Th - Forgotten Books · PDF fileEDITORIAL PREFACE Finally, brethren, ‘ whats oever things a re tru e, whatsoever things a re honou rable, wh atso ever things a re just, whatsoever

THE HERITAGE OF INDIA

The Righ t Reve re nd V . S . Azar iah ,B i shop o f Dor nakal .

J. N . Farquhar , M .A D .Litt.

Already published.

The Heart o f Buddh ism . K . J . SAUNDERS , M .A .

Asoka . REV. J . M . MACPHAIL , M .A . , M .D .

Indian Pa int ing . PRINCIPAL PERCY BROWN , Ca lcutta .

Kanarese L i t erature . REV . E . P . RICE , B .A .

The Samkhya System . A . BERRIEDALE KEITH ,

D .Litt .

Psalms o f Marath i Saints . NICOL MACNICOL , M .A . , D .Litt.

A H isto ry o f H ind i L i t era ture . REV . F . E . KEAY , M .A .

Hymns o f the Tamil Saiv i te Sa ints . K INGSBURY and

PHILL IPS .

Sub j ects proposed and volumes under prefia ra tz'

on .

SANSKRIT AND PALI LITERATURE .

Hymns from the Vedas . Pro f . A . A . MACDONELL,Oxfo rd .

Anth ology o f Mahayana Li terature . Pro f . L . DE LA VALLEPOUSSIN , Gh ent .

Select ions from the Upanisads . F . J . WESTERN , M .A . ,

Delh i .Scenes from the Ramayana .

Select ions f rom the Mahabh arat a .

THE PHILOSOPHIES .

An Int rodu ction to Hindu Ph ilosophy . J . N . FARQUHAR ,

and JOHN MCKENZ IE , M .A ., Bomb ay .

The Ph ilosophy o f the Upanisads .Sankara

’s Vedant a . A . K . SHARMA, M .A Pa t iala

Ramanu ja’s Vedant a .

Th e Buddh is t Syst em.

FINE ARTflAND MUSIC .

Indian Arch i tecture. R . L . EWING , B .A . , Madras ,Indian Sculpture ,

The Mino r Art s . Pri n cipal PERCY BROWN ,Calcu t t a .

Indian Co ins . C . J . BROWN , M .A .

BIOGRAPHIES OF EMINENT INDIANS .

Gau tama Buddha . K . J . SAUNDERS , M .A . , Rangoon .

Ramanu ja .

Akb ar . F . V . SLACK , M .A . , Calcu t ta .

Tulsi Das .

Ra b indrana th Tagore . E . J . THOM PSON , M .A . , Bankura .

VERNACULAR LITERATURE.

The Kurra l. H . A . POPLEY ,B .A . , Erode.

Hymns o f the Alvars . J . S . M . HOOPER, M .A .

, Madras .

Tulsi Das in Miniature . G . J . DANN , M .A . , Pa tna .

Hymns o f Bengali Singers . E . J . THOM PSON , M .A ., Banku ra .

Kanarese Hymns . M ISS BUTLER , Bangalore .

HISTORIES OF VERNACULAR LITERATURE .

Bengali . C . S . PATERSON , M .A . , Calcu t ta .

Gu jarat i . R . H . BOYD , M .A . , Ahmadab ad .

Marath i . NICOL MACNICOL , M .A . , D .Litt . , Poona .

Tamil . FRANCI S K INGSBURY , B .A .,Bangalo re .

Telugu . P . CHENCH IAH , M .A . , Madras , and RAJABHUJANGA RAO , Ello re .

Malayalam . T . K . JOSEPH , B .A . , L .T . Trivandrum .

Sinhalese .

Urdu . B . GHOSHAL , M .A . , Bhopal .

NOTABLE INDIAN PEOPLES .

Th e Rajpu ts .

The Syr ian Chris t ians . K . C . MAMMEN MAPILLA I , Alleppey .

The Sikhs .

VARIOUS .

Modern Fo lk Tales . W . NORMAN BROWN , M .A . ,Ph .D . ,

Ph iladelph ia .

Ind ian Village Go vernment .

Poems by Ind ian Women . MRS . N . MACNICOL , Poona .

Class i cal Sanskri t Li teratu re .

Indian Temple Legends . K . T . PAUL , B .A . , Cal cu t t a .

Indian As tronomy and Ch ronology . DEWAN BAHADUR L . D .

SWAM IKANNU PILLAI , Madras .

EDITORIAL PREFACE

Finally , b rethren ,

‘ what soever things are

t ru e , wh at soever th ings are honou rab le , wh at soever th ings a re just , what soever th ings are pu re ,wh atsoever th ings a re lo vely , wh atsoever th ingsare o f good report ; if there b e any v irtue , andif there b e any prai se , th ink on th ese th ings .

”

No section o f the populat ion of Indi a can afford to

neglect her ancient heri tage . In her li terature , philosophy ,art

,and regulated l i fe there i s much that i s worthless , much

also that i s distinctly unhealthy ; yet the treasures of

knowledge , wisdom ,and beauty which they contain are too

precious to be lost . Every ci ti zen of Indi a needs to use

them,i f he i s to be a cultured modern Indian . This i s as

true of the Christi an ,the Muslim

,the Zoroastri an as of the

Hindu. But,‘

while the heri tage of India has been largely

explored by scholars , and the results of thei r toi l are laid

out for us in their books , they cannot be said to be really

available for the ordinary man . Thevolumes are in most

cases expensive,and are often technical and difficult .

Hence thi s series of cheap books has been planned by a

group of Chri sti an men , in order that every educated

Indian , whether rich or poor , may be able to find his way

into the treasures of India ’s past. Many Europeans , both

in Indi a and elsewhere , will doubtless be glad to use the

series .

The utmost care is being taken by the'

General Editors

in selecting writers,and in passing manuscripts for the

press . To every book two tests are rigidly applied"everythingmust be scholarly , and everything must be sympatheti c.

The purpose is to bring the best out of the ancient

treasuries , so that i t may be known , enjoyed , and used .

THE HERITAGE OF lNDlA “

NHI . N O ‘tl l

THE

KARMA -MINI

A . BERRIEDALE KEITH, D.C.L D.LITT.

of the Inner Temple Barrister-at-Law, Regius Professor of Sanskrit

and Comparative Philology at the University of Edinb urgh )

AUTHOR OF THE SAMKHYA SYSTEM , ETC .

ASSOCIATION PRESS5 , RUSSELL STREET , CALCUTTA

LONDON"O"FORD UNIVERSITY PRESSNEW YORK, TORONTO , MELBOURNE,

BOMBAY, CALCUTTA AND MADRAS1921

CONTENTS

PREFACE

I .

II .

I I I .

IV .

VI .

THE DEVELOPMENT AND LITERARY HISTORY OF

THE KARMA-MimAMSA

Th e Origi n o f th e System .—TheMimar

'

nsa Siitra .

The Vrttikara .—Pra bh§kara and Kumarila .

—La terWri ters —Other L iterary Sou rces .

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGEThe Valid i ty o f Appreh ension - Mode o f Appre

h ension o f Cognition .—The Fo rms o f Cognit ion .

Percept io n .—Inference .

—Comparison .—Presumpt ion .

—Negat ion .—Scriptu re and Verb al Tes t imony .

THE WORLD OF REALITYThe Refu t at ion o f Buddhis t N ih ilism andIdealism .

—The Ca tegories o f Pra bh akara and Kumarila .

Su b s t ance .—Qu ali ty .

—Act ion orMo t ion .—Generali ty .

—Inherence .—Similar i ty.—Cause .

-Non-exist ence .

GOD , THE SOUL , AND MATTERThe Refu tat ion o f the Do ctrine o f Creat ion —The

Do ctrine o f the Soul .—The Des t iny o f Man—Th ePu rpose o f Sacrifi ce .

THE RULES OF RITUAL INTERPRETAT IONTh e Au thori ty o f Scriptu re—Th e Bréhmanas as

Vidh i , Arth avfida , and N5ma dh eya .—The Mantras .

—Smrtis , Vedangas , Grammar , and Cus tom .—The

Class es o f Ac tions enj o ined—Originat ing Injunet ions —Injunct ions o f Appli cat ion .

—Inju nct ions o f

Perform ance .-Injunct ions o f Qu alifi cation .

-Or iginal ,Restri ct ive , and Lim i t ing Injunct ions .—Proh ib i t ionsand Except ions —Transfer and Modifi cat ion o f

Details —Repet it ion and Opt ion .

THE MINIAMSA AND HINDU LAw . .

The Mimémsé. and the Law Schools . -The Int erpretation o f Injunct ions —Religiou s and SecularFactors in Ownersh ip—I nheri t ance and Part i t ion .

Adopt ion and Part nersh ip—Criminal Law and theLaw o f Ev idence .

INDE"

PAGE

PRINTED ATTHE WESLEYAN M ISSION PRESS ,

M YSORE CITY.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND LITERARY

HISTORY OF THE KARMA MIMAMSA

NOT rarely in the B rahmanas , especi ally in later tex ts l ikethe Kausi taki , the term Mimamsa occurs as the designationo f a discussion on some point o f ri tual practise . Thesacrifice left innumerable opportunities for divergenceof usage in detail

,and the texts decide in favour of one or

the other alternative , on the strength of the reasons famili arto the Brahmanas , i n speci al the symbolical significanceattaching to the action recommended . There i s a vitaldifference between thi s form of M imar

'

nsa and that of theclassical Karma-Mimamsa school , in the fact that in theformer the appeal to authori ty

,and the necessity of

reconciling apparent di screpancies of authority , are enti relylacking . But the tendency to surrender judgment in favouro f tradition may be traced in the care with which in theSotopatha and the Kausitaki Brahmanas the name of theteacher i s adduced in support of the doctrines expoundedin the older style the reasonings stand by themselves

,

commended by thei r intrinsic value .

The process by which the Brahmanas came to be regarded as texts o f incontrovertible accuracy

,and speculation on

the sacrifice ceased to be independent , cannot now be traced indeta il. The account of the sacrifices given in these texts

,

supplemented by the collections of Mantras in the Samhitasof the various schools , would , obviously , never h ave sufficedto enable priests to carry out the sacrifices

,and there must

have been a full and precise oral tradition regarding themode in which the sacrifices

,which formed the subjects of

the mystical speculations of the Brahmanas , were to beperformed . This tradition

,however , in the course of time

2 THE KARMA -MIMAMSA

seems to have become obscured , j ust as the tradition of theinterpretation of the Mantras fell into con fusion

,and in i ts

place in some degree supervened an attempt , on the groundo f reasoning , to deduce from the Samhitas and the Brahmanas , taken together , rules for the regulation of theperformance of the offerings . The difficulties of such acourse were considerable ; there are real d ivergences betweenthe Samhitas and the Brahmanas , which we may justlyattribute to change of ri tual , but which in the opinion ofthe priests admitted of other explanations .

‘

Thus,in some

cases,the order of the Mantras i s patently d ifferent from

the order of actions contemplated in the B rahmanas , adivergence which the new Mimamsa decided in favour ofthe order of the Mantras on the ground that

,as they were

reci ted in the sacrifice they were more directly connectedwith the sacrifice than the Brahmanas , which were notimmediately employed in the offering . With more plausib ility, the new doctrine held that i f a Brahmana mentionedan action out of its natural order , such as the cooking o f therice grains before the husking , i t was nevertheless to beassumed that the normal sequence was to be followed .

More legit imately still , the new science devoted i tself to such

problems as the determination of the person by whom theseveral actions enjoined , without specification of the acto r ,fell to be performed ; the connect ion as principal andsubordinate of the many details of the offering ; and the

precise mode of performance of the Vikrtis , or derivat iveforms of the main sacrifices , the parti culars o f which areseldom adequately indicated in the sacred texts .The antiquity of the new sc ience i s vouched for by the

Dharma Sutras . Apastamba in two passages1 disposes of

contested po ints by the authori ty o f those who know theNyaya , a term whi ch is the early designation o f the KarmaMimamsa and persi sts through i ts hi story in i ts genericsense of “ reasoning

,

” while the Nyaya philosophy properborrows it

,and applies i t more specifically to denote the

syllogism. What i s still more convincing i s that Apastamba

1 Buhlcr, Sacred Books of the East , II, xxviii , xxix ; ""V,

xlvii,Iii.

DEVELOPMENT AND LITERARY HISTORY 3

uses arguments which are to be found in the M imamsdSfi tra ; thus he maintains that no text can be inferred froma custom for which a secular mo tive i s apparent , and that arevealed text has superior val idity to a custom whence atext might be in ferred . The corresponding rules in theM imdmsd Satra ( I , 3 , 3 - 4 ) do not textually agree , and wemay fai rly conclude that at this date , probably not laterthan the middle o f the th ird century B.C. , the Sutra did not

exist in i ts present form ,but i t i s plain that the science

i tsel f was in full vogue,and a M imamsaka appears to have

been deemed a necessary member o f a Parisad. Theinfluence of thi s discipline can plainly be discerned in the

existing Sutra texts ; the works o f ASvalayana , Saf1khayana ,Apastamba , Hiranyakeéin ,

Latyay ,ana and Drahyayana

have been composed under its influence , and the same consideration appl ies even to texts like those of the Baudhayanaand Manava schools , which Show greater affinities to theBrahmana style . We need not , o f course , assume th at theold sacrifici al tradi tion was entirely lost , but we may becertain that i t has been largely transformed in the processof remodelling .

Simultaneously with the remodelling of the Sutras , theremust have proceeded the defini tion of the rules of interpretation until they were finally codified in the M imdmsdSic

'

tra ,1 which passes under the name of Jaimini , but the

details o f th is process must remain unknown to us . Whatis certain i s that the M imdmsd Satra presupposes a longhistory of discussion , and that i ts aphori sms , which oftenassume , without expressing , general rules of interpretation ,deal largely wi th difficulties affecting individual Vedictexts , which had long been the subject of dispute

.

This characterist i c i s shown clearly in the mode ofdiscussion followed in the text ; the essent ial subdivi s ioni s the Adhikarana , which , according to the school , i s tobe deemed to fall into fi ve parts ; these M adhava reckonsas the subject of investigation (visaya) , the doubt(samsaya ) , the first or prima facie V iew (purvapaksa ) , the

Edited, Bi b liotheca Indica , 1873 1889 , trans . o fAdhyayas I III ,by G anga natha Jha , Sacred Books of theHindus , vol.".

4 THE KARMA-MIMAMSA

answer or demonstrated conclusion and therelevance o f the topi c (samgati ) , but the last head i s elsewhere reckoned as the thi rd , and a more natural division

1

omits i t,and regards as the fourth and fi fth members the

answer (uttaropaksa) , and the conclusion (nirnoya ) . Thusin the first Sfi tt a of the text there are two Adhikaranas ; isthe study of the Veda necessary for the three upper castes ,and i s Dharma a proper subject of study"The latter aloneneeds full discussion , the reply to the former being selfeviden t . The subject then is formed by the two Vedi c precepts , One should study the Veda

,

” and One should perform the final bath after studying the Veda .

” The doubt i swhether one should , after learning the Vedic text , performthe bath and end one ’s studentship, or remain longer withthe teacher to study Dharma . The prima facie view is thatthe bath should follow immedi ately on the learning of thetext

,but the reply is that real study of the Veda is not

satisfied by mere reading of the text , and the conclusion ,therefore

,i s that the final bath i s to be postponed for a t ime

in o rder that the student may complete h i s learning of thetext by a study of Dharma . Of all th is , however , the Sutrai tself has nothing , consi sting merely of the words ,

“ Now,

therefore,an enquiry into Dharma

,and , though in some

cases there i s more full development o f an Adhikarana ,i t

i s to the commentators that we must look for enlightenmenton the exact i ssues in dispute . It i s not

,o f course

,to be

supposed that at any time the Sutra was handed downwithout oral explanation , but , as usual , the authentic vers ionwas early obscured.

Of these Adhikaranas there are in the Sutra in Madhava ’sreckoning about 9 15 , divided into twelve books with sixtyPadas , the thi rd , s ixth , and tenth having eight each in lieuo f the normal four , and aphorisms in anotherreckoning) . Jaimini i s the ch ie f authority cited , but mention i s made also of other names , such as those of Badari ,Atreya , and Badarayana , who occur also in the VedantaSatra , and of Labukayana , Aitasayana , etc. Who Jaiminiwas we cannot say. A Jaimin

‘

i is credited with the author

1 Cowell in Colebrooke, Essays I , 326 .


ship of a Srauta and a Grhya Siltra , and the name occursin li sts of doubt ful authentici ty in the Asvala

'

yana andSdhkhdyana Grhya Sdtros ; a Jaiminiya Samhitd and aJaiminiya Brahmona Of the Santa Veda are extant. As

an authority on philosophy Jaimini appears in theVedanta Sfi tra and often in later works ,

1 but i t is significantthat

,while i t i s poss ible that the M ahabharota recognises

the exi stence of the Mimamsa i t does not re fer to Ja iminias a philosopher

,but merely as an ancient sage .

2 NeitherBuddhist or Jain li terature throws light on h is personalityor date , and the period of the Sutra - can be determined ,therefore , merely on grounds of comparison of its contentswith those of other works .

It is probable that the Mimdmsd Sfitra i s the earliest o fthe six DarSanas preserved to us . The Yoga Sfi tra i s notan early work ; i t seems to recognise the Vijfianavada schoolof Buddhism

,which

,in all probabili ty , belongs to the

fourth century A.D . ,and the popular identification of

Patafijali with the author of theM ahdbhdsya is clearly untenable .3 The lateness of the Samkhya Sfi tra i s admitted ,and the theory that its contents include early matter hasbeen controverted . The Vaisesika Satra has no point ofcontact with the M imamsa such as would render any conclusion possible , but the Nydya Sfitra ( I I , 1 , 6 1 ) i s famili arwith the Mimamsa terminology , and i t is improbable that ,had the Nya

’

ya exi sted before the Mmama Sfitra took form ,

i t would have been ignored by the latter as i t i s . Therelation to the Veddnta Satra i s less clear ; the mentionof Ja imini and Badarayana in both texts affords some

ground for the view that the two works were simultaneouslyredacted , but this conclusion i s by no means assured .

We have no valid reason for assuming that the Sutras wereactually redacted by Jaimini and Badarayana themselves ,

1 His death , caused by an elephant , is recorded in Pa iz'

catantra

II , 34 , but no t in the Tantrakhydyika . The name is strange, but isIgnored in Panini and the Mahabha

'

sya , which , however , knows o fM imamsakas , prob ably adherents o f this schoo l ( Indische Studien ,

XIII , 455 ,3 Hopkins, Great Epic of India , p. 97 .

Samkhya System , pp. 56 , 57 .

6 THE KARMA-MIMAMSA

and , unless thi s is established , the argument for contemporaneity i s inval id . It i s true that it i s impossible to deducefrom the style of the Mimamsa as Purva-Mimamsa arelation of temporal priority for Jaimini

’s work ; the

M imamsa is prior to the Vedanta because it deals with thesacred ri tes , the knowledge of which , in the view of oneschool o f Vedanta , i s an indispensable preliminary to theknowledge o f the absolute

,though Samkara declines to

accept thi s view and insists instead on the diverse character ofthe ends of the two discipl ines

,which renders i t imposs ible

to treat the former as the normal or necessary prelude to thelatter . 1 Nonetheless i t remains true that we must assumethat the Mimamsa as a science developed before the Vedanta .

2

The former was plainly necess itated by the development ofthe sacrificial ritual wi th which it i s immediately connected ,and i t serves an important practical end ; the latter i s proofOf the growth of a philosophical Spi ri t , which sought tocomprehend as a whole the extremely varied speculationswhich are scattered in the Aranyakas and Upanisads .While

,of course

,i t i s not impossible th at the redaction of

the two Sutras was contemporaneous , despi te the earl ierdevelopment of the Mimamsa, the probabili ty surely lies infavour of the view that the M imamsd Sfi tf a was redactedfirst and served as a model for the other schools .

Even i f thi s view is accepted , i t remains difficul t toassign any definite date to the Sutra . It conta ins nocertain reference to Buddhist tenets of any kind , for theterm buddha , i n I , 2 , 33 , has not this significat ion , and weneed not with Kumarila read a reference to Buddhism intoI, 3 , 5 , and

,

6 . The Vedanta Sfitra i s o f uncertain date i fwe believe Sarhkara , i t cri t icises ( II , 2 , 28-32 ) the Vijfianavada school of Buddhism ,

but thi s doctrine is probablyWrong3 and we need see only a reference to the Sfinyavadaof Nagarjuna. The date of th is school i s uncertain i f weaccept the opinion that i t was not enunci ated beforeNagarjuna in such a manner as to invite criticism in the

1 Deussen , Vedanta , ch . I .

Thib aut , S .B .E . XXX IV, ix ff .

‘ Jaco b i , J .A .O .S XXX I , l ff ; Keith , J .R.A .S 1914 , pp.

1091 If ; see b elow , pp. 46 , 47 .


Vedanta Sfi tra , that work cannot be earlier than the th irdcentury A.D . ,

for Aryadeva , Nagarjuna’

s contemporary ,refers to the zodiacal signs and the week—days , which werenot known in India until that epoch . But i t i s poss iblethat the Sunyavada , which can be recognised in ASVaghosa ,was of older fame than Nagarjuna , though on the whole i t i smore likely than not that i t was the di alec tical abil ity ofthat teacher which made the doctrine the object of Vedant i cconfutation . It i s , then , a plausible conclusion that theMimdmsd Sfi tra does not date after 200 A.D . , but that i t isprobably not much earlier , since otherwise i t would havebeen natural to find in the M ahdbha

’

rata some reference toi t and to its author.

As we have seen , the Sutra must from the first have beenaccompanied by a comment , which in course of time was los tor became defective . The first commentator of whom we

have certain knowledge i s a Vrttikara , from whose work along extract i s made in the Bhdsya of Sabarasvamin onMima

'

msa Sntra , I , 1 , 5 , in which the author attacks andrefutes Buddhist views . If we believe Kumarila , the discussion is directed in art against the Vijiianavada school ,in part against the finyavada , but in this case we haveevery reason to distrust hi s assertion

,for

,plainly by error ,

he ascribes the major port ion of the discussion to Saharasvamin , and not to the Vrttikara . It is , therefore , notimprobable that he is also in error in finding any referenceto the Vijiianavada , for the passage seems to deal with one

topi c only , and that the Sunyavada . It follows , accordingly ,that the date of the Vrttikara was probably not later thanthe fourth century A.D . , s ince , had he lived later , he wouldhardly have omitted an expl ici t di scussion of the tenets ofthe ideal istic school of Buddhism .

The name of the Vrttikara i s uncerta in . The conjecture1

that he was Bhavadasa , mentioned in one place by Kumarila ,may be dismissed as wholly without support. The currentOpinion makes him to be Upavarsa , who , we know from Samkara (Vedanta Sutra , III , 3 , 53 ) wrote on both the texts . Tothis the objection has been brought that in the passage cited

1 Ganganatha Jhé , trans . o f Slokavdrttika , p. 116 .

8 THE KARMA-MIMAMSA

from the Vrttikara by Sabarasvamin there i s a reference toUpavarsa with the epithet Bhagavat , imply ing that he wasin the eyes of the Vrttikara an author of venerable authori ty.

It i s probable , however , that the citation from the Vrttikarai s only a résumé,

1 not a verbatim quotation , and that Saharasvamin i s responsible for the reference 1 to Upavarsa , theVrttikara

’s proper name , and for thi s view support may be

derived from the mode in which the Vrttikara and Upavarsaare referred to by Kumarila elsewhere ( II , 3 ,

If th isview is rejected

,i t i s possible that he i s Bodhayana , who

certainly wrote on the Veddnta Sfi tra , but thi s theory i s abare and unnecessary conjecture

,seeing that Bodhayana

nowhere else appears as a Mimamsa authority . Of other ,presumably early

,commentato rs we hear of Bhartrmitra 2

and Hari,

3 but there i s no reason to identi fy e ither o f thesewi th the Vrttikara .

The extract from the Vrttikara proves that an im

portant addition has been made to the teaching o f theMimamsa in the shape o f the introduction o f discussionso f the val idity of knowledge and its d iverse forms .The Sutra i tsel f i s content with the denial of the validi tyof perception for the purpose of the knowledge of Dharma ,and the exaltation of Vedic inj unctions as the sourceo f the necessary knowledge ; under the influence , perhaps ,of the Nyaya the earl ier doctrine i s now elaborated intoa cri tical examination of the nature of evidence , i ts val id ity ,and the forms o f proof. It i s not illegi timate to assumethat the Vrttikara j ndulged also in metaphysical di scussions ; at any rate Sab arasvamin enters into a long discussionof the nature of soul

,despi te h i s predilection for brevity

in treatment of the Sutra . The Mimamsa there fore by th ist ime enters into the whole field o f philosophy , Whilemaintaining i ts primary duty of expounding the rules bywhich the ritual can be reconstructed from the Brahmanasand the Samhitas .

1 In 11 , 3 , 16 , he clearly describes the Vrttikara as bhagavdn

acdryah ; CI. 111, 1 , 6 . T hese passages j acob i has overlooked .

3 Parthasarathi on Slokaodrttika , p. 4 ( v . 10 ) he is cited on the

organ o f sound, Nydyamafijori , p. 213 .

s Sdstradipika ,x , 2 , 59 , 60 .

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10 THE KARMA-MIMAMSA

Erb ati has enabled us to correct thi s error. Prabhakara

follows Sabarasvamin closely ; he does not refute theopin ions o f Kumarila ; in one passage ( IV, 1 , whenhe does crit ici se an Opinion of the latter

,the form of words

used by him in adducing it di ffers enti rely from those inwhich the view of Kumarila i s expressed , showing clearlythat he i s dealing with some older author

,whom Kumarila

has followed . On the other hand,Kumarila frequently

diverges from the views of the Bhdsya ; he cri tici ses ( I ,2 , 3 1 3 , 2 4

, 1 ) views which are expressed by Prabhakara , and asserts independent views . There i s a cleardi fference of style between the two authors ; Prabhakarais comparat ively simple , vivid and direct l ike Saharasvamin ; he seldom uses long compounds ; he avoids the combination of various reasonings in a single clause in l ieu ofthe formal terminology o f objection and reply (nanuced, na or sydd etot tad ayuktam) he adopts the formof question and answer

,which

,however , has the disadvan

tage o f leaving at t imes the meaning in doubt. In all theseaspects Kumarila shows a richer , more varied , and elaboratedstyle

,which is reminiscent of the Sa

’

rirakabhdsya of Samkara .

Kumarila ’s great exposi tion of the Sabarabhdsya fallsinto three parts , the first , the Sloka'

ocirttika ,1 in verse , deals

with Pada I of Adh) aya I of the Bhdsya , and is of thegreatest value as an explanation of the metaphysics andepi stemology of his system. The second

,the Tantrava

‘

rt

tiha,

2 covers the remaining three Padas of Adhyaya I andthe whole o f Adhyayas II and I II . The third part , theI nptikd, consists merely of scattered notes on the last n ineAdhyayas . Each part has been commented on ; the first byParthasarathi M iSra in his Nydyarotndkara ,

and by SucaritaMisra in hi s d ikd ; the second by Someévara , son ofMahadeva , in his Nydyasudhd or Rdnaka ; the third byVehkateévara Diksita in his Vdrttika

’

bharana . Kumarila ’s

date is determinable within definite limits ;3 he used the

1 Ed. Benares , 1898 -99 ; trans . G anganatha Jha, Bibliotheca

Indica , 1900 -8 .

1 Ed Benares , 1890 ; trans . G afiganatha Jha , Bibliotheca Indica ,1903-20 .

Pathak,

XVIII , 213 ff.


Va'

kyapodiya of Bhartrhari ; neither Hiuen-Thsang norI- tsing mentions him ; he was before Samkara ; he attackedthe Jain theory of an omniscient being as propounded in theZptomimdmsd of Samantabhadra , but i s not answered byAkalar

‘

ika in hi s Astasati , which comments on the Aptamima

'

insd. On the other hand , he i s freely attacked byVidyananda and Prabhacandra , who both l ived before838 A.D . Vidyananda assures us , doubtless correctly , thathe cri tic ised the Buddhist Dharmakirti , and Prabhakara , onthe latter point agreeing with the result above arrived frominternal evidence . The upper limit of date is , therefore ,not earlier than 700 A.D . The lower limit depends on hi s

precise chronological relation to Samkara and the latter’s

exact date . Later tradition,theSamkaravijayas of Madhava

and the pseudo-Anandagiri , would make him an older contem

porary, but the interval may have been considerably longer.Only sl ightly later than Kumarila was Mandana Misra ,

author o f the Vidhiviveka ,a treati se on the significance o f

injunctions , and the M imdmsdnukramani , a summary ofSabarasvamin

’

s Bhdsya . The trad i t ion of the Samkaravijayas makes h im out to be identical with SureSvara , apupil of Samkara , but Anandagiri

’s account insists that he

was also a pupil of Kumarila . The identification withSureSvara , which might be suspected because of the latenessand inferior character of the authori ties , is to some extentconfirmed by Vidyananda

’s description 1 of Mandana

M iSra as Vedantavadin ,which could hardly apply to him

unless he were the author of the works ascribed to Sureévara .

His direct connection with Kumarila , however , need not heinsisted upon . His lower limit of date i s fixed by the factthat the famous Vacaspati Misra devoted the Nydyakonika

'

to the exposit ion of h is Vidhim’

veka ,2 and Vacaspati pro

bably lived about 850 A.D . He wrote also the Tattoabindu’

on Kumarila ’s views .Of the later writers the most important is perhaps

Parthasarathi Misra , who wrote the Sdstradipikd“ to explain

1 I bid . p. 228 .

1 Ed . Pandit,XXV-""VIII , 1903-6 .

Ed. Benares , 1892 .

Ed . Benares , 1891 . He is earlier than Madhaya .


the Sutra ; on it commented , in 1543 A.D . , RamakrsnaBhatta , son of Madhava , in the _ Yuktisnehapraparani ,Somanatha , son o f Sara Bhatta , an Andhra Brahman of theNittal family , in ,

his M ayi'

ckhamdlika'

,Vaidyanétha ( 17 10

Bh atta Sar'

nkara , Bhatta D inakara ,Kamalakara ,

and others . His Tontrarotna comments on poin ts in thelast nine Adhyayas of the Sutra and the Bhdsya , while hi sNya

'

yaratnamdlci1 i s an independent treat i se on which Rama

nuja , apparently the great Vedantist , has written a comment ,the Na

'

yakaratna .

Much later in date i s Khandadeva , who died at Benaresin 1665 A.D . His works , the Bhdttadipikd, and on a largerscale the M imciriasdkaustubha ,

2 deal fully with the,

Sfitra ;the former was commented on in 1708 by his pupil SambhuBhatta . Value attaches also to the M imdmsdsfi tradidhiti orNydyclvolididhiti of Raghavananda Sarasvati , pupil ofAdvaya , pupil of Vi sveSvara , and to the M imdmsdnayaviveka of Bhavanatha Misra , which deals also with Saharasvamin . Yet other commentaries are recorded , includingworks by Mahadeva Vedantin ,

Kamalakara and Vaidyanatha , son o f Ramacandra ,

the Subodhini 3 of RameSVaraShri , the Bhdtlocintdmoni o f ViéveSvara or Gaga Bhatta , etc.Apart from the Sii tra there was developed a considerable

l i terature which aims,as did Mandana Misra , at dealing

systematically wi th the doctrines of the school. First inimportance

,perhaps

,i s the Jaiminiyanyciyama

"

lcim'

stora4 o f

the famous Madhava wri tten in the fourteenth century ,which

,however

,i s merely a summary in verse , with a prose

comment,of the M imdn

’

z sd Sil ira . At the end of thesixteenth century Appayya Diksita wrote h is Vidhirasdyana ,

5

a disquisi t ion on the nature of injunct ion , adding himselfa commentary

,the Sukhopayoj ini . This text was refuted

by Gopala Bhatta in h is Vidhirasdyanabhfisona , and bySamkara Bhatta in his Vidhirasdyanodfisona . The sameauthor

,who was of the same period as Appayya , wrote

1 Ed. Benares , 1900 .

2 Ed . Conjeveram , 1902 ( I , 2 only ) . T he D ipikd is ed. in the

Bibliotheca Indieo .

Ed. Pandit ,"VII-""I . Ed. London , 1878 .

5 Ed . Benares 1901 .


a commentary on the Sdstradipikd, and the M ima’

msdsdrasamgraha ,

1 in which he enumerates Adhikaranas ,allott ing to each a quarter verse . An extended version ofthi s work forms his M imcimsa

’

bcilapralecisa ,2 on which there

i s a commentary by KeSava , son o f Visvanatha . Appayya

himself wrote also the Upakramapardkrama , a treati se onthe comparat ive importance of the commencement and endof a continuous Vedic passage .The most popular introduction to the Mimér

'

nsa is pro

bably the Mimdmsdnydyoprakds’

a3 o f Apadeva , son of

Anantadeva ,and pupi l o f Govinda . His date i s determined

by the fact that hi s son ,Anantadeva

,wro te h i s Smrti

koustubha under a prince who l ived in the middle of theseventeenth century . Anantadeva commented on his

father ’s work in the Bhdttdlamkdra,and his brother

,

Jivadeva , discussed in the Bhdttobhdskara the d ivergentviews prevalent in the schools . Even better known

,

perhaps,i s the Arthasomgraha

f of Laugaksi Bhaskara ,which seems to be based in part on the work of Apadeva ,

and,i f so , must belong to the seventeenth century. This

date would sui t adequately the probable period of hispopular Nyaya-VaiSesika treati se

,the Tarkakaumudi .

Another sho rt text i s the Mimdmsdparibhdsd5 of Krsna

Diksita , and the Mimdmsdratna of Raghunatha , who usesthe Kdéikd,

contains some information of value on the views ofthe opposing schools . Narayanatirtha Muni

’s Bha‘

ttabhdsd

praka'

sa6 i s an exposi tion of the terminology of the Mimamsa,while Ramakrsna Udicya Bhattacarya

’

s Adhikaranakau

mudi"expounds a selection of interesting Adhikaranas .

Khandadeva’

s Bhdttarahasya8 deals with the mode of

determining which i s the leading word in a text underdiscussion . More interesting is the fact that the famousVallabha Acarya i s credited with a Pfirvamimdmsdkdrikd ,an epitome in 42 verses of Jaimini

’s views , written with

reference to the doctrine of fai th whichVallabha expounded ,

1 Ed . Benares , 1904 .

1 Ed . Benares , 1902 .

1 Ed . Calcutta , 1901 ; Benares , 1905 .

4 Ed . and trans . Thibaut, Benares , 1882 .

9 Ed . Benares , 1904 .3 Ed. Benares , 1900 .

7 Ed. Calcutta , 1885 .3 Ed . Conjeveram , 1900 .


and a Jaiminisfi trabhdsya which deals with the first chaptero f the second book of the Sutra . The well- known scholar

,

Venkatanatha Vedantacarya , in his Mimdmsdpc'

z'

dukd,1 in

verse , discusses the Adhikaranas in the first chapter o f thefirst book of the Sutra , and in his Ses

’

varamimdmsd seeks tocombine the Mimamsa with the Vedanta . Another writerfrom southern India ,Venkatadhvarin ,

deals with the threefoldclassificat ion o f inj unctions in his Vidhitrayaparitrdna , whilein his M imdmsdmakaranda he discusses the authoritativecharacter ofArthavadas. Narayana of Keral

’

a,the well- known

author of theNdrdyaniya ,who flourished at the end of thes ix

teenth century , gives in the first part of the M (i nameyodaya2

an account of Kumarila ’s views on the nature of proof ; hepurposed complet ing h is task by adding an account of thesame author ’s views on the world of real i ty

,but thi s part of

h is work was never carried out , and was supplied at a laterdate by another Narayana , who was patronised by Manadeva , king of Sailabdhi ; the work is interest ing as showinghow far the school of Kumarila went in appropriat ing theviews of the Nyaya—VaiSesika philosophy .

Of the other systems i t i s the Nyaya , and later the comb ined school of Nyaya-VaiSesika , which throws the most lighton the M imamsa. The Nydya Siltra deals cri tically withthe Mimamsa doctrine of the eternity of the word , andKumarila and Prabhakara3 al ike appear to have developedthei r philosophical tenets under the influence o f the controversy on logic which took place between the Nyaya schooland the Buddhists

,especi ally Dignaga and Dharmakirti on

the other hand ; Kumarila attacked both o f these writersand was clearly aware of the Nya

'

yava'

rttika of Uddyotakara ,in which the orthodox Nyaya view was set out in re futationof Dignaga

’s onslaughts . On the other hand , the Mimamsa

views are freely disputed in Vacaspati Misra’s comment on

Uddyotakara and inJayantaBhatta’

sNydyamafijari Varadaraj a ’s Tdrkikaraksd, and Udayana

’

s works , much of theKusumdn

'

jali being expressly devoted to dealing withMimamsa cri t icisms of the doctrine of the creation of the

1 Ed Conjeveram ,1900 .

1 Ed . Trivandrum, 1912 .

1 Prakaranapa i’

icika, pp. 47 , 64, discusses Dharmakirti’s views o f

perception and inference.


world . The Tattvacinta'

mani of Gar’

rgeéa repeatedly attacksthe Mimar

‘

nsa views of the nature and validi ty of proof , andthe controversy i s continued in the voluminous l iteraturebased on that important text

,and in the short text books of

the combined school of Nyaya-Va lsesika In his commentaryon PraSastapada

’s Bha'

sya Sridhara ,from the point of view

of theVaiSesika deals freely with Mimamsaviews , moreover ,theJainHaribhadra (ninth century) includes in hisSaddars

‘

an

asamuccaya , commented on by Gunaratna , an account of theM imar

'

nsa,and there are chapters upon i t in the Sarvasiddh

antasamgraha , falsely ascribed to Sar'

nkara , and in Madhava

’s Sarvadarsonasomgraha . The former work deals separately with the doctrines of Prabhakara and Kumarila ; i tbetrays i ts late character by its attempt to show that Prabhakara was the pupi l o f Kumarila , and by converting the doctrine of Kumarila into a form of the Vedanta . The work ofMadhava gives a long specimen of the confl i cting views o fthe two schools as to the interpretation of the opening ofthe St

'

ttra , and contains an interesting expos it ion of thearguments for and against the eternity of the Veda

,and the

self- evidence of cogn ition.

Jayanta Bhatta’

s work1 is of special interest,as i t i s the

product of a member of a family skilled in the Mimamsa,and its author freely attacks Prabhakara and his followers ,and repeatedly ci tes the Slokava

’

rttika . The author ’s grandfather was confirmed in his faith In the efficacy of sacrificeby obtaining as the result of one o ff ering the village ofGauramfi laka

,doub tless from a king of Kashmir

,for

Jayanta’

s great-grandfather , Saktisvamin , wa s a mini sterof Muktapida , better known as Lalitaditya . Incidentally

Jayanta affords a welcome confirmation of the date ofVacaspati Misra , whom he quotes (pp. 120 , for

,

as Lalitaditya’

s reign ended about 753 A.D . ,i t i s impossi ble

to place Jayanta later than the second half of the ninthcentury , and hence the disputed era of the year 898given by Vacaspati himself as the date of his Nya

’

yasaci

1 Ed . Benares , 1895 . His quotation from Vacaspati on Su tra II , 1 ,32 , is found at p. 312 . His son , Abhinanda , wro te the Kadambarikatha

éara and lived c . 900 A .D Thomas , Kavindravacanasamuccaya

p 0


must be taken as fall ing in the Sar‘

nvat reckoning as 841A.D . This date , i t may be added , tells strongly against anyeffort to bring down the date of Sar

’

nkara ,1 on whose

Sarirakabha'

sya Vacaspati wrote the Bhamati , and thesame conclusion is favoured by the view that MandanaMisra , on whose work Vacaspati also commented , was apupil of Samkara .Varadaraja also claims , with obvious truth , to have been

an expert in M imar'

nsa;2 he was evidently famili ar with

salikanatha’s work , and his commentator fortunately preserves

for us a fragment of the Prameyaparayana chapter of thePrakaranapah

’

cika, no MS. of which has yet been discovered ,which gives an authentic l ist o f Prabhakara

’s categories .

1 S. V . Venkateswara 1916 , pp. 151-62 ) ignores thisevidence in giving Samkara

’s date as 805-897 A .D . He canno t have

died later than 825 A .O . or so .

1 Ed . Benares , 1903 , p. 364 .



between the two sets of instances can only be supplied byreference to an external factor , which is fatal to the bel iefin intrinsic validi ty or the reverse . Therefore

,the Nyaya

argues,i t i s best to accept the doctrine that apprehension or

cognition i s intrinsically unauthoritative , and its authorita

tiveness in any speci al case is derived from the perfection ofthe cause of the apprehension . This doctrine , i t i s pointedout

,explains the case of dream consciousness ; i t i s invalid

because there is no perfection in i ts cause , while the wakingconsciousness may be valid i f it i s due to a

'

perfect source ;i f

,however , the source i s vi ti ated , when the sense organs are

defective,the apprehension i s doubtful or erroneous , while

in the case of non—apprehension there i s no defect in thecause

,but absence of cause.

The reply o f Kumarila i s that , i f apprehension were notin i tself valid , i t could not be made so by any external power.Apprehension needs , indeed , an originating cause , but j

it

does not depend on any ex ternal cause for i ts power ofascertaining the true nature of things. The conclusiveargument i s that , i f the validity of a cognit ion i s deemeddependent on the perfection of i ts source , then there must beanother cogni t ion to guarantee the co rrectness of the source ,and so ad infinitum,

and such a process i s i llegitimate,at

least in the eyes of Kumarila , who does not appreciate thepossibil i ty o f regarding truth as a comple te system ,

in whichall parts are dependent on one another , and there is no simple

primary truth . All cases of apprehension, there fore , are

prima facie val id , and , i f cognitions are erroneous ordoubt ful

,that is , due to de fects in thei r causes , while non

apprehension is due to the absence of any cause , as on theNyaya theory , wi th which Kumarila agrees in thi s regard .

The recogni t ion o f the non- val idi ty of an apprehensionestabli shes i tself most simply when a subsequent cogni tionsublates an earl ier Cognition , for instance , when the erroneousj udgment

,

“ This is s ilver,i s supplanted by the correct

j udgment,This i s mother- o f-pearl .” More indirectly the

former judgment can be sublated by ano ther judgment

,based on the recognition of the defect of the cause ;

thus the proposition ,“ The shell i s yellow , may be sub

lated by the further j udgment , The eye i s j aundiced .

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

Normally,however

,a j udgment is valid , and is accepted as

val id without quest ion ; only i f , for any reason , such as

distance,doubt is possible , are further cognit ions sought ; i f

then a sublat ing cognit ion is found , and on further investigat ion it i s not sublated ei ther directly or indirectly , then thefals ity of the first cognition appears ; i f , on the other hand ,the sublating cogn ition i s i tself sublated , the val idity o f thefirst cognition is fully established . Thus , in lieu of theregressas in infinitum of the Nyaya theory , no more thanthree or four cogni tions are necessary to establish the validi tyof any cogn ition , or , to put i t more precisely , to negate theobjections which may be adduced to impair its normalvalid ity.

Prabhakara1 similarly maintains the val idi ty of all cognit ions as such , and illustrates , i n an interest ing manner , thediverse modes in which apparent non—validity arises. Whenmother- of—pearl is mi staken for si lver , the error i s due tothe fact that the percipient observes in the object presentedto him the qual ities common to the shell and the si lver

,and

omits to notice those which differenti ates the two ; memorythus brings back to him the cognition of silver

,and thi s

cognition is i tsel f real , leading no less than the actualperception of silver to the normal action of seekingto take up the object. Memory here plays the percipientfalse , for i t does not present the si lver as connected wi thsomething formerly perceived

,thus di fferenti at ing i t

from the object actually before the eyes , and this failurei s due to a certain weakness of the mind . Similarly

,

memory is to blame when we mistake one directionfor another ; the real direct ion i s not seen , and the wrongi s remembered . In the dream state the cogn i tionswhich ari se are erroneous , in as much as the things seenseem to be directly apprehended , whereas they are onlyremembered . The factor o f apprehension on a previousoccasion i s lost sight of , thus obliterating the essenti ald istinction between what i s apprehended and what is

remembered. The presentation of impressions in sleep i s

1 Prakaranapan’

eika , pp. 32-38 ; Bhandarkar CommemorationVolume, pp. 167-70 .

THE KARMA-MIMAMSA

due to the Operat ion of the unseen principle , that i s thedestiny begotten of man’s previous acts

,which thus secures

to man pleasure or pain in due course .In other cases the explanation rests

,not on the interven

t ion of memory , but on fusion of impress ions . Thus thewhite shell appears as yellow as a result of j aundice , thecognition being a blend of the shell perceived without colour ,and the yellowness o f the bile in the eye

,perceived without its

‘

substratum. So the bilious man feels sugar bitter,because

his taste is a blend of the sugar and bile. The vision oftwo moons is due to a lack Of co- ordination o f the rays oflight which i ssue from the eyes and bring back the images .

In the case of merely doubtful cognitions the explanationof thei r character i s that some object i s seen as possessed ofa quality which produces two discrepant remembrances ;thus

,seen at a distance a tall object may be e i ther a p illar

,

or an ascetic buried in meditation and motionless .As the Mimamsa differs from the Nyaya in i ts view of

the validity of cogni tions , so i t differs in its attitude to themode in which a cognition i tself is apprehended . In theNyaya view th is is an act of mental perception (mana sapratyaksa ) , and the Vijiianavada school of Buddhism holds theopinion that one cognition is known by another

,though ,

going further than the Nyaya , i t draws the conclusion that , i fthe first cognition i s to be apprehended by the second , i tmust have form

,and form therefore does not belong to any

external real ity , as the Nyaya holds . The Mimamsa as

early as the Vrttikara 1 maintains that in apprehension it i sthe object that i s perceived , not the cognit ion ( arthavisaya hi

pratyoksabuddhih ,no As expounded by

Prabhakara , consciousness ( samvit ) , which is self- illumined ,i s cognised , but not as an object of cognition , but as cognit ion (somvittayoiva hi samuil samvedya, na samvedyataya) .

To say that the cogni t ion i s unknown is absurd , s ince thecognit ion of things i s possible only i f the cogni tion i s known .

The mode in which cognition i s known is inference ; ininference we grasp the existence of a th ing only , not its

1 Mimamsa Satra , p. 9,l. 16 ; ct. Prakaranapan

’

cika, pp. 56-63

Saddarsanasamuccaya , pp. 289 , 290 .

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 1

concrete form ; we learn the presence of fire on themountainfrom its smoke , but we do not see the actual form of thefire . Cognition

,therefore

,we infer from the fact that we

know things ; i t , therefore , may be classed as an object ofproof (prameyo ) , since i t i s arrived at by the use o f in ference

,which i s a means of proof (pramana ) , but i t is not an

object of direct apprehension . In Kumarila ’s doctrine1 alsothi s view appears , though the doctrine of self- i llumination i srejected ; the percept ion of any object does not result in afurther cognition of the perception , but in the directapprehension of the object , and every act of perceptioninvolves a relation ( sombandha ) between the sel f and theobject ; thi s relation impl ies action on the part of the self asagent

,and thi s action constitutes the cognition , which i s

inferred from the relationship between the self and theobject.From this point of view i t is possible to understand the

definition o f thevalid apprehension given by ParthasarathiMisra as that which , being free from discrepancies , apprehends things not previously apprehended .

2 This defini tiondoes not really derogate from the principle of the sel fevidence of cogni tions ; the qualification of freedom fromdiscrepanc ies merely lays stress on the fact that i t i s theabsence of a sublating cogn ition which assures us in caseof question of the validi ty of a cognition , while the condition that the th ing in question should not have been

previously apprehended is not a new factor , but merely aformal express ion of the essenti al nature of apprehension .

The exact process of cognition as explained in theSiddha

’

ntamuItata'

val'

i 3 consi sts in the production in theobject of the quali ty of being cogni sed (jfiatata) , and ,however often we cognise the same object , nevertheless ineach instance the quali ty in question i s generatedanew .

The precise character of the doctrine was , i t i s clear ,largely determined by the desi re to avoid the di fficulty of

1

9

Cf. Sas tradipika, p. 37 ; Manameyodaya , p. 103 ; Tarkikaroksa,pp. 3 ff .

2 Sastradipika, p. 28 .

3 P. 118 ; cf . Kusumafijali , IV 1 .


the infinite regress , which seemed to be involved in thetheory that a cognit ion could only be known through theinstrumental i ty o f another cogni tion , and perhaps still moreby the aim of avoiding the conclusion , which was derivedfrom this doctrine by the Idealist school of Buddhism

,that

there exi sted no sel f , but merely a series of cognit ions , heldtogether by no substanti al unity. To the Mimamsa sucha doctrine was naturally anathema , since the essence of thesacrifici al ri tual lay in the fact that there was a sel f whocould profi t by the performance of sacrifices , not merely inth i s world but after death . It might have been hard toconvince men that sacrifices were worth performing, i f theonly reward held out had been success in thi s li fe , for factswould too often have controverted the claim that sacrificeswere availing ; when the reward was predicted for thenext world , the i ssue was removed from empirical verificat ion . But the denial of the possibili ty of introspection thusnecessi t ated was obviously a real di fficulty , and rendered theM imar

'

nsa view less plausible than that of the Nyaya , whichaccepted cognition (vyavasaya ) and as supervening upon itconsciousness of cognition ( anuvyavasaya ) . The di sadvantage o f the Nyaya view was that i t tended to ignore thefact

,which was strongly emphasi sed in the M imar

'

nsa, of thenecessary impl ication of the subject in all cogni tion. Thedistinction between the cognit ion and the subject , whichpossesses i t

,i s i llustrated clearly in the case of sleep ; in i t ,

the school holds , there i s no cognition normally , and apparentlyno cogniser or object of cogn ition ,

yet the exi stence of both ,despi te sleep, i s proved by the fact of remembrance ofdreams . The knowing subject , therefore , is not, l ike thecognit ion

,self- i llumined

,though as to i ts exact character

Prabhakara and Kumarila are far from agreed .

Of forms o f apprehension or cognition Prabhakara

recognises five"perception , in ference , analogy , scripture orverbal testimony

,and presumption ; while Kumarila accepts

also non-

perception or negation , in accordance with the viewof the Vrttikara ,

who thus supplements the bare mention ofperception in the Sfi tra ( I , 1 , where i t i s defined as thecontact of the sense organs with the object , which must beactually present. The analysi s of perception given by


Prabhakara shows on every hand clear trace of derivationfrom the views of the Nyaya and Va i sesika , which againare ult imately based on popular psychology , such as appearsfi tfully in the Upanisads and in Buddhist texts . Theessential feature is contact between the object and the o rganof sense

,which i s essentially something real ; but the unity

Of consciousness makes i t clear that there must be a furthercontact between the organ and the sel f , whether directly ormediately . The fact that , despi te the presence of objects incontact with the senses , there may be no cognition of them ,

proves that the contact cannot be direct,but must be

medi ated by an instrumentali ty called mind . It i s th iswhich prevents all facts being always and at once present tothe self , and it i s thi s which perceives pleasure and pa in andbrings them home to the self. It i s through the mind alsothat the sel f experiences desi re , aversion , and voli tion . Butmind has no quali ties

,such as colour

,smell or taste

,and

therefore for the cognit ion of colour i t needs the aid of anorgan which possesses that qual i ty , namely , the eye , which to

possess colour as i ts di stinctive quali ty must be possessed oflight ; similarly there must be the nose , composed of earth ,for the cognition of smell ; the tongue , composed of water , forthe cogn ition of savours ; the skin , the organ of ai r , for thecognition of touch ; and the ear , consisting of the ether , forthe cognition of sound ; the organs themselves being imperceptible.

This doctrine , of course , rests on metaphysical groundsand assumes in its treatment of the organs the doctrine thatlike must be known by like . The deduct ion of the ex is

tence and atomic s ize of mind by Prabhakara rests on thebasis of a doctrine of causat ion1 which is different from

,

but allied to , that of the Nyaya , and which is applied toexplain the parti al and evanescent characteri stics o f ourexperience . Causes are ei ther ma teri al or immateri al

,the

latter head covering all the ci rcumstances which,in conjunc

t ion with a material cause , result in an effect. Theimmaterial or non- inherent cause may subsi st e ither in the

157 f

1

f

Prakaranapar‘

icika, pp. 52-54 ; cf. Slokavarttika , I , 1 , 4 , vv .


materi al or inherent cause , or in the material cause of thatcause ; thus , when by contact with the

‘fire smell is generatedin a substance , the immateri al cause i s the contact wi th thefire

,and the contact subsists in the substance i tself

, while ,i n the case of the colour of a mat , the colours of the yarnswhich cause the colour of the mat subsist in the yarns

,

which are the materi al cause of the mat . In the case of

perception the soul i s the materi al cause , and , as the soul i suncaused , the immaterial cause must subsist in i t ; in asubstance , like the soul , only a qual ity can subsist , andtherefore the immateri al cause of perception must be aquality of the soul , and thi s can only be some contact with anindependent substance , j ust as the colour of the earth atomi s produced by contact with fire. This independent substance cannot be all-pervading like space or time

,contact

with which i s from their nature as all -pervading out of thequestion ; i t must therefore be atomic , and the only substancewhich fulfils the necessary condition i s mind

,residing in the

body ensouled by the sel f , and possessing the power ofswi ft motion

,by which i t can form a rapid series of contacts

,

giving the appearance of simultanei ty in our mental li fe.The deduction i s ingenious , but unconvincing ; i t i s significantof the consciousness o f the gap between the self and the body ,which i t seeks to bridge by the mediation of the atomic andtherefore corporeal

,but yet eternal subs tance

,mind .

Of greater philosophical significance i s the attitude ofthe school to the vexed question of the nature of perceptionas determinate or indeterminate (savikalpaka or nirvikol

poke ) . The Nyaya Satre ( I , 1 , 4 ) poses the problem inits famous definition of perception as knowledge producedby the contact of the sense organ and the object

,consist

ing o f a determination which does not require definition byname (evyepedesye ) and is not discrepant (avyobhicari ) .The preci se of th is declaration i s far from certain , as theambiguities of the commentors , Vatsyayana , Uddyotakara ,and Vacaspati Misra , clearly show , but Dignaga andDharmakirti developed a perfectly defini te theory inwhich a clear di stinction was drawn between the elementof sense in percept ion and the function of imagination .

In the narrowest sense perception i s without imagination



Kumarila , though thei r verbal expression differs Kumarilaholds that in cognition in the form o f indeterminate perceptionneither the genus nor the diff erentia i s presented to consciousness , and that all that is present is the individual in which boththese characteristics subsist. Like Prabhakara ,

he holdsthat determinate percept ion i s no less valid than indeterminate

perception , s ince i t merely makes explici t what i s implici t inthe indeterminate form.

The views of the school are best understood whenbrought into contact with the metaphysical doctrine towhich they correspond . The essence of that doctrineaccepts generali ty as a real existence which i s percept ibleas much as individual things , and in the simplest form o f

perception , therefore , the two aspects of reality are equallypresent .The obj ects of percept ion include

,besides general ities ,

substances,quali ties , and , in the view of Kumarila , but not

of Prabhakara ,motion . The Nyaya holds that there are

s ix forms of contact in percept ion ; substance i s perce ivedby conjunction ; qual i t ies by thei r inherence in what i s inconjunct ion

,and so also the general i ty of substance ;

general ity of qual i ty by inherence in that which inheresin that which is in conjunct ion ; sound as a quality ofether

,a portion o f wh ich forms the organ of hearing, i s

perceived by inherence , and its generali ty by inherence inthat which inheres

,while negation and inherence i tself

are perceived by a peculiar and artificial variety ofcontact

,styled the relation of qualification and qualified .

Prabhakara , though he accepts the doctrine of inherence ,denie s genus to qual i ty , mot ion , and sound , and so contentsh imsel f with recognising the first

,second , and fourth

forms of contact as val id,and with pointing out that

to perceive qualities , there is requisi te the contact of thesubstance and the organs , of the organs and the quali ties ,of the organs and mind , and of mind and the sel f. Sub

stance and quali ties,he holds

, may be perceived apart. In

Kumarila ’s school , however , which denies inherence , thecontacts are reduced to simple conjunct ion , and identitywith what i s in conj unct ion ( semyuktatadatmye ) , the secondcovering perception of generali ty of substance , quality and


motion , while the generali ties o f these two can be perceivedby a relationship o f identity with that which is i denti calwith that which i s in conj unction .

A further technicali ty,also found in the Nyaya , i s the

discussion of the exact nature of the means of proof and i tsresult . If the term Pramana i s understood as

“ means ofproof

,

” then perception denotes one or other o f the contactsbetween object and organ , organ and mind , mind and soul ,each of which i s essent i al to the result (phele) in thi s casethe mental percept . If , however , Pramana denotes thecognition i tself , then percept ion signifies the mentalpercept

,and its result i s the attitude of acceptance , rejection ,

or indifference of the subject to the object presented to himIn the cognition .

Inference in the view of the Vrttikara 1 i s the apprehen

s ion of a th ing not b efore the subject,by reason of the

perception of some other th ing, between which and the firstobject we know an invariable connection to exist . Therelation

,according to Prabhakara , must be both general and

constant ; examples are the relation between the class andthe individuals ; substance and quali ty ; the quali t ies of thesame substance ; or cause and effect. Smoke s tands in aninvari able relation to fire

,but not vice verse ,

for on theIndian view glowing i ron emits no smoke . Even ih

dividual events may thus be related in Kumarila ’s view ;thus the sight of the constellat ion Krttika suggests theproximity o f Rohini . How

,then

,i s th is relat ion to be

recognised"The Nyaya view , when i t realised the questionas a result of the introduction by D ignaga and , followinghim , PraSastapada o f the conception of a universal relat ionship (vyapti ) in lieu of mere reasoning by analogy , foundrefuge in the development of a transcendental perception

(elaukike pratyeksez

) , by which in perceiving , for example ,fire and smoke

,the percipient recognised not merely the

1 M imen’

i sa Sittre . p. 10 ; Prekaranaper’

icika, pp. 64-87 ; Slokavarttika , pp. 345-405 ; Manemeyodeye , pp. 11-46 ; Nyeyemefijeri , pp.

109 -41 Logic and Atomism , pt . 11, ch . ii i .1 The Mimarh sa rejects wholly the perception o f Yogins , which

is th

gspéecursor o f this idea in the early Nyaya ; cf Nyayemaiijeri ,

PP'


connection of the individual fire and smoke perceived byh im

,but that of fire and smoke in thei r general aspect.

Prabhakara , however , does not recognise th is view ,the

elaboration of which i s characteri stic of a later epoch .

He denies that sense perception can give the knowledgeof a universal connection , since i t deals only with

particular times and places ; he a lso rejects the viewthat the connection can rest on inference or presumpt ion

,since obviously thus there would be a regressa s in

infinitum ; nor will he accept the View that i t i s due tomental activi ty only , as suggested by the doctrine of Dignaga ,

s ince i f the mind had thi s power , why is man not omniscient"His own view i s that fire and smoke are perceived bysense as in relation to each other , as qual ified by certainconditions of place and time . By repeated experience theimpression i s gained that , while the presence of smoke isalways accompanied by the presence o f fire

,the reverse

relation does not hold , but i s qualified always , unlike theformer , by speci al conditions of place and time . Henceemerges the recogni tion of the permanent relation o f smokeand fire

,so that the sight of smoke immediately produces

the concept ion of fire . He admits that we do not byinference arrive at any knowledge which we had not before ,but he does not admit that th is i s any defect to the inferemt i al process

,which does not involve novelty of result . The

school o f Kumarila , however , in accordance with i ts definit ion of apprehension as involving knowledge of somethingnot previously apprehended , po ints out , with perfect truth ,that the actual inference gives us much more than the mereknowledge of the connection of smoke and fire , which isalready known ; i t enables us to infer the presence , at a

part icular time and place beyond our vis ion , of the existenceof fire as result o f the perception of smoke. Cidananda1

recognises also the part played by the reductio ad absurdum

in arriving at the knowledge of the universal connection .

The relationsh ip,however

,which affords the basi s of

inference,need not refer merely to things whi ch fall with in

the l imits of perception (dystesvelaksene ) ; matters which

1 Manemeyodaya , p. 15 .

THE PROBLEM OF KNoWLEDGE

are supersensuous ( edrstasvelaksane ) may equally be inferred ; thus Prabhakara deduces from the general principleof the relation of cause and effect the existence of thecapaci ty , e.g. of fire to burn . In the Vrttikara the distinction appears as pratyeksato drstesambandha and Samanyato

drstesembendhe , terminology reminiscent at once of theNyayo Satra and of Praéastapada ; the latter i s illustratedby the inference to the sun ’s movement from the observationof a man ’s change of place as following on movement.Following Dignaga and PraSastapada , but in disagree

ment with the orthodox commentators on the Nyaye Siltra ,the Mimamsa distinguishes between the inference for oneself ,which is the true logical process

,and that for another , which

is in reality enunciation for another person of the process ofreasoning

,which leads to hi s drawing the conclusion already

arrived at by the first person. In inference for one ’s selfthe process is that something is perceived , and recognised asinva ri ably connected with something else , which thus isrecalled to the mind ; in inference for another a formalorder of statement i s usually adopted . First the proposi tionto be

_established i s enunciated , e.g. The mountain i s

fiery,

” the enunciation serving to bring before the mind anycontrary j udgment which might sublate i t . Then theground for the conclusion thus set out is given in the formof a general rule , supported by a corroborat ive instance , e .g .

“ Where there i s smoke , there i s fire, as in a kitchen .

Finally , the necessary l ink between the conclusion and thegeneral principle is suppl ied by the statement that themiddle term exists in the subject , e.g.

“ The mountain i ssmoking.

” The order of the propositions i s not regardedas of importance by Prabhakara or the other members of theschool

,who agree in rejecting the more compl icated scheme

of the Nyaya in which , with 5. certa in redundancy due to itsorigin in dialectic the argument is expounded in the fiveproposi tions , e.g. The mountain i s fiery ; Because i t issmoking ; Where there i s smoke there is fire

,as in a

kitchen ; And thi s (mountain ) i s so (possessed o f smokeWi th which fire i s invari ably concomitant ) ; Therefore is i tthus The omiss ion of the last two members is nomateri al injury to the scheme , while Buddhist logicians


reduce the scheme to two members only. The retention ofthe example i s due to the origin of inference as a process ofreasoning by simple analogy ; even when the necessity of auniversal connection was asserted by Dignaga and adoptedby PraSastapada and his followers

,the example was

rel igiously attained , and it i s not until the latest days of theNyaya that we find Laugaksi Bhaskara declaring that theexample i s a mere superfluity. But Prabhakara and theschool o f Kumarila are agreed in insisting on the use o f

posi tive instances only , reject ing the process o f argumentfrom such a general proposition as , Where there i s no fire

,

there there is no smoke , as in a lake ,” though Kumarila

himself recognises i ts util ity , though not its necessi ty , or , as

in the Buddhist view , sole validity.

In the case of in ference also there arises the problem,

already seen in'

regard to perception , of the exact force ofthe term Anumana and the corresponding result. If

Anumana i s used as equivalent to Inferenti al Cognition,

which is more precisely designated Anumiti , then the frui tor result i s the attitude of acceptance

,rejection or indiffer

ence assumed by the knowing subject_to the inferred result.If , however , Anumana i s referred to the means by whichthe cognition i s attained , there i s a divergence of view as tothe exact process to which the name should be applied .

The most immediate cause of inference is the percept ion ofthe middle term or minor proposition , e.g.

“ The mounta inis smoking ,

” but a more scientific Nyaya view accepts as

the true Anumana the whole mental process , including theconsciousness of the relation between the middle and themajor terms

,through which the major term comes to be pre

dicated of the minor term , e.g. fire of the mountain. Theresult in either case i s the inferential cognition i tself.The doctrine o f fallacies i s deduced both by Prabhakara

and by Kumarila from the definition given by the Vrttikaraof the nature of inference. Thus Prabhakara holds that thecondition , that the relation between the two terms whencethe inference i s deduced

,must be previously known , precludes

all those cases styled in logic cases of the too restricted middle

(asadharene ) , where the middle term , which i t is proposedto use as a basi s of proof , is connected with the subject


of the 1nference alone , thus permitting no furtherconclusion . Earth

,for example , has odour , but nothing

further can be derived from thi s unique relationship .

Again the relation must be universally valid , a rulewhich excludes the too general middleIt is impossible to prove that sound is eternal becausei t can be known

,since many things can be known and

yet are not eternal . The necess ity of some relationexisting excludes the variety of middle term known asannulled to prove sound eternal because i t is aproduct i s impossible , since the character of being a producti s flatly inconsistent wi th eternity . Finally , the necessi ty ,that the middle term should be perceived as the basi s of theattribut ion of the major to the minor , excludes the varietyof middle term known as unreal (esiddhe ) ; thus the perception by the Buddha of righteousness and unrighteousnesson the ground of hi s omniscience i s an illegi timate argument , s ince the omniscience o f the Buddha has never beenperceived . No other form of fallacy of the middle isaccepted by Prabhakara he rejects the Nyaya view of thefallacy of the counter- balanced middle (setprotipekse ) ;which balances against the argument , e.g. of the imperceptib ility of ai r because o f its lack o f colour , the argument ofi ts perceptibil ity because o f its tangibility . Prabhakara

’s

argument is that i t i s not possible for contradictory predicates , such as lack of colour and tangibility , are thusassumed to be , to exist in respect of one subject ; hence oneof the two alleged inferences is wholly invalid

,and there is

no true counterbalancing. He holds that really contradic

tory in ferences are possible only of some subject whosenature is unknown

,in which case

,however

,in the absence

of the essenti al known relat ion,no true in ference i s attain

able .The views of Kumarila do not di ffer materi ally from

those of Prabhakara ; he classifies the too restricted andthe too general fallacies under the head of doubtful( eneikantike ) , and adds as a third class the case of confl icting inferences , which he accepts , contrary to the views o fPrabhakara . Of the unreal (asiddho ) and the contradictory types of fallacy he gives various subdivi sions. In


th is and in his elaborate examination of the general ity( samanye ) , which lies at the basis o f inference , he showsplainly his close relation to the Nyaya and his polemicagainst the Buddhist views . In accord with the older viewaccepted in Buddhist logic , Prabhakara recognises notmerely fallacies o f the ground (hetu ) , but also of the minor(poksa ) , the example (drstante ) , and even o f the proposit ion which in the Nyaya view are all reducedto special cases of fallacies of the ground .

Analogy or comparison i s accepted by both schools ofMimamsa with the Vrttikara , 1 but thei r view o f the exactnature of thi s form of proof difl ers from that of the Nyayagenerally , which accepts analogy as a dist inct form of proof.In the Nyaya view the process results in the cognitionthat an object , hitherto unknown , when brought with inthe range of perception , i s recognised , by reason of itssimilari ty to something already known

,to be the object

designated by a name communicated by some person ofexperience . Thus a man who has never seen a buffaloin his li fe is informed by a forester that the buffalo i s likethe cow on entering the waste he sees an animal similarin appearance to the cow ,

and formulates the j udgment ,This thing i s a buff alo .

” The preci se force of the j udgment i s disputed in the school , but the best opinion is thati t appl ies not merely to the single animal seen , but that the

precipient acquires a correct apprehension of the specificnature o f the whole class buff alo . Thus

,as Udayana2 says ,

the effect of thi s means of proof i s to give a clear un derstanding of the meaning of a word , though he rej ects theview

,held by Bhasarvajii a

3 and his followers in the Nyayaschool

,that analogy can be reduced to a parti cular instance

o f verbal testimony as well as that of theVa iSesika , which reduces analogy to inference . TheMimar

'

nsa view o f the analogical cognition i s that i t consists

1 P . 10 ; Prakaranapefi cika, pp. 110-12 ; Slokave‘

rttika , pp. 433

50 ; Manameyodoya , pp. 47 -51 Saddersanasamuccaya , pp. 292 , 293 .

1 Kusuman'

ja li , 111, 8 - 12 ; Nyayamaiijari , pp. 141-49 ; Tarki

karaksa , pp. 84-93 .

3 Nyayesara , pp. 30 , 31 . The Jain view (Saddarsanesamuccaya ,

pp. 205 , 206 ) reduces it to recognition , 3 form o f Paroksa .



man who is alive i s not in his house,we must assume that

he has gone out , in order to make our thinking consi stentwith our percept ion . To give ri se to presumption theremust , Prabhakara holds , be doubt , which the presumptionremoves , and this element serves to distinguish presumptionfrom inference , s ince inference can only begin when a certainfact , e.g. the existence of smoke , i s known with perfectcertainty . On the other hand Kumarila ’

s view is that presumption i s imposs ible , i f the original fact were in doubt ;i t i s only because the absence of the man from his house i sfor certain known that i t can come into operation ; the origino f presumption l ies rather in the apparent incons istency oftwo equally certain facts , in thi s case , the man

’s absenceand his being alive , which leads to the enunciation of apresumpt ion to reconcile the apparent discrepancy , and i ti s thi s reconcili ation of apparent discrepancies whichmarks out presumption from inference . The Nyaya on thecontrary finds place for presumption under the purelynegative (kevelavyetirekin) form of in ference , in which iti s imposs ible to adduce a posi t ive instance of the gene ralrule

,but the Mimamsa could not accept thi s view s ince i t

decl ined to regard the use o f the negat ive form in inferenceas sati s factory .

Unl ike the Nyaya the Vrttikara1 accepts non- existenceor , as i t i s also termed

,nonapprehension

( anupelebdhi ) , as a separate means o f proof. The argument in favour o f thi s view adopted by Kumarila i s thatthe absence of any thing, e .g. of a j ar on a parti cular spotof ground , canno t be the object of direct perception , whichadmittedly

,accord ing to the definition o f the M imamsa'

Satre , requires a present contact with the organs of sense ,nor can i t he arrived at by inference , analogy , presumpt ionor verbal testimony . It can only ari se into an object ofknowledge through the fact that none of the normal methodsof cognition can come into operat ion

,and this peculi ari ty

distinguishes i t from any of these means . Prabhakara ,

1 P . 10 ; Prekerenapahcika, pp. 118-25 ; Slokavarttika , pp. 473

92 ; Manemeyodaye , pp. 58-62 , 114- 18 cf .Nya'

yemofijeri , pp. 49 -54

Saddarsenasemuccaya , pp. 295-98 ; it is refuted from the Ja in standpo int , ibid . pp. 206-7 .


with the Nyaya and VaiSesika , declines to accept nonapprehension as a distinct means of proof. When we say,“ The j ar i s not on the ground ,

” all that we mean i s that ,i f the j ar were on the ground , we would perce ive i t there ,but that as a matter of fact we see the ground alone . Theseeing o f the ground is mere perception , and the furtherstatement i s merely a qual ification o f what is perceived interms o f something which , formerly seen along with i t , i snot now present . In thi s there i s no separate mentalprocess leading to proof . The Nyaya also escapes thedifficulty by adopting a peculi ar doctrine of i ts own , underwhich nonexistence , regarded as a posi tive enti ty

,i s

perce ived by a peculiar mode of contact known as therelation of qualifier and qualified .

Whether,however, four , with Prabhakara , or , with the

Vrttikara and Kumarila , five means of proof“ other than

verbal testimony or scripture are reckoned , all these meanso f proof are subject to the defect that they do not avail todetermine the nature o f Dharma

,man ’s duty and righteous

ness . This i s establi shed by the St'

rtra ( I , 1 , 4 ) for thecase of perception ; that means of proo f deals only withexisting things which can be brought into contact wi th theo rgans of sense , but duty i s a th ing whi ch is not alreadyexisting

,but needs man ’s act ion to bring i t to fruition

,and

duty is not tangible so as to be able to come into contactwith the organs . Inference , analogy , presumption , andnon- apprehension

,all have relation to

“

percept ion , and forthat reason are vi ti ated by the defects o f the latter

,as we

gather from the Vrttikara , who thus supplements Jaimini.On the other hand , Jaimini declares that the relation of theword to its meaning i s natural and eternal , and Vedic inj unet ions are

,there fore , the source o f knowledge of duty , which

i s something not open to ordinary means o f apprehension .

Such injunctions are authori tative , according to Badarayanaas ci ted in the Mimamse

'

Sil ira , because of thei r independence. In the definition of the Vrttikara

1 scriptural cognition

(sastre ) is the cognition of some thing , which is not percept

1-70 ; S aka

va’

rttika , pp. 405 33 , 498 ff , 728 fpfp

; Menemeyodeye , pp. 40 47 ; cf.Nyayamanjari , pp, 150 ff, 205 ff.


i ble , through the instrumental ity o f intelligible sounds , thati s words . whose meaning i s known . The further analysi so f Prabhakara shows that each word i s composed of letterswhich are severally apprehended , impressions of the earlierletters blending wi th that produced by the cognition o f thelast letter to bring about the idea o f the whole word

,which

alone has the power to bring about the comprehension of asingle defini te meaning . The letters , then , are the means o fverbal cognition , s ince i t i s they which by combinationcompose the word and bring about the comprehension o f i tsmeaning . With Kumarila Prabhakara agrees in disregarding the grammatical school ’s doctrine o f Sphota , an en t i tywhich i s invented to meet the diffi culty felt by the grammarians as to the poss ibil i ty of any combination of impressionsfrom individual letters producing the unity , which enablesus to comprehend the meaning of a word , and in thi s viewthe Vedanta , Nyaya , Varsesika and Samkhya are at one withthe Mimamsa, leaving the Yoga only to support the doctrineo f the grammarians . 1

The meaning of words i s declared by Jaimini to benatural (eutpettike ) and Prabhakara ins ists on the fact thatwords cannot be supposed to owe thei r meanings to conven

t ion,whether human or divine . The view o f the school in

this regard can hardly be regarded as anything else than anattempt to bring the doctrine o f verbal testimony into harmony wi th thei r trad itional bel iefs in the nature in the Veda ,which doubtless long preceded their speculations on then ature of the relat ion o f word and meaning . The Nyayaview

,that meanings were given to words by a convention due

to the action of God , offended the Mimamsa belief that theVeda had no creator , and that no God , as unders tood by theNyaya , existed. The alternat ive of human convent ion con

tradicted flatly the M imarhsa belie f that the essenti al functionof the Veda was to lay down inj unctions for the performanceof actions

,whence arose an invis ible po tency (aparve ) leading

to a desirable end,and that this potency was a thing of

1 Cf . Max Mu ller , Six Systems , pp. 527-44 ; a full refutation o f thedoctrine o f Bhartrhari that Sabda is the source of the world and is the

lower form o f the ab solute, Brahman , is given in Nyayamafijari , pp.

531-36 ; cf. Sarvadarsanesamgrahe , ch . xiii .


which no person,save through the Veda , could have any

knowledge . The Nyaya argument in favour of convention ,derived from the case of proper names , i s met by theadmiss ion that in the case of such names conventioni s active

,but that common names stand on a d ifferent foot ing .

In the former case , we know that the persons or thingsso called have a beginning in t ime , and that some personmust have applied the names to them ; in the case ofcommon names we have no warrant for finding a beginning in time for either the th ings or the words . Therehas been no beginning of the world or of men

,and

they must have from the first talked of the things of theworld

,j ust as in actual li fe i t i s from observing the conver

sation of h is elders,or by thei r ins truction , that a youth

learns the meanings of words . What i s sti ll more conclusiveevidence is that , unless we recognised , as we do , that wordspossess of thei r own nature meanings , we could never formthe conception of conventional meanings , which is a late rdevelopment .The eternity o f the word i s establ ished formally and at

length by Jaimini in a systemati c refutation ( I , 1 , 6 - z3 )of theobjections directed against the doctrine by the Nyaya schoolin part icular. The Nyaya1 holds that the eternity of theword i s precluded by the fact that i t is percept ible onlya fter effort ; that i t is evanescent ; that in common parlancemen talk o f producing a sound , j ust as they speak of producing any ordinary article ; that the same word i s pronouncedby many people and in many places ; that words havechanges in form

,such as dadhy etre for dedhi ; and that ,

when uttered by many people , the volume of sound is

increased. The reply of Jaimin i insists that the apparentproduction of sound , regarded by the Nyaya as a creat ion ,is only a mani festation of a pre- exist ing entity

,a fact in

harmony with the disappearance of words on the cessation ofthe mani festation , while p roducts proper remain in being .

The analogy of the sun refutes the argument fromsimultaneity of perception by many persons ; the change to

1 T he St‘

rtra ( II , 2 , 23-59 ) deals with the topic , but in such a wayas to show in all likelihood posteriority to theM imamsa Sil ira .

38 THE KARMA-MiMAMsA

dadhy otra i s not a modification o f the letter i , but thesubstitution of a quite d i fferent form ; increase of magnitudere fers to the tone , not to the wo rd i tsel f. Posi tive arguments for the e ternity of the word are not lacking. If i t werenot so , i t would fa il in its purpose , the conveying of ameaning to another. Aga in , we do find in point o f fact thatmen recognise words as being the same when uttered ond iverse occasions by diverse people . Language supports theM imar

'

nsa case ; when a word is repeated , we talk of tenrepetit ions o f the word . not of ten words . Moreover

,no

cause for the destruction of words i s adduced,and in non

eternal things causes of destruction are always to be found .

Finally , there i s Vedic author ity for the doctrine and no

valid counter authori ty .

The word then exists ever , but only from time to t imeby effo rt on the part o f some being i s i t made mani fest tous . But effort i s not enough ; the deaf do not hear , and theeffort must be supported by a suitable organ which aids inthe cogni tion of the word . Through the effort on the part Ofthe speaker

,the ai r from hi s lungs rises upwards and comes

into contact with the vocal chords , by which i t i s modifiedin character. Passing, then , out from the mouth , i t reachesthe ears o f those near enough to be affected

,produces in

thei r ears a change favourable to audition,and passes out ,

bringing to a close the audit ion . The ear cavity contains alayer o f ai r

,upon which the ai r current issuing from the

speaker’s mouth impinges , producing the condition on which

audition supervenes . Thus the Mimamsa rejects the primit ive conception under which , as light from the eye travels toi ts object and brings back vis ion , so the sound travels insome form to the source of the sound , as held by the Jains ,and the samkhya view that the sense of hearing , as allpervading, reaches the place o f the sound . It also rejectsthe Buddhist v iew that actual contact i s unnecessary forhearing , and the Nyaya -Va iSes ika doctrine of propagationo f sound on the analogy of waves , or the filaments of theKadamba flower

,i n the ether until i t reaches the ether

enclosed in the ear cavity , which , on that view , const itutesthe organ of hearing. To thi s opinion Kumarila objectsthat

,the ether being one and indivis ible , i f one ear i s


affected,all ears should equally be affected , and every sound

be heard by every one ; or, again , i f one man is deaf ,everyone should no less be deaf. The Mimamsa evadesthis objection by the doctrine that the ear cavity containsai r

,and that i t d iffers in s ize and shape from man to man .

A further object ion to the wave theory i s also based on thefact that sounds travelling with the wind are heard atfurther distances than sounds travelling against the wind ,which is inexpl icable i f the propagation of waves takesplace in the ether

,which

,of course

,i s unaffected by wind .

The essential character of the word i s,in the view of

Jaimini , not mere denotation , but injunction , a view whichclearly stands in close relation to the doctrine that themeaning o f words i s largely learned by the young from theobservation of intercourse among the old ; one addresses theother , and the other acts as a result ; one says , gam anaya ,

the other brings the cow . Hence , as against the Vedanta , i ti s denied that the essence of Vedic texts l ies in the makingmanifest of the sole existent Brahman , and asserted that ,even when this seems to be the case

,the real import of the

text is an injunction to med itate on the Brahman . Fromthis view Prabhakara proceeds to develop a conclusion

,

which is in harmony with the view of Sabarasvamin , thatwords themselves have no meaning , and obtain i t only insentences , properly injunctive clauses ; gam by itself is

nothing , but atta ins meaning when conjoined with aneya ,

the whole then signi fying generically the genus cow as connected with bringing. This view in the school obtains thename of the theory of significat ion in syntact ical combinat ion

(envitabhidhane) , in opposit ion to the view of Kumarila ,who admits that words possess a meaning independently ofcomb ination in injunctive sentences

,and whose theory

accepts , therefore , the combination of significant terms( abhihitanveye ) . The two schools , however , are at one inholding that the s ignification of words is a class signifi

cat ion ( I , 3 , 30 as the theory of the eternity of wordsdemands . The modern Nyaya , on the other hand , insi ststhat the import of words i s always the concrete individual

,

while the older Nyaya ( II , 2 , 61- 71 ) adopts the doctrinethat the word expresses the class (jati ) , individual (vyekti ) ,


and characteri sti c mark of the class (akrti ) , all at once .The Buddhist view , again , ins ists on negative determinationonly , on the ground that i t i s impossi ble to determineposi ti vely the specific nature Of anyth ing, and that al l thatcan be attained is a series o f negations

,a view which

Kumarila refutes at great length ,1 ins isting that the doctrine

would mean the imposs ibil i ty of d i s t inguishing between anytwo th ings , s ince , for instance , bo th the cow and the horseare negat ives of the elephant , and could never deal withindividuals

,each negation being necessari ly general. The

de fender of Apoha thus accepts the exi stence of negativeclasses

,which mus t be all identical

,s ince he cannot rely

,

ex hypothesi , on any posi t ive means of discrimination betweenthem .

The case for the claim that words denote individuals,as

put in the Satra 33 ) in the view of Prabhakara , i s that ,i f i t were not so , all injunctions , Vedic or pro fane , wouldbecome meaningless ; number and gender would be out ofplace with regard to nouns ; there could be no words toexpress qualit ies , and agreement between noun and adjectivewould be imposs ible . Prabhakara repl ies by insi sting that ,as indicated by the Bhasya , i f words had individualmeanings , such a sentence as , One should pile the fire altarin the fo rm o f a ki te ,

” would be meaningless,as i t cannot

be supposed that such an inj unction was intended to referto an individual ki te

,while i ts plain meaning i s a reference

to the class ki te .” Without this element o f generali ty allinj unctions are absurd

,and the necessary individual reference

in certa in cases i s obtained through the general i ty , withwhich i t i s inseparably connected . Kumarila adds that th isview i s supported by the fact that the word

“ cow , asexperience shows

,does not suggest to us an individual cow ,

but the class ; i f individuals were denoted by words , a genericidea like cow would be imposs ible , and even i f possiblewould merely consist o f the impression of all the peculi arit iesof all cows known to the thinker. Again , the word cannotdenote all the individuals

,s ince this would mean that the

1 Slokevarttika , pp. 566-614 ; Nyayamanjeri , pp. 303-8 ; contrastRatnakirti

’s Apohasiddhi (Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts , pp. 1


42 THE KARMA-MiMAMsA

accord ing implic i t bel ief to the assertions made to us byany merely human authori ty .

There i s an obvious difficulty in thi s reasoning,when it

i s remembered that Prabhakara,l ike the Vrttikara , insists

on the self- evidence of cognitions , from which it would seemto follow that the assertions of any man are prima facievalid

,until sublated by better evidence . Kumarila ,

who isalways anxious to accommodate the views o f the school topopular belie fs , i s at the same t ime more in harmony withthe tenets of the school in adopting a doctrine , which doesnot involve the general denial of the validity -o i human test imony . He adopts , therefore , the plan of di stinguish ingtestimony as human and super-human ( epauruseya ) , whileadmitting both as val id

,though for di fferent reasons .

In the case o f the Veda there is no author,and there

fore the possibi l i ty of defects i s absolutely precluded .

In the case of human testimony i ts validi ty may be impairedby defects in the speaker , but the presence of excellencies inhim precludes the presence of defects

,so that i f we are

assured of the latter we can be assured that the defects donot exi st . But i t must not be understood that the excellenciespos itively con tribute to the val id ity of hi s utterances , whichthey possess o f themselves ; the excellencies are of servicemerely in assuring us of the absence of those defects ,which might cause hi s test imony to be suspect .The Veda , however , has special claims on our regard , and

the M imamsa Sfi tre ( I , 1 , 24- 28 ) meets detailed criticismsof i ts claim to eternity . Thus i t is argued against i tsvalid ity that parts of i t bear names of men , or refer to humanbeings

,to which Jaimini repl ies that passages bear names

of persons who studied them in detai l , and that apparenthuman names in the Veda are really mere cases ofhomonymns ; thus , as Sabarasvamin points out , Pravahanai s not the name of a man , but an epithet ,

“

The excellentcarrier .” Similarly , apparently absurd statements , such as“ The cows performed a sacrificial session ,

” are to be understood merely as emphasis ing the value o i some ritual actionby way of hyperbole

,not as showing that the authors of the

Veda were fool ish mortals . The eternity of words , and thefact that i t alone serves to reveal the unseen potency , which


results from obeying its inj unct ions , are conclusive proofsof the eternity of the Veda

,and the alternat ive view of a

creator is needless and unsat i s factory both in regard to theVeda and to the world .

Other forms of proof, both Prabhakara and Kumarilaexpressly reject. 1 Sambhava , which is variously interpretedas probabili ty , e .g. that ten i s included in fi fty , or muchmore probably as inclusion pure and simple , i s regarded asmerely a form of inference. Rumour , which like Sambhava i sclaimed as a means of proof by the Pauranikas, is patentlyuseless for purposes of proof ; i ts source being uncertain , i ti s quite impossible to afford i ts contents any measure o fcredi t. Gesture ( caste) which is given as .a means of proofby the Tantra school , the Mimamsa ignores .The relat ion between the various means of proof i s

developed by Kumarila ; the use of any means of proofsuch as inference i s debarred i f there i s a more direct modeof cognition

, e .g. sense perception , or i f the contrary ofwhat is sought to be established i s established in advance bythe use of some s impler means of p roof.

1 Prakaranapafi cika, pp. 125 , 126 ; Ma'

nameyodaye , pp. 64 , 65 ;Slokavarttika , p. 492 (W . 57 , Tarkikareksa , pp. 116 , 117 ;Saddersanasamuccaya , p. 207 .

THE WORLD OF REALITY

THERE i s nothing to show that the question o fthe rea lity o f the world had ever occurred to the framersof the M imamsa Satro , but in Sabarasvamin

’s Bhasye we

find the problem defini tely faced in answer to theonslaught made by the Nihilist school o f Buddhism on thewhole concept ion of the real i ty o f exi stence as we know i t.The doctrine of Nagarjuna ,

1 doubtless an effective restatement of tendencies earlier mani fested in the Buddhistschools , denies at once the real ity of the external world , andof the ideal world which seems to present us wi th the knowledge o f external real i ty . That much o f i ts di alecti c i ssophistic i s true , but i ts novelty of view and the energy wi thwhich Nagarjuna ,

an eastern parallel o f Zeno,urged his

paradoxes , evoked from the orthodox schools elaborate repl ies ,bo th the Nyaye and the Vedanta S iltres seeking to refuteheresies so dangerous to their own tenets . The reply of theMimamsa, in keeping wi th what appears to be the earlycharacter of that St

'

i tra as compared wi th the Vedanta orNyaye Sil tras i s given only in the Vrttikara as cited in theBhasya .

2An opponent objects , in hi s version , to the

val idi ty o f our waking percept ions , on the ground that in adream we have cognitions which all admit to be withoutfoundation

,and

,i f this is true of one set of cogni tions , i t may

be as sumed to be equally true of another. The reply of theVrttikara i s , in effect , that the argument assumes what i s to be

1 Malamadhyamekekarika, ed. Bib liotheca Buddhica , 1903 - 1913

M axWa lleser, D ieM i ttlere Lehredes Nagarj una , Heidelb erg, 1911 and

1912 . Cf. Sarvadarsanasemgrahe , ch . 11 ; Sarvas iddhantasamgraha ,ch . IV.

1 Pp. 8-10 .

THE WORLD OF REALITY 45

proved,namely

,that all cognitions as such are inval id . On

the contrary , we can form the idea of the invalidity of dreamcogni tion simply from our having waking cognit ions whichafford us a basis for discrediting the dream cognit ions , and wecan explain the defects of dream cognitions by the assumptionthat the mind in dream is weak and does not act effectively ,a view which we can support by the fact that in deep sleepthe mind i s wholly absent , suggesting that in the dream statei t is i n a condition intermediate between its effective wakingpresence and its disappearance. The opponent , however ,continues the argument by urging that the object o f the cogu it ion is really a void , thus discredi ting the validi ty of thecognition . There i s , he says , no difference between the objectof percept ion and the idea ; the idea i s di rectly perceived ,and there i s nothing in reality corresponding to an externalobject . The Vrttikara repl ies that thi s V iew rests on theerroneous assumption that an idea must have a form ; i treally i s without form

, whi ch , on the o ther hand , the externalobject possesses . What we perceive i s not our idea , butsomething locali sed as outs ide ourselves ; no idea canperce ive another idea , for each has a momentary existenceonly , whence one cannot be present to another. Theopponent contends that the second idea has a certa in continuity with the first as i t originates i t becomes known tothe first and reveals to i t the obj ect , j ust as a lampillumines and thus makes known things . Or

,put in

another way , i t i s the idea which firs t originates,and then

the object becomes known , having no anterio r real existence.The Vrttikara refutes th is by insi sting that , though the ideaoriginates first

,i t i s net known first ; as we have seen , the

idea is known by inference from the fact of our cognit ion ofan object , and the actual knowledge and the knowledge ofthe idea cannot possibly be simultaneous . Though we knowan object , we sometimes say we do not know it

,that is

,that

we are not conscious of having an idea about i t . Further,

ideas are essent i ally connected with names , while perceptionis essentially immediate knowledge

,in which naming i s not

necessarily involved . Moreover , i f the idea and the objecthad the same form

,as is assumed in the opponent

’s argument,

th is would sublate the idea,not the object , which is directly


perceived , but in truth the idea is formless and known byinference , while the object i s endowed with form and i s anobject of sense perception . Or , again , the reality of anexternal world i s shown by the fact that we have the idea of amat only when threads form its material cause ; i f otherwi se ,then a man might form the idea of a j ar despi te the use o f

threads in the composit ion o f an object ; putmore broadly , ourideas are not the free result o f our mental activi ty ; they are

i mposed upon us as regards thei r content by external reali ty.

The argument as a whole thus falls into two parts,the

first deal ing with the contention that ideas have no

foundation (niralambene ) , and the second with the viewtha t external reali ty i s void (sanye ) . Both these contentions are the tenets of the Nihilism of Buddhism

,

and there i s no real ground for doubt that the argumentsof the Vrttikara are directed agains t this contention .

Kumarila,

1 however,or some predecessor , has interpreted

the passage otherwise , treating the first part of the argument as d irected against the Vijfianavada of Vasubandhuand Asar

'

rga ,2 which admitted the reali ty of ideas

,while

denying that of the outer,

world,and the second part he

treats as a refutation of the Sfinyavada of the Madhyamikaschool of Nagarjuna . Preci sely the same fate

3 has overtaken the corresponding discussions of the Sftnyavada i nthe Nyaye and Vedanta Siltras

' Vatsyayana sti ll interpretedthe former ( IV, 2 , 25-33 ) in i ts true sense , but VacaspatiM iSra reads into part of i t an attack on the Vijfianavada ;in the case of the Vedanta Sar

’

nkara turns the whole passage ( 11, 2 , 28—32) into an attack on that school , whileRamanuja treats i t as refuting bo th Buddhist doctrines .The causes for these vagaries of interpretation are obvious ;the St

'

myavada in i ts refutat ion o f external real ityused the arguments which the Vijfianavada later employed ,

1 Slokeverttika , pp. 217-67 , 268-345 . Prekaranepeficika, pp. 141

ff, 171 ( a fragment only ) ; cf . Nyayakan ike, pp. 253 ff, Manameyodeya , pp. 119 -22 ; Nyayanzar

'

tjari , pp. 536 ff (Vijfianavada ) , 548 ff(Sfi nyavada ) .

1 Mahayanesfi tralemkara , ed . and trans . S. Levi , Paris , 1907-11Servadarsanasemgraha , ch . I Sarvasiddhe

’

ntasamgreha , ch . IV ( i i ) ,Saddarsenasamuccaye , pp. 40 , 41 , 47 .

1 Jacobi , XXX I , 1 ff.


but i t supplemented the conclusions i t arrived at regardingexternal real ity by demoli shing the value of our ideas .Any reply to the St

'

myavada must therefore include ananswer which would apply to the Vijfianavada , andlater authors l ike Kumarila naturally thought that thediscussion must deal wi th the more recent and moreconv inc ing school of Vijiianavada . But the Vrttikara

shows no knowledge of the pecul i ar terminology of theVijfianavada , such as i ts di st inc t i on between the Alayavijfiana , the quasi -permanent consciousness which consti tutesthe individual unti l he attains Nirvana , and the parti cular

presentations which are thence derived (pravrtti-vzynana ) .Moreover

,the argument from the dream condition i s not

peculi ar to the Vijfianavada ; on the contrary i t is a spec i alfavourite of the Madhyamikas , occurring in the Madhyemika"il t (VII , 34 ) and in other texts ci ted in the Vrttion that text.The view of Prabhakara i s in accord with the Vrttikara

and theBhasye ,but Kumarila ’s interpretat ion of the passage

has the advantage o f el ici t ing from him a most interestingexposit ion of , and attack upon , the Buddhist Vijfianavadaand St

'

rnyavada theories . The discussion shows the closeaffinity of the two doctrines , and the form of the argumenti s often compl icated by the resort to elaborate syllogisti creasoning

,but the whole makes a very creditable effort to

refute either the extreme scept ici sm o f the Madhyamika orthe extreme ideal ism of the Yogacaras. The reali ty of anexternal world i s vehemently insisted upon as the onlyfoundation of the common facts o f l i fe , including suchdistinctions as those of virtue and vice , teacher and pupil.If there were nothing but ideas , all our views would befalse

,s ince they essenti ally rest on the belief in external

real i ty. Moreover,there i s a complete counter argument ;

cogni tions , we hold , have real substrata in the externalworld ; thi s notion of ours i s correct , because i t i s wi thoutcontradiction

,l ike the notion of the falsi ty of dream cog

nition . I f you reply by denying the validi ty of the probative example which we adduce , then the doctrine thatdream cogni t i ons are false would disappear , and you wouldlose the chief argument adduced against the real ity which


underl ies cognitions as a whole. Moreover,in dream

cognitions , which you adduce as examples where there i s nounderlying reali ty , we find on examination that there isalways a real substratum ,

however much distorted anddisguised . If , again , you argue that the unreal ity ofour waking cogni tions i s revealed by the fact that theYogin sees real i ty far otherwise , we re tort by denying theval idi ty of his percept ion , and ci ting against him the vis ionsof our Yogins . Nor can we accept the arguments of theBuddhist logicians , such as Dignaga , who assert that theactiv i ty of the mind can Supply the full complement o f

not ions , which appear to us to reflect reality ;1 without an

external world all these mental conceptions would bemeaningless , for we deal not with concep t ions , but wi th thefacts of li fe.Against the conception that cogni tion alone exi sts to the

exclusion of cogniser and cogni sed , Kumarila contends withspeci al energy. The case for thi s concept ion i s set out byhim with much care a s the prelude to his reply to theSt

'

rnyavada . It rests on the difficul ty of understanding howcognition and cogntsed can be related . There cannot reallybe two enti ties , one formless and one possess ing form ,

for inmemory

,when no object is present

,we s t ill have cognition

of form,showing that the cognit ion has form ,

and renderingthe hypothesis of an external reality mere superfluity. How ,

again , can there be contact between the incorporeal cognit ionand the external Object P An Object can be perceived onlyi f i t has form

,but again the form does not exi st unti l i t i s

perceived,which involves contradiction . Again , even i f

contact were possible,how could two th ings

,in themselves

without fo rm , acquire i t in this way P Moreover , the ideawe have of a double moon i s admittedly -erroneous , andtherefo re cannot rest on real ity . So also we use a variety o fwords of varied gender for the stars

,and a masculine word

for a wi fe,which would be impossible i f reali ty

controlled our ideas . The same thing,e .g. a lovely woman ,

raises very diff erent feel ings in the mind of the asceti c , the

1 Cf . Ratnakarasanti’s treatment o f inference as internal only,

Antervyaptisemerthene (Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts , pp. 103-14 )



speculat ion , which holds that the form of the object i simpressed on the cogni tion . The objection to the NyayaVaiSesika V iew appears to be that the idea i s understood bythe school to be perceived simultaneously with the object

,

and , as the perception of the idea requi res that i t should beprovided wi th visible form , that i s , colour and extension ,there would be no possibili ty of demonstrat ing the existenceof the external object , since , the form being cognised withthe idea , an external reference would be needless . Theobject ion , i t must be noted , i s not cogent against thedeveloped fo rm of the Nyaya doctrine , in which i t i s heldtha t on the actual cogni tion (vyavese

'

ye ) there supervenesthe mental perception o f the cogni tion thecogni t ion thus brings real i ty immediately before the mind ,whi le in a secondary act the cognition i tsel f i s made theobject o f introspec tion , as in the accepted theory of modern

psychology. The Mimamsa, by ignoring this possible view ,

renders i t necessary to hold that a cogni t ion can never bethe object of in trospection ; i t i s an entity which i s in ferredfrom the fact o f cogni t ion ; i ts existence i s known , but notas an objec t of sense-perception of any kind . Mental

perception , which the school admits , i s thus restricted tothose forms of mental act ivi ty which are not cognit ive .There remains , however , yet another contention of the

Sfinyavada which Kumarila seeks to re fute. It i s based onthe view that atoms are invi sible

,that aggregates of a toms

are invi sible,that all objects , being composed of such

aggregates , are invi s ible and incomprehensible , and thereforevoid . The weigh t of th i s argument lies in the fact that theMimamsagives a mo re or less hearty acceptance to the doctrineof atoms

,though Kumarila i s careful not to bind himself

definitively to i t. The conglomeration of atoms , i t i s urged ,i s impossible , s ince atoms have no extension , or at any rate noparts

,and no contact between them is , therefore , conce ivable .

More generally,i t i s also contended that no whole of parts

can really exist . If i t did , i t must ei ther reside in i ts enti retyin each of the component parts , which is positively absurd ,or i t must res ide collectively in all the parts ; in thi s event ,even i f i t can be assumed that i t i s something over and abovethe parts

,i t would be perceived only when all the parts had


been perceived,which would be normally impossible , abso

lutely so in the case o f a whole of imperceptible parts l ikeatoms . This d ialectic

,which the Nye

'

ya Sil ira ( IV,2 , 7- 14 )

also seeks to face,i s met with the argument that, as there i s

an interminable di spute between the opposing schools , theBuddhists who deny the difference of the whole from its parts ,and the Nyaya who assert the d istinction , the safe courselies in the via media of admitt ing that a. whole i s in one sensedifferen t from

,and in another sense not d ifferent from

,

i ts consti tuent parts . A whole,therefore , i s not of a

simple and absolute character , and resembles an objectwith variegated hues , but i t i s not the less real forthat . Invalidi ty applies to doubtful ideas

,not to ideas of

an object which in i tself is not absolute in character. Thestock argument of the Buddhists

,that i f any composi te thing

is investigated no whole remains after deduction of the composing parts , e.g. the threads of a mat , is met by the rejoinder

,in harmony with the Nyaya , that the same result is

achieved on the Nyaya view , which regards the whole asdi fferent from the parts ; the whole , in thei r View ,

only existswhen there i s an agglomeration of parts ; i f , mentally , -youtake away the parts , naturally the whole , despi te its

difference from the parts , disappears also. The furtherhypothesis , that what i s really seen i s merely atoms withoutreal unity but vi s ible in numbers , though singly invi sible ,i s naturally rejected as devo id o f cogency . Finally

,the

argument i s used that the attempt to ask i f a whole residesin the parts

,as an entirety in each or collect ively in all

,i s

mis taken . The whole is impartite , and the idea of itsrelation to its individual consti tuents in whole or in partis a question which ar ises only in respect of the individualelements

,and i s meaningless as applied to the whole .

1

The value of Kumarila ’

s refutation of the Buddhistschools is not inconsiderable ; he brings out fully the gravedifficulties which meet any effort to account for the facts ofli fe wi thout accepting some permanent enti ty , and the object ions to the effort to evade this problem by creating the fig

Slokavarttika , pp. 632 34 (vv . 75 cf . Nyayamer‘

tjari , p. 550 ;Avayaivinirakarana (Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts , pp. 78


ment of an unending series of ideas , each of which must besupposed to take upon itself in some form the impressions ofthe whole previous h istory of the series . He insists

,also

rightly , on the imposs ibil ity o f accepting any purely subject iveideal ism , but he does not seem to have appreci ated the poss ib ility o f discarding th is atti tude , but accept ing an objectiveidealism. A suggestion to th is effect was implici t in the doctrine of knowledge adduced by D ignaga ,

1 which insi sted thatin ference and other mental acts dealt with ideal contents , butKumarila was able to reply to this doctrine that the wholescheme was meaningless , as i t assumed that there wasnothing truly real beyond the unreal play of ideas in themind . No true objective idealism was

,therefore

,before hi s

mind,and he i s content to assert absolutely the reali ty of an

external world,which i s not the product of intellect , but

which is known by us , the relation o f knowledge to realitybeing of a pecul iar and unique type , involving an activi tyon the part of the cogniser which does not

,however , create

the object.In their positive doctrines as to the nature of the

universe there are considerable differences between Prabhakara and Kumarila . The former admitted , i t i s clear ,

1 nofewer than eight categories , while the latter accepted fiveonly . They agreed in regard to substance

,quali ty , action

or motion,and general i ty , but , while Prabhakara accepted

the category of inherence from the Nyaya-VaiSesika , andadded the three o f potency or capacity (sekti ) , s imilarity

and number Kumarila rejected thethree additiohs o f Prabhakara , and also , in thi s casein agreement with hi s predecesso r , the part icul ari ty

(viseso ) of the Nyaya-Va iSesika . Finally , inherence wasalso rej ected by him . On the other hand

,the texts ascribe

definitely to him the acceptance of the category o f nonexistence (abhava ) , with a fourfold divi sion of priornegation , subsequent negation or destruct ion , absolute nega

1 Slokavarttike , p. 258 ( v . 167 ) T he invalidity o f a ll b ut indeterminate perception is asserted in Saddarsenasamuccoye , p. 41 .

1 Prameyapa‘

rayana in Mallinatha Tarkikaraksa , p. 164 ; Mana

meyodaya , pp. 65 , 114 ff ; Prakaranapa iicika, pp. 110 , 111 ( overlooked ia Prabhakara School, p. 89 )


t ion,and mutual negat ion , sub - divi sions which , of course , are

simply transferred bodily from the Nyaya-VaiSesika doctrine .Non-existence stands in definite opposition to the other fourcategories accepted by Kumarila ; though regarded as real , i ti s nevertheless admitted to be essenti ally relative to the fourcategories of being (bhave ) . Prabhakara , however , rejectsnon- existence

,as might have been expected from his rejec

t ion of non- exi stence or nonapprehension as a means ofproof. The only reali ty

,in hi s view

,in the absence of a

pot from a spot o f ground i s the spot of ground . Theparti culari ty of the Nyaya-VaiSesika , which serves todi fferenti ate such things as the ultimate atoms and selves ,has no foundation as a separate category , as the difi erentiat ion can be based on the ordinary quali ties which thesethings possess .

Substance1 i s that in which quali ties reside , and Prabhakara reckons the number as nine"earth , water , ai r , fire , ether ,the sel f or soul (atmen ) , mind , t ime , and space . Kumarila

i s credi ted with admitting also the substantial i ty of darkness and sound , while others accept gold as a twel fth . Ofthese earth

,water

,air and fire all possess colour and

tangibili ty , and accordingly are the objects of the senses of‘

sight and touch , but only when in non- atomic form , for somedegree of magnitude i s recognised by Prabhakara , as by thelater Nyaya-VaiSesika , as a necessary condition , along withtouch (sparse) , o f proper sense perception . The other fivesubstances cannot be regarded as perceptible

,since they

cannot be seen or touched , and there fore are only inferred toexi st. In the case of ether the apparent whiteness of i t isdue to particles of fire in i t

,while the darkness of night is

not a substance , nor i s i t a quali ty ; i f i t were a quali ty i twould be perceptible by day also , and therefore must bedeemed to be merely absence o f light . A vari ant of thi sdoctrine in the school o f Prabhakara declares darkness to bethe absence of the knowledge o f light .

.

Kumarila claimsdarknes s as a substance

,because i t i s blue in colour and

moves , these two facts being necessarily attributed to some

1 Prekarenepar‘

icika, pp. 24 , 54 , 77 , 84 , 141 ff ; Manemeyodaya ,

pp. SH, 66 if, 78 ft ; Slokeva‘

rttike , p. 404 ( v . Tarkikaraksa,

pp. 133, 134 .


substance , but the Nyaya denies these facts . Pointing outthat a colour can be perceived only in'

light, and darkness i sexperienced when there i s no l ight . Sridhara again suggeststhat darkness i s the imposition of blue colour on somethingelse . The necess ity of inferring ether arises from the natureof sound , which must be provided with a substratum ; unlikeKumarila , Prabhakara sees no sufficient ground to give tosound the rank of a distinct substance

,a pos i tion which has

obvious difficulties in a system which allots so pre- eminent aplace to the word .

Air,in Prabhakara ’

s view i s nei ther hot nor cold,the

apparent heat being due to fire particles,and the coolness to

water part icles d i ffused in i t . Kumarila also regards i t aspercept ible , but does not claim that i t has any colour ; herejects therefore the Nyaya view that i t can only be inferred

,

colour being necessary to percept ion , and adopts the laterNyaya opin ion which admits of direct perception throughthe sense o f touch . In th i s and in many other details h i sschool

,i f not the founder , clearly largely assimilated the

Nyaya-Va tsesika physics , though i t i s clear that Kumarilahimself was not prepared to accept the atomic theory asabsolutely essenti al to h is principles . Some of his followerswent further

,and claimed that ether , space and t ime were

directly perceptible , but on these points the doctrine of bothschools seems never to have been developed .

The account of quali ties which inhere in substances,

and are distinct from motion , given by both Prabhakara

and Kumarila shows obvious Obligat ions to the VaiSesika .

1

Prabhakara gives as objects of perception the quali ties ofcolour

,taste

,smell

,and touch ; number , dimension , indivi

duality,conj unction

,disj unct ion , priority and posteriori ty ;

pleasure,pain

,desire , aversion , and effort , and , l ike the

VaiSesika , distinguishes conjunctions and disj unct ions ac

cording as they are produced by the action Of one or bothof the things concerned , or rise mediately through anotherconj unction or d isj unction. Kumarila , l ike Praéastapada ,enumerates twenty- four qualit ies colour , smell , taste ,

1 Prakaranapar‘

icika, pp. 54 , 151 ; Mdnameyodaya , pp. 99-111 ;Tarkikareksa , p. 164 .


touch ; number , individuali ty,dimension , conjunction ,

disjunction, priority , posteriority ; grav i ty , fluidi ty , viscidi ty ;

cognition, pleasure , pain , desire , aversion , effort , impress ion

(covering velocity , elasti ci ty , and mental impression ) , tone

(dhveni ) , which is a quali ty of the ai r , revealing sound ,mani festation (prakotyo ) , a quali ty common to all substances

,percept ible and determining them , and potency .

Potency is reckoned by Prabhakara as a distinct category ;its existence i s proved by in ference"fire burns normally ,but under the influence of some spell i t ceases to h ave thateffect there must

,therefore

,be something of specia l charac

ter in the fire by virtue of which i t burns . Words also havethe potency to denote meanings , and so on ad infinitum.

It is eternal in eternal th ings , but transient in transientthings

,coming into being with them and disappearing when

they disappear , and thus di ffering from impression (samskare ) , which even in eternal things is evanescent . TheNyaya view i s sensibly opposed to the recognition o f anysuch conception

,since

,stri ctly speaking , the number o f

potencies in any object might be regarded as very numerous ,negating the possibili ty o f accepting potency as one quali tyor a distinct category of being . Number , which Prabhakaramakes a separate category ,

1 in the list of Kumarila falls tothe rank of a quality . The classification o f quali ties andtheir assignment to substances follows generally the classifi

cation first gi ven in i nfinite detai l by PraSastapada . Fromhis l i st Kumarila departs only in the substitution o f tone forsound , and o f mani festa t ion and po tency for merit anddemeri t . Unlike PraSastapada , he denies that cognition i sthe object of mental perception , though admitting this forthe other speci al quali t ies o f the self. From the school ofPrabhakara that of Kumarila di ffers in asserting that individuality appl ies both to eternal th ings and to products ,while the former asserts that i t appl ies to eternal thingsalone. Priori ty and posteriori ty apply to both space andtime the later Nyaya wisely rejects both as general qualit ies , s ince they are essenti ally determinations of space and

1 In Prokaranepen’

cike, p. 54 , i t appears as a quality impression

1n its various form is referred to ( pp. 80 , 81 ) as inferred only ; the fulltreatment occurred in the missing Prameyaparayana ( see ibid . p. 111 )

56 THE KARMA-M IMAMSA

t ime , or , as stated in the Manameyodaye, are special qualit ies of these enti t ies .

Action1 as a category covers only,as in the Nyaya

VaiSesika , the restricted field of motion,with its traditional

five- fold divi s ions,as throwing up or down , drawing towards

or expanding , and motions other than these. But Prabhakara maintains that i t i s only an object of in ference

,while

Kumarila holds that i t i s perceived . The argument of theformer rests on the fact that , when we think we see motion ,we only see conjunction and disj unction with points of space

,

these contacts subsisting only in outs ide space and not in themoving thing , in which the activi ty of motion must res ide .The reply of Kumarila

’

s school i s that it could only beinferred as the immaterial cause of the conjunction anddisj unction o f a thing with points in space , which wouldmean that it must subsi st both in space and in the thing ,whereas i t exi sts in the thing only. We really see motion ,which i s in the thing and which brings about conjunctionand disj unction in space

,a doctrine which has now excellent

modern support.Generality both Prabhakara and Kumarila admi t as real

and as directly perceptible by the senses , and thus set themselves at vari ance wi th the Buddhist denial that there i s anysuch th ing as generali ty . The first Buddhist argument restson the impossibility of the existence of any whole , whichboth schools of Mimamsa deny . But further difficultiesare raised . If generali ty i s perceptible and i s eternal , asclaimed in the Mimamsa, the absurdity arises of perpetualperception . Again , how i s generali ty related to the individuals ; i s it present in its enti rety in each"2 If so

, thenthere are as many generalit ies as individuals , and there i smere duplication of names. If not

,then it must exi st in all

collectively, and therefore be entirely unknown , s ince one

can never know all the individuals whi ch make up ageneral ity. I f i t i s eternal

,and exists before the ind ividuals ,

1 Prakarenepar’

icika , pp. 78-81 ; Manameyodaya , pp. 112 , 113 ;

a wider view is taken in Slokavarttike , p. 707 ( v .

1 Prekerenapancika , pp. 17-32 ; Slokava‘

rttika , pp. 545-65 , 614

39 ; Manameyodaya , pp. 95-99 ; cf. Nyayemefijari , pp. 297-324 ; Asoka ,Semanyadfisanadikpresarita

’

(Six BuddhistNyaya Tracts , pp. 94-102 )



and in some cases by action also , in places where the dutieso f the castes are duly supervi sed by the king. Prabhakara ,however , declines to admit o f general i ties such as Brahmanhood and Ksatriyahood, which Kumarila accepts .

Prabhakara also differs from Kumarila i n hi s use of thecategory of inherence as a means o f explaining the relationof the individual to the generality . When a new individualof a class comes into being , what i s produced i s not theexistence of the generali ty , which is eternal , but of therelation of inherence between the individual and the class.Inherence differs from contact in that i t does notpresupposethe previous exi stence of the things affected by i t

,and ,

unlike the Nyaya-Vaiéesika , Prabhakara does not hold thati t i s necessarily eternal . This affords an easy reply to thequestion of the fate of the class character on the destructionof an individual ; i t does not go away , as it has no mo tion ; i tdoes not subsist i n the individual , which is no longer in being ;i t does not cease to exi st

,for i t remains in o ther individuals ,

but the inherence between the class and the individualcomes to an end . But Kumarila1 rejects in toto the idea ofinherence as a true category ; a relat ionship, he argues , canexist only between things which are established as di stinctentit ies , and , as inherence i s supposed to be a relat ionbetween things which , l ike the class and the individual , areinseparable , i t i s a contradiction in terms .While Kumarila ’s school admits , as usual , the exi stence of

general it ies of substance , qual ity , and action , Prabhakaradecl ines to accept the last two or a summum genus ofexi stence as a real generali ty , on the ground that , as eachgeneral ity rests on the fact of actual perception , the genusexi stence must be disallowed , as we do not in fact perceiveth ings as merely existing. The true sense o f existence i smerely the individuality of th ings (svarfipasattd) ; i t i s nota true class character.

Similari ty2 as a category i s asserted by Prabhakara , who

holds that i ts existence is proved by our consciousness in

filokava rttika , l , 1 , 4 , W . 146 55 ; cf. Asoka ’

s Avayavin ird

karana (Six Buddhist Nya'

ya Tracts , pp. 783 Prakaranapancikd , pp. 110 , 111 ; S

'

lokavdrttika, pp. 438-41

(W . 18 565 (W . 74 77 ) Tdrkikaraksd , p. 164 .


precisely the same way as every other category . It cannotbe held to be substance

,for i t exi sts in quality and motion

as well as in substance. It cannot , in view of i ts relation tomotion and to quality

,be a quali ty ; motion has no quali ties ,

nor can a quality have a quali ty . It i s not generality , forno comprehensive conception of i t exi sts. It i s quite otherthan the relation of inherence . It i s not parti culari ty ,which in any case i s not a true category

,s ince i t i s no more

than the quali ty of individual i ty. It must , therefore , be adistinct category

,which i s perceived in the apprehension of

quali ties , mot ions , or parts of two things as common to both .

Kumarila’s rejection of thi s category i s based on the fact

that s imilari ty admits of degrees , e.g. the resemblance of acow and a buff alo i s considerable , that of a cow and a boari s slight ; i f there were a t rue category there could be nodegrees . He agrees , however , with Prabhakara in regardings imilari ty as directly perceptible . I t consi sts , in his view ,

in the fact of the possession by two objects of the samearrangement of parts , and he attr ibutes the erection of aspeci al class of s imilarity to a misunderstanding by theVaiéesikas of the doctrine of Vindhyavasin , which merelyasserted that generality consi sted in possession of un i ty ofform ( sdrfipya ) , which was taken to mean likenessThe same author i s elsewhere1 ci ted by Kumarila as denyingthe doctrine of the exi stence o f the subtle transmigratingbody

,a view accepted from him by Kumarila , and as

enunciating the principle of the genesi s of in ference , whichi s accepted also in the Slokavdrttika . Who thi s author wasis not apparent ; he canno t , i t i s certain , be Isvarakrsna ,nor is there any plausibili ty in identi fying him wi th theVindhyavasa who plays a part in the history of the Samkhya ,whether or not he was really Isvarakrsna .

2 He may,of course

,

have been an older teacher of the Mimamsa school i tself.Cause i s not reckoned by either school as a category

,

a fact significant of the curious failure of Indian

1 Pp. 704 ( v . 393 ( v .

3 Sa‘

n’

zkkya System , pp. 62 , 69 . G unaratna (Saddars‘

anasamuccaya

p. 104 ) cites a Sloka o f Vandhyavasin ( l) , who was clearly, in his view ,

not Isvarakrsna , but it is hard to say o f what value his evidence is , ortowhom he refers .


philosophers to find a due place for this i ssue,even when

, as

in the case of the Nyaya-Vaiéesika , they by no means ignorei ts importance . But there seems no ev idence that eitherPrabhakara or Kumarila contributed anything of noveltyor value to the doctrine . In his discussion of percept ion ,as we have seen , the former makes use of the doctrine of thedivis ion of causes into the materi al or inheren t (samavdyikdrana ) , and immaterial or non- inherent ( asamavdyi ) , adistinction , doubtless , taken from the Nyz

'

iya-Vaisesika.

1

The denial by Kumarila o f the conception of inherencewould have precluded him from adopting such a distinction ofcauses .

Causat ion , however , affords Kumarila an argument infavour of his thesi s of the reali ty of non- exi sten ce .2 Thatentity he classifies as prior , as the non- exi stence of curd inmilk ; subsequent or destruction , as the nonexistence of milkin curd ; mutual , as the non- exi stence of the horse in the cowand vice versa

‘

; and absolute , as the nonexistence of a hornon the head of the hare. Without the recogni tion of the firsttwo kinds

,he contends

,there could be no idea of causat ion

in i ts prior negation lies the character of the curd as effect , ini ts destruction that of the milk as the cause. Everyth ing hastwo aspects"i t regards i ts sel f , i t exi sts , as regards anythingelse i t i s non- exi stent ; and both these aspects are real andnecessary to each other . It i s only through thi s fact that wecan say, There i s no j ar on the ground ,

” or th at we canever diff erenti ate th ings , which i s possible only on the groundof a real existence of non—exi stence . It i s impossible toperceive th i s ent ity

,for perception must deal with the exis

tent ; the process of intellection i s , there fore , purely mental ;the ground i s seen , the j ar remembered , and then ensues thepurely mental cogn ition styled negation , which must bedistingui shed from inference or any other form of knowledge .

It may b e no ted tha t Salikanatha commented on the Prasasta ,

padabhdsya (Bodleian Ca ta logue , p.

Slokavarttika , pp. 473-92 ; M anameyodaya , pp. 58 64 , 114 18 ;cf. Nydyamanjari , pp. 49 63 ; Saddars

’

anasamuccaya , pp. 295

GOD , THE SOUL , AND MATTER

THOUGH the Mimamsa i s so deeply concerned with thesacrifice

,i t has no belie f in the doctrine that the rewards of

offeringare to be expected ei ther from the de it ies to whomthe offerings are directed to be made , or from a God ascreator or apportioner of reward and punishment . Thesacrifice generates an unseen potency , whence the goodsdesired by sacrifi cers are obtained ; the Vedanta Satra

( III , 2 , 40 ) expressly negatives the idea that in Jaimini’s

view there was divine intervention in thi s regard , and theatheism of the true Mimamsa i s regarded wi th such unanimity as to render i t impossible to explain i t away.

1 Thefull development , however , of the doctrine i s , as usual , tobe found in Prabhakara and Kumarila , who adopted fromthe Nyaya-Vaiéesika the groundwork of thei r views of theworld , but decl ined to follow that school in its speculat ionson the existence o f a creator . 2

The Nyaya-Va isesika , accepting the doctrine o f atomson the one hand and of the periodical creation and destruct ion of the world on the other

,had found it necessary to

introduce the conception of a creator,in order to secure in

some measure a mode of bringing about the renewal anddestruction of the combinations of the atoms and thei rconnection wi th souls . But Prabhakara and Kumarilaalike deny absolutely the validi ty of the bel ief in the periodiccreation and dissolution of all things ; they accept a con

1 As does Max Muller, Six Systems , pp. 275-79 ; cf. K . L. Sarkar,

Tagore Law Lectures , 1905 , p. 508 .

Prakarazzapaficikd , pp. 137-40 Slokavarttika , pp. 639-80 ;Manameyodaya , pp. 70-74 ; cf. Nyayamafijari , pp. 193-204 ; Saddartanasamuccaya , pp. 284 ff.


stant process of becoming and passing away,but they find

no ground for the systematisat ion of the process, so as to

produce cycles of evolution and involution of souls . Experi

ence , Prabhakara urges , shows us the bodies of all animalsbeing produced by purely natural means ; we can argue henceto the facts of the past and the future , and need invoke noextraneous ai d . Moreover , the whole conception o f Godsupervising the meri ts and demerits of men i s idle ; Godcannot perceive meri t or demeri t by perception , since they arenot perceptible , nor by the mind , which is confined to the bodywhich i t occupies . Supervi s ion also i s impossible , even hadGod the necessary knowledge i t must take the form eitherof contact

,which is impossi ble as meri t and demeri t being

quali ties are not subject to contact,or inherence , and

plainly a man ’s qualit ies cannot inhere in God . If theargument i s adduced of the analogy of the carpenter

,i t may

be replied that on this basi s the creator would have to be anembodied spiri t , and no embodied Spi r i t can affect suchsubtle things as the atoms or meri t and demeri t . Nor is i tconceivable that the atoms should themselves act under thewill o f God , for no parallel to such act ivi ty i s known to us ,and

,i f i t were possible , i t would follow from the eternity o f

the will o f God that creation would be unceasing . The onlytrue case of supervision known to us i s that exerci sed bythe soul over the body

,which i t occupies by virtue of its

meri t or demeri t,and there i s no need to hold that the world

i s more than an ever- changing sequence of things affected bythe souls in i t .Kumarila ’s treatment includes both an elaborate attack

on the whole conception of creation and a Special refutat ionof the Vaiéesika views . He ridicules the idea of the ex is

tence of Prajapati before the creation of matter ; without aa body

,how could he feel desire P If he possessed a body ,

then matter must have existed before hi s creat ive act ivi ty ,and there i s no reason to deny then the existence of otherbodies . Nor i s there any intelligible motive for creat ion ;granted that

,when the world exists , condit ions are regulated

by meri t and demeri t,originally there was no meri t or

demeri t,and the creation of a world full of misery was

inexcusable,for i t is idle to argue that a creator could only

GOD, THE SOUL , AND MATTER 63

produce a world in which there is sin and pain . Yet , i f hisact ion i s conditioned

,he cannot be omnipotent . If , again ,

i t is alleged that the creation was for his amusement , thi scontradicts the theory that he i s perfectly happy , and wouldinvolve him in much weari some toi l . Moreover , there is nopossi bility of establishing the real ity of hi s creat ive activity .

It could only rest on reports of the first of created men , and theycould have no power to testi fy effectively to a state of thingsexi sting before they were brought into being . They couldonly rely on what they were told by the creator , and hisassertions might be mere boasting. Nor is i t at all sat isfactory to accept the belief in the creation o f the Veda ,which by no means enhances its value ; stil l less to holdthat i t resides with the creator during the periodic dissolut ions of the world , for which , again , there i s not a shredof evidence .Against the Vaiéesika View of creation exception i s

j ustly taken to the diffi culty involved in holding that insome manner the action of the Supreme Lord brings to astand at one time the potencies of all the souls , and thenawakens them all when a new creation is imminent. Againstth is view i t is contended that the activi ty of men arisingfrom thei r past deeds can never cease , and i t is absurdneedlessly to complicate matters by assuming both the forceof men ’s deeds and the intervention of the desire of God .

Moreover , i t i s impossible to explain why thi s desi re shouldever ari se , and unintelligible to elucidate the mode in whichthe creator can act without a body or acquire a body .

Kumarila , however , does not content himself withrefuting the Nyaya-Vaisesika doctrine ; he attacks equallythe Vedanta ,

1 on the s imple ground that,i f the absolute is ,

as i t is asserted to be , absolutely pure , the world i tselfshould be absolutely pure. Moreover , there could be nocreation , for nescience i s impossible in such an absolute .If , however , we assume that some other cause starts nescienceto activity , then the unity of the absolute di sappears .Again , i f nescience i s natural i t i s impossible to remove it ,for that could be accomplished only by knowledge of the

1 Cf. Nyayamafijari , pp. 525-31 .


self, which , on the theory of the natural character ofnescience , i s out of the question . Nor is the Samkhyadoctrine o f many selves and nature any more tenable asa theory of creation . The beginning of creat ion i s held tobe due to a disturbance in the equilibrium of the threeconst ituents which make up nature . But how can sucha disturbance take place at a first creation

,when there are

no potencies due to men ’s actions demanding fruition"Even at subsequent creations , how do latent potenti al it iesby themselves become fruit ful wi thout any consciousnessto direct them"And

, i f .they do attain fruition , the

Samkhya theory of l iberat ion by knowledge i s withoutvalue , s ince the potencies will remain able to come againinto activi ty. Knowledge

,i t must be recognised

,can never

give freedom from bondage , which can be attained only bythe exhaustion of action , for which the samkhya metaphysicsaffords no adequate possibility , owing to the infinitepotentiali ty of nature.Though the existence of a creator i s denied , the

Mimamsa accepts without reserve the doctrine of theexi stence o f the sel f or soul ,

1 and Sabarasvamin elaboratesthe case for i ts existence ; Prabhakara and Kumarila bothdevelop the theme in close accordance wi th his views .The necessity of the existence of the sel f for the Mimamsarests on i ts fundamental assumption that the sacrifices areperformed to secure , i n many cases , a reward not in th is l i fe .There must

,therefore

,be an eternal enti ty , distinct from the

body,the sense organs , and cognitions , which is both the

doer of actions and the reaper o f their reward . It i s notunnaturally objected that there i s a strong presumptionagainst claiming etern i ty for someth ing which sufferschange , but the more serious objection i s made that men donot real ise

,when they reap results , the actions which

brought these about,thus inval idat ing the value o f the

assumed continui ty , and that there i s nothing unnatural ina man determining to do an act which will lead to evilresults in the future

,secure in the knowledge that , when

Mzmamsd Sfi tra , pp. 18 24 ; Prakaranapar‘

icika , pp. 141

Slokavarttika , pp. 689-728 ; Manameyodaya , pp. 78 84



then they would possess intelligence , and rebirth wouldbecome impossible , since on thei r destruction intelligencewould go also ; further , the share played by the organs indeveloping the idea would contradict the Buddhist doctrinethat the idea arises from a preceding idea only . Nor i sthere any evidence that the first cognition of the newbornchild is due to a previous idea ; we hold that i t arises fromthe functioning of the sense organs . There must

,there fore

,

be something which possesses the potentiali ty o f ideas,is

eternal , and capable of transmigration . This need is

furnished by the soul,which is immaterial and omnipresent

,

and thus,without motion

,i s able to connect i tsel f with one

body after ano ther.The soul

,then , i s essenti ally act ive , for , unlike the

Vaisesika school , the Mimamsa does not , according toKumarila , deem that motion i s the only form of action , andi t i s through its superintending activi ty that the mot ions ofthe body are achieved . We must , therefore , conceive the soulengaged from t ime immemori al in the work of direct inga body , the acts done in each l i fe determining the charactero f the body attained in the next

,a process which will cease

only,i f ever

,when the soul ceases to obtain a bodily

habitation .

Again , from another point of view the Buddhist conceptiono f a series i s imperfect. Granted that i t i s impossible toestabl ish a soul merely on the ground of such attributes o fthe soul as pleasure , desire , or memory , adduced by theVaisesika school as indicat ions o f the existence o f the soul

,

s ince these might be explained on the theory of impressions,

no such explanation i s available to dispose o f the cognitionof the sel f. In the case of the two j udgments , I knewand I know ,

the theory of ideas breaks completely down .

The first idea cannot,as past , know the later idea , nor can

the later idea know the first. It i s useless to appeal to aseries

,for the series was not present at the first cognition

,

nor i s i t present at the last. Nor i s there any unity in thetwo cognitions , for the Buddhist refuses to recognise anyclasses . Nor can i t be argued that s imilarity would suffice ,for in cognitions of different objects , e.g. a horse and a cow ,

there i s no similarity of cognit ion . The bare fact of each

GOD , THE SOUL , AND MATTER

being in one aspect a cogniser would at most give merelythe bare recognition that there was a cogniser , but no

personal identi ty . A true permanent substance i s , therefore ,essenti al

,and such a substance explains far more effect ively

than any other hypothesis such phenomena as desi re ,memory

,and pleasure and pain

,while i t is the indispensable

basi s of meri t and demeri t.This permanent entity i s quite di stinct from the body ,

the senses,or cognition . The elements of the body are

seen to be without intelligence , and the combinat ion ofsuch elements cannot produce intelligence . If , again , oneelement alone had thi s nature , the others could not coalescewith i t to form a body . A dead body , which consi stsof precisely the same mater i al as the l iving body , containsno intelligence . On the contrary , the fact that a body is ano rganised whole suggests i rresi st ibly the fact that i t servesthe purpose of another which di rects i t , namely , the soul .Such phrases as I am fat ,

” or “

I go ,” are merely natural

transfers of use. On the other hand , the phrase“ My body ”

shows clearly that the ego and the body are di fferent .The same argument can be appl ied to the case of thesense organs

,but others are also available ; thus the fact

that I feel with my hand what I see with my eyes showsthat there is something beyond the sense organs . Again

,a

blind man remembers what he saw when his eyesightremained , which would be impossible i f the organ were theself. More generally the analysi s o f any cognit ion reveals tous the f act that the I is not the body , nor the sense organsnor the cognition i tself, but something over and beyond .

Many people can have the same cognition as far as contenti s concerned , but each cognit ion has an individual re ference , as i s seen also with perfect clearness in the facts ofmemory ; i f there were no I how could we have the factthat one

,who has learned half a lesson at one t ime

,can

later on resume the task at the place at which he left off PThe object ion , that the terms My soul indicate a difference between the I

” and the soul , i s met by holding thatin the word “ soul ” the meaning “ cognition i s to beunderstood , cogn ition often being inaccurately described as

the soul. The result can be confirmed by the evidence

68 THE KARMA—MIMAMSA

of the Samhitas and Brahmanas , the former of whichimplicitly , the latter explicitly , recognise the existence ofthe eternal soul .There must , however , be something to mediate between

the eternal and omnipresent soul and the world , else i tsknowledge would be eternal and omniscient

,as emphati

cally i t i s not . The mediator i s furnished by mind,whose

contact with the soul is the essenti al condition for i ts consciousness in al l i ts forms. For this contact i t i s necessarythat mind should , in contrast to soul which i s omnipresent ,be atomic

,and possess the capaci ty of extremely rapid

motion,a fact which makes our experiences

,even when

truly success ive as they are , appear on occasion to be simultaneous. Mind

,however

,can exist only in a body

,which

the soul must ensoul , and then through i t the soul comes intocontact with the outer world by means of the sense organs .Through the contact of external objects with the senseorgans

,mediated by the mind

,the soul appreciates the outer

world the mind directly conveys to i t knowledge of plea"

sure , pain , desi re , aversion and effort , which are among itsqualit ies . It possesses further qual ities"cognition , which isself cognised in the terminology of Prabhakara or , asKumarila has i t , inferred ; merit and demerit , which areinferred ; and impress ion which i s producedby apprehension and results in memory , from whose operat ions i t i s in ferred . The principle of impress ion , moreover

,really appl ies to merit and demerit , for these exist in

the form of impress ions o f past activi ties , and can hardlybe said to be separate quali t ies , s ince they merely sum upin terms of moral value the nature of the accumulatedimpress ions hence , though they appear as distinct elementsin the Nyaya-VaiSesika l is ts , one list of qual i ties attri

buted to Kumarila more logically leaves out meri t anddemerit. Further

,the soul possesses the common qual ities

of number,namely

,uni ty ; ind ividuality ; dimens ion as

omnipresent as opposed to atomic , or of the same sizeas the body as held by the Jains ; and conj unction anddisj unction with mind . No thing i s more obscure thanthis relat ion between the soul and the mind . It i s said tobe brought about by meri t and demeri t

,but i t i s obvious

GOD , THE SOUL , AND MATTER 69

that i t i s also affected by the activity of the soul , which isnever regarded as merely passive in i ts atti tude to mind .

The impossibili ty of expressing the relationship intelligiblyis inherent in the effort to bridge the gul f between themateri al and the immaterial worlds . But i t i s curious that ,as in the Nyaya—Va isesika , there i s no real attempt in theM imamsa to explain in what way mind is active in theprocesses of reasoning . It i s obvious that inference , andthe other means of proof apart from sense perception , must bedue to the activi ty of mind in contact with the soul , butinsi stence on the part of mind in the direct perception of

pleasure , pain , desire , aversion , and effort has apparentlyresulted in obscuring the essenti al part which i t must bedeemed to play in the higher mental activi ties

,i f for no

other reason than that they all rest , save verbal cognitionand negation

,on sense perception as an ultimate basi s

,and

even verbal cognition and negat ion must be medi ated to thesoul by mind .

The soul , then , with the aid of the mind , i s the enj oyerof all experience ; the sense organs the instruments ; theobjects , external or internal , the world and the qual it ies ofthe soul ; and the body is the abode of the sense organs andthe mind

,through whose instrumental ity the soul has experi

ence . Of bodies Prabhakara recognises three kinds onlywomb- born , egg- born and sweat- born— omitt ing, with someNyaya-Vaisesika authori ties , the vegetable body , on theground that i ts possession of sense organs is not establ ished ,despite the Jain views on thi s topi c. None but earth bodiesare accepted by Prabhakara , though the Nyaya-Vaisesikaaccepts the existence in other wo rlds of water bodies

,fire

bodies and ai r bodies ; thi s excludes the Vedanta View ,which

finds in the body five or three elements or the vari ant whichadmits of four only. The body , however , in any event i sessentially subservient to the soul

,which acquires a body in

accordance with i ts past deeds ; in what manner thi s i saccomplished neither Prabhakara or Kumarila tell us

,for

in truth the problem is incomprehensible.So far the views of Prabhakara and Kumarila seem to

be in general harmony , but there i s.

a di stinct di screpancy,

if not a very important one , in thei r view of the manner in


which the soul i s cognised . In the view of Prabhakara thecognition is self- i llumined , but th is doctrine i s not applicableto the soul . The Vedanta view

,o f course , ins i sts on the

doctrine of self- i llumination in the case of the cognitionand the soul as consciousness alike ; Prabhakara objects thatin this case the soul must be present in consciousnessduring the state of deep sleep no less than during the waking ,dreaming and fourth s tates , and , as all our consciousnesscan be explained by hypothesis of the self- illumination ofcognition , i t i s needless to assume any other self- luminousobject. The Nyaya view , which makes the soul to be theobject o f d irect perception , as opposed to the Vaisesikadoctrine of the inferring of the soul , which

‘ i s also found inolder Nyaya , i s rejected by Prabhakara on the ground thati t serves to make the perceived also the perceiver , which i sin his view absurd , a pos i tion for which there i s clearlymuch better ground than in the cognate case of the deni alof the mental perception of cognition . The theory whichhe adopts i s , then , simply that in every cognition the soulenters into the cogni t ion as a necessary element

,and

,therefore ,

in a sense the soul i s cognised by the same means of val idcognition as the objects which i t knows . But

,while the

soul i s thus cognised , i t i s not cognised as a true object ; i ti s cognised as the agent in cognition , j ust as a man who walksi s the agent of walking , not the object . The soul , therefore ,i s the substratum of the sel f- i llumined cogni tion

,into which i t

enters in the element of I ,” and thi s fact explains why in

deep sleep there i s no self-consciousness , s ince at that timethere i s no cognition , and the soul can be known only alongwith a cognition . But the fact that there i s no cognit iondoes not mean that there i s no soul"consciousness i s not , asin the Vedanta , the essence of the soul , but a mere qualityof i t

,and in the state of l iberation the soul remains eternally

existent , though by ceasing to have cognitions i t ceases to becognised . While thi s view of the knowledge of the soul inself- consciousness i s ingenious and not unhappy , l aying as

i t does due stress on the necessary impli cat ion of the self inconsciousness

,i t i s a l i ttle difficult to see why Prabha

kara did not admit that the soul was self- i llumined , whichis certainly the natural interpretat ion of the Sabarabhasya


(p. That term seems to apply more readily to the soulthan to cogni tions on h is own theory , in which the cognitionseems really to be inferred

,as i t actually i s held to be by

the school o f Kumarila .

How far Kumarila really differs from Prabhakara inthese views i s not clear . He certa inly is credited by suchtexts as the Sast1 adapt/ea (p. 10 1 ) and the Samasiddhanta

samgraka (VIII , 3 7 ) with the view that the self IS the objectof d irec t perception by the mind , a view ascr ibed by theNyayamanjari (p . 429) to the Aupavarsas ,

1 and thi s i s

perhaps a legi timate deduction from the doctrine,which he

certainly held,that the existence of the self i s established

through the notion of “

I .

” The soul he holds to be thesubstratum of the “

1” element in cognition

,and this

appears to be practically identical with Prabhakara’s View

that the soul i s the substratum o f the sel f- i llumined cogu it ion

,and the “

I” element in i t. Kumarila , however ,

adopts in the Tantrcwc'

z'

rttika2 the doctrine that the souli s pure consciousness , though he distinguishes i t from cogni

t ion,but this characteristi c i s hardly more than a verbal

deviation from the View of Prabhakara ,as far as practical

results go.

Prabhakara and Kumarila are agreed as to the fact ofthere exist ing a mult itude of separate souls , as i s the mecessary supposi t ion o f the Sutra and the theme of the Bhasya .

The perception o f another soul is obviously imposs ible , butone sees the act ivi ties of other bodies

,and infers thence that

they must be ensouled , j ust as one’s own body i s ensouled .

Thus , i f a pupi l has learned half h i s task in one day , thefact that he continues to learn the next hal f the next dayis a good ground for assuming that he possesses a soul .The same result can be arrived at from the fact that meri tand demeri t are infinitely various , and not one , as theymust be i f there were one soul only. The objection thatpain i s felt as local ised , though there i s but one soul in thebody , i s met by insisting that in real ity the feeling i s in thesoul

,and it i s only the cause of the pain which can be said

1 Cf . M anameyodaya , p. 80 . But in Slokava rttika , p 525 ( vv .

142 , he seems to accept self- illumination from the Bhasya .

2 Trans . p. 516 °

so Slokaearttika , p. 187


to be local ised. The further Vedanta contention , that thesun , though one , appears by reflect ion in different substancesto be endowed with diverse qualities

,i s also rebutted by the

observation that the qualit ies,which appear different

, do not

really belong to the sun but to the reflectingmedium. On thisanalogy the di fferent qualit ies appearing in connection wi ththe soul would belong to the bodies which are ensouled , andthi s conclusion i s manifestly contrary to fact

,s ince cognition ,

etc. , are qualities , as we have seen , of soul , not of body . It

i s characteristi c , however , of the tendency to import Vedantaconceptions into the M imar

’

nsa that the Sarvasiddhdntasamgraha (VIII , 39 ) asserts categorically that there is onereal supreme self, of which the individual selves are unrealdi fferenti ations .

Such being the nature of the soul of man , hi s normal loti s to continue in an unending cycle of lives

,each determined

from the outset by h is act ions in previous l ives,unless he

adopts the path which leads to freedom from this round ofexistence . The process of th is liberation i s sketched byPrabhakara ; first the man becomes disgusted by the troubleswhich attend this mortal li fe ; then he reali ses that even the

pleasures of thi s li fe are inseparable from pain , both inthei r attainment and in thei r disappearance ; accordingly hedevotes hi s mind to seeking final release from all worldlythings . To this end he abstains from all prohibited acts ,which lead to punishment herea fter , and also from all actswhich are undertaken for the purpose o f attaining someworldly or heavenly guerdon . He also exhausts the accumulated store of h is meri t and demeri t by undergoing theexperiences which result thence . Finally he destroysthe receptacle of experience by the knowledge of thesoul

,together with such concomitants as contentment ,

self- restraint and so forth , all things enjoined by thescriptures to prevent the return of the soul . When all th i si s accomplished

,then the achievement of release i s brought

about . Prabhakara ins ists that , as the texts enjoin the knowledge of the soul for no ulterior purpose , i t must be understoodthat the absence of rebirth i s the reward of th is knowledge.Liberation thus consists in the cessat ion of the operation of

merit or demeri t , and in total freedom from the body.



without cognition or feel ing of any sort. This view,though

in entire harmony with the M imar‘

nsa, has suffered the usualfate at the hands of the later texts

,

1 in which i t i s assertedthat the final condit ion of man i s a state of constant bliss .

In what manner then does the performance of sacrificeoperate as affecting the soul"The Mimamsa in bothschools i s confident that there i s no question of rewardscoming from the dei ty to whom the off erings are made ; nodeity i s e i ther eternal or omnipresent

,and there could be no

assurance of i t ever receiving the numerous offerings madeby diverse votaries , apart from the difficulty of the deityconferring rewards . There must , therefore , be a capaci ty ,which does not exist prior to the sacrifici al action

,either in

the principal performance or in the agent , but which i s

generated in the course of the performance; Before a man

performs a sacrifice , which will lead to heaven , there i s anincapacity in the ofiering and in the man himsel f to securethat result , but , when he has performed i t , he becomes , asa result of the action

,endowed with a potency , s tyled

Apt’

i rva , which in the course of time will secure for him theend desired . The existence of thi s potency i s testified toin the scriptures ; i ts necessity i s apparent by the means of

proof known as presumption . We find in the Vedaassertions that sacrifices produce certain results

,and

,as the

operation of the sacrifice , as we see i t , i s transient , thetruth o f the scripture would be vitiated i f we did not acceptthe theory of Apurva . Nor i s there anything illogical inthe doctrine ; every action sets in force activi ties insubstances or agents , and these come to frui tion when thenecessary auxili aries are present . The action specified i scalled into existence by the injunction contained in theform of an optative in a sentence in the Veda .

From this doctrine Prabhakara dissents , elaboratinginstead a theory which i s obviously a refinement on thesimple view which Kumarila accepts from the older writerso f the school and which best suits the Mimamsa

’

Sz'

ttra .

2In

h is opinion the inj unct ion rests in the sentence as a whole ,

Manameyodaya , p. 88 .

2 II , 1 , 1 ft ; Prakaraa apafi cika, pp. 185 ff ; Tantravdrttika ,ll , 1 , 1-5 .


not in the optat ive verb,and he denies that from the action

there arises directly the Apurva . On the contrary , theprocess i s that the injunct ive sentence lay s down a mandate ,Niyoga ; th is exci tes the man to exert ion , and thi s exertionpertains to some form of action

,indicated by the verb of

the inj unct ive sentence. The exertion produces in the agenta result (karya ) to which also the name of Niyoga i s givenby Prabhakara , on the ground that i t i s thi s which acts asan incentive to the agent to put forth exertion towards the

performance of the act ion denoted by the verb of the inj unctive clause . The N1yoga however , is un able to produceits result , unless aided by something which Salikanatha stylesfate , nor i s i t apparent that ei ther in his terminology orin hi s view of the process Prabhakara ’s doctrine i s anysuperior to that of Kumarila . It seems as i f primarily i t arosefrom nothing more important than the observation that theresult produced in the agent was in one sense hi s motive toaction as much as the sentence directing the action to be done ,leading to a transfer of the term Niyoga

,naturally applicable

to the sentence , to the condit ion in the agent to which themore orthodox name of Apt

'

i rva was usually applied .

In simple sacrifices there i s only one Apurva produced , butin more complicated sacrifices there may be several , as a rulefour. Thus in the new and full moon sacrifices

,consi sting

of two sets of three oblations at new and full moon respec

tively, there may be distinguished the Angapt’

irva , pertainingto the minor acts of the several oblations ; the Utpattyapurva ,

the result flowing from each of the three oblations in eitherset ; the Samudayapurva , the result of each group o f three ;and the Phalapurva , the result of the whole performance re

garded as a unit . But i t i s not every action which bringsabout an Apurva ; those actions , which are devoted simply tosome material result

,though a part of the sacrifice , such as

the appointment of priests or the threshing of corn,are not

credited with any such effect,as they serve an immediate

purpose and need no further explanation .

In the view of both schools there i s a clear relat ion between the inj unction and the action of the agent ; the formerpossesses a verbal energy (sabdi bhc

‘

ivana) in i ts tendency to

produce action by the agent , whi le the latter puts forth


actual energy (arth'

i bhavana) towards the end indicated inthe inj unction.

1

It is significant of the theisti c tendency of Indian thoughtthat .even the M imar

'

nsawas not exempt from transformation .

Despi te i ts emphatic deni al of the exi stence of a SupremeLord , the Sarvasiddhantasamgraha (VIII , treats theend of man as to be obtained by meditation upon

,and wor

ship of , the Supreme_Spirit which 15 mani fested in each man ,and authors , such asApadeva and Laugaksi Bhaskara , declarethat i f the sacrifice i s performed in honour of Govinda orthe creator , Isvara , it leads to the highest good , basing thi sassertion on the authority of the Bhagavadgita. Hence i t i seasy to explain the tendency o f such works as the Setvaramimafnsd of the polymath Vehkateéa , where Vedanta tenetsare grafted on the Mimamsa. Gunaratna , i n hi s commenton the Saddarasanasamuccaya (p . 298 ) s imilarly attributes to

Jaimini acceptance of the Maya doctrine.The question

,however

,arises

,how far

,in accepting views

o f the future of the spiri t , which are rejected by bothPrabhakara and by Kumarila , and in imparting a theist ictinge to the doctrine

,later texts relied on earlier authority

,

now lost to us . It must be remembered that in the VedantaSzZtra there are attributed to Jamini not merely views inentire harmony wi t h hi s principles , such as insistence ( IV,

1 , 17 ) on the fact that works bear thei r due frui t withoutany divine intervention of any kind , but also opinions whichshow him in the unexpected light of a true Vedantin , thoughnot of the orthodox doctrine of Samkara Thus he i scred ited with the view that the order in which a man mustpass through the various stages of li fe (asramas ) i s fixed asfrom lower to higher

,and never vice versa, and as explain

ing away as metaphorical the assertion that the highestspi ri t i s a span in size . More preci se l ight i s thrown onhis doctrine by the fact that he adopted the view of the fateof the soul on depart ing

,by which i t is ultimately led by a

Spiri t to Brahman , in the sense that the absolute B rahman 1s

meant,though Samkara argued , apparently against the

1 M imdfitsa’

nydyapraka'

ta ( ed. Benares ) pp. 1-22 , 118-25 ; 114i.

ma'rhsa'

paribhasa, pp. 25-30.

GOD, THE SOUL , AND MATTER 77

intention of the Vedanta Sfi tra ( IV, 3 , 7- 14 ) that the reference i s to the lower Brahman

,the soul passing to the h igher

state only on the occurrence of the absorption of the lowerBrahman . In i ts final condit ion the soul possesses , according to Jaimini , all the qualities of the Brahman enumeratedin the Chandogya Upanisad (VIII , 7 ) together with omnipotence and omniscience

,and further possesses a body and senses ,

having the power of assuming many diverse forms . Thoughthis i s not the view of Samkara ( IV,

4, 5 , 1 1 ) i t can hardly

be imagined that Jaimini really regarded th i s condi tion as

pertaining to the soul merely preparatory to final absorpt ionin the Brahman ; we may rather suppose that on th is topi chis views

,were akin to those of Ramanuja , and perhapsof Badarayana himsel f.

I f we were to hold that the Jaimini of the KarmaMimamsa and the Jaimini of the Vedanta must be regardedas enunciating one body of doctrine , we would be forced tothe admiss ion that the later school of Mimamsa departedfrom the principles of the founder of the doctrine by ignoring the fact that the t dmsa Satra represented only oneside of his thought . But to accept thi s would probably beto lay far too much stress on the traditional allocation ofdoctrines ; i t i s far more plaus ible to assume that the viewsexpressed in the Mimamsa do not represent one aspect of thethought of an individual sage , but are the express ion of thedoctrine of a school

,which appealed to Jaimini and

Badarayana only so far as i t thought fi t to adopt or d iscussviews of theirs . It would otherwise be altogether tooremarkable that of two authorit ies

,who covered much the

same ground , we should have preserved the Sutra of one onthe doctrine of act ion , and the Sutra of the other on the natureof the absolute , and in both cases the form of the Sutra isdecidedly unfavourable to the V iew that i t is the productionof one definite author . The shadowy personali ties of Jaiminiand Badarayana can hardly cla im much more eff ectivereal ity than those of Gautama or Kanada , or even thanKapila himself.

If, on the one hand , there was a tendency to adapt the

Mimamsa to theisti c or pantheist ic views,there was on the

other a steady process of degradation of the deit ies to whom


the offerings were supposed to be made. It can hardly beassumed that these dei ties were not believed to be real bythe founders of the M imar

'

nsa. And there i s nothing to showthat Jaimini did not accept their existence . But the laterdoctrine , as evinced in such works as the Devatasvarfipavi

a im of Apadeva , does not accept. the val idi ty of thedescriptions of the deities given in the Puranas as showingthe exi stence o f such beings ; these passages rank as mereArthavada ; the dei ty i s merely that to which offering i smade

,and has no existence beyond the Mantras addressed

to i t .

THE RULES OF RITUAL

INTERPRETATION

WE have seen that Prabhakara and Kumarila establ ishby thei r elaborate epi stemological and metaphysical em

quiries precisely the same results as were more s implyaccepted by Jaimini , the fact that duty or righteousness i sincul cated by the Veda in the form of injunctions , which areto be carried out on the strength of the authority of that textas uncreated and eternal . The task of Jaimini , in all savethe first Pada of Adhyaya I , is , therefore , to lay down theprinciples which will enable men rightly to perform theactions which the Veda enjoins , but which the vast extent ofthe Vedic literature renders i t difficult to determine . Thetask falls essenti ally under two great heads ; i t is necessaryto determine precisely to what texts and in what degreeauthority attaches

,and it i s requisite to class i fy systemati

cally the various forms of injunction with reference to theactions which they enjoin . Both duties are performed ,though occasionally in somewhat haphazard manner

,in the

Sutra ; the more important one , the investigation of injunet ion , forms the main topic o f many later works , while thecompendi a usually cover more or less adequately the wholefield . The detai ls of the discussions have necessarily l ittlegeneral value ; they deal with incidents of sacrifices , whichflourished only in the early days of the history of theM imamsa, and in many cases the labour devoted to thei rinvestigation cannot but seem to us mis- spent. On the otherhand , the principles of interpretat ion developed are oftenboth valuable and interesting as examples of logical analysi s .Of the Vedi c text s the Brahmanas afford the immediate

material for the extraction of the injunctions which are the


essential part of the Veda , but they contain also passageswhich cannot be treated as dealing with either posit ive ornegat ive injunctions , and are classed either as explanatorymatter , Arthavada , or name , Namadheya . The Arthavada( I , 2 , 1- 30 ) at first sight seems not to be enti tled to authority ,but Kumarila and Prabhakara alike defend i ts val idity , thelatter against the charge that such sentences are inexpress ive ,s ince they are not construed with inj unctive verbal forms.The value of the Arthavada , both hold , l ies in i t e i therextolling desi rable , or censuring forbidden , acts ; i t thuscomes into immediate connection with injunction or prohib ition. Hence i t follows that , in cases where i t might be

poss ible to extract from an Arthavada an inj unction , i t i sneedless to do so , the passage being adequately explained i fi t remains eulogistic of some action already enjoined .

Arthavadas may be variously divided , but the simplestdivision i s into three classes"the first i s where in contradict ion of some other means of proof a quality i s asserted to exi st ,as in “ The post i s the sun ,

” which serves to extol thebrilliance of the post. Or i t may merely rei terate a truthknown otherwise , as in Agni i s a protection from the cold .

Or i t merely may refer to something which has happened ,neither contradicted by other means of proof nor alreadyknown .

The case of name ( I , 4 , 1- 16 ) i s far more obscure ; d iseussions regarding i t usually turn on one or other of thesentences udbhida yafeta pasukamah ,

“ he who des i rescattle should sacrifice with the udbhz

’

d citraya yajeta

pasukamah , with the citra’

agm’

kotramjuhoti ,“

he offersthe Agnihotra

”; and syenenabhicaran yajeta , he who

pract ices witchcraft should offer the s’

yena sacrifice . It

seems at least plausible to suppose that the subdivisionowes i ts creation to the practical necess ity of dealing wi th al imited number of obscure sacrifici al terms , but was laterextended into a wider area. In the developed theory ,

1 thej ustificat ion of the class ificat ion of name i s given as follows.Each word in the inj unction must be brought into eff ective

T hib aut , Arthasamgraha , pp. x i i , xiii M iman'

zsanyayaprakasa ,

pp. 85 ft.



Mantras were recorded in long paragraphs , with no obviousmechanical dividing marks . These principles are that o fsyntacti cal unity (ekavakyata) ; those words must be takentogether which

,when so united , form a single idea , or , as

Prabhakara puts i t , to suit h is theory of inj unction , expressa single purpose , and which , taken apart , are not express iveof any idea or purpose . Secondly , there i s admitted the

principle o f syntacti cal spl i t (vakyabheda ) , which permitsus to break up what else might be taken as a single sentenceinto parts

,each of which must contain a single idea . But

this expedient is permissible only when there i s a clearVedic inj unction to make the spli t , or when no other con

struction i s really possible , for otherwise the error i s committed o f multiplying Apfi rvas resulting from Mantras .None the less i t i s a necessary procedure in cases where i t ismade clear in any way that there are di stinct acts to beaccompanied by Mantras ; Pleasant I make this seatfor thee s i t upon it

”(T .B. I II , 7 , 5 , 2 ) would prima facie

be one Mantra , but , as i t i s intended to serve the doublepurpose of accompanying the act of making the seat for thecake

,and setting i t down , i t must be taken as two . Thirdly

,

there i s the principle o f extension ( anusaizga ) , whichdenotes that i t i s o ften necessary in the case o f Mantras tosupply with several sets of words a clause which follows thelast of these sets only

,and which might thus be deemed to

belong to i t alone .Authority , however , i s not confined to the Vedic Samhitas

and the Brahmanas . It i s extended to the Smrtis , in whichterm Kumarila1 includes primarily the Itihasas , Puranas ,and the Smrti of Manu , these being works which claimuniversal applicat ion . The Itihasas and Puranas he deemsto contain inj unctions based on Vedi c authori ty and muchArthavada , but he admits that there are also inj unctionsaris ing from mere worldly considerations , passages usefulonly to give pleasure , and other extraneous matter ; thehymns to deit ies serve to secure a transcendental result .They serve as wholes the useful purpose of instruct ing men

1 Tantravarttika ,trans . pp. 25 , 112 ft, 244 . T he Sfi tra ( I , 3 , 1-7 ,

11-14 ) never mentions the word Smt‘ti and the commentators differwidely in their versions .

RULES OF RITUAL INTERPRETATION 83

of very various capaci ty and knowledge. In the case of theSmrtis proper only five alternatives are available"ei ther theyare completely erroneous

,which is impossible , as these works

are obviously useful and men are not so foolish as to bel ievenonsense ; or they are due to personal observation , whichcannot be accepted ; or they rest on tradition , which wouldgive no assurance of validi ty ; or they are deliberatelyintended to deceive

,which is incredible for lack of motive

and probabil ity of success ; or , finally , they represent los tVedic tradition . For th i s deci sion there can be adduced acertain corroboration in the fact that for certain s tatementsin Smrtis we can find confirmation in Ved ic texts , whence wecan assume that other statements were also derived from text s

,

now unhappi ly lost to us . Thus part of the Smrtis i s derivedfrom the Veda

, part from ordinary motives of li fe , and thestory material i s Arthavada , as in the

‘Itihasas and Puranas .

The View of Prabhakara1 i s not essentially different ; healso accepts the inference of Vedic authori ty , but expresslynegates i t in the case of Smrtis which do not prescribeor prohibi t any course of action , for example , statementsthat plants have souls , which contradicts hi s own denial o fvegetable bodies . Both schools again agree ( I , 3 , 15 , 16 )in accepting as valid the Smrtis of such authors asGautama , Vasistha , Baudhayana , Apastamba , Sankha andHarita , despi te the occurrence in them of passages layingdown certain customs as practised by persons in the east ,and so on , a fact which apparently contradicts the universality of the Vedic inj unction .

‘ The decis ion of the schools i sthat thei r injunctions are truly universal

,and even the Veda

lays down certain practices as to be performed by certaincl asses only , for instance , the Rajasuya is a sacrifice forkings only.

The Vedar’

igas , or subsidiary treatises bearing on Vedic

pronounciation , ritual , grammar , etymology and astronomy ,are also admitted to res t in part on Vedic tradition , and theMimamsa and phi10 50phic treatises generally are permittedto share in Vedic authori ty ; thus Kumarila

2 assures us that

1 Prakaranapaficika, pp. 100, 101 , 150 .

3 Slokavarttika , p. 267 ( v .


the Buddhist denial of the external world was not reallymeant to be taken as a serious contradiction of i ts reality

,

but to divert men ’s m inds rom undue attention to i t,and

so with other apparently erroneous tenets . In the case of theri tual Sfi tras the claim is made by some that they must betreated as true Veda themselves , but this is denied , for theyhave human authors , and are merely , l ike Smrtis , based onVedic authority. In the case of grammar

,however

,a really

interesting discussion i s raised on the Satra ( I , 3 , 4-30 ) bythose who deny that i t can be made out to rest on Vedicauthority

,and who go so far as to challenge the validi ty of

the claims of the grammarians to be authori tative.The argument o f these unorthodox persons runs"words

l ike gavi , in l ieu o f the grammarians ’ gauk , for cow are

perfec tly correct ; they are fully express ive , they are perceptible by the ear , they are as eternal as any word is , and no

beginning in time for them can be traced . The science of

grammar , too , has no Vedic connection ; i t di ffers in no wayfrom the process of explaining vernacular words for everydayuse ; i t does not deal with ac t ions which are the sole businessof the Veda ; i t serves no useful purposes in relation to duty , aswe do not need grammar to tell us the meanings of words ;nor i s grammar the source of usage , s ince , on the contrary ,i t rests upon and follows usage. The reply of theMimarnsai s not convincing ; i t maintains that synonyms are not

permiss ible , unless enjoined by Vedic use ; as gaultexpresses exactly the meaning cow , any variant of i t i swrong and undes irable , and has such power of denotation asi t may actually possess , merely because of i ts s imilarity to

gauh and not in its own right . The science of grammar alsoi s essential to set out in orderly derivation the vast masseso f word s in the Vedas ; moreover , not usage alone , but usageand grammar determine whether a word has the correct formto convey the meaning , and grammar in the last i ssue i smore authoritative than mere usage . That correct words

produce , when used , a transcendental result i s proved by thefact that the Veda enjoins thei r use , and forbids the use ofbarbarous expressions ; moreover , truth leads to supremebliss

,and the use of correct words i s truth in speech .

Fortunately th is disqui s i t ion does not prevent either Prabha

RULES OF RITUAL INTERPRETAT ION 85

kara or Kumarila ( I , 3 , 10 ) from agreeing that , when theVeda uses a barbarous word

,i t i s to be interpreted in the

sense barbarian usage accords to i t , in lieu of attempting tofoist upon i t an etymological sense. 1

The relat ion of Smrti authori ty to the Veda , in caseswhere there appears to be confl ict , i s the subject ofdivergence of Opinion between Prabhakara and Kumarila .

In the view of the former,which i s apparently that of

the Mimdn’

zsa’

Sfi tra ( I , 3 , 3 - 4 ) i f a Smrti contradicts a Vedi cpassage

,the former loses all authori ty , while , even in the

case of Smrti passages which do not thus offend , i t may beimpossible to accord thei r injunctions any spi ritual value ,i f they seem to be due to the avarice o f the priests , as

when the giving of the cloth from the sacrifici al post to apries t i s enjo ined by Smrti authori ty . Kumarila , however ,with his greater regard for tradition , reduces , as far as

possible,cases of contradiction to mere instances where

alternatives are permiss ible,and only holds that the Sfttra

recommends in the case of such alternatives the adoption o fthat which has direct

,and not merelyinferred,Vedic authori ty .

Below the Smrtis in value comes the pract ice of goodmen ( I , 3 , 8- 9 ) or custom ( I , 3 , 15- 23 ) on the simpleground that , while both must go back to Vedic authority tobe valid , the former goes more directly to the fountainhead .

In addition , however , to Smrti and practi se must be reckoned as sources of knowledge of duty the impli cations containedin Vedic texts , which may be deduced by us from them ,

eveni f not already set out in Smrtis or by tradit ion .

The essenti al function of all these sources i s to give us

knowledge of inj unctions (vidhi ) and injunctions are encitements to actions . Actions may be class ified in various ways ;there is a clear di stinction between Vedic and worldly actions

,

with the former alone i s the M imamsa concerned . Actionsof th is type may be classed as posi t ive , as negative (pratisedha ) or as partaking of both charac ters as in

1 Kumarila enlivens the discussion by giving a long list o f errors ingrammar commi tted even by grammarians , and simi larly divers ifies( I , 3 , 7 ) his exposition of the practice o f the good by an account o fcrimes attributed to gods and sages . On grammar, cf. Nyayama1

‘

ijari ,pp. 412-26 .


the case of a vow not to look at the sun taken by a student .Of actions 1 the sacrifici al are the most important

,falling

under the three main classes of Yaga , the offering to a deityo f a substance ; Homa , the offering of a substance in fire orwater ; and Dana , the waiver of one

’s ownership of an objectin favour of a third party. Sacrifices , again , can be dividedaccording as they serve as archetypes only , l ike the Agnihofra , or as derivatives (vikrti ) , l ike the Masagnihotra , or

as bo th , l ike the victim for Agn i and Soma , based on the newand full moon sacrifice and i tsel f a model for the offeringat the Soma pressing ; or as neither , l ike the Darvihoma , forspeci al reasons given in the Sutra . More important i s thed ivi sion by purpose ; the N itya sacrifices must constantly beperformed at the due seasons ; the Naimittika must be performed on certain speci al occasions , as the Jyoti s offeringon the approach of spring , while the Kamya o ff erings areoptional , being undertaken by a man who desi res somespecial end , as in the case of the Kariristi performed toobtain rain .

The di rection to perform an o ffering i s la id down in anoriginating inj unction (utpattim

’

dhi ) or an injunction ofappl ication (viniyogavidhi) , according as the matter concernedis a principal or a subordinate offering . In e i ther case , i ti s frequently necessary to ascertain preci sely how manyactions are prescribed , and six rules for th i s purpose arelaid down by the M imarnsa ( I I , 2 and Difference inwords i s one clear indicat ion

,especi ally in the case of the

verb,which i s the most important part of a sentence of in

j unction ; the repeti tion o f the verb indicates di stinct off erings ; the mention of a defin ite number of oblations i s clearevidence ; o ther sources are the difference of names ; ofmateri als to be used

,and of context. In the case o f the last

i tem i t i s agreed that the occurrence of the same offering intwo different recensions of one text

,as in the case of the

Kanva and Madhyamdina texts of the Satapatha Brahmana ,does not constitute a diversi ty o f context .The originat ing inj unct ions are few in number , relating

as they do to the principal Vedic offerings only , such as the

1 M imarhsabalaprakasa , pp. 81 11 ; M imdrhsaparibliasa, pp. 17 ft.


Agnihotra , the new and full moon sacrifices , the Somasacrifice

,and so forth . It might have been expected that

there would have been made some effort to systematise theseoff erings

,but no trace of any attempt to effect thi s end is

seen in the Mimamsa, whi ch accepts the sacrifices from thesacrificial tradition . It i s true that there i s a certain degreeof order of progress from the s impler to the more complex ,but this order i s not absolute

,being broken by the necess ity

of performing the Naimittika offerings on the occurrence ofthe Speci al occasions which evoke them . Nor i s there anyprinciple discernible in the rewards attainable by theseofferings ; they include such material th ings as wealth ,usually in cattle

,children

,long l i fe , rule , and , most frequently

of all , heaven , which is held , on what i s known as theViSvaj it principle ( IV, 3 , 10 - 16 ) to be the reward promisedin any case in which no specific boon is laid down .

The originating inj unctions , however , do no more thanexcite in the mind of the hearer the desi re to perform theaction which they enjoin , generally in the form of asacrifice i t remains for other injunctions

,those o f appli

cation, to denote the exact manner o f procedure ( itikar

tavyata) , by speci fying the numerous subsidi ary actionsrequisite , and the materi als and other necessaries for theperformance . The discrimination between what i s principaland what is subsidi ary (Sesa ) occupies the greater part ofthe attent ion of the Mimar

‘

nsa, and i t stands in a closerelat ion to the motive for the performance of the variousactions . Actions may be undertaken according to the Sutra( IV,

1,l ff ) , followed by Sabarasvamin ,

Prabhakara ,and

Kumarila, either for the sake of the agent (purusartha ) or

for the sake of the offering (kratvartha ) , while Parthasarath i adds a third class of those which are neither forthe one purpose or the other

,giving as an instance the

Agnyadhana , or piling of the sacred fire . This innovationseems to be without warrant the original di stinction corres

ponds roughly to that between principal and subordinateact ions the new and full moon oflerings serve to benefitman by producing a due reward , while the fore- offerings ,which form part of them , are merely subsidiary to thesacrifice materials normally are subsidiary to the sacrifice

,


any good results mentioned being treated as merely Arthavada , though on occasions a thing l ike curds , which serves asan elemen t in offerings , may be used to make effi cient thesense organs of the sacrifi cer, and thus to serve for hisbenefit . The last instance shows that the correspondencebetween actions for the benefi t of the agent and principalactions i s by no means complete .The question o f what things can be subs idi ary is the

subject of an elabo rate investigation ; according to Badari’s

opin ion , ci ted in the M imamsa Satra ( III , the onlysubsidiaries are substan

7

ces,accessories

,namely. th e Mantras

and the deities , and purificatory actions , such as the threshing o f corn . To thi s list Jaimin i adds actions or sacrificesgenerally

,results , and agents . The distinction between the

two sets,acco rding to the Vrttikara , whom Sabarasvamin

cites,i s that the first three classes are essenti ally in thei r

nature subsidi ary , while the latter three are in one sense

principal , in another subsidiary. Thus the sacrifices areprincipal with re ference to the materi als , but subsid iary tothe result ; the result i s principal with re ference to thesacrifice

,but subsidi ary towards the agent ; the agent , again ,

i s principal with regard to the result , but subsidi ary to suchacts as the measuring of the sacrifici al post , which i s to berelated to his height. From another point of view the agentmay be said to be subsidi ary to the sacrifices , s ince i t i s toperform them that he acts .

Prabhakara1 divides the subsidi aries into four classes

,

according

fl

to the heads of class (jati ) , quali ty , substance ,and actions

,denoted by verbs ( bhavarthatmaka ) . The last

head he divides into those act ions which are d irectly con

ducive to the fulfilment o f the sacrifice (samnipatyopakaraka ) and those which are more distantly conducive to thisresult (aradupakaraka ) . The former he classifies in fourd ivisions ; the bringing into existence (utpatti ) of someobject

,as the production of dough by kneading the corn ;

the obtaining (prapti ) of a substance already in existence ,such as milk ; the modification (vikrtz

'

) of a substance , as of

1 Prakarazzapaficika’

, pp. 202 if ; cf . M imafhsanyayaprakasa , pp.

62-67 , where the division is twofold , siddha and kriya .



syntacti cal connection i s of value ; thus , in one passage(SB. IV,

4, 6 , 16

- 18 ) we are able to decide that Re andYajus mean the Rgveda and the Yajurveda , and not , asmight else be thought , metrical and prose Mantras , becauseof the syntactical connect ion with the immediately preceding words. Fourthly

,context (prakaragi a) i s of great

importance ; we have the general injunct ion that one should

perform the new and full moon sacrifices , and the inj unctionto offer to Tanfinapat ; thi s principle enables us to find apurpose for the latter offering in connection with the formersacrifices ; mere syntact ical connection would not here help ,as the sentences stand apart and are in themselves quitecomplete. Fi fthly

,order (krama ) or posi tion ( sthana ) i s

o f service ; thus in one passage (T.S. I , 6 , 2 , 4 ) occur threeMantras wi thout indication of use ; we can , however , byfinding that elsewhere three offerings are enjoined inconnection with these Mantras

,assume that the order of the

sacrifices and the Mantras i s to correspond , one being usedwith each offering in order . Finally

,names (samakhya)

may supply information else wanting ; thus Mantras , nototherwise identified

,by being styled Hautra are known to

fall wi thin the sphere o f the Hotr priest . Each of thesemeans for adequate reasons i s deemed to be of more valuethan the p receding, and in working out the principle indetai l the Mimamsa shows both skill and acumen , evenwhen we admit that in many cases i ts reasonings wereguided by the fact tha t a certain usage had become regular ,and therefore that the sound conclusion was already givenby customary practice .While these injunctions of application determine the

exact mode in which the ceremonies prescribed in the originating injunct ions are to be performed , the order of theactions i s prescribed by inj unctions of performance (viniyogavidhi) . On this point

,however

,there i s a di fference of view

between Prabhakara and Kumarila (V , the latteradmits readily the existence of injunctions determining theorder of performance by the process of extracting suchdirect ions from inj unctions of appl ication . Prabhakara ,however

,insists that an inj unct ion of appl icat ion cannot be

deemed to deal with order,which is a matter of indifference ,


So long as an act is performed , but even he admits that afew cases occur in which the order of oflerings i s speci allydefined . As a rule , however , the order i s left to be determined by minor indications . Thus it may be directlyenjoined

,or the order of the mention of the offerings may

be deci sive,or the order o f the natural actions may be

resorted to ; thus the gruel must be cooked before the Agnihotra i s offered , although the text mentions the latter first .Again

,the order o f commencement i s of importance ; in the

Vajapeya there are seventeen vi ctims to be immolated ; theofferer may begin with any one

,but the different acts must

be done to each following the initi al order adopted . Posit ion

,again

,i s of importance ; thus in the Agnistoma there are

three animal vict ims,one to Agni and Soma offered on the

day before the sacrifice , the Savaniya on the day of the

press ing o f the Soma , and a barren cow on the final day .

In the Sadyaskra , a modification of the Agnistoma , thethree victims are to be oflered on one day , that of the pressing ; hence , as thi s is properly the day of the Savaniyavictim

,i t i s to be offered first , followed by that for Agni and

Soma , and the barren cow. Lastly,the order of the

principal actions prevails over that of subordinate actions ;thus at the new moon sacrifice the prel iminaries for theoffering to Indra are performed before those o f the offeringto Agni , but the offering to Agni comes before that to Indra"accord ingly , i n the performance of subsequent rites , i t i sthose connected with Agni that take precedence over thoseconnected with Indra . In cases where none of these meansgive a clear result , any order may be resorted to , and so withofferings performed independently to obtain worldly goods .Nor i s there any fixed order between the Soma sacrifices andthe s impler rites known as Istis.

There remains the quest ion of the right to performsacrifices , which forms the subject of a set of injunctionsrelating to qualification ( adhikaravidhi ) . Jaimini , i tseems , took a generous view of the posi tion o f woman , contemplating (VI , 1 , 6 - 8 ) her as a performer of sacrifices ,though , in the case of her being married , both she and herhusband must co -operate in offering

,and the Vedic Mantras

would be reci ted by him only . Sabarasvamin already


emphasises the disability of women aris ing from theirignorance of the Veda , which is not asserted by Jaimini ,who doubtless reflects the older usage . Sfidras are excluded

(VI , 1 , from sacrificing for this very reason of ignorance of the Veda , and in the later texts the admiss ion ofwomen even to a qualified share of the sacrifice i s thusanomalous . Some small amount o f means i s also requisi tein a sacrificer, and he must not be incapacitated by disease.Further detai ls are given in the Srauta Sutras , which recognise , like Jaimini , the case of certain classes who can takesome part in sacrifice though not of the three higher classes ,such as the Rathakara . In the case of Sattras onlyBrahmans of the ViSvamitra family studying the same KalpaSutra are qualified to act ; all act as sacrificers

,and each

individually obta ins the whole benefi t of the sacrifice,instead

of it'

being shared collectively. Moreover,while the death

of an ordinary sacrificer destroys the rite , in the case of aSattra the place of any one incapacitated can be taken byanother priest

,who

,however

,obtains no share of the result.

Only Brahmans again can eat the remnants of sacrifice, so

that , i f a Ksatriya has a Soma sacrifice performed for him ,

he must be given to drink a substitute for Soma remnants .On the other hand , the threefold duty of sacrifice to thegods , of Vedic s tudy as payment of debts to the Rsis , and ofthe begetting of children as a debt to the Fathers , i s incumbent on all these classes , not merely on those who may wishto attain the benefits o f these actions (VI , 2 , Again heonly may perform the ViSVaj it (VI , 7 ) who can afford a feeof gold pieces

,but

,when he i s hidden to give up all in

i t , that appl ies only to hi s riches , not to , e.g. his parents,and

of his ri ches there are excluded lands , horses , and slaves inpersonal attendance

,while the years of performance i s

interpreted as so many days .In addition to these divi s ions according to content

injunctions can be classified on the basi s of the knowledgealready possessed by the agent of the mode of performanceor actions possible . 1 Thus an original inj unction (apartm

1 Kumarila on Miniamsa Sam , I , 2 , 42 ; Arthasarhgraha , pp. 17 ,18 M imafii saparibhasa, pp. 10-12 , 41 .



proh ibition would not be what was desired,s ince

,owing to

the equal validity of all Vedic sentences,the only result

would be to make the action optional . Thus,instead of a

prohibition , we have what i s technically styled a Paryudasa ,and the sense of the rule i s that the words

,

“ HO,we

sacrifice ,” which are uttered with the sacrificial verses

,are

to be uttered with those verses only which do not occur inAnuyajas.

These are the main topics , which , with numerous excursions into subs idiary detail

,fill Padas II- IV of Adhyaya

I and Adhyayas I I-VI of the M imamsa Siltra . Thenext two Adhyayas deal with the transfer of details fromthe archetype to sacrifices whose form is derived fromit , a discussion rendered necessary by the fact that inthe, Brahmanas there are many cases in which i t i s

presumed that the detai ls of one offering will be suppliedfrom another , as in the often-

quoted case of the Isu

offering which i s based on the Syena . The transference

( atidesa ) appl ies not merely to the mode of performance ,but to materi als and other details. 1 It i s regulated bycontext (prgkarana ) or pos it ion ; thus the Isu offeringfollows the Syena model , because they are enjoined in thesame context. The rule of position again lays i t down thatthe deity of the original offering i s to take the same placein the transferred off ering, and the offering materi al i salso to be transferred . T ransfer takes place by expressinjunction

,as in the case of the Isu offering ; by impl ied

inj unction , as in the case of the offering to Sfirya , which i sbased on the new and full moon offerings ; by mention ofthe name of a sacrifice

,as in the case of the Masagni

hotra , which is made in accordance with the Agnihotra ; orby mention of the name of a purificat ion (samskara ) , aswhen

,theAvabhrtha being mentioned at the Varunapraghasa ,

i t i s performed like the Avabhrtha , or concluding bath , ofthe Agnistoma where the rite i s purificatory.

The process of transfer,however , frequently involves

modifications (fi lm) in the Mantras used to accompany theri tes

,in order to adapt them to the change of ci rcumstance .

1 Prakaraa apaficika’

, p. 227 ( v .


Elaborate rules are accordingly given in Adhyaya I"of the St

‘

i tra on this head . Nor only Mantras are altered ,but also Samans ; thus at the VaiSyastoma the Kanvarathan

tara replaces the orginal Brhat and Rathantara samans .In some cases purifi cations are modified ; thus the wild rice

( uivara ) used at the Vajapeya offering , i n place of theordinary rice

,i s subjected to the processes o f purification

applicable to the latter . In other cases Mantras are notaltered

,but the number of times o f the i r use i s modified.

In other cases the transference must be accompanied bythe annulment of detai ls which are now inappropri ate .The cases in which thi s occurs , enumerated in Adhyaya X ,

are numerous and complicated ; thus an act may by changebe rendered useless ; i n the Prajapatya ri te , based on thenew and full moon sacrifices , grains of gold replace ricegrains

,and the operations of husking and washing are

therefore annulled . Again , i f Yajus Mantras are given tobe reci ted as Nigadas , which are i nvi tat ions and thereforemust be said aloud , the normal rule o f muttering of YajusMantras is annulled in favour o f the necessary loudutterance. Annulment , again , may be parti al or complete ,and the later text books take speci al pleasure in developingthe diverse forms in which it may appear . Opposed toannulment i s combinat ion ( samuceaya ) i n which the newdetails of the derivative form are only added to the detailsof the original offering .

In Adhyaya "I the quest ion i s raised of the relat ionof subsid iary to principal offerings as regards repetit ion of

performance . In certain cases a single performance ofsubsidi aries gives effect ive aid to more than one principalaction , as in the case of the Agnyadhana , which needonly once be performed , the s ame consecrated fire servingfor all subsequent sacrifices ; thi s ai d i s styled T antra .

On the other hand , some subsidi aries must be repeated witheach principal offering ; thus the subsidi aries of the r ites

performed at new and full moon respectively in those offerings are nearly the same , but the lapse of time between thetwo rites renders the repeti t ion of the subsidiaries essenti althis case i s styled Avapa . But in some cases where a sub

sidiary ismerely performed for the purpose of aid ing one


principal operat ion , i t may nonetheless aid also another

principal Operat ion ; thus the fore- offerings for the vi ctim toAgni and Soma at the Soma sacrifice serve for the cakeoffering also , and , i f an altar has been made ready for aSoma sacrifice , the sacrificer may perform an Isti with

‘

i t,i f

he will. This form i s termed Prasanga .

Finally , in Adhyaya"I I the topic o f Options (vikalpa )i s disposed of ; options are of many kinds ,

1 indicated byreasoning

,or by direct declaration , or depending on the

wish of the agent ; nineteen subdivis ions of each type aremade , of which eight depend on the Opt ion furthering theperformance of the ri te , and eleven on i ts bringing aboutsome benefi t for the agent . By another principle of divis ion opt ions are classed as l imi ted or fixed (vyavasthita )and unlimited (avyavasthita ) , each class again being sub

divided according as i t rests on reasoning or declarat ion .

But Options as a rule are open to many ob j ections , thoughthis defect does not apply ei ther to fixed Options

,or to those

which depend on the will of the agent. The subjects towhich options may apply are most varied , the use or non- useof certain Mantras , preference for one colour or ano ther ,the choice of kinds of grain , mode of action , and so forth .

1 Mimafii sdbalaprakasa , p. 152 ; Mimamsaparibhasa’

, pp. 41-44



with which his father , Sar'

nkara Bhatta , had dealt. Theparallelism , indeed , of the two enquiries only became the moresal ient as with the course of t ime the number of Smrtis andother texts cla iming authori ty increased , and the ideal ofreconciling thei r confl icting views was more and morestrongly held . All the devices necessary for such an endexisted in the Mimar

'

nsa, and we can understand from thisreason why it was not thought necessary or desirable todevelop a distinct science of legal interpretation .

Thus the essential doctrine of injunction in c ivil law is

based on the principles adopted in the Mimamsa, and inthe interpretation of the various kinds of injunction thecivil law adapts to its own speci al needs the maxims of thesacred law . The distinction between injunct ion proper anda restri ctive inj unction (niyama ) is applied in the sensethat the latter i s reduced to nothing more than a maximor rule , which ought to be regarded , but which , i f violated ,does not render the action affected invalid ; thus Manu

’srule as to marrying an amiable and healthy girl i s notan injunction , the violat ion of which renders void themarri age , but a counsel of prudence. The case of aninj unct ion of limitation (parisamkhya

'

) rai ses difficulties , asthere ari ses in regard to i t the quest ion whether or not i t isto be deemed to imply a prohibi tion ; thus , when the

injunction i s la id down that the sons may divide the. familyproperty on the death of their parents , Jimutavahana putsthe question whether i t i s to be inferred that they may do so

only on the death of their parents , a view which he rejects .Negative inj unctions also raise a point of legal impor

tance in the relation of proh ibition proper , and a mereexception (paryudasa) . Thus the general law of the succession of a son and other he i rs is subject to the exclusion fromsuccess ion of persons impoten t

,outcaste , lame , blind , and

suffering from incurable diseases , who are entitled to

maintenance merely. The negation in their case i s essentially to be treated ,

as an exception to the general rule ofsuccession i t

,therefore

,applies only to persons so ci rcum

stanced at the moment when the success ion would normallyvest

,and

,therefore

,i f successors become so affl icted after

becoming enti tled to the succession,the rule does not in any

THE MIMAMSA AND HINDU LAW 99

way affect them , as , of course , i t would do i f i t were a

prohib i tion proper .1

In the interpretation of the Smrti injunctions the sameprinciples are applicable as in the case o f the interpretationof the inj unctions of applicat ion in Vedic texts . Thus theexpress declaration of a text must be held to override anyconclusion which might be deduced from it by suggestion

( laksagi a) , corresponding to lir’

zga in Jaimini. The declaration of Manu ( I", 104 ) that “ after the death of fatherand mother the sons should divide the paternal property , forthey have no power over i t while thei r parents l ive ,

” i s anabsolute declaration that they have no such power ; i t isimpossible to read the rule as forbidding parti tion duringthe parents ’ li fe

,but acknowledging the power of the sons

over the property. The power of suggestion , however , hasalso its own place thus Nanda Pandi ta in expla in ing how ,

although the word substi tute was first applied Specificiallyto five kinds of sons , i t becomes applicable to all the twelvekinds legally recognised , adduces the Pranabhrt maxim

28 ) as hi s warrant. Pranabhrt originally denotes a

Mantra used in consecrating a brick in the fire altar ;thence i t passes to be the name of . the brick , and fromdenoting the Speci al bricks used applies more generally toany brick. The principle of syntact ical connect ion (vakya)reappears , usually under the ti tle Anvaya its superiori ty tocontext (prakarana) is i llustrated byRaghunandana

’s discus

sion of Mann’s rule ("I , 209 ) that one who assaults a

Brahman must undergo the Krcchra penance . If the contextis invoked , thi s may seem merely to re fer to the case of thenew and full moon sacrifices

,and therefore has no general

or civi l appl ication , but the sound view i s that i t is to betreated as a s ingle independent proposition .

The term, Arthavada , which plays so important a part

i n the Mimamsa discussions is dropped in legal terminology ,but the legal texts recognise the existence of such passagesi n the Smrtis and deal variously with them. One difficultproblem i s handled in the l ight of the maxim of Jaimini( I , 2 , 19 dealing with declarations which have the

1 Tagore Law Lectures , 1905 , pp. 332 , 333 .


appearance of being inj unctions but are not really so

(vidhivannigadadhikarazi a ) . Thus Jimfitavahana1 i s

enabled to hold that the text which provides that,

“ Thoughimmovables or bipeds have been acquired by a man , no giftor sale of them without the assent of his sons

,

” i s to becompleted by the words , should be made

,

” and not by thewords

“

must he made .” This interpretation reduces thesentence to a mere pious Opinion , and avo ids contradictionwith the well-known inj unction

,which allows a man absolute

power of d isposal over property acquired by his ownexertions , as opposed to ancestral possess ions . The samemaxim , however , has been interpreted as supporting the

general rule that an inj unction for which a reason i sadduced i s merely equivalent to an Arthavada , so thatVasistha

’s rule against the adopt ion of an only son is

reduced to a pious expression of Opin ion , because i t i sfollowed by the explanation that a son i s one who savesfrom hell h is natural father

,a fact which makes the

adopt ion of an only son undes irable. The Mimamsa rule ,however , goes no further than to hold that , i f for a rulewhich has no known Vedic sanct ion a selfish motive can beseen , i t i s impossible to postulate for i t the authority ofa Vedic text , and the supposed rule of law is clearly toowidely stated .

The obl igat ion of law to the Mimamsa extends to everydepar tment o f the topic , and i t not merely in matters ofinterpretat ion that the legal writers borrow matter from theM imamsa, but they Show repeatedly traces of influence bythe pos i tive doctrines o f that school in their hearing on thereligious aspect of property and family rights . The doctrineo f the three debts of man , sacrifice to the gods , study to theRsis, and the begetting of a son for the Fathers , enunciatedby Ja imini , affords three presumptions which , more or lesseffectively

,are taken into account by the schools of law. In

t reat ing the principle o f success ion Jimutavahana uses , asa guiding principle in reconci ling the confl icting statementso f the Smrtis , the principle of securing as far a s possiblespiritual welfare , and in interpret ing the rules regarding

1 Dayabhaga , trans . Colebrooke, II , 29 , 30 .



his all , his children are excluded from the gi ft . The same

passage i s also employed to express the l imited character ofthe ownership of a king or a feudatory ; h is actual ownersh ip is restricted to whatever property he has acquired ; hi sposit ion towards the territory i s one of sovereignty or suz eranity, entitl ing him to a maintenance but not to true ownerShip when a king is said to give a village , he does not transfer the ownership Of the land , which i s not hi s to give , buta ssigns to the donee the right o f drawing a maintenancef rom the village .The Mimamsa also affords guidance to VijfianeSvara

( II , 136 ) in a variety of details in connection with heritageand part ition . The claim of woman to inheri t i s

q uest ioned on the ground that , as property i s intended fors acrifici al purposes and as save along with her husband awoman has no locus standi as a sacrificer, on the interpretat ion of the M imamsa Siltra (VI , 1 , 17- 2 1) adopted in thecommentators , there i s no ground for her having the right ofinheritance . This illiberal doctrine i s disposed of by appealto another passage of the Mimamsa Satra (III , 4 , 26 ) inwhich i t re fers to ornaments of gold worn by the priests andthe sacrificer, though serving no sacrificial purpose . Theexact share o f a wi fe raises difficulties in view of the confi icting interpretation of the two main texts , the first of which

provides that , i f an owner d ivides property in his l i fetime ,he should make his wives have equal shares with his sons ;and the second , that on partit ion after the death o f thehusband the wi fe should have a share equal to that of hersons . These passages are interpreted by some authorities tomean that , i f the property i s extensive , she i s to have a meresubs istence from the estate , while , i f i t is small , she i s toh ave an equal share . This view is rejected on the strengtho f the principle upheld by Jaimini (VI I , 3 , 19- 25 ) that , solong as a text can yield a s ingle coherent meaning , i t is notright to treat i t as broken into two incongruous parts . Similarly i t i s on the Mimamsa rule (V, 1 , 4 - 7) of following theo rder of things mentioned in a certain order that i s basedthe claim that

,when the parents of a childless son succeed

to his property,the mother has a prior claim , because the

term parents (pitarau) i s explained in grammatical treatises

THE MIMAMSA AND HINDU LAW 103

as mother and father and not as father andmother. Another appeal to the Mimamsa doctrine is madein regard to Yajnavalkya ’s doctrine ( II , 126 ) that a

coparcener,who at the time of partit ion withholds part of

the property , must give i t up for d ivis ion . The quest ionarises whether the action is reprehensible or not , and isdecided in the affi rmative because in the Mimamsa (VI , 3 , 20)i t i s ruled that a man who substitutes one form of meal foranother

,even i f acting under a genuine misapprehension , st ill

does wrong , so that , even i f the coparcener had some rightto the property and regarded i t as hi s own

,his conduct is

censurable . Jimutavahana , as often , di ffers in part fromVijfianeSVara , and extenuates the act ion. On a strictinterpretation by Mimamsa principles again , i t is notimpossible to argue that Jimfi tavahana does not allow the

disposal by will by a father of inherited property withoutprovision being made for the maintenance of the sons ; theconfl ic ting view of the Privy Council i s clearly hard toreconcile with the principles of Mimamsa.

1

Adoption ,like inheritance

,affords a frui tful field

,

for theapplication of Mimamsaprinciples .

2 The right of a Sfidra toadopt

,which is denied in the Suddhiviveka , on the ground

that adoption must be accompanied by Vedic Mantras andan oblat ion which he cannot as a Sudra have performed

, is

vindicated on the ground of the occurrence of a certain offering for a Nisadasthapati (VI , 1 , 5 1 ) in the Veda , although aNisada is normally as a Sfidra excluded from any Vedicrite . The Mantras can then be recited by an Aryan. Awoman , again , can only adopt with the permiss ion o f herhusband , as she cannot by hersel f perform Vedic rites andceremonies Again , a child when adopted cannotinheri t hi s father ’ s property or perform his Sraddha , according to Mann ; thi s rule , though restricted to these two facts ,must be understood to apply generally on the analogy ofterms like antarvedi in the M imamsa ( III , 7 , 13 , whichmeans not merely at the centre of the altar

,but anywhere

with in it . By another maxim Nilakantha decides that

1 Tagore Law Lectures , 1905 , pp. 405-11 .

1 Vyavaharamayfikha ( ed. Bombay, pp. 40 if.


Saunaka ’5 text , which asserts that the son of a daughter andthe son of a si ster are adopted by Sudras , is to be read to meanthat these adoptions are generally permissible , and that theyare specially so in the case of Sudras"the maxim used 1S theMaitravaruna , which rests on the interpretation of thetwo sentences , He hands over a staff to the Maitravaruna

priest ; he initiates or invokes by means of the staff.” Theaccepted opinion i s that the handing over of the staff i s adi stinct injunction , the ini ti ation or invocat ion subsidi ary ,and so here the part of the Sudra i s only subsidi ary toan establ ished rule. Samkara Bhatta

, his father , whomNilakantha cites , expressly applies to the Sudra the dutyof paying hi s debt to the Fathers , which is asserted of theBrahman as an instance in the Mimamsa Sfitra .

Similar use of the Mimamsa is made in the same con

nection by Nanda Pandi ta in the D attakamiman‘

i sa

( c. 1600 Thus on the analogy of the VaiSvadeva ,which i s a maxim (I , 4 , 13 - 16 ) laying down that in the caseof such a word as that the conventional sense i s to be followed in l ieu of the etymological

,he holds (VI , 27 ) that the

term sapipda used of relationship i s not to be restricted tothe exact meaning suggested by the word as a compound .

SO also , in order to meet the objection of Medhatithi to anadopted son on the ground that the duty of man i s fulfilledonly by begetting a son , he adduces (I , 4 1 ) the maxim(VI , 3 , 3 1) of the substi tution of the Put ika for the Somaplant. In determining the value of subst itution the mode inwhich the substi tute originated is unimportant , the quest ioni s whether i t can serve i ts purpose adequately , and thi s (anadopted son can easily do. Again , the objection to the rulethat an adoptive father must perform the birth ceremony foran adopted child

,though adopt ion i s permitted up to the

fi fth year,i s met by the use of the maxim (V ,

4, 5- 14 ) that ,

when a difficulty ari ses as to the order of performance ofoffe rings , reason and necessi ty must be consulted , whence i tfollows that the performance of the birth ceremony i s in orderthough tardy . The author of the Dattakacandrika similarlyappeals to the Mimamsadoctrine( IV,

1,22- z4 )of the relation

of the pr incipal and incidental aspects of an action , in orderto support hi s view that , i f one of two co-widows adopt , the



o ther occasions reduces a plural to i ts bare meaning ofthree .Even more interest ing i s a case in which the law of

evidence i s influenced by the Mimamsa doctrine of the selfval idity of cognitions . Yajfiavalkya lays down ( II , 80 )that , i f a man has brought forward witnesses , yet i f at a laterperiod he can produce more satis factory testimony

,the

evidence already adduced i s to be discredited. This procedure, at first s ight drast ic , i s j ustified by the adduction intheM ita

‘

ksara of the arguments adduced by the Vrttikara insupport o f the self- evidence of cognitions . Evidence isprima facie valid , unless i t can be shown that the witnesscould not have known the facts , that his means of knowledge were defective (karanadosa) , or his evidence i sd isplaced by other evidence , that i s , the first cognition issublated by a second cognition . Immediately after

, Vijfianesvara ( II , 83 ) has recourse to the Mimamsa to provide asuitable penance for the witness whom he enjoins to withhold evidence or testimony , where the proof of the chargewould result in the infl iction o f the capital penalty ; inthese cases the usual punishment of a fine , or in the caseo f a Brahman banishment

,i s not in point still , to do away

with the sin of the devi ation from the truth the performanceof a speci al offering , the Sarasvatesti , given in the Mimamsa,is prescribed .

As 13 natural , the obligations of the law books to theMimamsa principles are still more marked In those parts ofthose treatises which deal

,not with civ il l aw (vyavaha

'

ra) inthe narrower sense of the term , but with religious customand penances . Even in the civil law , however , there i s onepoint on which the law books differ in essenti als from

Jaimini ; i t was necessary for the latter , in support of hisdoctrine o f the eternity of the Veda , to maintain that i tscommands are universal , and thus he treats even Smrti textswhich contain inj unct ions expressed as local pract isesas really laying down general principles . In the practi calneeds of the law

,however

,the utmost value i s always

attached to local customs,and the practice of good

men,which thus in effect comes to outweigh maxims in

Smrtis , i f i n any place these are not followed . Yet

THE MIMAMSA AND HINDU LAW 10 7

Jaimini’s insistence on the supreme value of the Veda in all

questions was not without effect ; the tendency in theSmrtis i s , in harmony no doubt with a common pract ice , toallot in the case of partition of property a larger share tothe eldest son than to the others. But there is Vedicauthori ty for the statement that Manu divided h is propertyin equal shares among his sons , and th is doctrine has finallyprevailed in the law , despite the efforts of some of thecompilers of digests to compromise the matter in order toobey the clear directions of the Smrtis.

l In the legalschools

,again , i t has been found necessary to assign relative

weight to Puranas and Smrtis, a dist inction which i s notfound in Kumarila , who accepts the Puranas on the s amebasis as the Smrtis. In the case of a divergence betweenSmrti and Purana the former should prevail in the view ofVyasa ; the Purana represents no more than custom , whilethe Smrti is a step nearer to Sruti . 2

While the Mimamsa thus stands in close relat ion withIndian law , in i ts enunciation of principles in the form ofbrief maxims (nyaya ) , comparable with the headnotes ofmodern law reports , i t stands in equally close relat ion withthe popular vogue

”

of maxims3 framed on the model whencethe Mimar

'

nsa use i s doubtless derived . Such popularmaxims are freely cited by the text—books o f the school

,and

i t was presumbly on their analogy that the Adhikaranaheadings were derived ; the remarkable divergence of thecommentators‘1 in allotting SI

'

Itras to Adhikaranas indicatesthat the latter were not a primitive constituent of the St

'

I tra

text.

1 Cf. Mandlik , trans . o f Vyaoaharamayii kha , p. 41 , n . 1 .

1 Tagore Law Lectures , 1905, pp . 234 , 235 cf however,Mandlik, op. cit .

1 See Co l. Jacob’s Lankikanyayafija li ( 2nd cd. , 3 parts ) .

1 Above pp. So m the Vedanta Satra .

INDE"C

’

I‘ION, 56 , 66A ct ions , classifi cat ion o f ,

Adopt ion , 103 , 104Adh ik arana , 4 , 13 , 107A ir , 53 , 54

Ai tasayana , 4

Alayavij iiana , 47

An alogy , 32 , 33Anandagiri , 11

Anantadeva , 13

Angapu rva , 75

Annulment of ri tes , 95Anu bh fi ti , 17Anumana , 30

Anusanga , 82

Anuvyavasaya ,22 , 50

Anvaya , 99

Apastamb a ,2

Apadeva , 13 , 76 , 78

Apo ha ,40

Appayya Diksita , 12

Apprehension , validity o f , 17 -20

Aprama,17

Apurva , 36 , 73 , 74 , 75 , 89

Arthapatti , 33 , 34

Arthasan‘

i graha , 13

Arthavada , 80 , 83 , 88 , 99 , 100

Aryadeva , 7

Asanga , 46A§vagh osa , 7

A theism , 61

Atom i c theory , 50 , 54 , 61 , 62Atreya , 4

Aupavarsas 71

Avapa , 95

Aversion , 54 , 55 , 68

ADARAYANA , 4 , 5 , 35 , 77

Badar i , 4 , 88

Baudhayana Dharma Sfi tra , 97

Bhagavadgita, 73 , 76

Bhdma ti, 16

Bh artrha ri , 11 , 36 n .

Bh a rtrmitra , 8

Bhasarva jfi a , 32

ATEGORIES , 52 , 53

Cause , 23 , 24 , 59 , 60Chandogya Upanisad, 77

Cidananda , 28

Class signifi cat ion o f words , 39Class ificat ion o f a ctions , 85 , 86Cognition , v alidi ty o f , 17

-20

mode o f apprehension o f , 20

22 , 45 , 46 , 49 , 50 , 68 , 70 , 71 ;of soul , 70 , 71 ; as q uali ty o fsoul , 67

Colour , 54 , 55

Conjunct ion , 54 , 55 in percept ion ,

23 , 26 , 35C onstru ction ,

rules o f , 81 , 82 ,

86 , 87 , 89 , 99Convention ,

as b asis o f lan

gu age , 36Co -

partners , 103Crea to r

,existen ce o f denied ,

36 , 43 , 61-64

Custom ,value o f , 85 , 106. 107

DANA , 86Darkness , 53 , 54

Dattakacandrika, 104

Bha tta Dinakara ,

Bh atta Samkara ,Bha

‘

tta bhaskara , 13

Bhattacintamari i , 12 , 97Bhattalamkara , 13

Bhattarahasya , 13

Bh avadasa , 7

Bh avanath a Mi§ra , 12Bhavana, 75 , 76

Bodh ayan a , 8

Body , 67 , 69 o f crea to r , 62 , 63Brahman , 36 n . , 39 , 76 , 77

Brahmanas , Mimafnsa in , 1 ; recognise soul , 68 content s of ,79-81

Erketi, 9 , 101 n .

Buddh ist v iews , 6 , 7 , 14 , 30 , 40 ,and see Vijnanavada

and Sunya vada


110

ABUKAYANA , 4

Laksana orL inga , 89 , 99

Language , origin o f , 36 , 37Laugaksi Bh askara , 13 , 76Law , Mimar

'

nsa principles in ,

97 -107

Lib eration , 72-74

L i ke , known by like , 23Logic , 14 , 17-43 .

ADHAVA , 3 , 4 , 12 ,Madhyami kas , 46 , 47

M ahabharata , 5 , 7

M ahabhasya , 5 n .

Mahadeva Vedantin , 12

Ma itravaruna , a Nyaya , 104Manadeva , 14

Manameyodaya ,14

Mandana MiSra , 11 , 16Mantra , 81 , 82 Uha of , 94 , 95

Manu , 82 , 97 , 98 , 103

Ma tter , 67 , 69

Mayi'

i khamalika, 12

Meaning , relation o f to word ,

35 , 36

Medhatith i , 98 104

Memo ry , 19 , 20 25 , 66 , 67 , 68

Mental percept1on ,20 , 50 ; and

seemind .

Meri t , 55 , 62 , 67 ,Metaphys ics , 44-78Mimamsa, 1M imamsa Sfi tra , 3

-7 , 37 n con

ten ts , 79-96

M imamsabalaprakasa , 13

Mimamsaka , 3 , 5 n .

M imamsakaustubha , 12

M iman'

zsa'

nayaviveka , 12

M imamsanukramani , 12M imamsdnydyaprakdta , 13

M ima’

fi udmakaranda ,14

M imamsapaduka , 14

M ima’

n’

zsapari bhasa, 13

M imamsaratna , 13

M imarii sasarasariigraha , 13

Mind,23 , 69 , 70 ; and see

Ment al Percept ion .

M itaksara, 9 , 106

Mode o f apprehension o f cogu ition ,

20-22 , 49 , 50 , 68 ,

70 , 71 o f soul , 70 , 71

THE KARMA-MIMAMSA

Mo t ion , 56 , 66

OBJECTIVE idealism , 52

Ontology , 44-60

Order o f s acrifices , 90 , 91

AIN, 68 , 73

Paficatantra , 5 n .

Panini , 5 n .

Parisar‘

nkhya, 93 , 98

Parth asara thi MiSra , 10 , 11 , 12 ,21 , 87

Part i cularity , 52 , 59Partnersh ip , 105

Paryudasa , 85 , 86 , 94 , 98

AGARJUNA , 6 , 44

Name , 80 , 81Nanda Pandi ta , 99 , 104

N a'

yakaratna , 12

Narayana , 14Narayana , o f Kerala , 14Narayana tirth a Muni , 13

Nes cience , 63 , 64Nigada s , 95N ih ilism , 6 , 7 , 44 , 45 , 46-52

Nilakantha , 97 , 103 , 104

Nirnaya , 4

Nisadasthapati , 103Nisedha , 93

Niyama , 98

Niyoga , 7 5Non -existence , 34 , 35 , 52 , 53 , 60

Non -

percept ion , 34 , 35 , 60

Numb er , 52 , 68Nyaya , meaning o f , 2 , 107

Nyaya school , 14 , 17-20 , 22 , 26 ,30 , 32 , 33 , 34 , 36 , 40 ,

55 , 70

Nyaya Si'

itra , 5 , 14 , 24, 29 , 37 n . ,

44 , 46 , 51Nyaya-Va iSesika school , 14 ,23 , 50 , 52 , 53 , 56 , 57 , 58 , 60 ,61 , 63 , 68 , 69

Nyayakazi ika , 11

Nyayamafijari , 14

Nyayaratnakara , 10

Nyayaratnamala , 12

Nyayasudha , 10

Nyayava lididhiti , 12

Nya‘

yava'

rttika , 14

INDEX

Percept ion , 22-27 , 54 , 63 ; of Rumour , as a Pramana , 43

mo tion , 56 ; o f similari ty , 59 Rjuvimala‘

, 9

Phala , 27 , 30Phalapurva , 75Pleasure , 54 , 66 , 67 , 68 , 73Plurali ty o f souls , 71 , 72Posteriority , 54 , 55Potency , 32 , 55Prab hacandra , 11

Prabhakara , 9 , 10 , 14 , 15 , 17 ,19 , 20 , 22 , 25 , 27 , 28 , 30 , 34 ,

40 , 41 , 52 , 53 , 61 , 64 ,69 , 70 , 71 , 72 , 74 , 75 , 79 , 80 ,83 , 85 , 90

Prakarana , 94 , 99Prakarartapaficika, 16Prakatya , 55Pr ama, 17Pramana , 27 numb er o f , 35 , 43Prameyaparayap a , 9 , 16 , 55 n .

Pranab hrt, a Nyaya , 99Prasafiga , 96PraSastapada , 15 , 27 , 29 , 30 , 54 ,55 , 60 n .

Pratisedha , 85 , 86Pratya b hijfia , 17

Presumpt ion , 33 , 34 ; as proo fof Apfirva , 74

Prio rity , 54 , 55Purana , au thori ty Of , 82 , 83 , 107Pfi rvapaksa , 3

QUALITIES ,

RAGHAVANANDA S a r a svat i , 12

Raghunandana , 99 , 105Raghunatha , 13

Ramakrsna , 12

Ramakrsna Udicya Bha ttacarya , 13

Ramanu ja , 12 , 46 , 77Rammvara , 12Ra

'

zzaka , 10Rathakara , 92

Ratnakarasanti , idealism of ,48n .

Recognit ion , 17Rememb rance, 17 and see

Memo ry .

111

SABARASVAMIN , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 ,39 , 44 , 64 , 87 , 88 , 91

Sab da , as form of ab solu te , 36n . and see Word .

Sacrifices , 22 , 73 , 74 , 76Saddarsanasamuccaya , 15

Salikanatha , 9 , 17 , 60 n ., 75

saman , 81Samantabh adra , 11

Samb ha va , as a Pramana , 43

Samgati , 4Sa fnkara , 6 , 7 , 9 , 46 , 76

Safnkara Bhatta , 12 , 98 , 104

Sarhkaravijaya , 11

San‘

i khya Sfi tra , 5 , 36 , 38 , 64 , 73 .

Sar’

nSaya , 3

Samudayapfi rva , 75

Sariraka bha'

sya , 10

Sarvadarsanasamgraha , 15

Sarvasiddhanta samgraha , 9 , 15

Sastra , as a Pramana , 35 , 41

Sastradipika, 11 , 12

Sa ttras , 92

Sau naka , 104Sau trantika , 49

Self -consciousness , 20 -22

Self -evidence o f cogni tions , 1720 , 106 and see Ideas .

Senses , 23 , 54 , 55

Sense organs , 23 , 67 , 69Ser ies o f ideas , 49 , 65 , 66

Sesa , 87SeSvaramimamsa, 14 , 76Siddhanta , 4S imilari ty , 32 , 33 , 52 , 58 , 59Slokavarttika , 10Smell , 54 , 55Smrti , 82 , 83 , 107

SomeSvara , 10

Soul , 64-72Sound , 37 , 38 , 39 , 53 , 54

Space , 53 , 54 , 55

Sph ota , 33

Spiri t ; s ee Soul.Sridhara , 15 , 54

Subodhini , 12

Sub stance , 53 , 54

1 12

Sucarita MiSra , 10

Suddhiviveka , 103S t

‘

i dra , 103

Sfinyavada , 6 , 7 , 44

SureSvara , 11

Svatahpramauya ,7

Syena , 94Syllogism , 29 , 30

TANTRA , 95 , 105Tantravartti ka , 10

Tarkikaraksa, 14

T aste , 54 , 55Ta ttoa bindu

, 11

Tattva cintamani , 15

46-52

Theism , 76 ; and see God , Dei

t ies .T ime , 53 , 54 , 55

Touch , 53 , 54 , 55

Transcendental percept ion , 27 ,28

Transfer o f ceremonies , 94 , 95

T ransmigration , 65 , 66

Tuptika , 10

BAYANA , 14 , 32

Uddyota kara ,9 n

Uha , 94 , 95

Unseen pr in ciple , 20Upakramaparakrama , 13

Upamana , 33 , 34

Upavarsa , 7 , 8

Utpattyapt‘

i rva , 75

ACASPATI Misra , 11 , 14 ,

15 n 24 , 46

Va idyanatha , 12

Va iéesika sch ool , 32 , 35 , 36 , 4266 , 70 , 73

Va isesika Satra , 5

Va iSvadeva , a Nyaya , 104vakya b heda , 82

V al idi ty o f knowledge , 17 -20 ;o f perception , 25 , 26

V a llab h a Acarya , 13

Va rada raja , 14 , 16

Va'

rttika'

bhararta , 10

varttikakara , 9

N a su b andhu , 46

vatsyayana , 24 , 46

THE KARMA-MIMAMSA

ATER , 53 , 54

Wh ole and part , 50 , 51 ;c f . 56-58

Wife , share o f husb and ’s property , 102Woman , righ t to sacrifice , 91 ,92 , 102

Wo rd , or verb al testimony , 3543

Venka tadhvarin , 14

Vefikatanatha , VenkateSa , 10 ,

76

Ver’

rka teSvara Diksita , 14Veda , 36 , 42 , 43 , 63Vedanga , 83Vedanta school , 36 , 46 , 63 , 64 ,

69 , 70 , 72Vedanta Sfi tra , 5 , 6 , 7 , 44 , 46 , 61 ,76 , 77

Vijfianavada , 5 , 6 , 7 , 20 , 22 , 4652

Vijfi'

zi neSvara , 101

V idh i see Injunct ion .

Vidhirasayana , 12 commentaries on , 12

Vidhitrayaparitrana , 14Vidhivi'veka , 11

Vidyananda , 11

Vikalpa , 96

Vikrti , 2 , 86Vifidhyavasin , 59 , 65Visaya , 3Viscidi ty , 55ViSva jit , a Nyaya , 87 , 101Vrttikara , 7 , 8 , 20 , 22 , 27 , 29 ,30 , 32 , 34 , 35 , 42 , 88 , 106

Vyapti , 27

Vyasa ,107

Vyavaharamayfikha , 101 , 103

Vyavasaya ,22

, 50

YAGA , 86

Yajfiavalkya , 103 , 106

Ya jus , 81Yuktisnehaprapfirarti , 12Yoga Satra , 5

Yogacaras , 47Yogins , percept ion of , 27

48

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Th - Forgotten Books · PDF fileEDITORIAL PREFACE Finally, brethren, ‘ whats oever things a re tru e, whatsoever things a re honou rable, wh atso ever things a re just, whatsoever