The Japanese Journal of American Studies, No. 14 (2003)

The Atlantic Charter of 1941:A Political Tool of Non-belligerent America

Yui HATCHO

INTRODUCTION

In August 1941, American President Franklin D. Roosevelt and BritishPrime Minister Winston Churchill held a conference and agreed on ajoint statement to be published simultaneously in Washington andLondon. The joint statement, which was soon to be known by the nameof the Atlantic Charter, announced eight principles that provided theframework for their hopes for a better future world. This paper aims toshed light on the political aspects of the making of the Atlantic Charter,and also to bring out the original character of the bilateral statement,which is not well known now.

It is not too much to say that the Atlantic Charter is one of the mostfamous documents in the history of the Second World War. The com-mon understanding of the statement is probably that it was similar inmeaning to the war aims of the United States or the Allies, or that it rep-resented an Anglo-American plan for the reconstruction of the postwarworld. Yet, is it really so? If the Charter was a statement of U.S. waraims, why did non-belligerent America make such a statement withouta declaration of war? If the Charter was a program for the postwar world,why did the two countries make it when Britain was on the edge of

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falling, after the French collapse and the opening of the German-Sovietfront? Such an understanding is inconsistent with the international situ-ation of the day.

It is this author’s opinion that the Atlantic Charter has not been care-fully studied so far as an independent subject, and that this has resultedin the Atlantic Charter of 1941 becoming confused with the principlesof the Atlantic Charter which were incorporated in the Declaration of theUnited Nations in 1942. Although both statements endorsed the sameeight points, there was a fundamental difference between them. The firstwas a bilateral statement made jointly by belligerent Britain and non-belligerent America, while the second was a multilateral statement madeby belligerent countries including America. The political implicationsof the two were different. Unlike the Atlantic Charter, the declaration ofthe United Nations in 1942 may appropriately be regarded as a statementof war aims and a program for the future.

Then, what was the Atlantic Charter of 1941 intended to be? Therehave been few studies made on this topic. Theodore A. Wilson publishedThe First Summit in 1969 and its revised edition in 1991, which is nowthe standard work on the Atlantic Conference. He narrates the scenes anddiscussions of the Conference with skill, and in so doing describes howthe Atlantic Charter was drafted. Yet, the Charter is not his central inter-est. While Wilson characterizes the Charter as “the embodiment of a realyet informal alliance between Roosevelt and Churchill and their coun-tries,” he does not give it any further thought in the context of America’swartime diplomacy.1

The Atlantic Charter is a related collection of essays published fol-lowing an international conference held in 1991 at the Memorial Uni-versity of Newfoundland to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of theAtlantic Conference. Eight scholars, from the United States, Britain andCanada, contributed papers to the book, completing the first study specif-ically focused upon the Atlantic Charter. The book is noteworthy in pointof introducing studies on the British and Canadian views of the Charter,and also on the Charter’s effect upon the future development of the post-war reconstruction. Yet, these essays do not fully discuss the creation ofthe Charter, either. Theodore A. Wilson expanded his earlier study inthis collection, adding analysis of Roosevelt’s awareness of public opin-ion, but his basic understanding of the Charter remains the same as inhis earlier works. David Reynolds introduces an interesting study, try-ing to “establish the ‘meaning’” of the Atlantic Charter. Yet, his analysis

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is limited to the meaning for the British.2 But for these books, there isnot any satisfactory work giving more than a few pages to the discussionof the Atlantic Charter. So far, no Japanese scholar in the field of AmericanStudies or International Relations has attempted to examine it.

It cannot be denied, however, that the Atlantic Charter is an importantdocument, referred to by almost all books on the diplomatic history ofthe Second World War. This paper suggests keeping the Atlantic Charterof 1941 distinct from other references to the Charter made afterward, andevaluating the former in the context of Roosevelt’s handling of the for-eign policies since the opening of war.

I AMERICA’S INITIATIVE IN PEACE MAKING AS A LEADING

NEUTRAL COUNTRY

America’s immediate response to the outbreak of war in Europe wasPresident Roosevelt’s proclamation of neutrality. In his radio address onSeptember 3, 1939, he stated, “Let no man or woman thoughtlessly orfalsely talk of America sending its armies to European fields.”3 Hisspeech adhered to a series of Neutrality Acts legislated since 1935 underthe initiative of Congress, intending to keep the nation out of foreignwars. Yet, his neutrality was not necessarily the same as WoodrowWilson’s neutrality, proclaimed a quarter century before. Wilson expect-ed the U.S. to “exercise all the rights of neutrality under internationallaw.” He said he supported neutrality because “there is something somuch greater to do than fight.”4 Roosevelt, however, said “even a neu-tral has a right to take account of facts.” When “peace has been brokenanywhere, peace of all countries everywhere is in danger,” he insisted.He did not ask the nation to remain neutral both in thought and deed. Hehimself was not.5

Roosevelt’s position toward war was soon revealed in the State of theUnion Message of 1940. He stated that his country should strive withother nations “to encourage the kind of peace that will lighten the trou-bles of the world,” and expressed America’s enthusiasm for taking theworld leadership for “a renewal of world peace.”6 His suggestion soontook shape in two diplomatic initiatives. One was a call for a conferenceof the neutrals, and the other was the Welles mission to the key coun-tries in Europe. Since the Western front still remained in the state of a“phony war,” it seemed to be a good time for the Roosevelt Adminis-tration to initiate peace moves as a neutral nation.

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The plan of the conference developed from the study of the AdvisoryCommittee on Problems of Foreign Relations, established within theState Department in preparation for the nation’s role as envisaged byRoosevelt. In mid-January 1940, they conceived a plan for a conferenceto discuss postwar economic cooperation and disarmament. By the endof the same month, the Committee prepared a proposed agenda for theconference. Then, Secretary Hull, who was a passionate follower of free-trade policy, initiated diplomatic talks with the governments of forty-seven neutral countries, expressing the importance of exchanging viewson “two basic problems” before any peace conference: “a sound interna-tional economic system” and “armament limitation and reduction.”7

Those countries included twenty American republics, European coun-tries such as the Baltic States, Italy, Spain, and Yugoslavia, and someArab countries. Only Thailand was invited from Asia. Most countriesthat received Hull’s invitation reacted favorably. By the end of May, thir-ty countries had expressed full approval of the conference. All thepreparatory work for the conference was completed by April.

This proposal for the neutral conference revealed two important char-acteristics of the American initiative. First, it started as an attempt toorganize neutral nations. Since the American people were cherishingneutrality as part of their national identity in those days, any Americanattempt to play a more positive international role had to start from thisposition, that is, as a neutral nation leading other neutral nations. Second,the American initiative was directed to the task of formulating basic prin-ciples for a future international order. The American policy makers werecertain that the “only hope of constructive accomplishment” lay in the“firm prior acceptance of sound policies by as many nations as possi-ble.”8 How to realize the agreed principles in the world was a matter tobe considered later. America would make her commitment to worldaffairs by way of committing herself to certain basic principles of theinternational order. This position was the result of the bitter experiencethat President Wilson had been through in the previous war. The AtlanticCharter came later as a part of the policy giving priority to an interna-tional statement of principles.9

About the same time, another attempt for peace had been undertakenon Roosevelt’s initiative. This was a direct diplomatic approach to thebelligerents. In February 1940, the President announced Welles’ one-month tour to Germany, France, Britain, and Italy.10 The Welles missionin those countries was to “find out only what the views of the four gov-

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ernments might be as to the present possibilities of concluding any justand permanent peace.” The President did not empower Welles to makeany proposals or enter into any commitments. Yet, if he “thought it wise,”Welles was allowed to “discuss peace on the ‘old basis of disarmamentand an opening of trade,’ or to revive the President’s peace proposal toHitler of April 1939.” This instruction indicates that Roosevelt was,regardless of its real possibility, still interested in the chance of restor-ing peace in Europe on the status quo of April 1939. If anything hadworked, he might have been able to delay a German offensive, give theAllies a chance to strengthen their defenses, or discourage Mussolinifrom entering the war.11

Welles’ tour started in mid-February and lasted for forty days. He firstvisited Rome and met Galeazzo Ciano, Foreign Minister, and DuceBenito Mussolini himself. Italy was Germany’s ally but not at war.Welles had imagined that, only in Italy, “the policy of this governmentmight have some concrete effect.” Yet, the Italian response was disap-pointing. When Welles questioned Mussolini about the possibility forpeace, Mussolini explained he saw hope for it only if the Allied gov-ernment “would not prove completely intransigent” on the matter ofGerman retention of her “lebensraum” in Central Europe. When Wellessounded out the Italian response to the planned conference of neutrals,Ciano expressed little hope. The Italians knew that “if a ‘real war’ brokeout, there would be no possibility for a long time to come of any peacenegotiation.” And they recognized that the “real war” was not very faraway.12 During the meeting, the Italians did not hide their “anxiety”about Germany and her military power, but showed no “predilection”towards Britain or France, either.13

In Berlin, Welles met Adolf Hitler and several top German officials,such as Von Ribbentrop, Minister for Foreign Affairs. During the meet-ing with Hitler, Welles talked about Roosevelt’s peace proposal, basedon the limitation and reduction of armaments and sound internationaleconomic relationships. Hitler did not show any interest, however.Looking back over German foreign policy since 1935, he spoke of theconciliatory attitude that Germany had taken toward diplomatic talks,and insisted that German efforts had been repeatedly ignored. As for theidea of unrestricted international trade, he doubted its efficiency as thecure for all of the world’s economic problems. It was “only too tragi-cally plain,” Welles learned, “that all decisions had already beenmade.”14

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In Britain and France, Welles met many present and former officials.They were no less determined and resolute than the Germans. FrenchPrime Minister Edouard Daladier questioned the practicability of theidea of disarmament while his country was at war with Germany. He alsoinsisted that “actual disarmament” would be impossible unless the mostpowerful neutrals were willing to take the responsibility of enforcing itif necessary. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, who had been“deceived” and “lied to” by Germany, was certain that “Hitler did notdesire a peaceful Europe founded upon justice, reason and security.” Solong as the Nazi government existed, “there could be no hope of any realpeace.” Welles also met future Prime Minister Churchill, and found himinsisting on “outright and complete defeat of Germany.”15

Retuning to Washington, Welles reported to the President and theSecretary of State the difficulty of pursuing peace under the present cir-cumstances. He indicated two major obstacles. First was the matter of“security.” He stated that the “basic problem I feel is the problem of secu-rity, inseparably linked to the problem of disarmament.” The other wasthe matter of “statesmanship” or “leadership.” He found no signs ofstatesmanship in the countries he visited, even though he felt it wasimperatively required at the time. Listening to Welles’ report, Rooseveltissued a statement to the Press that there was “scant immediate prospectfor the establishment of any just, stable, and lasting peace in Europe,”and, that the result of the Welles mission would be of “great value” whenthe time comes for the realization of such a peace.16

Welles’ talks with the leaders of the four powers in Europe revealeda great gap between the American approach to peace and the attitude ofthe European leaders. The Americans spoke of liberal trade and disar-mament while the Europeans were preoccupied with war. Hitler mighthave been interested in discussing how to maintain balance of powersamong the nations but not in the abstract principles of a peaceful worldorder. The American attitude was irritating to the British and the French,who had finally abandoned the policy of appeasement. They were notmuch interested in discussing principles for the postwar internationalorder. Welles took this attitude for a lack of statesmanship. For him,statesmanship was a leader’s ability to envision the outline of a peace-ful world.17

In April, Germany started the blitzkrieg in the West, invadingDenmark, Norway, Holland, and Belgium. Italy declared war on Britainand France. On June 17, the French Government decided to seek an

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armistice with Germany. In September, the two Axis countries in Europeand Japan concluded the Tripartite Alliance Pact, which was intended todeter America’s entry to war in Asia or in Europe. The phony war peri-od, when the United States might have been able to make her positioneffective upon the course of war as a neutral, was over.18

II CONTROVERSY OVER THE U.S. COMMITMENT

The German blitzkrieg, particularly the German victory over France,gave America a great shock in the summer of 1940, significantly alter-ing its leaders’ perception of war. Roosevelt had not felt any direct threatfrom Nazi Germany, as Britain and France had seemed to be able tocounterbalance the German power. When Germany was victorious inWestern Europe, however, he perceived Nazi Germany a great threat tothe security of the United States. The United States should give activesupport to Britain to avoid the worst-case scenario of its defeat by theGermans.19

While embarking on a great military build-up program for nationaldefense, the U.S. Government began to transfer military supplies toBritain, and made the Destroyers-for-Bases deal in September 1940.20 InDecember, Roosevelt called for the nation to be “the great arsenal ofdemocracy.” Step by step, the President moved to strengthen an infor-mal Anglo-American alliance against Nazi Germany. The enactment ofthe Lend-Lease bill in the spring of 1941 was his great legislativeachievement in this direction.21

By this time, isolationist opinions in the United States had been con-siderably weakened. But their influence was still far from negligible.U.S. Senator Burton S. Wheeler, for example, known as an advocate ofisolationism, delivered a speech in December 1940 warning theAmerican public of a national emergency. In his understanding, themajor dangers to democratic America were not foreign but domestic, thatis, unresolved problems at home. He insisted on settling domestic prob-lems “before we undertake to settle the problems of Asia, Africa,Australia, South America and Europe.”22 Similar opinions came fromCharles A. Lindbergh, as well, who was an active speaker for the isola-tionist group, the America First Committee. He believed that democra-cy could “be spread abroad by example, but never by force.”23 They didnot differ much from Roosevelt in believing in the importance of democ-racy, but differed greatly in their understanding of how best to defend it.

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Roosevelt is one of the first presidents to demonstrate an ability in pub-lic diplomacy. Unlike other presidents, he paid attention to the publicacceptability of his policy. When he thought public support lacking, heattempted to increase it.24 He used his public speeches as chances to “edu-cate” the public towards a deeper involvement in world affairs. InJanuary 1941, Roosevelt revealed the political principles that were tobecome “the basis for our consideration of a future world order”: thefreedom of speech and expression, the freedom of worship, the freedomfrom want, and the freedom from fear—everywhere in the world. Ac-cording to Roosevelt, the future world would guarantee these four essen-tial human freedoms, and that world would be attainable in their timeand generation.25 In May 1941, Hull introduced America’s economicprinciples in a radio speech: no extreme nationalism in trade; non-dis-crimination in international commercial relations; guarantee of rawmaterial to all nations; international agreements regulating the supply ofcommodities; and the institutions and arrangements of internationalfinance. The world order Hull described was one in which independentnations would cooperate freely with each other for their mutual economicgain.26

The Roosevelt Administration’s bright vision of a world enjoying theFour Freedoms and free trade stood in great contrast to the gloomy sit-uation of the world at the beginning of 1941. It may seem to make nosense that the American leaders were speaking of the basic features orprinciples of the future world when the United States was still not at warin a world in which the forces of aggressive totalitarianism were ram-pant. But this advocacy of idealistic visions was probably the only wayfor them to lead the American people toward greater involvement inworld affairs.27 And so far as America involved itself in Roosevelt’s aidpolicies, they needed a British statement on war aims which was agree-able to the American public. Such a statement was a prerequisite to forg-ing the Anglo-American relationship into a firm partnership.

The British Government had been without any blueprint for the future.The Cabinet thought that it would be premature to make any commit-ment to any future plan. As early as November 1939, the Prime Ministerclearly stated that, in his mind, he made a “distinction between war aimsand peace aims.”28 He said that Britain’s war aims were “to defeat ourenemy.” Yet, peace aims, he argued, would deal with “something to beachieved in conditions we cannot at present foresee.” In the circum-stances under which nobody knew how long the war would last, in what

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direction it would develop, and who would be by Britain’s side, “it wouldbe absolutely futile—indeed, it would be worse than futile, it would bemischievous—if we were to attempt to lay down to-day the conditionsin which the new world is to be created.”29 Besides, there was “the his-tory of the commitments” made in World War I, in the minds of theCabinet members, “how undesirable it was to lay down in advance theconditions of a post-war settlement.”30

Gradually, though, the British Government began to recognize theimportance of the politics of war aims in developing the Anglo-Americanpartnership. In the early months of 1941, the Cabinet adopted a semi-official document of British war aims, and sent it to the State Department.31

Then, on May 29, in a way answering and supporting Roosevelt’s “Na-tional Emergency” speech, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden made apublic statement on war aims. It was the first and the only public state-ment made in Britain before the Atlantic Charter. Churchill only gave it“grudging acquiescence” when his advisers assured him that “it con-tained nothing sensitive.”32 Americans considered this British statementto be “one of the authoritative indications of British war aims,” thoughin fact it revealed, if anything, the difference in the future plans for thepostwar world between the two countries.33

From the spring of 1941, rumors of negotiated peace and territorialdeals were often reported to the State Department. In June, it was said,“Hess had brought to Great Britain specific and concrete German peaceproposals.”34 In July, N. N. Butler of the British Embassy came to Wellesand passed on to him the information that there was a report that Hitlerwas going to end his campaign after he occupied Leningrad and Moscow,and that he would put forward a peace proposal to Great Britain as soonas the campaign ended. Such a proposal, if it came, would have been aheavy blow to the public morale. An American newspaper article asked,“Would a war-weary world clamor for peace—any kind of peace to stopthe slaughter? Would a peace movement gain a foothold in England?Would a peace-at-any-price cause spread in the United States?”35 Thereeven existed rumors in July that Britain and the Soviet Union were mak-ing deals as to their future spheres of influence, and also, that the Britishhad promised “to set up Yugoslavia again as it formerly existed.” At atime when the British war aims were not certain, rumors of negotiatedpeace or secret agreements sounded more likely.36

The U.S. Government could not leave these rumors unchecked.Assistant Secretary A. A. Berle, who had considerable interest in postwar

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peace-making, suggested to Welles that “if we want to have anything tosay about the post-war settlement, we had better start now. Otherwise,we shall find, as President Wilson did, that there were all kinds of com-mitments which we shall be invited to respect, and we shall not be ableto break the solid front any more than we were at Versailles.”37 Withina week, Welles, on behalf of the President, sent a cable to Churchill toinquire about this rumor. The cable began with an excuse for mention-ing a matter “not in any way serious” but causing “unpleasant repercus-sions” in the United States, and asked the British to issue an overallstatement that stated clearly the non-existence of “post war peacecommitments as to territories, populations or economies” so that thePresident could back it up in strong terms. Although it was a requestmade in a polite manner, the American Government intended to remindthe British not to make any commitment to the postwar settlement behindthe scenes. Roosevelt warned that “it seems to me that it is much tooearly for any of us to make any commitments for the very good reasonthat both Britain and the United States want assurance of future peaceby disarming all troublemakers and secondly by considering the possi-bility of reviving small states in the interest of harmony even if this hasto be accomplished through plebiscite methods.”38

After all, in spite of growing military cooperation between Americaand Britain, they had not reached agreement on the vision of the post-war world. While American principles were revealed, the British state-ments on war aims were, in Americans’ eye, reactive, obscure in theiroverall vision, and far from satisfying. The gap was becoming danger-ous, especially when Germany overwhelmed the Soviet forces in theeastern front, and the opinions of the American isolationists soundedplausible to the American public.

III NEGOTIATED ALLIANCE FOR PEACE

A report came in from Washington and London simultaneously onAugust 14, 1941. In Washington, Press Secretary Stephen T. Early, andin London, the Lord Privy Seal Clement Attlee, read out the same state-ment announcing the Atlantic meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill, andtheir joint declaration. As Roosevelt expected, the news caught people’sattention, as many had been wondering about the whereabouts of theleaders of the two democracies. They had been “missing” for a week.

The joint statement enumerated eight points: no territorial aggran-

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dizement; opposition to undemocratic territorial change; respect for sov-ereign rights for all peoples; access on equal terms to trade and raw mate-rials; international collaboration for the improvement of labor standards;the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny and freedom from fear; freedomof the seas; and the abandonment of the use of force made along withthe establishment of a permanent system of general security. These wereintroduced as the “common principles” on which Roosevelt andChurchill based their hopes for a better future for the world.”39

The Atlantic Conference and the joint statement had originally beenRoosevelt’s idea. About Christmas time, 1940, he had thought ofmeeting Churchill to discuss numerous issues between the two countries.Without using ordinary diplomatic channels, Harry S. Hopkins,Roosevelt’s most trusted advisor, arranged the meeting independently,setting an approximate meeting date of March or April. The pending leg-islation of the Lend-Lease Act and the aggravated war situation in Greeceand Crete postponed the meeting until August. For the security of thetwo traveling leaders, but also in order to dramatize the news of theirconference, the public was kept strictly in the dark in both nations. Mostof the officials who attended the meeting were notified about their triponly a couple of days before departure.40

Because of the unique setting of the meeting, Roosevelt seems to havebroached to Churchill the idea of making a joint statement casually, justbefore the latter set out on his journey. Roosevelt, Churchill, Welles, andSir Alexander Cadogan, the British Under Secretary, joined in draftingthe joint declaration during the meeting. After redrafting it three times,the four participants reached agreement on the text of the declaration,and cabled it to their respective countries for delivery to the public onthe 14th.41

The announcement of the Anglo-American joint statement was posi-tively received by the media in both countries. The New York Times, forexample, wrote: “No other act of Washington or London could notifythe world so unmistakably that the two democracies are united by a com-mon idea and are determined to pursue together to the end their commonpurpose.”42 The British Government and public also recognized thesignificance of that aspect, and later came to appreciate that the aims ofthe Charter “sustained British opinion throughout the terrible dangers ofthe months following the collapse of France.” Indeed, it was in Britainthat the joint declaration was given the dignified name, “the AtlanticCharter.”43

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For those who participated in the meeting, the implications that theCharter came to hold were appreciated, because the two countries hadnot been without mutual misgivings regarding the other’s intentions. Forthe United States, the Charter showed British commitment to theAmerican idea of future world order, and denied Britain the possibilityof making an armistice with Nazi Germany or of going back to the oldorder of power politics. Without such a British commitment, theAmerican public could not have supported any further Roosevelt’s pol-icy of greater cooperation with Britain and of more active involvementin the war. Removal of American anxiety over the British vision for thefuture was “uppermost” in the President’s mind when he came to theConference.44 Britain, which had become increasingly impatient of theAmerican assistance “short of war,” could now expect, at least, that theAmerican commitment to war aims had moved a step closer to wherethe British stood at war.45 Both sides realized the effect which these var-ious interpretations on the agreement had on the other.

During the conference, the two sides disagreed with each other aboutcertain principles, such as the fourth point, about free trade, and theeighth point, about the establishment of an international organization.For Americans, as shown, free trade policy was indispensable for therealization of peaceful world. The British, however, bound by the OttawaAgreements, could not accede to such a policy without consulting othercabinet members and the Commonwealth. It was Roosevelt, on the otherhand, who was opposed to the eighth point, dealing with the establish-ment of an international organization, reasoning that it would cause “sus-picions and opposition” in America. The conference seemed to be at animpasse. After taking a break, however, the participants managed towork through the disagreement by reaching a compromise, or, in otherwords, by replacing the controversial phrases with ambiguous ones thatwould satisfy both sides.46

While setting forth universal guidelines for peace, Roosevelt careful-ly calculated how much or how little he would make commitments inthe joint statement. He enhanced the statement by making “the defeat ofNazi tyranny” their common purpose, but he deleted the greater part ofthe bellicose preamble from the draft the British proposed.47 For him, itwas important for the two nations to pursue the common purpose by dif-ferent means, one by war and the other by means short of war. That wasthe most Roosevelt was able to offer Churchill, because of his domesticpolitical context. Churchill and his Government accepted this as the best

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obtainable from Roosevelt under those circumstances. Even though theUnited States could not become a party to a military alliance, it becameBritain’s ally on war aims. The British hoped that this would eventual-ly make America a full-fledged participant in war.48

The Anglo-American pledge of cooperation had considerable impactnot only upon the British but also upon the Nazis. It brought psycho-logical pressure to bear on Germany. Although the British had beenaware of the psychological aspect of this war, they had not launched acounteroffensive against the Nazi’s imperial world order. The British,therefore, made the most of this opportunity, publicizing the Conferenceand the joint statement in their international publicity. In addition, thejoint declaration of the two leaders was intended to encourage the SovietUnion, which had been fighting Germany since June 1941. Rooseveltand Churchill agreed on the need of offering aid to that country.49

The Nazis reaction was, naturally, hostile. They downgraded the im-portance of the Charter, and emphasized the Charter’s unpopularity inBritain and the United States. Yet, their repeated coverage of the Charterin newspapers told its impact. The Hitler-Mussolini meeting held twoweeks after the Atlantic meeting tried to imitate the publicity effect ofthe Atlantic Conference.50

CONCLUSION

The Atlantic Charter was not only a symbolic statement of futurevision of the world but also one of America’s political tools in dealingwith several problems simultaneously. America had been showing inter-est in the making of a new world order, and so it was probable that theAtlantic Charter came as a part of that policy. Yet, if such was the onlypurpose of making the Charter, Roosevelt could have expressed his pro-gram unilaterally, utilizing years of study made in the State Department.He could have demanded complete agreement to the American idea fromthe British, too. Yet, Roosevelt did not do so.

Instead, he made a joint statement on the basic principles, and gavepriority to the encouragement of the British. As to the program of thepostwar world, Roosevelt contented himself with the minimum agree-ment with the British, because it was useful in easing the public anxietyin the U.S. Public support was necessary to continue Roosevelt’s policyaiding the British. After all, it was of the utmost importance for thenon-belligerent U.S. to support the British morale for the moment and

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maintain the possibility of being able to realize the American idea offuture world order later. The Atlantic Charter was, above all, anAmerican cheer for the British, and also Britain’s agreement to theAmerican program.

In conclusion, the diplomatic style seen in the making of the AtlanticCharter was typical of America’s wartime diplomacy. In other words,the U.S. insisted on making a specific framework at conferences, but itshowed a conciliatory attitude toward details and measures for the mate-rialization of programs. This was the style taken not only at the negoti-ating table with Britain but also in the negotiations with the Soviet Unionwhich were begun soon after the Atlantic Conference. In a way, owingto this style, Roosevelt was able to bring various countries together, andlead them toward the American goal. A major part of the significance ofthe Atlantic Charter was that it represented the first example of what wasto become the characteristic style of American diplomacy.

NOTES

1 Theodore A. Wilson, The First Summit (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,1991), 227.

2 Douglas Brinkley, The Atlantic Charter (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 129.3 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “This Nation Will Remain Neutral,” Vital Speeches of the

Day, September 15, 1939, 712–713.4 Frank Ninkovich, The Wilsonian Century (Chicago: The University of Chicago

Press, 1999), 53–55.5 Franklin D. Roosevelt, op. cit.; and David Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor

(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001), 63. Ninkovich explains the difference between the con-ceptions of neutrality in the 1910s and 1930s, saying that “the object of the new neu-trality (1930s-style) was to avoid war, even if that meant abandoning the allegiance toneutral rights.” Ninkovich, op. cit., 113. A turning point of Roosevelt’s prewar foreignpolicy, Barbara Rearden Farnham explains, was the Munich crisis. Roosevelt conclud-ed on that occasion that Hitler was “implacably aggressive and that a German-domi-nated Europe would pose a clear security threat to the United States.” Barbara ReardenFarnham, Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press,1997), 5–8.

6 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “The State of the Union,” Vital Speeches of the Day, January15, 1940, 194–196.

7 Ninkovich, op. cit., 113; Harley Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation,1939–1945 (Westport: Greenwood Publishers, 1949), 18–24; Memorandum on WorldOrder, Box 191, Folder 7, Welles Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (hereafter citedas FDRL); and “Area of Discussion as Regards Post-War Problems,” Welles Papers,FDRL.

8 Memorandum by Berle, January 31, Box 191, Folder 7, Postwar Foreign PolicyFiles, 1940–43, Welles Papers, FDRL.

9 Memorandum, July 7, 1941,Book 4, Sherwood Collection, Harry L. Hopkins Papers,FDRL.

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10 Though Italy was not yet a belligerent, Welles visited this country because it was“an Axis partner.” As for the Soviet Union, Roosevelt did not think the visit would “serveany useful purpose,” because the two had concluded the Nazi-Soviet Non-AggressionPact in August previous year. The pact guaranteed the other’s neutrality while at war.Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers,1944), 73.

11 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940, General, Vol. 1, 12 (hereafter cited asFRUS); Welles, op. cit., 73; and Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and AmericanForeign Policy 1932–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 216. DavidReynolds adds Roosevelt’s unspoken reason for this Welles mission: election politics.Reynolds, op. cit., 74–75.

12 Welles, op. cit., 78, 85–88, 139–140. When Mussolini first met Welles, the formerwas to meet Hitler in a few days at the Brenner Pass, and the Duce suspected that Hitlerwould demand Italy’s immediate entry into war. When Mussolini met Welles again afterWelles’ visit to Germany, Britain and France, Mussolini, having finished the meetingwith Hitler on March 18, had found that Germany “would undertake an immediate offen-sive; that she would conquer France within three or four months, and that thereafterGreat Britain would be forced to her knees.”

13 FRUS, 1940, General, Vol. 1, 27.14 Welles, op. cit., 109.15 Ibid., 121–135.16 FRUS, 1940, General, Vol. 1, 20, 116–117.17 The British government received the impression that Welles was “affected to some

extent by Mussolini and [had been] impressed in Berlin with the pretended invincibili-ty of Germany.” The British anticipated that Welles would suggest to the President tooutline peace terms which would not eliminate Hitler’s regime but would give securityto the Allies. British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, I (London: H.M.S.O.,1970), 164–170.

18 By this time, Britain and France were also accelerating their military plans to counterGerman offense. Reynolds, op. cit., 74–75.

19 Reynolds claims that the “fall of France was the second” turning point in the evo-lution of Roosevelt’s foreign policy. Reynolds, op. cit., 174. Roosevelt came to recog-nize the direct threat of Germany as he received repeated warnings of German subversionin governments in Latin America. Soon he began to develop the military relationshipfurther by approving secret military talks between U.S. and Latin American officers, andsigning a congressional resolution authorizing the sales of guns and ships for cash.Robert Dallek, op. cit., 233.

20 For a British account of the Destroyers-Bases Deal, see British Foreign Policy inthe Second World War, I, 333–383. Churchill praised this American decision highly andappreciated its diplomatic importance as well as the material. Ibid., 369.

21 The Lend-Lease Act passed with a Senate vote of 60 to 31 and a House vote of 317to 71 by March 11. Dallek, op. cit., 252–261. Wendell Willkie, Roosevelt’s Republicanopponent, did not make foreign affairs an election issue. Dallek, op. cit., 247–251.Reynolds, op. cit., 100.

22 Burton S. Wheeler was an U.S. Senator from Montana. “America’s PresentEmergency,” Vital Speeches of the Day, January 15, 1941, 203–205.

23 Charles A. Lindbergh, “Election Promises Should Be Kept,” Vital Speeches of theDay, June 1, 1941, 482–483; and Lindbergh, “We Are Not Prepared for War,” VitalSpeeches of the Day, February 15, 1941, 266–267.

24 Farnham, op. cit., 85–86. Some people criticize Roosevelt for being too sensitive topublic opinion. But Betty Houchin Winfield mentions the remark of Hadley Cantril’s,

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an editor of the Princeton American Institute of Public Opinion, that Roosevelt “neveraltered his goals because public opinion appeared against him or was uninformed.”Rather, he used information to “bring the public around more quickly or more effec-tively to the course of action he felt was best for the country.” Betty Houchin Winfield,FDR and the News Media (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 214–225.

25 Willard Range, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s World Order (Athens: University ofGeorgia Press, 1959), 132–133; and Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (NewYork: The Macmillan Company, 1948), Vol. 2, 1630.

26 Cordell Hull, “Aid to Britain Will Be Delivered,” Vital Speeches of the Day, June1, 1941, 484–485.

27 Henry Kissinger stated, “Americans could be moved to great deeds only through avision coinciding with their perception of their country as exceptional,” and admittedthat Wilson “knew how to move the American people.” Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 44.

28 This time, the Prime Minister was Neville Chamberlain.29 Foreign Office Record, 371/24362, Public Record Office (hereafter cited as PRO).30 British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, II (London: H.M.S.O., 1970),

198–199.31 Wilson, op. cit., 158–159.32 David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937–41 (London:

Europa Publications Limited, 1981), 256.33 Wilson, op. cit., 159.34 Memorandum, June 22, 1941, Folder 4, Europe Files, 1933–1943, Welles Papers,

FDRL.35 Turner Catledge, “Dramatic Talks at Sea Spike a Hitler ‘Peace’,” New York Times,

August 17, 1941; and “Conference at Sea Forms U.S.-British Front to Crush Axis andShape Peace,” Washington Post, August 15, 1941.

36 Memorandum, July 8, 1941, August 1 and 2, Diary July 41-March 42, Box 213,Berle Papers, FDRL; and FRUS, 1941, General, Vol. 1, 342.

37 Memorandum, July 7, 1941,Book 4, Sherwood Collection, Harry L. Hopkins Pa-pers, FDRL. Berle also suggested that “the President ought now, by personal word, tointimate to the British that he expects to be consulted about any peace settlement, andrequest that the British pledge that prior to the entering of any commitment they will soconsult; and that no commitments which they consider binding have as yet been enteredinto.”

38 FRUS, 1941, General, Vol. 1, 342. The British response was made during theAtlantic Conference. Ibid., 351–352.

39 Ibid., 367–369.40 Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: Harper and Brothers,

1948), 230; Memorandum by the president, August 23, 1941, President’s Secretary File(Safe): Atlantic Charter Meeting (1), FDRP, FDRL; and Wilson, op. cit., 30.

41 Sherwood, op. cit., 350. There are no documents surviving that explain the linkingof the meeting with the joint statement, except participants’ memoirs. Wilson sorts outthe several sources of information on this matter well. Theodore A. Wilson, “The FirstSummit,” in The Atlantic Charter, 13.

42 “The Rendezvous with Destiny,” New York Times, August 15, 1941. The Depart-ment of Treasury summarized American reactions. “The aftermath of the conference,”August 22, 1941, Morgenthau, PSF, FDRP, FDRL.

43 British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, II, 202–204; and “London ExpectsMore From Talks,” New York Times, August 15, 1941. Counselor of Embassy in London

138 YUI HATCHO

reported British reactions to the statement. Herschel V. Johnson to the Secretary of State,August 22, 1941: (National Archives Microfilm Publication M973) Records of theDepartment of State, 740.0011 European War 1939/14527–8, Record Group 59, Na-tional Archives Building, Washington D.C. (NARS)

44 Welles, op. cit., 6.45 Ibid.46 FRUS, 1941, General, Vol. 1, 361–363; and British Foreign Policy in the Second

World War, II, 198–200.47 Welles, op. cit., 7–15.48 Churchill expected more at the conference. David Reynolds, ‘The Atlantic “Flop”:

British Foreign Policy and the Churchill-Roosevelt Meeting of August 1941,’ TheAtlantic Charter (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 136. But Churchill appreciatedthe Atlantic Charter, as well. FO 371/28903.

49 FRUS, 1941, General, Vol. 1, 359, 367–369; Washington Post, August 19, August28; War Office Records 193/326, PRO; and ‘World-Wide Broadcast,’ Times (London),August 15, 1941. Nicholas John Cull, Selling War (New York: Oxford University Press,1995), 152–153, 162.

50 Records of the Department of State, 740.0011 European war 1939/13993. RecordGroup 59, NARS.

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