Terminology in the Social Sciences and the Humanities

1/20/2015 TerminologyandDiscoursebetweentheSocialSciencesandtheHumanities

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TerminologyandDiscoursebetweentheSocialSciencesandtheHumanities

RobertdeBeaugrande

[abstract]

TheepistemologyoftheWest(roughly,Europeanditssphereofinfluence)hasbeenheavilycontentoriented.Eachknowledgedomain,rangingfromasubjectmatter taught in school up to classical science, is held to consistchieflyofacompartmentoffacts.Terminologyisnaturallyheldtobeaclearandstraightforwardrefractionofthesefactsandoftheobjectstheyinvolve.The role of terminology has accordingly been conceived too simply andnarrowly. Significant progress demands a new postclassical model ofdiscourseasamode foraccessingandconstructingknowledgeandhenceas antecedent rather than consequent to facts. This insight suggest acomprehensive reseach and development plan for the coming years. Ifsuccessful, such a plan could have paradigm significance for discoursethroughoutthesciences.

Conceptscanneverberegardedaslogicalderivativesof

senseimpressions.Butdidacticandheuristicobjectives

makesuchanotion inevitable.Moral: it is impossible to

getanywherewithoutsinningagainstreason.

AlbertEinstein.

1.Socialscienceandhumanities:Terms,fields,discourse

1.1F.deSaussureswellknownCoursdelinguistiquegnraleremarkedoverseventy years ago that other sciences work with objects that are given inadvance,whereasinlinguisticsitwouldseemthatitistheviewpointthatcreatestheobject(1966[1916]:8).Today,wemightwanttoputthemattermoreradically:itisnotsomuchtheviewpointbutthespecialpurposediscourseanditsrelationtotheobjectdomainthatcreatesthescienceanyscience,includinglinguistics,butalsoanybranchofthehumanities.Thisthesis,whichpointsupthecentralityofLSPandterminologyresearch, ismoredisruptive,andtoappreciate its force,we should continually and carefully reassess the role and function of specialpurposediscourseandinparticularofterminology,itsthemostprominentsector.



1.2Oneplacetostartisthediscourseintendedtodefinethetermslabelingthedomainitself.Herearetherespectivedictionarydefinitionsofsocialsciences[1]and humanities [2] (fromWebsters Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, 1963:828,404):

[1]branchesofsciencedealingwiththeinstitutionsandfunctioningofhumansocietyandtheinterpersonalrelationshipsofindividuals

[2]branchesoflearninghavingprimarilyaculturalcharacter.To construct an opposition from thesewordings, three potential distinctions

seemopportune:1.2.1betweenscienceversuslearning.Therespectivedefinitionsofthosetwotermsinthesamedictionary(771,480)read:

[3]knowledgeattainedthroughstudyorpracticeknowledgecoveringgeneraltruthsortheoperationofgenerallawsoneofthenaturalsciences

[4]knowledgeorskillacquiredbyinstruction,study,orexperience. Apparently, science overlaps with learning but focuses more on general

truthsandlawsalso,thefinalsubdefinitionin[3]indicateshowtheEnglishtermscienceispreemptedbynaturalscience,aperennialhandicapforsocialscience(cf.4.1f).AlthoughthespecificallyEnglishtermhumanitiesmakesnoreferenceto science, the corresponding term in other languages does, such asGermanGeisteswissenschaftenandFrenchscienceshumaines.

1.2.2 between society versus culture. This distinction is more interesting(4.3), but does not bear on the opposition at hand, because both concepts arewidelyacknowledgedinthesocialsciencesandthehumanitiesalike.

1.2.3betweendealingwithandhavingthecharacterof.Thisdistinctionbearsmoreonmethodthanoncontent.Inconventionalviews,scienceismorelikelytobe visualized standing apart from its object domain than are the humanities.Echoes of these views can be detected in the diverse dictionary definitions(Websters,202)ofculture:

[5]behaviourtypicalofagrouporclass[6] development of intellectual and moral faculties, especially by educationenlightenmentandexcellenceof tasteacquiredby intellectualandaesthetictraining.

Whereas [5]canbe objectified, observed,andsoon, [6]mustbeacquiredthroughsubjectiveparticipation.

1.3. In sum, the standarddictionarydefinitionsof the terms social sciencesand humanities do not clearly support an incisive opposition. To assess theircurrentorpotentialrelationship,wemustratherturntotheirrespectivediscursiveandterminologicalpractices.



2.Seventhesesonterminology

2.1 According to my opening thesis (1.1), the status of a domain, whetherscientificorhumanistic,hingesontheconstitutionofitsdiscourseastheprimarymodeofaccess toknowledge(cf.Beaugrande1991a,b,c,d,eBeaugrande&Dressler,inpreparation).Thisthesisopposestheconventionofscientistswhoseeknowledge as a formal or substantive absolute set apart from the means tocommunicateitandwhomightclassifytheseveralsciencesbythedegreeoftheirdisengagement from discourse, ranging from mathematics, physics, andelectronics at the far end over to cultural anthropology and ethnography ofcommunication at the near end. But the same thesis might seem hardlycontroversial in the humanities, which are after all often housed in a faculty ofletters(compareItalianFacoltdiLettere,orFrenchFacultdeLettres).

2.2.Terminologycanhelpustomakethethesismoreconcrete.Heretoo,wecanstartwithprospectivedefinitionsforthetermterminologyitself,thistimenotcommonsensicalonesfromadictionarybutfunctionalones:

2.2.1A terminology is a specialized lexical repertory. This definition seemssolidenough,butsayslittleaboutthegenesisanduseoftherepertory.Aratherstatic image is projected of a selfsufficient finished product, a set of preciselydeterminedanddeterminatelabelsforsomeindependentandperspicuousreality.This imageisnolongertenableeveninthenaturalsciences,whereonestrikingexample is the "black hole" and its circumstances, such as "event horizon","Schwarzschildradius",or"Hawkingevaporation".Theimageisallthemoreineptforthesocialsciencesandthehumanities,where(asweshallsee)theconceptofrealityismoreasocialorliteraryproblemthanapredecidedconstant.

2.2.2A terminology is a means of intervention in ordinary discourse. Thisdefinitionprojectsamoredynamicimageofanongoingprocess,butrequiresusto stipulate the relevant conditions and results. Some terms start out in highlytechnicalusageforconspicuousinterventionandmoveintoordinaryusage,suchas black hole and relativity, although (as these examples show) with acharacteristic loss of special content. Others remain purely technical, such asSchwarzschild radius or Gdel number, and cannot appear in ordinarydiscoursewithoutsomemediation.

2.2.3Aterminologyprovidesthekeywordsforactivatingspecializedframesofknowledge about the domain. This definition entails a psychological hypothesisabout the organization of knowledge in human memory and is thus open toempirical testing. So far, however, most experiments have addressed ordinaryknowledgeoratmostmildlyspecializeddomainslikearithmetic(Riley,Greeno,&Heller 1982) and baseball (Voss, Vesonder, & Spilich 1980). Work on expertknowledge,e.g.medicineandchemistry,hasbeenmoreconcentratedinartificial



intelligence,wherethetestingisdonebysimulationandjudgedbyefficiency.2.2.4 A terminology asserts a claim to authorization. Here, the relevant

functionistosignal thattheinstantiatedcomplexesofknowledgeareauthorizedbytheestablishedconsensus inthefield.However, theuseof terminologydoesnot by itself carry authority or guarantee consensus. In diffuseanddisputatiousfields like linguistics or literary theory, the choice of terminology is frequently adoubleedgedgestureofallegiance tooneapproachanddefiance to theothersandauthorityvacillatesaccordingtothesideoneadopts.

2.2.5 A terminology is a system of signals to distinguish insiders fromoutsiders.Thoughthiseffectisoftenattained,insiderswouldprobablynotwanttodeclareitagenuinepurposenorcanapersonconvertfromoutsidertoinsiderbyadoptingtheterminologyalone.Themostrestrictedcasesaretermsderivedfromthe names of persons who were of course eminent insiders themselves, e.g.Gdel number from the Austrian mathematician Kurt Gdel. These terms aremostinefficientiftheyrequireinsideknowledgeofspecificcareers,buttheyoftenfadeto impersonal labels,evenfornotionsthepersonsmightnotevenapprove.Forexample,thevonRestorffeffectinpsychologyiswidelysaidforthememoryadvantage of the salient items in a list, whereas Hedwig von Restorff (1933)herself,amemberoftheGestaltschool,showedthedisadvantageofsuchitemsfortheformationofanintegratedarray(Bereich).

2.2.6A terminology is an organizational and pedagogical tool for offering oracquiring competence and fluency in the domain. This definition has a strongpractical emphasis, putting the terminology in an instrumental though notexclusively decisive role. This role is undeniably crucial during introductorytraining,witnesstheeffortexpendedonpresentingandquizzingitallthewayfrombasic coursework up to degree examinations. However, the formulation of apedagogicallyeffective terminologyhasnot receivedsufficientattention ineithersocial science or humanities, despite the growing population of students ingeneral area studies, which primarily fulfill a service role in training forprofessionslikemanagementandlaw.Thisshiftinemphasiscallsforaconcertedreassessmentofthepedagogicaladaptationoftermstotherequirementsofnontraditionaloutsiders.

2.2.7 A terminology names the control centers within domainspecificknowledge. In this definition, which I have developed in my own work(Beaugrande 1987, 1988b, 1989a, 1991d), the term control designates anylimiting of indeterminacy not merely a mechanical intervention (the everydaymeaningapplied,saytomachines),butanyinformationalorcognitiveenrichmentthathelpstoguideorselectsignificance.Thepotentialcontributionofterminologyto control in this expanded sense is virtually unlimited, provided that we cangrasp the fluctuation and regulation of determinacy within the entire discourse,



andinrespecttospecificgroupsofparticipants.Inparticular,thediscourseshouldexert active and conscious control, e.g., by explaining each problematic termconciselyuponfirstmentionandthenusingitconsistentlyhenceforth.

2.3.Eachofthesesevendefinitionsholdssomecogencyand,takentogether,they encourage us to bear in mind that terminology is an emphatically multifunctionalresourcewhoseactualcontributioninspontaneousorroutineusageistypically just a small part of its potential contribution under adequately plannedandcontrolledconditions.

3.Conventionalpreferencesinsocialsciencesandhumanities

3.1. Conventional usage of terminology so far is characterized by threepervasivepreferences(Beaugrande1991e):

3.1.1forinternalusewithinthefieldoverexternalusebeyonditsborders3.1.2 for objectoriented terms labeling specific objects of inquiry oversubjectorientedtermsgeneratedbytheinterpretationoftheuserand

3.1.3foratermcenteredviewofspecialpurposelanguageoveradiscoursecentered view implicating the entire texture, including the processes oftextualizingtheterminology.3.2 These preferences are particularly dominant in the sciences, where the

folkwisdom flourishes that the terminologyof a scientific field is just thepropercatalogue of labels for welldefined objects and makes an ideal means ofcommunicating in a normal science (in the popularized sense of Kuhn 1970).Individualtermsareaccepteduncriticallyattheirnominalvalue,evenwhereasforthetermsentenceinmodernlinguisticsaconsiderablespreadofdivergingusescouldeasilybedocumented(Beaugrande1989a,1991a).

3.3 The impact of this uncritical acceptance can be seen in social science,whereterminologypersistsinanunsettledstate.MarvinHarrisforinstance(1980:15)diagnosesan overloadof illdefinedconcepts in the socialscientistsbasicworking vocabulary, such as state, role, group, institution, class, caste, tribe,state,andsoforth.Inhiseyes,thecontinuingfailuretoagreeonthemeaningoftheseconceptsisareflectionoftheirunoperationalstatusandconstitutesagreatbarriertothedevelopmentofscientifictheoriesofsocialandculturallife(cf.4.2)3.4However,giventhepressuresonsocialsciencetocreateascientificdictionfordescribingordinaryknowledgeandbehavior,theprojectofmakingtermsoperationalmaybecomepartoftheproblemratherthanthesolution(4.1).Ithashelpedtofosteranuncritical,forcedoscillationormelange,wherebymechanical,objectorientedtermsarecombinedwithtermsapplyingtosubjectiveeventsorabilities.Hereisasample,whenTalcottParsons(citedinBolinger1975:172)setsouttodefinethetermskills:



[7]Skillsconstitutethemanipulativetechniquesofhumangoalattainmentandcontrol in relation to the physical world, so far as artifacts for machinesespeciallydesignedastoolsdonotyetsupplementthem.Trulyhumanskillsare guided by organized and codified knowledge of both the things to bemanipulated and the human capacities that are used to manipulate them.Suchknowledge isanaspectof cultural level symbolicprocesses,and, likeotheraspects tobediscussedpresently, requires thecapacityof thecentralnervoussystem,particularlythebrain.

On the one hand,Parsonswants to specify truly human skills, presumably asdistinctfromskillsattributedtoanimalsor,anthropomorphically,tomachinesandtools. On the other hand, he clearly leans toward the objectoriented terms ofconventionalscience.Thus,hedirectshumangoalattainmentandcontroltowardthephysicalworldratherthantowardthehumanagentsmentalagendaofplansand wishes cognitive and communicative skills would thereby be restricted tomerelyinstrumentalroles.Healsosetsupaskewedinterchangebetweenskillsand themeans of supplementing them the construction implies that the skillsoperate on the world only insofar as they are not yet supplemented, which ispatentlyfalse.

3.5 He further tries to mediate between object and subject in the openingsentenceby injecting the terms artifactsand design,bothofwhich implyskillsby definition, but the mediation goes awry in the syntax. Artifacts are not formachines designedas tools both machines and tools are artifacts, only theformer necessarily requiring special design (a tool could be a mere piece ofrock)andamachinethatwasnotdesignedasatoolwouldbeamarginalcasehardlyrelevanthere.

3.6 Again to grant the objects equal weight, the second sentence pairs offthings with capacities, as if they were two parallel types of organized andcodified knowledge. But the parallel conjures up a distinction between theknowledge of capacities versus the capacities themselves, which seemsgratuitoushere:ifyouwanttomanipulateathingyoumusthaveanduse them,notjustknowaboutthem.Afinalforcedbalanceisdrawnbetweencultural level[i.e.notindividual]symbolicprocessesandthecentralnervoussystemplusthebrain, the latter being either trivially involved inevery skill and process or elsemisleadinglyimpliedtobetheactualphysicalcodificationoftheknowledge,liketheDNAincells.

3.7 Linguistically, the objectoriented approach favours a pronouncedpreference for nouns and noun phrases over verbs. The opening of Parsonsdefinition is a conspicuousexample, aswecanseeby contrasting toa versionwiththeactionsandprocessesexpressedbyverbs:

[7a]Skillsenablehumanstomanipulateandcontrolthephysicalworldsoasto



attaintheirgoals.Amoresweepingrevisiontorelaxthedistortivetensionbetweenobjectversussubjectmightbe:

[7b]Trulyhumanskillsareguidedby theorganizedandcodifiedknowledgethat both constitutes the capacities for attaining goals and schematizes thephysicalworldtobemanipulatedandcontrolled.Thisknowledgedevelopsoutof the potential of the central nervous system, particularly the brain, in theperformanceof cultural symbolicprocesses, includingcommunication.Toolsandmachinescanbespeciallydesignedtosupplementtheskills,butdonotactuallycompriseorembodythem.

Thisdefinitionisnotmerelyshorter(70wordstoParsons87),butquitedifferentinfocus.Thetargetoftheskillsnowisnotthephysicalworldworlditself,buttheschematized version of it that serves as the cognitive operational base forapplyinghumanskillsaswellasforcommunicatingwithintheculture.Toolsandmachines are introduced not as a major reservation at the start, but as aconcessivestipulationattheend.Thecentralnervoussystemandthebrainarenot trivially implicated nor implied to be amaterial codification, but cited as thedevelopmental resourcewhose performance centersmoreoncultural symbolicprocesses,includingcommunication,thanonmechanicalmanipulation.

3.8 The humanities are less dominated by the anxiety about subject andobject,thoughhardlyfreeofit.Objectcenteredtermshavelongbeenafavouritein textbooksandsurveys,aswecansee in theHeath Introduction to Literature(Landy1980:837f):[8]Asimile is a comparisonand isalways statedas such.Youwill usually findlike, as, so, or some such word of comparison within it. Like similes,metaphors are direct comparisons of one object with another. In metaphors,however,thefusionbetweenthetwoobjectsismorecomplete,formetaphorusesnoasorliketoseparatethetwothingsbeingcompared.Instead,themetaphorsimply declares that A is B one element of the comparison becomes, for themoment at least, the other. Somemetaphors go even farther and omit the is.TheysimplytalkaboutAasifitwereB,usingtermsappropriatetoB.TheymaynotevennameBatall,butletusguesswhatitisfromthewordsbeingused.Inthiscasethemetaphorbecomesanimpliedmetaphor.Threeitemsofterminology,allnouns,aredefinedandcontrastedasiftheyweretangible things rather than cognitive and aesthetic activities. Each thing is tidilyidentified by ostensibly formal and observable criteria, namely the presence orabsenceof comparisonwords theprepositionsor conjunctions like and asandthecopulaisthoughthetextfudgesthequestionsofwhethertheseareinfact required and if not, how the three things could be differentiated on othergrounds.



3.9 Moreover, each term is stated to designate a specific kind of relationbetween distinct objects, presumably in the physical world, albeit the passagecloudstheirstatusbygivingthemonlythequasialgebraicsymbolsAandB,asifwecouldsolveeachtermlikeanequationbyinsertingtheunknowns.Yetisispreciselythedistinctnessofobjectsorotherentities,notinthephysicalworldbutin our mental representations of any real or possible word, that similes andmetaphorscallinquestion.

3.10 Such definitions thus promulgate a termcentered and objectorientedviewof literatureandpoetry,as if theywerepatchworksofschemesand tropeswaitingtobereducedtocomparisonsandequations.Structuralistpoeticsdidlittletocorrect thisview,and ifanythingreaffirmed iton thebasisof itsmorerefinedtermsandmethods(cf.4.5).Suchaviewappliesmuchbettertomediocreefforts(e.g. Robert Burns my love is like a red, red rose) than to aesthetically validworks,suchasEmilyDickinsonspoemnr.1129:

[9]TellalltheTruthbuttellitslantSuccessinCircuitliesToobrightforourinfirmDelightTheTruthssuperbsurpriseAsLightningtotheChildreneasedWithexplanationkindTheTruthmustdazzlegraduallyOreverymanbeblind

Tosolvethesimileidentifiedbytheasinline5(whichthetextbookadvocates),the definitions in [8] require us to select two compared objects, such asLightning and Truth or is it surprise? For an impliedmetaphor, we couldguesson thebasisof blind that Delight stands for eyesight, but that seemsironically literalminded for a poem expressly counseling against directpresentation.

3.11 On the other hand, we would not be encouraged to focus on anassociation between a noun suggesting an object and a verb suggesting anactivity.WewouldaccordinglymisstheprocesscenteredanalogybetweentellingslantversusCircuit,alongwiththeexquisitetensionbetweentheprocesseaseversusthesuddenevent Lightning,whosefantasyresolution isprojected in theoxymorondazzlegradually.

3.12 In sum, the conventional terminology of humanitieswould seem to bejust as riddled with forced compromises and evasions as the conventionalterminology of the social sciences. The search for poetic things and the realobjectstheyrefertoandcomparethusdistractsawayfromtherealimportoftheentiretextasoneintegralmetaphoricfieldwherein,asinEmilyDickinsonspoem,



preciseequationsareskillfullyevadedandidentitiesaredeliberatelyeffacedeventhesyntacticconstructionisblurredbyheravoidanceofconventionalpunctuation.And if thismetaphor assertsanything, thensurely that Truth isnotan object,butaprocessandthatthisTruthandanySuccessorDelightpertainingtoitispreciselynottobegraspedthroughacommonsensicalcorrespondencewiththe real world, but through utterly unexpected and astonishing bursts. EmilyDickinsonmaywellhaveviewedherownpoetryasoneslantedmodalityforsuchTruth, but unlike lesser, more selfserving poets, she does not say so bypresentingusatidytextbooksimileormetaphor,sheenactsitandhasusenactitthoughtheengagementhertextrequires.Andtheengagedreaderhereletslooseofidentities,objects,andwordclasseslikeconjunctionsandprepositions,inorderto constitute an ephemeral but powerful aesthetic terminology for the uniqueexperience.

4.Recentshifts

4.1 In both social science and humanities, a general reassessment ofepistemological groundwork has been gaining momentum, with an increasinglyconspicuous impact on terminology. In the social sciences, this impact can beseenbycontrastingthreedefinitionsofthetermculture:

[10] culture is best seen as a set of control mechanisms plans, recipes,rules, instructions, which are the principle bases for the specificity ofbehaviourandanessentialconditiongoverningit.(Durbin1973:470)

[11]culturereferstothelearnedrepertoryofthoughtsandactionsexhibitedbymembersofsocialgroups.(Harris1980:47).

[12]Believing,withMaxWeber, thatman isananimalsuspended inwebsofsignificancehehimself has spun, I takeculture to be thosewebs, and theanalysisofittobethereforenotanexperimentalscienceinsearchoflawsbutaninterpretiveoneinsearchofmeaning.(Geertz1973:5)

Marshal Durbins ostensibly operational appeal to control mechanisms in [10]ironicallyimpliedthathumansintheculturedonothavemuchcontrolthemselves,but function like regulated parts of a largemachine. The terminologywithin thedefinition left at best scant leeway for personal choice, i.e. from marginal (notprinciple) bases and incidental (not essential) conditions that influence (notgovern)behaviour.ButDurbintookadifferenttackwhenstatingtheoverallgoalofanthropology:tounderstandthewayinwhichmanprocessesinformationfromthesurroundingenvironment(1973:468).Thisgoalisnotrelatedinanyinsightfulway to his own definition of culture. Evidently, his terms were beset by anuneasy,partialtransferofallegiancefromnaturalscience,especiallyphysics,overtoinformationscienceasthemodelparadigm(cf.1.2.1).



4.2MarvinHarrisdefinition[11]reflectshisconvictionwhichhechampionsagainsttheinfluenceofnaturalsciencethatmatterisnomoreorlessrealthanthoughts(1980:30).Hence,thesubstanceofcultureisnolongerjustbehaviour,but thoughts and actions and in place of physicalist mechanisms we have amoremental repertory.However, theoperational turnpersists in thestipulationexhibited,whichapplies to actions,whereas thoughtswouldneedtoreportedor inferred. Still, Harriss motive for the dualism is not a division or transfer ofallegiance, but anessential step in his plan tomaintain an important distinctionbetweenwhat themembers of a culture do or say (the etic system) andwhatthey think they are doing or saying (the emic system). Between these twosystemsliestheslippagethatenablesthemystificationofsociallife,whichrulinggroupsthroughouthistoryandprehistoryhavealwayspromotedastheirfirst lineofdefenseagainstactualorpotentialenemies (1980:158).Heevendiagnosesthis slippage within social science itself, where in the contemporary politicalcontext, idealism and eclecticism serve to obscure the very existence of rulingclasses, thus shifting the blame for poverty, exploitation, and environmentaldegradation from the exploiters to the exploited and preventing people fromunderstanding the causes of war, poverty, and exploitation. In contrast, Harrisownculturalmaterialism

[13]holdsthattheeliminationofexploitationwillneverbeachievedinasocietywhich subverts the empirical and operational integrity of social science forreasons of political expediency. Because without the maintenance of anempiricist andoperationalist critique,weshall never know ifwhat somecalldemocracyisanewformoffreedomoranewformofslavery.(1980:157f)

Thisrationaleforanoperationalterminologyisutterlydifferentfrompayingtributeto a timeworn folk wisdom about scientific method. The explanatory task is tocreateadiscursiveand terminological framework for representing thoughtsandactionssoas toreflectnotmerely theirvalencedefinedby theculture,butalsotheoperationalimpactofmaterialconditionslikethedistributionofresourcesandpower, and thereby to account for the origin,maintenance, and change of theglobal inventory of sociocultural differences and similarities (1980: 27). Theterminology of social science would thus have two correlated but distinctivemodesofreference,theemicandtheeticones,whosemutualcontrastsorgapswould be the focal points and fulcrums for a radical critique of the status quo(1980:158).Aneminentcasecanbeseenintheelaborateeuphemismsadoptedbycultureswhopracticeinfanticide,e.g.whenmotherstermthedeathablessingorGodswillandthevictimslittleangels(ScherperHughes1987).

4.3In[12],CliffordGeertzindirectlysuggestsananalogybetweencultureitselfandaterminologicalsystem:thewebsofsignificancewhichthesocialscientistmustinterpretinsearchoftheirmeaning.Finally,theobjectdomainisnolonger



aconstellationofobservablebehavioursorexhibitedactions,buttheirsymbolicvalenceswithinacomplexsystemwithina cultural terminology,so tospeak.Thedistinctionbetweenculturalsystemversussocialsystem,whichwesawtobearonthedefinitionsofhumanitiesversussocialscience(1.2.2),wouldbe

[14] to see the former as an ordered system of meaning and of symbols interms of which social interaction takes place and to see the latter as thepatternofsocialinteractionitself[...]cultureisthefabricofmeaningintermsofwhichhumanbeingsinterprettheiractionsocialstructureistheformthataction takes, the actually existing network of social relations. (Geertz1973:144f)

Heretoo,theterminologyofsocialsciencehastwocorrelatedbutdistinctivesetsof referents, one for exhibited social interaction and one for its significances whereby theactions themselves functionasculturally interpretable terms.Then,no discontinuity or disparity arises when the discourse of the science acceptsdiscoursesofthecultureintoitsdomain,viz.:

[15]Sincecommunicationacts,especiallyspeechacts,usuallyoccurinhumanscenesofevenmoderateduration,allmajoreticrubricsaretosomedegreebuilt up out of the observation of communication events. [...] studies of eticcomponents (kinship, political ideology, national ideology, etc.) usuallyinvolve the identification of speech acts and other communication events,[e.g.] in the description of domestic hierarchies by means of requests andcompliancestorequests(Harris1980:54f)

4.4Thenextstep is toreflectonthediscursivequalityofsocialscienceitself.ForGeertz (1988:5),one crucialpeculiarityofethnographicwriting is the factthat

[16]somuchofitconsistsofincorrigibleassertion.Thehighlysituatednatureofethnographicdescriptionthisethnographer,inthistime,inthisplace,withtheseinformants,thesecommitments,andtheseexperiences,representativeofaparticularculture,amemberofacertainclassgivestothebulkofwhatissaidarathertakeitorleaveitquality.

Due to the usual objectoriented view of science, anxieties about subjectivityhavemade it extremelydifficult toaddress thequestionofhowethnographicaltextsareauthorized(1988:9).Usually,

[17] anthropologists [...] have traced their difficulties in constructing suchdescriptionstotheproblematicsoffieldworkratherthantothoseofdiscourse.Iftherelationbetweenobserverandobserved(rapport)canbemanaged,therelationbetweentheauthorandtext(signature)willfollowitisthoughtofitself.(1988:9f)

This belief thoroughly obscures the oddity of constructing texts, ostensibly



scientific, outofexperiencesbroadlybiographical andof findingsomewhere tostandinatextthatissupposedtobeatoneandthesametimeanintimateviewandacoolassessment(ibid.).Geertzsownrevisioncentersonhisclaimthattheconviction carried by the ethnographic text does not rest either on factualsubstantiality or on theoretical arguments but on the authors capacity toconvinceus thatwhat theysay is the resultof theirhavingpenetrated(or ifyouprefer, been penetrated by) another form of life (1988: 4).He now proposes aclosereadingofethnographicdiscoursestounderstandwhy

[18] someethnographersaremoreeffective thanothers in conveying in theirprosetheimpressionthattheyhavehadclosecontactwithfaroutlives[...]Asthe criticism of fiction and poetry grows best out of an imaginativeengagementwith fictionandpoetry themselves, not out of importednotionsaboutwhattheyshouldbe,thecriticismofanthropologicalwriting(whichisina strict sense neither, and in a broad sense both) ought to grow out of asimilarengagementwithit,notoutofpreconceptionsofwhatitmustlookliketoqualifyasascience.(1988:6)4.5Suchdeliberationsareaclearsignalofabasic reorientationwhichcould

bring the social sciences much closer to the humanities. The conditions for arapproachement are also improving in the wake of a reorientation on thehumanisticside.Literarystudiesiscurrentlyreconsideringthespecialstatusandqualities of literary discourse, and the implications of this status for humanisticdiscourse about such discourse (Beaugrande 1988a). The problematics ofengagement are acknowledged on many levels. The reliance on the objectorientedterminologiesandmethods,whethertraditionalorstructuralist(cf.3.8f),isnow receding,aswecansense in some recent statementsof literary theoristsfromthe(erstwhile)Yaleschool:

[19]methodology[...]promotesclosereading[but]isanevasionifitrestswithadistinctionbetweenthelanguageofdescriptionandthelanguageoftheobjectdescribed and privileges the former as a scientific metalanguage (Hartman1979:187,1980:156)

[20]sinceitisassumedlyscientific,thelanguageofastructuralistpoeticswoulditself be definitely outside literature, but it would prescribe (in deliberateopposition to describe) a generalized and ideal model of a discourse thatdefines itselfwithout having to refer to anythingbeyond its ownboundaries(DeMan1983:107)

[21]weshouldtakebackfromthescienceswhathisours[andnot]dependonthephysicalorhumansciencesforthemodelofamechanismthatfascinatesbyitsanonymous,compulsive,impersonalcharacter(Hartman1980:270)

The conventional activity of resolving the literary text through its similes,metaphors,andsoon(3.8ff)intoanaworldofimpliedrealobjectsanobjective



correlative (to borrow T.S. Eliots stodgy phrase) is viewedwith acceleratingscepticism.Thefocusofconcern israther theselfcomplicatingnatureof literarydiscourse,viz.:

[22]wordsareonlywords,notthingsorfeelings[...]allinterpretationdependson theantithetical relationbetweenmeanings, not on the supposed relationbetweenatextanditsmeaning(Bloom,1979:8f,1975b:76)

[23] language appears to be a restless medium that both transcends andnegatesitsrelationtothephenomenalworld[...]themorepressureweputona text to interpret or decode it, the more indeterminacy appears (Hartman1980:152,202)

[24] literary language takes it for granted that sign and meaning can nevercoincide [...] thesignpoints tosomething thatdiffers from its literalmeaningand has for its function the thematization of this difference (DeMan 1983:261,209)

Insuchanambience,theobjectdomaintobeaddressedisnotapileofpoemsandtheirpieces,buttheexperienceofengagingwithadiscoursewhoseaestheticvalueandvalencedependpreciselyonapluralismofalternativesignificances,assuggestedbymysketchof theEmilyDickinsonpoemin3.812(cf.Beaugrande1988a,1988c).Inparticular,wewouldnotbeconcernedtodecidejustwhatisrealor metaphoric, or to guess exactly what is implied, but would attempt toexperiencetheshiftsandinterchangesofidentitieswhichthepoembothportraysandenacts.

4.6The keyquestion for us today is how the intensifyingengagementswithdiscourse insocial science reflectupon those in thehumanitiesandviceversa.Admittedly,themodeofdiscourseontheonesidediffersconspicuouslyfromthatof theother.But,as Ihave tried to indicate, theways inwhichculturaldomainsrepresent the world also has important commonalities with the ways in whichhumanisticdomainslikeliteratureandpoetrydo:4.6.1 both sidesmake strategic decisions about how significances should beassignedtosymbolsandviceversa

4.6.2 both take it for granted that the actionswhich humansperformand theobjects with which they surround themselves are meaningful well beyondobservablephysicalconditionslikeforce,motion,anddimension

4.6.3bothdependcruciallyoninteractionandcommunicationtonegotiateandregulatethesesignificancesandmeanings

4.6.4bothare fundamentally creativeand innovative, though the cultural sideusuallyprogressesinbroaderandslowercycles

4.6.6 both present expansive interpretive problems to the professionalinvestigator.



4.7 It follows thatbothsidesshouldhavepowerfulmotives tobewaryof thestatic, objectoriented terminology favoured by long tradition and folkwisdom(3.1). Which terms may prove appropriate and insightful must be carefullyassessedinrespecttofarmorefundamentalepistemologicalandcommunicativeissues and problems than themere affixing of convenient labels to things. Thistaskwas nevermore urgent than now,when the current reorientation of socialscienceandhumanitieshaspowerfullyincreasedtheawarenessonbothsidesofthecentralityandcomplexityofdiscourse.Suchanambienceishighlyauspiciousforanewassessmentnotmerelyof thecurrent terminologies,butof the roleofterminologyatlargeintheexpandinginteractionamongthedisciplines.

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