The Anglo-American Naval Conversations on the Far East of January 1938

8/7/2019 The Anglo-American Naval Conversations on the Far East of January 1938

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The Anglo-American Naval Conversations on the Far East of January 1938Author(s): Lawrence PrattSource: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 47, No. 4(Oct., 1971), pp. 745-763Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Royal Institute of International AffairsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2625681 .

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THE ANGLO-AMERICAN NAVALCONVERSATIONS ON THE FAR EASTOF JANUARY 1938Lawrence PrattLATE in 1945,withthewarsinEuropeandthePacificsafelyover,theUnitedStatesCongressbeganan investigationinto thePearlHarbourdisasterof December 1941. In thecourseof subsequenthearings1AdmiralRoyal E. Ingersoll,USN, revealedthatin his formercapacityas Chiefofthe Plans DivisionoftheNavy Departmenthe hadtravelledto London in late December1937forsecretexploratorytalkson the Far East with the BritishAdmiralty.His instructions,he said,had come directlyfromPresidentFranklinRooseveltand were, first,to discuss what America and Britaincould do if theybecame involvedin a war against Japan, and, second, to take up the questionof the

London Treaty of 1936. Ingersoll deprecatedthe significanceof hismission: the agreed Record of Conversationshad been supersededbythe stafftalks of 1940-41,and, beyondan exchangeof codes, littlewasachieved. The Britishhad had to be 'a littlebit careful' because oftheirproblemsin Europe and consequentlyhad been unable to 'statedefinitelywhat forcestheycould allocate to thePacific'. No commit-mentshad been enteredinto and the bulk of the informationexchangedwas about communication,liaison and so on.All of thiswas offeredratherin the spiritof an academic aside tothe main business of the hearings,the Pearl Harbour inquisition.Perhapsbecause theyacceptedIngersoll'sopinionthatthe conversationshad not shaped later decisions,the investigatingsenatorsand congress-men made no attemptto probe into his missionor the circumstanceswhichhad given rise to it. This was understandable,but for thosewhoseinterestlies in thedeeper originsof the Second WorldWar it wasalso regrettable.For the Ingersollmissionwas not only a key episode

in theunexploredbackgroundto the unofficialAnglo-Americanallianceof 1940-41, but it is also of centralimportanceto any studyof westernreactionsto the Far Eastern crisisof 1937-41. The talks were neitheras technicalnor 'low-level' an Ingersoll implied; on the contrary,theyexplored the foundationsof the two powers' navel strategies,andI Testimonyof February 12, 1946, before Joint Committee of Congress on theInvestigationof the Pearl Harbour Attack, 79th Congress, 1st session in PearlHarbourAttack,(Washington.1946),pp. 4273-4277.

745


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746 INTERNATIONALAFFAIRStheyare of specialinterestforthelighttheythrowon certainaspects ofFranklinRoosevelt'sstrategicalthinking,particularlyhisplansfora dis-tant' quarantine' ofJapan. Untilrecently,however,littleinformationaboutthe substanceof theseearlyAnglo-Americanstaffcontactshasbeenavailable to historians.Whatfollowsis an attemptpartiallyto rectifythis: the agreed Record of Conversationsis appended,and I haveintroducedthisdocumentbyreconstructingthediplomaticand strategicbackgroundagainstwhich the talks between(then) Captain Ingersolland theBritishnaval staffwereheld.2It can be said thatthe summerof 1937was,inmanyways,a turningpoint for pre-warBritishdiplomacy. The outbreakof the 'Chinaincident' and the subsequentcrisis in the Far East coincided withaseries of dangerous incidents in the westernMediterranean;andmenacingthoughtheseweretoBritishimperialinterests,theywereover-shadowedbytheCabinet'sincreasingconcernoverGermanrearmament.The lack of progressin Anglo-Germanrelationsand the failureofprojectedconversationswith Mussolini lent a new urgencyto thewarningsof London's militaryplanners: Britainwas a fulltwo yearsfromits rearmamenttargetdate and facingconcurrentthreatsat bothends of the Empire and across its shortestline of communications.It was no accidentthat thisnew phase in the country'sglobal pre-dicamentwas to be followedin thecomingmonthsbyfreshconciliatoryapproachesto Germanyand Italy; approaches,it may be added,whichhad the supportof thewholeCabinetand its diplomaticand militaryadvisers.The absenceofsettlementinEuropeortheMediterraneandiminishedBritain'soptionsin the Far East and addedweightto theGovernment'seffortsto re-establisha good workingrelationshipwith the UnitedStatesand to induce thatnationto take a more activerole in worldpolitics.By theautumnof 1937,Anglo-Americandiscussionsbegantofocus on the southwarddriveof theJapanesearmyin China, on thebombardmentof Shanghai and the InternationalSettlement,and onpossibleactionfordefendingwesterninterestsin China fromJapaneseencroachments.TheBritishForeignSecretary,AnthonyEden,impressedby the immediate(and temporary)resultsof a raredisplayof Anglo-Frenchunityat theNyonConferenceon piracyin theMediterraneanin September,hoped that as a next step America and Britainmightpresenta jointshow of strengthin the Far East. Whethereconomicornaval power shouldbe theinstrumentwas undecided,buttheobjectivewouldbe to bringJapanto a settlement.2 All unpublishedreferences,unlessotherwisenoted,fromtheCabinet,ForeignOffice,and Admiraltyarchivesin the Public Record Office,London. The papers of LordChatfieldare cited with the kind permissionof the presentLord Chatfieldand

ProfessorA. TemplePatterson.


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ANGLO-AMERICANNAVAL CONVERSATIONS ON THE FAR EAST 747While the question of a possible naval demonstrationwas underreviewby theAdmiralty,Eden continuedto discussschemesofeconomic

pressurewithAmericandiplomats.These werelittlemorethangeneralexchanges,however,and theyelicitedfaintencouragementfromtheAmericanSecretaryofState,CordellHull, and hisnotoverlyanglophileDepartment.The effectsof a recentheritageofneglectand frictionandan atmosphereof mutualwarinesswere compoundedby the absenceof thoroughlydependablechannelsof communication,and theautumnsaw someclassic instancesof good intentionsmis-representedon eitherside. The bitterexperienceof Abyssinia,and technicalstudies of theJapaneseeconomyhad led the Britishto concludethatsanctionswouldbe useless unlessbacked byoverwhelmingforceand activelysupportedby America;and all the signalsindicatedthatRooseveltwas unlikelyto assume such a commitment.His famous 'quarantine' speech ofOctober5, far fromprovokinga warm Britishresponse,alarmed theCabinet. The Prime Minister,Neville Chamberlain, thoughtthePresident'had ratherembarrassedthe situation' and was worriedbythepossibilitythathe mighttakeactionwithoutfirsthavingagreed tomeet,withBritain,all theconsequencesofJapaneseretaliation.3In suchcircumstancesit was hardlysurprisingthattheChamberlainGovernmenthad come,byNovember,to place fewhopes in an Atlanticsolutiontoany part of its immediateforeignpredicament. Even Eden wenttothe Nine PowerConferenceon the Far East in Brusselsin a decidedlypessimisticframe of mind; and, as expected, that conferencewas afailure,especiallyfor those advocatingAnglo-Americanco-operation.A morestrikingcontrastto Nyoncould hardlybe imagined.4And yet,despitetheapparentfutilityof his past efforts,Eden toldhis Cabinetcolleagueson November24 thatthe rate at whichBritain'spositionin China was collapsingunderJapan's encroachmentsmightmake strongactionnecessary:he was thinkingof invitingtheUnitedStatesto join Britainin sendingnaval reinforcementsto the Far East.Chamberlain,whilenotobjectingto suchan approach,doubtedwhetheritwould be successful,and he was surethatJapancouldnot be coercedwithoutAmericansupport.5Indeed,that was theharshtruth,for theglobal outlook was so uncertain in late 1937 and Britishnaval3 Cab. Conclusions,October6, 1937. Cab. 23/89. Lord Chatfield,Chief of theNavalStaff,was evenmore ungenerous.He wroteto theCommanderof theHome Fleet,' I am concernedabout the Far Easternsituationand wherewe may findourselvesdragged by the sentimentalists.I am afraid that Roosevelt's speech will do usmore harm than good. It encourages the anti-Japaneseenthusiasts-andyet youmay be quite sure that if it ever comes to any trouble in the Far East theAmericanswill standaside'. Chatfieldto Admi.Sir R. Backhouse,October8, 1937.ChatfieldPapers.4 Lord Avon, The Eden Memoirs: Facing the Dictators (London: Cassell. 1962),pp. 531-541.-5 Cab. Conclusions,November24, 1937. Cab. 23/90.


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748 INTERNATIONALAFFAIRSstrengthso inadequateto meet concurrentthreatsthatBritainwasbecomingincreasinglydependentuponAmericandecisionsin theFarEast. UndertherearmamentprogrammetheageingBattleFleetwasundergoingextensivemodernisationandthenavalstaffhadattheirdis-posalin thesemonthsa maximumoftwelveoftheirfifteencapitalships.Thiswas notdue toimprovebefore1939,indeed1938wouldbe worsethan1937;Britainwas enteringits periodof danger,theinevitableby-productofan attempttomakeitsFleetbattleworthy.Oppressedbynaval tensionin theMediterraneanas well as offthecoastofChina,theAdmiraltywas understandablyanxiousaboutitsabilityto defendscatteredinterestsin twohemisphereswitha Fleetbasedon whatwasforall practicalpurposesa one-powerstandard.The prospectof havingto reinforcethe Far East particularlyworriedtheAdmiralty,and notsimplybecauseJapanwas,of threepotentialenemies,theonlyformidablenavalthreat.Althoughin theseweekstherewas politicalpressureto have two or threebattleshipsdispatchedto Singapore,theAdmiraltyhad decidedagainstanysuchpolicy.Sucha smallforcewouldnotdeter,andmighteventempttheJapaneseNavy;andtherewere,moreover,strongstrategicobjectionstoanygeneraldivisionoftheMainFleet. TheAdmiralty'spolicywouldbetosenda FleetlargeenoughtoengagetheentireJapaneseFleetundernormalconditions.ShouldBritainact withoutAmericannaval co-operation,theFleetmustbe composedofat leastninecapitalshipsanda strongaccompanyingforce.Andevenat thissizesucha FleetwouldnotenjoydecisivesuperiorityovertheJapaneseFleet (ninecapitalships)andcouldonlyacton thedefensiveonceintheFarEast,standingon Singapore-stilluncompleted-anddeterringany advanceagainstHongKongor anyothervitalBritishinterests.Lord Chatfield,theChiefof theNaval Staffand FirstSea Lord,whosharedthe PrimeMinister'ssuspicionsofAmericanpolicy,did notthinkthearrivalofthe BritishFleetalonewouldbringJapanto terms,and thequestionaroseas to whethertheGovernmentcould affordtheabsenceof thebulkof theRoyalNavyfromwatersnearerhome,possiblyformanymonths.Twoorthreecapitalshipscouldbe leftwiththeHomeFleet,butcouldBritainriska 'stab in theback' in theMediterranean,forthatsea mustbe completelydenudedofEnglishwarships.At bestitmustdependontheFrenchNavytodeterItalyfromoperationsagainstEgypt,butany threatto itsMediterraneancommunicationswhiletheFleetwas in theFar East wouldbe a gravecomplication.ChatfieldknewthatMussoliniwas carefullywatchingBritain'sreactionsto theJapanesedriveinChina.6r Chatfieldto Sir Maurice Hankey, December 7, 1937. Cab.21/579; Adm. Sir D.Pound to Chatfield,December22, 1937.ChatfieldPapers.


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ANGLO-AMERICANNAVAL CONVERSATIONS ON THE FAR EAST 749Considerationssuch as these ruled out a unilateralBritishinter-vention.But theAdmiraltyagreedthatAmericanco-operationcould

radicallyalter the situation.Britainmust still send the largerpart ofitsFleet,but it was feltthatthesynchronisedarrivalof thetwo FleetsintheFar East should have an overwhelmingeffectand bringJapanto aspeedysettlement.The Anglo-Americanforceswouldnotsimplystandon the defensive,actingas a deterrent,but could undertakeoffensiveoperations, bringeconomic pressureto bear and, Chatfieldthought,shouldbe able tocompeltheJapanese' todo as we wishedin Shanghai'.Britain'spracticalchoices were eitherto choose this road and trytodraw the United States into co-operation,or simplyto endure,andretardwherepossible, Japaneseintrusions.Eden preferredto exhaustthepossibilitiesof theformerbeforeresortingto thelatter,and, withthe unenthusiasticconsentof the Cabinetand Admiralty,on November27 hewiredSirRonald Lindsay,theBritishAmbassadorinWashington,to ask the AmericanGovernmentwhetherit agreedthatthe timehadcome to take steps to bolsterwesternrepresentationsto Tokyo. Suchstepswouldhave to demonstratethatin thelast resortthetwogovern-mentswouldsupporttheserepresentations'by an overwhelmingdisplayof naval force'. Lindsay was to offerstafftalks as the necessarycomplementto themainproposal."* * *.

Consideringthe ratherfragilestate of Anglo-Americanrelationsatthe time,this was a heavy-handedand insensitiveapproach. Lindsaywas givenno supplementaryinformationabout the proposed size ofBritain'snaval contributionand he was consequentlyunable to giveany to suspiciousState Departmentofficials.SumnerWelles, Hull'sassistant,pointedout to Lindsay on the27th that the BritishGovern-menthad recentlymade it knownthat it was in no positionto releaseany largeportionof the Fleet fromEuropeanwaters. Since Lindsaywas at a loss foran explanationof his Government'sabout-face,Wellesremarkedthatit seemedthattheUnitedStates alonewas to providethe' overwhelmingdisplayof naval force'. On November29, Hull toldLindsaythathe feltBritainwas actinghastilyand the followingdaythe Americans turned down the whole proposal. However, thepossibilityof futurestafftalks was not ruled out in the event of achange in the Far Eastern situation."Even at that the British hadprobablydone more harm than good to theirimage in Washington;small wonderthat some Americandiplomats saw in Eden's policiesa sinisterdesignto drag American power into a general defence ofBritishimperialinterests.7 Eden to Lindsay,tel. No. 561, November27, 1937. F10024/9/10.(F.O.371/20959).8 ForeignRelations of the United States, 1937, III. 724-725; Lindsay to Eden, tel.

No. 438,November30, 1937. F10285/9/10.(F.O.371/20960).


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750 INTERNATIONALAFFAIRSIn any event, the question was reopened withindays, for onDecember 12 theUSS Panay, a rivergunboat,was sunkby Japanese

aircraftnearNanking; at thesame timeBritishshipswere involvedinsimilarincidents.It was indicativeof the stateof American-Japaneserelations at the time that the United States Ambassador to Japanexpected his Governmentto reactto the attackwith a declarationofwar. Throughoutthe autumnof 1937 the Administrationhad takenan increasinglyserious viewof the situationin China whereAmericahad heavy investmentsand tradinginterests,and althoughBritishcallsfor'joint action' mightbe resisted,thisdid notmean thesewerebeingabandoned. The President'snaval and diplomaticadvisers,however,appearto have been in someconflictabouthowbestto react. AdmiralW. D. Leahy,ChiefofU.S. Naval Operations,had favouredjointactionwithBritain as early as September,and the Commander-in-ChiefoftheAsiaticFleet,AdmiralHarryE. Yarnell,had been implementingasforwarda policyin China as his superiorswouldpermit.Yarnell'sideason naval and economic warfarein the Pacific are known to haveinfluencedthe President.On the otherhand, Cordell Hull, who hadeffectivecontrolof diplomacy,opposed naval retaliationand overtcollaborationwiththeBritishon thegroundsthatthiscarriedunaccept-ably highpoliticalrisks and mightonly strengthenthe hand of theextremeArmyfactionofthedividedJapanese.9The same policydivisionsemergedafterthe Panay sinking,easilythemostseriousincidentinvolvingAmericanintereststhusfar. Leahyapparentlyfavouredan immediateblockadeof Japanand thoughttheFleet must be preparedforsea and an agreementmade withBritainforjointaction. He urgedRoosevelt to ordertheFleet to be readied,but the President,who had already made a personal protestto theJapaneseEmperorand demandedfullcompensation,refused.Insteadhe asked Leahyforhis recommendationsfor an expansionof the 1938programmeofnaval constructionbeyondtreatylimits;he also orderedtheSecretaryoftheTreasury,HenryMorgenthau,to studytheproblemof seizingJapanese assets in the United States. At a meeting ofpresidentialadvisers on December 16, Norman Davis, Roosevelt'sspecial ambassador-at-large,pressedfora naval demonstrationat theside ofBritain,but theconsensusofopinionwas againstthis. Hull wasanxious about American naval capabilities and his suspicions ofLondon'spolicycontinuedto shapehisadvice.109 T. V. TulIeja,Statesmenand Admirals(New York: Norton & Co. 1963); C. Hull,The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1948), Vol. I,p. 538; Roosevelt to Leahy, November 10, 1937, coveringYarnell memorandumof October 15, 1937. I am indebtedto Mr. M. Glassman for this referencefromthe F. D. Roosevelt Library,Hyde Park,N.Y. (P.S. File, Navy Dept. 33-37).10 Tuleja, op. cit.,citingLeahy's diary; also Leahy's,I Was There(London: Gollancz.

1950), pp. 83 and 156; Manny T. Koginos, The Panay Incident: Prelude to War


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ANGLO-AMERICANNAVAL CONVERSATIONS ON THE FAR EAST 751A delicateproblemof diplomacynow emergedfor Roosevelt. TheBritishhad seized on thePanay attack in orderto returnto the call

forjointaction;if he yieldedto thispressureduringa crisis,wouldhebe able to regain his freedomof action,or would he findhimselfunwittinglyentangledin some generalcommitmentto Britain forthefuture?Roosevelt chose to make his firstacts ofprotestunilateral,butthisdid not discouragetheForeignOffice. On December15, afteranagonisingCabinet discussion,Eden cabled Lindsay to say that theGovernmentstillwished to giveweightto itsrepresentationsto Tokyo.This would involve a demonstrationof naval force,but all woulddependupon Americanco-operation.Britaincontemplatedthedespatchof 'eight or nine' capital ships with accompanyingvessels 'if theUnitedStates would make at least an equivalenteffort'.Such a forcemightbe readyto sail in threeor fourweeks. Otherless drasticformsof collaborationmightbe stafftalks or partialmobilisation.Lindsay,who had been given advance notice of an importantinterviewwithRoosevelt,was told to makethebestpossible use ofthisinformation.1'Lindsay'ssecretconversationwithRoosevelttookplace on thenightof December 16 aftera White House diplomaticreception.Hull waspresentbut did not enterthediscussion: thePresidentwas obviouslyin active control. Roosevelt opened by proposingnaval staffcon-versations.He wanteda directarrangementbetweenthetwonavies,by-passingtheStateDepartmentand ForeignOffice,as had prevailedfrom1915 to 1917when he was an Under-Secretaryof theNavy. This hadled to a systematicexchangeofsecretinformationandhadbeenmostfruitful.The officersmustbe familiarwiththeplans of theirrespectivedepartments,and Rooseveltthoughtsecrecycould bestbe ensuredinLondon.As Lindsayput it, Rooseveltthen plungedinto 'his worst"inspirational" mood'. The objectofstafftalkswouldbe to arrangefora blockadeor 'quarantine'ofJapan,theoccasionforwhichmustbe the'nextgraveoutrage'bytheJapanese(theymightattackHongKong or Indo-China,forexample). A line wouldbe drawnfromtheAleutianIslands,throughHawaii,midwaybetweentheislandstothenorthof thePhilippinesand thenceto HongKong. Americashouldlook aftereverythingup to thePhilippinesandBritaincouldtakethewesternsection.It wouldbe a cruiserblockade,said Roosevelt;battleshipscould be kept in therear. He definitelydid notwantAmericanshipsbased at Singapore.The purposeoftheblockadewouldbe to cutoffmainlandJapan fromrawmaterials(othermeasurescould(Lafayette: Purdue University.1967). This latter work is unhappilyunreliable,especiallyon the Anglo-Americanexchangesarisingout of the Panay attack.11 Cab. Conclusions. December 15, 1937. Cab.23/90. Eden to Lindsay,tel. No. 607,December 15, 1937. F10976/10816f/10.(F.O.371/21021).


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ANGLO-AMERICANNAVAL CONVERSATIONS ON THE FAR EAST 753had been told to revisethe JointArmyand Navy Basic War Plan'Orange': the original plan envisageda war in the Pacific betweenAmericanandJapanesenaval forces.Partlybecause of thechangedinter-nationalcontextandpartlybecauseoftheArmy-Navydisagreement,thiswas rescindedin November 1937. Its successorwas to reviseUnitedStates Fleet requirementsand to be based on thepossible contingenciesof a two-oceanwar and theco-operationof the BritishNavy. Neitherrearmamentnor planningcould safelyproceedwithoutmore intimateknowledgeof England'snaval situation. It was thisneed,ratherthanany desire forimmediateaction against Japan,which seems to havebeen behindRoosevelt'sagreementto staffconversations.For Washing-ton the talks were to be an informaland non-bindingexchangeofinformationand plans, and not-as Eden hoped-the preludeto anearly displayof force.'3

* **Roosevelt's unwillingnessto allow thePanay incidentto become acasus belli by itselfstood in sharpcontrastto somexenophobicadvicehe had been receivingfrom c-ertainAdministrationvoices. The

Secretaryof the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, thought it 'un-American' to do nothingabout the attack and favouredeconomicretaliation. It would be possible, using existinglegislation,to seizeJapanese assets in America, and, with the President'sapproval, heapproachedtheBritishTreasuryto suggestthatit should studysimilaraction.At a Cabinetmeetingon December18,Rooseveltresistedradicaladvice from several Ministerswho demandedwar or, at least, thedespatchof the Fleet to Hawaii. These mnenwereagreed that Americaand Japan must sooner or later come into violentcollision in theWesternPacificandtheyfeltthatthemostadvantageousmomentfortheUnitedStateswas at hand. Not all ofMahan's disciples,itwould seem,were to be foundinside theNavy. For his part,Roosevelt agreed thatthePanay attack was partof Japan'swiderstrategyto drive westerninfluencefromChina;America's'open door' policywas nowthreatenedas gravelyas it had been in Manchuriain 1931-32. But he would notdeclare war and dweltinsteadon his plansfornaval expansionand onhis own rangeof economicweaponry. Again he sketchedthe oceanicblockade (this time he claimed it would bring Japan to its kneeswithina year)and hementionedtradeembargoesas well.'4 A fullpolicyof sanctions,he stressed,would need the supportof other democraticnations,buttheCabinet werenot told of the impendingstafftalks.1.3 M. S. Watson,United StatesArmnyin World War II: Chiefof StaffPre-warPlansand Preparations(Washington.1950), pp. 92-93; L. Morton, 'War Plan Orange,Evolutionof a Strategy',World Politics.XI, 2, 1959.14 J. M. Blum,From the MorgenthauDiaries: Years of Crisis 1928-1938 (Boston:HoughtonMifflin.1959),pp. 486-487; H. L. Ickes, The Secr-etDiary of Harold L.

Ickes (London: Weidenfeld& Nicolson. 1959),Vol. II, pp. 274-275.


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754 INTERNATIONALAFFAIRSChamberlainand his Cabinet reacted to Roosevelt's moves withconfusionand scepticism;Eden's was the sole voice of unqualified

optimism.The stafftalkswerewelcomedbut theirpurposewas unclear.It was suggestedthat the Presidenthad 'rathernaive' ideas about thechances of imposinga blockade withoutendingup in a war: Japanwas fartoo dependentupon westernmarketforrawmaterials. To thewaryBritish,with theirburdensin Europe,it all soundedsuspiciouslylikeanothersanctionsproject.Roosevelt'sremarks,like his ' quarantine'speech,had alertedtheBritish,and Neville Chamberlainclearlymeantto use the stafftalksto constrainand educatehim. The PrimeMinistertold the Cabinet on December22 thatthe conversationswould serveto demonstrateto the Americansthat one could not contemplateablockade withoutbeing ready to back it withforce. (WhetherevenLindsay's confused account of Roosevelt's ideas merited this con-descensionis a fair question. The Presidentappears to have beensketchingsome future'undeclaredwar' in thePacific,butChamberlainand Lindsay seem to have missed the point. No criticismof thefeasibilityof an ocean-wideblockadewas offered,althoughthisseems,withhindsight,themostfallibleaspect of thescheme.) A discouragingreply had been sent to Morgenthaupointingout thatBritainlackedthe necessarylegislationto confiscateJapanese assets and that themeasurewas inany case a long-termproposition.Co-ordinatingmethodswas certainlyprovingto be more difficultthan simplyagreeingthatwesterninterestsin the Far East needed to be defended. But theCabinetneverthelessconcludedthata jointdemonstrationof force byBritainand theUnitedStatesmightwellboostEnglishprestigeall overtheglobe and theyleftit to Eden to discoverRoosevelt'sintentions.The ForeignSecretary'shopeswerehigh: 'co-operationwiththeUnitedStates',he told Chamberlain,'thoughdifficultto foster,is now,I hope,makingreal progress.I shall knowmoreabout thisafterI have seenIngersolltomorrow,but I am surethatour role in thisrespectmustbetodo everythingwe can privatelyto encouragetheAmericans'.'5Ingersollarrivedin London on December 31st and saw Eden onNew Year's Day 1938. He told Eden thatAmericanplanswerebasedon certainassumptionsabout Britishpolicy; thePresidentand AdmiralLeahy thoughtthe timehad come to exchangeinformationand co-ordinateplans moreclosely. He would give theAdmiraltyAmericandispositionsfor certain contingenciesin return for correspondingBritishinformation,and some technical arrangements,such as anexchangeof codes, could also be workedout. Eden asked Ingersollwhetherhis superiorssoughtjoint action now, or were the talks to

Cab. Conclusions,December22, 1937. Cab.23190. Eden to Chlamberlain,December31, 1937. Premier1/314.


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ANGLO-AMERICANNAVAL CONVERSATIONS ON THE FAR EAST 755providefor the uncertainfuture? The Americanofficerwould onlyreply that his Departmentfelt thatno movementsshouldbe ordereduntil fullpreparationhad been made foreveryeventuality,includingwar. For instance,theNavy did not wish to concentratethe PacificFleet at Hawaii or furtherwestbeforecrewswereraisedto fullstrength.So he could not say whetheraction shouldbe taken,but at least thetechnical discussions should precede political decisions. Eden wasperhapstoo eager, for he gave Ingersollthe impressionthat he 'wasmoreinterestedrightnowin immediategesturesto impresstheJapanesethanhe was in long-rangefutureplanning'."l Concludingforhis partthat the American had not been given authorityto discuss jointactionin the near future,Eden wentoffto holidayin France and inso doing removed himselffromcontrolover decisions. But he con-tinuedhis advocacyofAnglo-Americanco-operationin correspondencewithChamberlainand theForeignOffice.Only througha joint sihowof force in the Far East could Britainretain its great-powerstatusand maintain 'white race authority' in that part of the world.7Eden believed, like so many pro-AmericanBritish, in an Anglo-Americanhegemony,based on a monopolyof sea-power,rawmaterialsand commerce,and thoughtthat, afte:rEngland had composed itsdifferenceswithHitler,peace based on the imperialstatusquo couldbe imposedin theFar East and Mediterranean,ifnecessaryby force.Ingersollproceededto the Admiraltyforhis firstdiscussionwithChatfieldand his staffon January3rd. It was a wide-rangingand'exceedinglyfriendly'exchangefromwhichChatfieldlearnedthat theUnited States Fleet was not ready for action. Crews were kept atabout 85 per cent.of theirfullwar complement,and beforereservescould be called up thePresidentmustdeclare a ' stateof emergencya step describedby Chatfieldas 'a very similarmeasure to our ownmobilisation'. The Fleet could proceed to Honolulu beforethe dec-laration,said Ingersoll,but theNavy Departmentwould oppose this.'A good deal would thereforedependon the state of thepublicmindin theUnited States as to whetherthe Presidentwould feel justifiedin declaringa " state of emergency".' Chatfieldgathered that theAmericanFleet would be readyto sail severalweeks afterthis stephad been taken. Ingersolllater indicatedthat an advance forceofcruisers,destroyersand submarinescould proceed at once to thewestPacific and he added that,if it was decidedto act, the entireUnitedStatesFleet wouldbe transferredto thePacific.

16 IngersollMemorandumfor Leahy on London discussions.n.d. Officeof NavalHistory.WashingtonD.C. Copy in Adm.1/9822; Eden's account in F95,/841.0.(F.O.371122106).5 Eden to Chamberlain.January9, 1938. Premier1/276; Eden to Sir A. Cadogan.January9. 1938. F407/84/10.(F.0.371/122106).


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756 INTERNATIONALAFFAIRSChatfieldrepliedthathis Fleetwas by contrastin a 'far greaterstateof preparedness',thatbymid-Januaryit wouldbe ready,and

thatthemomentatwhichitcouldarriveatSingaporecouldbeenvisaged.If thetwoGovernmentsagreedto a demonstration,theFleetsshouldmove to theirdestinationssimultaneously,but if a furthercrisisdeveloped-ifJapanmenacedHongKong,forexample-Britainmighthave to sendits FleetwithoutwaitingforparallelAmericanaction.Ingersollthoughta similarsituationwouldemergeifJapanthreatenedthePhilippines,an act Americanplannershad previouslyanticipatedbut nowregardedas less likelyin view of its heavyinvolvementinChina. Chatfieldstressedthathe had ' a veryimportantbackdoortoguard' whichcould limitBritain'seffortin the Far East. It wasagreedthat the two Fleets shouldnot be tacticallycombinedbutwouldgo in supportof each other.As regardsstrategy,themosttheUnitedStatesNaval Board contemplated,said Ingersoll,was adistantblockadeor ' quarantine' ofJapan.Theywouldsupporttheblockadeon thePacificside withtheirFleetbased on Honoluluandtheirshipsin a distantcirclefromthe AleutianIslandsthroughtheSandwichIslandsandJohnstonIslandsouth-westwards.ChatfieldsaidtheBritishwouldtrytoholdsucha blockadeonthesouth-westside.18WhilethestafftalkswentaheadinLondon,Anglo-Americanpolicy-makerscontinuedto explorethe opportunitiesforjointor parallelactionagainstTokyo. By earlyJanuaryit was plainthattheinter-ventionistimpulsewas fading.The spasmofAmericanoutragewhichgreetedthePanayattackhad dissipated,a factdue in largeparttoJapan'sshrewdhandlingof thecrisis: thewesternnotesof protesthadbeenacceptedandapologiesmade byChristmasDay. Therewasprobablylittlecynicisminthis,fortheJapanesecertainlydidnotwantto provokea generalwarin 1938and theyknewthata conciliatorydiplomacywasalmosta guaranteeagainstanoverwhelmingcombination.Lindsayalsounderstoodthis,and,whenqueriedbytheForeignOffice,hewas reluctantto pressagainfora navaldemonstration.Roosevelthad toeducatehispublic,andhisAdministrationwas a 'horsethatwillrunbestwhenthe spur is not used'. The Americans,he added,'greatlypreferto actindependentlyofus andtoavoidanyappearanceofcollusionor ofjointaction'.", But Londondeterminedto resolvetheissueandLindsaywasinformedonJanuary7 thatBritishnavalprepara-tionswerein theirmostadvancedstateshortof actualmobilisation:was thePresidentlikelyto declarea stateof emergencyin presentcircumstances?News of furtherincidentsin ShanghaibroughttheForeignOfficeto add thatBritainmighthave to make a publicIs Chatfield,'Memorandum of Meeting with Captain Ingersoll', January3, 1938.Adm. 116/3922.19 Lindsayto F.O., tel. No. 5, January3, 1938. F98/84/10.(F.O.371/22106).


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ANGLO-AMFRICANNAVAL CONVERSATIONS ON THE FAR EAST 757announcementabout its preparations.Would Rooseveltagree toparallelsteps,suchas thedespatchofan advanceforcetoHawaii?

Roosevelt'sdecisionsweretakenon January10 and Lindsaywastoldthat: (a) it wouldbeannouncedthatthreeAmericancruiserswouldvisitSingapore;(b) if-but onlyif-Britainannouncedits preparations,withina fewdaysit wouldbe announcedthatvesselsof theUnitedStatesPacificFleetwereto have theirhullsscraped,i.e., preparedforsea; (c) afterthat,an announcementwouldbemadethattheAmericanPacificmanoeuvreswere being advancedto February.This wascertainlynota nonpossumus,andforoncetheBritishhad to assesstheirown,ratherthan American,willingnessto act. The ForeignOffice,Chatfieldand Chamberlainagreedthatonce an announcementwasmadetheonlyfurtherstepswhichcouldbe takenwouldbe actualmobilisationfollowedby the despatchof theFleet. Suchburningofone's ownbridgesmightsetin motionan automaticsequenceofactionsandreactions,and heretheinternationalsituationin Europeintrudedintotheircalculations.Chatfieldwas disturbedaboutpossiblerepercus-sionsintheMediterranean.ConversationswithItalywereplannedandtheabsenceoftheMediterraneanFleetwouldmeantheloss ofBritain'sstrongestbargainingcard(Chatfield,withtheotherChiefsofStaff,hadbeenpressingformonthsfora settlementwithMussolini).Chamberlainagreeditwouldbe 'a mostunfortunatemomentto sendthefleetawayand I wouldthereforetakeno immediateactionwhichwouldinvolveus inhavingtodo so'. It was decidedinsteadtoprotestagainin Tokyoand to playfortime.20

* * *Thesewerethelast importantexchangesarisingfromthePanayepisode.The absenceoffurtherseriousincidentsin theFar East andtheappearanceofa newinitiativebyRooseveltin theloftierrealmofinternationallaw-his so-called'peace plan' 21-defusedtheemergencyanddeflectedAnglo-Americanrelationsontoa newplane. Butin viewof theusual historicalassumptionthat it was Americawho finallyretreatedfromco-operationduringtheseweeks,the exchangesofJanuary10-11are of someinterest.In truth,it had beenBritainwhichhad been unable to acceptRoosevelt'stimetableof escalatorysteps.Its positionin Europeand the Mediterraneanwas so dangerousthatit was incapableof a seriousinterventionelsewhere.'Imperiallywe

20 F.O. to Lindsay, tel. No. 19, January 7, 1938. F96/84/10. (F.O.371/22106);Lindsay to F.O., tel. No. 29, January 10, 1938. F407/84/10. (F.O.371/22106);minutesby F.O., Chatfieldand Chamberlain,January11, 1938. Ibid.21 F. L. Lowenheim,'An Illusion that Shaped History: New Light on the Historyand Historiographyof American Peace Effortsbefore Munich', in D. R. Beaver(ed.), Some Pathwaysin Twentieth-CenturyHistory(Detroit: Wayne State UniversityPress. 1969).


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758 INTERNATIONALAFFAIRSare exceedinglyweak', Chatfieldcautionedthe MinisterforCo-ordina-tionof Defence, Sir Thomas Inskip. ' If at the presenttime,and formanyyearsto come,we had to send a Fleet to the Far East, even inconjunctionwith the United States,we should be left so weak inEuropethatwe shouldbe liabletoblackmailorworse.'22 The ChiefsofStaffhad thereforeconcluded,and Neville Chamberlainagreed,thatthe imperial predicament must be resolved throuighdiplomaticapproachesto Italyand Germanyaimedat a generalEuropean appease-ment. The time for dealing with Japan would comlewhen navalrearmamentwas completeand stabilityhad been achievedin Europe.For Britainthattimeneverarrived.Ingersoll'stalks withAdmiraltyplanningofficerswere completedin justovera week and on January13 theAgreedRecordofConversa-tionswas initialled(see below). A good deal of unexploredstrategicalmaterialrelatingto his mission still awaits its historian. A recurringtheme,for example, in the Britishdocumentsis the Americanplanforan economic'quarantine' or distantblockadeofJapan,and linkedto this can be seen the outlinesof a doctrineof 'un.declared war'.Was Lindsay correctin assumingthatthesewerethepersonalinspira-tions of Roosevelt? CertainlyIngersollrepresentedthe blockade ideaas Navy Departmentstrategy(although the line of demarcationwasslightlymodifiedin his version). Roosevelt'sinterestin such a strategy,based on an economyof violencein thePacificand the avoidance ofan Asian land war, can be tracedback to the 1920s,but thisdoes notmean thata scenarioofnaval blockadelay behindhis Chicago speech.For his ideas seemto have been modifiedsubstantiallyby his advisersduringthePaniayaffair.23In the light of subsequentevents, the related 'uLndeclaredwar'themeis also ofinterest.Thiswas definitelyRoosevelt'sownconception,developedpartlyfroman intellectualinterestin themilitarystrategiesof theAxis nationsin Abyssinia,China and Spain,whereinterventionwithoutformalbelligerencyhad occurred,and partly as a defensivereactionto congressionaleffortsto restrictthePresident'sauthoritytodeclare and wage war. His remarksto the BritishAmbassador onDecember 16, 1937,suggestthat he had givenconsideirablethoughttothese issues and had alreadyevolved'a new doctrineand technique'whichcould bringAmericainto'hostilities'butnotnecessarily'war'.If thishas the ringof contemporaryfamiliarity,it was neverthelessaconcept obscure to diplomatslike Lindsay who were conditionedto

22 Chatfieldto Inskip,January25, 1938.ChatfieldPapers.23 On the speech and its aftermath,D. Borg,The UnitedStates aind the Far EasternCrisis of 1933-1938 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UniversityPress; London:OxfordUniversityPress. 1964); J. McV. Haight,Jr.,'Roosevelt and theAftermathof theQuarantineSpeech', Reviewof Politics,Vol. 24, 1962.


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ANGLO-AMERICANNAVAL CONVERSATIONS ON THE FAR EAST 759think in the dated 'either peace or war' school of internationalrelations. England would later have reason to be gratefulfor thisparticularinspiration.On theBritishside, Captain Ingersoll'svisittriggeredno revolutionin strategicalthinking,but it seems at least to have thawed theAdmiralty'slong-standingsuspicions of Americannaval ambitions.Chatfieldwas aware thattheNavy Departmentcould make Britain'sfurthernaval expansion politicallydelicate and he now used hisinfluenceto press fora friendlierattitudeto thatpowerfulservice. TheAmericans had proposed in January1938 an arrangementwherebysecrettechnicalinformationcould be exchangedperiodicallyin Londonon a quidpro qutobasis. Althoughhe consideredthathis ownFleetwastechnicallysuperiorand thatBritainmustthereforegivemorethanshecould gain in such a scheme, Chatfieldsaw the potentialpoliticalgains far outweighingthis disadvantage.Accordingly,in May 1938,at a moment,incidentally,whenLondon was refusingFrenchrequestsfor naval collaborationin the Mediterranean,the AdmiraltyBoardreverseda 1936 rulingagainstpreferentialtreatmentfor Americaandauthorisedfull co-operationin the new arrangement.In succeedingmonths,againsta steadilyworseninginternationalbackground,Britishnaval planners and the United States Naval Attache in Londonexchangedideas and informationon a varietyof subjects,includingfleettactics,mine sweeping,naval construction,the JapaneseNavy,Japan'sactivitiesin thePacificand Germiany'sin theCaribbean.24Thelogical sequel followedin the summerof 1939 when the Admiraltysecretlydespatchedone ofitsownplannerstoWashingtonto informtheNavy Departmentof changesin Britishstrategywhich had occurredsince Ingersoll'svisit.These continuingexchanges kept the Americans apprised ofBritishnaval problemsand intentions,and to some extenttheyanticip-ated the contactsestablishedbetweenRooseveltand WinstonChurchillafterthelatter'sappointmentto theAdmiraltyon theoutbreakofwar.They also formedthe backgroundto the President'sinterventionsinnaval affairsin September1938-when AmericancruiserswerekeptinBritishwatersin orderto impressGermany-and again inApril1939-when the AmericanFleet was prematurelytransferredto the Pacificin responseto Anglo-Frenchrequests.This policy can be tracedbackto the exchangesof December 1937, and if it did not exactlyheralda new 'hands across the sea' period of Anglo-Americanrelations,itwas at least an importantbeginning. 'For fromthese firsthesitantcontactswould springthe entiretechnical apparatus of co-operationthatsupportedtheAnglo-Saxonrevivalof thewar years.

24 Adm.116/4302.


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760 INTERNATIONALAFFAIRSRECORDOF CONVERSATIONS25

The followingmemorandumcontainstheagreedrecordof theconversationsbetweenCaptainIngersoll,USN, and theNaval Staffat theAdmiralty.Composition,stateof readinessand initialmovementof FleetsU.S. FleetThe U.S. Naval viewis thatno gestureshouldbe made unlesstheFleetnowin commissionis broughtup to 100% full complementand preparedin allrespectsforwar. The abilityto bringthe Fleet up to fullcornplementdependson the issueby the Presidentof a Declarationof NationalEmnergency.The presentstate of readinessof the U.S. Fleet in comnmissionas regards

personnelis as follows:-SubmarinesandAircrafton thePacificCoast 100%.AdvanceForce,consistingof 2 Squadronsof heavyCruisersand 2 Squad-rons of Destroyersand 1 AircraftCarrieris now beingcompleted,as faras practicable,to fullcomplement.CapitalShips,Cruisers,Destroyersand Auxiliarieson the PacificCoast,otherthan AdvanceForce,85% complement.AtlanticCoast-3 Battleships,WYOMING and 1 Squadronof Destroyersareused as a trainingSquadronwithabout50%/complement.It is the intentionof the U.S. Navy Departmentto send firstto Honolulu

theAdvanceForce, togetherwithabout 15 Submarines.These could leave atanytime.There are alreadyabout75 patrolplanesand about 20 submarinesatHonolulu.There are 6 Submarinesand 36 aircraftin thePanama Canal zone.It is understoodthatall available capital shipswould proDbablybe senttoHonolulu. Allowingfor 2 or 3 shipsrefittingand 3 on theAtlanticCoast, 9of 10 capital shipscould be readyto sail 10 to 15 days aftertheDeclarationofNationalEmergency.Subsequentlythe Navy Departmentvisualise a gradualadvance across thePacificafterair reconnaissance,makinguse of JapaneseMandatedIslands asnecessary,and finallyestablishingthemselvesat Truk or some otherpositioninthesamegeneralarea.They do not at presentenvisageproceedingimmediatelyto Manila or anyotherPhilippineport.A FleetSupplyTrainwithabout one month'ssuppliescould sail in about 20days, and transports,tankersand auxiliaryvessels about :30 days aftertheDeclarationof a NationalEmergency.The U.S. NavyDepartmentintendalso to despatch2 submrLarinesand a smallnumberof aircraftand a seaplanetenderto operatefroma base at Unalaska.BritishFleetThe Admiraltypolicy is to sendto the Far East a forcewhichis sufficientto engagetheJapaneseFleetundernormaltacticaland strategicalconditions.Ingeneral,thisFleetwouldproceedto theFar East as a singletacticalunit.The forcewhichit is at presentintendedshouldformtheFar EasternFleetis as follows:-Some oftheseshipsarealreadyinEasternwaters.

Battleships......................... 8Battlecruiser........................ IAircraftCarriers................ .. 3* 8" Cruisers ......................... 825 Adm.116/3922.


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ANGLO-AMERICANNAVAL CONVERSATIONS ON THE FAR EAST 761* 6" Cruisers .......... ....... 11 (including 2 attached to DestroyerFlotillas)Cruiser Minelayer .................. I

Destroyer Flotillas ............... 7Submarines......... . ,.. 25togetherwith the necessaryDepot and Repair Ships and certainminorwarvessels.* 2-3" cruisersand 14" cruiserfromAustralia and 2-6" cruisersfromNew Zealand are in additionto the above and all come,probably,underordersof theAdmiralty.The exact compositionof the Far EasternFleet is subjectto modificationwith the passage of time: forinstance,at a later date it maybe desirabletosend 9 battleshipsto the Far East and to retainboth battlecruisersin HomeWaters. The above figures,however,serveas a generalguideto Britishstrengthin Far Easternwaters.It is understoodthattheships of the Home andMediterreanFleetswouldbereadyto sail fortheFar East at 10-14days' noticeifmobilisationwas orderedafter15thJanuary,1938.The BritishFleetwouldproceedinitiallyto Singapore.This base will notbefullycompletedfor 18 months.The drydocks thereare readybut Singaporeisnot preparedat the presenttimeto handle large repairsof shipsdamagedinaction. It can support,mainlyby commercialfacilities,in otherrespectstheforcecontemplatedto be based there.

General PolicyBoth partiesagree that,in principle,politicalmovementsshouldkeep stepwiththeNaval situation,butitis realisedthatthismay be difficultto accomplish.Ioth partiesalso agree that the politicalanclNaval measuresof each nationshouldbe kept in step withthoseof theothernation.To this end it is agreedthatit is desirablethatthearrivalof theBritishFleetat Singaporeand theU.S.Fleetat Honolulushould,as faras possible,be synchronised.Nevertheless,it isrealisedthatthecircumstances,and particularlyanyincidentsprimarilyaffectingone nationratherthanboth,maymakeit difficultto carryout the above policy.It is assumedthat all watersof the BritishCommonwealth,includingtheDominions,will be availableforuse of U.S. Naval Forces and thatall watersof theUnitedStates,includingthePhilippines,will be available foruse of theBritishNaval Forces.It is understoodthattheGovernmentoftheUnitedKingdomcannotdefinitelycommittheGovernmentsof theDominionsof theBritishCommonwealthto anyactionin concertwiththeUnitedKingdom.The Admiraltyfeelssure,however,thatCanada, Australiaand New Zealand would co-operatewiththe UnitedKingdomagainstJapanin thecircumstancesunderconsideration.The Admiraltyis notat thepresenttimeanticipatinganydirectaid fromtheFrenchor Dutch in theFar East, but theyconsiderthat it is possiblethat thelattermightadopt a benevolentattitudeof nieutrality.The Admiraltyare notcountingon anyaid fromRussia.

In the eventofGermanyprovinghostilea mostseriousproblemwouldarise.The Adniraltyis not so seriouslyapprehensiveof submarinesas theybelievethattheycan successfullydeal with them.Theyare, however,seriouslyappre-hensiveof Britishtraderoutesin theAtlantic,shouldtheGernans use their3PocketBattleshipsand the2 new27,000tonshipsas commerceraiders.An evenmore dangeroussituationwould arise shouldhostilitieswithItalyalso superveneafterthegreaterpartof theBritishFleethad proceededto the FarEast. It wouldbe necessaryfor theAdmiraltyto relyentirelyon thealternativerouteto the East via theCape of Good Hope. In thesecircumstancesthemainproblemin theMediterraneanwouldbe to hold theSuez Canal and Egypt.TheAdmiraltywould have to dependon the FrenchNavy to hold the WesternMediterraneanand some of her Naval Forces would have to be based on


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762 INTERNATIONALAFFAIRSGibraltarto securetheWesternentrance.Theywouldthemselves,however,keepanti-submarineforcesat Gibraltar. In this connectionthe Admiraltyis of theopinionthat theStraitsof Gibraltarcan be made hazardousforthe passageofenemysubmarines.In the eventof such a generalEuropean war it would almost certainlybenecessaryto effecta considerablereductionin the Britishstrengthin the FarEast. Withthereductionof Britishstrengthin the Far East underthesecondi-tionsthepossible necessityof directtacticalco-operationbetweenthe U.S. andBritishFleets would requirefurtherconsideration.

Policy withregardto Forcesnow in the Far EcastU.S. ForcesIt is understoodthattheU.S. Navy Departmentwouldlike the U.S. garrisonsnow in North China to be withdrawnand that in emergencythe U.S. AsiaticFleetwould withdrawfromNorthernChineseWaters.BritishForcesThe Admiraltyis also concernedregardingthe Britishgarrisonsin NorthChina. Should parallel action in regard to the movementsof the two MainFleets be decided upon, considerationwould have to be given to the accuratetimingof thewithdrawalof the Britishtroopsin NorthChina to Hong Kong,and themajor unitsof the BritishChina Fleet would also have to withdrawtothatplace or to Singapore.

Arrangementsfor inter-commiunicationbetweeniBritishand U.S. FleetsIt is agreedthatsince the two fleetswill be widely separatedat firstandprobablyforsome time therecould not be unityof commandin a tacticalorstrategicsense in thenearfuture.It is, however,agreedthatstrategicco-opera-tion will be necessaryand that such co-operationwill require common com-municationfacilities.The followingarrangementshavebeen agreeduponto thisend:-(a) The Admiraltywill distributeto all shipsofthe BritishFleet,and arrangeto depositat theBritishEmbassyin Washington,at Gibraltarand in theFar East forissue to theshipsof theU.S. Navy,thenecessarycopies otthefollowingbooks:-(1) A suitableCoda(2) Re-cypheringTables for use with the Codle by the HigherCommand.(3) Re-cypheringTables for use with the Code by the otherFlagOfficers.(4) Re-cypheringTables foruse withtheCode by all ships.(5) A Key Memorandumcontainingsimple recognitionsignalsforuse by both Fleets.(6) A book ofWarW/T Call SignsforbothFleets.(b) A copy of the BritishNaval W/T organisationwiVLbe issued by theAdmiraltywiththebooks to be distributedto theU.S. Fleet.(c) The U.S. Navy Departmentwill make availablethe necessarycopies oftheirPacificand Asiatic Fleet W/T Organisationfor distributionto theBritishFleet. These will be depositedas soon as practicablewiththeU.S. Embassyin London, on board the Flagship of theU.S. Squadronin the Mediterranean,and on board the Flagshipof the U.S. AsiaticFleet.(d) CommercialW/T procedurewill be used forinter-communication.(e) The Admiraltywill propose frequenciesfor inter-communicationif andwhen theoccasion arises.(f) Direct inter-communicationby W/T betweenindividualships of the twoFleets will not normallybe necessaryunless tacticalco-operationis

envisaged.


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ANGLO-AMERICANNAVALCONVERSATIONSON THE FAREAST 763The inter-communicationprocedureoutlinedabove will be subjectto adjust-mentbetweentheCommanders-in-Chiefof the two Main Fleets.

Interchangeof CommunicationPersonnelTo facilitateinter-communicationbetweenthe two Fleets it is agreedthatthe followinginter-changeof personnelwith experiencein WIT would bedesirable:(a) 1 Officerand 1 ratingfrom U.S. AsiaticFleet to be lent temporarilyto bothHong Kong and SingaporeW/TStations.(b) 1 Officer,if and whenavailable,and 1 ChiefPettyOfficerTelegraphistto be lenttemporarilyfromtheBritishChina Fleet to the U.-S.AsiaticFleetFlagship.(c) 1 Officerand 1 ratingto be lent fromthe Britishand U.S. Navies to theU.S. andBritishMain Fleetflagshipsrespectively.(d) 1 BritishOfficerto be appointedfordutywith the U.S. Navy initiallyat Washington.One officerfromU.S. Navy to be attachedto the staffof the U.S. Naval Attachein London -andto be availablefor communi-cation duties. GeneralLiaisonBothpartiesagreethatno furthermeasuresfor generalliaison purposesarenecessaryat thepresenttime.Should, however,parallelactionbe decidedupon by the two Governments,it would be necessaryto appointa BritishOfficerwithknowledgeofwar plansto Washingtonand a U.S. Officerwithsimilarknowledgefordutyin London.

StrategicalPolicyShouldtheGovernmentsdecidedthata distantblockadeis to be established,the BritishNaval Forces will be responsiblefor the stoppageof Japanesetradeon a line running,roughly,fromSingaporethroughtheDutch East IndiespastNew Guinea and New Hebrides,and thenceto theEastwardof AustraliaandNew Zealand.The U.S. Navy will be responsiblefor operationsagainstJapanesetradethroughoutthe WVestCoast of Northand SouthAmerica,includingthePanamaCanal and thepassageroundCape Horn.The U.S. Navywill also assumeresponsibilitvforthegeneralNaval defenceof theWestCoast of Canada.In thesecircumstancesit is agreedthatno hardand fastline of demarcationbetweentheareas in whichthe two fleetswill.operateneed to be laid downatthisstage. (Sd.) R. E. Ingersoll,Captain,UnitedStatesNavy.(Sd.) T. S. V. Phillips,Captain. Royal Navy.13thJanuary,1938.Lawrence Pratt is AssistantProfessor of Political Science at the

Universityof Alberta, Edmonton, Canada.

Documents

The Anglo-American Naval Conversations on the Far East of January 1938