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Marsilio Ficino, Platonic TheologyAuthor(s): Josephine L. BurroughsSource: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Apr., 1944), pp. 227-242Published by: University of Pennsylvania PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2707387

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FICINO AND POMPONAZZI ON MAN 227MarsilioFicino,Platonic Theology'

TranslatedbyJosephineL. Burroughs Bryn Mawr College)Book III, Chapter 2.Soul is the intermediate egreeof all things, nd connects ll superior ndinferior egrees ntoone by bothascendingto the superior nd descendingto the nferior.

Finally, to cometothe point,we again collect ll Being intofivedegrees,puttingGod and Angel in nature'shighestplace, Body and Quality2 n thelowest, nd Soul right n themiddlebetweenthesehighest nd lowestde-grees. We rightlycall it, in Platonic fashion,the thirdor intermediateessence, inceit is both ntermediate etween heothers nd in every ensethird. In descendingfromGod, Soul is found in the thirdgrade of thedescent;and in ascendingfromBody it is also found n thethirdgrade ofthe ascent. In our opinion t is exceedinglynecessaryfor there to be anessenceof thiskind in nature,since Angel indeed, as the Platonists say,possesses true Being, that is, remains at all times unchanged; whereasQuality s Becoming, hat s, changesfrom imeto time. ClearlyQuality scompletely ifferentromAngel. While Quality changes,Angel remainsunchanged; and whileQuality comes nto beingfromtimeto time,Angelexists at all times. There must thereforebe something ntermediate(medium) whichmay agree partlywithAngel, and partlywith Quality.What is this thing? Is it perhapssomething hathas trueBeing, that is,remains ntrinsically nchangedfor a time. No, fornothingof thiskindcan be discovered, ince anythingwhichremainsat any time ntrinsicallyunchanged, itherbecause of its ownnature,or because of its proximity otheprincipleof rest,3 emainsso at all times. The intermediate r mean,therefore, ill be something hat is always coming ntobeing,that is, thatis alwayschanging. It agreeswithAngel in that t alwayshas Being,withQualityin thatit is changing. From this it followsthat there must be athirdessence ntermediate etweenthe otherdegrees, n essencewhichisalways changing nd alive, and which,by its ownmotion, iffusesifeintoBody. The Platonistsrightly ay that above thatwhichexists n a part oftime, s thatwhichexiststhrough ll time; and above this in turn, s thatwhichexiststhrough ternity; nd finallyrbove this,eternitytself. Butbetweenthe thingswhichare eternalonly,and thosewhichare temporalonly,there s Soul, a kind of link,as it were,betweenthem. Indeed, themost xcellentpartsof thebodyofthe universe re somewhat imilarto theSoul in thisrespect. Thereare some whoplace the Empyrean,since it is

1 Textbased on the editionof Paris, 1559 (a). This editionhas been at timescollatedwith heedition f Plato (Venice,1491) (b).2 qualitatemb, quantitatem .3vel ex statu proximemaneta b.


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228 NOTES AND DOCUMENTSwhollyunchanging,4n eternity; he remaining pheres, imultaneouslyneternity nd in time; lastly,the composite odies in time alone. Similarlyalso, theyplace pure intellectsn thefirst egree, he ntellects elonging osouls in the second, nd lastly, ouls belonging obodies n the thirddegree.But let us return o our original problem. Every work constructed fmany elements s most perfectwhen all its members re closely boundtogether,o that it becomesone in all respects, irm n order and harmonywithin tself, nd noteasilydissolved. Corporealnature showsthisclearlyin the rightly roportionedmixtureof the fourelements,whereearth andfire, ar distantfrom ach other, re joined through ir and water. To anevenhigherdegree, uch a connection fpartsmust be assumed n theuni-versal work fGod, n order hat theworkof the oneDeity mayalso be One.God and Body are extremes n nature,and absolutelyunlike each other.Angeldoes not bindthem ogether, orsurely t is entirely irected owardsGod,and neglectsBody. Appropriately his mostperfect nd supremeofGod's creatures s madeentirely ivine, nd inclines owardsGod. Further,Quality does not connect he extremes, or it declinestowardBody, relin-quishing the highest things. Abandoning incorporeal things, t becomescorporeal.Thus farall thesedegrees re extremes,nd thehigher nd lower thingsfleefrom each other, acking any bond to unite them. But if the thirdessence5 is placed between hem, hen t is of such kindthat t holdsfast tohigher thingswithout forsakingthe lower, and thus binds togetherthehigherwiththelower. It is bothunchangedand changing. Because it isunchanged,t agreeswith hehigher hings;because it is changing,withthelower. If it agreeswithboth, t desires both. On thisaccount t ascendsto higherthingsby a certain natural instinct, nd similarly t descendstolower things. And in ascendingit does not forsakethe inferior, nd indescending t does notrelinquish he sublime. For if it relinquished itherofthe two, t would nclineto the other xtreme,nd would nottrulybe thebondofthe world.Indeed, it performs he same function s does the air betweenfire ndwater,for air agreeswithfire n warmth, nd with water n moistness. Onthe onehand, t is alwayswarm ikefire, n theother,t is alwaysmoist ikewater. On theonehand,it becomesfine nd bright ike fire, n the other,it becomesdull in appearance like water. Again,this third essencehas thesamefunction s the ightof the sun. The lightdescendsfrom hesun intofire, nd fillsfire,without eaving the sun. At all times t adheresto thesun,and at all times t fills ire. Again itperfects heair,and is not nfectedby the corruption f the air. In the samefashion, he thirdessence mnust

4 immobile,mobile .5 essentia , essentiali .6 hebescit b.


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FICINO AND POMPONAZZI ON MAN 229adheretodivinethings, nd fillmortal hings. By adhering o divinethingsit comesto know them, or t is united spirituallywith them, nd spiritualunion causes knowledge. By fillingbodies and movingthemfromwithin,it animates hem. Therefore hethird ssence s themirror f divinethings,the ifeofmortal hings, nd theconnection etween hetwo.But in what manner s Soul united withbodies? When for nstance tenters nto a body,does it touchthat body at one particularpoint, nd is itthus that t is said tobe unitedwithbody By no means,for t wouldthenbe unitedwith a point,not withthe wholebody; norwould it animatethewholebody,for onlyone pointwould thenlive, and the body as a wholewould lack life. Moreover,f Soul were always concentrated t one point,and remained hus at unitywith tself, t wouldbe the sameas Angel,whichis verydifferentromBody; or at least it would adhereto divine things nthe same manner as Angel, and relinquishBody. Therefore, oul is notjoined withBody at one point only,but at many, nd thusfills hepartsofa body.Does it thenfill bodyin thesame way that whiteness illswhiteflesh,and as in general anyqualityfills ts own propermatter Not in theleast,forthen t would be the same as Quality; and relinquishing ivinethings,would inclinecompletelyowardsBody. Whiteness s in thewholefleshnsuch a way that t is extended qually alongwith flesh nd divided into itsmany parts; and in such a waythat, ccording o the natural philosophers,a part of whiteness xists n a part offlesh, larger part in a larger, nd asmallerpart in a smaller. Thus whiteness ecomescorporeal. Clearlythesamewould happen to thatessencewhichwe believe to be third, f it werepoured nto body n thesamemanner s Quality. And thus beingdraggedtotheother xtreme f nature, t would ceaseto be thebond of the world.On thataccount,whenSoul entersBody,it is present s a wholeto eachpartofa body;nor does tneedtobe divided ordispersed ntoparts n orderto penetrate heparts of bodywhichare distant fromeach other;for thethirdessencetouchesbodythrough n indivisible orce,notthrough he ex-tension f tsquantity. Therefore,emaining ntire nd simple, t is presentto the ndividualpartsofbodyas an undividedwhole; ust as an entirewordand itsmeaning s somehow resent t the same time n the ndividualpartsof a house, sinceas a whole t is heard and understood n all parts almostsimultaneously. Nor is it impossible hat thisessence, ince t is somethingindivisible, xisting n itself, houldbe thuswhollypresent n themass of agreat body. On thecontrary, inceit is indivisible nd not limited o anyplace, t is able as a wholeto penetrate nd wholly omprehendll that s ina place. Extension ofquantitywherever t is foundprecludesthis kindofpowerand presence, o that anythingquantitatively xtended cannot bewhollypresentin many parts at the same time. Even a thing which,although t is indivisible,s neverthelessomehowoined to corporealquan-


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230 NOTES AND DOCUMENTStity, uch as a point located on a line as the limit of that line, cannotbewholly resent t the same time hrough ll the partsofbody. Thus a pointplaced anywhere n the radius of a circle s neither ontained n all the otherradii,nor diffusedhrough he whole radius or circle. But thepointwhichis thecenter fthecircledoes notbelong to any particularradius; it is in asense located on all the radii drawn from t to the circumference.Andwhereasnopoint ocatedon thecircumferences equallyrelated to the wholecircle,the center s equally related to the whole circle, although t is notlimited to any particular circumference. Therefore t is impossiblefor athingwhich s divisible o be whollypresent n many parts simultaneously;this s also impossible or a thingwhich s indivisible uthas a definiteoca-tion n anotherdivisible hing.Hence that third essence s not extended, or then t wouldbe Quality;nor is it placed somewheren extension, or if it did not subsist throughitself, t wouldnotbe moved through tself nd freely. Whencethethirdessence s likea point iving n itself, nd entirely reefrom ll quantity ndlocation. Therefore oul penetrates verypart ofa body equally,and whenit enters nto a body, s not bound to any point of the quantityof body,because it is not itself point belonging o a particular quantity. Indeed,since t fallsoutsidethegenusofquantity, t is notboundto touchany par-ticular pointof quantity, ut is present s the center s in all radii and inthewholecircle.Hence it also follows hatthis essence s at once divisible nd indivisible.It is divisible, or tdiffuses he shadow of its ownlife through he divisionofbody,by communicatingtself o the diverseparts of body. It is indivisi-ble, for it is simultaneously resentas a whole and simple entity. It isdivisible, say, because ts shadow s in the wholedivisiblebody; indivisible,because it is itselfwhollypresent n an indivisiblemanner n everypart ofbody. Again, it is indivisible, ecause it has a stableand unified ubstance;it is divisible,because it is divided intomany parts through ts operation,in so far as it operatesthroughmotion nd time. It is indivisible, ecauseit inclinestowardthe higher hingswhichare completely nified; divisible,because it declines toward the lower thingswhich are divided into manyparts.A natureof this kindappears exceedinglynecessary n the orderof theworld, o that afterGod and Angel,which re divisibleneither ccording otimenoraccording oextension,nd aboveBody and Quality,which re dis-persed in time and in extension, hereis an appropriate mean,which isindeed divided n a certainmannerbythesuccession fits acts in time,yetnot divided in its extension. Further, t neitherremains forever oncen-trated n its own nature ike thehigher eings,nor s it separated ntopartslike the ower; butis at thesame time ndivisible nd divisible. This is thatsame essencewhich he LocrianTimaeus, nd Plato in hisbook on theworld,


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FICINO AND POMPONAZZI ON MAN 231say is compounded f the indivisible nd the divisible.7 This is thenaturewhich mmersestself nmortal hings,without tselfbecomingmortal. Forjust as it immerses tself s a whole,not in parts, o it withdrawstself s awhole,not in dispersedparts. And because,while it rules bodies, t alsoadheres to that which is divine, it is the mistressof bodies, not theirattendant.This is thegreatestwonder n nature. All otherthingsunderGod arealwaysin themselves f onecertainkind ofbeing; thisessence s at onceallof them. It possesses n itself mages of the divine things upon which tdepends. It also possessesthe reasons and models of the inferior hingswhich t in a sensebringsforth. Since it is the mean of all things, t pos-sesses the powersof all; hence it transformstself into all things. Andbecauseit is itself he truebond ofthe universe,n passingintosomethingsit does not forsake he others, ut enters ntoindividualthings, nd at thesametime preserves ll things. Thereforet can with usticebe called thecenterof nature, he middlepointof all that s, the chainof theworld, heface ofall, and the knot nd bondof the universe.I thinkwe have sufficientlyxplained the nature of this thirdessence.Moreover, hat this essence s itselfthe properseat of the rational soul iseasilyseen from hedefinition ftherationalsoul as a lifewhichthinks nsuccessive acts, and animates the body in time (vita et intelligensdiscur-rendoet corpusvivificansempore). This is just thecondition f the thirdessence, or tlives, hinks,nd gives ifeto thebody. That it lives s appar-ent,for we say that thoseterrestrial odies are alive which moveby theirown internalforce n all directions, p and down,forwards, ackwards, otheright nd to the eft. This is theway plantsand animalsmove. There-fore,wherever here s internal nd commonmotion, here s life. Life, Isay,is a thing's nternalpowerofmoving tself. Such a forcemust be inthehighest egreepresentwherewefind hesourceand originof all motion,and firstmotion. For motion s in the highestdegree nternal nd commonwhen tis firstmotion. But firstmotions said toreside n thisthird ssence.Therefore ife is there, ife I say of such a kind thatby participating n itbodies live and move; for life is by its verynature as close as possibletobodies.This third ssence, hen, s the ifewhich nimatesbodies. It also thinks.Clearly if motion s everperfect, t is surelymostperfectwhenit is firstmotion;forthere sno perfectionnposteriormotions ot derivedfrom irstmotion. Therefore he motion n thethirdessence s the mostperfect fallmotions. But thisis themotionwhichdepartsfrom ts sourceas little aspossible; which is mostcloselyunited to its foundation;which is in thehighestdegreeone and equal; which s sufficientntoitself;and which mi-tates the mostperfectform. It is plain to all that circular motion s like

7Plato, Timaeus35 a. Pseudo-TimaeusLocrus,De animamundi95 e.


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232 NOTES AND DOCUMENTSthis. Certainlyit alone of all motions s perpetual. Clearly, all othermotions eachan end beyondwhich t is notpossibleto advance,for in nodirection s space infinite. But circular motionreturns o the same pointonceand likewise wice, nd three nd fourtimes. In it thebeginning ndthe end are thesame; just when t seems o be finished,t is beginning gain.Therefore, erpetual circularmotionbelongsto the third essence, o thatthus throughmotion n a circle, t may be reflected nto itself. Since itmoves out of itself, t also quite properlymoves into itself, so that thedeterminate nd of motionmay be where its determinatebeginningis.Surely the cause of motion n a sense produces motionfor its own sake.Thereforehisessence, eginning rom tself, erpetually eturns nto tself,unfoldingtsownpowersfrom hehighest hrough hemiddleto the owest,and again resuming hem rom he owest hrough hemiddle to thehighest.If this is the case, then t perceives tself and what it possesseswithinitself. If it perceives, t certainlyknows. But it knowsby "intellection"or pure thought n so far as it recognizes ts ownessenceas spiritualandfree from ny material imits;for theknowledgeof such objects is indeedcalled intellectio. In ourselveswe see perfectly hat knowledge s nothingelse thana spiritualunion with somespiritualform. Vision,being joinedthrough ts own spiritusto the spiritual magesof colors, ees them. Yetwhen tis joinedto matter t seesnothing, s is shownwhen we place a solidbody directlyupon the eye. Our mind also knows thingsin themselveswhen, hroughts ownspiritualforce, t is unitedto the ncorporeal peciesand principlesof things. Similarly,whenthe thirdessence (which s cer-tainly spiritual) is joined to itself, urning ttention oward tself, hen trecognizes nd knows tself n a spiritualmanner. It likewise knowsthedivine things o which t adheresmost closely n a spiritual fashion. Anditalso knows he corporeal hings owardswhich tdeclinesby nature. I sayit "thinks" in a temporal uccession f acts, since in its operation t is sub-ject to change (mobile). From all this results thefollowingdefinitionfthe third ssence: t is "life" whichbyitsnatureanimatesbodies, nd whichalso knows tself, nd divine and naturalthings hrough iscursive hought.Whoever does not see that this definitions also that of the rational soul,lacks a rationalsoul. Therefore, herational soul has its seat in the thirdessence,holds the middleregionof nature, nd connects ll things nto one.Book XlII, Chapter 3.The thirdsign of immortality,aken fromtheactivitiesof the arts and ofgovernment.

All other nimals live eitherwithout rt,or each with one single art totheuse ofwhichtheyare not directedby theirown will, but to whichtheyare drawnby a law of fate. This is shownby the fact that theymake no


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FICINO AND POMPONAZZI ON MAN 233progress n timewithrespectto theskillapplied in theproduction f theirworks. On theotherhand,menare theinventors f innumerable rts andpracticethemaccordingto theirown freewill. This is evidentfromthefactthat ndividualmenpracticemanyarts,changethem nd overa periodof timebecomemore killful n theiruse of them.And whatis quitewonderful, umanartsproduceby themselveswhat-evernature itselfproduces,as if we werenot the slaves,but the rivals ofnature. Thus,Zeuxis paintedgrapes n suchmanner hatthe birdsflew othem. Apellespainteda steedand a she-dogn suchmanner hat npassingby horseswould neighand dogsbark. Praxiteles shaped a marbleVenusfor an Indian temple8whichwas so beautifulthat it could hardlybe keptsafe and undefiledfrom the lascivious ones who passed by. ArchytasofTarentummadea woodenpigeonwithhismathematicalkill,poised t in theair, filled t withbreathand thusmade it fly. As Hermes Trismegistusreports, heEgyptiansmadestatuesof thegodswhichwereable to talkandto walk. Archimedes f Syracusemade a heavenof brass in whichall themovementsf thesevenplanetscouldbe trulyperformeds in theheavens,and the wholethingmoved iketheheavens.-Not to mention he pyramidsof the Egyptians,thebuildingsof the Greeksand Romans,theworkshopswheremetalwork nd glass are made.

Thus man imitates ll theworksof thedivinenature, nd perfects, or-rectsand improves heworksofthe owernature. Therefore hepowerofman is almost imilarto thatofthedivinenature,forman acts in thiswaythrough imself. Throughhisownwit and art he governshimself,withoutbeingboundbyanylimits fcorporealnature; and he imitates ll theworksofthehighernature. Much less thantheanimalsdoeshe need thesupportof the owernature, incehehas receivedfromnature ess protection orhisbodythanhavetheanimals. Throughhis ownresourcefulness e producesfood, lothes, edding, helter,nstruments,nd weapons. Althoughhe sup-portshimself yhis ownpower,he supportshimselfmore abundantly hannaturesupports heanimals.Hence arisesthe nexhaustible arietyofpleasureswhichdelight hefivesenses of thisbody and whichwe procurefor ourselvesthroughour owngenius.9 The animals are kept in themostnarrow imits of nature. Ourmind doesnot aimonlyat thenecessity f thebody, s do the animalswhichare subjectedto the ruleof nature. It also aimsat manifolddelights fthesenses, s at somefoodforourimagination. Our mind does notonlyflatterourimagination hrough arious blandishments, hen t soothes maginationdaily bydifferentames n a kind ofplay; but sometimes,lso,thethinkingreasonactsmore eriously,nd eagertobringforth tsproducts,eaps forthand visiblyshowsthepowerof its geniusin themanifold extures f wool

8 Indorum b.9 ngenio b.


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234 NOTES AND DOCUMENTSand silk and in pictures,sculptures, nd buildings. In producingthesethings, urmindoftendoesnottake nto considerationny physicalcomfortor pleasure of the senses,for sometimes t even endures discomfort ndtroublefrom hemof its ownfreewill. It rather ims at an amplificationof tseloquence nd at a proofof tspower.In theseworks f art we may noticehowmanhandles all materials ftheworld and in all manners, s if they were all subjected to him. I say,hehandles elements, tones,metals,plants and animals, and transforms heminto many forms and figures, n achievement f which the animals areincapable. Nor is he contentwith one element r with some of them s aretheanimals,butheuses them ll as ifhe were the ord of all. He treads onthe earth, sails on the water, ascends into the air by means of veryhightowers, ottomention hewingsofDaedalus or Icarus. He lightsthefire,uses the flame onfidentlynthehearth, nd is theonlybeingthatenjoys t.Quite appropriately hecelestialcreature lone enjoysthecelestialelement.With celestialpowerhe ascends nto the heavenand measures t. With hissupercelestialmindhe transcendsheaven. Man not onlymakesuse of theelements, ut also adorns them, thing whichno animal ever does. Howwonderfuls the cultivation f the soil all overtheearth,how marvelous heconstruction f buildings and cities,how skillfulthe controlof thewater-ways!Man is reallythevicar of God, sincehe inhabitsand cultivatesall ele-ments nd is present n earthwithout eing absentfrom he ether. He usesnot only the elements, ut also all the animals whichbelong to theelements,theanimals of theearth, f thewater, nd of the air, for food,convenience,and pleasure, nd thehigher, elestialbeingsforknowledge nd themiraclesof magic. Not onlydoes he make use of the animals, he also rules them.It is true,with heweapons receivedfromnature some animals may at timesattackman or escape his control. But with theweaponshe has inventedhimselfman avoids the attacksof wild animals,puts them o flight nd tamesthem. Whohas everseenanyhumanbeings keptunder thecontrol f ani-mals, n sucha way as we see everywhere erds of both wild and domesti-cated animalsobeyingmenthroughoutheir ives? Man notonlyrules theanimalsby force, e also governs, eepsand teachesthem. Universal provi-dencebelongs oGod,who s theuniversalcause. Hence manwhoprovidesgenerally orall things, oth ivingand lifeless,s a kindofgod. Certainlyhe is the god oftheanimals,forhemakesuse of them ll, rulesthem ll, andinstructsmanyof them. It is also obviousthat he is the god of the ele-ments, orhe inhabits nd cultivates ll of them. Finally,he is thegod ofall materialsfor he handles, changesand shapes all of them. He whogov-erns thebody n somanyand so importantways,and is thevicar ofthe m-mortalGod,he is no doubtimmortal.But these arts, althoughthey shape thematerialof theworld,rule theanimalsand thus mitateGod theartisan ofnature, re yet nferior o those


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FICINO AND POMPONAZZI ON MAN 235arts which,mitating he divinerule,take careof human government. Indi-vidual animals are hardly capable of taking care of themselves r theiryoung. Man alone abounds n such a perfectionhat he first uleshimself,something hatno animalsdo, and thereafter ules the family, dministersthe state,governsnations nd rules the wholeworld. As if he were borntorule, he is unable to endure any kind of slavery. Moreover,he undergoesdeath for the commonweal, a thing which no animal does. For man de-spisesthese mortalblessings, eing confidentn the firmness f thecommonand eternalgood.Some maythinkthatthesearts pertainto thepresent ife,and that somuch care is not necessary orthe present ife,but should be devotedto theimitationof the divine providence. Let us therefore onsiderthose artswhichare notonlyunnecessary orbodily ife,but are most harmful o it,suchas all the iberal arts, hestudyof whichweakens he bodyand impedesthecomfort f ife: the subtlereckoning f numbers, he curiousdrawingoffigures, heobscuremovementsf lines and theawe-inspiringonsonance fmusic, he long-continuedbservation f the stars,the inquiry nto naturalcauses,the nvestigation f things ong past,10 he eloquence of orators ndthemadnessofpoets. In all these rts themind ofmandespisesthe serviceof thebody, ince the mind s able at times nd can even nowbegin to livewithout hehelp of the body.One pointaboveall shouldbe noted, hatnot everyman can understandhow and in whatmanner he skillfulworkof a clever rtisan s constructed,but onlyhe who possessesa like artistic genius. Certainlyno one couldunderstandhow Archimedes onstructed is brazenspheresand gave themmotions ike theheavenly motions, nless he were endowed witha similargenius." He who can understand t because he has a like genius coulddoubtless, s soon as he has understood t, also construct nother, rovidedhe did not ackthe propermaterial. Now,sincemanhas observed he orderof the heavens,whentheymove,whither heyproceedand withwhatmea-sures, nd whattheyproduce,who could denythatmanpossesses s it werealmost hesamegeniusas theAuthorof the heavens? And who coulddenythat man could somehow lso make the heavens, could he only obtain theinstruments nd the heavenly material,since even now he makes them,though fa different aterial, utstill witha verysimilarorder?BookXIV, Chapter .Sixthsign,because thesoul attempts o becomeeverything.We have shownthatour soul in all its acts is tryingwithall its powerto attainthe first ift fGod,that s,thepossession fall truth nd all good-ness. Does it also seek His second attribute? Does not the soul try to

'0 Diuturnorumnvestigatio b."ingenio a b.


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236 NOTES AND DOCUMENTSbecome verythingust as God is everything? It does in a wonderfulway;for the soul lives the lifeof a plant when t serves the bodyin feeding t;the lifeof an animal,when t flatters hesenses; thelifeof a man, when tdeliberates hrough easonon humanaffairs; helife of the heroes,when tinvestigates atural things; the life of the daemons,when t speculates onmathematics; he life of the angels, when t enquires nto the divine mys-teries;the ifeofGod,when t doeseverythingorGod's sake. Everyman'ssoul experiences ll thesethings n itself n someway, althoughdifferentsouls do it in different ays, and thus the humanspecies strives o becomeall things y iving he ives of all things. This iswhat Hermes Trismegistuswas admiringwhenhe said: Man is a great miracle, livingcreatureworthyofreverence nd adoration, or he knowsthe genusof the daemonsas if hewereby naturerelatedto them, nd he transforms imself ntoGod as ifhewereGod himself.Moreover, ll things hatexist, n so faras they xist, re true; and in sofar as theypossess someforce, rder and purpose,theyare good. We havealready shown hatthesoul seeks ll true nd all goodthings. Hence it seeksall things. What else does the soul seek except to know all things hroughthe intellect nd to enjoythem ll through hewill? In bothways it triesto become ll things. One of the senses,for nstance, ight, annotperceivecolors unless t assumesthe forms f those colors, nd unless a single thingis producedfrom he powerof seeing and the actualizingof the visible form,just as a single thing s producedfrom ir and light. In thesameway,theintellectdoes not knowthings hemselves nless it is clothedwith the formsofthethings obe known, nd unlessa singlethingresultsfrom he powerof thinking nd the actualizingof the intelligible orm, nd their union isaccompaniedbya singleaction. For a single operation fthinking elongsto themboth. Moreover,who would denythat a single thingresultsfromcorporealmatter and the formgiven it, since one actualization and onemotion risefrom hatcomposite Much more, ccording o the Platonistsand Averroes,musta single thingresultfrom hepowerof the ntellect ndtheform fthething o be known. For often more tablecomposite risesfromthem,since they oftenremain togetherfor a longer time than docorporealmatter nd its form. Moreover, he intellect tself s a kind ofform, mean a formwhich, ikematter, ongsfora further orm. Henceitagreesmorewith heform o be received hancorporealmatter greeswithits ownform. For all formsdescend ntothematters f the world fromhighermind. Therefore hey agree much more with our mind than withmatter.Finally,sincethemind s moreexcellent hanmatter,t also receives ndunites o tself hedesiredformmuchmore ffectivelyhandoesmatter. Wemustnotbelievethatthemind s less able to uniteto itselfwhat t takes nthanis thebody. For thebodytransformshe most diversefoods, hesoul


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FICINO AND POMPONAZZI ON MAN 237digesting hem. The mind also transformsnto itselfwhat it receivesorconceives, nd muchmoreso. For corporealextensionprevents mutualunion n bodies,whereas piritualthings re muchmoreadapted to union.Hence, accordingto Plotinus,the ideas (rationes) of things ntellectuallyknownpass into thesubstanceof the ntellectmuchmorethando foods ntothesubstance fthebody.Thus it is obvious hata singlethingresultsfrom urmindand the formof thething obe known. Whatever ssumestheform fsomething lse insuch a way that tmakes a singlething out of itselfand thatform, lmostbecomes he very hingwhoseformt assumes. Who doesnotknowthatthematter fair,when treceives heform f fire, ecomes ire, r fiery Hencethe ntellect lmostbecomeswhat t is thinking. The intellect, say,actuallybecomes hatthing, orpotentially,nd in a sense n a still mplicit utmoredeveloped state (habitu) the intellectreally was that thing even beforethinkingt,as Plotinusheld. Certainly heintellect s thinking circleatthe timewhen t has itself ctuallybecome, s itwere, he dea (ratio) ofthecircle. In fact,to be actualized in this way is to think. The intellectwasthatsame dea ofthe circleeven before, irst otentially,with respect o thesubstantial dea ofthecircle tself, nd secondly,n its moredeveloped tate(secundum habitum), with respectto the formulawe have of the idea.Moreover, hetruthof particularthingsconsists n the firmdea of them.Hence themind becomes ach truethingwhen it thinks hingsthemselves,turningtoward theirperpetual ideas (rationes). But of this elsewhere.For thepresent t is enoughto understand hat,since the intellect eekstothink ll things, nd since n the act ofthinkingt is completely lothedwiththeirforms,t follows hat it seeks to becomeall things. Hence in tryingto becomeall thingsthe intellect riesto become God, in whomall thingsexist. So muchof the ntellect.Our willhas thesamedesire,for t ever desiresto enjoyall goodthings.When tenjoysthings,tunites tself o what tenjoys. Yet there s a differ-encebetweenntellect nd will. Both become ll things, he ntellect ll thatare true,and thewill all that are good. But the intellect s unitedwiththingsbytransforminghem nto tself;the will,on the contrary, y trans-formingtself ntothethings. In whatway? Our intellectknowsthingsin its ownmannerratherthanaccordingto the natureof the things. Thecorporeal ormswhich reparticular,mmersednmatter, ivided, onfused,tainted nd subjectto change, he ntellect hinks n a mannerwhich s uni-versal, bsolute, imple,distinct, ure,and stable. God and theangelswhoare stableand simple, he ntellect omprehendsn a changing nd multipleact ofthought. Thus ourintellect rasps n its ownmanner he things hatexistbothabove and below tself. Hence it is said to transformll thingsinto its ownnature. Thus Plato's sayingseemsto be confirmed,hat themind thinks hroughnnateforms, inceit thinks n themannerof its own


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238 NOTES AND DOCUMENTSnature. However, he will doesnot remainwithin tself s doesthe ntellect,but on the contrarymoves soul and bodyto action in order thatthey mayapproachthedesiredobjects. Moreover, he will doesnot desirethe thingsas they re inherentn the soul,but rather s theyexist n themselves. Tothe ntellectwhen t thinks old,theuniversal nd incorporeal peciesof goldis sufficient.To thewill this species s notsufficient.Since thewill is con-cernedwithhuman life, t wants this particularand corporealgold as itexists n itself.To conclude, ur soul bymeans of the ntellect nd will as by those twinPlatonic wings flies oward God, sincebymeans of them t fliestowardallthings. By means of theintellect t attachesall things o itself;by meansofthewill, t attaches tself o all things. Thus thesoul desires, ndeavors,and beginsto becomeGod,and makesprogress veryday. Every movementdirectedtowarda definite nd first egins,thenproceeds,thengraduallyincreases and makes progress,and is finally perfected. It is increasedthrough he same power throughwhich it was begun; it makes progressthrough hesamepowerthroughwhich t was increased; and finally, t isperfected hrough hesame powerthroughwhich t made progress. Henceour soul will sometimebe able to become n a senseall things;and eventobecome god.Chapter 4. Seventh and eighth igns,because the soul attempts o makeall things nd also to overcome ll things.

Therefollowother ttributes fGod: thethird, hat He is theauthorofall things;the fourth, hatHe is above all things. These our soul likewiseattempts o reach. Elsewherewe have describedhowthe soul through tsvariousarts imitates ll theworksofGod,and thusmakesall things, fterthe modelof God. We have also said thatman strives o rule overhimselfand all other reatures,men as well as animals; and that he is unableto bearanykind ofslavery. Even ifhe is forcedto serve,he hates his lord,sincehe servesagainsthis nature. In everything e striveswithall his strengthto overcome thers;and he is ashamed to be defeatedeven n smallmattersand themosttrifling ames,as if this were against the natural dignityofman. In general, hesenseofshameand reverence s properto thehumanrace, and denotes n us something o be respectedwhich it is a crime toviolate, nd which s mostworthy freverence. About thiselsewhere.As for our desireforvictory,we can easilyrecognize he immeasurablesplendorofour soul from he fact that evendominion ver this world willnotsatisfy t, f afterhavingsubdued thisworld, t learnsthat there s stillanotherwhich t has notyetsubdued. Thus when AlexanderheardAnax-archus the followerof Democritusassertingthat there are innumerableworlds,he exclaimed:How miserable m I who have notyetsubduedevenone world. Thus man wants neither uperior,nor equal, and he does not


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FICINO AND POMPONAZZI ON MAN 239suffer hatanything e excludedfromhis rule. This conditionbelongstoGod only. Hence man desires the conditionof God. This can be easilyinferredfrom the fact that many philosophers nd princes have soughtdivinehonorsfor themselves. It did not satisfy hemto be considered sgoodmenunlesstheywere considered lso as divine. Theyeven wanted tobe worshiped ikegods. Innumerablemen have made theattempt; n par-ticular,amongthephilosophers mpedoeles,amongtheprinces Alexanderof Macedonia,are said to have had this desire. But all menhave thesamedesire, nd wouldmaketheattempt f theycould but hopeto succeed, s iftheycould as a naturalrightclaimdivinity orthemselves.


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240 NOTES AND DOCUMENTSPietroPomponazzi,Or the mmortality f theSoul'

TranslatedbyWilliamHenry Hay II (Washington,D. C.)Chapter One,in which t is shown hatmanis ofa twofoldnature,half-waybetweenmortal nd immortal hings.Now, I hold that the beginningof our consideration hould be madehere: man is plainlynot of simplebut of multiple,not of certainbut ofambiguousnature,he is to be placed halfwaybetweenmortaland immortalthings. This is plain to see if we examinehis essential operations; foressences re alwaysmade knownbyessentialoperations. For in performingthe operationsof thevegetative nd the sensitive oul, which, s is said in

the secondbook of De anima and in the thirdchapterof thesecond book ofDe generatione nimalium, annot be performedwithout corporealandperishable nstrument,man assumesmortality. However, n knowing ndwilling,operationswhichthroughout he whole book of De anima and inthefirst hapterofthe first ookofDe partibusanimalium nd in the thirdchapterof the secondbook of De generatione nimatium, re held to beperformed ithout corporeal nstrument,incetheyproveseparability ndimmateriality,nd theseproveimmortality, an is to be numbered mongthe mmortal hings. Fromwhichthewholeconclusion an be drawn, thatman is plainlynot of a singlenature,since he includes threesouls, as itwere,thevegetative, he sensitive, nd the intellective; nd that he claimsa twofoldnatureforhimself, ince he existsneitherunqualifiedlymortalnor unqualifiedly mmortal,but embraces both natures. Therefore theancients pokewellwhenthey stablishedhimbetween ternal nd temporalthings, orthe reason that he is neitherpurelyeternalnorpurelytemporal,since he partakesof bothnatures; and to himwhoseplace is thus in themiddle,power s givento assume whichever aturehe wishes. Therefore,there are three kinds of men to be found. Some are numberedwith theGods, lthough hese rebutfew; and these rethosewho,havingsubjugatedthe vegetative nd the sensitive,have becomealmost completely ational.Some,from ompleteneglectof the ntellect nd from ccupying hemselveswith hevegetative nd sensitive lone,have changed, s itwere, ntobeasts.And perhaps this is what thePythagoreanfable meanswhen it says thatmen's souls pass into differenteasts. Some are called normalmen: andthese are those who have lived tolerablyaccordingto the moral virtues;theydo not,however, evote hemselvesntirely othe ntellect, or entirelyto thecorporealfaculties. Each of thesetwo atter sortshas a wide range,as is plain to see. Withthisagreeswhatis said in thePsalm: "Thou hastmadehimbuta little ower than theangels, etc.

1 Reprinted,with the translator's permission,from Petrus Pomponatius,Tr'actatus e Immortalitate nimae,translatedbyWilliamHenryHay II (Haver-ford,1938), pp. 1-2 and 57.


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FICINO AND POMPONAZZI ON MAN 241ChapterFourteen.

To complete hisopinionwe mustknow hat, s Aristotle eaches n the booksDe generatione nimalium,natureproceeds tep by step,and in an orderlyfashion, o that it does not join an extreme mmediatelywith an extreme,but an extremewith a mean. For we see that between grasses and treesshrubsexist as a mean,betweenplants and animalsare immovable nimatethings, ike oystersand otherthings of that sort; and so on ascendingfurther. The blessed Dionysius supportsthis in the seventh chapter ofDe divinisnominibus,whenhe says that thedivinewisdom oins the endsofhighertlhingso thebeginnings f lower things. But man,as has beensaid, is the mostperfect f animals; therefore,ince thehuman soul obtainsfirst lace among materialthings, t will be joined with mmaterial hings,and is halfwaybetweenmaterialand immaterial hings. But a mean com-paredto the extremess calledthe other ftheextremes; hereforeomparedto immaterialthingsthe soul can be called material, and in respect tomaterial things, mmaterial. Nor does it deserve the names only, it alsoparticipates n theproperties ftheextremes:forgreencomparedtowhiteis not only called black, it also gatherssightlike black, althoughnot sointensely. Therefore hehuman soul also has someof the properties ftheintelligences nd some of the propertiesof all materialthings. Hence itis that,when tperforms unctions hroughwhich t agrees withthe intelli-gences, t is said to be divine and to be changed into Gods; but when itperforms unctiolls f thebeasts, t is said to be changed nto a beast; forbyreasonof ts malice t is called a serpentor a fox,byreasonofits crueltya tiger,and so on. For there s nothing n the world that by reason ofsomeproperty annot agreewithmanhimself;wherefore ot undeservedlyis man called themicrocosm r the little world. Therefore omehave saidthat man is a greatmarvel, incehe is the wholeworldand convertiblentoeverynature, incepowerhas beengivenhimto assume whateverpropertyhe may prefer. Therefore he ancientsweretellingwise mythswhen theysaid that some men had been made Gods, some lions, some wolves,someeagles,somefishes, omeplants, omerocks, nd so on; sincesome menhavefollowed he ntellect,omethe senses, nd somethepowersofthe vegetativesoul,and so on.Therefore ll thosewho place bodily pleasures beforemoral or intel-lectual virtuesmake man a beast ratherthan a God; those whoput richesfirst urnman intogold: hence theformer re to be called beasts,the latterinsensate. Therefore, ven if the soul be mortal, hevirtuesare not to bedespised, nd pleasuressought,unless one prefers o be a beast ratherthana man,and deprivedof sense ratherthan endowedwith sense or knowing.Neverthelesswe oughtto knowthat howevermuchman thus participatesin the material nd the mmaterial, et he is properly aid to participate n


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242 NOTES AND DOCUMENTSthe mmaterial,ecausehe acksmuch f mmateriality;utheis notprop-erly aidtoparticipatenanimalsndplants, utrather o"contain"them,forheis below mmaterialhings ndabovematerialhings.Therefore ecannot rrive t theperfectionf mmaterialhings:whencemen re notcalledGods,butgod-likerdivine. But man cannotonlymakehimselfequal tothebeast,nay he can evenexcell hebeast; forthere xist omemenfar cruellerhan nybeast, s Aristotle ays n theseventh ookofEthica:"an evilman s ten housandimesworse han beast." And whatwehavesaid ofcrueltymaybe said ofthe other ices. Since,therefore,vice s so foul, ndthe ife of a viciousmanso unjust,while hecontraryis trueofvirtue,who, herefore,ven fthesoulbe mortal,wouldratherchoose in thanvirtue, nlesshe preferredo be a beastorworse han abeast, atherhan man?

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