`

McCauslin 2

Introduction

The Arab Spring began in December 2010, after a fruit vendor named Tarek al-Tayeb

Mohamed Bouazizi lit himself on fire in Tunisia to protests against the municipal officials

harassing his business. This event sparked protests and revolts throughout the Middle East. The

states that remained virtually unchanged were the eight autocratic monarchies that were able to

quell the violence and the public dissent. In Tunisia, where the protests first started, former

President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali relinquished power and fled to Saudi Arabia in exile. While in

Egypt, revolts led to former President Muammar Muhammad Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi’s

resignation as President and his death in 2011.

The autocratic monarchies faced some demonstrations, but were mostly met by the

governments with reforms and military assistance from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In

this paper, I will explain how autocratic monarchies were able to weather the Arab Spring when

authoritarian republics were met fiercely by revolts, protests, and violence, by studying the

relationship of domestic decisions and the relationship between the ruling party and the people.

Dynamic structural factors; such as rerouting budget funds to other sources, played a significant

role in regime resilience, and the fall of regimes, according to many literature sources such as the

Foreign Policy Research Institute, and works published by the Council of Foreign Relations. The

Middle East is the most unstable region in the world, and understanding the cause for the

unprecedented revolts of the Arab Spring assists many researchers in fully understanding the

political and historical implications this event will have. I will focus on researching how

autocratic monarchies were able to prevent and quell protests through providing socio-economic

benefits to the people from oil revenue and co-optation, while authoritarian republics faced

McCauslin 3

protests, uprisings, and revolts due to a loss of a social contract with the people and higher levels

of resource constraints.

Understanding the Literature of the Arab Spring

Comparative politics in literature focuses on two sides of the Arab Spring, one that

focuses on the domestic issues and the structural integrity of the authoritarian republics, and that

of the autocratic monarchies. Jones (2012) examines how the Arab Monarchies were able to

counter the revolution, all while the republics failed at responding to social uprising. Through his

interviews of more than 70 senior leadership officials, he contends that the Arab monarchies

managed to maintained societies where there is still a “social contract” amongst the ruling party

and the people (Jones; p. 449). This article examines the idea that the people of the authoritarian

regimes lost their trust in the structural integrity of the Presidential system, as to where the

autocratic regimes were less likely to lose the trust with their people because. This is because of

how Jones points out, that monarchies are traditionally rulers, where that family will be there for

life, and in the republics, such as in Tunisia and Egypt; the Presidents are also there for life. This

is due to the systematic amendments to the countries’ constitution, making it possible for the

Presidents to do so, thus losing their integrity, respect, and trust of the people. (Jones; p.449-450)

They form amendments and reform the constitution for personal gain.

Korotayev, Isssaev, Malkov, and Shishkina (2014), find that instability in this region was

found to be due to a list of contributing factors. They found that instability resulted from

“instability of political order”, an “uneven distribution of socio-economic benefits”, “high levels

of poverty”, and the “availability of attractive alternatives to the existing political regime.”

(Korotayev, p. 152) The causes here can be seen in the revolts in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and in

Syria. These are times when unemployment in the Middle East is rising due to the growing

McCauslin 4

population, and growing recession. They do not receive any economic benefits due to the rising

poverty levels, and when they want reform and changes made to the policies of their economy,

the ruling parties ignore the people.

Graeme Herd (2011) addresses the underlying causes for unrest in the authoritarian

regimes; such as, in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria by discussing how presidential

dictatorships failed to address political grievances in the countries with Republic-style regimes.

This directly led to demoralization, mass distrust amongst the populace, and collective

frustration. (Herd; p. 104-105) This occurred when men like Mohamed Bouazizi were simply

trying to provide for their family in a country where there was little to no employment

opportunities, or economic benefits. Like him, many of his fellow countrymen were upset in the

same ways, and this led to the Arab revolts of 2010 in Tunisia. This event led to the ousting of

former President Ben Ali, and the spark of political protests around the Middle Eastern region.

Lesch (2011) states that when Hosni Mubarak initially rose to power, he consistently

urged the “practice of parliamentary elections”, “stressed the rule of law”, and even “released

political prisoners”. (Lesch, p. 35) It was not until his second term as President that he started

mandating changes to the policies of his government. He began “excluding opposing parties

from parliament”, “refused to reform the constitution”, and “denounced parties that criticized his

policies”. (Lesch, p. 35-36) These initial acts led to the failure to reform policies of the

constitution that would eventually lead Egypt out of a recession, and open up new avenues to

employment opportunities. This led to privatization in Egypt which meant Egypt would

“increase prices on food staples and other commodities primarily through the lifting of subsidies

on those commodities.”(Aoude, p. 245)

McCauslin 5

Discussed above were the effects and aftermaths of the Arab Spring in relation to the

authoritarian republics, which suffered the most during this phenomenon. On the other side of

the spectrum, there were autocratic ruling countries that saw only isolated protests such as the

Sultanate of Oman and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. According to research published by Yom

and Gause (2012), the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Republic of Morocco faced youths

marching in the streets but the demonstration failed to attain mass revolts. The State of Kuwait

saw very little dispute, and only with the parliamentary and autocratic ruling parties. The

Kingdom of Bahrain faced the largest manifestation of protests, but was suppressed by the Gulf

Cooperation Council. (Yom, p. 74) The Monarchies in this region were all using a variety of

tactics to quit the protesting and the mass outcry of the public, ranging from financial support to

employment opportunities.

Tetreault (2011) contends that the Gulf Monarchies were able to avoid large

demonstrations because they gave payments to citizens and addressed that they were due to the

concerns of food prices. Likewise, Bahrain and Oman announced the opening of 20,000 new

jobs to the unemployed youth (Tetreault, p. 631). However, in Tunisia, the Prime Minister of

Development had announced a $10 million employment program to create jobs. This issue with

this is that “the employment program did not end protests, because people were tired of hearing

promises that went unfulfilled,” according to Twair (2012). (Twair, p. 54) The social contracts in

states such as this and Egypt had failed, while those with monarchies were able to last. Jordan,

Bahrain, and Oman were states that were able to fulfill those promises.

These countries were able to afford this action due to the high revenue they received on

oil exports that they had allocated for their country. Also, countries such as Jordan held onto

massive amounts of foreign assistance grants, and used the funding to make policy reforms, and

McCauslin 6

open up new employment opportunities. According to author Onn Winckler (2013) Jordan

received more than “$1.7 billion in foreign assistance from the United States and GCC

countries.” (Winckler, p. 78) This represents how Arab Monarchies, were fueled by the oil

exportation and assistance from other oil exporter countries that were also autocratic monarchies,

in order to quell the demonstrations seen in the rest of the Gulf. These states used their assistance

money and worked it into their budget to readily make more funds available for the people.

Ross (2011) further investigates the correlation between oil revenue and Arab monarchs

in the Gulf. He claims that countries with little or no oil had a difficult time repelling the

protests. Exceptions here are Jordan and Libya, with Jordan being an autocracy, and Libya being

authoritarian. Jordan was able to counter the revolution, only through foreign assistance, while

Syria, faced civil war due to a misappropriation of funds and lack of assistance. (Ross, p. 17)

These monarchies will only continue to thrive and appease the people, so long as oil production

does not decrease or run out. The same implications the republics faced, can also happen in the

Monarchal Gulf countries as well. This is where countries need to practice reform in their

policies, and work with foreign agencies in order to foster better relations between themselves

and their people.

Social Pay-offs vs. Military Action

The existing literature on the Arab Spring focuses primarily on how the autocratic

monarchies were able to remain unaffected by the effects of the Arab spring. Previous studies

from researchers present cases where leaders in authoritarian states failed to uphold their “social

contracts” with the people through high inflation rates and unemployment as a result of

privatization. This paper hypothesizes that not only did they not uphold social contracts, but due

to failed economic states as a result of political corruption, these countries were able to form

McCauslin 7

constitutional ratifications and reforms which led to failed presidential representation, resulting

in longer terms for office, and mishandling of the economic funding for the country. Political

corruption in the authoritarian republic of Syria led to an uneven distribution of socio-economic

benefits, which contributed to poverty, income inequality, and funding for the military rather

than the people.

The authoritarian governments were utilizing the funding of these countries for personal

political agendas; whereas in autocratic regimes such as Jordan gave funding to the citizens

because monarchies that lose the interest of the people, will start to lose power. This in turn led

to political instability, and a weakened economic infrastructure, which was combined with an

abuse of power in all authoritarian states that ultimately led to the Arab Spring and a decline in

political stability of the states. Autocratic regimes; such as Jordan, was able to uphold social

contracts with the people, due to proper use of revenue to give to the people, resulting in a lager

trust system. Through foreign revenue and assistance, the autocratic states earned the trust of the

people creating new jobs and offering the people profits from the states earnings, which led the

people to trust in the government. Therefore,

“H 1: …States that used social pay-offs rather than military actions were better able to subdue protests and uprisings in their given country.”

The second theory of this paper will focus how states with more resources are better often

able to select a pay-off option to its citizens. Jordan and Saudi Arabia, both autocratic

monarchies, garnered a substantial amount of profit. Having more state revenue as makes it

possible for governments to increase social spending on options for diversifying the budget of

the state. This led to a more developed social contract and a larger trust system in both of these

two countries and the people were convinced that the government was looking out for their well

being when more jobs were created, and the people saw that their socio-economic levels were

McCauslin 8

increasing. States that are not wealthy typically divert state resources to the military rather than

civilian interests in order to quell protests, to keep opposition parties and lobbyists out of

government issues and elections, and to also control the people. This is due to a long history of

government military occupation, as seen in the case of Syria.

Jordan and Saudi Arabia had more options through state revenue which helped prevent

those states from utilizing military force to quell the protests. States that did not have economic

revenue options; such as, Egypt and Syria used military force to respond to the people, which

were met with even fiercer movements and led to civil war in Syria. Syria did not have large

amounts of income as did Jordan because they had no resource wealth and were not given much

in foreign assistance aid, so they had nothing to give the citizens as incentives to stop the

protests. The instead met the people with military force in the hopes of ending the movements,

but this only increased the amount of uprisings and violence in the country. This resulted in the

overthrow of these two countries governments. The Middle Eastern states…

“H 2: …States that received more foreign support though resource revenue and international assistance were better able to subdue uprisings in their given country.”

Investigating Relationships

I will analyze how states used social pay-outs were better able to subdue uprisings

in their states, and examine how states that received more resource revenue were able to quell

protests. By looking at the case of Syria, there can be seen that they diverted resources to their

military, instead of the civilian population, and this led to an increase in violence; whereas,

Jordan used its resource revenue for the civilians and were better able to subdue uprisings.

Jordan also received more foreign support and had a lower population, so they this state was able

to have more options for diversifying their economy. This paper will examine the events in Syria

and Jordan because they both have similar occurring themes and each government went through

McCauslin 9

a different course through this event. They will also be compared in regards to their population

size and how much wealth was divided amongst the citizens in each given state.

Analyzing the economies of Syria and Jordan 2010 will closely examine the issues and

events that led to the different outcomes of the Arab spring in each state. These two states show a

close comparison in GNI per capita with numbers ranging from $4,120 in Jordan and $1,850 in

Syria. This can be seen as close in terms of comparing states GNI, but the population sizes differ

greatly with Jordan having a population size of 6,046,000, while Syria’s is 21,532,647. (World

Bank; 2015) These relationships between GNI and populations illustrate how much the

diversification and distribution of wealth is amongst both states. The unemployment rate is a

substantial factor as well considering this is where the citizens make their money and increase

their socio-economic wealth. In 2010 Syria had an unemployment rate of 8.3% while Jordan had

an unemployment rate of 13.4 percent. This number accounts for the unemployment rate

amongst the labor force of both states. (CIA World Factbook; 2015)

The inflation rates were also an impact of the economy and were also a grievance

common amongst citizens of a state in the Arab Spring. According to the CIA World Factbook,

Syria’s inflation rate reached 5.9% in 2010, while Jordan’s was at a low of 4.4%. (CIA World

Factbook; 2015) This compared with the states GNI and unemployment rate demonstrates how

each economy was with the given state, and also illustrates how and why uprisings broke out.

The amount of military expenditure is another variable needed in this case examination to

determine how much of the GDP was spent for military use leading up to an in the Arab Spring.

According to the World Bank website, Syria’s military expenditure is not recorded for the year

of 2010, the latest recording was at 4% in 2007. Jordan only diverted 5% of its GDP for its

military force in 2010. (World Bank; 2015)

McCauslin 10

Jordan was able to pay the citizens through the $371.6 million in aid granted to them by

the United States in 2010. (USAID; 2010) Using this amount of foreign assistance, Jordan was

able to introduce greater reform strategies, while increasing jobs and income levels within the

state that led to greater trust and satisfaction with the ruling government. Syria on the other hand

uses their resource revenue from oil profiteering in order to divert the funds to the military in an

effort to suppress uprisings. I will base my research on a theory generating format, which will

work best in answering the research question of why autocratic regimes were able to survive the

Arab spring through social pay-offs, and why authoritarian governments fell, while funding the

military to subdue protests. The reason for this is that there have been other types of research in

this area that do not fully expand in this area of criticism. Creating my own theory will allow this

research to grasp and understand how through the systems of foreign assistance and socio-

political trust, that they are able to withstand the regime transitions within the region.

Finding the Data

For hypothesis one, “the states that used military power rather than social contracts with

the people were not able to subdue protests and uprisings in their given country,” I will examine

why states used police/military force and violence versus social spending responses with the

citizens of their respective states. The data for the research in this theory can be found on the

CIA World Factbook website and the World Bank. These two sources use data sets that measure

government expenditures on the military and social infrastructures of the economy. They also

provide data on the literacy rates, education, and citizens that are unemployed. This type of data

will be useful in garnering an understanding of the grievances of the Arab Spring, and the

government’s responses in each state.

McCauslin 11

For the second hypothesis, “States that received more foreign support though resource

revenue and international assistance were better able to subdue uprisings in their given country,”

I will examine how states distributed their revenue on either social spending or the military

through U.S. foreign aid and oil revenue. I will use data from the U.S. Aid government website

to determine how much assistance was granted to each state, and also the U.S. Energy

Information Administration site to determine how much oil revenue was profited from each

country. I will use the data gathered here and compare it to the states’ GDP in order to determine

how much they profited from revenue services and how they diversified it in their economy. The

results will give an understanding if the second hypothesis in this paper is true in terms of

revenue being used properly to quell uprisings.

Overview of Syria and Jordan

The economics of Syria and Jordan opened the way for protests, and also how the

government of each state chose to respond. To examine how each Syria and Jordan reacted

during the course of the Arab Spring, the researcher must look the similarities between both

nations. Syria and Jordan both have official religions of Sunni Muslim with 72% from Syria and

92% from Jordan. The median age is both within 3 years with the median in Syria are 23.3 and

21.8 in Jordan (CIA World Factbook, 2015). The largest cities of both states also have relatively

the same size populations with Aleppo, Syria at 1,602,260 and Amman, Jordan 1,275,860. They

also both received independence in 1946 from the League of Nations Mandate (CIA World

Factbook). They also had very significant differences in 2010, in terms of population, GDP, and

GDP per capita.

Syria had a population of 21,031,546 in the year leading up to the uprising, (World Bank;

2015) with a GDP (purchasing power parity) $100.8 billion. (CIA World Factbook; 2015) This

McCauslin 12

leaves the GDP per capita resting at $4,600 and an inflation rate of 5.9%. (CIA World Factbook;

2015) This, combined with a high unemployment rate, of 33% raised concerns among most

citizens which led to the eruption of the Arab Spring in March 2010. (CIA World Factbook;

2015) According to the World Bank (2015), Jordan had a population of 5,915,000 in 2009, with

a GDP of $32.26 billion. (CIA World Factbook; 2015) The GNI per capita in this state was at

$5,100 and an inflation rate of -0.7%. (CIA World Factbook; 2015) This data represents Jordan

in comparison to Syria as being much better off socio-economically. This and Jordan’s

unemployment rate of 12.9% in 2009 demonstrates that the citizens of Jordan were financially

more stable than Syria and that the Jordanian government utilized the workforce more and had

enough money to spend on other government needs according to the budget. (CIA World

Factbook; 2015).

Factors Triggering Protests in Syria and Jordan

Although these issues seem miniscule in comparison to the state of other countries in the

region, the citizens still protested inflation rates, unemployment, corruption, and political

freedom. In Syria, the unemployment rate was devastating to the youth, especially those that

lacked post and secondary education. Before the Arab Spring took place in Syria, the

unemployment rate was officially declared to be at 12%; however, this figure was measured by

design “to keep the numbers low, counting people with a 2-day a week job as employed”

(Kalpakian, p. 11) 80% of those that lack post-secondary education are also unemployed, and

72% are between the ages of 15 and 24. (Kalpakian, p.11) Unlike Syria, Jordan had a number of

economic frustrations that they had protested; including rising food prices, inflation, and

unemployment, also exceeding electric expenses for heating and gas due to the war in Iraq.

(Tobin, p. 101)

McCauslin 13

Other factors that contributed were human rights abuses and corruption cases that were

widespread throughout the state. According to the Freedom House organization, “In 2009, police

killed several civilians who were protesting the demolition of illegally constructed homes outside

Damascus.” (Freedom House; 2010) Syria grants their police and military force the authority to

detain people without trial and for long periods of time if they are a threat to the state in the eyes

of the government. This case is reason to believe that they grant more funding to the military

than the socio-economic infrastrure of the state. According to the Freedom House organization,

“private citizens were arrested in 2009 for criticizing the King of Jordan. Laith Shbailat, a

prominent Islamist opposition leader, was beaten by unidentified assailants after he gave a

televised interview accusing the government of corruption and calling for abrogation of the

peace treaty with Israel.” (Freedom House; 2010) It appears that Syria and Jordan have the same

rule of law and public freedoms as one another, which illustrates the grievances of the protestors

in both states. Transparency International published a Corruption Perception Index in 2010

which ranked countries in the world on a scale from 0-10 with a 10 being the least corrupt and 0

the most corrupt. The index awarded Syria a score of 2.5 out of 10, while Jordan received a score

of 4.7. (Transparency International; 2010)

Jordan vs. Syria: Understanding the Response

The second theory covers foreign aid and oil revenue assisting states in subduing

protestors when dispersed into the government budget effectively. This image below illustrates

countries in the Middle East and how much oil they produce, and how much makes up their

GDP. This data

Table 1: Economics of the Arab World

Country Oil Production 2010 GDP 2011 Per Capita Oil/GDP

McCauslin 14

(1000s bb/day) (PPP Billions

USD)

Population

(Millions)

GDP Ratio

Syria 400.4 107.4 22.5 $4,800 3.7

Jordan 0 34.5 6.5 $5,400 0.0

"The Finance Professionals' Post." The Finance Professionals' Post. January 1, 2015. Accessed April 21, 2015. http://post.nyssa.org/nyssa-news/2011/07/summer-perspectives-on-the-arab-spring.html.

was retrieved from the “Finance Professionals” website and shows the differences between Syria

and Jordan’s oil production rates. (The Finance Professionals; 2015) From this graph, one can

see that Syria produces 400.4 to 420.571 thousand barrels a day in 2010 which made up 3.7% of

the Syrian GDP for the same year. (U.S. Energy Information Administration; 2015) This was

additional revenue the government received to spend on their government budget excluding other

goods and services. During this period, Syria also received only an additional $2.5 million in

foreign assistance according to the Foreign Assistance government website. (Foreign Assistance;

2010) This data represents the little amount of foreign aid and oil revenue to Syria and represents

itself in proportion to the actions taken during the Arab Spring by the government toward the

citizens and properly demonstrates the outcome of instability within the country.

The second theory also develops an understanding around if foreign aid or other revenue

services best helped Jordan and other monarchies to suppress protests. According to the U.S.

Energy Information Administration, Jordan produces very little oil, at only 0.1608 barrels a day

in 2011. (U.S. Energy Information Administration; 2015) This number contributes to 0% of

Jordan’s GDP, making the country relying off of other resources or U.S. government aid.

According to the USAID government website, Jordan received $449 million in foreign assistance

from the United States in 2011. (USAID; 2011) This revenue was used for the treaty with Israel

and Jordan was able to use this revenue to conduct “pay-outs” for the citizens in an effort to

McCauslin 15

appease them and to trust in the government again. The Jordanian government reduced the

military expenditure, and reduced government spending in an effort to come to an agreement

with the people. The research gathered using this data supports the findings of my hypothesis and

will help greatly improve further research.

Military Spending/Budgets

According to the Military Budget Organization website, $2.3 billion dollars were spent

on Syria’s military which makes up 4.1% of their GDP for 2010 (Military Budget Organization;

2010). This data represents that 1/25th of the state entire budget was spent on the police force and

military during the Arab Spring uprisings. Data shows the year prior, government spending on

education was 5.13%, while only 3.41% of the Syrian GDP was spent on healthcare. However,

according to the Global Economy website, government spending on defense and security was at

10.13% in 2010. (The Global Economy; 2015) This means that 14.23% of Syria’s GDP was

spent on the military, security, and defense of the state, with very little going into other markets

of the economy. This data is represented on the graph below:

Table 2: Military Expenditure of the Syrian Arab Republic

"Military Expenditure as % of GDP - Syrian Arab Republic." Macro Economy Meter. Accessed April 26, 2015. http://mecometer.com/whats/syrian-arab-republic/military-expenditure-percentage-of-gdp/.

McCauslin 16

This was a major factor that led to the Syrian governments’ failure at the end of the Arab Spring.

The Syrian government lost control of the state and as a result, the Syrian Free Army emerged as

an opposing unit to the government. This conflict landed Syria into a civil war that is causing a

great amount of unrest, political instability, and economic failure.

According to the Military Budget organization, Jordan spent $1.4 billion on military

expenditures in 2010, which made up 4.9% of the government’s GDP. However in 2011 after the

Arab Spring, the Jordanian government reduced military spending by $60 million, or 0.3% of the

budget they were already spending on the military. (Military Budget Organization; 2010) This

can be seen on the graph below:

Table 3: Military Expenditure of Jordan

"Military Expenditure as % of GDP - Syrian Arab Republic." Macro Economy Meter. Accessed April 26, 2015. http://mecometer.com/whats/jordan/military-expenditure-percentage-of-gdp/.

Data also shows that 20.53 percent of Jordan’s GDP was used for the government budget

that includes national defense and police forces. However, Jordan spent 8.6% of the GDP on

healthcare in 2010 and increased it to 8.82% after the Arab Spring took its course in the country.

The unemployment rate also went down by 0.7% between 2010 and 2011. (The Global

Economy; 2015) These are reflections of what the Jordanian government did in order to solve the

issues that the citizens had with the government. The Jordanian government also gave the

citizens “pay-outs” in order to appease their distrust in the hopes of mending the “social

McCauslin 17

contract.” Between 2010 and 2012, the GDP per capita was risen $538.31in the economic pay-

out that was a result, also jobs increased and deflation decreased. (The Global Economy; 2015)

This data illustrates how Jordan best used its revenue from foreign aid and other services and

used it to work in favor of the people so that political instability would not be a factor in this

country.

Chosen Responses in Syria and Jordan

In the Syria Arab Republic, the Bashar Al-Assad witnessed what had happened to the

government of Tunisia, and knew he had to take a different approach. He turned the military on

the protestors whom took part in “the daily killings of scores of citizens” (Khan, p. 84) The

Assad regime already spent 14.23% of the state’s GDP on military, defense, and security, and

although there is no record of the percentage by GDP in the years following, events show that

there was an increase in military force. Soon after the protests, the military was sent out to

subdue the uprising. “The use of violence led to the escalation of the revolutionaries’ demands

and fed confessional fissures in Syria, and the conflict quickly became embroiled in religious

discourse” (Kalpakian; p. 13). The Syrian government increased military spending in an effort to

put down the uprisings. This did not occur the way it was intentioned, for defectors emerged out

of the Syrian military and assisted the Free Syrian Army in the East of obtaining weapons.

Several factions of rebel groups emerged and have been fighting a civil war in their country for

three years.

In Jordan, King Abdullah used these protests as an effort to grant freedom of speech and

freedom to protest in an effort to appease the citizens and to listen to their grievances. He chose

this instead of a militarized response because his country would not be able to effectively control

massive uprisings, nor a civil war. King Abdullah immediately sat down with the leaders of the

McCauslin 18

Muslim Brotherhood and put $500 million in salary increases for government employees. He

also used this money for food staples and fuel; due to the economic fallout of the Iraq war and

refugees entering the country. (Tobin, p. 101) The government also reduced military spending by

$60 million after the protests, and used this along with foreign aid and oil revenue to put into the

account for salary increases, and money for food. The Jordanian government additionally raised

the healthcare budget by .22% of the GDP. (Military Budget Organization; 2010) The initial

main complaint of the Jordanian protests was the parliamentary elections that occurred on

November 9, 2010. The citizens had frustrations with this election because the people wanted

more of a democratic approach to the government, where there is equality of who can vote, and

who can participate in the electoral process. King Abdullah responded by creating a 3-month

deadline for the government to implement constitutional reforms so that there if more freedom

and equality. (Tobin, p. 104)

The people of Syria responded with more protests and uprisings when the Assad regime

imposed the military upon the citizens. When the military began using violence against the

citizens, the Syrian people marched on and further demanded the Syrian leader Al-Assad to step

down, to withdraw the military from cities, and to allow opposition parties to participate freely in

elections. The Syrian military had defectors and assisted the citizens in the East in obtaining

weapons, so they became rebels and developed militias in order to defeat the Assad regimes

military forces. The militias that have formed out of the violence, in order to depose Al-Assad

were the Free Syrian Army, the AD Army, and the Mujahedeen Army. They had entered into a

civil war between the two sides of the country, one that is still ensuing today. In Jordan, the

protests subsided the following year, when their neighboring country, Syria was engulfed in

McCauslin 19

violence. They feared the same would happen and started losing motivation out of fear for the

same effect.

Conclusion

The research question covered in this paper, how autocratic monarchies were able to

subdue protests through providing socio-economic benefits to the people from foreign assistance,

while authoritarian republics faced protests, uprisings, and revolts due to misappropriations of

revenue funds into the government and higher levels of poverty. I found that Syria was not able

to subdue protests in an efficient manner due to government spending focused too much on

military, police, and national defense. Syria spent very little on healthcare, education, and the

infrastructure. I found that the Assad regime chose the response they did because they witnessed

the events in Tunisia and believed that an increased military presence and use of force would

deter and subdue protest movements. The Syrian government then raised military expenditure in

2011 and issued orders to the security forces to imprison or kill protestors. This proved to be an

ineffective resolve to the issues facing the state.

Jordan on the other hand, was able to suppress protests movements by channeling funds

into different avenues of the state. Jordan was able to use foreign assistance revenue to cut down

on military expenditure and route funds into healthcare, and their infrastructure. This effectively

silenced the protest movement in the state and allowed the Jordanian government to listen to its

citizens and to make the country operate more effectively. They chose this approach in a way

designed to open up democratic freedoms that the citizens of the state were protesting for. King

Abdullah knew that his state would be threatened, because as a monarchy, the leaders of the

country need the peoples’ support. He was able to successfully meet with the leaders of the

Muslim Brotherhood, whom spearheaded the movement and come to find a solution to end

McCauslin 20

protests. More jobs were created and the GNI per capita increased by $500, and food prices were

lowered. Jordan was able to increase economic funding rather than increase military spending to

suppress protest movements, and effectively had done so.

This research will matter by allowing further researchers and comparative analysts to

further understand the development of countries and their allocation of revenues in their budget.

Perhaps this field of study will help gain an understanding in political movements across the

Middle Eastern region. This research will help assist social scientists and political scientists in

assessing economic and governmental grievances across the Middle Eastern Region. It will also

help us in providing aid to non-democracies that want to further democratize their country,

economy, and infrastructure. Through understanding these grievances, the U.S. and other allied

countries can better assist states; such as, Jordan, Syria, Tunisia, and Egypt at further

democratizing their country in an effort to ensure there is stability in the region.

McCauslin 21

References

Aoude, Ibrahim, "Egypt: Revolutionary Process and Global Capitalist Crisis," Arab Studies

Quarterly 35, no. 3 (2013): 245.

"Corruption Perceptions Index 2010 View Country Results." 2010 Corruption Perceptions

Index, 2010, (Accessed May 3, 2015).

"Country Comparison Egypt vs. United States 2015," Country Economy, (Accessed April 6,

2015).

"Foreign Assistance by Recipient Country / Region 2010," Foreign Assistance, January 1, 2010,

(Accessed April 21, 2015).

"Freedom in the World 2010: Jordan," Freedom House, January 1, 2010, (Accessed April 21,

2015).

"Freedom in the World 2010: Syria," Freedom House, (Accessed April 21, 2015).

Herd, Graeme, "The Arab Spring: Challenges, Obstacles and Dilemmas," Connections: The

Quarterly Journal (2011): 103-120.

Jones, Peter. "The Arab Spring: Opportunities and Implications." International Journal (2012):

447-463.

"Jordan: Economy," Central Intelligence Agency, (Accessed April 20, 2015).

"Jordan Spending as Percent of GDP - Data, Chart | TheGlobalEconomy.com." The Global

Economy, January 1, 2015 (Accessed April 21, 2015).

"Jordan." The World Bank DataBank, (Accessed April 20, 2015).

"Jordanian Military Budget," Military Budget, January 1, 2010 (Accessed April 21, 2015).

Kalpakian, Jack, "Between Reform and Reaction: The Syrian and Moroccan Responses to the

McCauslin 22

Arab Spring," The Innovation Journal: The Public Sector Innovation Journal 18, no. 1

(2013): 1-20.

Korotayev, Andrey, Leonid Isssaev, Sergey Malkov, and Alisa Shishkina, "The Arab Spring: A

Quantitative Analysis," Arab Studies Quarterly 36, no. 2 (2014): 149-69.

Lesch, Ann, "Egypt's Spring: The Cause of the Revolution," Middle East Policy Council (2011):

35-48.

"Military Expenditure as % of GDP – Jordan," Macro Economy Meter, (Accessed April 26,

2015).

"Military Expenditure as % of GDP - Syrian Arab Republic," Macro Economy Meter, (Accessed

April 26, 2015).

Ross, Michael, "Will Oil Drown the Arab Spring?" Harper's Magazine (2011): 17-22.

"Syria: Economy," Central Intelligence Agency (Accessed April 20, 2015).

"Syria Spending as Percent of GDP - Data, Chart | TheGlobalEconomy.com," The Global

Economy, January 1, 2015, (Accessed April 21, 2015).

"Syrian Military Budget," Military Budget, January 1, 2010, (Accessed April 21, 2015).

"Syria," The World Bank DataBank, (Accessed April 20, 2015).

Tetreault, Mary, "The Winter of the Arab Spring in the Gulf Monarchies," Globalizations

(2011): 29-37.

Tobin, Sarah A, "Jordan's Arab Spring: The Middle Class and Anti-Revolution," Middle East

Policy XIX, no. 1 (2012): 96-109.

Twair, Pat McDonnell, "An Overview of Syria's Revolution," ProQuest (2012): 54-55.

"The Finance Professionals' Post," The Finance Professionals' Post, January 1, 2015, (Accessed

April 21, 2015).

McCauslin 23

"U.S. Energy Information Administration - EIA - Independent Statistics and Analysis,” Jordan,

(Accessed April 20, 2015).

"U.S. Energy Information Administration - EIA - Independent Statistics and Analysis," Syria,

(Accessed April 20, 2015).

"U.S. Official Development Assistance (ODA) - Aid by Country," USAID Economic Analysis

and Data Services, (Accessed April 20, 2015).

Winckler, Onn, "The "Arab Spring": Socioeconomic Aspects," Middle East Policy Council XX,

no. 4 (2013): 68-87.

Yom, Sean L., and F. Gregory Gause, "Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies Hang On,"

Journal of Democracy (2012): 74-88.