out in his introduction that originally the Bon (meaning 'priests who invoke') were just one among various classes of priests, whose practices and beliefs were covered by the term iha-chos, 'sacred conventions' (p. 20). Over the centuries, Bon evolved as the appellation for



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The Awakening of Faith, Attributed to Aśvaghoshaby Yoshito S. Hakeda