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Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection AGENDA

NFPA 502 Second Draft Meeting October 9-11, 2018, 8 AM-5 PM

Holiday Inn Orlando – Disney Springs Area Orlando, Florida

1. Call to order. Tony Marino, Chair.

2. Introductions and Update of Committee Roster. (Attachment A)

3. Approval of Minutes from First Draft Meeting on Oct. 3-5, 2017. (Attachment B)

4. Staff Liaison Report

a. Review Annual 2019 Revision Cycle (Attachment C)

b. Committee Membership Update (Attachment D) c. Revision Process Review

5. Review and Act on all 8 Public Comments on NFPA 502. (Attachment E)

6. Task Group Reports. (Attachment F – TG list; Attachment G – Committee Inputs)

a. Support Devices for Heavy Equipment

b. Integration of FACP and SCADA Systems

c. Critical Velocity

d. Concurrent Incidents

e. Applicability of NFPA 72 Requirements

f. Tunnel Categories

g. Wayfinding

h. Autonomous Vehicles Annex

7. Additional Items.

a. Presentation: Lionel Lutley – Tunnel Wayfinding Lighting (Tuesday, Oct. 9)

8. Schedule Next Meeting. (First Draft meeting in the A2022 cycle must be between June

30, 2020 and December 8, 2020).

9. Adjournment.

1

ATTACHMENT A

2

Address List No PhoneRoad Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection ROA-AAA

Janna E. Shapiro09/14/2018

ROA-AAA

Antonino Marino

ChairPort Authority of New York & New Jersey4 World Trade Center150 Greenwich Street, 20th FloorNew York, NY 10007Alternate: Dimitry Kogan

U 10/27/2009ROA-AAA

Jarrod Alston

PrincipalArup955 Massachusetts AvenueCambridge, MA 02139-3180Alternate: David Barber

SE 10/23/2013

ROA-AAA

Ian E. Barry

PrincipalIEB Consulting Ltd.25 Abbeycroft CloseAstley, Manchester, M29 7TJ United KingdomAlternate: John Celentano

SE 4/3/2003ROA-AAA

David L. Bergner

PrincipalMonte Vista Associates, LLC.4024 East Elmwood StreetMesa, AZ 85205

SE 11/30/2016

ROA-AAA

Cornelis Kees Both

PrincipalPRTC Fire LaboratoryBormstraat 24Antwerp, Tisselt, 2830 Belgium

RT 10/29/2012ROA-AAA

Francesco Colella

PrincipalExponent, Inc.9 Strathmore RoadNatick, MA 01760-2418

SE 08/11/2014

ROA-AAA

William G. Connell

PrincipalPB Americas, Inc.75 Arlington StreetBoston, MA 02116Alternate: Daniel T. Dirgins

SE 10/10/1997ROA-AAA

James S. Conrad

PrincipalRSCC Wire & Cable66 Mountain Laurel DriveTolland, CT 06084-2276Alternate: Robert Schmidt

M 3/15/2007

ROA-AAA

John A. Dalton

PrincipalGCP-Applied Technologies62 Whittemore AvenueCambridge, MA 02140

M 8/9/2011ROA-AAA

Alexandre Debs

PrincipalMinistere Des Transports Du Quebec380, rue Saint-Antoine Ouest, 2nd FloorBureau 2010, P.O. Box 353Montreal, QC H2Y 3X7 Canada

E 10/20/2010

ROA-AAA

Arnold Dix

PrincipalSchool Medicine, UWSLawyer/Scientist16 Sherman CourtBerwick, VIC 3806 Australia

C 3/21/2006ROA-AAA

Michael F. Fitzpatrick

PrincipalMassachusetts Department of Transportion6 Tracy CircleWilmington, MA 01887-3071

E 10/20/2010

ROA-AAA

Russell P. Fleming

PrincipalNortheast Fire Suppression Associates, LLC157 School StreetPO Box 435Keene, NH 03431International Fire Sprinkler Association, Ltd.Alternate: Alan Brinson

M 08/17/2017ROA-AAA

Norris Harvey

PrincipalMott MacDonald50 Oneida AvenueSelden, NY 11784-3736Alternate: Iain N. R. Bowman

SE 08/11/2014

13



ROA-AAA

Jason P. Huczek

PrincipalSouthwest Research Institute6220 Culebra Road, Building 143San Antonio, TX 78238-5166Alternate: Marc L. Janssens

RT 7/23/2008ROA-AAA

Haukur Ingason

PrincipalSP Technical Research Institute of SwedenBrinellgatan 4Boras, SE-50115 SwedenAlternate: Anders Lönnermark

RT 8/5/2009

ROA-AAA

Ahmed Kashef

PrincipalNational Research Council of Canada1200 Montreal Road, Building M59Ottawa, ON K1A 0R6 Canada

RT 7/23/2008ROA-AAA

Joseph Kroboth, III

PrincipalLoudoun County VA101 Blue Seal DriveLeesburg, VA 20175

U 4/5/2001

ROA-AAA

James D. Lake

PrincipalViking Corporation210 N Industrial Park DriveHastings, MI 49058

M 08/17/2018ROA-AAA

Max Lakkonen

PrincipalInstitute for Applied Fire Safety ResearchPankstrasse 8-10, Haus ABerlin DE, 13127 Germany

RT 3/7/2013

ROA-AAA

Igor Y. Maevski

PrincipalJacobs EngineeringTwo Penn Plaza, Suite 0603New York, NY 10121

SE 4/15/2004ROA-AAA

Zachary L. Magnone

PrincipalJohnson Controls1467 Elmwood AvenueCranston, RI 02910Alternate: Robert M. Cordell

M 07/29/2013

ROA-AAA

Maurice M. Pilette

PrincipalMechanical Designs Ltd.67 Chouteau AvenueFramingham, MA 01701-4259Alternate: Gary L. English

SE 1/1/1991ROA-AAA

David M. Plotkin

PrincipalAECOMTunnel Ventilation Group125 Broad Street, Suite 1500New York, NY 10004-2400Alternate: Nader Shahcheraghi

SE 8/9/2011

ROA-AAA

Tomas Rakovec

PrincipalEfectis NederlandBrandpuntlaan Zuid 16BleiswijkZuid-Holland, 2665 NZ The NetherlandsAlternate: Daniel Joyeux


Carl H. Rivkin

PrincipalNational Renewable Energy Laboratory15013 Denver West ParkwayGolden, CO 80401-3111

U 11/30/2016

ROA-AAA

Ana Ruiz

PrincipalTD&T LLCC/ Ríos Rosas, 44AMadrid, 28010 SpainMetro Malaga

U 10/29/2012ROA-AAA

Blake M. Shugarman

PrincipalUL LLC333 Pfingsten RoadNorthbrook, IL 60062-2096Alternate: Luke C. Woods

RT 10/28/2014

24



ROA-AAA

Paul W. Sparrow

PrincipalEtex Building PerformanceSterling Centre, Eastern RoadBracknell, Berkshire, RG12 2TD United Kingdom

M 03/05/2012ROA-AAA

Dirk K. Sprakel

PrincipalFOGTEC Fire Protection GmbH & Co KGSchanzenstrasse 19AKoln, 51063 Germany

M 3/15/2007

ROA-AAA

Peter J. Sturm

PrincipalGraz University of TechnologyInffeldgasse 21AGraz, 8010 Austria


William Ventura

PrincipalFDNY263 Walker AvenueEast Patchogue, NY 11772Alternate: Kevin P. Harrison

E 08/17/2017

ROA-AAA

Hadi Wijaya

PrincipalLand Transport Authority, Singapore1 Hampshire RoadBlock 10, Level 3, MES DivisionSingapore, 219428 SingaporeAlternate: Eric Mun Kit Cheong

U 08/17/2017ROA-AAA

David Barber

AlternateArup1120 Connecticut Avenue, NWSuite 1110Washington, DC 20036-3902Principal: Jarrod Alston

SE 04/08/2015

ROA-AAA

Iain N. R. Bowman

AlternateMott MacDonald Canada Ltd.550 Burrard Street, Suite 1888Bentall 5Vancouver, BC V6C 0A3 CanadaPrincipal: Norris Harvey


Alan Brinson

AlternateEuropean Fire Sprinkler Network70 Upper Richmond RoadLondon, SW15 2RP United KingdomInternational Fire Sprinkler Association, Ltd.Principal: Russell P. Fleming

M 4/14/2005

ROA-AAA

John Celentano

AlternateCH2M Hill Consulting EngineersOldmains Cottage, SanquharDumgrieshire, DG4 6LB ScotlandPrincipal: Ian E. Barry


Eric Mun Kit Cheong

AlternateLand Transport Authority, Singapore1 Hampshire RoadBlock 10, Level 1, Systems SpecialistsSingapore, 219428 SingaporePrincipal: Hadi Wijaya

U 08/17/2017

ROA-AAA

Robert M. Cordell

AlternateJohnson Controls1467 Elmwood AvenueCranston, RI 02910Johnson ControlsPrincipal: Zachary L. Magnone

M 08/17/2017ROA-AAA

Daniel T. Dirgins

AlternatePB Americas, Inc.75 Arlington Street, 9th FloorBoston, MA 02116Principal: William G. Connell

SE 3/15/2007

35



ROA-AAA

Gary L. English

AlternateUnderground Command And Safety23415 67 Lane South WestVashon, WA 98070Principal: Maurice M. Pilette


Kevin P. Harrison

AlternateFire Department City of New York71 Mount Salem RoadPort Jervis, NY 12771Fire Department City of New YorkPrincipal: William Ventura

E 08/09/2012

ROA-AAA

Marc L. Janssens

AlternateSouthwest Research InstituteFire Technology6220 Culebra Road, Building 143San Antonio, TX 78238-5166Principal: Jason P. Huczek

RT 7/23/2008ROA-AAA

Daniel Joyeux

AlternateEfectis NederlandBrandpuntlaan Zuid 16Bleiswijk Zuid-Holland,, NZ 2665 NetherlandsPrincipal: Tomas Rakovec

RT 08/17/2018

ROA-AAA

Dimitry Kogan

AlternatePort Authority Of NY and NY150 Greenwich Street, 20th FloorNew York, NY 10007Principal: Antonino Marino

U 08/17/2018ROA-AAA

Anders Lönnermark

AlternateSP Fire TechnologyBox 857Brinellgatan 4Borås, SE-50115 SwedenPrincipal: Haukur Ingason

RT 10/29/2012

ROA-AAA

Robert Schmidt

AlternateRSCC Wire & Cable LLC20 Bradley Park RoadEast Granby, CT 06026-9789Principal: James S. Conrad

M 04/04/2017ROA-AAA

Nader Shahcheraghi

AlternateAECOM2101 Webster Street, Suite 1000Oakland, CA 94612-3060Principal: David M. Plotkin

SE 8/9/2011

ROA-AAA

Luke C. Woods

AlternateUL LLC146 Nathaniel DriveWhitinsville, MA 01588-1070Principal: Blake M. Shugarman


Arthur G. Bendelius

Member EmeritusA&G Consultants, Inc.11391 Big CanoeBig Canoe, GA 30143-5108

SE 4/1/1993

ROA-AAA

Janna E. Shapiro

Staff LiaisonNational Fire Protection AssociationOne Batterymarch ParkQuincy, MA 02169-7471

4/20/2017

46

ATTACHMENT B

7

Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection MINUTES

NFPA 502 First Draft Meeting October 3-5, 2017

Crowne Plaza Redondo Beach & Marina Redondo Beach, CA

Part I, Attendance:

Committee Members and Staff:

Name Office Organization

Antonino Marino Chair Port Authority of New York & New Jersey

Cornelis Both Principal PRTC Fire Laboratory

Francesco Colella Principal Exponent, Inc.

William Connell Principal WSP

James Conrad Principal RSCC Wire & Cable

John Dalton Principal GCP-Applied Technologies

Arnold Dix Principal School Medicine, UWS

Russell Fleming Principal International Fire Sprinkler Association

Jason Huczek Principal Southwest Research Institute

Haukur Ingason Principal RISE Research Institute of Sweden

Joseph Kroboth Principal Loudoun County VA

Max Lakkonen Principal Institute for Applied Fire Safety Research

Igor Maevski Principal Jacobs Engineering

Zachary Magnone Principal Johnson Controls

Maurice Pilette Principal Mechanical Designs Ltd.

David Plotkin Principal AECOM

Tomas Rakovec Principal Efectis Nederland

Carl Rivkin Principal National Renewable Energy Laboratory

Ana Ruiz Principal Metro Malaga

William Ventura Principal Fire Department City of New York

Hadi Wijaya Principal Land Transport Authority, Singapore

Iain Bowman Alternate Mott MacDonald Canada Ltd.

John Celentano Alternate CH2M Hill Consulting Engineers

Eric Cheong Alternate Land Transport Authority, Singapore

Robert Cordell Alternate Johnson Controls

Daniel Dirgins Alternate WSP

Gary English Alternate Underground Command and Safety

Robert Schmidt Alternate RSCC Wire & Cable LLC

Paul Sparrow Alternate Promat UK

Janna Shapiro Staff Liaison NFPA

8

Guests:

Spencer Quong Toyota/Quong & Associates Inc.

Part II, Minutes:

1. Chairman Tony Marino called the meeting to order at 8:00 AM on Tuesday, Oct. 3, 2017.

2. All attendees delivered their self-introductions. An attendance roster was produced; there

were 28 Committee Members (Principals and Alternates) present, and NFPA Staff Liaison

Janna Shapiro. One guest was present via teleconference.

3. Chairman Marino called for a motion to accept minutes of October 2015 meeting (2nd Draft)

of the Technical Committee in Dallas, TX. Motion passed unanimously.

4. Staff Liaison Shapiro provided standard meeting instructions and legal policies.

5. Staff Liaison Shapiro instructed Technical Committee on Roster update and attendance log.

6. The Technical Committee began the review and action process on 124 Public Inputs:

a. Iain Bowman addressed Inputs assigned to the QRA/Engineering Analysis Task Group

along with the Group’s recommendations.

b. Daniel Dirgins addressed Inputs assigned to the Non-hazardous Materials and

Limited Combustible Materials Task Group along with the Group’s

recommendations.

c. Francesco Colella addressed Inputs assigned to the Annex G Task Group (Electric

vehicle fire hazards and alternative fuels) along with the Group’s recommendations.

d. Igor Maevski addressed Inputs assigned to the Emergency Exit Doors/Egress Task

Group along with the Group’s recommendations.

e. Igor Maevski addressed Inputs assigned to the Structural Elements FFFS Task Group


f. Daniel Dirgins addressed Inputs assigned to the Standpipes Task Group (Chapter 4)


g. Haukur Ingason addressed Inputs assigned to the Design Fire/Critical Velocity Task

Group along with the Group’s recommendations.

h. Tomas Rakovec addressed Inputs assigned to the Road Tunnels Task Group (Chapter

7) along with the Group’s recommendations.

9

i. As Chair of the Technical Committee, Tony Marino called for actions on all remaining

Inputs.

7. After completing the review of the Public Inputs, additional proposals were brought forward

for discussion:

a. Gary English presented proposals relating to smoke in portals, fire department

connections, and concurrent incidents.

b. David Plotkin presented proposals related to noise level criteria

c. Bill Connell presented proposals for the IAN20 New Revision Task Group.

d. Iain Bowman presented proposals for new annex material to provide background

information and guidance on autonomous/semi-autonomous vehicles.

e. James Conrad presented a proposal addressing test methods for fire-resistive cables

f. Staff Liaison Shapiro presented editorial issues to the Technical Committee for

consideration.

8. Chairman Marino disbanded the existing NFPA 502 Task Groups with his thanks.

9. Chairman Marino appointed the following Task Groups for future business:

a. Support Devices for Heavy Equipment: This Task Group will review the proposal in

Committee Input #21 (based on Public Input #29) and make a recommendation at

the Second Draft meeting. Task Group members include Bill Connell (Chair), James

Conrad, Igor Maevski, Daniel Dirgins, Kees Both, Arnold Dix, Russell Fleming, and

Robert Schmidt.

b. Integration of FACP and SCADA Systems: This Task Group will review the proposal in


the Second Draft meeting. Task Group members include Iain Bowman (Chair), Gary

English, Ana Ruiz, John Celentano, Russell Fleming, and Zachary Magnone.

c. Critical Velocity: This Task Group will review the proposals in Committee Input #41

(based on Public Input #126), Committee Input #42, and Committee Input #43

(based on Public Inputs #16, #17, and #59) and make recommendations at the

Second Draft meeting. Task Group members include: Haukur Ingason (Chair), Iain

Bowman, Norris Harvey, Ahmed Kashef, Rene van der Bosch, Jason Huczek,

10

Francesco Colella, Kees Both, Igor Maevski, David Plotkin, Jarrod Alston, and Arnold

Dix

d. Concurrent Incidents: This Task Group will review the proposal in Committee Input

#55 and make a recommendation at the Second Draft Meeting. Task Group

members include: Gary English (Chair), Arnold Dix, Iain Bowman, Zachary Magnone,

and Daniel Dirgins.

e. Applicability of NFPA 72 Requirements: This Task Group will review the proposal in


the Second Draft meeting. Task Group members include Norris Harvey (Chair), Gary

English, Arnold Dix, James Conrad, and Bill Connell.

f. Tunnel Categories: This Task Group will review the proposal in Committee Input #58

(based on Public Inputs #8, #98, #9, and #87) and make recommendations at the

Second Draft meeting. Task Group members include Norris Harvey (Chair), Kees

Both, Tomas Rakovec, John Dalton, and Igor Maevski.

g. Wayfinding: This Task Group will review the proposal in Committee Input #69 and

make recommendations at the Second Draft meeting. Task Group members include

Norris Harvey (Chair) and James Conrad.

10. The Second Draft Meeting was scheduled for Oct. 8-11, 2018, with Oct. 8 being reserved for

Task Group meetings. The location will be determined at a later time. Suggestions included

Chicago, Miami, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Atlanta.

11. Chairman Marino called for a motion to adjourn the meeting at 3:00 PM on Thursday, Oct.

5, 2017. Motion passed unanimously.

11

ATTACHMENT C

12

Process Stage Process Step Dates for TCDates for TC

with CC

Public InputStage (First Draft)

Public Input Closing Date* 6/28/2017 6/28/2017

Final Date for TC First Draft Meeting 12/06/2017 9/06/2017

Posting of First Draft and TC Ballot 1/24/2018 10/18/2017

Final date for Receipt of TC First Draft ballot 2/14/2018 11/08/2017

Final date for Receipt of TC First Draft ballot - recirc 2/21/2018 11/15/2017

Posting of First Draft for CC Meeting 11/22/2017

Final date for CC First Draft Meeting 1/03/2018

Posting of First Draft and CC Ballot 1/24/2018

Final date for Receipt of CC First Draft ballot 2/14/2018

Final date for Receipt of CC First Draft ballot - recirc 2/21/2018

Post First Draft Report for Public Comment 2/28/2018 2/28/2018

Comment Stage(Second Draft)

Public Comment Closing Date* 5/09/2018 5/09/2018

Notice Published on Consent Standards (Standards that received no Comments)Note: Date varies and determined via TC ballot.

Appeal Closing Date for Consent Standards (Standards that received no Comments)

Final date for TC Second Draft Meeting 11/07/2018 8/01/2018

Posting of Second Draft and TC Ballot 12/19/2018 9/12/2018

Final date for Receipt of TC Second Draft ballot 1/09/2019 10/03/2018

Final date for receipt of TC Second Draft ballot - recirc 1/16/2019 10/10/2018

Posting of Second Draft for CC Meeting 10/17/2018

Final date for CC Second Draft Meeting 11/28/2018

Posting of Second Draft for CC Ballot 12/19/2018

Final date for Receipt of CC Second Draft ballot 1/09/2019

Final date for Receipt of CC Second Draft ballot - recirc 1/16/2019

Post Second Draft Report for NITMAM Review 1/23/2019 1/23/2019

Tech SessionPreparation (&

Issuance)

Notice of Intent to Make a Motion (NITMAM) Closing Date 2/20/2019 2/20/2019

Posting of Certified Amending Motions (CAMs) and Consent Standards 4/03/2019 4/03/2019

Appeal Closing Date for Consent Standards 4/18/2019 4/18/2019

SC Issuance Date for Consent Standards 4/28/2019 4/28/2019

Tech Session Association Meeting for Standards with CAMs 6/20/2019 6/20/2019

Appeals andIssuance

Appeal Closing Date for Standards with CAMs 7/10/2019 7/10/2019

SC Issuance Date for Standards with CAMs 8/07/2019 8/07/2019

TC = Technical Committee or PanelCC = Correlating Committee

As of 4/12/2017

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ATTACHMENT D

14

Friday 9 14, Friday

Road Tunnel and Highway Fire ProtectionROA-AAAName Representation Class Office

Distribution by %

Company

Arnold Dix School Medicine, UWS C Principal

1Voting Number Percent 3%

Alexandre Debs Ministere Des Transports Du Quebec E Principal

Michael F. Fitzpatrick Massachusetts Department ofTransportion

E Principal

William Ventura FDNY FDNY E Principal


James S. Conrad RSCC Wire & Cable M Principal

John A. Dalton GCP-Applied Technologies M Principal

Russell P. Fleming Northeast Fire SuppressionAssociates, LLC

IFSA M Principal

James D. Lake Viking Corporation M Principal

Zachary L. Magnone Johnson Controls JC M Principal

Paul W. Sparrow Etex Building Performance M Principal

Dirk K. Sprakel FOGTEC Fire Protection GmbH & CoKG

M Principal


Cornelis Kees Both PRTC Fire Laboratory RT Principal

Jason P. Huczek Southwest Research Institute RT Principal

Haukur Ingason SP Technical Research Institute ofSweden

RT Principal

Ahmed Kashef National Research Council of Canada RT Principal

Max Lakkonen Institute for Applied Fire SafetyResearch

RT Principal

Tomas Rakovec Efectis Nederland RT Principal

Blake M. Shugarman UL LLC UL RT Principal


Jarrod Alston Arup SE Principal

Ian E. Barry IEB Consulting Ltd. SE Principal

15

Friday 9 14, Friday

Road Tunnel and Highway Fire ProtectionROA-AAAName Representation Class Office

Distribution by %

Company

David L. Bergner Monte Vista Associates, LLC. SE Principal

Francesco Colella Exponent, Inc. SE Principal

William G. Connell PB Americas, Inc. SE Principal

Norris Harvey Mott MacDonald SE Principal

Igor Y. Maevski Jacobs Engineering SE Principal

Maurice M. Pilette Mechanical Designs Ltd. SE Principal

David M. Plotkin AECOM SE Principal

Peter J. Sturm Graz University of Technology SE Principal


Antonino Marino Port Authority of New York & NewJersey

U Chair

Joseph Kroboth, III Loudoun County VA U Principal

Carl H. Rivkin National Renewable EnergyLaboratory

U Principal

Ana Ruiz TD&T LLC MM U Principal

Hadi Wijaya Land Transport Authority, Singapore U Principal


33Total Voting Number

16

ATTACHMENT E

17

Public Comment No. 5-NFPA 502-2018 [ Section No. 2.3.1 ]

2.3.1 ASTM Publications.

ASTM International, 100 Barr Harbor Drive, P.O. Box C700, West Conshohocken, PA 19428-2959.

ASTM E84, Standard Test Method for Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials, 2017 2018 .

ASTM E119, Standard Test Methods for Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials, 2016a 2018 .

ASTM E136, Standard Test Method for Behavior of Materials in a Vertical Tube Furnace at 750°C, 2016a.

ASTM E2652, Standard Test Method for Behavior of Materials in a Tube Furnace with a Cone-shapedAirflow Stabilizer, at 750°C, 2016.

Statement of Problem and Substantiation for Public Comment

date updates

Related Item

• pi77

Submitter Information Verification

Submitter Full Name: Marcelo Hirschler

Organization: GBH International

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Thu May 03 01:19:11 EDT 2018

Committee:

Copyright Assignment

I, Marcelo Hirschler, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rights in copyright inthis Public Comment (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem and Substantiation). I understand and intend thatI acquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in any publication of the NFPA in which this Public Comment in this or another similaror derivative form is used. I hereby warrant that I am the author of this Public Comment and that I have full power and authority to enter intothis copyright assignment.

By checking this box I affirm that I am Marcelo Hirschler, and I agree to be legally bound by the above Copyright Assignment and theterms and conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I am creating an electronic signature that will,upon my submission of this form, have the same legal force and effect as a handwritten signature

National Fire Protection Association Report https://submittals.nfpa.org/TerraViewWeb/ContentFetcher?commentPar...

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Public Comment No. 6-NFPA 502-2018 [ Section No. 2.4 ]

2.4 References for Extracts in Mandatory Sections.

NFPA 3, Recommended Practice for Commissioning of Fire Protection and Life Safety Systems, 2015edition.

NFPA 10, Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers, 2013 edition.

NFPA 70®, National Electrical Code®, 2017 edition.

NFPA 101®, Life Safety Code®,2015 2018 edition.

NFPA 402, Guide for Aircraft Rescue and Fire-Fighting Operations, 2013 edition.

NFPA 472, Standard for Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass DestructionIncidents, 2013 edition.

NFPA 921, Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations, 2017 edition.

NFPA 1142, Standard on Water Supplies for Suburban and Rural Fire Fighting, 2017 edition.

NFPA 1901, Standard for Automotive Fire Apparatus, 2016 edition.

NFPA 5000®, Building Construction and Safety Code®,2015 2018 edition.


date updates

Related Item

• fr3




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:





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4.8.1*

A material that complies with any one of the following shall be considered a noncombustible material:

(1)

(2) The material is reported as passing ASTM E136, Standard Test Method for Behavior of Materials in aVertical Tube Furnace at 750°C.

(3) The material is reported as complying with the pass/fail criteria of ASTM E136 when tested inaccordance with the test method and procedure in ASTM E2652, Standard Test Method for Behavior ofMaterials in a Tube Furnace with a Cone-shaped Airflow Stabilizer, at 750°C.

(4) The material is reported as complying with the pass/fail criteria of EN 13501-1, Fire classification ofconstruction products and building elements — Part 1: Classification using data from reaction to firetest , in relation to ISO 1182, Reaction to fire tests for products — Non-combustibility test .


It has been shown repeatedly that the results obtained when testing to ISO 1182 are significantly less severe than the results when testing to ASTM E136. The key reason is that ASTM E136 has thermocouples placed near the test specimen and they record temperature rise that ISO 1182 does not record. When ASTM E2652 was developed (based on the apparatus and procedure of ISO 1182) and incorporated as an option into ASTM E136 it was made very clear that the additional thermocouples needed to be used for testing to ensure that materials did not "game the system" by testing to a less severe test. Numerous examples exist of materials that "pass" the criteria based on ISO 1182 and fail the criteria based on ASTM E136. Adding this option will decrease fire safety.

Related Item

• FR11




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:




* The material, in the form in which it is used and under the conditions anticipated, will not ignite, burn,support combustion, or release flammable vapors, when subjected to fire or heat.


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4.8.2 *

Where the term limited-combustible is used in this standard, it shall also include the term noncombustible.


There is nothing in this standard that explains what is a limited combustible material. The information recently added to NFPA 101 and 5000 was proposed to be added to the annex, at the public input stage. This public comment, as an alternate, proposes to simply send the user to NFPA 101 as a reference.By virtue of mentioning the term "limited combustible material" in this section the term is used.

Related Public Comments for This Document

Related Comment Relationship

Public Comment No. 3-NFPA 502-2018 [New Section after A.4.8.1(1)]

Related Item

• pi73 • pi74




Street Address:

City:

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7.3.4

Structural fire protection material, where provided, shall satisfy the following performance criteria:

(1) Tunnel structural elements shall be protected to achieve the following for concrete:

(a) The concrete is protected such that fire-induced spalling is prevented.

(b) The temperature of the concrete surface does not exceed 380°C (716°F).

(c) The temperature of the steel reinforcement within the concrete [assuming a minimum cover of 25mm (1 in.)] does not exceed 250°C (482°F).

(2) Tunnel structural elements shall be protected to achieve a lining temperature not exceeding 300°C(572°F) for steel or cast iron.

(3) The material shall be noncombustible in accordance with Section 4.8.

(4) The material shall have a minimum melting temperature of 1350ºC (2462ºF).

(5) The material shall meet the fire protection requirements with less than 5 percent humidity by weightand when fully saturated with water, in accordance with the approved time-temperature curve.

Additional Proposed Changes

File Name Description Approved

NFPA_502_Public_Comment.docx correction to text error possible link to PI#78


simply to clarify the difference between humidity and moisture and to bring the text in line with the language used in Efectis test procedure document 2008_Efectis-R0695

Related Item

• PI#78


Submitter Full Name: Paul Sparrow

Organization: Etex Building Performance

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Wed May 09 08:24:08 EDT 2018

Committee:


I, Paul Sparrow, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rights in copyright in thisPublic Comment (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem and Substantiation). I understand and intend that Iacquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in any publication of the NFPA in which this Public Comment in this or another similar orderivative form is used. I hereby warrant that I am the author of this Public Comment and that I have full power and authority to enter intothis copyright assignment.

By checking this box I affirm that I am Paul Sparrow, and I agree to be legally bound by the above Copyright Assignment and the termsand conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I am creating an electronic signature that will, upon mysubmission of this form, have the same legal force and effect as a handwritten signature


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It has brought to my attention recently, coincidently on more than one occasion in the space of a couple of weeks, some confusion in the market with regard to NFPA 502 2017 Edition, in paragraph 7.3.4. (5), the word “humidity” has the potential to cause misinterpretation of what was initially intended in 2008‐Efectis‐R0695. In this regard, the word humidity should be read as moisture content by weight. I have referred back to previous NFPA 502 publications and the language has remained consistent Edition 2011 7.3.4 (4) refers to humidity Edition 2014 7.3.4 (4) refers to humidity Edition 2017 7.3.4 (5) refers to humidity. I have checked with Efectis on this topic and they are in agreement that the correct terminology should be moisture by weight. Thus the paragraph if correctly written should read: The moisture content of the insulation material should in principle be < 5% (m/m). A higher content is only allowed if the supplier can prove that this will be the case in practice in the particular tunnel for which the use of that material is intended. If substantive proof is provided, this fire test report is only applicable for the specific tunnel in question and shall not be used for any other project. The average moisture content shall be calculated as follows: Moisture content in % m/m = (Ww ‐ Wd )/ Wd where: Ww is the weight of the core sample of the insulation material before drying in an oven at (105 ± 5)°C; Wd is the weight of the core sample after drying. PI 78 does technically include all of 7.3.4, whilst this public comment addresses a different topic than addressed by PI 78 I do not believe that this proposal is “new material” it is simply a clean up of existing text which I hope the committee will view as a related item and approve the change.

23


12.1.2

Emergency circuits installed in a road tunnel and ancillary areas shall remain functional for a period of notless than 1 hour for the anticipated fire condition by one of the following methods:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6) They shall remain functional by the routing of the cable system external to the roadway

(7) They shall remain functional by using diversity in system routing as approved, such as separateredundant or multiple circuits separated by a 2-hour fire barrier, so that a single fire or emergencyevent will not lead to a failure of the system.


This public comment deals with the actual text as shown and with the proposed committee input 68. It is inappropriate to include "other recognized standards"because that clearly will open up the likelihood of an AHJ allowing less severe standards and even inappropriate standards, since the AHJ is typically not as knowledgeable as the technical committee. It was pointed out in the rationale to CI68 that it is possible that more severe tests will be used but, of course, it is equally possible (and much more likely) that less severe tests would be used. This technical committee has, in recent editions, eliminated the use of terms like "other recognized standards" for that very reason and they should not be reintroduced.The other change made is to eliminate the term "normal", which suggests there is also an "abnormal" time-temperature curve in ASTM E119.

Related Item

• CI68




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:

* Fire-resistive cables shall be approved or listed as having been tested to the normal ( time-temperature curve of ASTM E119, Standard Test Methods for Fire Tests of Building Construction andMaterials) , time-temperature curve in in accordance with ANSI/UL 2196, Standard for Fire Test forCircuit Integrity of Fire-Resistive Power, Instrumentation, Control and Data Cables, and shall complywith the requirements for no less than a 2 hour fire-resistive rating as described in the ANSI/UL 2196:

Fire-resistive cables shall be tested as a complete system, in both vertical and horizontalorientations, on conductors, cables, and raceways as applicable.

Fire-resistive cables intended for installation in a raceway shall be tested in the type of raceway inwhich they are intended to be installed.

Each fire-resistive cable system shall have installation instructions that describe the testedassembly with only the components included in the tested assembly acceptable for installations.

* Circuits shall be protected by a 2-hour fire barrier system in accordance with UL 1724, Outline ofInvestigation for Fire Tests for Electrical Circuit Protective Systems. The cables or conductors shallmaintain functionality at the operating temperature within the fire barrier system.


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Public Comment No. 3-NFPA 502-2018 [ New Section after A.4.8.1(1) ]

A.4.8.2 NFPA 101, in section 4.6.14, describes how to determine whether a material is a limitedcombustible material.


Section 4.8.2 references limited combustible materials but does not explain what they are or how to assess whether a material is, or is not, a limited combustible material. PI 74 recommended adding the requirements and this PC simply recommends a refernce to the appropriate section of NFPA 101, as another option.

Related Public Comments for This Document

Related Comment Relationship

Public Comment No. 2-NFPA 502-2018 [Section No. 4.8.2]

Related Item

• pi74




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee:





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Public Comment No. 7-NFPA 502-2018 [ Section No. A.13.3(12) ]

A.13.3(12)

Provisions of procedures for multiple concurrent emergencies do not require design capacity for multipleconcurrent emergencies.

Concurrent incidents could range from simple, e.g. two or more separate stopped vehicles in the tunnel, tolarge complex incidents such multiple vehicle accident with fire and injuries occurring at different locations.Managing concurrent incidents is limited by the structure, systems, staffing and emergency operationsplans.

Although the possible combinations of concurrent incidents are significant, especially in complex tunnelstructures, the designer, owner and operator should recognize the potential and plan strategies to mitigatethe impacts using available resources. Tunnel systems are typically designed to be either manually orautomatically operated to a predetermined best emergency operational mode.

The complexity of tunnel systems is increasing. Some modern tunnel systems can automatically detect afire, identify the location and posture ventilation, WBFFFS, signage, portal gates, etc. In all cases thetunnel operator should have the ability to override automatic functions, either in whole, or in part.

Typically, the fire and life safety systems are designed to address a ‘worst case scenario’ and as such,might have the capacity to address two smaller incidents. For example, WBFFFS might be sized to applywater for an accident with fire with two large trucks with trailers over two or more zones. The samecapacity water flow/pressure is adequate to cover two smaller incidents within single WBFFFS zones;however, the automatic control system would likely only operate the WBFFS for the first incident that isactivated.

Planning for a concurrent incident would allow the operators to identify the second incident, and manuallyoverride automatic systems, to address the second incident. Systems which are wholly manual may haveless difficulty in initiating action at more than one location.

To be effective, designers might wish to ensure the detection systems have the capability to notify theoperator during an incident of concurrent incidents with location and type.

Since operators might receive multiple notifications of the initial and concurrent incidents, specific trainingon addressing multiple incidents should occur. Manually operating multiple system in emergency modeswill likely require development of additional operating procedures and resultant training. As part of thistraining, tunnel operators might need to be trained to prioritize the concurrent incidents based upon agencydetermined priorities. Generally, this might take the form of prioritizing the system response for; life safety,incident stabilization, property conservation, and return to service.


Although current language points out potential of concurrent incidents, there is no annex language to guide designer or operator on what can be done to mitigate the incident. New annex provides potential examples to mitigate concurrent incidents.

Related Item

• CI 55


Submitter Full Name: Gary English

Organization: Underground Command And Safety

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Tue May 08 12:09:00 EDT 2018

Committee:


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I, Gary English, hereby irrevocably grant and assign to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) all and full rights in copyright in thisPublic Comment (including both the Proposed Change and the Statement of Problem and Substantiation). I understand and intend that Iacquire no rights, including rights as a joint author, in any publication of the NFPA in which this Public Comment in this or another similar orderivative form is used. I hereby warrant that I am the author of this Public Comment and that I have full power and authority to enter intothis copyright assignment.

By checking this box I affirm that I am Gary English, and I agree to be legally bound by the above Copyright Assignment and the termsand conditions contained therein. I understand and intend that, by checking this box, I am creating an electronic signature that will, upon mysubmission of this form, have the same legal force and effect as a handwritten signature


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ATTACHMENT F

29

Task Groups for NFPA 502 A2019

Task Group Description Related Input Task Group Chair Task Group Members Status Support Devices for Heavy Equipment

Review proposal to require support devices to maintain support during a fire for at least 2 hours and propose revisions as necessary

CI 21 Bill Connell James Conrad Igor Maevski Daniel Dirgins Kees Both Arnold Dix Russell Fleming Robert Schmidt

Integration of FACP and SCADA Systems

Review proposal to add annex language on the integration of these systems and propose revisions as necessary

CI 40 Iain Bowman Gary English Ana Ruiz John Celentano Russell Fleming Zachary Magnone

Critical Velocity Review the proposed definition of confinement velocity, the critical velocity calculations in Annex D, and proposed revisions to Annex E, and propose revisions as necessary

CI 41 CI 42 CI 43

Haukur Ingason

Iain Bowman Norris Harvey Ahmed Kashef Jason Huczek Francesco Colella Kees Both Igor Maevski David Plotkin Jarrod Alson Arnold Dix Eric Cheong Max Lakkonen

Concurrent Incidents

Review the proposal to add annex language regarding concurrent incidents and propose revisions as necessary

CI 55 Gary English Arnold Dix Iain Bowman Zachary Magnone Daniel Dirgins

Applicability of NFPA 72 Requirements

Review the proposal to delete 7.4.7.2 and the overall applicability of NFPA 72 to tunnels, and propose revisions as necessary

CI 56 Garry English

Norris Harvey Arnold Dix James Conrad Bill Connell Arnold Dix

Tunnel Categories Review the tunnel categories and related

CI 58 Norris Harvey Kees Both Tomas Rakovec John Dalton

30

requirements and propose revisions as necessary

Igor Maevski

Wayfinding Review the proposed new language on wayfinding lighting and propose revisions as necessary

CI 69 Norris Harvey James Conrad

Autonomous Vehicles Annex

Review the language proposed in CI 67 for a new annex providing guidance on autonomous vehicles

CI 67 Iain Bowman Arnold Dix Daniel Dirgins Jason Huczek Joe Kroboth Arnold Dix

Alternate Fuels Review the language proposed in CI 5 for revisions to Annex G that reflect advancements in alternative fuel vehicles.

CI 5 Carl Rivkin Arnold Dix

Notes:

- Other CIs to review: CI 68, CI 39

31

ATTACHMENT G

32

Committee Input No. 67-NFPA 502-2017 [ Global Input ]

Annex X Autonomous Vehicles

This annex is not a part of the requirements of this NFPA document but is included for informationalpurposes only.

X.1 General

Background on developing area of autonomous vehicles

Autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicles are a reality on road networks worldwide. An associatedtechnology also in the process of being introduced is that of connected vehicles, i.e. vehicles that arecapable of wirelessly communicating with other similar vehicles (vehicle-to-vehicle, abbreviated as V2V)and/or suitable enabled infrastructure (vehicle-to-infrastructure, abbreviated as V2I).

An autonomous vehicle (AV) is defined as a vehicle that is capable of sensing its environment andnavigating without human input. Presently, no fully autonomous vehicle has been introduced to the roadnetwork. All vehicles currently on the road network are semi-autonomous and require the presence of ahuman driver who is able to take control of the vehicle in event the vehicle is unable to respond correctly toan environmental input.

Autonomous vehicles use a range of techniques to detect the environment around them, including radar,LIDAR, GPS, odometry, and computer vision. Control systems interpret the sensory input to identifyappropriate navigation paths, obstacles, relevant signage. Pre-programmed control logic determines thevehicle’s response to the sensory inputs.

X.2 Current Capabilities

SAE Classifications

The automotive standards body, SAE International, published a classification system for levels ofautonomous control in 2014 (revised in 2016), in standard J3016, Taxonomy and Definitions for TermsRelated to On-Road Motor Vehicle Automated Driving Systems. The standard defines six levels, based onthe level of driver intervention and awareness required. It has been adopted by the US National HighwayTraffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), replacing an earlier system that NHTSA used until 2016.

The six levels are listed in Table 1.

Table 1. SAE Autonomous Vehicle Classifications, per J3016-2016.

AutonomousLevel

Description

0 Automated system has no vehicle control, but may issue warnings.

1Driver must be ready to take control at any time. Automated system may include featuressuch as Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC), Parking Assistance with automated steering,and Lane Keeping Assistance (LKA) Type II in any combination.

2The driver is obliged to detect objects and events and respond if the automated systemfails to respond properly. The automated system executes accelerating, braking, andsteering. The automated system can deactivate immediately upon takeover by the driver.

3Within known, limited environments, such as freeways, the driver can safely turn theirattention away from driving tasks, but must still be prepared to take control when needed.

4The automated system can control the vehicle in all but a few environments such assevere weather. The driver must enable to automated system only when it is safe to doso. When enabled, driver attention is not required.

National Fire Protection Association Report http://submittals.nfpa.org/TerraViewWeb/ContentFetcher?commentPara...

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5Other than setting the destination and starting the system, no human intervention isrequired. The automatic system can drive to any location where it is legal to drive andmake its own decisions.

Current Capabilities

At present, many vehicle manufacturers sell Level 1 vehicles. Research and development of higher levelvehicles is active and ongoing, with rapid progress having been made in the past few years. The followingsubsections describe the current capabilities for different vehicle types.

Personal Passenger Vehicles

There are no commercially available automated driving systems for personal passenger vehicles moreadvanced than Level 2. However, nearly every major vehicle manufacturer has released at least one modelcapable of Level 2 driving (longitudinal and lateral control). Perhaps the most widely publicized is the TeslaModel S, but high-end vehicles from Mercedes-Benz, Infiniti, Lexus, Acura, and others also incorporateLevel 2 driving systems. These systems are expected to spread to all major manufacturers and mostvehicle models over the next several years; for example, Ford intends to offer it as an option on most of itsmodels by 2019.

Google has perhaps the most-discussed AV program. When it was first developed, Google referred to itsautomated Toyota and Lexus vehicles as NHTSA Level 3 (roughly SAE Level 3), but after further analysisof the requirements of Level 3, decided it only attained Level 2. In 2015, Google’s test drivers interactedwith the vehicles only a few hundred times across the entire fleet all year despite driving on various roadtypes in real traffic conditions, suggesting that the system is very near to attaining Level 4 capabilities .Google’s efforts have also made its vehicle robust to many common hazards and anomalies on roads,enabling them to avoid de-activation for longer. In addition, Google has since developed a neighborhoodelectric vehicle (NEV) that it refers to as Level 4. Google also has a strong advantage in terms ofexperience with AVs on public roads in real conditions: its fleet of fifty vehicles travels roughly 25,000 milesper week, for total of more than 2 million miles traveled in automated mode. (Google also has a thoroughsimulation environment, through which it claims to achieve 3 million simulated miles per day.)

Tesla has also started pervading the media with its automation experiments which it refers to collectively asAutopilot. Tesla is actually selling vehicles to customers instead of just using them for research. While itscurrent publicly available vehicles are at most Level 1 by default (longitudinal or lateral control only), theyhave the equipment and an available driving mode to enable Level 2 driving in some circumstances(namely, good weather and road conditions). (Tesla refers to its Autopilot as Level 3 automation; however,this designation is fraught with difficulty, as discussed above.) This experimental system made headlines in2016 when the Autopilot system failed to identify a semi-trailer as a hazard and collided with it, killing thedriver of the Tesla, the first publicized fatality caused by an automated driving system .

Many auto-makers, such as Mercedes-Benz , BMW , Audi , , and Volvo have all made progress withautomated driving. However, car manufacturers aren’t the only companies experimenting with automateddriving. Google is most famous, but two others are particularly notable. Tier one supplier Delphidemonstrated its automation technology and Chinese search engine Baidu, has also recently madeprogress in this regard .

Commerical Cargo Vehicles

While many vehicle manufacturers and other organizations research automated passenger vehicles,relatively few have put similar effort into automating commercial vehicles. Those that have are focusing onClass 8 vehicles. Four organizations in particular have developed noteworthy automated trucktechnologies:

• Freightliner, a subsidiary of Daimler AG

• UPS, the delivery service

• Otto, a new company, founded in January 2016 by AV experts from Google and elsewhere to developaftermarket kits to transform Class 8 trucks into Level 2 AVs

• Peleton, which is focused on platooning operations of heavy trucks

Shared Transportation

A number of AV developers are concentrating on neither the consumer market nor the freight or deliverymarket, but the transportation market. Automated vehicles permit an unprecedented opportunity for sharedtransportation, the use by multiple passengers of the same on-road vehicle throughout a trip and


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throughout a day. There are three such examples of this type of developer:

• Uber, most well-known company in the ride sharing market

• nuTonomy, which in 2016 started operating driverless vehicles in Singapore

• Navya, developer of fully autonomous shuttles

X.3 Legislative and Regulatory Environment

Numerous jurisdictions, including Nevada, California, and Michigan in the USA, have authorised testing ofsuch vehicles on the public road network. Various jurisdictions have legislation to authorise use of suchvehicles in stages of execution. Elsewhere, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, France and Singapore areamong the countries developing a legislative response to the development of autonomous vehicles. Thelegislative environment is presently fluid, however significant efforts are being made to develop thenecessary legislative and regulatory framework to enable widespread adoption of autonomous vehicles asthe technology becomes more mature.

X.3.1 Legal Liability

Motor vehicle legal liability – especially for drivers and car manufacturers - is one of the features of the legalindustry which surrounds motor cars. Traditionally the decision making process and skills associated withdriving a motor vehicle are linked to both criminal and civil liability, while corporate liability is usually focusedon contractual and consumer protection law.

X.3.3 Criminal Liability

In the context of artificial intelligence, criminal liability and attribution of criminal liability requiresmodernising. In law criminal liability can only be imposed on an individual if the act is accompanied by athought. In Latin this is actus reus (the act) and mens rea (the thought). Since ancient times our concept ofcriminality has therefore required a coupling of a physical act and an intention to commit the act. Forexample a vehicle which is intentionally driven at speed has both the intention to speed and the act ofspeeding coupled to one another. Lawmakers could attach criminal liability to robots and theirmanufacturers for intentional law breaking such as speeding that causes injury or death.

X.3.7 Civil Liability

Civil liability is different to criminal liability in most legal systems. In each instance where a passenger,owner, or a possessor of a vehicle has a contractual relationship with the vendor of the vehicle or theartificial intelligence decision making component of that vehicle, liability may attach for criminal acts or civildamage. It is a separate legal issue to the question of criminality. The tests for civil liability are less onerousthan those for criminal liability. Typically under concepts such as negligence or more traditional contractualarrangements the burden of proof is not ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, rather it is simply on the balance ofprobabilities. In this way the manufacturer of autonomous vehicles can be held liable in a civil Court for civiland commercial consequences of the failure of the robot. This is the basic underlying principle of recalls oftechnology today in the automotive and other sections and it would be no different with autonomousvehicles.

The supervisory function of humans must maintain a criminal and civil liability component for autonomousvehicles for so long as humans are expected to play a supervision or intervention role. Once effectivehuman supervision is unreasonable no liability should attach for failure to supervise.

Manufacturers should assume legal responsibility for dangerous or otherwise unacceptable conduct by theautomatic vehicles they create.

X.4 Issues Related to Usage Within NFPA 502 Facilities

Tunnels are recognised as one of the more significant challenges for safe operation of autonomousvehicles. Among the tunnel-related issues facing developers of autonomous vehicles are:

• Ability to recognise presence of fire/smoke

• Ability to recognise LCS/VMS, presence of closed gates, PA/VA, FFFS deployment, presence of stoppedvehicles

• Ability to recognise lane/shoulder striping

• Ability to recognise walls, regardless of wall finishes/quality of lighting

• Ability of sensors to function reliably in tunnel environment

• Lack of GPS positioning capability in tunnel environment


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• Ability of sensors to function in a fire environment

• Decision-making in emergency scenarios

• V2I communications

• V2V communications

X.5 Emergency Response Considerations

Owners and operators of tunnel facilities that may allow autonomous vehicle operations should considerany specific challenges raised by the presence of autonomous vehicles in event of an emergency occurringwithin the tunnel, and should include appropriate measures within their emergency response planning.

X.5.1 Recognition of emergency by AV

Predominant among these considerations is whether the vehicles have the capability to recognise theoccurrence of the emergency. Factors that should be considered include:

• Does the AV have the ability to identify stopped vehicles ahead?

o This should be a fundamental ability of any licensed AV. The AV should come to a safe stop if it identifiesstopped vehicles ahead.

• Does the AV have the ability to recognise the presence of smoke and/or heat?

o Visual sensors may respond to loss of visibility by losing visual cues e.g. walls, vehicles, lights, etc,necessary to autonomous operation. In such cases, the AV would request the driver to take over (all levelsbelow SAE 5). Detection of heat is a separate issue. In principle this could be implemented, however it isnot believed that current AVs possess this capability.

• Does the AV have the ability to recognise signals from systems designed to notify motorists of danger, e.g.gates at portals, VMS, LCS, flashing beacons, PA/VA, FFFS?

o Based on current technology, the AV would likely recognise a closed gate and stop the vehicle, and wouldpossibly treat a FFFS similar to a severe rainstorm and thus would request driver to take control. It is notbelieved that current AVs would identify VMS, LCS, beacons or PA/VA without implementation of V2Icapabilities.

• Does the AV have the ability to communicate to the occupants the nature of the emergency and thecorrect occupant response?

o Current AV technology is not likely to include this capability. However, development of V2I and V2Vtechnologies may in future provide the capability to advise the AV of the nature of the emergency and forthe AV to communicate that information to the occupants.

X.5.2 Ability of tunnel operator to communicate directly with the AV

The presence of a V2I system could allow for direct communications between the Operator and the AV.This would allow the Operator to issue instructions to AVs e.g. slow down, stop, keep to kerb lane, proceedto exit, etc. AV HGVs with a fire in their load could be prioritized to exit the tunnel, and prevented fromentering the tunnel if they are approaching it. AV HGVs with Dangerous Goods loads could be similarlyregulated to eliminate the possibility of them using a regulated tunnel.

Currently, communications with AVs would be limited to the existing systems in place for communicatingwith the vehicle occupants e.g. VMS,LCS, PA/VA, beacons, radio rebroadcast, etc. The Operator shouldconsider whether using such systems to issue instructions for occupants to take control of the AV isdesirable.

X.6 Platooning in road tunnels, bridges and other limited access highways

There are several issues related to the future use of platooning that should be considered for new andexisting road tunnels, bridges and other limited access highways. These issues include the impact ofplatooning on traffic related considerations such as the vehicle classification mix, the traffic volume,congestion, and traffic control during emergencies. Platooning may also introduce fire life safety issuessuch as potential impacts to the range of fire emergencies, design fire size, emergency response time, andfire protection features.

X.6.1 Mitigation measures

Each facility operating agency and/or AHJs should be aware of the current autonomous vehicletechnologies and platooning, be aware of the current regulations and legislation, and be aware of theissues related to their use and the potential impact of their use to the facilities for which the AHJ is


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responsible.

As the use of truck platooning increases and ultimately gains regulatory approval, each facility AHJ willneed to consider establishing policies to address truck platooning. AHJs may consider mitigation measuressuch as those used for hazardous cargo which could include prohibition or other regulations such as time ofday restrictions to mitigate the concerns specific to the facility.

X.7 Informational References


Submitter Full Name: Janna Shapiro

Organization: National Fire Protection Assoc

Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Fri Oct 27 16:09:25 EDT 2017

Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

The committee would like time to review the details of the proposal for a new annex onautonomous vehicles before incorporating it into the standard.

ResponseMessage:


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Committee Input No. 71-NFPA 502-2017 [ Global Input ]

Update extract material as appropriate.




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

At the second draft meeting, the committee will review and update all of the extracted textas appropriate.

Response Message:


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Committee Input No. 42-NFPA 502-2017 [ New Section after 3.3.12 ]

3.3.13 Confinement Velocity.

The velocity needed to stop back-layering at a certain distance from the fire and prevent further smokespreading against the main airflow.

A.3.3.13 Confinement Velocity.

Confinement velocity is typically lower than critical velocity and can be used to preserve a certain degree ofcontrolled backlayering.




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Wed Oct 25 16:04:20 EDT 2017

Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

There is a need for a new definition of confined velocity. This term is being discussed morecommonly in the industry, which supports the need for NFPA 502 to address this term.

ResponseMessage:


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Committee Input No. 58-NFPA 502-2017 [ Section No. 7.2 [Excluding any Sub-Sections]

]


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For the purpose of this standard, factors described in Section 4.3.1 shall dictate fire protection and fire lifesafety requirements. The minimum fire protection and

firelife safety requirements, based on main tunnel

lengthparameters characterizing the fire risks , are categorized

as follows: Category X — Wherebelow. Four main tunnel parameters characterizing the risks are defined by:

Tunnel length: 4 ranges of length are defined as “less than 90 m (300 ft)”, “equal or less than 300 m(1000 ft)”, “equal or less than 1000 m (3280 ft)” and “more than 1000 m (3280 ft)”.

Traffic density: 20000 vehicles per day are used as criteria (1 heavy vehicle is considered equal to 5vehicles). Less than 20000 vehicles per day is low traffic and more than 20000 vehicles per day ishigh traffic.

Traffic flow: Uni and bidirectional

Neighbouring conditions: the tunnel is considered as with high environmental risk (HER) when thetunnel is under building or important structure or undersea, otherwise the tunnel is defined as withlow environment risk (LER).

(1) Category X: Where the tunnel length is less than 90 m (

300 ft

(2) 300 ft ), an engineering analysis shall be performed in accordance with Section 4.3.1 , an evaluationof the protection of structural elements shall be conducted in accordance with

7

(3) Section 7 .3 , and traffic control systems shall be installed in accordance with the requirements of

Section

(4) Section 7.6 .

(5) Category A

—

(6) : Where the tunnel length is

90 m (300 ft) or greater

(7) equal or less than 300 m (1000 ft) with low environmental risk , an engineering analysis shall beperformed in accordance with Section 4.3.1 , an evaluation of the protection of structural elementsshall be conducted in accordance with Section 7.3 , and a standpipe system and traffic controlsystems shall be installed in accordance with the requirements of

Chapter

(8) Chapter 10 and

Section

(9) Section 7.6

.

(10)

(11) Category B

—

(12) : Where tunnel length

equals or exceeds 240 m (800 ft) and where the maximum distance from any point within the tunnel to apoint of safety exceeds 120 m (400 ft)

(13) is equal or less than 1000 m (3280 ft) with low traffic density and low environmental risk andunidirectional traffic , all provisions of this standard shall apply unless noted otherwise in thisdocument.

(14) Category C

—


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(15) : Where

the

(16) tunnel length

equals or exceeds 300 m (1000 ft)

(17) is equal or less than 1000 m (3280 ft) with high traffic density or high environmental risk or bidirectionaltraffic , all provisions of this standard shall apply unless noted otherwise in this document.

(18) Category D

—

(19) : Where

the

(20) tunnel length

equals or

(21) exceeds 1000 m (

3280 ft)

(22) 3280 ft) and the risk parameters are at any value , all provisions of this standard shall apply.

On any other consideration of risk, the AHJ can request any upgrade of the category. The tunnel ownermay require a higher category taking into account the eventual strategic importance and impact on theregional economy.

Category

Tunnelparameter

X A B C D

Tunnel length< 90 m

(300 ft)≤ 300 m (1000 ft)

≤ 1000 m

(3280 ft)

≤ 1000 m

(3280 ft)

> 1000 m

(3280 ft)

and and and and and

Traffic density L/H L/H L H L/H

and and and or and

Traffic flow Uni-/Bidirectional Uni-/Bi directional Unidirectional Bidirectional Uni-/Bidirectional

and and and or and

Neighbouringconditions

LER/HER LER LER HER LER/HER




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Thu Oct 26 16:07:00 EDT 2017

Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

The committee agrees that changes need to be made to the definition of tunnel categories andrelated requirements. A task group has been assigned to review this for the Second Draft


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Meeting.

ResponseMessage:

Public Input No. 87-NFPA 502-2017 [Section No. 7.2 [Excluding any Sub-Sections]]

Public Input No. 98-NFPA 502-2017 [Section No. A.7.2]

Public Input No. 8-NFPA 502-2016 [New Section after 3.3.10]

Public Input No. 9-NFPA 502-2016 [Section No. 7.6.2]


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Committee Input No. 56-NFPA 502-2017 [ Section No. 7.4.7.2 ]

7.4.7.2

Where a fire detection system is installed in accordance with the requirements of 7.4.7.1 , signals for thepurpose of evacuation and relocation of occupants shall not be required.




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

There is concern that there is not clarity in reference to the requirements of NFPA 72 as theyare applicable to tunnels. A task group is being developed to review this further.

ResponseMessage:

Public Input No. 22-NFPA 502-2016 [Section No. 7.4.7.2]


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Committee Input No. 69-NFPA 502-2017 [ New Section after 7.16.4 ]

7.16.5 Wayfinding lighting

7.16.5.1

Wayfinding lighting (egress path marking) shall be provided to aid evacuation of the tunnel as requiredthrough an engineering analysis.

7.16.5.2

Where required by 7.16.5.1, wayfinding lighting shall be used to delineate an evacuation route to anemergency exit in the event that smoke obscures the tunnel emergency lighting located at high level.

7.16.5.3*

Minimum marker illumination levels, requirements, and location shall be established.

A.7.16.5.3

CIE 193, Emergency Lighting in Road Tunnels, provides guidance.

7.16.5.4

Wayfinding lighting shall be located at a height of less than 1 m (3.28 ft) above the egress pathway surface.

7.16.5.5

The wayfinding lighting systems shall be automatically initiated when the tunnel emergency systems areactivated.

7.16.5.6

Powered wayfinding lighting systems shall be connected to the tunnel emergency power systems.

7.16.5.7

The wayfinding lighting systems shall be continuously available for operation in the event of an emergencyfor a minimum of 90 minutes or as approved.

7.16.5.8

The wayfinding lighting systems cables shall be wired from emergency distribution panels and routedthrough dedicated raceways.




Street Address:

City:

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Zip:


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

The committee is considering the addition of a section on wayfinding for the following reasons:

1.Wayfinding is included in North America NCHRP 20-47(59) Proposed Guidelines for EmergencyExit Signs and Marker Systems for Highway Tunnels, NCHRP Document 216. No date. Availableto Mott MacDonald Jan 2016.

2. Wayfinding lighting have been installed in the following road tunnels: Port of Miami FL and


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Midtown Elizabeth River Crossing Norfolk VA.

3. Wayfinding lighting has been designed to be installed in the following road tunnels: Hugh L.Carey Tunnel NYC NY, Queens Midtown Tunnel NYC NY, LaFontaine Montreal CA and VilleMarie Montreal CA.


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Committee Input No. 21-NFPA 502-2017 [ Section No. 11.5.1 [Excluding any Sub-

Sections] ]

Tunnel ventilation fans, their motors, and all components critical to the operation of the system during a fireemergency that can be exposed to elevated temperatures from the fire shall be designed to remainoperational for a minimum of 1 hour at a temperature of 250°C (482°F).

Any support devices for heavy equipment suspended within the tunnel must be capable of maintaing itssupport during a fire emergency for not less than 2 hours.




Street Address:

City:

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Zip:

Submittal Date: Mon Oct 16 22:05:33 EDT 2017

Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

There is not enough information to support the proposed revision at this time. A task group hasbeen formed to review this for the second draft meeting.

ResponseMessage:

Public Input No. 29-NFPA 502-2017 [Section No. 11.5.1 [Excluding any Sub-Sections]]


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Committee Input No. 68-NFPA 502-2017 [ Section No. 12.1.2 ]

12.1.2

Emergency circuits installed in a road tunnel and ancillary areas shall remain functional for a period of notless than 1 hour for the anticipated fire condition by one of the following methods:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6) They shall remain functional by the routing of the cable system external to the roadway

(7) They shall remain functional by using diversity in system routing as approved, such as separateredundant or multiple circuits separated by a 2-hour fire barrier, so that a single fire or emergencyevent will not lead to a failure of the system.




Street Address:

City:

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Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

The addition of other approved standards will allow for other fire test methods equivalent ormore severe to ANSI/UL 2196.

ResponseMessage:

* Fire-resistive cables shall be approved or listed as having been for no less than 2-hours when testedto the normal (ASTM E119), time-temperature curve in accordance with ANSI/UL 2196 and shallcomply with the requirements for no less than a 2 hourfire-resistive rating as described in theANSI/UL 2196 or other approved recognized standards :

Fire-resistive cables shall be tested as a complete system, in both vertical and horizontalorientations, on conductors, cables, and raceways as applicable.

Fire-resistive cables intended for installation in a raceway shall be tested in the type of raceway inwhich they are intended to be installed.

Each fire-resistive cable system shall have installation instructions that describe the testedassembly with only the components included in the tested assembly acceptable for installations.

* Circuits shall be protected by a 2-hour fire barrier system in accordance with UL 1724, Outline ofInvestigation for Fire Tests for Electrical Circuit Protective Systems. The cables or conductors shallmaintain functionality at the operating temperature within the fire barrier system.


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Committee Input No. 55-NFPA 502-2017 [ Section No. 13.3 [Excluding any Sub-

Sections] ]

An emergency response plan shall be submitted for acceptance and approval by the authority havingjurisdiction and shall include, as a minimum, the following:

(1) Name of plan and the specific facility(ies) the plan covers

(2) Name of responsible agency

(3) Names of responsible individuals

(4) Dates adopted, reviewed, and revised

(5) Policy, purpose, scope, and definitions

(6) Participating agencies, senior officials, and signatures of executives authorized to sign for each agency

(7) Safety during emergency operations

(8) Purpose and operation of operations control center (OCC) and alternative location(s) as applicable:

(9) Procedure for staffing the backup location(s) shall be specified.

(10) Procedure to control risk while the OCC does not have staff until the backup facility can take overshall be specified.

(11) Purpose and operation of command post and auxiliary command post

(12) Communications (e.g., radio, telephone, messenger service) available at central supervising stationand command post; efficient operation of these facilities

(13) Fire detection, fire protection, and fire-extinguishing equipment; access/egress and ventilation facilitiesavailable; details of the type, amount, location, and method of ventilation

(14) * Procedures for single or multiple concurrent fire emergencies, including a list of the various types offire emergencies, the agency in command, and the procedures to follow. Provisions of procedures formultiple concurrent emergencies do not require design capacity for multiple concurrent emergencies

(15) Maps and plans of the roadway system, including all local streets

(16) Any additional information that the participating agencies want to include

(17) Emergency response plan that recognizes the need to assist people who are unable to self-rescuewithestablished, specific response procedures

(18) Emergency operational procedures developed based on the design

(19) Emergency response plan that includes traffic control procedures to regulate traffic during anemergency that can affect operation of the facility

A.13.3(12)

Concurrent incidents create challenges for systems designed for a single event. It is possible that theemergency response systems might have enough capacity to mitigate a second, concurrent incident if theincidents are small enough. For example, the operation of a single FFFS zone, might leave enoughcapacity to operate a second, non-adjacent FFFS at the same time. Emergency response plans couldidentify this potential.




Street Address:


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City:

State:

Zip:


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

Although the systems are not necessarily designed for concurrent events, in some cases, thereis capacity to operate two zones concurrently. New annex language could explain this possibility.

ResponseMessage:


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Committee Input No. 39-NFPA 502-2017 [ Section No. A.7.1.1 ]

A.7.1.1

Additional information for engineering analysis can be found in NCHRP Synthesis 415: Design Fires inRoad Tunnels. The document is primarily a literature review and includes chapters with the following titles:Tunnel Safety Projects, Tenable Environment, Significant Fire Incidents in Road Tunnels, Combined UseRoadways, Fire Tests, Analytical Fire Modeling, Design for Tunnel Fires, Compilations of Design Guidance,Standards and Regulations, Design Fire Scenario for Fire Modeling, Fixed Water-Based Fire Suppressionand Its Impact on Design Fire Size, Effects of Various Ventilation Conditions, Tunnel Geometry, andStructural and Non-Structural Tunnel Components on Design Fire Characteristics, as well as a summary ofa survey from which results were compiled.

A second source of tunnel fire characteristics is available in the PIARC report, Design Fire Characteristicsfor Road Tunnels. This document discusses design fires, other publications, and smoke managementimplications, and has appendix language relative to practices adopted in other countries, fire tests, and realfire experiences.

Chapter 88 "Fires in Vehicle Tunnels" of the SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 5th editionreviews p ublished experimental research related to design fires for vehicle tunnels.




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

The committee would like time to review the referenced document before including it in theStandard.

Response Message:

Public Input No. 118-NFPA 502-2017 [Section No. A.7.1.1]


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Committee Input No. 40-NFPA 502-2017 [ New Section after A.7.4.7.7 ]

A7.4.8

For facilities where 24-hour supervision and an associated supervisory control and data acquisition(SCADA) system are present and required to operate facility systems as part of an integrated emergencyresponse system (traffic control, electronic signs, signals, CCTV, emergency communications systemsetc.), the Fire Alarm Control Panel (FACP) design should include two-way interfacing with the SCADAsystem to permit automated responses from an integrated facility control system. The number of datapoints imported and exported to and from the FACP and the SCADA should be sufficient to provideeffective notifications, alarms and status conditions between SCADA and the FACP, to facilitateimplementation of optimized responses to these alarms and conditions and to permit necessary operationand coordination of facility emergency response systems from a single interface.

Where fixed water-based fire-fighting systems (FFFS) are provided, if these are under the control of theFACP, the interface should allow SCADA to instruct the FACP to initiate deployment of the FFFS.




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:


Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

The committee would like some time to work on the development of this language. A taskgroup has been assigned to work on this for the Second Draft Meeting.

ResponseMessage:

Public Input No. 39-NFPA 502-2017 [New Section after A.7.4.7.7]


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Committee Input No. 41-NFPA 502-2017 [ Chapter D ]

Annex D Critical Velocity Calculations


[SEE ATTACHED WORD DOCUMENT FOR PROPOED CHANGES IN COMMITTEE INPUT]


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D.1 General.

The simultaneous solution of the following equations, by iteration, determines the critical velocity. Thecritical velocity, Vc, is the minimum steady-state velocity of the ventilation air moving toward a fire that is

necessary to prevent backlayering.

[D.1]

where:

Vc = critical velocity [m/sec (fpm)]

K1 = Froude number factor, Fr-1⁄3(see Table D.1)

Kg = grade factor (see Figure D.1)

g = acceleration caused by gravity [m/sec2 (ft/sec2)]

H = height of duct or tunnel at the fire site [m (ft)]

Q = heat fire is adding directly to air at the fire site [kW (Btu/sec)]

ρ = average density of the approach (upstream) air [kg/m3 (lb/ft3)]

Cp = specific heat of air [kJ/kg K (Btu/lb°R)]

A = area perpendicular to the flow [m2 (ft2)]

Tf = average temperature of the fire site gases [K (°R)]

T = temperature of the approach air [K (°R)]

Figure D.1 provides the grade factor for (Kg) in equation D.1.

Figure D.1 Grade Factor for Determining Critical Velocity.

Equation D.1 is based on research founded on theoretical work performed in the late 1950s (Thomas,1958) and correlated by large scale tests in the mid-1990s (see Annex H). The equation previously used aconstant K1 value equal to 0.606. Later research on critical velocity (see, for example, Li et al., Wu and

Bakar, and Oka and Atkinson), suggests that a refinement of K1 values as shown in Table D.1 is desired for

heat release rates (HRRs) lower than or equal to 100 MW.

Table D.1 A Range of K1 Values That Apply for Various HRRs

Q (MW) K1

>100 0.606

90 0.62

70 0.64

50 0.68

30 0.74

<10 0.87


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Supplemental Information


D.1_Committee_Input.docx Proposed revised text




Street Address:

City:

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Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

The Annex D Critical Velocity Calculations provides the equations which have been corrected at thelast NFPA cycle to address discrepancy with numerous internationally recognized tunnel fire testsprograms. Those corrections were made by introducing table D1 with variable empirical K factors asa function of a fire HRR. New research show that the effects of the tunnel width are not wellcaptured.

The proposed equations:

1. Eliminate the need in empirical K values and Table D.1;

2. Addresses the impact of tunnel width on critical velocity;

3. Provides future abilities to calculate “confined velocities” - the length of controlled backlayering atdifferent air velocities, which helps in designing tunnel extraction systems along with longitudinaltunnel ventilation systems.

ResponseMessage:

Public Input No. 126-NFPA 502-2017 [New Section after D.1]


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D.1 General.

The critical velocity can be calculated according to the following equation

[1, 2]:

1/3 1/12 1/4( )

18.5 1/2 5/2 1/2 5/2

( )18.5

1/2 5/2

0.81 e , 0.15

0.43e , 0.15

b

b

L

H

a p a a p a

L

H

a p a

Q H Q H

C T g H W c T g H Wu

gH Q H

c T g H W

1/4

(D.1)

where:

a is the ambient density (kg/m3),

Cp is the heat capacity (kJ/(kg K)),

g is gravitational acceleration (m/s2),

H is tunnel height (m),

Lb is the backlayering length (m) where Lb =0 defines critical velocity (no

backlayering of smoke(.

Ta is the ambient gas temperature (K),

u is the longitudinal velocity (m/s),

Q is the total heat release rate (HRR) (kW),

W is the tunnel width (m).

The effects of the tunnel grading is obtained by multiply the calculated

critical velocity, uc, by the grade factor Kg given in Figure D.1.

56

Figure D.1 Grade Factor Kg for Determining Critical Velocity

Example:

Assume a road tunnel that is 5 m high (H) with a width (W) of 12

m. Backlayering shall be prevented (Lb=0 m) for a 30 MW heat

release rate. Ambient values include: a=1.2 kg/m3; Cp = 1 kJ/kg K;

g = 9,81 m/s2 and; Ta = 293 K (20 oC).

Solution:

First, establish which critical velocity relationship to apply by

solving 1/4

1/2 5/20.15

a p a

Q H

c T g H W

or

1/4

1/2 5/20.15

a p a

Q H

c T g H W

.

Since 1/2 5/2a p a

Q

c T g H

= 0.487 is greater than

( )18.50.43e

bL

H

= 0.121, the

lower Equations D.1 should be used. Therefore we solve for u in:

( )18.50.43e

bL

Hu

gH

with the result that u = 3.01 m/s (592.8 fpm) where

Lb=0 m.

57

The grade factor according to Fig. D.1 is 1.1, which means that the

calculated crictical velocity is 3.3 m/s.

References

[1] Li Y.Z., Ingason H., Effect of cross section on critical velocity in

longitudinally ventilated tunnel fire, Fire Safety Journal, 2017, 91: 303‐

311

[2] Li Y.Z., Lei B., Ingason H., Study of critical velocity and backlayering

length in longitudinally ventilated tunnel fires, Fire Safety Journal, 2010,

45, 361‐370.

58

Committee Input No. 43-NFPA 502-2017 [ Chapter E ]

Annex E Fixed Water-Based Systems in Road Tunnels


E.1 General.

This annex provides considerations for the incorporation of fixed water-based fire-fighting systems in roadtunnels.

E.2 Fixed Water-Based Systems.

Equipment permanently attached to a road tunnel that, when operated, has the intended effect of reducingthe heat release and fire growth rates, is able to spread an extinguishing agent in all or part of the tunnelusing a network of pipes and nozzles.

Fixed water-based fire-fighting systems should be used as a component of an integrated fire engineeringapproach to fire protection to reduce the rate of fire growth and the ultimate heat release rate.

Examples of fixed water-based fire-fighting systems include deluge systems, mist systems, and foamsystems.


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E.3 Background.

NFPA 502 has included material regarding fixed water-based fire-fighting systems (formerly called sprinklersystems) since the 1998 edition. This material had been contained in a separate annex in each editionsince then.

The World Road Association, PIARC, addressed the subject of fixed water-based fire-fighting systems(formerly called sprinkler systems) in road tunnels in the reports presented at the World Road Congressesheld in Sydney (1983), Brussels (1987), and Montreal (1995). In addition, the subject of fixed fire-fightingsystems was addressed in PIARC’s technical reports titled Fire and Smoke Control in Road Tunnels ,Systems and Equipment for Fire and Smoke Control in Road Tunnels , and Road Tunnels: An Assessmentof Fixed Fire-Fighting Systems .

No European country currently installs fixed water-based fire-fighting systems in road tunnels on a regularbasis. In some road tunnels in Europe, fixed fire suppression systems have been used for specialpurposes. Catastrophic road tunnel fires have encouraged a re-evaluation of these systems for use infuture road tunnels in Europe. Below is a list of tunnels in Europe that currently have fixed water-based fire-fighting systems installed:

(1) Austria

(2) Mona Lisa Tunnel

(3) Felbertauern Tunnel

(4) France: A86 Tunnel

(5) Italy: Brennero Tunnel

(6) The Netherlands: Roermond Tunnel

(7) Norway

(8) Válreng Tunnel

(9) Fløyfjell Tunnel

(10) Spain

(11) M30 Tunnels

(12) Vielha Tunnel

(13) Sweden:

(14) Stockholm Ringroad Tunnels

(15) Tegelbacken Tunnel

(16) United Kingdom

(17) Dartford Tunnels

(18) Heathrow Tunnel

(19) New Tyne Crossing

Tests on fixed water-based fire-fighting systems have recently been conducted by France, the Netherlands,and UPTUN and SOLIT.


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In Australia, deluge-type fixed water-based fire-fighting systems are installed in all major urban roadtunnels. It is the Australian view that it is more likely that small fires could — if not suppressed — developmore often into large (and uncontrollable) fires, particularly since this type of fire development is moretypical than the occurrence of instantaneously large fires. Below is a list of road tunnels in Australia thathave fixed water-based fire-fighting systems installed:

(1) Sydney Harbour Tunnel

(2) M5 East Tunnel

(3) Lanecove Tunnel

(4) Eastern Distributor

(5) City Link Tunnel

(6) Graham Farmer Tunnel

(7) M4 Tunnel

(8) Adelaide Hills Tunnel

(9) Mitchham/Frankstone Tunnel

(10) North/South Busway Tunnel

(11) North/South Tunnel

Fixed water-based fire-fighting systems have been installed in road tunnels for more than four decades inJapan. The decision for a specific tunnel project has to be based on the Japanese safety standards. InJapan, fixed water-based fire suppression systems are required in all tunnels longer than 10,000 m(32,808 ft) and in shorter tunnels longer than 3000 m (9843 ft) with heavy traffic.

Six road tunnels in North America are equipped with fixed water-based fire-fighting systems: the BatteryStreet Tunnel, the I-90 First Hill Mercer Island Tunnel, the Mt. Baker Ridge Tunnel, and the I-5 Tunnel, all inSeattle, Washington; the Central Artery North Area (CANA) Route 1 Tunnel in Boston, Massachusetts; andthe George Massey Tunnel in Vancouver, British Columbia.


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The decision to provide fixed water-based fire-fighting systems in these tunnels was motivated primarily bythe fact that these tunnels were planned to be operated to allow the unescorted passage of vehiclescarrying hazardous materials as cargo. See Table

E.3 .

Table E.3 Road Tunnel Fixed Water-Based Fire-Fighting Systems in North America

Tunnel Location Route Opened to

Traffic Length Bores/

Lanes Fixed Fire Suppression System Type System Zones m ft Battery Street Seattle,Washington SR99 1952 671 2200 2/4 Deluge water 14 I-90 First Hill Mercer Island Seattle, Washington I-90 1989 914 3000 3/8 Deluge foam 37 Mt. Baker Ridge Seattle, Washington I-90 1989 1067 3500 3/8 Deluge foam 50 CANA Northbound Boston, Massachusetts U.S.

1

1990 470 1540 1/3 Deluge foam 15 CANA Southbound Boston, Massachusetts U.S.1 1990 275 900 1/3 Deluge foam 9 I-5 Tunnel Seattle, Washington I-5 1988 167 547 1/12 Delugefoam 9 George Massey Tunnel Vancouver, British

Columbia 99 1959 630 2067 2/4 Sprinkler

system N/A

E.3.1

In the past, the use and effectiveness of fixed water-based fire-fighting systems in road tunnels were notuniversally accepted. It is now acknowledged that fixed water-based fire-fighting systems are highlyregarded by fire protection professionals and fire fighters and can be effective in controlling a fuel roadtunnel fire by actually limiting the spread of the fire. One of the reasons why most countries were reluctantto use fixed water-based fire-fighting systems in road tunnels is that most fires start in the motorcompartment of a vehicle, and fixed water-based fire-fighting systems are of limited use in suppressing thefire until the fire is out in the open. Fixed water-based fire-fighting systems can be used, however, to cooldown vehicles, to stop the fire from spreading to other vehicles (i.e., to diminish the fire area and propertydamage), and to stop secondary fires in tunnel lining materials. Experiences from Japan show that fixedwater-based fire-fighting systems have been extremely effective in cooling down the area around the fire,so that fire fighting can be performed more effectively.


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E.3.2

There is general agreement that, in many cases, the inclusion of water-based fire-fighting systems can actas a valuable component of the overall fire and life safety system in a tunnel. Some of the benefits andcapabilities of water-based fire-fighting systems include the following:

(1) Minimizing fire spread. Water-based fire-fighting suppression or control systems prevent fire spread toother vehicles so that the fire does not grow to a size that cannot be attacked by the fire service.

(2) Fire suppression and cooling. If designed accordingly, a water-based fire-fighting suppression systemsuppresses the fire and cools the tunnel environment to provide more time for evacuation and enablefire fighters to access the fire. Early operation of a water-based fire-fighting system is important inachieving this objective. For example, a heavy goods vehicle fire needs only 10 minutes to exceed 100MW and 1200°C (2192°F), which are fatal conditions.

(3) Improved conditions for first responders. The cooling and radiation-shielding effects of water sprays aidin manual fire-fighting and rescue operations by reducing the thermal exposure.

(4) Improved performance of ventilation systems. The cooling of hot products of combustion provided byproperly designed water-based fire suppression systems may increase the actual capacity ofventilation systems due to the higher density of cooled products of combustion.

(5) Reduced fire exposure to structure. When a fixed fire-fighting system is operated, it is possible tointerrupt the fire growth rate, as a result reducing the peak temperatures and their duration occurring atthe surface of any exposed structure.

E.3.3

The impact of water-based fire-fighting systems may have additional consequences beyond those listed inE.3.2 that should be considered. For example:

(1) Reduced stratification. The cooling and loss of buoyancy resulting from the discharge of water-basedfire-fighting systems may lead to destratification of the smoke layer, where such stratification occurs.Normal air movement in the tunnel accelerates this process. However, by limiting the spread of fires,water-based fire-fighting systems reduce the total quantity and rate of smoke generated.

(2) Testing and maintenance requirements. Water-based fire-fighting systems will require somemaintenance. Proper system design can minimize these requirements. A full discharge test is normallyperformed only at system commissioning. During routine testing, the system can be configured todischarge flow to the drainage system.

E.4 Recommendations.

E.4.1 Application.

Fixed water-based fire-fighting systems should be considered as part of a package of fire life safetymeasures in long or busy tunnels where an engineering analysis demonstrates that an acceptable level ofsafety can be achieved. The tunnel operator and the local fire department or authority having jurisdictionshould consider the advantages and disadvantages of such systems as they apply to a particular tunnelinstallation.

E.4.2 System Operation.

To help ensure against accidental discharge, the fixed water-based fire-fighting system can be designed asa manually activated deluge system with an automatic release after a time delay. To prevent developmentof a major fire, the time delay should not exceed 3 minutes. The piping should be arranged using intervalzoning so that the discharge can be focused on the area of incident without necessitating discharge for theentire length of the tunnel. If foam is applied, each zone should be equipped with its own proportioningvalve set to control the appropriate water and foam mixture percentage.

Nozzles should provide an open deluge and be spaced so that coverage extends to roadway shouldersand, if applicable, maintenance and patrol walkways. The system should be designed with enough waterand/or foam capacity to allow operation of at least two zones in the incident area. Zone length should bebased on vehicle length and hydraulic analysis and should be coordinated with detection and ventilationzones. Piping should be designed to allow drainage through nozzles after flow is stopped.

E.4.3 System Control.


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It can be assumed that a full-time, attended control room is available for any tunnel facility in which safepassage necessitates the need for fixed water-based fire suppression system protection. Therefore,consideration should be given to human interaction in the fixed water-based fire suppression systemcontrol and activation design to ensure against false alarm and accidental discharge. Any automatic modeof operation can include a discharge delay to allow incident verification and assessment of in-tunnelconditions by trained operators.

E.4.3.1

An integrated graphic display of the fixed water-based fire-fighting system zones, fire detection systemzones, tunnel ventilation system zones and limits, and emergency access and egress locations should beprovided at the control room to allow tunnel operators and responding emergency personnel to makeappropriate response decisions.

E.5 Australia, Japan, U.S., and Recent Research Work.

E.5.1

For the tunnels listed in Table E.3, a water density of 10 mm/min (0.25 gpm/ft2) was used for the Battery

Street tunnel, with two zones operating; and a foam-water density of 6.5 mm/min (0.16 gpm/ft2) was usedfor the Seattle I-90 and I-5 tunnels.

E.5.2

There are a range of deluge nozzles with varying performance characteristics. The selection of anappropriate deluge nozzle requires consideration of a range of tunnel-specific factors including:

(1) Ventilation regime (e.g., wind speeds and direction)

(2) Tunnel height

(3) Nozzle installation height

(4) Expected fire load

(5) Environmental conditions (e.g., corrosion and freezing)

(6) Water application rate

E.5.3

Japanese authorities have conducted a series of fire tests to study the use of water spray for tunnelprotection, and some of these studies have been reported. For example, a series of tests were conducted

in an operating road tunnel with a large cross-section area (115 m2 [1238 ft2]) using a 5 MW gasoline poolfire where the performance of three different types of spray systems was investigated. The water density

used in the tests was 6 mm/min (0.15 gpm/ft2), which was much lower than that used in the Europeantunnels (i.e., half of that used in the Benelux tunnel tests). Other Japanese test programs involved fire sizes

from 4 m2 (43 ft2) and 9 m2 (97 ft2) gasoline pool fires to a bus fire in an operating road tunnel. The resultsof these tests showed that the air temperature in the tunnel was quickly decreased to the ambient airtemperature with the activation of the spray system. There was no report on smoke distribution and steamgeneration during fire suppression.


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E.5.4

In an examination of the effectiveness of sprinklers during fire suppression in tunnel incidents, theauthorities in the Netherlands conducted a series of fire tests with sprinklers in the Benelux tunnel. The testtunnel was an operating road tunnel, 9.8 m (32 ft) wide and 5.1 m (17 ft) high. Various fire scenarios wereused to simulate stationary vehicle fires, including a van loaded with wood cribs, a high heavy goodsvehicle (HGV) fire loaded with wood pallets, and an aluminum truck cabin loaded with wood cribs. No liquidfuel fire was used in the tests. The fire size in the test program ranged from 15 MW to 40 MW. Two sprinklerzones were installed in the test tunnel. The length of Zone I was 17.5 m (57.4 ft) and Zone II was 20 m

(66 ft) long. The discharged water quantity was 12.5 mm/min (.5 in./min 35 gpm/ft 2 ). Activation time of thesprinklers in the tests ranged from 6 min to 22 min after ignition of the fire source. In order to focus on thestudy of the air cooling and steam formation generated by sprinklers, the mechanical longitudinal ventilationin the tunnel was not activated during tests. The air speed in the tunnel was approximately 0–1 m/s (0–197fpm) in three tests, and approximately 3 m/s (590 fpm) in one test.

For all tests, the air temperature upstream and downstream of the fire decreased from approximately250–350°C (482–662°F) to 20–30°C (68–86°F) in a very short period of time after sprinkler activation,which prevented the fire spread from one vehicle to others. The smoke layer was disturbed with theactivation of the sprinklers, and visibility was almost entirely obstructed. It took 5 to 15 min to improvevisibility. No significant steam formation and no deflagration were observed in the test program.

E.5.5

One example for the use of water-based fighting for tunnel protection is to use foam additives to protectagainst possible flammable liquid fuel or chemical fires. The feasibility of the use of foam–water sprinklersystems against pool fires was investigated in large-scale fire tests conducted in the Memorial Tunnel.Diesel pool fires with heat release rates of 10, 20, 50, and 100 MW were used in the test program. The

water density with foam additives (3% AFFF) ranged from 2.4 mm/min (0.1 in./min 6 gpm/ft 2 ) to

3.8 mm/min (0.15 in./min 10 gpm/ft 2 ). It was reported that the fires were extinguished in less than 30 s inall four tests. The effectiveness of the deluge foam-water sprinkler system was not affected by alongitudinal ventilation velocity of 4.2 m/s (827 fpm). No details on the changes in air temperature, smokedistribution, and steam generation during suppression were reported.

E.5.6

UPTUN was a large multinational European research project that tested water mist systems in the HobølTest Tunnel in Norway and Virgolo Tunnel in Italy. Fire sizes were limited to 25 MW in shielded pool andwood pallet fires. The zone length was 30 m (98 ft). Heat release rates were reduced by up to 50 percentupon activation of the systems. During testing at the Virgolo Tunnel, fire fighters were fitted with sensors tomonitor their physiological response whilst working close to the fires. Reports are available in the publicdomain.

E.5.7

For the German research project SOLIT (Safety of Life in Tunnels), more than 50 fire tests were carried outin the test tunnel of San Pedro Des Anes in Spain, involving pool fires of up to 35 MW and covered truckfuel packages with a potential heat release rate of 200 MW. As well as the water mist systems, severaltypes of detection systems were tested in combination with a longitudinal ventilation velocity of 6 m/s (1181fpm). Some tests were also performed with semitransverse ventilation. The maximum activated length ofthe tested system was 45 m (148 ft). Cooling and attenuation of radiant heat by the water mist kept the heatrelease rate of the fire below 50 MW. Conditions were such that fire brigade intervention was possible at alltimes.

E.5.8

The SOLIT 2 research project tested over 39 full scale fires. The test program was performed at the SanPedro Des Anes test tunnel facility in Spain. Both Class A Heavy Goods Vehicle fire loads with a potentialheat release rate of 150 MW and Class B fires with heat release rates in the range of 30 MW to 100 MWwere tested. A high-pressure water mist system was tested and included both longitudinal andsemitransverse ventilation systems. The research program generated extensive reports that are available inGerman and English from the public domain.


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E.5.9

Authorities in Singapore organized a fire test program in the San Pedro Des Anes test tunnel facility thatconsisted of seven fire tests. The fire test program was carried out for the purpose of investigating theinfluence of a deluge fixed fire-fighting system on peak fire heat release rate and to acquire information onthe appropriate design parameters (e.g., types of nozzles, discharge density, and activation time) to adoptfor road tunnels. The fire test program included one free burn test and six tests with different deluge systemarrangements. The fire load consisted of 228 pallets, both plastic (20 percent) and wooden (80 percent). Allfire tests were carried out with longitudinal ventilation of approximately 3 m/s (9.84 ft/s). The peak heatrelease rate measured in the free burn test was 150 MW. When the deluge system was activated at4 minutes after fire ignition, the peak heat release rates ranged between 27 MW and 44 MW. In addition, 97MW was measured when the deluge system was activated 8 minutes after ignition of fire. The water

application rate during the fire test program was 8 mm/min (0.20 gpm/ft2) and 12 mm/min (0.30 gpm/ft2).

E.5.10

Authorities in Sweden carried out a fire test program in the Runehamar tunnel. The five tests includedClass A wooden pallet fire loads and one free burning test. As fuel pack, 420 pallets were used, and 21pallets were used as a fire target 5 m (16 ft) downstream of the fire load. The measured free burn peak heatrelease rate for the fire load was 80 MW, and all fire tests were carried out with longitudinal ventilation of

3 m/s (9.84 ft/s). The tested deluge system used a 10 mm/min (0.25 gpm/ft2) water application rate andwas able to prevent fire propagation to the adjacent target. The heat release rate was kept under 40 MWafter activation of one test and 20 MW for the remaining four tests.

E.5.11

There have been many tunnel fire tests initiated by tunnel owners and operators around the world. Fullscale fire test results are available from the following projects: A86 tunnel, Paris, France (high-pressurewater mist); A73 Roer tunnel, the Netherlands (high-pressure water mist); Dartford tunnel, United Kingdom(high-pressure water mist); M30 tunnels, Madrid, Spain (high-pressure water mist); Channel tunnel,France/United Kingdom (high-pressure water mist); and Tunnel Mont Blanc, France (deluge, low- and high-pressure water mist).

E.6 Fire Test Protocols.

While there are not currently any standard fire test protocols for the evaluation of fixed water-based fire-fighting systems intended for installation in road tunnels, ongoing work in Europe has resulted in an “adhoc” series of tests intended to quantify system performance. Guidance for fire test procedures and testarrangements has been published in following reference documents:

Engineering Guidance for a Comprehensive Evaluation of Tunnels with FFFS, Annex 7: “Fire Tests andFire Scenarios for Evaluation of FFFS” v.2.1 by SOLIT Research Consortium, Germany, 2012.

“Large Scale Fire Tests with Fixed Fire Fighting System in Runehamar Tunnel,” by Ingason H., G. Appel,and Y. Z. Li, SP Technical Research Institute of Sweden, 2014.

E.6.1 Class B Fire Scenario.

E.6.1.1

The purpose of the Class B scenario is to evaluate the ability of the system to provide cooling for caseswhere significant reduction in fire size is challenging, such as shielded hydrocarbon pool fires.

E.6.1.2

The Class B fire scenario should be based upon a partly shielded pool fire with a nominal steady stateoutput of at least 25 MW.

E.6.2 Class A Fire Scenario.

The Class A fire scenario is intended to evaluate the ability of a fixed water-based fire-fighting system toprovide fire suppression or fire control. This scenario employs a simulated heavy goods vehicle filled withwooden pallets.


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E.6.3

All tests should be supervised by an accredited independent third party. The final test report should beprepared and signed by the third party. The test report should include, at the very least, details of thefollowing:

(1) Name and address of the independent third party that has been considered acceptable by theauthorities having jurisdiction

(2) Detailed drawings of the test tunnel

(3) Detailed drawings of the tested water-based fire-fighting system

(4) Layout parameters for the tested water-based fire-fighting system

(5) Type and size of fire loads

(6) Method of ignition of fire loads

(7) Details of the position of the fire loads in the tunnel

(8) Preburn time

(9) Method of activation of the water-based fire-fighting system

(10) Ventilation conditions (type, velocity)

(11) Temperatures continuously before, during, and after testing at distances of 5 m (16.4 ft), 10 m (32.1 ft),20 m (65.6 ft), and 40 m (131.2 ft) on the downstream side and at distances of 5 m (16.4 ft), 10 m(32.1 ft), 20 m (65.6 ft), and 40 m (131.2 ft) on the upstream side; distances are measured from theend of the fire load; temperatures are measured at two positions in the cross-section of the tunnel atheights of 1 m (3.3 ft), 2 m (6.6 ft), and 3 m (10 ft) above the road surface and 0.15 m below the ceiling

(12) Radiant heat continuously before, during, and after testing at both ends of the activated WFS section

(13) O2, CO2, and CO and water vapor concentration continuously before, during, and after testing

approximately 40 m (131.2 ft) at the downstream side of the fire over the cross-section

(14) Estimates of fire heat release rate based upon oxygen consumption calorimetery measurements madeduring the test

(15) Visibility in the tunnel before, during, and after the tests




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Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

A task group is currently working on revising Annex E. This will be reviewed at the seconddraft meeting.

Response Message:

Public Input No. 59-NFPA 502-2017 [Section No. E.3 [Excluding any Sub-Sections]]

Public Input No. 16-NFPA 502-2016 [Section No. E.5.4]

Public Input No. 17-NFPA 502-2016 [Section No. E.5.5]


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Committee Input No. 5-NFPA 502-2017 [ Chapter G ]

Annex G Alternative Fuels


G.1 General.

Most vehicles currently used in the United States are powered by either spark-ignited engines (gasoline) orcompression-ignited engines (diesel). Vehicles that use alternative fuels such as compressed natural gas(CNG), liquefied petroleum gas (LP-Gas), and liquefied natural gas (LNG) are entering the vehiclepopulation, but the percentage of such vehicles is still not large enough to significantly influence the designof road tunnel ventilation with regard to vehicle emissions. However, it is possible that growing concernsregarding the safety of some alternative-fuel vehicles that operate within road tunnels will affect the fire-related life safety design aspects of highway tunnels. See Chapter 11 for requirements for road tunnelventilation during fire emergencies.

There are a number of standard requirements for these types of systems, and the requirements derive fromexisting requirements for storage and transport of CNG tanks.

The creation of accepted consensus-based standards for hydrogen tanks is an ongoing process. However,there are current international draft standards available, which provide some insight to what will be requiredoutside the U.S. in the near future.

In the U.S., the primary standards used are FMVSS 304, Compressed Natural Gas Fuel Container Integrity,and ANSI NGV2, American National Standard for Natural Gas Vehicle Containers. Both of these standardswere developed for the approval of compressed natural gas. It is currently being investigated whetherFMVSS 304 can be used for hydrogen fuel tanks. In addition, an ANSI HGV standard is underdevelopment, which will mirror the NGV standard, but incorporate specific tests for hydrogen gas vehiclecontainers and system components.

The tests in both of these standards include full-scale fire tests of the containers and their pressure reliefdevices (PRDs), as well as component reliability testing, such as pressure cycling, impact resistance, droptests, and hydrostatic burst testing. In addition to the required tests, a quality-control system is required tobe administered by an independent third party to ensure that the fuel system components are manufacturedin the same manner as when they were approved through testing. Further, the fuel system would be listedand labeled, such that it would be easily recognizable to an AHJ as having met these requirements.

In the long run, it should be feasible for regulators to only allow vehicles that carry an approved listing andlabel to travel through a road tunnel. In the short term, this is unrealistic, since the standards process isunder development and there is some level of controversy as to the minimum acceptable designparameters. As a result, in the short term, the decision will be in the hands of the AHJ as to the mitigationmeasures for dealing with alternative fuels in road tunnels.

Section G.2 provides some highlighted information about selected alternative fuels, Section G.3 providessome additional information about possible mitigation measures, and Section G.4 provides a briefdiscussion of applicable codes and standards, as well as recent research into the hazards of alternativefuels.

G.2 Alternative Fuels.


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It is evident that the use of vehicles powered by alternative fuels (i.e., fuels other than gasoline or diesel)will continue to increase. Of the potential alternative fuels, LP-Gas and hybrid electric currently are themost widely used. Under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and the Clean Air Act Amendment of 1990, thefollowing are considered potential alternative fuels:

(1) Methanol

(2) Hydrogen

(3) Ethanol

(4) Coal-derived liquids

(5) Propane

(6) Biological materials

(7) Natural gas

(8) Reformulated gasoline

(9) Electricity

(10) Clean diesel

The alternative fuels that are considered most viable in the near future are CNG, LP-Gas, LNG, methanol,hydrogen, and electric hybrid.

G.2.1 Compressed Natural Gas. (CNG)

CNG has some excellent physical and chemical properties that make it a safer automotive fuel thangasoline or LP-Gas, provided well-designed carrier systems and operational procedures are followed.Although CNG has a relatively high flammability limit, its flammability range is relatively narrow compared tothe ranges for other fuels.

In air at ambient conditions, a CNG volume of at least 5 percent is necessary to support continuous flamepropagation, compared to approximately 2 percent for LP-Gas and 1 percent for gasoline vapor. Therefore,considerable fuel leakage is necessary in order to render the mixture combustible. Furthermore, firesinvolving combustible mixtures of CNG are relatively easy to contain and extinguish.

Since natural gas is lighter than air, it normally dissipates harmlessly into the atmosphere instead of poolingwhen a leak occurs. However, in a tunnel environment, such dissipation can lead to pockets of gas thatcollect in the overhead structure. In addition, since natural gas can ignite only in the range of 5 percent to15 percent volume of natural gas in air, leaks are not likely to ignite due to insufficient oxygen.

Another advantage of CNG is that its fueling system is one of the safest in existence. The rigorous storagerequirements and greater strength of CNG cylinders compared to those of gasoline contribute to thesuperior safety record of CNG automobiles.

An incident with a CNG-propelled bus in the Netherlands [Fire in a CNG bus (Brand in een aardgasbus,2012)] highlighted the issue and associated risk of possible jet fires as a consequence of the pressurerelease valve operation.

G.2.2 Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LP-Gas).

There is a growing awareness of the economic advantages of using LP-Gas as a vehicular fuel. Theseadvantages include longer engine life, increased travel time between oil and oil filter changes, longer andbetter performance from spark plugs, nonpolluting exhaust emissions, and, in most cases, mileage that iscomparable to that of gasoline. LP-Gas is normally delivered as a liquid and can be stored at 38°C(100.4°F) on vehicles under a design pressure of 1624 kPa to 2154 kPa (250 psi to 312.5 psi). LP-Gas is anatural gas and petroleum derivative. One disadvantage is that it is costly to store because a pressurevessel is needed. Also, where LP-Gas is engulfed in a fire, a rapid increase in pressure can occur, even ifthe outside temperature is not excessive relative to the gas–vapor pressure characteristics. Rapid pressureincrease can be mitigated by venting the excessive buildup through relief valves. In Australia a significantproportion of the vehicle fleet uses LPG-powered vehicles. Alternative-powered vehicles are marked bycolored labels on their registration plates. No restrictions on use of such vehicles exist in Australia. InAustralia, the only impact on managing these vehicles is by alternative procedures for incident response byemergency services.


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G.2.3 Methanol.

Currently, methanol is used primarily as a chemical feedstock for the production of chemical intermediatesand solvents. Under EPA restrictions, it is being used as a substitute for lead-based octane enhancers inthe form of methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE) and as a viable method for vehicle emission control. MTBE isnot available as a fuel substitute but is used as a gasoline additive.

The hazards of methanol production, distribution, and use are comparable to those of gasoline. Unlikegasoline, however, methanol vapors in a fuel tank are explosive at normal ambient temperature. Saturatedvapors that are located above nondiluted methanol in an enclosed tank are explosive at 10°C to 43°C (50°Fto 109.4°F). A methanol flame is invisible, so a colorant or gasoline needs to be added to enable detection.

G.2.4 Hydrogen.

Hydrogen is one of the most attractive alternative fuels due to its clean-burning qualities ability to powerProton Exchange Membrane (PEM) fuel cells (the fuel cell of choice in vehicles) , the abundant source ofavailability, and the potential higher efficiency in vehicles . Hydrogen can be used to power vehicles in theform of fuel cells or as replacement fuel in internal combustion engines. 2.2 lb (1 kg) of hydrogen gas hasabout the same energy as 1 gallon of gasoline. For an adequate The first commerically deployedhydrogen powered vehicles employ fuel cells to convert hydrogen into electricity to power an electric motor.For a driving range of 300 miles (450 km) or more, a light-duty fuel cell vehicle must carry approximately11 to 29 lb lb (5 to 13 kg kg ) of hydrogen. Storage technologies currently under developmentCommercially available storage technologies include high-pressure tanks for compressed hydrogen gas upto 70 MPa (10,000 psi), insulated tanks for cryogenic liquid hydrogen below -253°C (-423°F), and chemicalbonding of hydrogen with another material such as metal hydrides . Fuel Cell Electric Vehicles (FCEVs)have evolved from a demonstration to commercial technology. Several OEMs now sell or lease FCEVs,and netowoks of hydrogen fueling stations have been constructed on both US coasts with plans to providefueling service to the entire country, This deployment of FCEVs requires that they be able to utilize existinginfrastructure including tunnels and bridges .

In comparison with gasoline, hydrogen has a much wider flammability range (4 percent to 75 percent byvolume) and detonability explosive limit. The minimum ignition energy of hydrogen in air is about an orderof magnitude (by a factor of 10) less than that of gasoline vapor. A static electric spark such as by thehuman body or from a vehicle tailpipe is sufficient to ignite hydrogen. As the density is only about 7 percentof air, hydrogen release in atmosphere usually results in rapid dispersion and mixing to a nonhazardousconcentration. However, accumulation of hydrogen in stagnant space that cannot be ventilated is a fire andexplosion hazard. A minimum separation distance from the ceiling or explosion proofing should beconsidered for such electrical equipment.

Gaseous hydrogen leak tends to be vertical and the flammability mixture be localized before being quicklydispersed; whereas liquid hydrogen leak may pool and spread similarly as gasoline, but at a much higherevaporation rate, which results in temperature decrease in surroundings and causes condensation of watervapor. Since hydrogen gas is invisible and odorless, on-board detection and incident shutoff system mustbe provided in fuel-cell vehicles. Similarly, emergency Emergency response to an incident involvinghydrogen fuel leak or fire requires necessary training, such as recognizing the hydrogen tank, high -voltage battery, or ultracapacitor capacitor pack that may might be present on the incident vehicle. TheNFPA website shown below provides specific emergency response information on commercialy availableFCEVs. The H2Tools website shown below provides training materials for emergency responders that canbe used to prepare for incidents involving FCEVs. See the following sites for information on emergencyresponse and emergency response training for FCEVs:

1. H2Tools: https://h2tools.org/content/training-materials

2. NFPA: http://www.nfpa.org/training-and-events/by-topic/alternative-fuel-vehicle-safety-training

G.2. 4.1 Hydrogen Behavior Compared to Other Fuels.

Table G.2.4.1 provides information on hydrogen properties relative to other alternative fuels and gasoline.

Table G.2.4.1 Comparative Properties of Hydrogen Fuels [ATTACHED]


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G.2. 5 Electric Hybrid.

Executive Order 13423 signed in 2007 directed federal agencies to use plug-in hybrid electric vehicles(PHEVs) when their cost becomes comparable to non-PHEVs. PHEV combines the benefits of pure electricand hybrid electric vehicles, which allows on-board energy storage device devices to be charged either byplugging into the electric grid or through an auxiliary power unit (APU) using replenishable fuels includingcertain types of alternative fuels such as CNG or hydrogen. Hybrid electric vehicles (HEV) offer better fueleconomy and lower emission than vehicles using fossil fuels, while electricity produces zero tailpipeemission. Efficiency in energy storage, transmission, and conversion is critical regardless of electric vehicletypes. Both battery EV and gasoline-electric HEV have been commercially available for a number of years.EV containes multiple battery modules with a battery capacity up to 100,000 Wh. Due to the introduction ofelectric drive, energy storage, and conversion system in the powertrain, one of the safety considerations isassociated with the high-voltage system (e.g., 600 VDC) used for the powertrain, such as electric shockand short-circuit; the other is the heat generated during battery charging and discharging, which also tendsto give off toxic fumes and hydrogen gas; another safety consideration is accidental spill of batteryelectrolyte. .

The main failure mode involving EV and HEV Li-ion battery packs involves thermal runaway events wherethe battery self-heats and fails energetically. Thermal runaway results in venting of flammable gases andmay result subsequent fires. Typical cell vent gases consist of a mixture of carbon monoxide, carbondioxide, hydrogen, methane, and a number of heavier hydrocarbons including but not limited to ethane,ethylene, and propylene. Recent testing has confirmed that the exact composition of vent gases dependson the battery state-of-charge and battery chemistry. Similarly, small scale testing confirmed that asignificant amount of flammable gases are released and such amount heavily depends on the batterystate-of-charge and chemistry [1].

Note also that a number of materials used in the battery, such as lithium, could burn at very hightemperature if ignited. These issues have long been recognized and addressed in relevant SAEdocuments, for example, SAE J2344, Guidelines for Electric Vehicle Safety , and UL standards, includingbattery thermal management and monitoring, proper electrical insulation and structural isolation of thebattery compartment, and automatic disconnect for the energy storage system. Similarly, these have alsobeen recognized for maintenance, training, and emergency response. Testing of full scale mock-upvehicles equipped with EV and HEV battery packs confirmed water to be an effective suppression agent forthese types of fires. However, the results confirmed that the amount of water required for suppression wasmuch higher than for standard IC vehicle fires and as high as 2600 gallons. Testing showed that the mosteffective way to attack EV and HEV fires is to concentrate the water flow onto the battery pack in order toreduce the temperature of the cells and avoid thermal runaway progression and fire re-ignitions. Whenusing water to extinguish/suppress an EV battery fire, a large volume of water should be used. Using onlya small amount could allow dangerous toxic gases to be released.

G.3 Mitigation Measures

REF:

[1] Colella et. Al. Electric Vehicle Fires, International Symposium Tunnel Safaty and Security, 2016.

[2] NFPA Alternative Fuel Vehicles, Safety Training Program, Emergency Field Guide, pp. 23-25.


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G.3 Additional Considerations .


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As the use of alternative fuels in road vehicles increases, each road tunnel operating agency or AHJ mustdeal with the issue of whether to permit such vehicles to pass through the tunnel for which it is responsible.Most road tunnel agencies throughout the world do permit the passage of alternative-fuel vehicles.

The mitigation measures that can be taken by the road tunnel designer relate primarily to the ventilationsystem, which, in most circumstances, can provide sufficient air to dilute the escaped fuel to a level that isnonhazardous. It is necessary to establish a minimum level of ventilation to provide such dilution under allcircumstances. To ensure that the ventilation system provides adequate capacity to provide such dilutionunder all circumstances, the AHJ is responsible for evaluating each tunnel on a case-by-case basis, whichmight be handled by risk analysis, computer (zone, CFD, etc.) modeling, experimental testing, or all of theabove. This assessment should consider all relevant tunnel characteristics (i.e., tunnel length, cross-sectional area, etc.). Other measures include reducing or eliminating any irregular surfaces of the tunnelceiling or structure where a pocket of gas can collect and remain undiluted, thus posing a potentialexplosion hazard. Additional precautions can be taken by installing permanent alternative-fuel detectiondevices within tunnels at high points or within ceiling cavities as appropriate where escaped fuel canaccumulate.

The use of alternative-fuel vehicles within tunnels generates challenges that require resolution. Each fuelmust be considered on its own merit.

Identification of the fuel type used within a vehicle is the first and most primary issue to address. This is adifficult prospect for many agencies. It is not enough to realize that a fire incident involves an alternativefuel vehicle, the fuel must also be identified. Currently there are no national requirements for a standardplacard system identifying the type of fuel within the United States. As consequence, if a particular fuel isprevented by regulation from entering a tunnel facility, vehicle identification is important for enforcement ofthe facilities rules and procedures.

Identification of alternative-fuel vehicles is critical

in the development of personnel training and emergency response procedures for accidents involving suchvehicles.as the correct emergency response strongly depends upon knowing the hazard posed by a fire incident. Specific emergency response procedures, precautions, and training requirements for each type of

thealternative-fuel

vehiclesmust also be prepared and included as part of the facility emergency response plan.

A good example of this type of plan is referenced in California Fuel Cell Partnership – EmergencyResponse Guide: Fuel Cell Vehicles and Hydrogen Fueling Stations .Precautions must be taken by firstresponders to identify if the vehicle is powered by alternative fuels. Vehicle identification must consist ofvehicle display graphics. An identification standard for each of the alternative fuels needs to beestablished. Emergency response personnel must These should also be coordinated with the local fire department response plan. Examples of alternativefuel vehicle response plan are accessible at http://www.nfpa.org/training-and-events/by-topic/alternative-fuel-vehicle-safety-training .

The hazards presented by various alternative fuel fires differ and are fuel dependent. For instance,hydrogen and methanol flames are not easily discernable with the naked eye. High voltage potential inelectric vehicles should be recognized. Therefore, emergency response personnel should be providedwith training specific to

theeach alternative-fuel vehicle

they are responding to and be provided with. In addition, the first responder should consider specialty response equipment such as, but not limited to,self-contained breathing apparatus, high-voltage gloves, static dissipative equipment, and infrared camerasto visualize a vehicle fire.

Additional precautions must be taken before attempting to rescue occupants from a disabled or damagedalternative-fuel vehicle or trying to remove a damaged vehicle. It is important to make sure that the systemis no longer running and that there are no indications of an alternative-fuel release. If extrication of apassenger is necessary, all precautions are to be taken into consideration and manufacturers' shutdownprocedures must be followed to ensure high-voltage lines or alternative-fuel (natural gas, hydrogen) lines


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are not cut.Due to the gaseous nature of most alternative fuels, the first responder may be directed to not extinguishthe fire, but instead to manage the fire incident.

If there is a delayed ignition after gas release, released gases may move away from the vehicle incident. In extreme cases, there may be the formation of flammable gas clouds that may ignite away from thevehicle and, in rare instances, this may lead to a flash fire or more significant overpressure event.

The facility must also review the potential of accumulation of a gaseous fuel. This could be at a low pointas in the case of dense gas clouds (e.g. propane, LNG, CNG ) or at a high point as in the case ofhydrogen. If alternative fuel vehicles are using the tunnel, these areas should be identified and monitoredto prevent unaware personnel from entering an environment with a latent hazard.

Tunnel ventilation provides the tunnel facility with one means of mitigation. Tunnel ventilation can providesufficient air to dilute the escaped fuel to concentrations below the Lower Flammabity Limit (LFL). It isnecessary to establish a minimum level of ventilation to provide such dilution under all circumstances.

G.4 Informational References.

Published research exists to help assess the relative hazard of specific alternative fuels (and fuel systems)and to help develop consensus safety standards for regulators. Subsection N.2.1 references several codesand standards used for alternative fuels as well as a few website resources for new standards indevelopment. Subsection N.2.2 contains a short list of published research in the area of alternative fuels.

This list of references represents a brief summary of some applicable documents, with some emphasis onhydrogen, as that seems to be the fastest growing technology. This list is not meant to be exhaustive. Onthe other hand, it is meant to be a starting point for document users to understand some of the hazards ofalternative fuels, potential mitigation measures, as well as necessary future research.

Supplemental Information


Table_G.2.4.1.xls




Street Address:

City:

State:

Zip:

Submittal Date: Mon Oct 16 15:59:01 EDT 2017

Committee Statement

CommitteeStatement:

This committee input captures advancements in alternative fuel vehicles. A report will beprovided to the committee for review prior to the second draft meeting.

ResponseMessage:

Public Input No. 135-NFPA 502-2017 [Chapter G]


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Properties Notes/Sources Units Hydrogen [1] Methane [1] Propane [1] Methanol [1] Ethanol [1] Gasoline [2]Chemical Formula H2 CH4 C3H8 CH3OH C2H5OH CxHy (x = 4 - 12)

Molecular Weight [a, b] 2.02 16.04 44.1 32.04 46.07 100 - 105

Density (NTP) [3, a, c] kg/m3

0.0838 0.668 1.87 791 789 751

lb/ft3

0.00523 0.0417 0.116 49.4 49.3 46.9

Viscosity (NTP) [3, a, b] g/cm-sec 8.81 x 10-5

1.10 x 10-4

8.012 x 10-5

9.18 x 10-3

0.0119 0.0037 - 0.0044

lb/ft-sec 5.92 x 10-6

7.41 x 10-6

5.384 x 10-6

6.17 x 10-4

7.99 x 10-4

2.486 x 10-4

- 2.957 x 10-4

Normal Boiling Point [a, b]oC -253 -162 -42.1 64.5 78.5 27 - 225

oF -423 -259 -43.8 148 173.3 80 - 437

Vapor Specific Gravity (NTP) [3, a, d] air = 1 0.0696 0.555 1.55 N/A N/A 3.66

Flash Point [b, d]oC < -253 -188 -104 11 13 -43

oF < -423 -306 -155 52 55 -45

Flammability Range in Air [c, b, d] vol% 4.0 - 75.0 5.0 - 15.0 2.1 - 10.1 6.7 - 36.0 4.3 - 19 1.4 - 7.6

Auto Ignition Temperature in Air [b, d]oC 585 540 490 385 423 230 - 480

oF 1085 1003 914 723 793 450 - 900

[d] "Hydrogen Fuel Cell Engines and Related Technologies. Module 1: Hydrogen Properties." U.S. DOE. 2001,

http://www.eere.energy.gov/hydrogenandfuelcells/tech_validation/pdfs/fcm01r0.pdf

[b] "Alternatives to Traditional Transportation Fuels: An Overview." DOE/EIA-0585/O. Energy Information Administration. U.S. Department of Energy. Washington, DC. June

1994.

Sources:

[a] NIST Chemistry WebBook. http://webbook.nist.gov/chemistry/

[c] Perry's Chemical Engineers' Handbook (7th Edition), 1997, McGraw-Hill.

Hydrogen Analysis Resource Center: Comparative Properties of Hydrogen and Fuels

Notes:

[1] Properties of the pure substance

[2] Properties of a range of commercial grades

N/A - Not applicable

[3] NTP = 20 oC (68

oF) and 1 atmosphere

75



http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/alternativefuels/0585o.pdf#

http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/alternativefuels/0585o.pdf#

http://webbook.nist.gov/chemistry/#

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