The Åland Question during the Last Years of the Russian Empire

The Åland Question during the Last Years of the Russian EmpireAuthor(s): Pertti LuntinenSource: The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Oct., 1976), pp. 557-571Published by: the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London, School ofSlavonic and East European StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4207333 .

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SEER, Vol. LIV, No. 4, October 1976

0

The Aland Question During the

Last Years of the Russian Empire

PERTTI LUNTINEN

Ru SSIA conquered the Aland Islands with the rest of Finland during the war of i 8o8-9. In the I830S some fortifications were built at Bomarsund on Aland, which the Franco-British fleet destroyed in I 854. Sweden would have liked to get back Finland or at least Aland, but she hesitated to join in the Crimean War. Nevertheless, she signed the treaty of November I 855, which obliged her not to cede any terri- tory to Russia, whose designs regarding the Atlantic coast were feared in the West.' As a reward, the Western powers added a convention to the Paris Peace Treaty of i 856 whereby Russia was denied the right to fortify the Aland Islands or to have any military or naval establishment there.2

During the rest of the nineteenth century this convention apparently did not irk Russia very much as she made no serious attempt to have it abrogated. It was only a few years before the First World War that the Russian Empire tried to regain its sovereignty in Aland. Thereby Russia created difficulties in her relations with Sweden and some minor repercussions in great power politics. These complica- tions were called 'The Aland Question'.3 They showed a remarkably constant pattern in the very different circumstances of peace and war.

I During the years I 906-8 the Aland question formed part of the Baltic or Northern Question, which in its turn has to be seen in the wider context of international politics. Russia at this time concluded an agreement with England about Tibet, Afghanistan and Persia and felt the need to demonstrate to a potentially jealous Germany that the agreement with England was not directed against her. Therefore the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aleksandr Izvolsky, planned that Russia and Germany should cooperate to close the Baltic to outside powers (this was the Baltic question). In return Germany might help

Pertti Luntinen is Teacher of History in a Grammar School in Tampere. ' Paul Knaplund, 'Finmark in British Diplomacy 1936-i955' (American Historical

Review, XXX, Washington, I925, pp. 478-502). 2 George Maude, Finland and Britain i854-I9I4 (Ph.D. Thesis, University of London,

I970, pp. 30-47). 3 James Barros, The 4land Islands Question: Its Settlement by the League of Nations, New

Haven, I960, pp. i-I9; J. 0. Soderhjelm, Dc'militarisation et neutralisation des Iles d'Aland en I856 et I92r, Helsingford, I 928.



558 PERTTI LUNTINEN

Russia to bring Sweden to view more favourably the abrogation of the Aland convention of I856. The Russians claimed that the demilitarization of the Aland Islands was creating problems for them; it had prevented adequate surveillance of arms smuggling by revolutionaries in 1905 and I9o6.4 The tsar had also been personally annoyed when he learned of the obligation and the diminution of his sovereignty it entailed.5

Izvolsky seemed to have a good chance of attaining his goal in I 907 when he started to work for the elimination of this violation of 'Russia's most sacred rights and most rightful interests'. The enemies of I 856, England and France, were now Russia's friends, and there seemed to be no reason why they should want to preserve the Paris Peace Treaty. Sweden felt hurt and forsaken by England, who had supported Norway after the break-up of the Union and had signed the Norwegian Treaty of Guarantee, which the Swedes regarded as directed against themselves. Izvolsky hoped that Sweden would join the proposed treaty by which Germany and Russia intended to guarantee the Baltic status quo, and which took no account of other powers. The guarantee of the status quo could be interpreted as affording Sweden greater security than she had obtained in the Aland convention so that the latter might be abrogated.

But Izvolsky's hopes were disappointed. Sweden might have con- sented to the abrogation of the convention by the Western powers, but only on condition that Russia would promise Sweden to leave the islands unfortified. This would have made the situation worse than ever from the Russian point of view. In the event, when the Russian proposal was made public, Swedish opinion took fright and the old 'fear of Russia' revived; 'the new Port Arthur six hours from the Swedish capital' was seen as 'a pistol levelled at the head of Sweden'.

In vain did Izvolsky protest that he wanted only to satisfy Russia's amour propre and to watch the revolutionaries. Germany was of no help when she found out that the agitation in Sweden against the proposal might harm German-Swedish relations. Nor was Germany inclined to view favourably the proposal to close the Baltic. England, in turn, welcomed the opportunity to restore her popularity in Sweden. Sir Edward Grey promised in the House of Commons that England would not abrogate the Paris Convention without taking into account the feelings of Sweden. Then, in the spring of I908,

4 Bonn, Politisches Archiv des Auswartigen Amtes, Abt. I A. Russland 63, Band 2: German Military Attache in St Petersburg to William II, I3 February I 908, with a Protocol of the Russian Technical Committee on Aland 20 September-3 October i906.

5 Bonn, Politisches Archiv des Auswartigen Amtes, Abt. I A. Russland 63, Band I: German Ambassador von Pourtales in St Petersburg to Chancellor Bernhard v. Bulow, 29 January I908.



THE ALAND QUESTION 559

Austria started operations in the Balkans, and Baltic problems became of secondary importance from the Russian point of view, com- pared with the historical direction of Russian aspirations.

Izvolsky had to give up his attempt. The proposed status quo agreement was signed without closing the Baltic to non-Baltic powers, and with the stipulation that the status quo did not imply any limitation on the sovereignty of any signatory, but also with a clause that older agreements remained in force. Thus Aland remained demilitarized.6 Izvolsky was left without this feather in his cap, but he made it clear that, as far as he was concerned, the matter was only postponed, not buried altogether.7

II As early as I909 Izvolsky, when visiting Sweden, repeated that 'Russia could not resign herself indefinitely to the limitation of her sovereign rights'. The Swedes replied that the matter would reflect unfavourably on relations between the two countries, and Izvolsky promised not to take up his project in the West without previously informing Sweden.8 It seems probable that he did not intend to take up the matter in earnest. It was hardly one that he could recall with pleasure. Presumably, he only wanted to put on record that the matter was not yet closed.

The Swedes, nevertheless, were sufficiently frightened to repeat in the West their standard threat: 'If England and France don't con- tinue to resist the Russian demands, Sweden must turn elsewhere for support'.9 This was the very time when the German General Staff tried to reach an agreement with the Swedish General Staff about collaboration.10 Grey would have liked Russia and Sweden to reach agreement on the Aland problem, in order to deprive the Central Powers of this opportunity to agitate against Russia in Sweden, but the Swedes were too suspicious of Russian intentions.11 Even in i908

the Aland question had been a 'tiresome affair' for the British, because it was difficult to defend Sweden against Russia; it would have been detrimental to the Franco-British Entente and to the recent agreement with Russia.

6 Folke Lindberg, Scandinavia in Great Power Politics I905-I908 (Acta universitatis stockholmiensis, Stockholm Studies in History, I), Stockholm, 1958, passim, shows the Northern Question from Stockholm's point of view; David W. Sweet, 'The Baltic in British Diplomacy before the First World War' (The Historical Journal, XIII, 3, London, 1970) deals with British policy. P. Luntinen, The Baltic Question 1903-i908, Helsinki 1975, is based on the documents in the Archive of Russian Foreign Policy.

7 Public Record Office/Foreign Office (PRO/FO), no. 371/529/I7764: O'Beirne to Grey, I8 May I908.

8 Karl Hildebrand, Gustaf V som manniska och regent, Malmo, I945, p. 564. 9 PRO/FO 37 1/745129656: Cecil Spring-Rice to Grey, 3 August 1909. 10 Folke Lindberg, 'De svensk-tyska generalstabsf6rhandlingarna Ar ig9o' (Historisk

tidskrift, no. i, Stockholm, 1957, pp. 1-40). 11 PRO/FO 371/745/29656: minute by Grey, io August I909.



560 PERTTI LUNTINEN

After Izvolsky's resignation from the Foreign Ministry in I9I0 the Aland question was not taken up officially before the outbreak of the Great War, but the Russians did not forget it. When the Swedish Royal visit was planned in I9I2, the Russian Foreign Office deli- berated on whether the Aland question should be discussed with the guests. The opinion was put forward that, as Russia had no intention of fortifying the islands, there was no need to revive the old quarrel. On the other hand, it was feared that an absolute silence might let the Swedes think that Russia had definitely given up her wish to solve the problem. It was therefore suggested that it would be in order to present the Swedes with a memorandum, explaining that Russia still maintained the standpoint expressed in I908. This proposition did not win enough support, however, because it was deemed that reviving the issue might prevent the attainment of what was after all the main political aim, gaining the confidence of the Swedes. The Aland question would push Sweden closer to Germany, which would be a greater disadvantage to Russia than any lack of fortification on Aland.12 The question was not taken up: it seems that Izvolsky's mistake in I908 had taught the Russian Foreign Office a lesson.

Apparently, however, the Swedes had some inkling of the Russian deliberations. For about this time the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Albert Ehrensvard, said to the British minister, Cecil Spring-Rice, apropos of rumours that Sweden might join the Triple Alliance, that 'Sweden would remain neutral as long as it was possible to do so, and as long as she was not forced by dire necessity to seek a foreign protector. As long as England and France maintained their agreement with Russia, by which the latter was pro- hibited from fortifying the Aland Islands, Sweden would be content to remain neutral."3 Of course Sweden's neutrality did not depend solely on the status of Aland, but even so Spring-Rice stressed the importance of France and England maintaining the Paris Con- vention of i856.14

Thus the Russian minister in Stockholm, A. A. Savinsky, was embarking on a hopeless task when a few days later he referred to this matter in a discussion with Spring-Rice. He proposed 'as a purely personal suggestion' that Russia might give a solemn pledge to respect the neutrality of Sweden, and in exchange Sweden would express her acquiescence in the abrogation of the convention.15 In the absence of Russian sources it is not possible to know whether this

12 Moscow, Arkhiv vneshney politiki Rossii (AVPR), fond sekretnyy arkhiv ministra, delo 383/390, no. 7 (summary of a protocol on the Aland question, I 2 July I9I2).

13 PRO/FO 371/1478/33056: Spring-Rice to Grey, 30 July 19I2. 14 PRO/FO 371/1478/33709: Spring-Rice to Grey, 5 August I9I2. 15 PRO/FO 371/1478/35675: Spring-Rice to Grey, 20 August I912.



THE ALAND QUESTION 56I

was really a personal speculation, or a cautious feeler coming from the Russian government. The latter seems improbable as it had just been decided not to take up the question during the Swedish Royal visit.

The British minister was not at all pleased with the suggestion: 'The mere allusion to the establishment of an armed station would lead to a great popular demonstration in which all parties (in Sweden) would join.'16 The Foreign Office concurred: 'The Russian minister's suggestion is not practicable'; 'it would give rise to a tre- mendous outcry in Sweden'; 'it is to be hoped that the Russian Govt. will let the question of the Aland Islands rest for the present."7

The discussion on the Aland Question in I9I2 was remarkably similar to that of I908. Against supposed Russian aspirations the Swedes played the card of the threat of German influence. England continued to be reluctant to abandon Sweden completely in spite of her pro-German inclinations. But there was a difference too: in I9I2 Russia had no schemes of co-operation with Germany in the Baltic, which in I908 had made her forget the German influence in Sweden.

Aland could not be fortified before the war, and the islands were left in front of the line of Russian defence. In I9I3 the Russian Foreign Office was asked whether a post of aerial observation could be established on Aland. Baron Michael von Taube, who had been much occupied with the Baltic operation in I908, thought that there was no objection;'8 but Baron Boris Nolde stated that the Convention of 1856 was still in full force,'9 and no air base was built.

III The Aland question was again taken up in I9I5. The Russians were afraid of a German landing and a rebellion in Finland, and in order to prevent it the Aland Islands had to be fortified. The Russian navy lay in its bases in the Gulf of Finland most of the time, undertaking only some minor operations.20 The Baltic was a German sea for all practical purposes.

Admiral Sir John Fisher had planned an attack on the German Baltic coast, but the plan was deemed impracticable while the Ger- man High Seas Fleet was in being. The military plan to send the

16 PRO/FO 371/1478135675: Spring-Rice to Grey, 20 August I9I2. 17 PRO/FO 371/1478/35675: minutes by F.O., 26 August 19I2. 18 AVPR, fond sekretnyy arkhiv, delo 383/390, no. i6: a memorandum by Taube, 20

November I 91 3. 19 AVPR, fond sekretnyy arkhiv, delo 383/390, no. 21: a memorandum by Nolde, 4

March I 914. 20 Rene Gregerer, Die Russische Flotte im Ersten Weltkrieg i9i4-r9q7, Munich, 1970,

pp. I 76-98.



562 PERTTI LUNTINEN

British Expeditionary Force to the Western Front was accepted instead. When an alternative front was opened in I9I5, the Dardan- nelles and Gallipoli were chosen. Only a couple of British submarines operated in the Baltic during the war.21 Nevertheless, the Baltic and the Aland Islands were of some importance to the British. As the war drew out unexpectedly, Russia's glaring unpreparedness came to light. Her Western Allies had to find a way to send material help in order to keep Russia in the war. One of the supply lines ran through Norway and Sweden over or around the Gulf of Bothnia to Finland. This route was open to German attack unless the Aland Islands were fortified.

Again it was the Swedish reaction that caused the difficulties. The majority of the Swedish nation preferred neutrality in the war. Of the parties, the Conservatives believed in a German victory and thought that the Western powers had betrayed their duty to civiliza- tion by making an alliance with Russia. But only a small group of so-called Activists wished Sweden to join Germany and to attack Russia: they had close contacts with the Finnish Activists, whose aim was to gain independence for Finland. The Socialists and the Liberals were more favourably inclined towards the Entente and aimed at 'real' neutrality between the warring camps. There was no 'left' activism.22

The Swedish Conservative Prime Minister, Hjalmar Hammar- skiold, had decided to keep out of the war and was profuse in his assurances of neutrality, but he did not wish to make the British too certain of Sweden's attitude in order to win concessions in the difficult negotiations about a new commercial treaty. These difficulties arose from the British policy of blockade, which Hammarskiold did not accept; but his arguments about international law were not very convincing because he had nothing to say about the German sub- marine war.23 The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Knut Wallenberg, was more favourable to the Entente than the Prime Minister, and his continuance in office was thought to be the guarantee of Sweden's neutrality.

As early as I914 the Swedes heard rumours concerning Russian fortifications on Aland. At the beginning ofJanuary I 915 Wallenberg discussed these rumours with Anatoly Neklyudov, the Russian minister in Stockholm. Neklyudov says in his memoirs that Russia was not yet afraid of the Swedish Activists, but it was deemed wise to give

21 Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era 1904-19i9; II, The War rears: To the Eve of Jutland, London, I965, pp. 176-98.

22 Sten Carlsson and Jerker Rosen, Svensk historia, II, Stockholm, 196I, pp. 613-25. 23 This problem has been thoroughly dealt with by the Swedish historians: Torsten

Gihl, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, 4: I9I4-I919, Stockholm, 1956-9; W. M. Carl- gren, Neutralitdt oder Allianz, Uppsala, i962; W. M. Carlgren, Ministdren Hammarskieold, Uppsala, I967.




some reassurance to Sweden.24 He therefore answered Wallenberg on 8 January I9I5 that, as the Germans were known to be planning an attack on the Islands, Russia had to take some precautionary defensive measures. But the fortifications to be erected were only defensive and only for the duration of the war; securing the Gulf of Bothnia against an attack was useful for Sweden as well as for Russia. The Swedish government seemed to be satisfied with this assurance, and the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Sazonov, was able to inform military and naval officials that the work of fortification could be commenced. There was of course no danger of a protest from London or Paris in this situation.25

In August I9I5 a German visit to an islet in Aland made the matter of the fortifications once more topical. Wallenberg told the British minister, Esme Howard, that it would be highly satisfactory if at the end of the war Russia gave Sweden a direct assurance that the islands would never be fortified in recognition of the correct and neutral attitude to Sweden during the war. He did not think of asking for such an assurance then, but he wished to emphasize Sweden's desire to maintain friendly relations with Russia, and he hoped that this would be remembered later.26 Thus the problem of Sweden's neutrality and the question of Aland were linked together even during the war, as they had been in I908 and I9I2. But as Wallen- berg only expressed pious hopes, there was no sense of urgency.

About the same time the Russians began to be troubled by certain rumours, according to which Sweden would try to take possession of the Aland Islands at the end of the war; Germany might give them to her as a compensation for attacking Russia and liberating Finland, or Russia might be asked to do so as a compensation for Sweden staying out of the war. Wallenberg denied the truth of these rumours, but repeated to the Russians what he had said to Howard27: the Swedes had hoped in I908 that Russia would give a pledge not to fortify Aland to Sweden as well as to the Western powers, for the latter could not be trusted to defend Sweden's interests at all times, as had been seen only too clearly now that the war had broken out. In I 908 an outraged Russia had opposed this Swedish wish, and even now Sazonov only repeated his assurance of 8 January. When the Swedish envoy in Petrograd, Lieutenant General Edvard Brandstro5m, asked for a clear answer whether Russia was going to raze the fortifications at the end of the war, Sazonov simply avoided answering; nor did Wallenberg get a clear answer out of Neklyudov.-A Swedish

24 A. Nekludoff, En diplomats minnen I9II -9I9, Stockholm, 1921, p. 236. 26 Gihl, op. cit., p. 204. 26 PRO/FO 37I/2455/II5I38: Howard to Grey, I8 August 1915. 27 Gihl, op. cit., pp. 205-6.



564 PERTTI LUNTINEN

historian says: 'The Russian foreign policy makers were unwilling to bind themselves for the future'.28 This was only natural since the war had at last de facto annulled the troublesome Convention of I856.

IV Sazonov saw no reason to renew Russia's obligation, but by the beginning of I9I6 the situation had become more ominous as the Swedish Activists began to exploit the fear created by the Aland fortifications as a weapon in their anti-Russian agitation. Sazonov tried to calm down the Swedes and in a speech in the Duma he emphasized the importance of good relations between Russia and Sweden. Obviously he was still reluctant to say more. When King Gustav remarked that it would be a good thing to conclude an agreement about Aland, Sazonov answered that the idea was good and that he would do everything to realize it if he were in office by the end of the war.29 But he was not able to put off the problem much longer. Wallenberg frightened Neklyudov by hinting at his (Wallen- berg's) dismissal because of German pressure.30

The campaign of the Activists must be seen against the background of the Great War in I 9 I 6. Germany concentrated her forces against Verdun. The Russian attacks led by Kuropatkin in March and by Brusilov in June caused the Central Powers difficulties. A Swedish attack in Finland might have been of some help to Germany.31

Neklyudov says in his memoirs that the campaign of the Activists 'made our government nervous. I thought it my duty to prevent a too abrupt turn-about in the Aland question and to give calming information to my government.'32 But in fact he was himself busy sending alarming reports about the anti-Russian bias in Swedish public opinion.33 The high point of the agitation of the Activists was reached at the beginning of May I9I6, when a question about Aland was put in the Riksdag.34 In his discussions with Wallenberg Neklyudov tried to put a brave face on the matter and said that Russia was not at all afraid of Sweden-that was not the reason that Russia was troubled. Russia was strong enough to conquer Sweden if necessary.35 But of course this was the cause of Russian anxiety; during the war there was no need to add a single nation to the

28 ibid., p. 206. 29 ibid., pp. 207-8. 30 ibid., p. 175. 31 Carlgren, Neutralitdt oder Allianz, pp. 159-75. 32 Nekludoff, op. cit., p. 250. 33 AVPR, fond sekretnyy arkhiv, delo 388/397, pp. 3-1o: Russian Legation in Stock-

holm to Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20, 2I, 22 and 23 March i9I6. 34 Gihl, op. Cit., p. 207. 35 AVPR, fond sekretnyy arkhiv, delo 388/397, p. i3: Russian Legation in Stockholm

to Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 I April/4 May I 1 I 6.




number of one's enemies, as Neklyudov fully realized when he tried to 'calm down the clearly expressed nervousness of our General Staff'.36 He reported that Germany had plans ready to bring about Wallenberg's fall, after which it would be easy to make Sweden launch an attack on Finland. Sweden's army admittedly was small, but trained to manoeuvre in the North.37 Neklyudov's discussion with Hammarskiold was not reassuring, either. The Prime Minister explained to him the attitude of the Activists, and repeated twice 'ablata causa cedit effectus'; and even Wallenberg wanted to start discussions about Aland.38

Sazonov ordered Neklyudov to report on the situation 'because of the alarming information received here'.39 Neklyudov explained that the Swedish government might indeed get into difficulties because of the parliamentary question, and then the court under German pressure might appoint an Activist government which would order mobilization. Therefore it would be a good thing to give some promise about dismantling the Aland fortifications after the war, so as to support the present government.40 Neklyudov 'was not able to con- ceal his anxiety' on account of the situation in Sweden; he felt that the 'Alandskiy strakh', the 'Aland fright', was rampant not only among the Activists and Germanophiles but even among the Liberals and the 'sensible' circles.41 Russia had better take the initiative herself because it was possible that the Swedes, provoked by the Ger- mans, would propose something that Russia could not accept, for instance, the neutralization of Aland under Swedish control; and even if she could accept it, it would then seem that she was forced to do so under pressure.42 Neklyudov thought that Russia could promise not to maintain military or naval forces on the islands in peace-time. They were not needed there in any case: if Germany won the war, she would certainly compel Russia to neutralize the islands; if Germany lost the war, no defence would be needed against her.43

After receiving these reports Sazonov acted. He drafted a memorandum for the tsar. He explained that he had tried to calm down

36 Nekludoff, op. cit., p. 251. 37 AVPR, fond sekretnyy arkhiv, delo 388/397, p. I5: Russian Legation in Stockholm

to Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2I April/4 May I9I6. 38 AVPR, fond sekretnyy arkhiv, delo 388/397, p. 23: Russian Legation in Stockholm

to Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 Aprillio May I9I6. 39 AVPR, fond sekretnyy arkhiv, delo 388/397, p. IO: Sazonov to Neklyudov, 30 April/

3 May I9I6. 40 AVPR, fond sekretnyy arkhiv, delo 388/397, p. 25: Russian Legation in Stockholm

to Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 April/io May I9I6. 41 AVPR, fond sekretnyy arkhiv, delo 388/397, p. 26: Neklyudov to Sazonov 27 April/

IO May I9I6. 42 AVPR, fond sekretnyy arkhiv, delo 388/397, p. 42: Russian Legation in Stockholm

to Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 April/i2 May I9I6. 43 AVPR, fond sekretnyy arkhiv, delo 388/397, p. 43: Russian Legation in Stockholm

to Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 April/ I 2 May I 9 I 6.



566 PERTTI LUNTINEN

Sweden with the assurance that the fortifications on Aland were only defensive; Sweden ought to believe this because for a hundred years Russia had done nothing inimical to Sweden, but nevertheless the agitation in Sweden had grown; even the British minister was pressing Russia to promise to destroy the fortifications at the end of the war, if that was to be the price for Sweden's neutrality.44 Now the Minister of Foreign Affairs asked the tsar whether Russia ought to stand fast against the Swedish wishes and accept the risk of war, if Sweden were not satisfied with Russian assurances that the fortifications were not directed against her; or whether Russia should pledge herself to dismantle the fortifications after the war, if that was the only means of making Sweden maintain her neutrality.45 Nicholas II passed the question on to the General Staff and the Ministry of Marine, although the form given to it by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in fact almost contained the answer.

General-Adjutant Ivan Grigorovich of the Ministry of Marine answered that his Ministry considered Aland as of no importance for the defence of the Empire.46 From the General Staff General Mikhail Alekseyev answered that during peace-time neither fortifications, nor military or naval forces, would be needed on Aland, so that Russia could well afford to pledge herself to destroy the fortifications after the war.47 Thus Sazonov was able to send to Neklyudov an authorization to sign the pledge desired by Sweden, if the situation became really dangerous. The pledge was to be in the form of a bilateral agreement, in which Sweden on her part would bind herself to maintain neutrality.48

In a moment of great danger Russia had to resign herself to accept this humiliation. In I908 Novoye vremya had been of the opinion that to submit the sovereignty of the Empire on Aland to Swedish control would lead to the immediate dismissal of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.49 Now the danger of Sweden joining the Central Powers seemed really great, and consequently the question of the status of the Aland Islands after the war seemed of secondary importance. The Foreign Office informed the Ministry of Marine that the agitation in Sweden was assuming menacing proportions; it was

44 Gihl, op. cit., p. 208, thinks that England paid measure for measure because Russia had pressed her to ease the blockade rules about which Sweden had complained. But the British had also other reasons, see pp. 570-I, below.

45 AVPR, fond sekretnyy arkhiv, delo 388/397, P. 36: a memorandum by Sazonov, 29 April/ I 2 May I 9 I 6, to the tsar.

46 AVPR, fond sekretnyy arkhiv, delo 388/397, p. 41: Ministry of Marine to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 April I9I6 (Old Style).

47 AVPR, fond sekretnyy arkhiv, delo 388/397, p. 55: General Staff to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 April/ 13 May I 9 I 6.

48 AVPR, fond sekretnyy arkhiv, delo 388/397, p. 59: Russian Ministry of Foreign Af- fairs to Russian Legation in Stockholm, I/ 14 May I 9 1 6.

4 Novoyc vremya, 15/28 February i908.




to be hoped that the pledge to be given to Sweden would calm down the agitation, but it might be as well to prepare the naval forces for counter-measures. At the same time the Foreign Office gave a warn- ing that sending troops to Northern Finland would add fuel to the agitation of the Swedish Activists.50

Russia was supported by her Western allies. Britain and France had no 'war aims' in the Baltic, nor anyintention of starting operations there.51 The British attitude to Sweden's neutrality emerges from the minutes of the War Committee of i February i9I6. In these it was pointed out that Swedish iron ore was essential for the manufacture of munitions, but that it was possible to manage with the ore found in Cumberland. The difficulties (mentioned above) in the commercial relations between the two states seemed to be wearing the British down; it was stated that it would have been simpler, from the blockade point of view, to deal with Sweden as an enemy. But from a more general point of view there was the danger, if war broke out with Sweden, of a landing behind the Russian lines. If the Swedes or the Germans landed 200,ooo men behind the Russian lines it would place the Russian army in a difficult position.52 During the whole war the Western Allies had to strengthen Russia's will to carry on fighting, and especially at that moment a Russian attack was badly needed to ease the German pressure on the Western Front. Hence Sweden could not be abandoned to the enemy side, and when in May Sweden's attitude seemed to be vacillating, the diplomatic representatives of England and France were prepared to present a note in Stockholm in support of Russia. They explained that Russia had been forced to fortify Aland against a possible German attack. But the fortifications were not directed against Sweden, and the governments of Great Britain and France were able to assure Sweden, on the strength of a pledge given to them by Russia, that the status quo in Aland with regard to the fortifications would be restored at the end of the war.53 In this way the promise to dismantle the fortifications would have received international sanction.

But in the event the Allies were able to omit the last sentence, and Russia was not forced to give any pledge. It seems that the situation in Sweden was not in fact as dangerous as Neklyudov saw it and led Sazonov to believe it to be; the confusing and tense events led the contemporary observers astray. Germany was not in fact interested

50 AVPR, fond sekretnyy arkhiv, delo 388/397, p. 63: Russian Ministry of Foreign Af- fairs to Ministry of Marine, 1/14 May I9I6.

51 V. H. Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy i9i4-I9r8, Oxford, 1971, passim.

52 PRO/CAB 42/8, Papers of the War Committee: Minutes of the War Committee, I February 1916.

53 AVPR, fond sekretnyy arkhiv, delo 388/397, p. 70: appendix to a memorandum by Sazonov, I May I9i6 (Old Style).



568 PERTTI LUNTINEN

in inducing Sweden to participate in the war, for it was thought that this would hamper the German attempts to induce Russia to make a separate peace.54 And the voice of the Swedish Activists was much more voluble than their power. Not many members of the Riksdag wanted to promote the schemes of the Activists. In a discussion with Wallenberg, Neklyudov was given to understand that it would suffice to save the government if Russia gave the assurance of 8 January in writing; it would not be published, but it would be given to the Secret Committee of the Riksdag, which would then be able to assuage public opinion.55

Sazonov hastened to answer Neklyudov that it would be excellent if this were enough to avoid the danger of a conflict; so 'please refrain from using the authorization sent to you except in the case of utmost necessity'. The Western Powers were asked to leave out of their notes the sentence referring to the dismantling of the fortifications after the war.56 Thus Neklyudov on i6 May I9I6 put in writing the assurance of 8 January I 9I5, and this was repeated by the envoys of the Western powers on i8 May.57 On the strength of this the Riksdag issued a manifesto declaring that Sweden was going to observe strict neutrality, and that the vital question of Aland was to be kept under relentless observation. Both chambers accepted the manifesto. Two days later the parliamentary question of the Activists was answered by a simple reference to the manifesto.58 The Swedish historian Torsten Gihl says that 'this was a death-blow to Activism, for the Conservatives henceforth disassociated themselves from the movement'.59

Thus the assurance that the fortifications were not directed against Sweden was after all sufficient to pay for Sweden's neutrality. The Swedes could not guess how near they were to achieving their aim with regard to Aland. But it seems that Hammarskiold and Wallen- berg were not interested in the Islands as such, only in their political importance as a pawn in the direction of Sweden's foreign and home policy; once the continuation of their own political line was assured, namely neutrality (somewhat benevolent to Germany), they could afford to ignore the deflated scarecrow which the Activists had tried so hard to erect. When Sweden later on wanted to take up the Aland question, it seems that the initiative was due to King Gustav V.

54 Carlgren, Neutralitdt oder Allianz, pp. 84, 230-6. 55 AVPR, fond sekretnyy arkhiv, delo 388/397, p. 50: Russian Legation in Stockholm

to Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 April/I3 May I9I6. 56 AVPR, fond sekretnyy arkhiv, delo 388/397, p. 64: Russian Ministry of Foreign Af-

fairs to Russian Legation in Stockholm, I/ 14 May I 9 I 6; p. 68: a memorandum by Sazonov, |I/4 May I9I6.

57 Gihl, op. cit., p. 209. See above, pp. 564-5. 58 Carlgren, Ministdren Hammarskiold, p. 131. 9 Gilil, op. cit., p. 2I0.




Thus the recurring theme of the Aland Question had reappeared in I9I6. Russian activity on Aland had caused uneasiness in Sweden, and this had led to increased German influence. In order to counter- act this, Russia had to give up, or very nearly so, her claims on Aland.

V At the end of May I9I6 King Gustav wrote a letter to Nicholas II about Aland asking Russia to promise Sweden what she had promised the Western Powers in I856. In June Nicholas answered that Russia might discuss the matter if Sweden so wished, but he made no practical suggestions. Gihl says that Russia wanted to delay dealing with the matter.60 Of course this is understandable. What the King was now asking for was something that Russia might have conceded at her moment of greatest danger. At that moment Russia nevertheless did not need to make this concession, and now the danger had passed. Even if the question of Russia's sovereignty in Aland was not of primary importance, there was no reason to give it up for nothing.

Of course Aland was not a Russian 'war aim'; the main issue in the Great War was the survival of the Russian state. Nevertheless, during the last months of the regime the Aland question was once more taken up. Rasputin's creature, Boris Stiirmer, the Prime Minister, dismissed Sazonov in the summer of i9I6 and himself took charge of foreign affairs; and he continued in Izvolsky's foot- steps in the Aland question. In November I 91 6 Sturmer informed the British that the Swedes were pressing for discussions on this issue, and Russia, desiring to maintain good relations with Sweden, was unable to oppose these demands. But Russia could not accept any scheme which entailed a restriction of her sovereign rights in the archipelago, especially as the war had demonstrated the importance of Aland for the defence of the empire. Russia was prepared to give any reassurance Sweden desired but she had to reveal that she no longer considered herself restricted by the clauses of the Convention of i 856. Stiirmer wanted to know whether the Allies would help Russia in her discussions with the Swedish government.6' Sturmer's approach differed greatly from the views expressed by Sazonov and the military and naval circles in May of the same year. It would be interesting to know what made Stuirmer follow a policy of nationalist aspiration in the spirit of Izvolsky, but in the absence of Russian sources it is use- less to construct any hypothesis.

Sturmer received no support from the West. The Foreign Office answered that 'it would be far better to leave well alone'. If the

60 ibid., p. 2IO. 61 PRO/FO 371/2754/221946: Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to British F.O., 5

November I9I6.



570 PERTTI LUNTINEN

Swedes were pressing, it would probably be sufficient to renew the assurances given in May. Grey thought that to open discussions with the aim of modifying the assurances given to Sweden would only provide material for the Activists and cause misgivings among those friendly to the Allies, and the consequences would be disastrous. The commercial negotiations would fail, and Wallenberg might have to resign.62 It seems that Grey assumed that Stiirmer himself wished to reopen the question, not because of Swedish pressure, but so as to secure the Russian position in Aland. The moment seemed most inopportune for the Allies to create new difficulties, since their great offensives had come to nought. Rumania was lost, Italy had turned out to be mainly a burden, and Russia was fast losing her grip. Without Western support Sturmer had to give up. He answered that he was fully alive to the necessity of caution in the discussions with Sweden and promised to postpone the issue until a more favourable moment.63

Soon afterwards, in December I9I6, King Gustav V returned to the question. Again the Russians asked for British views. The latter thought that raising the issue was 'most unfortunate'. 'The discussion respecting the Aland Islands is likely to end in a revival of Swedish ill-feeling towards Russia . . . and to react unfavourably to the pros- pects of the [Anglo-Swedish Commercial] Agreement coming off'. It was to be feared that Sweden would use the transit traffic as a means of obtaining concessions from the Russians, and thus the haggling over Aland would delay the conclusion of a commercial agreement, which was of prime importance in the light of the blockade. Thus the Russians were advised to return a dilatory reply to King Gustav.64 The latter regretted to see his great national aim un- realized. Allegedly he told his secretary that the King of Denmark ought to be approached so that he might hint to the tsar that Aland should be given to Sweden. In a discussion with the Austrian envoy he regretted Russia's reluctance to discuss the question, and said that the best solution would be if Sweden were given the Islands.65

With the rapid worsening of the political situation in Russia it was no longer profitable to make approaches to the tsar. In May I 917 General Brandstruim had to remind the Russians of the promised

62 ibid.: Grey to Sir George Buchanan, 5 November I9I6. 63 PRO/FO 37I/2754/228373: Count Alexander v. Benckendorif to Sir Charles

Hardinge, I2 November I9I6. 64 PRO/FO 371/2754/262603: Benckendorff to British F.O., 27 December I916;

Minutes by F.O., 28-9 December I9I6; F.O. to Russians, draft, 5 January 1917. Carlgren, Ministiren Hammarskiold, p. I31, says: 'Probably the Russians were incited [to give a dilatory answer] by the British government, who saw no reason to satisfy the Swedes'. As shown above, the British did incite the Russians, but thev had concrete reasons for it and no mere lack of good will.

6f5 ibid., pp. 276-7.



THE ALAND QUESTION 57I

discussions, the delaying of which was causing disquiet in Sweden. The Russians then proposed bilateral unofficial discussions by dele- gates, but the Swedes feared that such discussions would not have any binding results. In August the Russians promised to make the discussions official, and by the end of October their minister in Stock- holm informed the Swedes that discussions could now begin.66

During the year I 9 I 7 these discussions had an air of unreality. The Russians gave promises when it was clear that they had nothing to lose by them, evidently in order to humour the Swedes. In June I 9 I 7, when the proposal to start discussions was accepted, the Council of Naval Fortifications discussed the situation. It was decided that all possible work had to be stopped because the builder had no Finnish money, because of the difficult financial situation of Russia, and because the position which the Russian forces in Finland would occupy by the end of the war was not known.67 In October, when the discussions were to start, the families of the builders and officials were being hurriedly evacuated from the islands, and a note of panic can be detected in the letter of resignation by the engineer-colonel who was the leader of the building operations.68 Aland was lost to Russia, and the Russians seemed to realize it, although Izvolsky in Paris was engaged in pathetic attempts to realize his old dream, making the French abrogate the Convention of i856.69 In November I9I 7 the Russian Empire ceased to exist, and the Aland question was taken charge of by others. In the year I 9 I 7 the British were no longer involved in the Aland question.

During the war Russia was able to assert her 'sovereign rights' on the islands de facto. Sazonov, however, very nearly gave them up in order to keep Sweden neutral; but the Swedish government was not sufficiently interested, and a non-binding assurance proved enough.

After the defeat Russia's possession of the islands came to an end. The story of the Aland question before and during the war also sheds some light on its history in the years I9I8 to I92I, when the islands became an object of dispute between Finland and Sweden. It is evident that only a few Swedes supported those who wanted to annex the Aland Islands, but their demilitarization was held to be important for the security of Sweden by a large section of public opinion. A solution was found when the League of Nations decided to award Aland to Finland as autonomous and demilitarized islands.

66 GihI, op. cit., pp. 299-301- 67 Tsentral'nyy gosudarstvennyy arkhiv voyenno. morskogo flota, Morskoy general'nyy

shtab, fond 418 Morskogo krepostnogo soveta, delo Abo-Olandskaya pozitsiya, p. 14: Protokol zasedaniya, komissiya I 3 iyunya 1917 goda.

68 Tsentral'nyy gosudarstvennyy arkhiv voyenno-morskogo flota, Morskoy General'nyy shtab, fond 4I8 Morskogo krepostnogo soveta, delo Abo-Olandskaya pozitsiya, p. 25: Doklad ii oktyabrya 19I7 (Stroitel' Abo-Olandskoy pozitsii v Morskoy krepostnoy sovet).

69 Barros, op. cit., p. 59.



Documents

The Åland Question during the Last Years of the Russian Empire