Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCA. M. No. 08-1-16-SC January 22, 2008THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATARESOLUTIONActing on the recommendation of the Chairperson of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court submitting for this Courts consideration and approval the proposed Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.This Resolution shall take effect on February 2, 2008, following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation.January 22, 2008.THE RULE ON THE WRIT OFHABEAS DATASECTION 1.Habeas Data.- The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.SEC. 2. Who May File.- Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ ofhabeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by:(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children and parents; or(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; orSEC. 3. Where to File.- The petition may be filed with the Regional Trial Court where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner.The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan when the action concerns public data files of government offices.SEC. 4. Where Returnable; Enforceable.- When the writ is issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, it shall be returnable before such court or judge.When issued by the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored.When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such Court or any justice thereof, or before the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored.The writ ofhabeas datashall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.Sec. 5. Docket Fees.- No docket and other lawful fees shall be required from an indigent petitioner. The petition of the indigent shall be docked and acted upon immediately, without prejudice to subsequent submission of proof of indigency not later than fifteen (15) days from the filing of the petition.SEC. 6. Petition.- A verified written petition for a writ ofhabeas datashould contain:(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known;(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent. In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.SEC. 7. Issuance of the Writ.- Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court and cause it to be served within three (3) days from the issuance; or, in case of urgent necessity, the justice or judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person serve it.The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than ten (10) work days from the date of its issuance.SEC. 8. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ.- A clerk of court who refuses to issue the writ after its allowance, or a deputized person who refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the court, justice or judge for contempt without prejudice to other disciplinary actions.SEC. 9. How the Writ is Served.- The writ shall be served upon the respondent by a judicial officer or by a person deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall retain a copy on which to make a return of service. In case the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent, the rules on substituted service shall apply.SEC. 10. Return; Contents.- The respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits within five (5) working days from service of the writ, which period may be reasonably extended by the Court for justifiable reasons. The return shall, among other things, contain the following:(a) The lawful defenses such as national security, state secrets, privileged communications, confidentiality of the source of information of media and others;(b) In case of respondent in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information subject of the petition;(i) a disclosure of the data or information about the petitioner, the nature of such data or information, and the purpose for its collection;(ii) the steps or actions taken by the respondent to ensure the security and confidentiality of the data or information; and,(iii) the currency and accuracy of the data or information held; and,(c) Other allegations relevant to the resolution of the proceeding.A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.SEC. 11. Contempt.- The court, justice or judge may punish with imprisonment or fine a respondent who commits contempt by making a false return, or refusing to make a return; or any person who otherwise disobeys or resist a lawful process or order of the court.SEC. 12. When Defenses May be Heard in Chambers.- A hearing in chambers may be conducted where the respondent invokes the defense that the release of the data or information in question shall compromise national security or state secrets, or when the data or information cannot be divulged to the public due to its nature or privileged character.Sec. 13. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following pleadings and motions are prohibited:(a) Motion to dismiss;(b) Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position paper and other pleadings;(c) Dilatory motion for postponement;(d) Motion for a bill of particulars;(e) Counterclaim or cross-claim;(f) Third-party complaint;(g) Reply;(h) Motion to declare respondent in default;(i) Intervention;(j) Memorandum;(k) Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders; and(l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order.SEC. 14. Return; Filing.- In case the respondent fails to file a return, the court, justice or judge shall proceed to hear the petitionex parte, granting the petitioner such relief as the petition may warrant unless the court in its discretion requires the petitioner to submit evidence.SEC. 15. Summary Hearing.- The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.SEC. 16. Judgment.- The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall enjoin the act complained of, or order the deletion, destruction, or rectification of the erroneous data or information and grant other relevant reliefs as may be just and equitable; otherwise, the privilege of the writ shall be denied.Upon its finality, the judgment shall be enforced by the sheriff or any lawful officers as may be designated by the court, justice or judge within five (5) working days.SEC. 17. Return of Service.- The officer who executed the final judgment shall, within three (3) days from its enforcement, make a verified return to the court. The return shall contain a full statement of the proceedings under the writ and a complete inventory of the database or information, or documents and articles inspected, updated, rectified, or deleted, with copies served on the petitioner and the respondent.The officer shall state in the return how the judgment was enforced and complied with by the respondent, as well as all objections of the parties regarding the manner and regularity of the service of the writ.SEC. 18. Hearing on Officers Return.- The court shall set the return for hearing with due notice to the parties and act accordingly.SEC. 19. Appeal.- Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both.The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of notice of the judgment or final order.The appeal shall be given the same priority as inhabeas corpusandamparocases.SEC. 20. Institution of Separate Actions.- The filing of a petition for the writ ofhabeas datashall not preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative actions.SEC. 21. Consolidation.- When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the filing of a petition for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a petition for a writ ofhabeas data, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action.After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to govern the disposition of the reliefs in the petition.SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action.- When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The relief under the writ shall be available to an aggrieved party by motion in the criminal case.The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ ofhabeas data.SEC. 23. Substantive Rights.- This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.SEC. 24. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court.- The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with this Rule.SEC. 25. Effectivity.- This Rule shall take effect on February 2, 2008, following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 193636 July 24, 2012MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA,Petitioner,vs.P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director of Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte,Respondents.D E C I S I O NSERENO,J.:Before this Court is an Appeal by Certiorari (Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court) filed pursuant to Rule 191of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data,2seeking a review of the 9 September 2010 Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979 of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Laoag City, Branch 13 (RTC Br. 13).3The questioned Decision denied petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas data.4At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa (Gamboa) was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte.5Meanwhile, respondent Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was the Officer-in-Charge, and respondent Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.) William O. Fang was the Chief of the Provincial Investigation and Detective Management Branch, both of the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Office.6On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the Country."7The body, which was later on referred to as the Zearosa Commission,8was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them permanently in the future.9Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the Zearosa Commission released and submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report entitled "A Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against Private Armies Report to the President" (the Report).10Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNPIlocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides,11and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG.12Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNPIlocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zearosa Commission,13thereby causing her inclusion in the Reports enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.14More specifically, she pointed out the following items reflected therein:(a) The Report cited the PNP as its source for the portion regarding the status of PAGs in the Philippines.15(b) The Report stated that "x x x the PNP organized one dedicated Special Task Group (STG) for each private armed group (PAG) to monitor and counteract their activities."16(c) Attached as Appendix "F" of the Report is a tabulation generated by the PNP and captioned as "Status of PAGs Monitoring by STGs as of April 19, 2010," which classifies PAGs in the country according to region, indicates their identity, and lists the prominent personalities with whom these groups are associated.17The first entry in the table names a PAG, known as the Gamboa Group, linked to herein petitioner Gamboa.18(d) Statistics on the status of PAGs were based on data from the PNP, to wit:The resolutions were the subject of a national press conference held in Malacaang on March 24, 2010 at which time, the Commission was also asked to comment on the PNP report that out of one hundred seventeen (117) partisan armed groups validated, twenty-four (24) had been dismantled with sixty-seven (67) members apprehended and more than eighty-six (86) firearms confiscated.Commissioner Herman Basbao qualified that said statistics were based on PNP data but that the more significant fact from his report is that the PNP has been vigilant in monitoring the activities of these armed groups and this vigilance is largely due to the existence of the Commission which has continued communicating with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and PNP personnel in the field to constantly provide data on the activities of the PAGs. Commissioner Basbao stressed that the Commissions efforts have preempted the formation of the PAGs because now everyone is aware that there is a body monitoring the PAGs movement through the PNP. Commissioner Lieutenant General Edilberto Pardo Adan also clarified that the PAGs are being destabilized so that their ability to threaten and sow fear during the election has been considerably weakened.19(e) The Report briefly touched upon the validation system of the PNP:Also, in order to provide the Commission with accurate data which is truly reflective of the situation in the field, the PNP complied with the Commissions recommendation that they revise their validation system to include those PAGs previously listed as dormant. In the most recent briefing provided by the PNP on April 26, 2010, there are one hundred seven (107) existing PAGs. Of these groups, the PNP reported that seven (7) PAGs have been reorganized.20On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of the Report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG.21Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG also appeared on print media.22Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone who maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zearosa Commission.23As a result, she claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also made her, as well as her supporters and other people identified with her, susceptible to harassment and police surveillance operations.24Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.25In her Petition, she prayed for the following reliefs: (a) destruction of the unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte database; (b) withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c) rectification of the damage done to her honor; (d) ordering respondents to refrain from forwarding unverified reports against her; and (e) restraining respondents from making baseless reports.26The case was docketed as Special Proc. No. 14979 and was raffled to RTC Br. 13, which issued the corresponding writ on 14 July 2010 after finding the Petition meritorious on its face.27Thus, the trial court (a) instructed respondents to submit all information and reports forwarded to and used by the Zearosa Commission as basis to include her in the list of persons maintaining PAGs; (b) directed respondents, and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist from forwarding to the Zearosa Commission, or to any other government entity, information that they may have gathered against her without the approval of the court; (c) ordered respondents to make a written return of the writ together with supporting affidavits; and (d) scheduled the summary hearing of the case on 23 July 2010.28In their Return of the Writ, respondents alleged that they had acted within the bounds of their mandate in conducting the investigation and surveillance of Gamboa.29The information stored in their database supposedly pertained to two criminal cases in which she was implicated, namely: (a) a Complaint for murder and frustrated murder docketed as NPS DOC No. 1-04-INQ-091-00077, and (b) a Complaint for murder, frustrated murder and direct assault upon a person in authority, as well as indirect assault and multiple attempted murder, docketed as NPS DOCKET No. 1-04-INV-10-A-00009.30Respondents likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to comply with the following requisites under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data: (a) the manner in which the right to privacy was violated or threatened with violation and how it affected the right to life, liberty or security of Gamboa; (b) the actions and recourses she took to secure the data or information; and (c) the location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information.31They also contended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Data, being limited to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, was not the proper remedy to address the alleged besmirching of the reputation of Gamboa.32RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision dated 9 September 2010, dismissed the Petition.33The trial court categorically ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, as published in the Report, constituted a violation of her right to privacy, to wit:In this light, it cannot also be disputed that by her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboas right to privacy indubitably has been violated. The violation understandably affects her life, liberty and security enormously. The untold misery that comes with the tag of having a PAG could even be insurmountable. As she essentially alleged in her petition, she fears for her security that at any time of the day the unlimited powers of respondents may likely be exercised to further malign and destroy her reputation and to transgress her right to life.By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, it is likewise undisputed that there was certainly intrusion into Gamboas activities. It cannot be denied that information was gathered as basis therefor. After all, under Administrative Order No. 275, the Zearosa Commission was tasked to investigate the existence of private armies in the country, with all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987.x x x x x x x x xBy her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboa alleged as she accused respondents, who are public officials, of having gathered and provided information that made the Zearosa Commission to include her in the list. Obviously, it was this gathering and forwarding of information supposedly by respondents that petitioner barks at as unlawful. x x x.34Despite the foregoing findings, RTC Br. 13 nevertheless dismissed the Petition on the ground that Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that the subject information originated from respondents, and that they forwarded this database to the Zearosa Commission without the benefit of prior verification.35The trial court also ruled that even before respondents assumed their official positions, information on her may have already been acquired.36Finally, it held that the Zearosa Commission, as the body tasked to gather information on PAGs and authorized to disclose information on her, should have been impleaded as a necessary if not a compulsory party to the Petition.37Gamboa then filed the instant Appeal by Certiorari dated 24 September 2010,38raising the following assignment of errors:1. The trial court erred in ruling that the Zearosa Commission be impleaded as either a necessary or indispensable party;2. The trial court erred in declaring that Gamboa failed to present sufficient proof to link respondents as the informant to [sic] the Zearosa Commission;3. The trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;4. The trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the Zearosa Commission to [sic] the PNP as alleged by Gamboa is an assumption;5. The trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct to PNP as an agency.39On the other hand, respondents maintain the following arguments: (a) Gamboa failed to present substantial evidence to show that her right to privacy in life, liberty or security was violated, and (b) the trial court correctly dismissed the Petition on the ground that she had failed to present sufficient proof showing that respondents were the source of the report naming her as one who maintains a PAG.40Meanwhile, Gamboa argues that although A.O. 275 was a lawful order, fulfilling the mandate to dismantle PAGs in the country should be done in accordance with due process, such that the gathering and forwarding of unverified information on her must be considered unlawful.41She also reiterates that she was able to present sufficient evidence showing that the subject information originated from respondents.42In determining whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data, this Court is called upon to, first, unpack the concept of the right to privacy; second, explain the writ of habeas data as an extraordinary remedy that seeks to protect the right to informational privacy; and finally, contextualize the right to privacy vis--vis the state interest involved in the case at bar.The Right to PrivacyThe right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized as a constitutional right. This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc,43thus enunciated:The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a long way in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the provision on the periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to privacy. There is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom." As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. xxx.x x x x x x x x xx x x In the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas, speaking for five members of the Court, stated: "Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers in any house in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." After referring to various American Supreme Court decisions, Justice Douglas continued: "These cases bear witness that the right of privacy which presses for recognition is a legitimate one."x x x x x x x x xSo it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government, safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual has become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society."44(Emphases supplied)In Ople v. Torres,45this Court traced the constitutional and statutory bases of the right to privacy in Philippine jurisdiction, to wit:Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz:Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.x x x x x x x x xSec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health as may be provided by law.x x x x x x x x xSec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and the Intellectual Property Code. The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information.Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. x x x.46(Emphases supplied)Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks,47this Court underscored that the right to privacy is not absolute, viz:With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of the individuals right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed legislative investigation.48Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective, the courts are required to weigh both notions. In these cases, although considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling.The Writ of Habeas DataThe writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy.49It seeks to protect a persons right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.50It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads:Habeas data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law and jurisprudence. Considering that even the Latin American habeas data, on which our own Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins from the European tradition of data protection,51this Court can be guided by cases on the protection of personal data decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Of particular note is Leander v. Sweden,52in which the ECHR balanced the right of citizens to be free from interference in their private affairs with the right of the state to protect its national security. In this case, Torsten Leander (Leander), a Swedish citizen, worked as a temporary replacement museum technician at the Naval Museum, which was adjacent to a restricted military security zone.53He was refused employment when the requisite personnel control resulted in an unfavorable outcome on the basis of information in the secret police register, which was kept in accordance with the Personnel Control Ordinance and to which he was prevented access.54He claimed, among others, that this procedure of security control violated Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights55on the right to privacy, as nothing in his personal or political background would warrant his classification in the register as a security risk.56The ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police register of information relating to the private life of Leander, coupled with the refusal to allow him the opportunity to refute the same, amounted to an interference in his right to respect for private life.57However, the ECHR held that the interference was justified on the following grounds: (a) the personnel control system had a legitimate aim, which was the protection of national security,58and (b) the Personnel Control Ordinance gave the citizens adequate indication as to the scope and the manner of exercising discretion in the collection, recording and release of information by the authorities.59The following statements of the ECHR must be emphasized:58. The notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see, inter alia, the Gillow judgment of 24 November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 22, 55).59. However, the Court recognises that the national authorities enjoy a margin of appreciation, the scope of which will depend not only on the nature of the legitimate aim pursued but also on the particular nature of the interference involved. In the instant case, the interest of the respondent State in protecting its national security must be balanced against the seriousness of the interference with the applicants right to respect for his private life.There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of protecting national security, for the Contracting States to have laws granting the competent domestic authorities power, firstly, to collect and store in registers not accessible to the public information on persons and, secondly, to use this information when assessing the suitability of candidates for employment in posts of importance for national security.Admittedly, the contested interference adversely affected Mr. Leanders legitimate interests through the consequences it had on his possibilities of access to certain sensitive posts within the public service. On the other hand, the right of access to public service is not as such enshrined in the Convention (see, inter alia, the Kosiek judgment of 28 August 1986, Series A no. 105, p. 20, 34-35), and, apart from those consequences, the interference did not constitute an obstacle to his leading a private life of his own choosing.In these circumstances, the Court accepts that the margin of appreciation available to the respondent State in assessing the pressing social need in the present case, and in particular in choosing the means for achieving the legitimate aim of protecting national security, was a wide one.x x x x x x x x x66. The fact that the information released to the military authorities was not communicated to Mr. Leander cannot by itself warrant the conclusion that the interference was not "necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security", as it is the very absence of such communication which, at least partly, ensures the efficacy of the personnel control procedure (see, mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned Klass and Others judgment, Series A no. 28, p. 27, 58).The Court notes, however, that various authorities consulted before the issue of the Ordinance of 1969, including the Chancellor of Justice and the Parliamentary Ombudsman, considered it desirable that the rule of communication to the person concerned, as contained in section 13 of the Ordinance, should be effectively applied in so far as it did not jeopardise the purpose of the control (see paragraph 31 above).67. The Court, like the Commission, thus reaches the conclusion that the safeguards contained in the Swedish personnel control system meet the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2). Having regard to the wide margin of appreciation available to it, the respondent State was entitled to consider that in the present case the interests of national security prevailed over the individual interests of the applicant (see paragraph 59 above). The interference to which Mr. Leander was subjected cannot therefore be said to have been disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. (Emphases supplied)Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific component of the right to privacy, may yield to an overriding legitimate state interest. In similar fashion, the determination of whether the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this case entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon the private life of Gamboa and the relevant state interest involved.The collection and forwarding of information by the PNP vis--vis the interest of the state to dismantle private armies.The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority.60It also provides for the establishment of one police force that is national in scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national police commission.61Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently.To enable the Zearosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it with the powers of an investigative body, including the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation and use compulsory processes to produce documents, books, and records.62A.O. 275 likewise authorized the Zearosa Commission to deputize the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the PNP, and any other law enforcement agency to assist the commission in the performance of its functions.63Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by law to (a) enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the protection of lives and properties; (b) maintain peace and order and take all necessary steps to ensure public safety; and (c) investigate and prevent crimes.64Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and functions accorded to the Zearosa Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities.65One of those individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zearosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security.The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zearosa Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the formers mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter.Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that the PNP released information to the Zearosa Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and investigation.1wphi1Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which was used to update information on individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the situation on the field.66Thus, safeguards were put in place to make sure that the information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.Pending the enactment of legislation on data protection, this Court declines to make any further determination as to the propriety of sharing information during specific stages of intelligence gathering. To do otherwise would supplant the discretion of investigative bodies in the accomplishment of their functions, resulting in an undue encroachment on their competence.However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established in existing law and jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems it necessary to caution these investigating entities that information-sharing must observe strict confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be released exclusively to the authorities empowered to receive the relevant information. After all, inherent to the right to privacy is the freedom from "unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities."67In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its confidential nature.1wphi1That it was leaked to third parties and the media was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were responsible for this unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper.Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome.It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979 dated 9 September 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Laoag City, Br. 13, insofar as it denies Gamboa the privilege of the writ of habeas data, is AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENOAssociate justice

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998BLAS F. OPLE,petitioner,vs.RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT,respondents.PUNO,J.:The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."1Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds,viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos On December 12, 1996 and reads as follows:ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZEDIDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEMWHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities;WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently identify persons seeking basic services on social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations;WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic services and social security providing agencies and other government intrumentalities is required to achieve such a system;NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the following:Sec. 1. Establishment of a National Compoterized Identification Reference System. A decentralized Identification Reference System among the key basic services and social security providers is hereby established.Sec. 2. Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (IACC) to draw-up the implementing guidelines and oversee the implementation of the System is hereby created, chaired by the Executive Secretary, with the following as members:Head, Presidential Management StaffSecretary, National Economic Development AuthoritySecretary, Department of the Interior and Local GovernmentSecretary, Department of HealthAdministrator, Government Service Insurance System,Administrator, Social Security System,Administrator, National Statistics OfficeManaging Director, National Computer Center.Sec. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby designated as secretariat to the IACC and as such shall provide administrative and technical support to the IACC.Sec. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the NSO shall serve as the common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies. The IACC Secretariat shall coordinate with the different Social Security and Services Agencies to establish the standards in the use of Biometrics Technology and in computer application designs of their respective systems.Sec. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The Office of the Press Secretary, in coordination with the National Statistics Office, the GSIS and SSS as lead agencies and other concerned agencies shall undertake a massive tri-media information dissemination campaign to educate and raise public awareness on the importance and use of the PRN and the Social Security Identification Reference.Sec. 6. Funding. The funds necessary for the implementation of the system shall be sourced from the respective budgets of the concerned agencies.Sec. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and SSS shall submit regular reports to the Office of the President through the IACC, on the status of implementation of this undertaking.Sec. 8. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Six.(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOSA.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.Petitioner contends:A. THE ESTABLISNMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION.2Respondents counter-argue:A. THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A JUDICIAL REVIEW;B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS;C. THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES;D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY.3We now resolve.IAs is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power.4As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.5The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalidper seand as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card.6Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification system.7All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important constitutional principle and a fundamental right.IIWe now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to make laws and the power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance of power and cannot be allowed. Hence, the exercise by one branch of government of power belonging to another will be given a stricter scrutiny by this Court.The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them."8The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines.9The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive.10The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government.11Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.12In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or common interest.13While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws.14The executive power is vested in the Presidents.15It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws.16It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.17As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department.18He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office or interfere with the discretion of its officials.19Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.20Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs.21It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents.22To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.23An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.24We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and "incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles of governance."25and "embodies changes in administrative structure and procedures designed to serve thepeople."26The Code is divided into seven (7) Books: Book I deals with Sovereignty and General Administration, Book II with the Distribution of Powers of the three branches of Government, Book III on the Office of the President, Book IV on the Executive Branch, Book V on Constitutional Commissions, Book VI on National Government Budgeting, and Book VII on Administrative Procedure. These Books contain provisions on the organization, powers and general administration of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, the organization and administration of departments, bureaus and offices under the executive branch, the organization and functions of the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional bodies, the rules on the national government budget, as well as guideline for the exercise by administrative agencies of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The Code covers both the internal administration of government,i.e,internal organization, personnel and recruitment, supervision and discipline, and the effects of the functions performed by administrative officials on private individuals or parties outside government.27It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of thought. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenryvis-a-visthe State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law.Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.D. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no proctection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.Again, with due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly expand the limits of administrative legislation and consequently erodes the plenary power of Congress to make laws. This is contrary to the established approach defining the traditional limits of administrative legislation. As well stated by Fisher: ". . . Many regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here that administrative legislation must he restricted in its scope and application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws."28IIIAssuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone."29In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut,30the United States Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy when it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which can be found within the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments,31viz:Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from these guarantees that help give them life and substance . . . various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the ''right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."In the 1968 case ofMorfe v. Mutuc,32we adopted the Griswold ruling that there is a constitutional right to privacy. Speaking thru Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique Fernando, we held:xxx xxx xxxThe Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offence on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of married persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." It has wider implications though. The constitutional right to privacy has come into its own.So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual has become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society."Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution.33It is expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.Other facets of the right to privacy are protectad in various provisions of the Bill of Rights,viz:34Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.xxx xxx xxxSec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health as may be provided by law.xxx xxx xxxSec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "[e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another.35It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person,36and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications.37The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer,38the revelation of trade and industrial secrets,39and trespass to dwelling.40Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law,41the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act42and the Intellectual Property Code.43The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information.44Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs."Biometry or biometrics is "the science of the applicatin of statistical methods to biological facts; a mathematical analysis of biological data."45The term "biometrics" has evolved into a broad category of technologies which provide precise confirmation of an individual's identity through the use of the individual's own physiological and behavioral characteristics.46A physiological characteristic is a relatively stable physical characteristic such as a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry or facial features. A behavioral characteristic is influenced by the individual's personality and includes voice print, signature and keystroke.47Most biometric idenfication systems use a card or personal identificatin number (PIN) for initial identification. The biometric measurement is used to verify that the individual holding the card or entering the PIN is the legitimate owner of the card or PIN.48A most common form of biological encoding is finger-scanning where technology scans a fingertip and turns the unique pattern therein into an individual number which is called a biocrypt. The biocrypt is stored in computer data banks49and becomes a means of identifying an individual using a service. This technology requires one's fingertip to be scanned every time service or access is provided.50Another method is the retinal scan. Retinal scan technology employs optical technology to map the capillary pattern of the retina of the eye. This technology produces a unique print similar to a finger print.51Another biometric method is known as the "artificial nose." This device chemically analyzes the unique combination of substances excreted from the skin of people.52The latest on the list of biometric achievements is the thermogram. Scientists have found that by taking pictures of a face using infra-red cameras, a unique heat distribution pattern is seen. The different densities of bone, skin, fat and blood vessels all contribute to the individual's personal "heat signature."53In the last few decades, technology has progressed at a galloping rate. Some science fictions are now science facts. Today, biometrics is no longer limited to the use of fingerprint to identify an individual. It is a new science that uses various technologies in encoding any and all biological characteristics of an individual for identification. It is noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific biological characteristics and what particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify people who will seek its coverage. Considering the banquest of options available to the implementors of A.O. No. 308, the fear that it threatens the right to privacy of our people is not groundless.A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the "generation of population data for development planning."54This is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PRN.The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be undarplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must present his PRN everytime he deals with a government agency to avail of basic services and security. His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded whether it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may include his transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge formidable informatin base through the electronic linkage of the files.55The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist.56We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the name, address and other basic personal infomation about the individual.57Even that hospitable assumption will not save A.O. No. 308 from constitutional infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear and categorical terms how these information gathered shall he handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information.58Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of information. When the access code of the control programs of the particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored within the system.59It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes.60The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.61The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded.62They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.63The ability of sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle-to-grave dossier on an individual and transmit it over a national network is one of the most graphic threats of the computer revolution.64The computer is capable of producing a comprehensive dossier on individuals out of information given at different times and for varied purposes.65It can continue adding to the stored data and keeping the information up to date. Retrieval of stored date is simple. When information of a privileged character finds its way into the computer, it can be extracted together with other data on the subject.66Once extracted, the information is putty in the hands of any person. The end of privacy begins.Though A.O. No. 308 is undoubtedly not narrowly drawn, the dissenting opinions would dismiss its danger to the right to privacy as speculative and hypothetical. Again, we cannot countenance such a laidback posture. The Court will not be true to its role as the ultimate guardian of the people's liberty if it would not immediately smother the sparks that endanger their rights but would rather wait for the fire that could consume them.We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the Natioal ID and the use of biometrics technology as it stands on quicksand. The reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.67The factual circumstances of the case determines the reasonableness of the expectation.68However, other factors, such as customs, physical surroundings and practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this expectation.69The use of biometrics and computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable expectation of privacy.70As technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy decreases.71The measure of protection granted by the reasonable expectation diminishes as relevant technology becomes more widely accepted.72The security of the computer data file depends not only on the physical inaccessibility of the file but also on the advances in hardware and software computer technology. A.O. No. 308 is so widely drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of technology used, cannot be inferred from its provisions.The rules and regulations to be by the IACC cannot remedy this fatal defect. Rules and regulations merely implement the policy of the law or order. On its face, A.O. No. gives the IACC virtually infettered discretion to determine the metes and bounds of the ID System.Nor do your present laws prvide adequate safeguards for a reasonable expectation of privacy. Commonwealth Act. No. 591 penalizes the disclosure by any person of data furnished by the individual to the NSO with imprisonment and fine.73Republic Act. No. 1161 prohibits public disclosure of SSS employment records and reports.74These laws, however, apply to records and data with the NSO and the SSS. It is not clear whether they may be applied to data with the other government agencies forming part of the National ID System. The need to clarify the penal aspect of A.O. No. 308 is another reason why its enactment should be given to Congress.Next, the Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment of the right of privacy by using the rational relationship test.75He stressed that the purposes of A.O. No. 308 are: (1) to streamline and speed up the implementation of basic government services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication of services, and (3) generate population data for development planning. He cocludes that these purposes justify the incursions into the right to privacy for the means are rationally related to the end.76We are not impressed by the argument. InMorfe v. Mutuc,77we upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police power measure. We declared that the law, in compelling a public officer to make an annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources of income and expenses, did not infringe on the individual's right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote morality in public administration by curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service.78The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A. 3019 is a statute, not an administrative order. Secondly, R.A. 3019 itself is sufficiently detailed. The law is clear on what practices were prohibited and penalized, and it was narrowly drawn to avoid abuses. IN the case at bar, A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled by a worthy purpose, but, it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn. And we now hod that when the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this court will give the challenged law, administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter scrutiny. It will not do for the authorities to invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Nor is it enough for the authorities to prove that their act is not irrational for a basic right can be diminished, if not defeated, even when the government does not act irrationally. They must satisfactorily show the presence of compelling state interests and that the law, rule or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. This approach is demanded by the 1987 Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect human rights and to prevent authoritarianism. In case of doubt, the least we can do is to lean towards the stance that will not put in danger the rights protected by the Constitutions.The case ofWhalen v. Roe79citedby the Solicitor General is also off-line. In Whalen, the United States Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether the State of New York could keep a centralized computer record of the names and addresses of all persons who obtained certain drugs pursuant to a doctor's prescription. The New York State Controlled Substance Act of 1972 required physicians to identify parties obtaining prescription drugs enumerated in the statute,i.e., drugs with a recognized medical use but with a potential for abuse, so that the names and addresses of the patients can be recorded in a centralized computer file of the State Department of Health. The plaintiffs, who were patients and doctors, claimed that some people might decline necessary medication because of their fear that the computerized data may be readily available and open to public disclosure; and that once disclosed, it may stigmatize them as drug addicts.80The plaintiffs alleged that the statute invaded a constitutionally protected zone of privacy,i.e., the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court held that while an individual's interest in avoiding disclosuer of personal matter is an aspect of the right to privacy, the statute did not pose a grievous threat to establish a constitutional violation. The Court found that the statute was necessary to aid in the enforcement of laws designed to minimize the misuse of dangerous drugs. The patient-identification requirement was a product of an orderly and rational legislative decision made upon recommmendation by a specially appointed commission which held extensive hearings on the matter. Moreover, the statute was narrowly drawn and contained numerous safeguards against indiscriminate disclosure. The statute laid down the procedure and requirements for the gathering, storage and retrieval of the informatin. It ebumerated who were authorized to access the data. It also prohibited public disclosure of the data by imposing penalties for its violation. In view of these safeguards, the infringement of the patients' right to privacy was justified by a valid exercise of police power. As we discussed above, A.O. No. 308 lacks these vital safeguards.Even while we strike down A.O. No. 308, we spell out in neon that the Court is notper seagains the use of computers to accumulate, store, process, retvieve and transmit data to improve our bureaucracy. Computers work wonders to achieve the efficiency which both government and private industry seek. Many information system in different countries make use of the computer to facilitate important social objective, such as better law enforcement, faster delivery of public services, more efficient management of credit and insurance programs, improvement of telecommunications and streamlining of financial activities.81Used wisely, data stored in the computer could help good administration by making accurate and comprehensive information for those who have to frame policy and make key decisions.82The benefits of the computer has revolutionized information technology. It developed the internet,83introduced the concept of cyberspace84and the information superhighway where the individual, armed only with his personal computer, may surf and search all kinds and classes of information from libraries and databases connected to the net.In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused85and a compelling interest justify such intrusions.86Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that any law or order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny. The reason for this stance was laid down inMorfe v. Mutuc, to wit:The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic disctinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual has become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society.87IVThe right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The threats emanate from various sources governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc.88In th case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by an unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its record-keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to forget."89Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too quick in labelling the right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close with the statement that the right to privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Adminisrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional.SO ORDERED.Bellosillo and Martinez, JJ., concur.Narvasa, C.J., I join Justices Kapunan and Mendoza in their dissents.Regalado, J., In the result.Davide, Jr., In the result and I join Mr. Justice Panganiban in his separate opinion.Romero, J., Please see separate opinion.Melo, J., I join the dissents of Justices Kapunan and Mendoza.Vitug, J., See separate opinion.Kapunan, J., See dissenting opinion.Mendoza, J., Please see dissenting opinion.Panganiban, J., Please see Separate Opinion.Quisumbing, J., I join in dissenting opinion of JJ. Mendoza and Kapunan.Purisima, J., I join in Justice Mendoza's dissenting.Separate OpinionsROMERO,J.,separate opinion;What marks offs man from a beast?Aside from the distinguishing physical characteristics, man is a rational being, one who is endowed with intellect which allows him to apply reasoned judgment to problems at hand; he has the innate spiritual faculty which can tell, not only what is right but, as well, what is moral and ethical. Because of his sensibilities, emotions and feelings, he likewise possesses a sense of shame. In varying degrees as dictated by diverse cultures, he erects a wall between himself and the outside world wherein he can retreat in solitude, protecting himself from prying eyes and ears and their extensions, whether form individuals, or much later, from authoritarian intrusions.Piercing through the mists of time, we find the original Man and Woman defying the injunction of God by eating of the forbidden fruit in the Garden. And when their eyes were "opened" forthwith "they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons."1Down the corridors of time, we find man fashioning "fig leaves" of sorts or setting up figurative walls, the better to insulate themselves from the rest of humanity.Such vague stirrings of the desire "to be left alone," considered "anti-social" by some, led to the development of the concept of "privacy," unheard of among beasts. Different branches of science, have made their own studies of this craving of the human spirit psychological, anthropological sociological and philosophical, with the legal finally giving its imprimatur by elevating it to the status ofa right, specifically a private right.Initially recognized as an aspect of tort law, it created giant waves in legal circles with the publication in the Harvard Law Review2of the trail-blazing article, "The Right to Privacy," by Samuel D. Warre