CHAPTER 10

Meaning: Profile, base, and domain

ro.r Approaches to the study ofmeaning

ro.z Profile and base

10.3 Domains

ro.4 Some examptes

ro.5 Designation and connotation

Study questions

Further reading

r98

207t86

792

795

203

204

Meaning is a difficult topic to address in a systematic way. In the recent past,

many linguists considered semantics to be simply too hard to handle at all and

directed their attention to more tractable topics in syntax and phonology. As a

consequence, a good deal of linguistics, both in the Bloomfieldian and theChomskyan traditions, has simply ignored semantics. Howeveq if we take the

idea of language as a symbolic system at all seriously, semantic representa-

tions are going to have to play a central role. In fact, it is probably fair to say

that one of the major achievements of Cognitive Grammar to date has been in

the area of semantic analysis, and in elucidating the semantic motivation of

syntactic and morphological structure.This chapter introduces some basic notions involved in the study of

meaning. I begin, however, with some general observations on the ways in

which this topic can be approached.

Approaches to the study of meaning

We can distinguish three general approaches to the study of meaning:

(i) The language-world approach. Meaning is studied as the relationship

between linguistic expressions and states of affairs in the world.

10.1

Meaning: Profi le, base, and domain t87

(ii) The language-internal approach. Meaning is studied in terms of rela-tions between expressions within a language.

. (iii) The conceptualist approach. The meaning of an expression is equatedwith a conceptualization in the mind of a language user.

Let us consider these in turn.

10.1.1 The language-world approach

The language-world approach considers the kinds of situations to which alinguistic expression can be applied. Suppose we are interested in the meaningsof cup and mug (and in the difference in meaning between the two words). It isevident that the meanings of the two words are rather closely tied up with thekinds of things in the world that can be appropriately called cups and mugs,and that knowing the meanings involves being able to apply the wordsappropriately to the things.

We can distinguish two perspectives, according to the direction of therelation between language and the world:

. the semasiological' perspective goes from language to the world, and asks:'For this expression, what kinds of situations can be appropriatelydesignated by it?'

. the onomasiological' perspective goes from the world to language, andasks: 'For this state of affairs, what range of linguistic expressions canappropriately describe it?'

With respect to the cups and the mugs, the semasiological perspective mightinvolve asking English-speaking consultants to point to items that couldappropriately be named by each of the two words. Taking the onomasiologicalperspective, we could present our consultants with an array of objects (com-prising, obviously, things that we suspect might count as cups and mugs), andask them what they would call them.

It would certainly be a good starting point, if you were trying to explicatethe meanings of, say, cup and mug, to consider the kinds of things in the worldto which the words may be applied. Or suppose you were studying the pre-positions over and above, and were interested in the differences between theprepositions as well as the extent of overlap between them. A natural start-ing point, again, would be to consider which spatial configurations can beappropriately named by the two prepositions. I dare say that every linguist,when investigating the meanings of expressions (at least, the meanings of'concrete' expressions) will invite judgements as to what the expressions canpotentially refer to.

' From Greek selmasia' meaning'.'signi fi cation'.' From Greek onoma'name'. 'Onomasiological'is

being used here in a slightly non-traditionalsense. Traditionally, onomastics is the study of proper names (especially place names), while onomasiol-og7 is often used to reler to the study ofsemantic relations between words within a semantic field.

188 Cognitive grammar

Onomasiology and semasiology

Some semantic domains are better suited to the language-world approach thanothers. We can point to an object and ask people what they would call i t; equally,we can ask people to pick out objects that could be named by a 'concrete'word. Wecould not apply this methodotogy to abstract entit ies, such as emotions or betiefs.We could hardly ask a person to pick out, from an array of mental phenomena,those that count as 'betiefs', as opposed to'thoughts' or'knowledge', nor could wepoint to an emot ional s tate and ask people what they woutd cat l i t .

One semant ic f ie td that lends i tset f par t icu lar ty wel l to the onomasio logical andsemasiological perspectives is colour. We might begin by presenting consultantswith a series of colour samples and asking them to name the colours. This is theonomasiological perspective (from world to language) which serves to elicit therange of words that a person habitualty uses to name colours. Subsequently, wemight present subjects with a colour chart, on which colours are arranged accord-ingto hue and br ightness, and asksubjectsto indicate which of the cotours couldbe named by each of the colourwords they had volunteered in the f i rs t par t of theinvestigation. This is the semasiotogical perspective (from language to world).

Both perspectives were systematically employed by Maclaury in his investiga-tions of colourterminology in a wide range of languages. His results are especiallyinteresting to the extent that the two perspectives do not always mirror each other.The fact that colour word ry can be applied to colour sample c does not entail thatcolour sample c wilt be named by cotour word w. MacLaury (1982) gives a briefoverview of the methodology and discusses some of his findings; for moreadvanced accounts, see Maclaury GggSa, ry95b).For a brief summary see Taylor

i995a:28-4) .The onomasiologicaI and semasiological perspectives were ingeniously

employed by Geeraerts et al. (t99Q in their study of ctothing terminology, alreadyreferred to in Ch. t,p. ry6. The data collected in the course of the research made itpossible to enquire, for a given clothing term, the properties of the garments towhich the term was apptied; conversely, it was possible to enquire, for garments

with a certain set of properties, which names were typicatty given to the garments.

Geeraerts relates the two perspectives to the notions of prototype and basic-level. A basic-level term is one that is habituatty apptied to an entity of a certainkind; basic-level terms can be characterized in terms of onomasiological salience.The prototype is the entity to which an expression is typicatly apptied; prototypes

can be characterized in terms of semasiological salience.

This said, there are several reasons why an approach which focusesexclusively on the relation between linguistic expressions and states of affairsin the world is inadequate:

(i) A first, and obvious limitation is that the approach is applicable only toexpressions which designate 'concrete' entities. We would not get very far if we

j

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Meaning: Profile, base, and domain 189

tried to explicate the meanings of soul and spirit by asking our languageconsultants to point to entities that could be named by these words.

(ii) As was pointed out in section 4.5, it is an error to suppose that linguisticexpressions refer directly to the world at all; rather, linguistic expressionsrefer to entities in a mental space. The mental space may be taken to beveridical, in which case an expression's referent may be assumed to really existin the world. Equally, the mental space could be hypothetical, imagined, orfictional. Presumably, Martians exist only in fictional mental spaces. we wouldnot get very far by trying to explicate the meaning of Martian by linking upthe word with things that exist in the world (or even with things that exist onMars).

(iii) Even if we restrict ourselves to expressions for which potential refer-ents can be identified, the language-world approach offers a less than com-plete account of meaning. There is more to the meaning of an expression thanthe relation between the expression and its referents. To know the wordcarburettor involves more than simply being able to identify the carburettorunder the bonnet of a car. At the very least, we would expect knowledge of theword to include some notion of the role of a carburettor within the function-ing of an internal combustion engine; indeed, it is precisely this knowledgewhich enables a person to identify the carburettor in the first place. Theapproach also fails in the case of expressions which involve the speaker'sassessment of a situation. The words stingy and thrifty have to do not onlywith how a person handles their expenditures but also with how a speakerassesses the behaviour. And to return to our earlier example of cups and mugs,whether something is to be called a cup or mug might depend on factors thatare extrinsic to the object as such, for example, the situations in which it mightbe used, the kinds of substances with which it might be filled, and even theprice one paid for it.

(iv) It is often the case that one and the same state of affairs can be lin-guistically encoded in different ways. The sentences in (r) are truth-conditionally equivalent; if one of the sentences truly applies to a situation,then so will each of the others.

(r) a. Someone stole her diamonds from the Princess.b. Someone robbed the Princess of her diamonds.c. Her diamonds were stolen from the Princess.d. The Princess was robbed of her diamonds.

The sentences differ with respect to how they construe the described situation.Construal is a matter of how a situation is conceptualized, it cannot bereduced to the observable features of a situation. Matching the situation to theexpressions is not likely to reveal the semantic difference between active andpassive sentences, nor the difference between the verbs rob and steal.

79o Cognitive grammar

In spite of the above critical remarks, I do not wish to deny the value ofboth the onomasiological and the semasiological approaches in semanticstudies. Matching up expressions with states of affairs in the world-for thoseexpressions for which the procedure is applicable-is a valid technique ofsemantic enquiry. But language-world relations cannot be the whole story.Even if we can establish that a given expression regularly matches up with

' a certain kind of situation, this is at best $)mptomatic of the expression'smeaning, language-world relations are not to be equated with the meaning.The meaning, I would claim, is to be identified with the conceptualizationsymbolized by the expression. It is in virtue of the conceptualization that theexpression can be used to refer to entities in the world.

ro.r.2 The language-internaI ap proach

A second approach to the study of meaning focuses on the relations betweenlinguistic expressions within a language. Again, we can distinguish two waysof implementing this approach:

. we can focus on paradigmatic relations, that is to say, on the relationsbetween different expressions;

. we can focus on syntagmatic relations, that is to say, on the relationsbetween items which co-occur within an expression.

Paradigmatic relations include relations such as synonymy, hyponymy,opposites (of various kinds), and entailment. Perhaps the most fundamentalof these is entailment. I entails B, rf B is true whenever I is true. The sen-tences in example (z) illustrate the relation. If it is the case that the terroristsassassinated the President, then it has to be the case that the President died.

(z) The terrorists assassinated the President.entails

The President died.

Entailment is fundamental because it underlies other paradigmatic rela-tions. For example, it may be invoked to define synonymy: two expressions aresynonymous (they have the same meaning) if each entails the other. As we sawin Chapter 7 (p. tz;), we can appeal to entailment in order to define the relationbetween a superordinate term and its hyponyms. Entailment is also relevantfor distinguishing different kinds of opposites. Complementary opposites-(3) are such that,4 entails not-B, while B entails not-A'.

(3) a. The cat is alive.en ta i l s

The cat is not dead.b. The cat is dead.

entailsThe cat is not alive.

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Meaning: Profile, base, and domain 191

Gradable opposites, such as tall and short, are more complex:

(4) a. John is taller than Mary.entails

Mary is shorter than John.b. John is taller than Mary.

does not entailJohn is tall.

c. Mary is shorter than John.does not entail

Mary is short.

Converses, such as husband and wife, buy and sel/, exhibit a slightly differentpattern:

$) a. Fred is Martha's husband.entai ls

Martha is Fred's wife.b. Jim sold the car to Agatha.

entailsAgatha bought the car from Jim.

A different implementation of the language-internal approach focuses ona word's collocations, that is, on the kinds of words that a word typically occurstogether with, or in the neighbourhood of. It is evident that (to ) bark collocateswith (typically occurs in the vicinity of) dog, but not at all with cat. One aspectof heavy is that it collocates with drinker and smoker (heavy drinker, heavysmoker), but not wiLh eater or spender (*heavy eater, *heavy spender). Studiesof collocations based on the analysis of large text corpora often throw upinteresting and unexpected tendencies. Stubbs (rqqS) found that cause (bothnoun and verb) tends to be used of unpleasant events; we would talk of 'the

cause of the problem' rather than 'the cause of my happiness'.Linguists who have been sceptical of conceptualist semantics have some-

times opted to analyse meaning solely in terms of language-internal relations.John Lyons (see section 4.1) was one such:

Acceptance of the structuralist approach in semantics has the advantage that itenables the linguist to avoid commitment on the controversial question of thephilosophical and psychological status of 'concepts' or 'ideas'. As far as theempirical investigation of the structure of a language is concerned, the sense of alexical item may be defined to be, not only dependent upon, but identical with, the set ofrelations which hold between the item in question and other items in the same lexicalsystem. (Lyons ry68: 443;emphasis added)

Cruse (t986) took a similar line:3

3 Subsequently, Cruse (t992: 289) moderated his views: 'It is not sufficient, in my opinion, to treatword meaning exclusively in terms of relations between lexical items.'

t92 Cognitive grammar

It is taken as axiomatic in this book that every aspect of the meaning of a word isreflected in a characteristic pattern of semantic normality (and abnormality) ingrammatically appropriate contexts. That which is not mirrored in this way is not,for us, a question of meaning; and, conversely, every difference in the semanticnormality profile between two items betokens a difference in meaning. (Cruse r986:r5 - r6 )

It is interesting to note that several introductory linguistics textbooks treatword meaning largely in such terms. This is just as true of the well-establishedtextbook by Fromkin and Rodman (first published 1974, and still goingstrong), as it is of the very recent introduction by Radford et al. (t99$.

To be sure, every linguist, when pursuing a semantic investigation, willcollect information about collocations and will elicit judgements aboutentailments, antonyms, and other meaning relations. There can be no doubt asto the value of investigating meaning from the perspective of language-internal relations. Indeed, in a very important sense, one aspect of knowing aword is to know how that word is used in relation to other words.

The language-internal approach becomes problematic, however, if meaningis equated with sets of relations between linguistic expressions. On thisapproach, the semantic structure of a language becomes a vast calculusof language-internal relations, which makes no contact at all with the wayspeakers conceptualize the world. The question then becomes, how does alanguage learner bootstrap4 the conceptual content of linguistic expressions?Observation of the semantic relations between dead and alive,between tall andshort, between buy and sell, actually tells us very little about the conceptualcontent of these words. Once again, language-internal relations must beregarded as symptomalic of meaning, not as meaning itself.

10.1.3 The conceptualist approach

I argued in Chapter 4 for the viability of a conceptualist approach to seman-tics. It is time, now, to begin to fill in the details and to see how such anapproach can work. In this chapter, I focus on three basic notions in theCognitive Grammar analysis of meaning: profile, base, and domain.

1o.2 Prof i te and base

The notions of profile and base can best be introduced by way of an example.Consider the word hypotenuse. How can we characterize the semantic unitsymbolized by this word? What rs a hypotenuse? A minimal definition mightgo as follows: A hypotenuse is the longest side of a right-angled triangle, theside that is opposite the right angle.5

a How, in other words, does the learner gain a toe-hold into the conceptual system?5 ThehypotenuseexamplehasbeenusedbyLangacker(r988b:59)andFi l lmore(I985).

Meaning: Profile, base, and domain r93

There are two components to this definition. First, there is the notion of aright-angled triangle. Second, one of the sides of the triangle is called thehypotenuse. A person who did not know what a right-angled triangle is couldnot know what a hypotenuse is. An understanding of what a hypotenuse isrests on a prior understanding of what a right-angled triangle is.

So, what is a hypotenuse? In a sense, a hypotenuse is nothing more than astraight line. The straight line is what the word profiles, or designates. Thestraight line, however, is one which functions as one side of a right-angledtriangle. The right-angled triangle constitutes the base. The triangle itself isnot profiled; the profile picks out one facet of the base and renders it particu-larly prominent. The distinction is represented in Figure r o. r . The expression'sprofile is represented by bold.

There is a simple linguistic test for identifying the profile in contrast to thebase. Although the notion of the triangle is crucial to an understanding ofhypotenuse, any statement about a hypotenuse is a statement about theprofile it is about the hypotenuse qua straight line, it is not about any aspectofthe base.

(6) a. The hypotenuse is 3 cm long.b. *The hypotenuse is right-angled.c. xThe hypotenuse has three sides.d. *The hypotenuse has an area of ro cm'.

How can we characterize the concept [nvrornuusE]? Earlier (in section3.r.2), I proposed a preliminary definition of a concept as a principle ofcategorization-to have a concept is to be able to recognize instances. Noqit is clear that the concept [nvrorENusn] cannot be equated with the word'sprofile; the profile, as we have seen, is nothing more than a straight line. (As amatter of fact, we should have to say that the expressions lrypotenuse andstraight line profile exactly the same entity.) Although a hypotenuse rs a

? \ i : i t , : , ,"1j,iii:/Vair: tfr*botd:linCirpres*r*r the word's prafile; the right-angtrd triangte is the baie,

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794 Cognitive grammar ..,' i

straight line, the expressions hypotenuse and straight line are not synony-

mous. Rather, the concept consists in knowledge of the profile against the

appropriate base:

Perceived intuitively, the profile (in the words of Susan Lindner) 'stands out inbas-relief' against the base. The semantic value of an expression resides in neitherthe base nor the profile alone, but in their combination; it derives from the desig-nation of a specific entity identified and characterized by its position within a largerconfiguration. (FCGI : I 83),

Profile and referent

The profite of an expression is not to be equated with the expression's referent.The term 'referring expression' is well established in the semantics l iterature.

The term is traditionalty used of noun phrases which designate an entity that existsin the real or an imaginary wortd. l f I ask the quest ion, 'Do you see that t ree theregrowing in the yard?', in a situation in which there is indeed a tree in the yard, and I

am enquir ing whether you see that t ree or not , there is a sense in which I am usingthe expression that tree there growing in the yard Io refer to the tree; the tree is the

expression's referent, and the noun phrase is a referring expression.I have already emphasized (section +.:.r) that even a referring expression does

not actually refer to a thing in the world but to a thing as conceptualized by alanguage user and which inhabi ts , not the realwor ld, but a menta l space. Wi th th isproviso in mind, there is, I dare say, no great harm in claiming that the referent ofthe noun phrase fhot tree there growing in the yard, when uttered in appropriatecircumstances, corresponds to the expression's profi le.

But the notion of profi le is much broader in scope. Expressions other than refer-ring noun phrases have a profi le. (ln fact, it is axiomatic in Cognitive Grammarthatall t inguistic expressions profi le something or other.) A clause profi les a situationor event, a verb profi les a process, a preposition profites a kind of relation. Clauses,verbs, and prepositions would not normalty be considered to be 'referring

expressions'.Moreover, we shall want to say that not only noun phrases, but also 'bare' nouns

have a profi le. The noun free profi les an entity, just as much as the referring nounphrase fhaf tree. fhe difference is that the bare noun profi les a type of entity,whereas the futl noun phrase profi les a particular instance of the type.

Note, in this connection, that the diagram in Figure ro.r displays the profi le of the

noun hypotenuse, conceived as a type of entity, it does not profile fhe hypotenuseof aspecificright-angled triangle. Consequently, the triangle depicted in Figure ro.r is

also to be interpreted as a type of entity; you may think of it as a schematic right-

angled triangle, which abstracts away from particularit ies of individuat triangles,

such as thei r s ize, shape, and or ientat ion.

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Meaning: Profi le, base, and domain t95

1o.3 Domains

It is useful to make a distinction between the base'against which an entity isprofiled and the domain, or domains, against which concepts take shape. Thebase of an expression is the conceptual content that is inherently, intrinsically,and obligatorily invoked by the expression. A domain is a more generalized'background' knowledge configuration against which conceptualization isachieved. To be sure, the distinction between base and domain is not alwaysclear-cut. Essentially, the distinction has to do with how intrinsic the broaderconceptualization is to the semantic unit, how immediately relevant it is,and to what extent aspects of the broader conceptualization are specificallyelaborated.

A couple of examples will clarify the distinction. The notion of a right-angled triangle is intrinsic to the concept [uvrornuuse], in the sense that ahypotenuse cannot be conceptualized without reference to a right-angledtriangle. There exists, however, a whole cluster of concepts, including[HvrorrNusn], [rnu.Ncrn], [nrcur-,nNcrn], and even [srnalcHr uNn], whichcan only be understood against general notions of planar geometry and ofgeometrical figures; these in turn rest on even more general conceptualizationsof space. Planar geometry, or, more generally still, space, constitutes thedomain against which triangles and their properties are conceptualized.

Take, as another example, the concept [nernnn]. The word/a ther profiles anadult male human. (I ignore the use of the word to refer to a Catholic priest.)Any statement about a father is a statement about the father qua male humanadult (the content of the profile). The word invokes, as its base, the notion of arelation between a profiled individual and one or more individuals who countas the father's offspring. If there are no offspring, a person cannot be called afather; a father is necessarily a father alf someone. However, the very notion ofthe father-child relation the conceptual content of the base-rests on moregeneral notions of kinship and genealogy, and, more generally still, in notionsof gender and procreation. The idea of a kinship network constitutes thedomain against which a whole cluster of concepts are characterized: [rarHrn],[soN], [ruNr], [cousrN], etc.

For another example, consider the concept [rrruun-uln[ Thumb-nailprof i les an ent i ty that is part of a thumb; the concept ion of a thumb const i-tutes the base against which [rnurun-Nerr] is profiled. A thumb, in turn, isconceptualized as one offive fingersu that protrude from a hand. The concep-tion of a hand, with its fingers, constitutes the base against which [rHuun]is profiled. [uaNo], in turn, is understood against the conception of an arm,

6 Actually.finger is a bit more complicated. On the one hand. we can use the word to designate eachof the five protuberances on a hand. Alternatively, we can distinguish between the thumb and theremaining iour fingers.

' w '

t96 Cognitive grammar

while [enu] is understood against the conception of a human body. Here wewitness a kind of Russian doll situation, in which the base of one term isconceptualized against the base of another term, and so on. The concept of a

' thumb is the base specifically invoked to conceptualize a thumb-nail, whilethe human body is the domain against which a host of body-part terms areconceptualized.

to.3. t Mu l t ipte domains

A domain may be defined as any knowledge configuration which provides lhecontext for the conceptualization of a semantic unit.'

More often than not, a semantic unit needs to be conceptualized againstmore than one domain. Moreover, it would be an error to suppose thatdomains constitute strictly separated configurations of knowledge; typically,

Ofandhave

The distinction between base and domain, though not always cle4r-cut, does havelinguistic repercussions. One of the functions of the preposition of is to prqfi_lg-qnintrinsic relation between entit ies. Since the base is intrinsic to a concept, it is notsurprisingthatof can often be used to refertothe relation between a profi led entityand an entity in the base. 0n the other hand, the relation between a profited entityand a domain is a more d is tant retat ion, and of is of ten inappropr iate in suchcircum stan ces.

Thus, the hypotenuse of the triongle is a perfectly acceptable expression; ofestablishes the relation between the hypotenuse and an entity that is intrinsic in itsbase. The triangle of two-dimensional space, on the other hand, is decidedly odd.Likewise, it would be normalto speak of the thumb of my left hand, but very odd tospeak of the thumb of my left arm.

The verb have often invokes an intrinsic relation. The triongle has a hypotenuseis acceptable, whereas Geometry has triangles is very peculiar. lt is as if theconceptual l ink between 'hypotenuse' and ' t r iangle ' is much c loser than the con-ceptuaI l ink between 'triangte' and 'geometry'. For similar reasons,4 hand hos fivefingers (or-see footnote 6-four fingers and thumb) is normah we would not,however, say An arm has five fingers. An arm is invoked onty at a distance, so tospeak, in the conceptualization of a thumb. We need to be cautious, however, inapptying the have test. The possibit ity of saying I have a broken thumbnail, or evenI have a missing thumbnail, does not entit le us to say that the concept of a personis the base against which a thumbnai l is conceptual ized.

Finatty, the very expressions thumbnail and fingernail show that noun coq-pounding is sensi t ive to the prof i le-base d is t inct ion. The compounds take, as thei rfirst element, the base againstwhich the nail is profi led. We do not speakof *hand-

nail, or *arm-noil, even though, strictly speaking, the nails are a part of a hand andan arm.

Meaning: Profile, base, and domain t97

domains overlap and interact in numerous and complex ways. Consider againthe concept [rarnnn]. I stated that the concept is understood against thedomain of a kinship network. While this aspect certainly captures an impor-tant facet of the concept, other domains are involved as well. For example, afather is a physical being, with weight and dimensions; he is a living thing, whowas born, grew up, ages, and will die; he has a characteristic role within afamily unit, and is expected to display a certain behaviour towards othermembers of the unit; and so on. Physical object, living thing, and family uniteach constitutes a domain against which [rlrnrn] is conceptualized. If weexamine any one of these domains, we typically find that it relates with other

{omains. The notion of kinship, for example, rests on notions of gender,procreation, and family units; gender, in turn, is the domain against which afather is characterized as male.

Langacker (FCGI: t47) has used the term matrix to refer to the set ofdomains which provide the context for the full understanding of a semantic,Unit. In Figure ro.2, the three domains d', d", d"'constitute the domain matrixagainst which the profile-base relation is conceptualized. With respect to[rnrunn], the profile P is identified with'adult male human'; the base B mightbe the relation between the profiled entity and a child/children; while'kinship','family unit', and 'living thing' might constitute three partially overlappingdomains against which profiling takes place.

From the above remarks, it is evident that Cognitive Grammar takes anessentially encyclopaedic view of meaning. Ultimately, even the meaning of

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tvote: Al inguist icuni tprof i lesanent i tyP(representedbytheboldcirc le) ;prof i l ingtakesplaceagainstabase B (represented bythe box): the prof i le-base re lat ion is conceptual ized against over lappingconf lgurdt ions of knowledge, cal led domains (represented by the overtapping c i rc les) .

198 Cognitive grammar

common, everyday terms is supported by a vast network of interrelatedknowledge. I take up this aspect again in Chapter 22, where I examine moreclosely its ramifications.

to.3.2 ' l t 's domains al l the way down'

Domains vary in terms of their internal complexity. The notion of a kinshipnetwork ( the domain against which'a host o[kinship words are understood) isquite complex, and is itself understood in terms of such notions as gender,procreation, and the sharing of rights and responsibilities within a family unit.The question arises, whether there might be some domains which are obasic',

in the sense that they cannot be understood against other domains. Langacker(FCGI: I48-9) has proposed, as candidates for basic domains, such notionsas space, time, pitch, weight, temperature, colour, taste, and smell. The claimis that the phenomenological experience of temperature, time, pitch, and soon, are qualitatively unique; they cannot be'reduced' to any other domains.

It would be an erroq however, to understand basic domains as conceptualprimitives, on whose back more complex concepts emerge. In the first place,even the basic domains may be understood metaphorically in terms of otherdomains. Time can be conceptualized metaphorically in terms of space, whilepitch and temperature can be thought of in terms of 'high' and 'low'. More-over, even though the phenomenological experience of the basic domainsmay be irreducible, the domains are structured by the role they play in theunderstanding of other domains. Temperature is conceptualized not just asa primitive physical sensation, our conceptualization of temperature isstructured by the role it plays in our conceptualization of more complexdomains, such as climatic conditions, the cycle of the seasons, the clothes wewear, our physical well-being, our emotional states, and so on. As Barsalou(1992:4o) put it, 'It's domains all the way down'.

1o.4 Some examples

It is axiomatic, in Cognitive Grammar, that all linguistic expressions profilesomething or other, and that profiling takes place against backgroundconceptualizations. The background knowledge can be more or less intrinsicto the profile, but there is probably no such thing as an expression whosesemantic value resides solely in the profile.

Here are some more examples intended to illustrate these notions:

(i) Island. An island is a mass of land completely surrounded by water. Theword designatesT the land mass, it does not designate the water. However,

7 As technical terms in Cognitive Grammar, the verbs desrgzate and profile are roughly equivalent-at least, with respect to what they profile! The verbs do differ slightly with respect to their base. Profil|focuses more on the contrast between highlighted and backgrounded entities; designate focuses moreon the process ofpicking out an entity.

Meaning: Profi le, base, and domain 199

Austin on cricket

The philosopher John Austin is well known to l inguists for his ground-breakingwork on speech acts. In addition to his book How to do Things with Words GSSo),Austin also wrote many shorter pieces which address problems in l inguistic seman-tics, and his observations often prefigure some important themes in CognitiveLinguistics.

Consider the following passage from his essay'The meaning of a word':

Take the sense in which I talk of a cricket bat and a cricket balt and a cricket umoire. Thereason thatall are called bythe same name is perhaps thateach has its part-itsown specia!part-to play in the activity called cricketing: it is no good to say that cricket means 'used incricket': for we cannot explain what we mean by 'cricket' except by exptaining the specialparts played in cricketing by the bat, ball, etc. (Austin, 1979: Z3; author's emphasis)

Here, Austin is claiming that you can only understand what a cricket bat, cricketbal t , and cr icket umpire are against the knowledge of the ru les and act iv i t ies thatmake up'cr icket ing ' ; in turn, cr icket ing cannot be understood independent ty of therole played by the bat, batl, and umpire. In our terms, cricket is the domain againstwhich cricket bat, cricketboll, and cricket umpire are understood. Each term picksout and profi les an entity that plays a part in the complex activity. At the same time,the domain of cr icket ing is const i tu ted by the very ent i t ies that can only be under-stood in terms of the domain. The domain does not ex is t independent ly of theentit ies that are profi led against it.

the notion of the surrgu4gliqg water is intrinsic to the concept; if there wereno surrounding water, there would be no island. While the notion of thesurrounding water is in the base of the semantic unit [rsr-tNo], the profile-baserelation itself presupposes the broader domain of the Earth's geophysicalfeatures.

There is probably more to the semantic structure of [rsraNo] than this. Apiece of land surrounded by a moat would probably not be called an island. Itwould also be odd to talk about North and South America, taken together, asan island, or claim that the Panama Canal separates the island of NorthAmerica from the island of South America. The actual size of the land mass(and perhaps even its shape), as well as the extent of the surrounding water, arefurther facets of the word's meaning.

(ii) Peninsula. The profile of peninsula is very similar to that of island. Thedifference is that the land mass profiled by peninsula is attached, by a narrowland strip, to some larger land mass. Neither the surrounding water, nor thelarger land mass, are profiled by peninsula; nevertheless, these are intrinsic tothe very concept [rnNtNsuu].

(iii) Saturday. The word profiles a z4-hotr period, i.e. a'day', against the

2Oo Cognitive grammar

Searle and'the Background'

John Searte is another philosopher who is wel[ known to l inguists for his workon speech acts (Searle ry6). A recurring topic in Searte's work has been thefundamental role of background knowledge in the understanding of even the mostprosaic of expressions (e.g. Searle ry7).fake a statement that 'The cat is on themat'. l t seems like a straightforward matter to ascertain whether this statementmight be t rue of a g iven s i tuat ion-we need only look and see whether there isindeed a cat on the mat . Butwould we be so conf ident i f cat and matwere f loat ingaround in outer space? Probably not-for in the absence of a gravitational f ietdthere would be no basis for determining whether the cat was on the mat, under it,against it, or whatever. Whereas on profi les a relation of contact and supportbetween two entit ies, one of which is typicalty located higher than the other, theretation is conceptualized against the domain of a gravitational f ietd, which pro-

vides the context for the very notions of support and verticality. The gravitational

field and its effects are part of what Searle calls 'the Background'. Searle hasemphasized the 'non-proposi t ional 'nature of the Background, as wel l as the factthat the Background cannot be ' reduced' to a set ofs imple concepts. In our terms,the Background is constituted by a network of unprofi led knowledge and betiefswhich form the context for any conceptualization.

Here is another and more recent of Searle's i l lustrations of the Background:

To have one belief or desire. I have to have a whole Network of other beliefs and desires.Thus, for example, if I now want to eat a good meal at a local restaurant, I have to have a largenumber of other beliefs and desires, such as the beliefs that there are restaurants in thevicinity, restaurants are the sort of establishment where meals are served, meals are the sortof thing that can be bought and eaten inside restaurants at certain times of the day for certainamounts of money, and so - more or less indefi nitely- on. (Searle ry92: t7 6)

base of the seven-day week. The concept presupposes a rich network ofdomain-based knowledge, including:

. the practice of designating the day-night cycle as a'day', which is con-ventionally taken to begin at a point ('midnight') which is mid-way betweensuccessive high points of the sun;

. the convention of grouping days, as characterized above, into a seven-unitcycle, the idea of the seven-day cycle going back, ultimately, to the Biblicalcfgqtigrrstory;

. the convention of naming the component units of the cycle;

. the idea that different units of the cycle may be suitable for different kindsof activities, such as work, recreation, or devotion.

Ultimately, the domain matrix against which Saturday profiles a 24-hourperiod reaches into many aspects of our culture: astronomy, history, religion,work, time-measuring devices, recreational practices. The word nicely illus-trates the encyclopaedic nature of linguistic meaning.

Meaning: Profile, base, and domain 2O7

(iv) Vacation. This is another word which has to be understood againsta rich background of cultural knowledge. As a preliminary to attempting adefinition of the word, you might consider (a) the criteria by which you wouldevaluate a vacation as good or bad; (b) the frequency and the duration of aperson's vacations; (c) the criteria by which certain destinations are consideredto be suitable for a vacation; (d) the kinds of things that people typically do,or want to do, on avacation; (e) the way people typically behave on a vacation;(0 the reasons why (some) people consider it necessary to take a vacation;(g) whether the taking of vacations is a universal practice, or whether it islimited to certain historical periods and certain cultural conditions. Answersto these questions are likely to activate numerous facets of the domain-basedknowledge against which the concept [vacruoN]is understood.

(v) Anger. Although this word designates an internal state, we understandanger not just as an internal state. Anger is a reaction to some offence-ifa person is angry, there must have been some previous proyoration (or theperson believes there has been a provocation). Angei is rianifested by charac-teristic behaviour-angry persons display exaggerated bodily movements, theyraise their voices, they do unpredictable things. Moreover, a person in a stateof anger may be expected to act in the future in certain ways-they may seekrevenge, they may bear a permanent grudge. What this means, is,that anger, asan internal state, is understood against a typical 'scenario', comprising initialprovocation, anger, and retribution. The scenario is the base against which theemotion is conceptualized.

The anger scenario and its role in the conceptualization of the emotion havebeen studied by Kovecses (t986, I99o). Austin also drew attention to thescenario. He (t979: Io9) remarked that anger should not be identified withthe feeling alone; ratheq it is made up of 'a whole pattern of events, includingoccasion, symptoms, feeling and manifestation, and possibly other factorsbesides'. There would be little point in asking what anger itself really is,divorced from these aspects.

1o.5 Designation and connotat ion

The distinction between an expression's profile and the base or domain againstwhich profiling takes place is able to accommodate the traditional notions ofdesignation and connotation.

It is traditional to recognize two components of a word's meaning: onecomponent (its'designation') is responsible for what a word refers to, the other(its 'connotation') for usage aspects of the word, such as whether the word isformal or vulgar, whether its use implies an attitude of contempt or approval,whether the word is typical of a particular regional dialect, and suchlike. Alsoincluded under connotation are various 'associations' that a word misht have.

2o2 Cognitive grammar

Crystal, in his dictionary of linguistic terms (r98o: 8z), suggests in the entryfor 'connotation' that December might have connotations of 'bad weather','dark evenings','parties', and'Christmas'.

On the view presented here, all these aspects are handled straightforwardlyin terms of domains against which an entity is profiled. Metalinguistic aware-ness of degrees of formality, dialectal diversity, and sociolinguistic variationare all candidates for conceptual domains against which profiling takes place,as are the various 'associations' of a word. We should also bear in mind thatdifferent speakers may understand a concept against slightly different con-figurations of domain-based knowledge. Not everybody associates Decemberwith dark evenings (some people live in the Southern hemisphere) or withparties, nor, for that matter, with Christmas (not all English speakers areChristians).

On the Cognitive Grammar view, 'connotation' is not a distinct (andsecondary) level of meaning, but is fully incorporated into the semantic struc-ture of a word. Moreoveq discussion of connotation in terms of domains canoften lead to greater insight. Compare the words bachelor and spinster. Thesewords profile, respectively, an unmarried adult male and an unmarried adultfemale. Spinster, however, is a decidedly derogatory term; it implies thatthe woman is unmarried because no man wants her. Bachelor, on the otherhand, tends to have a more favourable connotation; the man has remainedunmarried because he has chosen to do so.

These connotations are not just arbitrary facts of usage, but fall out fromthe domain-based knowledge against which bachelor and spinster are under-stood (Taylor rggsa: 95-1.).First, it has to be noted that the notions of'adulthood' and'unmarried' (and perhaps even'male' and'female') are them-selves complex concepts which need to be understood against the appropriatedomain matrixes. Moreoveq concerning bachelor, it is not the case that anyadult unmarried male can be appropriately called a bachelor. We would notcall the Pope a bachelor, nor an unmarried man in an established relationship,whether the relationship be a heterosexual or a homosexual one. What isinvolved, in characterizinga bachelor as unmarried, is a somewhat idealized,and perhaps even outdated view of marriage practices, in particular, the ideathat people above a certain age are expected to be married, that men andwomen can pass the marriageable age without marrying but that they do so fordifferent reasons a man, because he chooses to, a woman, because no manwants to marry her. Lakoff (Iq8Z) refers in this connection to an 'Idealized

Cognitive Model', or ICM, of marriage. Given the ICM, the 'connotations'

of bachelor and spinster fall out naturally from the broader matrix againstwhich these words are understood. (The question why the Pope is not calleda bachelor is also easily answered: the Pope simply is not covered by theidealized model.)

Meaning: Profi le, base, and domain 2o3

Frames, scripts, scenarios, and lCMs

In this chapter I have used the term 'domain' to refer, very generally, to back-ground knowledge necessary for the understanding of semant ic uni ts . In pr inc ip le,a domain may be any knowledge configuration, ranging from 'basic' notions oftime, space, colour, and temperature, to complex and rather specific knowledge,such as the rutes of cricket. Equally, a domain may consist in knowledge of typicalscenar ios, cut tura l convent ions, and metal inguist ic not ions of d ia lecta l andstylistic variation.

Other writers have used a variety of terms to refer to domains, or to particularkinds of domains. For Filtmore (rg8S), a 'frame' is a rather tightty organizedconfiguration, such as the notion of a 'commercialtransaction', which provides thebackground for the characterization of terms such as buy, sell, price, cost, etc.Workers in artif icial intettigence (e.g. Schank and Abelson ry77) often refer totypical, or expected sequences of events as 'scripts'; the restaurant script, forexample, provides the context for understanding such activit ies as ordering themeal and paying for it. Many writers have used 'scenario' in this sense (G. Palmer1996:7). Lakoff (rg8Z) introduced the term 'ldealized Cognitive Modet' (lCM),which focuses on configurations of conventionatized knowledge.

While some terminological distinction may well be justif ied-it is often con-venient, for example, to talk of expected event sequences as 'scenarios', therebyfocusing on the dynamic aspects of the convent ional ized knowtedge- l shal lin general use the word 'domain' as a cover-term for any aspect of (unprofited)knowledge against which profi[ ing takes ptace.

Study questions

1. What do the following words profi le? What is the base against which profi l ingtakes p lace? What . are the broader domains against which the words areunderstood? Assufne that the words are nouns. For some of the words,you might t ry to represent the concepts d iagrammat ica l ly , in the manner ofFigure ro. r , drawing the prof i les in botd.

l id drawer

gap portrait

hole patch

spot edge

corner tear (as in a torn piece ofctoth)

crack ftash (of light)

arc (of a circle) orphan

z. lt could be argued that on land and on the ground profi le exactly thesame k ind of locat ion. The expressions d i f fer , however, in how the locat ion is

2o4 Cognitive grammar

conceptuatized (Fillmore ry79). Explain what the difference is. (lt may beuseful to consider what the expressions might contrast with. l f something isnot 'on the ground', where might i t be? l f i t is not 'on land' , where might i tbe?)

3. Domain-based knowledge often contributes to the coherence of an utterance.Compare:

(i) | left the restaurant without paying the bill.(ii) ? | teft the cinema without paying the bill.

(i) is easily interpreted, since the mention of a restaurant activates thescenario associated with restaurants, one component of which is that thecustomer, having eaten, is presented with the bi t t and is expected to pay i t .Not ice that the def ini te noun phrase the bi l l refers specif icat ly to the bi t t thatfeatures in the scenario. ( i i ) is odd because paying a bi l t ptays no role in thec inema scenar io .

Consider the fot lowing pairs of sentences. You wit l probably f ind that thosein (ii i) are relatively easy to make sense ol those in (iv) tess so. Explain thedifference in terms of the scenarios that are necessary for understanding thesentence pairs, and the ease with which these scenarios are act ivated byspecif ic words or phrases.

(ii i) I 'm sorry I'm late. I couldn't find my car keys.I'm afraid the beer is warm. There was a oower failure.

(iv) I'm sorry I'm tate. There was a power failure.I'm afraid the beer is warm. I coutdn't find my car keys.

4. I ment ioned colour and clothing as two conceptual domains that lend them-selves part icular ly wel l to both the onomasiologicaI and semasiologicalperspect ives. Another domain is that of spat ial relat ions.

Design (and, resources permitting, carry out) an experiment to investigatespat ial concepts such as [ t ru] , [ot t ] , [neove], [ovrn], etc. f rom both theonomasiological and semasiological perspect ives.

Further reading

On domains and profi[ ing, see Langacker (FCGr: ch. +), Taylor (995a: ch. S), Croft (tggl),

Crof t and Clausner Gggg).0n domains, scr ip ts , and scenar ios, see Ungerer and Schmid(tgg6), esp. chs. 4 and 5. For the semasiological vs. onomasiological perspectives, seeGeeraerts et al. Q99Q. For a concise account, see Geeraerts (zooo).