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Table of Contents
Abuse of power ...................................................................................................................... 5
Altering the Constitution ........................................................................................................ 6
Appointment of officers ......................................................................................................... 7
Arms ....................................................................................................................................... 8
Bill of rights ......................................................................................................................... 12
Checks and balances ........................................................................................................... 14
Constitution is not alterable by government ...................................................................... 25
Constitution is recommended not imposed ....................................................................... 26
Constitutional Convention .................................................................................................. 27
Corruption ........................................................................................................................... 28
Defense ............................................................................................................................... 30
Democracy .......................................................................................................................... 31
Due process ......................................................................................................................... 33
Economics ........................................................................................................................... 34
Electoral college .................................................................................................................. 35
Emergency powers .............................................................................................................. 36
Equality / inequality ............................................................................................................ 38
Eternal vigilance against usurpation ................................................................................... 39
Ex post facto laws ................................................................................................................ 43
Example for world ............................................................................................................... 44
Executive Branch, the nature of .......................................................................................... 45
Faction ................................................................................................................................. 49
Federal/national nature of U. S. government ..................................................................... 53
Federations/federal governments; nature of ..................................................................... 61
Foreign intrusions ............................................................................................................... 62
Future taken into consideration ......................................................................................... 63
2
General Welfare' not blank check ....................................................................................... 65
Government for the benefit of those who govern ............................................................. 67
Gridlock desirable ............................................................................................................... 69
Human nature ..................................................................................................................... 71
Impeachment ...................................................................................................................... 76
Judiciary; nature of the ....................................................................................................... 78
Jurisdiction of federal/national government limited to certain enumerated objects ...... 84
Law and equity .................................................................................................................... 92
Laws must be executed ....................................................................................................... 94
Laws must be few, understandable, and stable ................................................................. 95
Laws; various types of ......................................................................................................... 97
Legislature; Nature of the ................................................................................................. 101
Legislature not to accord themselves privileges ............................................................... 105
Limited jurisdiction of the federal/national government ................................................. 107
Maxims .............................................................................................................................. 115
Militia ................................................................................................................................ 122
Minority rights ................................................................................................................... 132
Miscellaneous.................................................................................................................... 134
Monetary system .............................................................................................................. 145
National concerns sacrificed to local interests (pork barreling) ....................................... 146
Novelty of the Constitution ............................................................................................... 147
Paper money ..................................................................................................................... 148
Parchment barriers insufficient ........................................................................................ 150
Part‐time legislature ......................................................................................................... 151
People ‐ the ultimate source of authority......................................................................... 152
People must protect themselves from the government .................................................. 157
Policy changes ................................................................................................................... 163
Property............................................................................................................................. 165
Purpose of government .................................................................................................... 167
3
Qualifications for office ..................................................................................................... 169
Ratification; Method and significance of .......................................................................... 170
Rebellion ........................................................................................................................... 171
Representatives to control purse strings .......................................................................... 173
Representatives to know the will of constituents ............................................................ 174
Republican form; ingredients of ....................................................................................... 175
Republics require enlightened citizenry ........................................................................... 180
Respectability abroad ....................................................................................................... 182
Rights given up upon joining society ................................................................................ 183
Seat of government ‐ exclusive legislation over ............................................................... 184
Senate; Nature of the ........................................................................................................ 186
Slavery ............................................................................................................................... 187
Standing armies ................................................................................................................. 188
State governments need voice in federal/national government ..................................... 201
States' rights ...................................................................................................................... 202
States to guard against encroachments of federal/national government ....................... 205
Suffrage; voters qualifications .......................................................................................... 212
Suing a sovereign .............................................................................................................. 213
Taxes .................................................................................................................................. 214
Term limits ........................................................................................................................ 218
Titles of nobility ................................................................................................................. 219
Treaties .............................................................................................................................. 220
Usurpation ......................................................................................................................... 222
Veto power ........................................................................................................................ 233
War .................................................................................................................................... 235
Appendix 1‐ The Constitution ........................................................................................... 238
Appendix 2 ‐ The Federalist Papers – Links ....................................................................... 253
Appendix 3 ‐ Chronology of the Federalist Papers ........................................................... 259
5
Abuse of power
It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that nations in general will
make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it; nay, that absolute
monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for purposes
and objects merely personal, such as a thirst for military glory, revenge for personal
affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or
partisans. These and a variety of other motives, which affect only the mind of the
sovereign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and
interests of his people.
John John Jay, Federalist # 4
Willful abuses of a public authority, to the oppression of the subject, and every species of
official extortion, are offenses against the government, for which the persons who commit
them may be indicted and punished according to the circumstances of the case. Hamilton,
Alexander Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 83
Alte
The m
by the
conve
James
That u
requis
prefer
It guar
mutab
moreo
amend
other.
James
ering th
most that the
e past experi
enient mode
s Madison,
useful alterat
site, therefor
rred by the c
rds equally a
ble; and that
over, equally
dment of err
s Madison,
e Consti
convention
ence of othe
of rectifying
Federalist #
tions will be
re, that a mod
onvention se
against that e
extreme diff
y enables the
rors, as they
Federalist #
itution
could do in
er countries,
g their own e
# 37
e suggested b
de for introd
eems to be s
extreme faci
ficulty, whic
e general and
may be poin
# 43
6
such a situat
as well as of
errors, as fut
by experienc
ducing them
tamped with
ility, which w
ch might per
d the State go
nted out by th
tion was to a
f our own; a
ture experien
ce could not
should be pr
h every mark
would rende
rpetuate its d
overnments
he experienc
avoid the err
and to provid
nce may unfo
but be fores
rovided. The
k of propriety
er the Consti
discovered fa
to originate
ce on one sid
rors suggeste
de a
fold them.
seen, It was
e mode
y.
itution too
aults. It,
the
de, or on the
ed
e
App
A thir
are to
judges
The pr
State g
of ren
appoin
With e
would
contra
those
their c
affairs
their c
Alexa
He wo
lucrati
State t
to him
obseq
Alexa
pointme
rd objection t
have in the
s of the cond
rinciple of th
governments
ndering those
nt them.
equal plausib
d always be a
adiction to th
who appoint
choice, and t
s, will inspir
conduct, may
ander Hami
ould be both
ive stations,
to which he
m, or of posse
quious instrum
ander Hami
ent of off
to the Senate
appointment
duct of men,
his objection
s, if not in al
e who hold o
bility might
an asylum fo
his principle,
t, for the fitn
the interest th
re a sufficien
y have prove
lton, Federa
h ashamed an
candidates w
particularly
essing the ne
ments of his
lton, Federa
ficers
e as a court o
ts to office.
in whose of
n would cond
ll the govern
office during
it be alleged
or the misbeh
, proceeds up
ness and com
hey have in
nt disposition
ed themselve
alist # 66
nd afraid to b
who had no
belonged, o
ecessary insi
s pleasure.
alist # 76
7
of impeachm
It is imagine
fficial creatio
demn a prac
nments with
g pleasure de
d in this case
havior of the
pon the pres
mpetency of
the respecta
n to dismiss
es unworthy
bring forwar
other merit t
or of being in
ignificance a
ments is draw
ed that they w
on they had
ctice which i
which we ar
ependent on
e that the fav
e former. Bu
sumption tha
the persons
able and pros
from a share
y of the confi
rd, for the m
than that of
n some way
and pliancy t
wn from the
would be too
participated
s to be seen
re acquainte
the pleasure
voritism of th
ut that practi
at the respon
on whom th
sperous adm
e in it all suc
idence repos
ost distingui
coming from
or other pers
to render the
agency they
o indulgent
d.
in all the
d: I mean th
e of those wh
he latter
ce, in
nsibility of
hey bestow
ministration o
ch who, by
sed in them.
ished or
m the same
sonally allie
em the
y
hat
ho
of
d
Arm
Little
them p
necess
"But t
misch
digest
militia
The at
select
need.
well-t
it.
This w
any tim
formid
inferio
rights
This a
best p
Alexa
The ex
James
ms
more can re
properly arm
sary to assem
though the sc
hievous or im
ted plan shou
a.
ttention of th
corps of mo
By thus circ
trained militi
will not only
me oblige th
dable to the
or to them in
and those o
appears to m
ossible secu
ander Hami
xistence of a
s Madison,
easonably be
med and equi
mble them on
cheme of dis
mpracticable;
uld, as soon
he governme
oderate size,
cumscribing
ia ready to ta
y lessen the c
he governme
liberties of t
n discipline a
f their fellow
me the only s
urity against
lton, Federa
a right to inte
Federalist #
aimed at wi
ipped; and in
nce or twice
sciplining th
; yet it is a m
as possible,
ent ought par
upon such p
the plan, it w
ake the field
call for milita
ent to form an
the people w
and the use o
w-citizens.
substitute tha
it, if it shoul
alist # 29
erpose will g
# 43
8
ith respect to
n order to se
e in the cours
he whole nati
matter of the
be adopted
rticularly to
principles as
will be possi
d whenever th
ary establish
n army of an
while there is
of arms, who
at can be dev
ld exist."
generally pre
o the people
ee that this be
se of a year.
ion must be
utmost impo
for the prop
be directed
will really f
ible to have
he defense o
hments, but i
ny magnitud
s a large bod
o stand ready
vised for a st
event the nec
at large than
e not neglec
abandoned a
ortance that
er establishm
to the forma
fit it for serv
an excellent
of the State s
if circumstan
de that army
dy of citizens
y to defend t
tanding army
cessity of ex
n to have
cted, it will b
as
a well-
ment of the
ation of a
vice in case o
t body of
shall require
nces should
can never be
s, little if at a
their own
y, and the
xerting it.
be
of
at
e
all
Beside
almos
are att
enterp
form c
Notwi
carried
people
And it
But w
thems
appoin
militia
Europ
Let us
be les
debase
oppre
James
It has
betwe
reserv
It is ev
applic
execu
es the advan
st every othe
tached and b
prises of amb
can admit of
ithstanding t
d as far as th
e with arms.
t is not certa
were the peop
selves, who c
nted out of th
a, it may be
pe would be
s not insult th
s able to def
ed subjects o
ssors.
s Madison,
been severa
een kings and
vations of rig
vident, there
cation to con
uted by their
ntage of bein
r nation, the
by which the
bition, more
f.
the military e
he public res
ain that with
ple to posses
could collect
he militia by
affirmed wit
speedily ove
he free and g
fend the righ
of arbitrary p
Federalist #
al times truly
d their subje
ghts not surre
efore, that, ac
nstitutions, pr
immediate r
ng armed, wh
e existence o
e militia offic
insurmounta
establishmen
sources will b
this aid alon
ss the additio
t the nationa
y these gove
th the greate
erturned in s
gallant citize
hts of which
power would
# 46
y remarked th
cts, abridgm
endered to th
ccording to t
rofessedly fo
representativ
9
hich the Ame
f subordinat
cers are appo
able than an
nts in the sev
bear, the gov
ne they woul
onal advanta
al will and di
rnments and
est assurance
pite of the le
ens of Ameri
they would b
d be to rescu
hat bills of ri
ments of prer
he prince.
their primitiv
ounded upon
ves and serva
ericans poss
te governmen
ointed, form
ny which a si
veral kingdo
vernments a
ld not be abl
ages of local
irect the nati
d attached bo
e that the thro
egions which
ica with the
be in actual
ue theirs from
rights are, in
rogative in fa
ve significat
n the power
ants.
sess over the
nts, to which
ms a barrier a
imple govern
oms of Europ
are afraid to t
le to shake o
government
ional force, a
oth to them a
one of every
h surround it
suspicion th
possession t
m the hands
their origin,
avour of priv
tion, they ha
of the peopl
e people of
h the people
gainst the
nment of any
pe, which ar
trust the
off their yoke
ts chosen by
and of office
and to the
y tyranny in
t.
hat they wou
than the
of their
, stipulations
vilege,
ave no
le and
y
re
es.
y
ers
uld
s
10
Here, in strictness, the people surrender nothing; and as they retain everything they have no
need of particular reservations, "WE, THE PEOPLE of the United States, to secure the
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution
for the United States of America."
Here is a better recognition of popular rights than volumes of those aphorisms which make
the principal figure in several of our State bills of rights and which would sound much
better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of government.
But a minute detail of particular rights is certainly far less applicable to a Constitution like
that under consideration, which is merely intended to regulate the general political interests
of the nation, than to a constitution which has the regulation of every species of personal
and private concerns.
If, therefore, the loud clamors against the plan of the convention, on this score, are well
founded, no epithets of reprobation will be too strong for the constitution of this State. But
the truth is that both of them contain all which, in relation to their objects, is reasonably to
be desired.
I go further and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the extent in which they are
contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution but would even be
dangerous.
They would contain various exceptions to powers which are not granted; and, on this very
account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why
declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do?
Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained,
when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed? I will not contend that
such a provision would confer a regulating power; but it is evident that it would furnish, to
men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretense for claiming that power.
They might urge with a semblance of reason that the Constitution ought not to be charged
with the absurdity of providing against the abuse of an authority which was not given, and
that th
that a
nation
Alexa
he provision
power to pre
nal governme
ander Hami
against restr
escribe prop
ent.
lton, Federa
raining the li
per regulation
alist # 84
11
iberty of the
ns concernin
e press afford
ng it was inte
ded a clear im
ended to be
mplication
vested in the
e
12
Bill of rights
It has been several times truly remarked that bills of rights are, in their origin, stipulations
between kings and their subjects, abridgments of prerogative in favour of privilege,
reservations of rights not surrendered to the prince.
It is evident, therefore, that, according to their primitive signification, they have no
application to constitutions, professedly founded upon the power of the people and
executed by their immediate representatives and servants.
Here, in strictness, the people surrender nothing; and as they retain everything they have no
need of particular reservations, "WE, THE PEOPLE of the United States, to secure the
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution
for the United States of America."
Here is a better recognition of popular rights than volumes of those aphorisms which make
the principal figure in several of our State bills of rights and which would sound much
better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of government.
But a minute detail of particular rights is certainly far less applicable to a Constitution like
that under consideration, which is merely intended to regulate the general political interests
of the nation, than to a constitution which has the regulation of every species of personal
and private concerns.
If, therefore, the loud clamors against the plan of the convention, on this score, are well
founded, no epithets of reprobation will be too strong for the constitution of this State. But
the truth is that both of them contain all which, in relation to their objects, is reasonably to
be desired.
I go further and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the extent in which they are
contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution but would even be
dangerous.
13
They would contain various exceptions to powers which are not granted; and, on this very
account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why
declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do?
Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained,
when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed? I will not contend that
such a provision would confer a regulating power; but it is evident that it would furnish, to
men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretense for claiming that power.
They might urge with a semblance of reason that the Constitution ought not to be charged
with the absurdity of providing against the abuse of an authority which was not given, and
that the provision against restraining the liberty of the press afforded a clear implication
that a power to prescribe proper regulations concerning it was intended to be vested in the
national government.
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 84
Che
The re
balanc
during
their o
toward
excell
avoide
Alexa
[Quot
length
contri
togeth
REPU
"This
memb
that co
arrive
"A rep
intern
"If a s
suppo
have t
which
had us
ecks and
egular distrib
ces and chec
g good behav
own election
ds perfection
lencies of rep
ed.
ander Hami
ing Montesq
h to live cons
ved a kind o
her with the e
UBLIC.
form of gov
bers of a larg
onstitute a n
to such a de
public of this
al corruption
single memb
osed to have
too great infl
h would still
surped, and o
d balanc
bution of pow
cks; the instit
vior; the rep
n: these are w
n in modern
publican gov
lton, Federa
quieu]: "It is
stantly under
of constitutio
external forc
vernment is a
ger one, whic
ew one, capa
egree of pow
s kind, able
ns. The form
ber should att
an equal aut
fluence over
remain free
overpower h
ces
wer into dist
tution of cou
resentation o
wholly new d
times. They
vernment ma
alist # 9
s very proba
r the govern
on that has al
ce of a mona
a convention
ch they inten
able of incre
wer as to be a
to withstand
m of this soci
tempt to usu
thority and c
one, this wo
might oppo
him before h
14
tinct departm
urts compose
of the people
discoveries,
y are means,
ay be retaine
able that man
nment of a SI
ll the interna
archical, gov
n by which s
nd to form. I
easing, by m
able to provi
d an external
iety prevents
urp the supre
credit in all th
ould alarm th
se him with
he could be s
ments; the in
ed of judges
e in the legis
or have mad
and powerfu
ed and its im
nkind would
INGLE PER
al advantage
vernment. I m
everal small
It is a kind of
means of new
ide for the se
l force, may
s all manner
eme authority
the confedera
he rest. Were
forces indep
settled in his
ntroduction o
s holding the
slature by de
de their princ
ful means, by
mperfections
d have been o
RSON, had th
es of a repub
mean a CON
ler states agr
f assemblag
w association
ecurity of the
support itse
of inconven
y, he could n
ate states. W
e he to subdu
pendent of th
usurpation.
of legislative
eir offices
eputies of
cipal progres
y which the
lessened or
obliged at
hey not
lican,
NFEDERATE
ree to becom
e of societie
ns, till they
e united bod
lf without an
niences.
not be
Were he to
ue a part, tha
hose which h
e
ss
E
me
es
dy.
ny
at
he
"Shou
to que
sound
be dis
"As th
each;
of all
Alexa
In eve
which
power
to the
effectu
That w
severa
conve
differe
1. Sec
2. Reg
3. Ma
4. Cer
5. Res
6. Pro
James
uld a popular
ell it. Should
d. The state m
solved, and
his governme
and with res
the advantag
ander Hami
ery political
h may be mis
r is to be con
public good
ually as poss
we may form
al powers co
eniently done
ent objects:
curity agains
gulation of th
aintenance of
rtain miscell
straint of the
ovisions for g
s Madison,
r insurrection
d abuses cree
may be destr
the confeder
ent is compo
spect to its ex
ges of large m
lton, Federa
institution, a
sapplied and
nferred, the p
d; as the next
sible against
m a correct ju
onferred on th
e they may b
t foreign dan
he intercours
f harmony an
aneous objec
e States from
giving due e
Federalist #
n happen in
ep into one p
royed on one
rates preserv
osed of smal
xternal situa
monarchies.
alist # 9
a power to ad
d abused. The
point first to
t will be, in c
t a perversio
udgment on
he governme
be reduced in
nger;
se with forei
nd proper int
cts of genera
m certain inju
fficacy to all
# 41
15
one of the c
part, they are
e side, and no
ve their sove
ll republics, i
ation, it is po
"
dvance the p
ey will see, t
be decided
case of an af
n of the pow
this subject,
ent of the Un
nto different
ign nations;
tercourse am
al utility;
urious acts;
l these powe
onfederate s
e reformed b
ot on the oth
ereignty.
it enjoys the
ossessed, by
public happin
therefore, th
is whether s
ffirmative de
wer to the pu
, it will be pr
nion; and tha
t classes as th
mong the Sta
ers.
states, the oth
y those that
her; the conf
e internal hap
means of th
ness involve
hat in all case
such a power
ecision, to gu
ublic detrime
roper to revi
at this may b
hey relate to
ates;
hers are able
remain
federacy may
ppiness of
e association
es a discretio
es where
r be necessar
uard as
ent.
iew the
be the more
o the followin
e
y
n,
on
ry
ng
A stan
provis
conseq
precau
A wis
itself f
pruden
be ina
James
Were
the St
the ad
If an a
popula
execu
alone.
The op
but in
preven
resorte
On the
unpop
warran
it are p
nding force,
sion. On the
quences may
ution.
e nation wil
from any res
nce in dimin
auspicious to
s Madison,
it admitted,
ate governm
dvantage in th
act of a parti
ar in that Sta
uted immedia
.
pposition of
flame the ze
nted or repai
ed to with re
e other hand
pular in parti
ntable measu
powerful an
therefore, is
smallest sca
y be fatal. O
l combine al
source which
nishing both
o its liberties
Federalist #
however, th
ments to exten
he means of
icular State,
ate, and shou
ately and, of
f the federal
eal of all part
ired, if at all
eluctance and
d, should an u
icular States,
ure be so, wh
d at hand.
s a dangerou
ale it has its i
On any scale i
ll these cons
h may becom
the necessit
.
# 41
hat the federa
nd its power
f defeating su
though unfri
uld not too g
f course, by m
government
ties on the si
, without the
d difficulty.
unwarrantab
, which wou
hich may so
16
s, at the sam
inconvenien
it is an objec
siderations; a
me essential
y and the da
al governme
r beyond the
uch encroach
iendly to the
grossly violat
means on the
, or the inter
ide of the St
e employmen
ble measure o
uld seldom fa
ometimes be
me time that i
nces. On an e
ct of laudabl
and, whilst it
to its safety
anger of reso
nt may feel
e due limits,
hments.
e national go
ate the oaths
e spot and de
rposition of f
tate, and the
nt of means
of the federa
ail to be the
the case, the
it may be a n
extensive sca
le circumspe
t does not ra
, will exert a
orting to one
an equal dis
the latter wo
overnment, b
of the State
epending on
federal offic
evil could n
which must
al governme
case, or even
e means of o
necessary,
ale its
ection and
ashly preclud
all its
which may
sposition wit
ould still hav
be generally
officers, it i
n the State
cers, would
not be
t always be
ent be
n a
opposition to
de
th
ve
s
o
The d
the of
embar
occasi
large
State,
happe
hardly
But am
govern
They w
Every
Plans
The sa
produ
volunt
was m
But w
James
The p
depart
place,
each a
requir
It is ag
not to
isquietude o
fficers of the
rrassments c
ions, would
very serious
ened to be in
y be willing t
mbitious enc
nments wou
would be sig
y governmen
of resistance
ame combin
uced by the d
tarily renoun
made in the o
what degree o
s Madison,
olitical apoth
tments shoul
to show tha
a constitution
res, as essent
greed on all
be directly a
of the people
Union; the
created by leg
oppose, in a
s impedimen
unison, wou
to encounter
croachments
uld not excite
gnals of gene
nt would espo
e would be c
ations, in sh
dread of a for
nced, the sam
other.
of madness c
Federalist #
hegm does n
ld be wholly
at unless thes
nal control o
tial to a free
sides that th
and complet
; their repug
frowns of th
gislative dev
any State, dif
nts; and whe
uld present o
r.
of the feder
e the opposit
eral alarm.
ouse the com
concerted. O
hort, would r
reign, yoke;
me appeal to
could ever dr
# 46
not require th
y unconnecte
se departmen
over the othe
government
he powers pr
tely administ
17
gnance and, p
he executive
vices, which
fficulties not
re the sentim
obstructions
ral governme
tion of a sing
mmon cause.
One spirit wo
esult from an
and unless t
o a trial of fo
rive the fede
hat the legisl
ed with each
nts be so far
ers, the degre
t, can never
operly belon
tered by eith
perhaps, refu
magistracy
would often
t to be despi
ments of seve
which the fe
ent on the au
gle State, or
. A correspo
ould animate
an apprehens
the projected
orce would b
eral governm
lative, execu
h other. I sha
connected a
ee of separat
in practice b
nging to one
her of the oth
usal to co-op
of the State;
n be added o
sed; would f
eral adjoinin
ederal gover
uthority of th
of a few Sta
ondence wou
and conduc
sion of the fe
d innovation
e made in th
ment to such
utive, and jud
all undertake
and blended
tion which th
be duly main
of the depar
her departme
perate with
; the
on such
form, in a
ng States
rnment woul
he State
ates only.
uld be opened
ct the whole.
ederal, as wa
ns should be
he one case a
an extremity
diciary
, in the next
as to give to
he maxim
ntained.
rtments ough
ents. It is
ld
d.
as
as
y?
o
ht
equall
influe
denied
from p
James
TO W
necess
Const
The on
inadeq
govern
means
James
In ord
power
the pr
and co
agenc
James
It is eq
possib
James
ly evident th
nce over the
d that power
passing the l
s Madison,
WHAT exped
sary partition
titution?
nly answer t
quate the def
nment as tha
s of keeping
s Madison,
der to lay a d
rs of governm
eservation o
onsequently
y as possible
s Madison,
qually evide
ble on those
s Madison,
hat none of th
e others in th
r is of an enc
limits assign
Federalist #
dient, then, sh
n of power a
that can be g
fect must be
at its several
each other i
Federalist #
due foundatio
ment, which
of liberty, it i
should be so
e in the appo
Federalist #
ent that the m
of the others
Federalist #
hem ought to
he administra
croaching na
ned to it.
# 48
hall we final
among the se
given is that
supplied, by
constituent
in their prop
# 51
on for that se
h to a certain
is evident tha
o constituted
ointment of t
# 51
members of e
s for the emo
# 51
18
o possess, di
ation of their
ature and tha
lly resort, fo
everal depart
as all these e
y so contrivi
parts may, b
er places.
eparate and d
extent is ad
at each depa
d that the me
the members
each departm
oluments ann
irectly or ind
r respective
at it ought to
or maintainin
tments as lai
exterior prov
ing the interi
by their mutu
distinct exer
dmitted on al
artment shou
embers of ea
s of the othe
ment should b
nexed to the
directly, an o
powers. It w
be effectual
ng in practice
id down in th
visions are fo
ior structure
ual relations
rcise of the d
ll hands to be
uld have a wi
ach should ha
ers.
be as little d
eir offices.
overruling
will not be
lly restrained
e the
he
found to be
e of the
s, be the
different
e essential to
ill of its own
ave as little
dependent as
d
o
n;
s
But th
depart
consti
The pr
dange
must b
human
But w
were a
extern
In fram
lies in
place
A dep
experi
James
In the
betwe
distinc
Hence
contro
James
he great secu
tment consis
itutional mea
rovision for
er of attack. A
be connected
n nature that
what is govern
angels, no go
nal nor intern
ming a gove
n this: you m
oblige it to c
pendence on
ience has tau
s Madison,
compound r
een two distin
ct and separa
e a double se
ol each other
s Madison,
urity against
sts in giving
ans and pers
defense mus
Ambition mu
d with the co
t such device
nment itself
overnment w
nal controls o
rnment whic
must first enab
control itself
the people i
ught mankin
Federalist #
republic of A
nct governm
ate departme
ecurity arises
r, at the same
Federalist #
a gradual co
to those wh
onal motive
st in this, as
ust be made
onstitutional
es should be
f but the grea
would be nec
on governm
ch is to be ad
ble the gove
f.
s, no doubt,
nd the necess
# 51
America, the
ments, and th
ents.
s to the right
e time that e
# 51
19
oncentration
o administer
s to resist en
in all other
to counterac
rights of the
necessary to
atest of all re
cessary. If an
ent would be
dministered
ernment to co
the primary
sity of auxili
e power surre
hen the portio
ts of the peo
each will be c
of the sever
r each depar
ncroachment
cases, be ma
ct ambition.
e place. It m
o control the
eflections on
ngels were to
e necessary.
by men over
ontrol the go
y control on t
iary precauti
endered by t
on allotted to
ople. The diff
controlled by
ral powers in
rtment the ne
ts of the othe
ade commen
The interest
may be a refle
e abuses of g
n human natu
o govern me
r men, the g
overned; and
the governm
ions.
the people is
o each subdi
fferent gover
y itself.
n the same
ecessary
ers.
nsurate to the
t of the man
ection on
government,
ure? If men
en, neither
great difficult
d in the next
ment; but
s first divide
ivided amon
rnments will
e
ty
ed
ng
The ai
posses
societ
virtuo
The el
The m
numer
appoin
James
a cons
will b
canno
govern
They,
history
gradua
it seem
govern
This p
weapo
for ob
saluta
James
im of every
ss most wisd
ty; and in the
ous whilst the
lective mode
means relied
rous and var
ntments as w
s Madison,
stitutional an
e able at all
ot only refuse
nment.
in a word, h
y of the Brit
ally enlargin
ms to have w
nment.
power over th
on with whic
btaining a red
ary measure.
s Madison,
political con
dom to disce
e next place,
ey continue
e of obtainin
on in this fo
rious. The m
will maintain
Federalist #
nd infallible
times to acc
e, but they al
hold the purs
tish Constitu
ng the sphere
wished, all th
he purse ma
ch any const
dress of ever
Federalist #
nstitution is,
ern, and most
to take the m
to hold their
ng rulers is th
orm of gover
most effectual
n a proper re
# 57
resource stil
complish thei
lone can pro
se --- that po
ution, an infa
e of its activi
he overgrown
ay, in fact, be
titution can a
ry grievance
# 58
20
or ought to
t virtue to pu
most effectu
r public trust
he characteri
rnment for pr
l one is such
sponsibility
ll remains w
ir just purpo
opose the sup
owerful instru
ant and humb
ity and impo
n prerogativ
e regarded as
arm the imm
, and for car
be, first to o
ursue, the co
ual precautio
t.
istic policy o
reventing th
h a limitation
to the peopl
with the large
oses. The Ho
pplies requis
rument by wh
ble represent
ortance, and
ves of the oth
s the most co
mediate repre
rrying into ef
obtain for rul
ommon good
ons for keepi
of republican
eir degenera
n of the term
le.
er States by w
ouse of Repr
site for the su
hich we beh
tation of the
finally redu
her branches
omplete and
esentatives o
ffect every j
lers men wh
d of the
ing them
n governmen
acy are
m of
which they
esentatives
upport of
hold, in the
e people
ucing, as far a
of the
d effectual
f the people
ust and
o
nt.
as
,
It is a
govern
and pr
In this
and di
govern
It dou
schem
be suf
James
The p
betray
where
concu
James
An ab
admitt
encroa
conten
check
Alexa
misfortune i
nments, that
rove unfaithf
s point of vie
ividing the p
nment.
ubles the secu
mes of usurpa
fficient.
s Madison,
eople can ne
yed by the re
e the whole l
urrence of sep
s Madison,
bsolute or qu
ted, by the a
achments of
nded that the
k in the hands
ander Hami
incident to r
t those who a
ful to their im
ew a senate,
power with a
urity to the p
ation or perf
Federalist #
ever wilfully
epresentative
legislative tru
parate and d
Federalist #
ualified negat
ablest adepts
f the latter up
e powers rela
s of that bod
lton, Federa
republican go
administer it
mportant tru
as a second
a first, must b
people by req
fidy, where t
# 62
y betray their
es of the peo
ust is lodged
dissimilar bo
# 63
tive in the ex
in political
pon the form
ating to impe
dy upon the e
alist # 66
21
overnment, t
t may forget
ust.
branch of th
be in all case
quiring the c
he ambition
r own interes
ple; and the
d in the hand
dies is requi
xecutive upo
science, to b
mer. And it m
eachments a
encroachmen
though in a l
t their obliga
he legislative
es a salutary
concurrence
n or corruptio
sts; but they
danger will
ds of one bod
ired in every
on the acts o
be an indispe
may, perhaps
are, as before
nts of the ex
less degree t
ations to thei
e assembly d
y check on th
of two distin
on of one wo
y may possib
be evidently
dy of men th
y public act.
of the legislat
ensable barri
, with no les
e intimated,
xecutive.
than to other
ir constituent
distinct from
he
nct bodies in
ould otherwi
bly be
y greater
han where th
tive body is
ier against th
ss reason, be
an essential
r
ts
m
n
ise
he
he
e
The sa
power
indepe
Alexa
The pr
virtue
that th
rights
its del
which
The pr
enable
comm
Alexa
It is im
expou
corrup
Alexa
The co
Const
excep
attaind
ame rule wh
r teaches like
endent of the
ander Hami
ropriety of th
in the execu
he love of po
of other me
liberations; t
h itself, on m
rimary induc
e him to defe
munity agains
ander Hami
mpossible to
unding the la
pted or influe
ander Hami
omplete inde
titution. By a
tions to the l
der, no ex po
hich teaches t
ewise that th
e other.
lton, Federa
he thing [vet
utive, but up
ower may so
mbers of the
that impressi
maturer reflec
cement to co
end himself;
st the passin
lton, Federa
o keep the jud
aws. It is pec
enced by the
lton, Federa
ependence o
a limited Con
legislative au
ost facto law
the propriety
his partition
alist # 71
to] does not
pon the suppo
metimes bet
e governmen
ions of the m
ction, would
onferring the
the seconda
g of bad law
alist # 73
dges too dist
culiarly dang
e executive.
alist # 73
of the courts
nstitution, I
uthority; suc
ws, and the li
22
y of a partitio
ought to be s
turn upon th
osition that t
tray it into a
nt; that a spir
moment may
condemn.
e power in qu
ary one is to
ws, through h
tinct from ev
gerous to pla
of justice is
understand o
ch, for instan
ke.
on between
so contrived
he suppositio
the legislatur
disposition
rit of faction
y sometimes
uestion upon
increase the
haste, inadve
very other av
ace them in a
peculiarly e
one which c
nce, as that i
the various b
d as to render
on of superio
ure will not b
to encroach
n may somet
hurry it into
n the executi
e chances in
ertence, or de
vocation tha
a situation to
essential in a
ontains certa
it shall pass n
branches of
r the one
or wisdom o
be infallible;
upon the
times pervert
o measures
ive is to
favor of the
esign.
an that of
o be either
a limited
ain specified
no bills of
or
t
e
d
Limita
mediu
manif
rights
Alexa
From
expec
had op
could
legisla
Alexa
The im
part o
body u
This i
delibe
resent
punish
Alexa
The tr
imped
court
ations of this
um of courts
fest tenor of t
or privilege
ander Hami
a body whic
t a dispositio
perated in m
it be expect
ators would
ander Hami
mportant con
f the legislat
upon the me
s alone a com
erate usurpat
tment of the
hing their pr
ander Hami
rial by jury m
diments to its
and jury; for
s kind can be
of justice, w
the Constitu
es would amo
lton, Federa
ch had had e
on to temper
making them
ed that men
be disposed
lton, Federa
nstitutional c
tive body, an
embers of the
mplete secur
tions of the a
body intrust
resumption b
lton, Federa
must still be
s success. A
r where the j
e preserved
whose duty it
ution void. W
ount to nothi
alist # 78
ven a partial
r and modera
would be to
who had inf
to repair the
alist # 81
check which
nd of determ
e judicial dep
rity. There n
authority of t
ted with it, w
by degrading
alist # 81
a valuable c
s matters no
jury have go
23
in practice n
t must be to
Without this,
ing.
l agency in p
ate them in t
o apt to oper
fringed the C
e breach in th
h the power o
mining upon t
partment.
never can be
the legislatu
while this bo
g them from
check upon c
ow stand, it w
one evidently
no other way
declare all a
all the reser
passing bad
the applicatio
rate in interp
Constitution
he character
of instituting
them in the o
danger that
ure, would ha
ody was poss
their station
corruption. It
would be nec
y wrong, the
y than throug
acts contrary
rvations of p
laws we cou
on. The sam
preting them
in the chara
r of judges.
g impeachme
other, would
the judges, b
azard the uni
sessed of the
ns.
t greatly mu
cessary to co
e court will g
gh the
y to the
articular
uld rarely
me spirit whic
m; still less
acter of
ents in one
d give to that
by a series o
ited
e means of
ultiplies the
orrupt both
generally gra
ch
t
of
ant
a new
court
Here t
tends
discou
The te
much
thems
Alexa
w trial, and it
could be like
then is a dou
to preserve t
urages attem
emptations to
fewer, while
selves the ex
ander Hami
would be in
ewise gained
uble security
the purity of
mpts to seduc
o prostitutio
e the co-ope
clusive deter
lton, Federa
n most cases
d.
y; and it will
f both institu
ce the integri
n which the
eration of a ju
rmination of
alist # 83
24
of little use
readily be p
utions. By in
ity of either.
judges migh
ury is necess
f all causes.
to practice u
perceived tha
ncreasing the
ht have to su
sary, than th
upon the jury
at this compl
e obstacles to
urmount mus
hey might be
y unless the
licated agenc
o success, it
st certainly b
if they had
cy
be
Con
It has
had a
severa
validit
right o
Owing
might
mainta
had re
The p
our na
fabric
PEOP
origin
Alexa
The im
establ
govern
observ
James
nstitutio
not a little c
ratification b
al legislature
ty of its pow
of legislative
g its ratificat
repeal the la
ain that a pa
espectable ad
ossibility of
ational gover
of America
PLE. The stre
nal fountain o
ander Hami
mportant dis
ished by the
nment and a
ved in any ot
s Madison,
on is not
contributed t
by the PEOP
es, it has bee
wers, and has
e repeal.
tion to the la
aw by which
arty to a com
dvocates.
f a question o
rnment deep
n empire ou
eams of nati
of all legitim
lton, Federa
tinction so w
e people and
alterable by t
ther country
Federalist #
alterab
o the infirmi
PLE. Resting
en exposed to
s in some ins
aw of a State
h it was ratif
mpact has a ri
of this nature
per than in th
ught to rest o
onal power o
mate authorit
alist # 22
well understo
unalterable
the governm
y.
# 53
25
ble by go
ities of the e
g on no bette
o frequent an
stances given
e, it has been
fied. Howeve
ight to revok
e proves the
he mere sanc
n the solid b
ought to flow
y.
ood in Amer
by the gover
ment, seems to
overnme
existing fede
er foundation
nd intricate q
n birth to the
n contended
er gross a he
ke that comp
necessity of
ction of deleg
basis of THE
w immediate
rica between
rnment, and
o have been
ent
eral system th
n than the co
questions co
e enormous
that the sam
eresy it may
pact, the doct
f laying the f
gated author
E CONSENT
ely from tha
n a Constitut
d a law establ
n little unders
hat it never
onsent of the
oncerning the
doctrine of a
me authority
be to
trine itself h
foundations
rity. The
T OF THE
at pure,
ion
lished by the
stood and les
e
e
a
as
of
e
ss
Con
Admit
remem
but to
subjec
John
It is ti
they w
have a
conseq
approb
James
nstitutio
t, for so is th
mbered that i
that sedate
ct demand, a
John Jay, F
me now to r
were so mean
accordingly
quence than
bation of tho
s Madison,
on is reco
he fact, that t
it is neither r
and candid c
and which it
Federalist #
recollect that
nt by the Sta
planned and
the paper on
ose to whom
Federalist #
ommend
this plan is o
recommende
consideration
certainly ou
2
t the powers
ates and so u
d proposed a
n which it is
m it is address
# 40
26
ded not
only recomm
ed to blind a
n which the
ught to receiv
were merely
understood by
Constitution
s written, unl
sed.
impose
mended, not i
approbation,
magnitude a
ve.
y advisory a
y the conven
n which is to
less it be stam
ed
imposed, yet
nor to blind
and importan
and recomme
ntion; and th
o be of no m
amped with t
t let it be
d reprobation
nce of the
endatory; tha
hat the latter
more
the
n;
at
27
Constitutional Convention
It is time now to recollect that the powers were merely advisory and recommendatory; that
they were so meant by the States and so understood by the convention; and that the latter
have accordingly planned and proposed a Constitution which is to be of no more
consequence than the paper on which it is written, unless it be stamped with the
approbation of those to whom it is addressed.
James Madison, Federalist # 40
Cor
One o
too ea
sacrifi
in the
equiva
Alexa
In rep
fellow
betray
exceed
obliga
Alexa
The tr
imped
court
a new
court
Here t
tends
discou
rruption
of the weak s
asy an inlet to
ice his subje
external glo
alent for wha
ander Hami
ublics, perso
w-citizens to
ying their tru
d the propor
ations of duty
ander Hami
rial by jury m
diments to its
and jury; for
w trial, and it
could be like
then is a dou
to preserve t
urages attem
n
sides of repu
o foreign co
ects to his am
ory of the nat
at he would
lton, Federa
ons elevated
stations of g
ust, which, to
rtion of inter
y.
lton, Federa
must still be
s success. A
r where the j
would be in
ewise gained
uble security
the purity of
mpts to seduc
ublics, among
rruption. An
mbition, has
tion, that it i
sacrifice by
alist # 22
d from the ma
great pre-em
o any but min
rest they hav
alist # 22
a valuable c
s matters no
jury have go
n most cases
d.
y; and it will
f both institu
ce the integri
28
g their nume
n hereditary m
so great a pe
is not easy fo
treachery to
ass of the co
minence and p
nds actuated
ve in the com
check upon c
ow stand, it w
one evidently
of little use
readily be p
utions. By in
ity of either.
erous advant
monarch, th
ersonal inter
or a foreign
o the state.
ommunity by
power may f
d by superior
mmon stock,
corruption. It
would be nec
y wrong, the
to practice u
perceived tha
ncreasing the
tages, is that
hough often d
rest in the go
power to giv
y the suffrag
find compen
r virtue may
and to overb
t greatly mu
cessary to co
e court will g
upon the jury
at this compl
e obstacles to
t they afford
disposed to
overnment an
ve him an
ges of their
nsations for
y appear to
balance the
ultiplies the
orrupt both
generally gra
y unless the
licated agenc
o success, it
nd
ant
cy
29
The temptations to prostitution which the judges might have to surmount must certainly be
much fewer, while the co-operation of a jury is necessary, than they might be if they had
themselves the exclusive determination of all causes.
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 83
30
Defense
The rights of neutrality will only be respected when they are defended by an adequate
power. A nation, despicable by its weakness, forfeits even the privilege of being neutral.
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 11
Dem
It may
small
admit
every
James
Demo
incom
short i
Theor
suppo
at the
and th
James
In a de
assem
must b
James
mocracy
y be conclud
number of c
of no cure f
case, be felt
s Madison,
ocracies have
mpatible with
in their lives
retic politicia
osed that by r
same time b
heir passions
s Madison,
emocracy th
mble and adm
be confined
s Madison,
y
ded that a pur
citizens, who
for the misch
t by a majori
Federalist #
e ever been s
h personal se
s as they hav
ans, who hav
reducing ma
be perfectly e
s.
Federalist #
he people me
minister it by
to a small sp
Federalist #
re democrac
o assemble a
hiefs of facti
ity of the wh
# 10
spectacles of
ecurity or the
ve been viole
ve patronized
ankind to a p
equalized an
# 10
eet and exerc
y their repres
pot. A repub
# 14
31
cy, by which
and administ
on. A comm
hole;
f turbulence
e rights of pr
ent in their d
d this specie
perfect equal
nd assimilate
cise the gove
entatives an
blic may be e
h I mean a so
er the gover
mon passion
and content
roperty; and
deaths.
es of governm
ity in their p
ed in their po
ernment in p
nd agents. A
extended ove
ociety consis
rnment in per
or interest w
tion; have ev
have in gen
ment, have e
political righ
ossessions, th
person; in a r
democracy,
er a large reg
sting of a
rson, can
will, in almos
ver been foun
neral been as
erroneously
hts, they wou
heir opinion
republic they
consequentl
gion.
st
nd
uld
ns,
y
ly,
As the
permi
will in
republ
people
James
In a de
and ar
measu
appreh
James
e natural lim
t the most re
nclude no gr
lic is that dis
e to meet as
s Madison,
emocracy, w
re continuall
ures, to the a
hended, on s
s Madison,
mit of a demo
emote citizen
eater numbe
stance from
often as may
Federalist #
where a mult
ly exposed, b
ambitious int
some favorab
Federalist #
ocracy is that
ns to assemb
er than can jo
the center w
y be necessa
# 14
titude of peo
by their inca
trigues of the
ble emergen
# 48
32
t distance fro
ble as often a
oin in those
which will ba
ary for the ad
ple exercise
apacity for re
eir executive
ncy, to start u
om the centr
as their publ
functions, so
arely allow th
dministration
e in person th
egular delibe
e magistrates
up in the sam
ral point whi
ic functions
o the natural
he represent
n of public a
he legislative
eration and c
s, tyranny m
me quarter.
ich will just
demand, an
l limit of a
tatives of the
affairs.
e functions
concerted
may well be
nd
e
33
Due process
The creation of crimes after the commission of the fact, or in other words, the subjecting of
men to punishment for things which, when they were done, were breaches of no law, and
the practice of arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in all ages, the favorite and most
formidable instruments of tyranny.
The observations of the judicious Blackstone, in reference to the latter, are well worthy of
recital: "To bereave a man of life [says he] or by violence to confiscate his estate, without
accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism as must at once
convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole nation; but confinement of the person,
by secretly hurrying him to jail, where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten, is a less
public, a less striking, and therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government."
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 84
Eco
It is a
nature
withou
When
two an
the co
confin
Alexa
Exorb
which
to ren
manuf
somet
less ad
Alexa
It mig
alway
Alexa
onomics
signal advan
e a security a
ut defeating
n applied to t
nd two do no
ollection is el
ned within pr
ander Hami
bitant duties
h is always p
der other cla
facturing cla
times force i
dvantage
ander Hami
ght be demon
ys be the leas
ander Hami
ntage of taxe
against exces
the end prop
this object, th
ot always ma
luded; and th
roper and m
lton, Federa
on imported
rejudicial to
asses of the c
asses, to who
ndustry out
lton, Federa
nstrated that
st burdensom
lton, Federa
es on articles
ss. They pre
posed -- that
he saying is
ake four." If
he product to
moderate boun
alist # 21
d articles wou
o the fair trad
community t
om they give
of its more n
alist # 35
the most pro
me.
alist # 35
34
s of consump
scribe their o
t is, an exten
as just as it
f duties are to
o the treasur
nds.
uld serve to
der, and even
tributary in a
e a prematur
natural chann
oductive sys
ption that th
own limit, w
nsion of the r
is witty that
oo high, they
ry is not so g
beget a gene
ntually to the
an improper
e monopoly
nels into oth
stem of [gov
hey contain i
which cannot
revenue.
t, "in politica
y lessen the
great as when
eral spirit of
e revenue its
degree to th
of the mark
hers in which
vernment] fin
n their own
t be exceede
al arithmetic
consumption
n they are
f smuggling;
self: they ten
he
kets; they
h it flows wi
nance will
ed
,
n;
nd
ith
35
Electoral college
It was equally desirable that the immediate election should be made by men most capable
of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station and acting under circumstances favorable
to deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which
were proper to govern their choice.
A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be
most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to so complicated an
investigation.
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 68
Eme
A wea
or the
once b
depen
Tyran
exigen
consti
James
There
things
the po
Alexa
It is in
than in
every
James
There
author
legisla
ergency
ak constitutio
usurpation o
begun, will s
nd on the con
nny has perha
ncies, by a d
itutional auth
s Madison,
are certain e
s ought to be
ossibility of s
ander Hami
n vain to opp
n vain; becau
precedent o
s Madison,
is no positio
rity, contrary
ative act, the
y powers
on must nec
of powers re
stop at the sa
ntingencies o
aps oftener g
defective con
horities.
Federalist #
emergencies
e forborne be
such emerge
lton, Federa
pose constitu
use it plants
f which is a
Federalist #
on which dep
y to the teno
erefore, contr
s
essarily term
equisite for t
alutary point
of the mome
grown out of
nstitution, tha
# 20
s of nations i
ecome essen
encies, ought
alist # 36
utional barrie
in the Cons
germ of unn
# 41
pends on cle
or of the com
rary to the C
36
minate in dis
he public sa
t, or go forw
nt.
f the assump
an out of the
in which exp
ntial to the pu
t ever to hav
ers to the im
titution itsel
necessary an
earer princip
mmission und
Constitution,
solution for
afety. Wheth
ward to the da
ptions of pow
e full exercis
pedients that
ublic weal. A
ve the option
mpulse of self
lf necessary
nd multiplied
ples than that
der which it
can be valid
want of pro
her the usurp
angerous ext
wer called fo
se of the larg
t in the ordin
And the gove
n of making u
f-preservatio
usurpations
d repetitions.
t every act o
is exercised
d.
per powers,
ation, when
treme, must
or, on pressin
gest
nary state of
ernment, fro
use of them.
on. It is wors
of power,
.
of a delegated
, is void. No
ng
om
.
se
d
o
37
To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the
servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people
themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers may do not only what their powers do not
authorize, but what they forbid.
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 78
38
Equality / inequality
Democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found
incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as
short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.
Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously
supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would
at the same time be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions,
and their passions.
James Madison, Federalist # 10
Eter
Safety
ardent
life an
contin
securi
be mo
Alexa
Where
preten
natura
of men
Alexa
Every
liberty
attach
preser
James
Were
the St
the ad
rnal vig
y from extern
t love of libe
nd property i
nual danger,
ity to institut
ore safe, they
ander Hami
e the whole p
nse for the us
al cure for an
n.
ander Hami
y man who lo
y ought to ha
hment to the
rving it.
s Madison,
it admitted,
ate governm
dvantage in th
ilance a
nal danger is
erty will, afte
incident to w
will compel
tions which h
y at length be
lton, Federa
power of the
se of violent
n ill administ
lton, Federa
oves peace, e
ave it ever b
Union of Am
Federalist #
however, th
ments to exten
he means of
against u
s the most po
er a time, giv
war, the conti
l nations the
have a tende
ecome willin
alist # 8
e governmen
t remedies in
tration in a p
alist # 21
every man w
efore his eye
merica and b
# 41
hat the federa
nd its power
f defeating su
39
usurpati
owerful dire
ve way to its
inual effort a
most attach
ency to destr
ng to run the
nt is in the ha
n partial or o
popular or re
who loves his
es that he ma
be able to set
al governme
r beyond the
uch encroach
ion
ector of natio
s dictates. Th
and alarm at
ed to liberty
roy their civi
e risk of bein
ands of the p
occasional di
epresentative
s country, ev
ay cherish in
t a due value
nt may feel
e due limits,
hments.
onal conduct
he violent de
ttendant on a
y to resort for
il and politic
ng less free.
people, there
istempers of
e constitutio
very man wh
n his heart a
e on the mea
an equal dis
the latter wo
t. Even the
estruction of
a state of
r repose and
cal rights. To
e is the less
f the State. T
n is a chang
ho loves
due
ans of
sposition wit
ould still hav
f
d
o
he
e
th
ve
40
If an act of a particular State, though unfriendly to the national government, be generally
popular in that State, and should not too grossly violate the oaths of the State officers, it is
executed immediately and, of course, by means on the spot and depending on the State
alone.
The opposition of the federal government, or the interposition of federal officers, would
but inflame the zeal of all parties on the side of the State, and the evil could not be
prevented or repaired, if at all, without the employment of means which must always be
resorted to with reluctance and difficulty.
On the other hand, should an unwarrantable measure of the federal government be
unpopular in particular States, which would seldom fail to be the case, or even a
warrantable measure be so, which may sometimes be the case, the means of opposition to
it are powerful and at hand.
The disquietude of the people; their repugnance and, perhaps, refusal to co-operate with
the officers of the Union; the frowns of the executive magistracy of the State; the
embarrassments created by legislative devices, which would often be added on such
occasions, would oppose, in any State, difficulties not to be despised; would form, in a
large State, very serious impediments; and where the sentiments of several adjoining States
happened to be in unison, would present obstructions which the federal government would
hardly be willing to encounter.
But ambitious encroachments of the federal government on the authority of the State
governments would not excite the opposition of a single State, or of a few States only.
They would be signals of general alarm. Every government would espouse the common
cause.
A correspondence would be opened. Plans of resistance would be concerted. One spirit
would animate and conduct the whole. The same combinations, in short, would result from
an apprehension of the federal, as was produced by the dread of a foreign, yoke; and unless
the projected innovations should be voluntarily renounced, the same appeal to a trial of
force would be made in the one case as was made in the other.
But w
James
In a go
heredi
dange
In a de
and ar
measu
appreh
But in
the ex
assem
confid
which
of its p
this de
precau
James
The H
recolle
minds
compe
is to b
there f
title to
what degree o
s Madison,
overnment w
itary monarc
er, and watch
emocracy, w
re continuall
ures, to the a
hended, on s
n a represent
xtent and the
mbly, which i
dence in its o
h actuate a m
passions by
epartment th
utions.
s Madison,
House of Rep
ection of the
s by the mod
elled to antic
be reviewed,
forever to re
o a renewal o
of madness c
Federalist #
where numer
ch, the execu
hed with all t
where a mult
ly exposed, b
ambitious int
some favorab
ative republi
duration of
is inspired by
own strength
multitude, yet
means whic
hat the peopl
Federalist #
presentatives
eir dependen
de of their ele
cipate the mo
and when th
emain unless
of it.
could ever dr
# 46
rous and ext
utive departm
the jealousy
titude of peo
by their inca
trigues of the
ble emergen
ic where the
its power; a
y a supposed
h; which is su
t not so num
ch reason pre
e ought to in
# 48
s is so consti
nce on the pe
evation can b
oment when
hey must des
s a faithful di
41
rive the fede
ensive prero
ment is very
which a zea
ple exercise
apacity for re
eir executive
ncy, to start u
e executive m
and where th
d influence o
ufficiently n
merous as to b
escribes; it is
ndulge all th
ituted as to s
eople. Before
be effaced b
n their power
scend to the
ischarge of t
eral governm
ogatives are p
justly regard
al for liberty
e in person th
egular delibe
e magistrates
up in the sam
magistracy is
e legislative
over the peop
numerous to
be incapable
s against the
heir jealousy
support in th
e the sentime
by the exerci
r is to cease,
level from w
their trust sh
ment to such
placed in the
ded as the so
ought to ins
he legislative
eration and c
s, tyranny m
me quarter.
s carefully li
e power is ex
ple with an i
feel all the p
e of pursuing
enterprising
and exhaust
he members a
ents impress
ise of power,
, when their
which they w
hall have esta
an extremity
e hands of an
ource of
spire.
e functions
concerted
may well be
imited, both
xercised by a
intrepid
passions
g the objects
g ambition o
t all their
an habitual
sed on their
, they will be
exercise of i
were raised;
ablished thei
y?
n
in
an
of
e
it
ir
42
I will add, as a fifth circumstance in the situation of the House of Representatives,
restraining them from oppressive measures, that they can make no law which will not have
its full operation on themselves and their friends, as well as on the great mass of the
society. This has always been deemed one of the strongest bonds by which human policy
can connect the rulers and the people together.
It creates between them that communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments of which
few governments have furnished examples; but without which every government
degenerates into tyranny. If it be asked, what is to restrain the House of Representatives
from making legal discriminations in favor of themselves and a particular class of the
society?
I answer: the genius of the whole system; the nature of just and constitutional laws; and,
above all, the vigilant and manly spirit which actuates the people of America -- a spirit
which nourishes freedom, and in return is nourished by it.
If this spirit shall ever be so far debased as to tolerate a law not obligatory on the
legislature, as well as on the people, the people will be prepared to tolerate anything but
liberty.
James Madison, Federalist # 57
43
Ex post facto laws
The creation of crimes after the commission of the fact, or in other words, the subjecting of
men to punishment for things which, when they were done, were breaches of no law, and
the practice of arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in all ages, the favorite and most
formidable instruments of tyranny.
The observations of the judicious Blackstone, in reference to the latter, are well worthy of
recital: "To bereave a man of life [says he] or by violence to confiscate his estate, without
accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism as must at once
convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole nation; but confinement of the person,
by secretly hurrying him to jail, where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten, is a less
public, a less striking, and therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government."
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 84
44
Example for world
But why is the experiment of an extended republic to be rejected merely because it may
comprise what is new?
Is it not the glory of the people of America that, whilst they have paid a decent regard to
the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration
for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good
sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience?
To this manly spirit posterity will be indebted for the possession, and the world for the
example, of the numerous innovations displayed on the American theater in favor of
private rights and public happiness.
Had no important step been taken by the leaders of the Revolution for which a precedent
could not be discovered, no government established of which an exact model did not
present itself, the people of the United States might at this moment have been numbered
among the melancholy victims of misguided councils, must at best have been laboring
under the weight of some of those forms which have crushed the liberties of the rest of
mankind.
Happily for America, happily we trust for the whole human race, they pursued a new and
more noble course. They accomplished a revolution which has no parallel in the annals of
human society.
They reared the fabrics of governments which have no model on the face of the globe.
They formed the design of a great Confederacy, which it is incumbent on their successors
to improve and perpetuate. If their works betray imperfections, we wonder at the fewness
of them.
James Madison, Federalist # 14
Exe
The ai
posses
societ
virtuo
The el
The m
numer
appoin
James
A feeb
anothe
theory
Alexa
The in
provis
Alexa
But on
agains
Alexa
ecutive B
im of every
ss most wisd
ty; and in the
ous whilst the
lective mode
means relied
rous and var
ntments as w
s Madison,
ble executive
er phrase for
y, must be, in
ander Hami
ngredients w
sion for its su
ander Hami
ne of the we
st the last as
ander Hamilt
Branch,
political con
dom to disce
e next place,
ey continue
e of obtainin
on in this fo
rious. The m
will maintain
Federalist #
e implies a f
r a bad execu
n practice, a
lton, Federa
which constitu
upport; and
lton, Federa
ightiest obje
the first plan
ton, Federali
the natu
nstitution is,
ern, and most
to take the m
to hold their
ng rulers is th
orm of gover
most effectual
n a proper re
# 57
feeble execu
ution; and a
bad governm
alist # 70
ute energy in
competent p
alist # 70
ections to a p
n is that it te
ist # 70
45
ure of
or ought to
t virtue to pu
most effectu
r public trust
he characteri
rnment for pr
l one is such
sponsibility
ution of the g
government
ment.
n the execut
powers.
plurality in th
ends to conce
be, first to o
ursue, the co
ual precautio
t.
istic policy o
reventing th
h a limitation
to the peopl
government.
t ill executed
tive are unity
he executive
eal faults an
obtain for rul
ommon good
ons for keepi
of republican
eir degenera
n of the term
le.
A feeble ex
d, whatever i
y; duration; a
e, and which
nd destroy re
lers men wh
d of the
ing them
n governmen
acy are
m of
xecution is bu
it may be in
an adequate
h lies as muc
sponsibility.
o
nt.
ut
ch
.
It is ev
the pe
delega
accou
accou
discov
either
Alexa
With a
eligibi
resolu
tenden
The la
to con
secure
Alexa
There
were c
relinq
obtain
it is ad
or that
their d
Alexa
vident from
eople of the t
ated power,
unt of the div
unt of the unc
vering with f
to their rem
ander Hami
a positive du
ility. The fir
ution to act h
ncy of his m
ast is necessa
ntinue him in
e to the gove
ander Hami
are few men
conscious th
quished at a d
ning, by mer
dmitted that
t the best sec
duty.
ander Hami
these consid
two greatest
first, the rest
vision of the
certainty on
facility and c
moval from o
lton, Federa
uration of co
rst is necessa
his part well,
measures, and
ary to enable
n the station
ernment the a
lton, Federa
n who would
hat the advan
determinate p
iting, a conti
the desire o
curity for the
lton, Federa
derations tha
securities th
traints of pu
censure atte
whom it oug
clearness the
ffice or to th
alist # 70
onsiderable e
ary to give th
and to the c
d thence to fo
e the people,
in order to p
advantage o
alist # 72
d not feel mu
ntage of the s
period, than
inuance of th
f reward is o
e fidelity of
alist # 72
46
at the pluralit
hey can have
ublic opinion
endant on bad
ght to fall; an
e misconduc
heir actual pu
extent, I conn
he officer him
community t
orm an expe
, when they
prolong the u
f permanenc
uch less zeal
station with
when they w
hem. This po
one of the str
mankind is t
ty of the exe
e for the faith
n, which lose
d measures a
nd, second, t
ct of the pers
unishment in
nect the circ
mself the inc
time and leis
erimental est
see reason to
utility of his
cy in a wise
l in the disch
which it was
were permitt
osition will n
rongest incen
to make thei
ecutive tends
hful exercise
e their effica
among a num
the opportun
sons they tru
n cases whic
cumstances o
clination and
sure to obser
timate of the
o approve of
talents and v
system of ad
harge of a du
s connected
ted to enterta
not be dispu
ntives of hum
ir interest co
s to deprive
e of any
cy, as well o
mber as on
nity of
ust, in order
ch admit of i
of re-
d the
rve the
ir merits.
f his conduc
virtues, and
dministration
uty when the
must be
ain a hope o
uted so long a
man conduc
oincide with
on
t.
ct,
to
n.
ey
of
as
ct;
An av
must a
be res
might
abund
before
even b
His av
or amb
good c
But w
would
Alexa
The pr
virtue
that th
rights
its del
which
The pr
enable
comm
Alexa
The es
rules f
varicious man
at all events
isted by such
not scruple
dant as it was
e him, might
be unwilling
varice might
bitious, as w
conduct, he
with the prosp
d be likely to
ander Hami
ropriety of th
in the execu
he love of po
of other me
liberations; t
h itself, on m
rimary induc
e him to defe
munity agains
ander Hami
ssence of the
for the regul
n who might
yield up the
h a man to m
to have reco
s transitory;
t content him
g to risk the c
be a guard u
well as avaric
might hesita
pect before h
o get the vict
lton, Federa
he thing [vet
utive, but up
ower may so
mbers of the
that impressi
maturer reflec
cement to co
end himself;
st the passin
lton, Federa
e legislative
lation of the
t happen to f
e advantages
make the bes
ourse to the m
though the s
mself with th
consequence
upon his ava
cious. And if
ate to sacrific
him of appro
tory over his
alist # 72
to] does not
pon the suppo
metimes bet
e governmen
ions of the m
ction, would
onferring the
the seconda
g of bad law
alist # 73
authority is
society; whi
47
fill the office
he enjoyed,
st use of his o
most corrupt
same man, p
he regular pe
es of an abus
arice. Add to
f he could ex
ce his appeti
oaching and
s caution, his
turn upon th
osition that t
tray it into a
nt; that a spir
moment may
condemn.
e power in qu
ary one is to
ws, through h
to enact law
ile the execu
e, looking fo
, would feel
opportunitie
t expedients
probably, wit
erquisites of h
se of his opp
o this that the
xpect to prol
ite for them
inevitable an
s vanity, or h
he suppositio
the legislatur
disposition
rit of faction
y sometimes
uestion upon
increase the
haste, inadve
ws, or, in oth
ution of the l
orward to a t
a propensity
es while they
s to make the
th a differen
his situation
portunities.
e same man
long his hon
to his appeti
nnihilation, h
his ambition
on of superio
ure will not b
to encroach
n may somet
hurry it into
n the executi
e chances in
ertence, or de
her words, to
laws and the
time when h
y not easy to
y lasted, and
e harvest as
nt prospect
n, and might
might be va
nors by his
ite for gain.
his avarice
.
or wisdom o
be infallible;
upon the
times pervert
o measures
ive is to
favor of the
esign.
prescribe
e employmen
e
o
ain
or
t
e
nt
48
of the common strength, either for this purpose or for the common defense, seem to
comprise all the functions of the executive magistrate.
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 75
Fac
The pu
often
the su
James
By a f
minor
or of i
intere
James
There
liberty
opinio
It cou
Libert
could
nouris
anima
The se
reason
be for
opinio
will b
tion
ublic good i
decided, not
uperior force
s Madison,
faction I und
rity of the wh
interest, adve
sts of the com
s Madison,
are again tw
y which is es
ons, the same
ld never be m
ty is to factio
not be a less
shes faction
al life, becau
econd exped
n of man con
rmed. As lon
ons and his p
e objects to
s disregarde
t according t
of an intere
Federalist #
derstand a nu
hole, who ar
erse to the ri
mmunity.
Federalist #
wo methods
ssential to its
e passions, a
more truly s
on what air i
s folly to abo
than it woul
use it imparts
dient is as im
ntinues fallib
ng as the con
passions will
which the la
d in the conf
to the rules o
sted and ove
# 10
umber of citi
re united and
ights of othe
# 10
of removing
s existence;
and the same
aid than of t
is to fire, an
olish liberty,
d be to wish
s to fire its d
mpracticable
ble, and he is
nnection subs
l have a recip
atter will atta
49
flicts of riva
of justice and
erbearing ma
izens, wheth
d actuated by
er citizens, or
g the causes o
the other, by
e interests.
he first reme
aliment with
, which is es
h the annihila
destructive ag
as the first w
s at liberty to
sists between
procal influe
ach themselv
al parties, and
d the rights o
ajority.
her amountin
y some comm
r to the perm
of faction: th
y giving to e
edy that it w
hout which i
ssential to po
ation of air, w
gency.
would be unw
o exercise it,
n his reason
ence on each
ves. The dive
d that measu
of the minor
ng to a major
mon impulse
manent and a
he one, by d
every citizen
was worse tha
it instantly e
olitical life, b
which is ess
wise. As lon
, different op
and his self
h other; and
ersity in the
ures are too
r party, but b
rity or
e of passion,
aggregate
destroying th
the same
an the diseas
xpires. But i
because it
sential to
ng as the
pinions will
f-love, his
the former
faculties of
by
,
e
se.
it
50
men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a
uniformity of interests.
The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of
different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees
and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the
sentiments and views of the respective proprietors ensues a division of the society into
different interests and parties.
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them
everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different
circumstances of civil society.
A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other
points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously
contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes
have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties,
inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and
oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good.
So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities that where no
substantial occasion presents itself the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been
sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the
most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution
of property.
Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in
society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like
discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a
moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and
divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views.
The re
legisla
operat
James
The in
that re
If a fa
which
admin
violen
When
hand,
rights
James
The sp
Alexa
new-f
the na
each o
James
egulation of
ation and inv
tions of gove
s Madison,
nference to w
elief is only t
action consis
h enables the
nistration, it m
nce under the
n a majority i
enables it to
of other citi
s Madison,
pirit of party
ander Hami
fangled and a
atural offspri
other
s Madison,
these variou
volves the sp
ernment.
Federalist #
which we are
to be sought
ts of less tha
e majority to
may convuls
e forms of th
is included in
o sacrifice to
izens.
Federalist #
y in different
lton, Federa
artificial trea
ing of free go
Federalist #
us and interfe
pirit of party
# 10
e brought is
t in the mean
an a majority
defeat its si
se the societ
he Constituti
n a faction, t
o its ruling pa
# 10
t degrees mu
alist # 26
asons have b
overnment, h
# 43
51
fering interes
y and faction
that the caus
ns of control
y, relief is su
nister views
ty; but it will
ion.
the form of p
assion or int
ust be expect
been the grea
have usually
sts forms the
n in the neces
ses of faction
lling its effec
upplied by th
s by regular v
l be unable t
popular gov
terest both th
ted to infect
at engines by
y wreaked th
e principal ta
ssary and ord
n cannot be
cts.
he republican
vote. It may
to execute an
ernment, on
he public goo
all political
y which viol
heir alternate
ask of moder
dinary
removed an
n principle,
clog the
nd mask its
n the other
od and the
bodies
lent factions,
e malignity o
rn
d
,
on
The d
of men
Alexa
The pr
virtue
that th
rights
its del
which
The pr
enable
comm
Alexa
emon of fact
n.
ander Hamilt
ropriety of th
in the execu
he love of po
of other me
liberations; t
h itself, on m
rimary induc
e him to defe
munity agains
ander Hamilt
tion will, at
ton, Federali
he thing [vet
utive, but up
ower may so
mbers of the
that impressi
maturer reflec
cement to co
end himself;
st the passin
ton, Federali
certain seaso
ist # 65
to] does not
pon the suppo
metimes bet
e governmen
ions of the m
ction, would
onferring the
the seconda
g of bad law
ist # 73
52
ons, extend h
turn upon th
osition that t
tray it into a
nt; that a spir
moment may
condemn.
e power in qu
ary one is to
ws, through h
his scepter o
he suppositio
the legislatur
disposition
rit of faction
y sometimes
uestion upon
increase the
haste, inadve
over all num
on of superio
ure will not b
to encroach
n may somet
hurry it into
n the executi
e chances in
ertence, or de
merous bodies
or wisdom o
be infallible;
upon the
times pervert
o measures
ive is to
favor of the
esign.
s
or
t
e
53
Federal/national nature of U. S. government
[Quoting Montesquieu]: "It is very probable" (says he *) "that mankind would have been
obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a SINGLE PERSON, had they
not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican,
together with the external force of a monarchical, government. I mean a CONFEDERATE
REPUBLIC.
"This form of government is a convention by which several smaller states agree to
become members of a larger one, which they intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of
societies that constitute a new one, capable of increasing, by means of new associations,
till they arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the
united body.
"A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may support itself without
any internal corruptions. The form of this society prevents all manner of inconveniences.
"If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he could not be
supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the confederate states. Were he to
have too great influence over one, this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that
which would still remain free might oppose him with forces independent of those which he
had usurped, and overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation.
"Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states, the others are
able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain
sound. The state may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may
be dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty.
"As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys the internal happiness of
each; and with respect to its external situation, it is possessed, by means of the association,
of all the advantages of large monarchies."
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 9
But if
design
under
those
betwe
person
Alexa
It seem
Const
contin
yet thi
extend
Alexa
Ff it b
comm
person
be em
The m
of just
Alexa
The fi
govern
with th
f we are unw
n of a nation
the direction
ingredients w
een a league
ns of the citi
ander Hamilt
ms to require
titution whic
nually on foo
is is the plain
ding its oper
ander Hamilt
be possible a
mon concerns
ns of the citi
mpowered to
majesty of the
tice.
ander Hamilt
irst question
nment be str
he genius of
willing to be p
nal governme
n of a comm
which may b
and a govern
izens -- the o
ton, Federali
e no pains to
ch could only
ot to execute
n alternative
rations to ind
ton, Federali
at any rate to
s and preserv
izens. It mus
employ the
e national au
ton, Federali
that offers i
rictly republi
f the people o
placed in thi
ent, or, whic
mon council,
be considere
nment; we m
only proper o
ist # 15
o prove that t
y be kept in m
e the ordinary
e involved by
dividuals.
ist # 16
construct a
ving the gen
st stand in ne
arm of the o
uthority mus
ist # 16
itself is whet
ican. It is ev
of America;
54
is perilous si
h is the sam
we must res
ed as forming
must extend t
objects of go
the States ou
motion by th
y requisition
y those who
federal gove
eral tranquil
eed of no int
ordinary mag
st be manifes
ther the gene
vident that no
with the fun
ituation; if w
me thing, of a
solve to inco
g the charact
the authority
overnment.
ught not to p
he instrumen
ns or decrees
wish to den
ernment cap
llity It must
termediate le
gistrate to ex
sted through
eral form and
o other form
ndamental pr
we still will a
a superintend
orporate into
teristic diffe
y of the Unio
prefer a natio
ntality of a la
s of the gove
ny it the pow
able of regu
carry its age
egislations, b
xecute its ow
h the medium
d aspect of t
m would be re
rinciples of
adhere to the
ding power
our plan
erence
on to the
onal
arge army
ernment. And
wer of
ulating the
ency to the
but must itse
wn resolution
m of the cour
the
econcilable
the
e
d
elf
ns.
rts
55
Revolution; or with that honorable determination which animates every votary of freedom
to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government. If the
plan of the convention, therefore, be found to depart from the republican character, its
advocates must abandon it as no longer defensible.
What, then, are the distinctive characters of the republican form? Were an answer to this
question to be sought, not by recurring to principles but in the application of the term by
political writers to the constitutions of different States, no satisfactory one would ever be
found. ...
If we resort for a criterion to the different principles on which different forms of
government are established, we may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that
name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great
body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure for
a limited period, or during good behavior.
It is essential to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society,
not from an inconsiderable proportion or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of
tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might
aspire to the rank of republicans and claim for their government the honorable title of
republic. ...
Could any further proof be required of the republican complexion of this system, the
most decisive one might be found in its absolute prohibition of titles of nobility, both under
the federal and the State governments; and in its express guaranty of the republican form to
each of the latter.
"But it was not sufficient," say the adversaries of the proposed Constitution, "for the
convention to adhere to the republican form. They ought with equal care to have preserved
the federal form, which regards the Union as a Confederacy of sovereign states; instead of
which they have framed a national government, which regards the Union as a consolidation
of the States." And it is asked by what authority this bold and radical innovation was
56
undertaken? The handle which has been made of this objection requires that it should be
examined with some precision.
Without inquiring into the accuracy of the distinction on which the objection is founded,
it will be necessary to a just estimate of its force, first, to ascertain the real character of the
government in question; secondly, to inquire how far the convention were authorized to
propose such a government; and thirdly, how far the duty they owed to their country could
supply any defect of regular authority.
First. -- In order to ascertain the real character of the government, it may be considered
in relation to the foundation on which it is to be established; to the sources from which its
ordinary powers are to be drawn; to the operation of those powers; to the extent of them;
and to the authority by which future changes in the government are to be introduced.
On examining the first relation, it appears, on one hand, that the Constitution is to be
founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America, given by deputies elected
for the special purpose; but, on the other, that this assent and ratification is to be given by
the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct
and independent States to which they respectively belong.
It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme
authority in each State the authority of the people themselves. The act, therefore,
establishing the Constitution will not be a national but a federal act.
That it will be a federal and not a national act, as these terms are understood by the
objectors -- the act of the people, as forming so many independent States, not as forming
one aggregate nation -- is obvious from this single consideration: that it is to result neither
from the decision of a majority of the people of the Union, nor from that of a majority of
the States.
It must result from the unanimous assent of the several States that are parties to it, differing
no otherwise from their ordinary assent than in its being expressed, not by the legislative
authority, but by that of the people themselves. Were the people regarded in this
transaction as forming one nation, the will of the majority of the whole people of the
57
United States would bind the minority, in the same manner as the majority in each State
must bind the minority; and the will of the majority must be determined either by a
comparison of the individual votes, or by considering the will of the majority of the States
as evidence of the will of a majority of the people of the United States.
Neither of these rules has been adopted. Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is
considered as a sovereign body independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own
voluntary act. In this relation, then, the new Constitution will, if established, be a federal
and not a national constitution.
The next relation is to the sources from which the ordinary powers of government are to
be derived. The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the people of
America; and the people will be represented in the same proportion and on the same
principle as they are in the legislature of a particular State.
So far the government is national, not federal. The Senate, on the other hand, will derive its
powers from the States as political and coequal societies; and these will be represented on
the principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress. So far the
government is federal, not national.
The executive power will be derived from a very compound source. ... From this aspect of
the government it appears to be of a mixed character, presenting at least as many federal as
national features.
The difference between a federal and national government, as it relates to the operation
of the government, is by the adversaries of the plan of the convention supposed to consist
in this, that in the former the powers operate on the political bodies composing the
Confederacy in their political capacities; in the latter, on the individual citizens composing
the nation in their individual capacities. ...
But if the government be national with regard to the operation of its powers, it changes
its aspect again when we contemplate it in relation to the extent of its powers. The idea of a
national government involves in it not only an authority over the individual citizens, but an
indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, so far as they are objects of lawful
58
government. Among a people consolidated into one nation, this supremacy is completely
vested in the national legislature.
Among communities united for particular purposes, it is vested partly in the general and
partly in the municipal legislatures. In the former case, all local authorities are subordinate
to the supreme; and may be controlled, directed, or abolished by it at pleasure.
In the latter, the local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of
the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority
than the general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere. In this relation, then,
the proposed government cannot be deemed a national one; since its jurisdiction extends to
certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable
sovereignty over all other objects. ...
If we try the Constitution by its last relation to the authority by which amendments are
to be made, we find it neither wholly national nor wholly federal. Were it wholly national,
the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the majority of the people of the Union;
and this authority would be competent at all times, like that of a majority of every national
society to alter or abolish its established government.
Were it wholly federal, on the other hand, the concurrence of each State in the Union
would be essential to every alteration that would be binding on all. The mode provided by
the plan of the convention is not founded on either of these principles. In requiring more
than a majority, and particularly in computing the proportion by States, not by citizens, it
departs from the national and advances towards the federal character; in rendering the
concurrence of less than the whole number of States sufficient, it loses again the federal
and partakes of the national character.
The proposed Constitution, therefore, even when tested by the rules laid down by its
antagonists, is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition
of both. In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary
powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the
operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them, again, it is
federa
is neit
It is ce
may d
the po
could
wholly
If this
the fed
absolu
Alexa
It is eq
Amon
the go
conge
It is re
to the
must s
system
. . . Th
result
does n
If inde
distric
al, not nation
ther wholly f
ertainly true
destroy the n
ossibility of i
not have be
y from a pla
had been do
deral princip
ute safeguard
ander Hamilt
qually unnec
ng the variou
overnment, th
enial with the
ecommended
State govern
secure the au
ms.
he equality o
of comprom
not call for m
eed it be righ
ct ought to h
nal; and, fina
federal nor w
that the Stat
national gove
injury from t
en avoided w
ace in the org
one it would
ple, and wou
d which they
ton, Federali
cessary to di
us modes wh
hat which ha
e public opin
d by the dou
nments such
uthority of th
of representa
mise between
much discuss
ht that amon
ave a propor
ally in the au
wholly nation
te legislature
ernment. So
the State leg
without excl
ganization of
d doubtless h
uld certainly
y will enjoy
ist # 59
ilate on the a
hich might ha
as been prop
nion.
uble advantag
h an agency i
he former, an
ation in the S
n the opposit
sion.
ng a people th
rtional share
59
uthoritative m
nal. James M
es, by forbea
far as that co
gislatures, it
luding the St
f the nationa
have been int
have depriv
under this pr
appointment
ave been dev
posed by the
ge of favorin
in the forma
nd may form
Senate is ano
te pretension
horoughly in
e in the gove
mode of intr
Madison, Fe
aring the app
onstruction m
is an evil; bu
tates, in their
al governmen
terpreted int
ved the State
rovision.
of senators
vised for con
convention
ng a select ap
ation of the fe
m a convenie
other point w
ns of the larg
ncorporated
rnment and
oducing ame
ederalist # 39
pointment of
may expose
ut it is an ev
r political ca
nt.
to an entire d
government
by the State
nstituting thi
is probably
ppointment,
federal gover
ent link betw
which, being
ge and the sm
into one nat
that among
endments, it
9
f senators,
the Union to
vil which
apacities,
dereliction o
ts of that
legislatures
is branch of
the most
and of givin
rnment as
ween the two
evidently th
mall States,
tion every
independent
t
o
f
s.
ng
he
t
60
and sovereign States, bound together by a simple league, the parties, however unequal in
size, ought to have an equal share in the common councils, it does not appear to be without
some reason that in a compound republic, partaking both of the national and federal
character, the government ought to be founded on a mixture of the principles of
proportional and equal representation.
James Madison, Federalist # 62
61
Federations/federal governments; nature of
[Quoting Montesquieu]: "It is very probable" (says he *) "that mankind would have been
obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a SINGLE PERSON, had they
not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican,
together with the external force of a monarchical, government. I mean a CONFEDERATE
REPUBLIC.
"This form of government is a convention by which several smaller states agree to
become members of a larger one, which they intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of
societies that constitute a new one, capable of increasing, by means of new associations,
till they arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the
united body.
"A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may support itself without
any internal corruptions. The form of this society prevents all manner of inconveniences.
"If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he could not be
supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the confederate states. Were he to
have too great influence over one, this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that
which would still remain free might oppose him with forces independent of those which he
had usurped, and overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation.
"Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states, the others are
able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain
sound. The state may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may
be dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty.
"As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys the internal happiness of
each; and with respect to its external situation, it is possessed, by means of the association,
of all the advantages of large monarchies."
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 9
62
Foreign intrusions
Let us not forget how much more easy it is to receive foreign fleets into our ports, and
foreign armies into our country, than it is to persuade or compel them to depart. How many
conquests did the Romans and others make in the characters of allies, and what innovations
did they under the same character introduce into the governments of those whom they
pretended to protect.
John John Jay, Federalist # 5
Futu
In pur
presen
are no
these w
human
Nothin
be lod
ought
Alexa
At pre
have m
compl
These
requir
has ac
proper
James
The p
define
The fo
and fo
conne
ure take
rsuing this in
nt period, bu
ot to be fram
with the pro
n affairs.
ng, therefore
dged in the n
to be a CAP
ander Hamilt
esent some o
made much p
lexity to the
e, however, w
re, on the par
ccordingly ta
r increase of
s Madison, F
owers deleg
ed. Those wh
ormer will b
oreign comm
ected.
en into c
nquiry, we m
ut to look for
med upon a ca
bable exigen
e, can be mo
national gove
PACITY to p
ton, Federali
of the States
progress in t
affairs of a n
will in all of
rt of each St
aken care tha
f the represen
Federalist # 5
ated by the p
hich are to re
e exercised p
merce; with w
consider
must bear in m
rward to rem
alculation of
ncies of ages
ore fallacious
ernment from
provide for f
ist # 34
are little mo
those branch
nation.
them be the
ate, a fuller
at the progre
ntative branc
56
proposed Co
emain in the
principally o
which last th
63
ration
mind that we
mote futurity.
f existing exi
s, according
s than to infe
m an estimat
future contin
ore than a soc
hes of industr
fruits of a m
representatio
ess of popula
ch of the gov
onstitution to
State gover
on external o
he power of t
e are not to c
. Constitutio
igencies, but
to the natur
er the extent
te of its imm
ngencies as t
ciety of husb
try which giv
more advanc
on. The fore
ation may be
vernment.
o the federal
rnments are n
objects, as w
taxation will
confine our v
ons of civil g
t upon a com
ral and tried
t of any pow
mediate neces
they may hap
bandmen. Fe
ve a variety
ced populatio
esight of the
e accompani
government
numerous an
war, peace, ne
l, for the mo
view to the
government
mbination of
course of
wer proper to
ssities. There
ppen
ew of them
and
on; and will
convention
ed with a
t are few and
nd indefinite
egotiation,
st part, be
f
e
d
e.
64
The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the
ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the
internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.
The operations of the federal government will be most extensive and important in times of
war and danger; those of the State governments in times of peace and security. As the
former periods will probably bear a small proportion to the latter, the State governments
will here enjoy another advantage over the federal government.
The more adequate, indeed, the federal powers may be rendered to the national defense,
the less frequent will be those scenes of danger which might favor their ascendancy over
the governments of the particular States.
If the new Constitution be examined with accuracy and candor, it will be found that the
change which it proposes consists much less in the addition of NEW POWERS to the
Union than in the invigoration of its ORIGINAL POWERS. The regulation of commerce,
it is true, is a new power; but that seems to be an addition which few oppose and from
which no apprehensions are entertained.
James Madison, Federalist # 45
65
General Welfare' not blank check
It has been urged and echoed that the power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and
excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the
United States," amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power which may
be alleged to be necessary for the common defense or general welfare. No stronger proof
could be given of the distress under which these writers labor for objections, than their
stooping to such a misconstruction.
Had no other enumeration or definition of the powers of the Congress been found in the
Constitution than the general expressions just cited, the authors of the objection might have
had some color for it; though it would have been difficult to find a reason for so awkward a
form of describing an authority to legislate in all possible cases. A power to destroy the
freedom of the press, the trial by jury, or even to regulate the course of descents, or the
forms of conveyances, must be very singularly expressed by the terms "to raise money for
the general welfare."
But what color can the objection have, when a specification of the objects alluded to by
these general terms immediately follows and is not even separated by a longer pause than a
semicolon? If the different parts of the same instrument ought to be so expounded as to
give meaning to every part which will bear it, shall one part of the same sentence be
excluded altogether from a share in the meaning; and shall the more doubtful and indefinite
terms be retained in their full extent, and the clear and precise expressions be denied any
signification whatsoever? For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be
inserted, if these and all others were meant to be included in the preceding general power?
Nothing is more natural nor common than first to use a general phrase, and then to explain
and qualify it by a recital of particulars. But the idea of an enumeration of particulars
which neither explain nor qualify the general meaning, and can have no other effect than to
confound and mislead, is an absurdity
James Madison, Federalist # 41
66
From these observations this conclusion results: that the trial by jury in civil cases would
not be abolished; and that the use attempted to be made of the maxims which have been
quoted is contrary to reason and common sense, and therefore not admissible.
Even if these maxims had a precise technical sense, corresponding with the ideas of those
who employ them upon the present occasion, which, however, is not the case, they would
still be inapplicable to a constitution of government. In relation to such a subject, the
natural and obvious sense of its provisions, apart from any technical rules, is the true
criterion of construction.
Having now seen that the maxims relied upon will not bear the use made of them, let us
endeavor to ascertain their proper use and true meaning. This will be best done by
examples. The plan of the convention declares that the power of Congress, or, in other
words, of the national legislature, shall extend to certain enumerated cases.
This specification of particulars evidently excludes all pretension to a general legislative
authority, because an affirmative grant of special powers would be absurd as well as
useless if a general authority was intended.
In like manner the judicial authority of the federal judicatures is declared by the
Constitution to comprehend certain cases particularly specified. The expression of those
cases marks the precise limits beyond which the federal courts cannot extend their
jurisdiction, because the objects of their cognizance being enumerated, the specification
would be nugatory if it did not exclude all ideas of more extensive authority.
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 83
Gov
It is to
make
monar
and ob
affron
partisa
sovere
intere
John J
Was, t
the pr
not th
govern
a certa
sovere
We ha
kings,
shape
institu
It is t
welfar
form o
attainm
James
vernmen
oo true, how
war whenev
rchs will oft
bjects merely
nts, ambition
ans. These a
eign, often le
sts of his peo
John Jay, Fe
then, the Am
ecious blood
at the people
nments of th
ain extent of
eignty?
ave heard of
, not kings fo
that the soli
utions of a di
oo early for
re of the gre
of governme
ment of this
s Madison, F
nt for th
ever disgrac
ver they have
en make war
y personal, s
n, or private c
and a variety
ead him to e
ople.
deralist # 4
merican Revo
d of thousand
e of America
he individual
f power and
f the impious
or the people
id happiness
ifferent form
politicians t
at body of th
ent whatever
object.
Federalist # 4
he benef
ceful it may b
e a prospect
r when their
such as a thir
compacts to
of other mo
ngage in wa
olution effec
ds spilt, and
a should enjo
l States, that
be arrayed w
s doctrine in
e. Is the sam
of the peop
m?
to presume o
he people, is
r has any oth
45
67
fit of tho
be to human
of getting an
r nations are
rst for milita
aggrandize
otives, which
ars not sancti
cted, was the
the hard-ear
oy peace, lib
t particular m
with certain d
the old worl
me doctrine to
le is to be sa
on our forget
s the supreme
her value tha
ose who
n nature, that
nything by it
to get nothin
ary glory, rev
or support th
h affect only
ified by justi
e American C
rned substan
berty, and sa
municipal est
dignities and
rld, that the p
o be revived
acrificed to t
tting that the
e object to b
an as it may b
govern
t nations in g
t; nay, that a
ng by it, but
venge for pe
heir particul
y the mind of
ice or the vo
Confederacy
nce of millio
afety, but tha
tablishments
d attributes o
people were
d in the new,
the views of
e public good
be pursued; a
be fitted for
general will
absolute
t for purpose
ersonal
lar families o
f the
oice and
y formed, wa
ons lavished,
at the
s, might enjo
of
made for
in another
f political
d, the real
and that no
the
es
or
as
,
oy
68
the House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the members an habitual
recollection of their dependence on the people. Before the sentiments impressed on their
minds by the mode of their elevation can be effaced by the exercise of power, they will be
compelled to anticipate the moment when their power is to cease, when their exercise of it
is to be reviewed, and when they must descend to the level from which they were raised;
there forever to remain unless a faithful discharge of their trust shall have established their
title to a renewal of it.
I will add, as a fifth circumstance in the situation of the House of Representatives,
restraining them from oppressive measures, that they can make no law which will not have
its full operation on themselves and their friends, as well as on the great mass of the
society.
This has always been deemed one of the strongest bonds by which human policy can
connect the rulers and the people together. It creates between them that communion of
interests and sympathy of sentiments of which few governments have furnished examples;
but without which every government degenerates into tyranny.
If it be asked, what is to restrain the House of Representatives from making legal
discriminations in favor of themselves and a particular class of the society? I answer: the
genius of the whole system; the nature of just and constitutional laws; and, above all, the
vigilant and manly spirit which actuates the people of America -- a spirit which nourishes
freedom, and in return is nourished by it.
If this spirit shall ever be so far debased as to tolerate a law not obligatory on the
legislature, as well as on the people, the people will be prepared to tolerate anything but
liberty.
James Madison, Federalist # 57
Grid
In this
consti
and an
no les
guard
one si
Ano
additio
resolu
and th
James
the fac
most l
James
In the
of opi
may s
and se
Alexa
dlock de
s spirit it ma
itutional reco
n instrument
s acceptable
, by every po
imple republ
other advanta
onal impedim
ution can now
hen of a majo
s Madison, F
cility and ex
liable
s Madison, F
legislature,
inion, and th
ometimes ob
erve to check
ander Hamilt
esirable
ay be remark
ognition of th
t for preservi
e to the large
ossible expe
lic.
age accruing
ment it must
w be passed
ority of the S
Federalist # 6
xcess of lawm
Federalist # 6
promptitude
e jarring of p
bstruct salut
k excesses in
ton, Federali
e
ked that the e
he portion o
ing that resid
e than to the
edient, agains
g from this in
t prove again
without the
States.
62
making seem
62
e of decision
parties in tha
ary plans, ye
n the majorit
ist # 70
69
equal vote al
of sovereignt
duary sovere
small States
st an improp
ngredient in
nst improper
concurrence
m to be the d
n is oftener a
at departmen
et often prom
ty.
llowed to eac
ty remaining
eignty. So fa
s; since they
per consolida
the constitut
r acts of legi
e, first, of a m
diseases to w
an evil than a
nt of the gov
mote deliber
ch State is at
g in the indiv
ar the equalit
are not less
ation of the S
ution of the S
islation. No l
majority of t
which our gov
a benefit. Th
vernment, tho
ration and cir
t once a
vidual States
ty ought to b
solicitous to
States into
Senate is the
law or
the people,
vernments ar
he difference
ough they
rcumspectio
s
be
o
re
es
on,
The pr
virtue
that th
rights
its del
which
The pr
enable
comm
Alexa
[Rega
institu
state i
harm;
which
the ad
ropriety of th
in the execu
he love of po
of other me
liberations; t
h itself, on m
rimary induc
e him to defe
munity agains
ander Hamilt
arding those
ution calcula
in which they
because it i
h may possib
dvantage of p
he thing [vet
utive, but up
ower may so
mbers of the
that impressi
maturer reflec
cement to co
end himself;
st the passin
ton, Federali
who consid
ated to restra
y happen to
s favorable t
bly be done b
preventing a
to] does not
pon the suppo
metimes bet
e governmen
ions of the m
ction, would
onferring the
the seconda
g of bad law
ist # 73
der the propri
in the excess
be at any giv
to greater sta
by defeating
number of b
70
turn upon th
osition that t
tray it into a
nt; that a spir
moment may
condemn.
e power in qu
ary one is to
ws, through h
iety of veto
s of lawmak
ven period a
ability in the
a few good
bad ones. Al
he suppositio
the legislatur
disposition
rit of faction
y sometimes
uestion upon
increase the
haste, inadve
power] The
king, and to k
as much mor
e system of l
laws will be
lexander Ham
on of superio
ure will not b
to encroach
n may somet
hurry it into
n the executi
e chances in
ertence, or de
ey will consi
keep things i
re likely to d
legislation. T
e amply com
milton, Fede
or wisdom o
be infallible;
upon the
times pervert
o measures
ive is to
favor of the
esign.
ider every
in the same
do good than
The injury
mpensated by
eralist # 73
or
t
e
n
y
71
Human nature
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the
liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same
opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy that it was worse than the
disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly
expires. But it could not be a less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life,
because it nourishes faction than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is
essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.
The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the
reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will
be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his
opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former
will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves.
The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not
less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is
the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of
acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately
results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective
proprietors ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them
everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different
circumstances of civil society.
A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other
points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously
contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes
have b
inflam
oppre
So str
substa
suffici
most c
of pro
Those
societ
discrim
A lan
many
differe
variou
the sp
James
Why h
to the
men a
The co
and th
influe
to fall
Alexa
been interest
med them wit
ss each othe
ong is this p
antial occasio
ient to kindl
common and
operty.
e who hold a
ty. Those wh
mination.
nded interest
lesser intere
ent classes, a
us and interfe
irit of party
s Madison, F
has governm
dictates of r
act with more
ontrary of th
he inference
nce when th
l singly upon
ander Hamilt
ting to the hu
th mutual an
r than to co-
propensity of
on presents i
e their unfrie
d durable sou
and those wh
ho are credito
, a manufact
ests, grow up
actuated by d
fering interes
and faction
Federalist # 1
ment been ins
reason and ju
e rectitude o
his has been
is founded u
he infamy of
n one.
ton, Federali
uman passio
nimosity, and
-operate for t
f mankind to
itself the mo
endly passio
urce of factio
ho are withou
ors, and thos
turing intere
p of necessit
different sen
sts forms the
in the neces
10
stituted at all
ustice withou
or greater dis
inferred by a
upon obviou
a bad action
ist # 15
72
ons, have, in
d rendered th
their commo
o fall into mu
ost frivolous
ons and excit
ons has been
ut property h
se who are d
st, a mercan
y in civilized
ntiments and
e principal ta
sary and ord
l? Because t
ut constraint
sinterestedne
all accurate
s reasons. R
n is to be div
turn, divide
hem much m
on good.
utual animos
and fanciful
te their most
n the various
have ever for
debtors, fall u
ntile interest,
d nations, an
d views. The
ask of moder
dinary operat
the passions
t. Has it been
ess than indiv
observers of
Regard to rep
vided among
d mankind i
more dispose
sities that wh
l distinction
t violent con
s and unequa
rmed distinc
under a like
a moneyed
nd divide the
regulation o
rn legislation
tions of gov
of men will
n found that
viduals?
f the conduc
putation has a
g a number th
into parties,
ed to vex and
here no
s have been
nflicts. But th
al distributio
ct interests in
interest, wit
em into
of these
n and involv
ernment.
not conform
bodies of
t of mankind
a less active
han when it
d
he
on
n
th
ves
m
d;
is
Power
it is co
to exp
memb
unbias
author
Alexa
Nation
to the
govern
of the
ought
forms
or is le
Alexa
The h
propo
Alexa
As the
circum
certain
existe
James
r controlled
ontrolled or
pect that the
bers of a con
sed regard to
rity. The rev
ander Hamilt
ns pay little
necessities o
nment with r
fundamenta
to be mainta
a precedent
ess urgent an
ander Hamilt
ope of impu
rtionately str
ander Hamilt
ere is a degre
mspection an
n portion of
nce of these
s Madison, F
or abridged
abridged. Th
persons intru
nfederacy wil
o the public w
verse of this r
ton, Federali
regard to rul
of society. W
restrictions t
al laws, thou
ained in the
t for other br
nd palpable.
ton, Federali
unity is a stro
rong discour
ton, Federali
ee of deprav
nd distrust, s
esteem and
qualities in
Federalist # 5
is almost alw
his simple pr
usted with th
ll at all time
weal to exec
results from
ist # 15
les and maxi
Wise politicia
that cannot b
ugh dictated b
breast of rul
reaches wher
ist # 25
ong inciteme
ragement to
ist # 27
vity in manki
o there are o
confidence.
a higher deg
55
73
ways the riv
roposition w
he administr
s be ready w
cute the reso
the constitu
ims calculat
ans will be c
be observed,
by necessity
lers towards
re the same p
ent to seditio
it.
ind which re
other qualitie
Republican
gree than any
al and enem
will teach us
ration of the
with perfect g
olutions or de
ution of man
ted in their v
cautious abo
, because the
y, impairs tha
the constitu
plea of nece
on; the dread
equires a cert
es in human
government
y other form
my of that pow
how little re
affairs of th
good humor
ecrees of the
.
very nature to
out fettering t
ey know that
at sacred rev
ution of a cou
essity does no
d of punishm
tain degree o
nature whic
t presuppose
m.
wer by whic
eason there i
he particular
and an
e general
o run counte
the
t every breac
verence whic
untry, and
ot exist at al
ment, a
of
ch justify a
es the
ch
s
er
ch
ch
ll,
in all l
be the
any as
ascend
In the
limite
descri
In the
orator
scepte
On the
the mo
Ignora
The p
beyon
Exper
numbe
whole
repres
The co
anima
the mo
James
An ind
affairs
to his
legislative a
e men who w
ssembly may
dancy of pas
next place,
d informatio
iption that th
ancient repu
r, or an artful
er had been p
e same princ
ore it will pa
ance will be
eople can ne
nd a certain l
rience will fo
er for the pu
e society, the
sentatives.
ountenance o
ates it will be
ore secret, w
s Madison, F
dividual who
s without any
own unstead
ssemblies th
will in fact di
y be, of what
ssion over re
the larger th
on and of we
he eloquence
ublics, wher
l statesman,
placed in his
ciple, the mo
artake of the
the dupe of
ever err more
limit they str
orever admo
urposes of sa
ey will count
of the gover
e more oliga
will be the sp
Federalist # 5
o is observed
y plan at all,
diness and fo
he greater the
irect their pr
tever charac
eason.
he number, th
eak capacitie
e and address
e the whole
was general
s single hand
ore multitudi
infirmities i
cunning, an
e than in sup
rengthen the
nish them th
afety, of loca
teract their o
rnment may b
archic. The m
prings by wh
58
d to be incon
, is marked a
olly. His mo
74
e number co
oceedings. I
cters compos
he greater w
es. Now, it is
s of the few
body of the
lly seen to ru
d.
inous a repre
incident to c
nd passion th
pposing that
barrier agai
hat, on the co
al informatio
own views by
become mor
machine will
hich its motio
nstant to his
at once by al
ore friendly n
omposing the
In the first pl
sed, the great
will be the pro
s precisely o
are known t
people assem
ule with as c
esentative as
collective me
he slave of so
by multiply
inst the gove
ontrary, after
on, and of dif
y every addi
re democrati
l be enlarged
ons are direc
plans, or pe
ll prudent pe
neighbors m
em may be, t
lace, the mo
ater is known
oportion of m
n characters
to act with al
mbled in per
complete a sw
ssembly may
eetings of th
ophistry and
ying their rep
ernment of a
r securing a
ffusive symp
ition to their
ic, but the so
d, but the few
cted.
erhaps to carr
eople as a sp
ay pity him,
the fewer wi
re numerous
n to be the
members of
s of this
ll their force
rson, a singl
way as if a
y be rendered
he people.
d declamation
presentatives
few.
sufficient
pathy with th
r
oul that
wer, and ofte
ry on his
eedy victim
but all will
ill
s
e.
le
d,
n.
s
he
en
declin
makin
One n
distinc
are un
other.
Every
calcul
neighb
James
They w
are tid
found
John J
There
this st
over th
Alexa
In the
power
Alexa
ne to connect
ng their fortu
nation is to an
ction, perhap
nder fewer re
y nation, con
late on every
bors.
s Madison, F
who have tu
des in them;
d to run twice
Jay, Federali
are men wh
tern virtue is
he man's sup
ander Hamilt
general cou
r over his wi
ander Hamilt
t their fortun
unes out of h
nother what
ps, that the f
estraints also
sequently, w
y loss which
Federalist # 6
urned their at
tides very ir
e exactly in t
ist # 64
ho could neit
s the growth
pport is a po
ton, Federali
urse of huma
ill.
ton, Federali
nes with his;
his.
one individu
former, with
o from taking
whose affairs
can be susta
62
ttention to th
rregular in th
the same ma
ther be distre
of few soils
wer over his
ist # 73
an nature, a p
ist # 79
75
and not a fe
ual is to ano
fewer of the
g undue adv
s betray a wa
ained from th
he affairs of
heir duration
anner or mea
essed nor wo
; and in the m
s will.
power over a
ew will seize
other; with th
e benevolent
antage of the
ant of wisdom
he more syst
men must ha
n, strength, a
asure.
on into a sac
main it will
a man's subs
e the opportu
his melancho
t emotions th
e indiscretio
m and stabil
tematic polic
ave perceive
and direction
crifice of the
be found tha
istence amou
unity of
oly
han the latter
ons of each
lity, may
cy of its wis
ed that there
n, and seldom
ir duty; but
at a power
unts to a
r,
ser
m
Imp
In sev
chief m
Presid
James
the pu
termin
ostrac
will st
Alexa
The re
sense
has be
deduc
person
to imp
forfeit
Alexa
. . . the
part o
body u
peachme
veral of the S
magistrate. A
dent of the U
s Madison, F
unishment w
nate the chas
cism from the
till be liable
ander Hamilt
emaining inq
-- due depen
een anticipat
cible from th
ns immediat
peachment, t
ture of life a
ander Hamilt
e important
f the legislat
upon the me
ent
States, howev
And in Delaw
United States
Federalist # 3
hich may be
stisement of
e esteem and
to prosecuti
ton, Federali
quiry is: Doe
ndence on th
ted in the inv
ese circumst
ely chosen b
trial, dismiss
and estate by
ton, Federali
constitution
tive body, an
embers of the
ver, no expli
ware and Vi
is impeacha
39
e the consequ
the offender
d confidence
ion and puni
ist # 65
es it also com
he people, a d
vestigation o
tances; the e
by the people
sion from off
y subsequent
ist # 77
al check whi
nd of determ
e judicial dep
76
icit provision
irginia he is n
able at any ti
uence of con
r. After havi
e and honors
shment in th
mbine the req
due responsi
of its other ch
election of th
e for that pur
ffice, incapac
prosecution
ich the powe
mining upon t
partment. Th
n is made fo
not impeach
ime during h
nviction upon
ing been sen
s and emolum
he ordinary c
quisites to sa
ibility? The
haracteristic
he President
urpose, and h
city to serve
n in the comm
er of institut
them in the o
his is alone a
or the impeac
hable till out
his continuan
n impeachm
ntenced to a p
ments of his
course of law
afety, in the
answer to th
cs, and is sati
once in four
his being at a
in any other
mon course
ting impeach
other, would
a complete s
chment of th
of office. Th
nce in office
ment is not to
perpetual
country, he
w.
republican
his question
isfactorily
r years by
all times liab
r, and to the
of law.
hments in on
d give to that
security.
he
he
e.
o
ble
ne
t
77
There never can be danger that the judges, by a series of deliberate usurpations of the
authority of the legislature, would hazard the united resentment of the body intrusted with
it, while this body was possessed of the means of punishing their presumption by
degrading them from their stations.
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 81
Jud
Laws
operat
part o
other
determ
TRIBU
And th
thems
final j
there a
There
but th
would
judica
rest, p
resort
Alexa
The co
Const
excep
attaind
Limita
mediu
diciary; n
are a dead le
tion. The tre
f the law of
laws, be asc
minations, th
UNAL.
his tribunal o
selves. These
urisdiction,
are courts.
are endless
e judges of t
d unavoidabl
atories, all na
possessing a
a uniform ru
ander Hamilt
omplete inde
titution. By a
tions to the l
der, no ex po
ations of this
um of courts
nature o
etter without
eaties of the U
the land. Th
ertained by j
hey ought to
ought to be i
e ingredients
there may b
diversities i
the same cou
ly result from
ations have f
general supe
ule of civil j
ton, Federali
ependence o
a limited Con
legislative au
ost facto law
s kind can be
of justice, w
of the
t courts to ex
United State
heir true impo
judicial dete
be submitte
instituted un
s are both ind
e as many di
n the opinio
urt differing
m the contrad
found it nece
erintendence
ustice.
ist # 22
of the courts
nstitution, I
uthority; suc
ws, and the li
e preserved
whose duty it
78
xpound and
es, to have an
ort, as far as
erminations.
d, in the last
nder the same
dispensable.
ifferent final
ns of men. W
from each o
dictory decis
essary to esta
e and authori
of justice is
understand o
ch, for instan
ke.
in practice n
t must be to
define their
ny force at a
s respects ind
To produce
t resort, to on
e authority w
. If there is in
l determinat
We often see
other. To avo
sions of a nu
ablish one c
ized to settle
peculiarly e
one which c
nce, as that i
no other way
declare all a
true meanin
all, must be c
dividuals, m
uniformity
ne SUPREM
which forms
n each State
tions on the s
e not only di
oid the confu
umber of ind
ourt paramo
e and declare
essential in a
ontains certa
it shall pass n
y than throug
acts contrary
ng and
considered a
must, like all
in these
ME
s the treaties
a court of
same point a
fferent court
usion which
dependent
ount to the
e in the last
a limited
ain specified
no bills of
gh the
y to the
as
as
ts
d
manif
rights
Alexa
It is no
repres
more r
the pe
limits
The in
consti
theref
act pro
If the
superi
Const
of the
Nor
legisla
where
people
than th
by tho
This
exemp
existin
contai
fest tenor of t
or privilege
ander Hamilt
ot otherwise
sentatives of
rational to su
eople and the
assigned to
nterpretation
itution is, in
fore belongs
oceeding fro
ere should ha
ior obligation
titution ough
ir agents.
does this co
ative power.
e the will of t
e, declared in
he former. T
ose which ar
s exercise of
plified in a f
ng at one tim
ining any rep
the Constitu
es would amo
ton, Federali
e to be suppo
f the people t
uppose that t
e legislature
their author
n of the laws
fact, and mu
to them to a
om the legisl
appen to be a
n and validit
ht to be prefe
onclusion by
It only supp
the legislatu
n the Consti
They ought to
e not fundam
f judicial disc
familiar insta
me, clashing
pealing claus
ution void. W
ount to nothi
ist # 78
osed that the
to substitute
the courts w
in order, am
rity.
is the prope
ust be regard
ascertain its m
lative body.
an irreconcil
ty ought, of
erred to the s
y any means
poses that th
ure, declared
itution, the ju
o regulate th
mental.
cretion in de
ance. It not u
in whole or
se or express
79
Without this,
ing.
Constitution
their will to
were designed
mong other th
er and peculi
ded by the ju
meaning as w
lable varianc
course, to be
statute, the in
suppose a su
e power of t
in its statute
udges ought
heir decision
etermining b
uncommonly
in part with
sion. In such
all the reser
n could inten
o that of their
d to be an in
hings, to kee
iar province
udges as, a fu
well as the m
ce between th
e preferred;
ntention of th
uperiority of
the people is
es, stands in
to be govern
ns by the fund
between two
y happens th
each other a
h a case, it is
rvations of p
nd to enable
r constituent
ntermediate b
ep the latter w
of the court
undamental l
meaning of a
the two, that
or, in other w
he people to
f the judicial
s superior to
opposition t
ned by the la
damental law
contradictor
hat there are t
and neither o
s the provinc
articular
the
ts. It is far
body betwee
within the
s. A
law. It
any particula
which has th
words, the
o the intentio
l to the
both, and th
to that of the
atter rather
ws rather tha
ry laws is
two statutes
of them
ce of the
en
ar
he
on
hat
e
an
courts
constr
should
to one
The ru
last in
not de
not en
conso
law. T
which
But
and de
as pro
They
an inf
contra
latter
Alexa
The co
WILL
pleasu
Alexa
s to liquidate
ruction, be re
d be done; w
e in exclusio
ule which ha
n order of tim
erived from a
njoined upon
nant to truth
They thought
h was the last
in regard to
erivative pow
oper to be fol
teach us tha
ferior and sub
avenes the C
and disregar
ander Hamilt
ourts must d
L instead of J
ure for that o
ander Hamilt
e and fix thei
econciled to
where this is
n of the othe
as obtained in
me shall be p
any positive
n the courts b
h and proprie
t it reasonab
t indication
the interferi
wer, the natu
llowed.
at the prior a
bordinate au
Constitution,
rd the former
ton, Federali
declare the se
JUDGMENT
of the legisla
ton, Federali
ir meaning a
each other,
impracticabl
er.
n the courts
preferred to t
law but from
by legislative
ety, for the d
ble that betwe
of its will sh
ing acts of a
ure and reaso
act of a super
uthority; and
it will be the
r.
ist # 78
ense of the la
T, the conseq
ative body.
ist # 78
80
and operation
reason and l
le, it become
for determin
the first. But
m the nature
e provision b
direction of th
een the inter
hould have th
superior and
on of the thin
rior ought to
that accordi
e duty of the
aw; and if th
quence woul
n. So far as t
law conspire
es a matter o
ning their re
t this is a me
e and reason
but adopted
heir conduct
rfering acts o
he preferenc
d subordinat
ng indicate t
o be preferred
ingly, whene
e judicial trib
hey should b
ld equally be
they can, by
e to dictate th
of necessity t
lative validit
ere rule of co
of the thing
by themselv
t as interpret
of an equal a
ce.
te authority o
the converse
d to the subs
ever a partic
bunals to adh
be disposed t
e the substitu
fair
hat this
to give effec
ty is that the
onstruction,
. It is a rule
ves, as
ters of the
authority tha
of an origina
e of that rule
sequent act o
cular statute
here to the
to exercise
ution of thei
ct
e
at
al
of
ir
the co
legisla
Alexa
Thoug
in que
of the
incons
repres
major
would
Until t
establ
presum
depart
But it
do the
been i
Alexa
But it
judges
societ
particu
Here a
severi
ourts of justic
ative encroac
ander Hamilt
gh I trust the
estioning tha
people to al
sistent with t
sentatives of
rity of their c
d, on that acc
the people h
ished form,
mption, or ev
ture from it p
is easy to se
eir duty as fa
instigated by
ander Hamilt
is not with a
s may be an
ty. These som
ular classes
also the firm
ity and confi
ce are to be c
chments
ton, Federali
e friends of th
at fundament
lter or abolis
their happin
f the people,
constituents i
count, be jus
have, by som
it is binding
ven knowled
prior to such
ee that it wou
aithful guard
y the major v
ton, Federali
a view to inf
essential saf
metimes exte
of citizens, b
mness of the j
ining the ope
considered a
ist # 78
he proposed
tal principle
sh the establi
ess; yet it is
whenever a
incompatibl
stifiable in a
me solemn an
g upon thems
dge, of their
h an act.
uld require a
dians of the C
voice of the c
ist # 78
fractions of t
feguard agai
end no farthe
by unjust an
judicial mag
eration of su
81
as the bulwar
d Constitution
of republica
ished Consti
not to be inf
momentary
e with the pr
violation of
nd authoritati
selves collec
sentiment ca
an uncommo
Constitution,
community.
the Constitut
inst the effec
er than to the
d partial law
gistracy is of
uch laws. It n
arks of a limi
n will never
an governme
itution when
ferred from
inclination h
rovisions in
f those provi
ive act, annu
ctively, as we
an warrant th
on portion of
, where legis
tion only tha
cts of occasio
e injury of th
ws.
f vast import
not only serv
ited Constitu
r concur with
ent which ad
never they fin
this principl
happens to l
the existing
sions.
ulled or chan
ell as individ
their represen
f fortitude in
slative invas
at the indepe
onal ill hum
he private ri
tance in miti
ves to moder
ution against
h its enemies
dmits the righ
nd it
le that the
lay hold of a
Constitution
nged the
dually; and n
ntatives in a
n the judges t
sions of it ha
endence of th
mors in the
ghts of
gating the
rate the
t
s
ht
a
n,
no
a
to
ad
he
immed
the leg
iniqui
compe
Alexa
a volu
advan
indisp
define
Alexa
there i
courts
any gr
admit
and th
Const
Alexa
The th
judicia
more t
the im
obstac
diate mischi
gislative bod
tous intentio
elled, by the
ander Hamilt
uminous cod
ntages of a fr
pensable that
e and point o
ander Hamilt
is not a sylla
s to construe
reater latitud
, however, th
hat wherever
titution.
ander Hamilt
heory, neithe
al sentence b
than in eithe
mpropriety of
cle.
iefs of those
dy in passing
on are to be e
e very motive
ton, Federali
de of laws is
ree governme
t they should
out their duty
ton, Federali
able in the pl
the laws acc
de in this resp
hat the Cons
r there is an e
ton, Federali
er of the Brit
by a legislati
er of them, b
f the thing, o
which may
g them; who
expected fro
es of the inju
ist # 78
one of the in
ent. To avoi
d be bound d
y in every pa
ist # 78
lan under co
cording to th
pect than ma
stitution oug
evident oppo
ist # 81
tish, nor the
ive act. Nor
y which it is
on the genera
82
have been p
, perceiving
om the scrup
ustice they m
nconvenienc
d an arbitrar
down by stric
articular case
onsideration w
he spirit of th
ay be claime
ht to be the
osition, the l
State constit
is there anyt
s forbidden.
al principles
passed but it
that obstacl
les of the co
meditate, to q
ces necessari
ry discretion
ct rules and p
e that comes
which direct
he Constitut
ed by the cou
standard of c
laws ought to
tutions, auth
thing in the p
In the forme
of law and r
operates as
les to the suc
ourts, are in a
qualify their
ily connected
n in the court
precedents w
s before them
tly empower
tion, or whic
urts of every
construction
o give place
horizes the re
proposed Co
er, as well as
reason, is th
a check upon
ccess of an
a manner
r attempts.
d with the
ts, it is
which serve
m
rs the nation
ch gives them
y State. I
n for the law
to the
evisal of a
onstitution,
s in the latter
he sole
n
to
nal
m
s,
r,
A legi
a parti
and it
govern
Alexa
. . . the
part o
body u
There
author
it, whi
degrad
Alexa
The ru
constr
confor
Alexa
A pow
Alexa
islature, with
icular case; t
applies in al
nments, as to
ander Hamilt
e important
f the legislat
upon the me
never can b
rity of the le
ile this body
ding them fr
ander Hamilt
ules of legal
ruction of the
rmity to the
ander Hamilt
wer to consti
ander Hamilt
hout exceedi
though it ma
ll its consequ
o the nationa
ton, Federali
constitution
tive body, an
embers of the
be danger tha
egislature, wo
y was posses
rom their sta
ton, Federali
interpretatio
e laws. The
source from
ton, Federali
itute courts i
ton, Federali
ing its provin
ay prescribe
uences, exac
al governme
ist # 81
al check whi
nd of determ
e judicial dep
at the judges
ould hazard
sed of the m
ations.
ist # 81
on are rules o
true test, the
m which they
ist # 83
s a power to
ist # 83
83
nce, cannot r
a new rule f
ctly in the sa
ent now unde
ich the powe
mining upon t
partment. Th
s, by a series
the united re
means of pun
of common
erefore, of a j
y are derived
o prescribe th
reverse a det
for future ca
ame manner
er considerat
er of institut
them in the o
his is alone a
of deliberat
esentment o
nishing their
sense, adopt
just applicat
d.
he mode of t
termination
ses. This is t
and extent,
tion.
ting impeach
other, would
a complete s
te usurpation
f the body in
presumption
ted by the co
tion of them
trial
once made i
the principle
to the State
hments in on
d give to that
security.
ns of the
ntrusted with
n by
ourts in the
m is its
in
e
ne
t
h
Juricert
In the
with th
certain
not to
can ex
retain
James
AN O
last ad
indivi
It may
to ena
with th
any re
person
divest
The re
allurem
the ob
necess
depos
The ad
superv
isdictiontain enu
first place it
he whole po
n enumerate
be attained
xtend their c
their due au
s Madison, F
OBJECTION
ddress may p
dual citizens
y be said tha
able it to abso
he States for
easonable ma
ns intrusted w
t the States o
egulation of
ments to am
bjects which
sary to those
itory.
dministration
vision of agr
n of fedeumerated
t is to be rem
ower of maki
d objects, w
by the separ
are to all tho
uthority and
Federalist # 1
N of a nature
perhaps be li
s of America
at it would te
orb those res
r local purpo
an can requi
with the adm
of the author
the mere do
mbition. Com
have charm
e objects oug
n of private j
riculture and
eral/natd object
membered th
ing and adm
which concern
rate provisio
ose other obj
activity.
14
different fro
ikewise urge
a.
end to render
siduary auth
oses. Allowin
re, I confess
ministration o
ities of that
omestic polic
mmerce, finan
ms for minds
ght in the firs
justice betw
d of other con
84
tional gots
hat the gener
ministering la
n all the mem
ons of any. T
jects which c
om that whic
ed against th
r the governm
horities, whic
ng the utmos
s I am at a lo
of the genera
description.
ce of a State
nce, negotiat
governed by
st instance to
ween the citiz
ncerns of a s
overnme
ral governme
aws. Its jurisd
mbers of the
The subordin
can be separ
ch has been s
e principle o
ment of the U
ch it might b
st latitude to
oss to discov
al governme
appears to m
tion, and wa
y that passion
o be lodged
zens of the sa
similar natur
ent limit
ent is not to b
diction is lim
e republic, bu
nate governm
rately provid
stated and an
of legislation
Union too po
be judged pro
o the love of
ver what temp
ent could eve
me to hold ou
ar seem to co
n; and all th
in the nation
ame State, th
re, all those t
ted to
be charged
mited to
ut which are
ments, which
ded for, will
nswered in m
n for the
owerful, and
oper to leave
f power whic
ptation the
er feel to
ut slender
omprehend a
e powers
nal
he
things, in
e
h
my
d
e
ch
all
short,
of a ge
the fed
attemp
posses
impor
Alexa
Do the
limite
sovere
the ge
enjoym
James
In eve
which
power
to the
effectu
That w
severa
conve
differe
1. Sec
2. Reg
which are p
eneral jurisd
deral counci
pt to exercis
ssion of them
rtance, or to
ander Hamilt
ese principle
d, and that, b
eignty and in
eneral power
ment of their
s Madison, F
ery political
h may be mis
r is to be con
public good
ually as poss
we may form
al powers co
eniently done
ent objects:
curity agains
gulation of th
proper to be p
diction. It is t
ils to usurp th
e those pow
m, for that re
the splendor
ton, Federali
es, in fine, re
beyond this
ndependence
rs are limited
r sovereign a
Federalist # 4
institution, a
sapplied and
nferred, the p
d; as the next
sible against
m a correct ju
onferred on th
e they may b
t foreign dan
he intercours
provided for
therefore im
he powers w
wers would be
eason, would
r of the natio
ist # 17
equire that th
limit, the St
e? We have s
d; and that th
and indepen
40
a power to ad
d abused. The
point first to
t will be, in c
t a perversio
udgment on
he governme
be reduced in
nger;
se with forei
85
r by local leg
mprobable tha
with which th
e as troubles
d contribute
onal governm
he powers of
ates should b
seen that in t
he States, in
dent jurisdic
dvance the p
ey will see, t
be decided
case of an af
n of the pow
this subject,
ent of the Un
nto different
ign nations;
gislation, can
at there shou
hey are conn
some as it w
nothing to th
ment.
f the general
be left in po
the new gov
all unenume
ction.
public happin
therefore, th
is whether s
ffirmative de
wer to the pu
, it will be pr
nion; and tha
t classes as th
n never be d
uld exist a di
nected; becau
would be nug
he dignity, to
l governmen
ssession of t
vernment, as
erated cases,
ness involve
hat in all case
such a power
ecision, to gu
ublic detrime
roper to revi
at this may b
hey relate to
desirable care
isposition in
use the
atory; and th
o the
nt should be
their
in the old,
, are left in th
es a discretio
es where
r be necessar
uard as
ent.
iew the
be the more
o the followin
es
he
he
on
ry
ng
3. Ma
4. Cer
5. Res
6. Pro
James
It has
excise
United
allege
could
stoopi
Had n
Const
had so
form o
freedo
forms
the ge
But w
these
semic
give m
exclud
terms
signifi
aintenance of
rtain miscell
straint of the
ovisions for
s Madison, F
been urged
es, to pay the
d States, am
ed to be nece
be given of
ing to such a
no other enum
titution than
ome color fo
of describing
om of the pre
of conveyan
eneral welfar
what color can
general term
olon? If the
meaning to e
ded altogeth
be retained
fication what
f harmony an
aneous objec
e States from
giving due e
Federalist # 4
and echoed
e debts, and
mounts to an
essary for the
the distress
a misconstru
meration or d
the general e
or it; though
g an authorit
ess, the trial
nces, must b
re."
n the objecti
ms immediate
different par
every part wh
er from a sh
in their full
tsoever?
nd proper int
cts of genera
m certain inju
efficacy to al
41
that the pow
provide for t
unlimited co
e common d
under which
uction.
definition of
expressions
it would hav
ty to legislat
by jury, or e
be very singu
ion have, wh
ely follows a
rts of the sam
hich will bea
hare in the m
extent, and t
86
tercourse am
al utility;
urious acts;
ll these pow
wer "to lay an
the common
ommission t
efense or ge
h these write
f the powers
just cited, th
ve been diffi
te in all poss
even to regu
ularly expres
hen a specifi
and is not ev
me instrume
ar it, shall on
eaning; and
the clear and
mong the Sta
wers.
nd collect tax
n defense and
to exercise ev
eneral welfar
ers labor for
of the Cong
he authors of
icult to find a
sible cases. A
ulate the cour
ssed by the t
ication of the
ven separated
ent ought to b
ne part of the
shall the mo
d precise exp
ates;
xes, duties, i
d general we
very power
re. No strong
objections, t
gress been fo
f the objectio
a reason for
A power to d
rse of descen
terms "to rais
e objects allu
d by a longe
be so expoun
e same sente
ore doubtful
pressions be
imposts, and
elfare of the
which may b
ger proof
than their
ound in the
on might hav
so awkward
destroy the
nts, or the
se money fo
uded to by
er pause than
nded as to
ence be
and indefini
denied any
d
be
ve
d a
or
n a
ite
For w
others
nor co
recital
nor qu
mislea
James
the mo
the pr
Congr
of the
the su
which
strikin
James
[Rega
into ex
govern
. . . Th
subjec
would
attemp
"neces
specif
what purpose
s were meant
ommon than
l of particula
ualify the gen
ad, is an absu
s Madison, F
ost minute p
etext for gra
ress have bee
ir chartered
ubject; and w
h seems to ha
ng defects of
s Madison, F
arding the] "
xecution the
nment of the
here are four
ct. They mig
d have prohib
pted a positi
ssary and pr
fying the pow
could the en
t to be includ
first to use a
ars. But the i
neral meanin
urdity
Federalist # 4
provisions be
adual and un
en betrayed,
authorities w
would be no i
ave provided
f the old.
Federalist # 4
"power to ma
e foregoing p
e United Stat
r other possib
ght have copi
bited the exe
ve enumerat
oper"; they m
wers excepte
numeration o
ded in the pr
a general ph
idea of an en
ng, and can h
41
ecome impor
observed usu
, or forced by
would not a l
inconsiderab
d no less stud
42
ake all laws
powers, and
tes, or in any
ble methods
ied the secon
ercise of any
tion of the po
might have a
ed from the g
87
of particular
receding gen
hrase, and the
numeration o
have no othe
rtant when th
urpations of
y the defects
little surpris
ble argument
diously for t
which shall
all other pow
y departmen
s which the C
nd article of
y power not e
owers comp
attempted a n
general defin
powers be i
neral power?
en to explain
of particulars
er effect than
hey tend to o
f power. A li
s of the Conf
e those who
t in favor of
the lesser tha
be necessar
wers vested b
nt or office th
Convention m
f the existing
expressly de
prehended un
negative enu
nition; they m
inserted, if th
? Nothing is
n and qualify
s which neit
n to confoun
obviate the n
ist of the cas
federation, i
have paid n
f the new Con
an the more
ry and proper
by this Cons
hereof."
might have t
g Confederat
elegated; the
nder the gene
umeration of
might have b
hese and all
more natura
y it by a
ther explain
nd and
necessity or
ses in which
into violation
no attention t
nstitution,
obvious and
r for carryin
stitution in th
taken on this
tion, which
ey might hav
eral terms
f them by
been
al
ns
to
d
ng
he
s
ve
88
altogether silent on the subject, leaving these necessary and proper powers to construction
and inference.
. . . As the powers delegated under the new system are more extensive, the government
which is to administer it would find itself still more distressed with the alternative of
betraying the public interests by doing nothing, or of violating the Constitution by
exercising powers indispensably necessary and proper, but, at the same time, not expressly
granted.
. . . for in every new application of a general power, the particular powers, which are the
means of attaining the object of the general power, must always necessarily vary with that
object, and be often properly varied whilst the object remains the same.
Had they attempted to enumerate the particular powers or means not necessary or proper
for carrying the general powers into execution, the task would have been no less
chimerical; and would have been liable to this further objection, that every defect in the
enumeration would have been equivalent to a positive grant of authority.
. . . No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is
required, the means are authorized; wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every
particular power necessary for doing it is included.
. . . If it be asked what is to be the consequence, in case the Congress shall misconstrue this
part of the Constitution and exercise powers not warranted by its true meaning. I answer
the same as if they should misconstrue or enlarge any other power vested in them; as if the
general power had been reduced to particulars, and any one of these were to be violated;
the same, in short, as if the State legislatures should violate their respective constitutional
authorities.
In the first instance, the success of the usurpation will depend on the executive and
judiciary departments, which are to expound and give effect to the legislative acts; and in
the last resort a remedy must be obtained from the people, who can, by the election of
more faithful representatives, annul the acts of the usurpers. The truth is that this ultimate
redress may be more confided in against unconstitutional acts of the federal than of the
State l
invasi
the ala
repres
There
intere
more
James
The p
define
The fo
and fo
conne
The p
ordina
intern
The op
war an
forme
will h
The m
the les
the go
If the
chang
Union
legislatures,
ion of the rig
arm to the pe
sentatives.
being no su
sted in watch
likely to rem
s Madison, F
owers deleg
ed. Those wh
ormer will b
oreign comm
ected.
owers reserv
ary course of
al order, imp
perations of
nd danger; th
er periods wi
ere enjoy an
more adequat
ss frequent w
overnments o
new Constit
ge which it pr
n than in the
for this plai
ghts of the la
eople, and to
uch intermed
hing the con
main unnotic
Federalist # 4
ated by the p
hich are to re
e exercised p
merce; with w
ved to the se
f affairs, con
provement, a
f the federal g
hose of the S
ill probably b
nother advan
te, indeed, th
will be those
of the particu
tution be exa
roposes con
invigoration
in reason tha
atter, these w
o exert their
diate body be
nduct of the f
ed and unred
44
proposed Co
emain in the
principally o
which last th
everal States
ncern the live
and prosperi
government
State govern
bear a small
ntage over th
he federal po
e scenes of da
ular States.
amined with
sists much le
n of its ORIG
89
at as every su
will be ever r
local influen
etween the S
former, viola
dressed.
onstitution to
State gover
on external o
he power of t
will extend
es, liberties,
ity of the Sta
will be mos
ments in tim
proportion t
e federal gov
owers may b
anger which
accuracy an
ess in the ad
GINAL POW
uch act of th
ready to mar
nce in effect
State legislatu
ations of the
o the federal
rnments are n
objects, as w
taxation will
to all the ob
and propert
ate.
st extensive a
mes of peace
to the latter,
vernment.
be rendered t
h might favor
nd candor, it
ddition of NE
WERS. The r
he former wil
rk the innova
ting a change
ures and the
e State consti
government
numerous an
war, peace, ne
l, for the mo
bjects which,
ties of the pe
and importan
and security
the State go
to the nation
r their ascen
t will be foun
EW POWER
regulation o
ll be an
ation, to soun
e of federal
people
itutions are
t are few and
nd indefinite
egotiation,
st part, be
, in the
eople, and th
nt in times o
y. As the
overnments
al defense,
ndancy over
nd that the
RS to the
f commerce
nd
d
e.
he
of
,
it is tr
which
James
It is a
intere
to tho
relate.
James
There
author
legisla
to affi
that th
by vir
forbid
Alexa
From
not be
quoted
maxim
them u
inappl
rue, is a new
h no apprehe
s Madison, F
sound and im
sts and circu
se circumsta
.
s Madison, F
is no positio
rity, contrary
ative act, the
irm that the d
he representa
rtue of power
d.
ander Hamilt
these observ
e abolished;
d is contrary
ms had a pre
upon the pre
licable to a c
power; but
nsions are en
Federalist # 4
mportant pri
umstance of
ances and int
Federalist # 5
on which dep
y to the teno
erefore, contr
deputy is gre
atives of the
rs may do no
ton, Federali
vations this c
and that the
y to reason an
cise technica
esent occasio
constitution o
that seems to
ntertained.
45
inciple that t
his constitue
terests to wh
56
pends on cle
or of the com
rary to the C
eater than hi
people are s
ot only what
ist # 78
conclusion r
use attempte
nd common
al sense, cor
on, which, ho
of governme
90
o be an addi
the represent
ents. But this
hich the auth
earer princip
mmission und
Constitution,
s principal; t
superior to th
t their power
esults: that t
ed to be mad
sense, and t
rresponding w
owever, is n
ent. In relatio
ition which f
tative ought
s principle c
hority and ca
ples than that
der which it
can be valid
that the serv
he people th
rs do not aut
the trial by ju
de of the ma
therefore not
with the idea
not the case, t
on to such a
few oppose a
to be acqua
can extend no
are of the rep
t every act o
is exercised
d. To deny th
vant is above
emselves; th
thorize, but w
ury in civil c
axims which
t admissible
as of those w
they would
a subject, the
and from
ainted with th
o further tha
presentative
of a delegated
, is void. No
his would be
e his master;
hat men actin
what they
cases would
have been
. Even if the
who employ
still be
e natural and
he
an
d
o
e
ng
ese
d
91
obvious sense of its provisions, apart from any technical rules, is the true criterion of
construction.
Having now seen that the maxims relied upon will not bear the use made of them, let us
endeavor to ascertain their proper use and true meaning. This will be best done by
examples. The plan of the convention declares that the power of Congress, or, in other
words, of the national legislature, shall extend to certain enumerated cases. This
specification of particulars evidently excludes all pretension to a general legislative
authority, because an affirmative grant of special powers would be absurd as well as
useless if a general authority was intended.
In like manner the judicial authority of the federal judicatures is declared by the
Constitution to comprehend certain cases particularly specified. The expression of those
cases marks the precise limits beyond which the federal courts cannot extend their
jurisdiction, because the objects of their cognizance being enumerated, the specification
would be nugatory if it did not exclude all ideas of more extensive authority.
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 83
Law
It has
out of
betwe
hardsh
jurisdi
peculi
bargai
deceit
and un
which
In suc
the fed
Agree
anothe
reason
betwe
every
Alexa
My co
equity
impro
relief
w and eq
also been as
f the Constitu
een individua
hip, which w
iction, as the
iar province,
ins: these are
t sufficient to
nconscionab
h a court of e
ch cases, whe
deral judicat
ements to con
er example o
ning may no
een LAW and
day's practic
ander Hamilt
onvictions ar
y from the la
operly comm
in extraordin
quity
sked, what n
ution and law
als which ma
would render
e distinction
, for instance
e contracts in
o invalidate
ble advantage
equity would
ere foreigner
tories to do j
nvey lands c
of the necess
t be so palpa
d EQUITY i
ce.
ton, Federali
re equally str
aw jurisdictio
mitted to jurie
nary cases, w
need of the w
ws of the Un
ay not involv
r the matter a
is known an
e, of a court
n which, tho
them in a co
e taken of th
d not tolerate
rs were conc
justice witho
claimed unde
sity of an equ
able in those
is not mainta
ist # 80
rong that gre
on, and that t
es. The great
which are ex
92
word "equity"
nited States?
ve those ingr
an object of
nd establishe
of equity to
ough there m
ourt of law, y
he necessities
e.
cerned on eit
out an equita
er the grants
uitable jurisd
e States wher
ained as in th
eat advantag
the causes w
t and primary
xceptions* to
"? What equ
There is har
redients of f
equitable rat
ed in several
relieve agai
may have bee
yet there may
s or misfortu
ther side, it w
able as well a
s of different
diction in th
re the forma
his State, wh
ges result fro
which belong
ry use of a co
o general rul
uitable cause
rdly a subjec
fraud, accide
ather than of
l of the State
inst what are
en no direct f
y have been
unes of one o
would be im
as legal juris
t States may
he federal cou
al and technic
here it is exe
om the separ
g to the form
ourt of equit
les.
es can grow
ct of litigatio
ent, trust, or
legal
es. It is the
e called hard
fraud or
n some undue
of the partie
mpossible for
sdiction.
afford
urts. This
cal distinctio
emplified by
ation of the
mer would be
y is to give
on
d
e
s
r
on
y
e
*It i
system
circum
Alexa
It is tr
Englis
the St
Alexa
The n
matter
jurisdi
advan
are est
law, a
decisi
Alexa
It is ob
as a ge
and eq
Alexa
is true that th
m; but it is no
mstances, wh
ander Hamilt
rue that the s
sh system of
ates.
ander Hamilt
ature of a co
rs of law; bu
iction of the
ntages which
tablished in
and to underm
on in that m
ander Hamilt
bvious there
eneral regula
quitable juris
ander Hamilt
he principles
ot the less tr
hich form ex
ton, Federali
separation of
f jurispruden
ton, Federali
ourt of equity
ut it is not a l
courts of law
h may be deri
this State, b
mine the tria
mode.
ton, Federali
efore, that th
ation until so
sdictions, sh
ton, Federali
s by which th
rue that they
xceptions to g
ist # 83
f the equity f
nce, which is
ist # 83
y will readily
little to be su
w to matters
ived from co
ut will tend
al by jury, by
ist # 83
e Massachus
ome uniform
hall be adopt
ist # 83
93
hat relief is g
are in the m
general rules
from the lega
s the model t
y permit the
uspected that
s of equity w
ourts of chan
gradually to
y introducing
setts proposi
m plan, with
ed by the dif
governed are
main applicab
s.
al jurisdictio
that has been
extension o
at the attempt
will not only
ncery, on the
o change the
g questions t
ition upon th
respect to th
fferent State
e now reduc
ble to SPECI
on is peculia
n followed in
of its jurisdic
t to extend th
be unproduc
e plan upon w
nature of th
too complica
his subject ca
he limits of c
es.
ed to a regul
IAL
ar to the
n several of
ction to
he
ctive of the
which they
he courts of
ated for a
annot operat
common-law
lar
te
w
94
Laws must be executed
Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea of a law that it be
attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience. If
there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the resolutions or commands which pretend
to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more than advice or recommendation.
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 15
Law
The in
of libe
own c
they c
underg
what i
which
Ano
sagaci
mass o
Every
value
chang
and ca
This i
few, n
James
What
knows
James
ws must
nternal effec
erty itself. It
choice if the
cannot be un
go such ince
it will be tom
h is little kno
other effect o
ious, the ent
of the people
y new regulat
of the differ
ge, and can tr
ares of the gr
s a state of th
not for the m
s Madison, F
prudent mer
s not but tha
s Madison, F
be few,
ts of a mutab
will be of li
laws be so v
derstood; if
essant chang
morrow. Law
own, and less
of public inst
erprising, an
e.
tion concern
rent species o
race its cons
reat body of
hings in whi
many.
Federalist # 6
rchant will h
at his plans m
Federalist # 6
unders
ble policy ar
ittle avail to
voluminous t
they be repe
ges that no m
w is defined
s fixed?
tability is the
nd the money
ning commer
of property,
equences; a
f their fellow
ich it may be
62
hazard his fo
may be rende
62
95
tandabl
re still more
the people th
that they can
ealed or revis
man, who kno
to be a rule o
e unreasonab
yed few ove
rce or revenu
presents a n
harvest, rear
w-citizens.
e said with s
rtunes in any
ered unlawfu
le, and s
calamitous.
hat the laws
nnot be read
sed before th
ows what the
of action; bu
ble advantag
r the industr
ue, or in any
new harvest t
ared not by th
some truth th
y branch of
ul before the
stable
It poisons th
are made by
, or so incoh
hey are prom
e law is toda
ut how can th
ge it gives to
rious and uni
y manner aff
to those who
hemselves, b
hat laws are m
commerce w
ey can be exe
he blessings
y men of the
herent that
mulgated, or
ay, can guess
hat be a rule
o the
informed
fecting the
o watch the
but by the to
made for the
when he
ecuted?
s
eir
s
e,
ils
e
96
No government, any more than an individual, will long be respected without being truly
respectable; nor be truly respectable without possessing a certain portion of order and
stability.
James Madison, Federalist # 62
Law
The ex
legisla
limits
The pr
eccles
to be c
been m
severa
freque
they a
James
Felony
impor
James
It has
out of
betwe
hardsh
jurisdi
It is th
called
fraud
ws; vario
xperience of
ators and jur
of different
recise extent
siastical law,
clearly and f
more industr
al courts, gen
ent and intric
are respective
s Madison, F
y is a term o
rt in the statu
s Madison, F
also been as
f the Constitu
een individua
hip, which w
iction, as the
he peculiar p
d hard bargai
or deceit suf
ous type
f ages, with t
rists, has bee
codes of law
t of the comm
, the law of c
finally establ
riously pursu
neral and loc
cate discussi
ely circumsc
Federalist # 3
of loose signi
ute law of tha
Federalist # 4
sked, what n
ution and law
als which ma
would render
e distinction
province, for
ins: these are
fficient to in
es of
the continue
en equally un
ws and differ
mon law, an
corporations
lished in Gre
ued than in a
cal, of law, o
ions, sufficie
cribed.
37
ification eve
at kingdom.
42
need of the w
ws of the Un
ay not involv
r the matter a
is known an
r instance, o
e contracts in
nvalidate them
97
ed and combi
nsuccessful i
rent tribunal
nd the statute
s, and other l
eat Britain, w
any other par
of equity, of
ently denotin
en in the com
word "equity"
nited States?
ve those ingr
an object of
nd establishe
f a court of e
n which, tho
m in a court
ined labors o
in delineatin
ls of justice.
e law, the ma
local laws an
where accura
rt of the wor
f admiralty, e
ng the indete
mmon law of
"? What equ
There is har
redients of f
equitable rat
ed in several
equity to rel
ough there m
of law, yet t
of the most e
ng the severa
aritime law,
nd customs,
acy in such s
rld. The juris
etc., is not le
erminate lim
f England; a
uitable cause
rdly a subjec
fraud, accide
ather than of
l of the State
lieve against
may have bee
there may ha
enlightened
al objects and
the
remains still
subjects has
sdiction of h
ess a source o
mits by which
nd of variou
es can grow
ct of litigatio
ent, trust, or
legal
es.
t what are
en no direct
ave been
d
l
her
of
h
us
on
some
of the
were c
justice
Agree
anothe
reason
betwe
every
Alexa
The pr
matter
Some
forms
supers
our co
Alexa
The fo
relatio
may h
course
revisio
Court
Alexa
undue and u
parties whic
concerned on
e without an
ements to con
er example o
ning may no
een LAW and
day's practic
ander Hamilt
ropriety of th
rs of law; bu
well-intenti
which obtai
sedure of the
ourts of adm
ander Hamilt
ollowing trai
on to this par
have been arg
e of the COM
on of the law
ander Hamilt
unconscionab
ch a court of
n either side
n equitable as
nvey lands c
of the necess
t be so palpa
d EQUITY i
ce.
ton, Federali
his appellate
ut the clamor
ioned men in
in in our cou
e trial by jury
iralty, proba
ton, Federali
in of ideas m
rticular prov
gued) will ex
MMON LAW
w only will b
ton, Federali
ble advantag
f equity wou
e, it would be
s well as leg
claimed unde
sity of an equ
able in those
is not mainta
ist # 80
e jurisdiction
rs have been
n this State, d
urts, have be
y, in favor o
ate, and chan
ist # 81
may well be i
vision. The ap
xtend to cau
W, others in
be, generally
ist # 81
98
ge taken of th
uld not tolera
e impossible
al jurisdictio
er the grants
uitable jurisd
e States wher
ained as in th
n has been sc
n loud agains
deriving thei
en induced t
of the civil-la
ncery.
imagined to
ppellate juri
uses determin
the course o
y speaking, th
he necessitie
ate. In such c
e for the fede
on.
s of different
diction in th
re the forma
his State, wh
carcely calle
st it as applie
ir notions fro
to consider i
aw mode of t
have influen
isdiction of t
nable in diffe
of the CIVIL
he proper pr
es or misfort
cases, where
eral judicato
t States may
he federal cou
al and technic
here it is exe
ed in questio
ed to matters
om the langu
it as an impli
trial, which
nced the con
the Supreme
ferent modes
L LAW. In th
rovince of th
tunes of one
e foreigners
ries to do
afford
urts. This
cal distinctio
emplified by
on in regard t
s of fact.
uage and
ied
prevails in
nvention in
e Court (it
s, some in th
he former, th
he Supreme
on
y
to
e
he
The le
appea
been t
but if,
qualif
mode
Alexa
In this
Great
matter
the co
all the
of the
In New
admir
State t
determ
more
more t
have e
plan o
Alexa
I belie
causes
egislature of
als to the Sup
tried in the o
, for the reas
fied with a lim
of trial.
ander Hamilt
s State, our j
Britain. We
rs to the spir
ourts of comm
e others a sin
canon or civ
w Jersey, the
ralty nor of p
the courts of
minable in th
extensive in
the case, for
equity jurisd
of ours.
ander Hamilt
eve, however
s depending
f the United S
preme Court
original caus
on already in
mitation to s
ton, Federali
udicial estab
have courts
ritual courts
mon law onl
ngle judge pr
vil law, with
ere is a court
probates, in t
f common la
he courts of t
n New Jersey
r there is no c
diction. It has
ton, Federali
r, that in som
in them are
States would
there should
es by juries.
ntimated, it
such causes
ist # 81
blishments re
s of common
in England)
ly, the trial b
resides, and
hout the aid o
t of chancery
the sense in w
aw have the c
the admiralty
y than in New
court of chan
s a court of a
ist # 83
me of those S
triable by ju
99
d certainly h
d be no re-ex
This would
should be th
only as are d
esemble, mo
n law, courts
, a court of a
by jury preva
proceeds in
of a jury.
y which proc
which these
cognizance o
y and of prob
w York. In P
ncery in that
admiralty, bu
States which
uries. In Geo
have full pow
xamination o
d certainly be
hought too ex
determinable
ore nearly th
s of probates
admiralty, an
ails, and this
general eith
ceeds like ou
last are esta
of those cau
bates, and o
Pennsylvania
t State, and i
ut none of pr
h have distin
orgia there ar
wer to provid
of facts wher
e an authoriz
xtensive, it m
e at common
han in any oth
s (analogous
nd a court of
s with some e
her according
urs, but neith
ablished with
uses which w
f course the
a, this is perh
its common-
robates, at le
nct courts of
re none but c
de that in
re they had
zed exceptio
might be
n law in that
her, those of
in certain
f chancery. I
exceptions.
g to the cour
her courts of
h us. In that
with us are
jury trial is
haps still
-law courts
east on the
admiralty, th
common-law
on;
f
In
In
rse
f
he
w
courts
a spec
Conne
courts
and, to
Alexa
Massa
jurisdi
only s
peculi
one ju
Alexa
s, and an app
cial jury, and
ecticut, they
s of probates
o a certain e
ander Hamilt
achusetts and
ictions, are i
stands upon a
iarity unknow
ury to anothe
ander Hamilt
peal of cours
d for which a
have no dist
s have no jur
xtent, equity
ton, Federali
d New Hamp
in a similar p
a broader fou
wn, in its ful
er, till there h
ton, Federali
se lies from t
a particular m
tinct courts e
risdiction of
y jurisdiction
ist # 83
pshire, in reg
predicament
undation tha
ll extent, to a
have been tw
ist # 83
100
the verdict o
mode of app
either of cha
causes. Thei
n.
gard to the b
. In the four
an in the othe
any of them
wo verdicts o
of one jury to
ointment is m
ancery or of
ir common-l
blending of l
Eastern Stat
er States, bu
. There is an
out of three o
o another, wh
marked out.
admiralty, a
law courts h
law, equity,
tes, the trial
ut it is attend
n appeal of c
on one side.
hich is calle
In
and their
have admiralt
and admiralt
by jury not
ded with a
course from
d
ty
ty
Leg
the ten
expen
James
one br
James
a cons
will b
canno
govern
They,
history
gradua
it seem
govern
This p
weapo
for ob
saluta
James
gislature
ndency of re
nse of the oth
s Madison, F
ranch of the
s Madison, F
stitutional an
e able at all
ot only refuse
nment.
in a word, h
y of the Brit
ally enlargin
ms to have w
nment.
power over th
on with whic
btaining a red
ary measure.
s Madison, F
e; Natur
epublican go
her departme
Federalist # 4
legislature i
Federalist # 5
nd infallible
times to acc
e, but they al
hold the purs
tish Constitu
ng the sphere
wished, all th
he purse ma
ch any const
dress of ever
Federalist # 5
re of the
vernments is
ents.
49
is a represen
58
resource stil
complish thei
lone can pro
se --- that po
ution, an infa
e of its activi
he overgrown
ay, in fact, be
titution can a
ry grievance
58
101
s to an aggra
tation of citi
ll remains w
ir just purpo
opose the sup
owerful instru
ant and humb
ity and impo
n prerogativ
e regarded as
arm the imm
, and for car
andizement o
izens, the oth
with the large
oses. The Ho
pplies requis
rument by wh
ble represent
ortance, and
ves of the oth
s the most co
mediate repre
rrying into ef
of the legisla
her of the St
er States by w
ouse of Repr
site for the su
hich we beh
tation of the
finally redu
her branches
omplete and
esentatives o
ffect every j
ative at the
tates
which they
esentatives
upport of
hold, in the
e people
ucing, as far a
of the
d effectual
f the people
ust and
as
,
in all l
be the
any as
ascend
In the
limite
descri
In the
orator
scepte
a repr
incide
Ignora
The p
beyon
Exper
numbe
whole
repres
The co
anima
the mo
Jame
The re
govern
does n
every
legislative a
e men who w
ssembly may
dancy of pas
next place,
d informatio
iption that th
ancient repu
r, or an artful
er had been p
esentative as
ent to collect
ance will be
eople can ne
nd a certain l
rience will fo
er for the pu
e society, the
sentatives.
ountenance o
ates it will be
ore secret, w
s Madison, F
epublican pr
n the conduc
not require a
transient im
ssemblies th
will in fact di
y be, of what
ssion over re
the larger th
on and of we
he eloquence
ublics, wher
l statesman,
placed in his
ssembly may
tive meeting
the dupe of
ever err more
limit they str
orever admo
urposes of sa
ey will count
of the gover
e more oliga
will be the sp
Federalist #
rinciple dema
ct of those to
an unqualifie
mpulse which
he greater the
irect their pr
tever charac
eason.
he number, th
eak capacitie
e and address
e the whole
was general
s single hand
y be rendere
s of the peop
cunning, an
e than in sup
rengthen the
nish them th
afety, of loca
teract their o
rnment may b
archic. The m
prings by wh
58
ands that the
o whom they
ed complaisa
h the people
102
e number co
oceedings. I
cters compos
he greater w
es. Now, it is
s of the few
body of the
lly seen to ru
d. On the sam
ed, the more
ple.
nd passion th
pposing that
barrier agai
hat, on the co
al informatio
own views by
become mor
machine will
hich its motio
e deliberate s
y intrust the m
ance to every
may receive
omposing the
In the first pl
sed, the great
will be the pro
s precisely o
are known t
people assem
ule with as c
me principle
it will partak
he slave of so
by multiply
inst the gove
ontrary, after
on, and of dif
y every addi
re democrati
l be enlarged
ons are direc
sense of the
managemen
y sudden bre
e from the ar
em may be, t
lace, the mo
ater is known
oportion of m
n characters
to act with al
mbled in per
complete a sw
, the more m
ke of the inf
ophistry and
ying their rep
ernment of a
r securing a
ffusive symp
ition to their
ic, but the so
d, but the few
cted.
community
nt of their aff
eeze of passi
rts of men, w
the fewer wi
re numerous
n to be the
members of
s of this
ll their force
rson, a singl
way as if a
multitudinous
firmities
d declamation
presentatives
few.
sufficient
pathy with th
r
oul that
wer, and ofte
should
fairs; but it
on, or to
who flatter
ill
s
e.
le
s
n.
s
he
en
their p
intend
This o
should
from e
do, be
the am
confid
deserv
When
with th
guardi
and op
condu
mistak
courag
Alexa
The es
rules f
of the
compr
Alexa
. . . the
part o
body u
prejudices to
d the PUBLI
often applies
d pretend tha
experience th
eset as they c
mbitious, the
dence more t
ve it.
n occasions p
heir inclinat
ians of those
pportunity fo
uct of this kin
kes, and has
ge and magn
ander Hamilt
ssence of the
for the regul
common str
rise all the fu
ander Hamilt
e important
f the legislat
upon the me
o betray their
C GOOD.
s to their very
at they alway
hat they som
continually a
e avaricious,
than they de
present them
tions, it is the
e interests to
or more cool
nd has saved
procured las
nanimity eno
ton, Federali
e legislative
lation of the
rength, eithe
unctions of t
ton, Federali
constitution
tive body, an
embers of the
r interests. It
y errors. But
ys reason rig
metimes err;
are by the wi
the desperat
serve it, and
mselves in wh
e duty of the
o withstand th
l and sedate
d the people
sting monum
ough to serve
ist # 71
authority is
society; whi
er for this pu
the executive
ist # 75
al check whi
nd of determ
e judicial dep
103
t is a just obs
t their good
ght about the
and the won
iles of parasi
te, by the art
d of those wh
hich the inter
e persons wh
he temporar
reflection. I
from very fa
ments of thei
e them at the
to enact law
ile the execu
urpose or for
e magistrate
ich the powe
mining upon t
partment. Th
servation tha
sense would
e means of p
nder is that th
ites and syco
tifices of me
ho seek to po
rests of the p
hom they hav
ry delusion in
Instances mig
atal consequ
ir gratitude t
e peril of the
ws, or, in oth
ution of the l
the common
e.
er of institut
them in the o
his is alone a
at the people
d despise the
promoting it.
hey so seldo
ophants, by
en who posse
ossess rather
people are at
ve appointed
n order to gi
ght be cited
uences of the
to the men w
eir displeasur
her words, to
laws and the
n defense, se
ting impeach
other, would
a complete s
e commonly
e adulator wh
. They know
om err as the
the snares of
ess their
r than to
t variance
d to be the
ive them tim
in which a
eir own
who had
re.
prescribe
e employmen
eem to
hments in on
d give to that
security.
ho
w
y
f
me
nt
ne
t
104
There never can be danger that the judges, by a series of deliberate usurpations of the
authority of the legislature, would hazard the united resentment of the body intrusted with
it, while this body was possessed of the means of punishing their presumption by
degrading them from their stations.
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 81
Leg
Is it no
depen
should
willin
and th
his ass
and th
Alexa
it is es
the pe
James
the Ho
recolle
minds
compe
is to b
there f
title to
I wi
restrai
its ful
societ
gislature
ot natural th
ndent on the
d take care to
ng to allow th
he necessity
sent are the t
he constituen
ander Hamilt
ssential to lib
eople
s Madison, F
ouse of Repr
ection of the
s by the mod
elled to antic
be reviewed,
forever to re
o a renewal o
ll add, as a f
ining them f
l operation o
ty. This has a
e not to a
at a man wh
suffrages of
o inform him
hem their pro
of being bou
true and they
nt.
ton, Federali
berty that th
Federalist # 5
resentatives
eir dependen
de of their ele
cipate the mo
and when th
emain unless
of it.
fifth circums
from oppress
on themselve
always been
accord t
ho is a candid
f his fellow-c
mself of their
oper degree
und, himself
y are the stro
ist # 35
e governmen
52
is so constit
nce on the pe
evation can b
oment when
hey must des
s a faithful di
stance in the
sive measure
es and their f
deemed one
105
themselv
date for the f
citizens for th
r disposition
of influence
f and his post
ong cords of
nt in general
tuted as to su
eople. Before
be effaced b
n their power
scend to the
ischarge of t
situation of
es, that they
friends, as w
e of the stron
ves priv
favor of the
the continuan
ns and inclin
e upon his co
terity, by the
f sympathy b
l should hav
upport in the
e the sentime
by the exerci
r is to cease,
level from w
their trust sh
f the House o
can make no
well as on the
ngest bonds
vileges
people, and
nce of his pu
nations and sh
onduct? This
e laws to wh
between the
e a common
e members an
ents impress
ise of power,
, when their
which they w
hall have esta
of Represent
o law which
e great mass
by which hu
who is
ublic honors
hould be
s dependence
hich he gives
representativ
n interest wit
n habitual
sed on their
, they will be
exercise of i
were raised;
ablished thei
tatives,
will not hav
s of the
uman policy
,
e,
s
ve
th
e
it
ir
ve
106
can connect the rulers and the people together. It creates between them that communion of
interests and sympathy of sentiments of which few governments have furnished examples;
but without which every government degenerates into tyranny.
If it be asked, what is to restrain the House of Representatives from making legal
discriminations in favor of themselves and a particular class of the society? I answer: the
genius of the whole system; the nature of just and constitutional laws; and, above all, the
vigilant and manly spirit which actuates the people of America -- a spirit which nourishes
freedom, and in return is nourished by it.
If this spirit shall ever be so far debased as to tolerate a law not obligatory on the
legislature, as well as on the people, the people will be prepared to tolerate anything but
liberty.
James Madison, Federalist # 57
Lim
In the
with th
certain
not to
can ex
retain
James
AN O
last ad
indivi
of the
might
Allow
confes
admin
author
appea
Comm
charm
ought
privat
other
provid
theref
mited jur
first place it
he whole po
n enumerate
be attained
xtend their c
their due au
s Madison, F
OBJECTION
ddress may p
dual citizens
Union too p
be judged p
wing the utmo
ss I am at a l
nistration of
rities of that
ars to me to h
merce, financ
ms for minds
in the first i
te justice bet
concerns of
ded for by lo
fore improba
risdictio
t is to be rem
ower of maki
d objects, w
by the separ
are to all tho
uthority and
Federalist # 1
N of a nature
perhaps be li
s of America
powerful, an
proper to leav
ost latitude t
loss to disco
the general g
description.
hold out slen
ce, negotiatio
governed by
instance to b
tween the cit
a similar nat
ocal legislatio
able that ther
on of the
membered th
ing and adm
which concern
rate provisio
ose other obj
activity.
14
different fro
ikewise urge
a. It may be
nd to enable i
ve with the S
to the love o
over what tem
government
. The regulat
nder allureme
on, and war
y that passio
be lodged in
tizens of the
ture, all thos
on, can neve
re should exi
107
e federal
hat the gener
ministering la
n all the mem
ons of any. T
jects which c
om that whic
ed against th
said that it w
it to absorb t
States for loc
of power whi
mptation the
could ever f
tion of the m
ents to ambi
seem to com
on; and all th
the national
same State,
se things, in
er be desirab
ist a disposit
l/nation
ral governme
aws. Its jurisd
mbers of the
The subordin
can be separ
ch has been s
e principle o
would tend to
those residua
cal purposes
ich any reaso
persons intr
feel to divest
mere domesti
ition.
mprehend all
he powers ne
depository.
the supervis
short, which
ble cares of a
tion in the fe
nal gover
ent is not to b
diction is lim
e republic, bu
nate governm
rately provid
stated and an
of legislation
o render the
ary authoriti
s.
onable man
rusted with t
t the States o
ic police of a
l the objects
ecessary to th
The admini
sion of agric
h are proper
a general jur
ederal counc
rnment
be charged
mited to
ut which are
ments, which
ded for, will
nswered in m
n for the
government
ies, which it
can require,
the
of the
a State
which have
hose objects
stration of
culture and o
to be
isdiction. It
cils to usurp
e
h
my
t
I
e
of
is
the po
would
reason
nation
Alexa
Do the
limite
sovere
the ge
enjoym
James
in eve
which
power
to the
effectu
That w
severa
conve
differe
foreig
Certai
injurio
James
owers with w
d be as troub
n, would con
nal governme
ander Hamilt
ese principle
d, and that, b
eignty and in
eneral power
ment of their
s Madison, F
ery political i
h may be mis
r is to be con
public good
ually as poss
we may form
al powers co
eniently done
ent objects:
gn nations; 3
in miscellane
ous acts; 6. P
s Madison, F
which they ar
lesome as it
ntribute noth
ent.
ton, Federali
es, in fine, re
beyond this
ndependence
rs are limited
r sovereign a
Federalist # 4
institution, a
sapplied and
nferred, the p
d; as the next
sible against
m a correct ju
onferred on th
e they may b
1. Security a
. Maintenanc
eous objects
Provisions fo
Federalist # 4
re connected
would be nu
hing to the di
ist # 17
equire that th
limit, the St
e? We have s
d; and that th
and indepen
40
a power to ad
d abused. The
point first to
t will be, in c
t a perversio
udgment on
he governme
be reduced in
against foreig
ce of harmon
s of general u
or giving due
41
108
d; because th
ugatory; and
ignity, to the
he powers of
ates should b
seen that in t
he States, in
dent jurisdic
dvance the p
ey will see, t
be decided
case of an af
n of the pow
this subject,
ent of the Un
nto different
gn danger; 2
ny and prop
utility; 5. Re
e efficacy to
he attempt to
d the possess
e importance
f the general
be left in po
the new gov
all unenume
ction.
public happin
therefore, th
is whether s
ffirmative de
wer to the pu
, it will be pr
nion; and tha
t classes as th
2. Regulation
er intercours
estraint of the
o all these po
o exercise tho
sion of them
e, or to the sp
l governmen
ssession of t
vernment, as
erated cases,
ness involve
hat in all case
such a power
ecision, to gu
ublic detrime
roper to revi
at this may b
hey relate to
n of the inter
se among the
e States from
owers.
ose powers
m, for that
plendor of th
nt should be
their
in the old,
, are left in th
es a discretio
es where
r be necessar
uard as
ent.
iew the
be the more
o the followin
rcourse with
e States; 4.
m certain
he
he
on
ry
ng
h
It has
excise
United
be alle
could
stoopi
Had n
Const
had so
form o
freedo
forms
the ge
But w
these
semic
give m
exclud
terms
signifi
For w
others
nor co
recital
nor qu
mislea
Jame
been urged
es, to pay the
d States," am
eged to be ne
be given of
ing to such a
no other enum
titution than
ome color fo
of describing
om of the pre
of conveyan
eneral welfar
what color can
general term
olon? If the
meaning to e
ded altogeth
be retained
fication what
what purpose
s were meant
ommon than
l of particula
ualify the gen
ad, is an absu
s Madison, F
and echoed
e debts, and
mounts to an
ecessary for
the distress
a misconstru
meration or d
the general e
or it; though
g an authorit
ess, the trial
nces, must b
re."
n the objecti
ms immediate
different par
every part wh
er from a sh
in their full
tsoever?
could the en
t to be includ
first to use a
ars. But the i
neral meanin
urdity
Federalist #
that the pow
provide for t
unlimited c
the common
under which
uction.
definition of
expressions
it would hav
ty to legislat
by jury, or e
be very singu
ion have, wh
ely follows a
rts of the sam
hich will bea
hare in the m
extent, and t
numeration o
ded in the pr
a general ph
idea of an en
ng, and can h
41
109
wer "to lay an
the common
ommission t
n defense or
h these write
f the powers
just cited, th
ve been diffi
te in all poss
even to regu
ularly expres
hen a specifi
and is not ev
me instrume
ar it, shall on
eaning; and
the clear and
of particular
receding gen
hrase, and the
numeration o
have no othe
nd collect tax
n defense and
to exercise e
r general wel
ers labor for
of the Cong
he authors of
icult to find a
sible cases. A
ulate the cour
ssed by the t
ication of the
ven separated
ent ought to b
ne part of the
shall the mo
d precise exp
powers be i
neral power?
en to explain
of particulars
er effect than
xes, duties, i
d general we
every power
lfare. No str
objections, t
gress been fo
f the objectio
a reason for
A power to d
rse of descen
terms "to rais
e objects allu
d by a longe
be so expoun
e same sente
ore doubtful
pressions be
inserted, if th
? Nothing is
n and qualify
s which neit
n to confoun
imposts, and
elfare of the
which may
onger proof
than their
ound in the
on might hav
so awkward
destroy the
nts, or the
se money fo
uded to by
er pause than
nded as to
ence be
and indefini
denied any
hese and all
more natura
y it by a
ther explain
nd and
d
f
ve
d a
or
n a
ite
al
the mo
the pr
Congr
of the
the su
which
strikin
Jame
[Rega
into ex
govern
. . . Th
subjec
would
attemp
"neces
specif
altoge
and in
. . . As
which
betray
exerci
grante
ost minute p
etext for gra
ress have bee
ir chartered
ubject; and w
h seems to ha
ng defects of
s Madison, F
arding the] "
xecution the
nment of the
here are four
ct. They mig
d have prohib
pted a positi
ssary and pr
fying the pow
ether silent o
nference.
s the powers
h is to admin
ying the publ
ising powers
ed.
provisions be
adual and un
en betrayed,
authorities w
would be no i
ave provided
f the old.
Federalist #
"power to ma
e foregoing p
e United Stat
r other possib
ght have copi
bited the exe
ve enumerat
oper"; they m
wers excepte
on the subjec
s delegated u
nister it woul
lic interests b
s indispensab
ecome impor
observed usu
, or forced by
would not a l
inconsiderab
d no less stud
42
ake all laws
powers, and
tes, or in any
ble methods
ied the secon
ercise of any
tion of the po
might have a
ed from the g
ct, leaving th
under the new
ld find itself
by doing not
bly necessar
110
rtant when th
urpations of
y the defects
little surpris
ble argument
diously for t
which shall
all other pow
y departmen
s which the C
nd article of
y power not e
owers comp
attempted a n
general defin
hese necessar
w system are
still more di
thing, or of v
y and proper
hey tend to o
f power. A li
s of the Conf
e those who
t in favor of
the lesser tha
be necessar
wers vested b
nt or office th
Convention m
f the existing
expressly de
prehended un
negative enu
nition; they m
ry and prope
e more exten
istressed wit
violating the
r, but, at the
obviate the n
ist of the cas
federation, i
have paid n
f the new Con
an the more
ry and proper
by this Cons
hereof."
might have t
g Confederat
elegated; the
nder the gene
umeration of
might have b
er powers to
nsive, the go
th the alterna
e Constitutio
e same time,
necessity or
ses in which
into violation
no attention t
nstitution,
obvious and
r for carryin
stitution in th
taken on this
tion, which
ey might hav
eral terms
f them by
been
construction
overnment
ative of
on by
not expressl
ns
to
d
ng
he
s
ve
n
ly
. . . fo
means
object
Had th
for car
chime
enume
. . . No
requir
particu
. . . If
part o
the sam
genera
the sam
author
and ju
in the
more
redres
State l
invasi
the ala
repres
the pe
consti
James
r in every ne
s of attaining
t, and be ofte
hey attempte
rrying the ge
erical; and w
eration woul
o axiom is m
red, the mean
ular power n
it be asked w
f the Constit
me as if they
al power had
me, in short
rities. In the
udiciary depa
last resort a
faithful repr
ss may be mo
legislatures,
ion of the rig
arm to the pe
sentatives. T
eople interest
itutions are m
s Madison, F
ew applicatio
g the object o
en properly v
ed to enumer
eneral power
would have be
ld have been
more clearly
ns are author
necessary for
what is to be
tution and ex
y should mis
d been reduc
, as if the Sta
first instanc
artments, wh
a remedy mu
resentatives,
ore confided
for this plai
ghts of the la
eople, and to
here being n
ted in watch
more likely t
Federalist # 4
on of a gene
of the genera
varied whils
rate the parti
rs into execu
een liable to
n equivalent
established i
rized; where
r doing it is
e the consequ
xercise powe
sconstrue or
ced to particu
ate legislatur
ce, the succe
hich are to ex
ust be obtaine
annul the ac
d in against u
in reason tha
atter, these w
o exert their
no such inter
hing the cond
to remain un
44
111
eral power, th
al power, mu
st the object r
icular power
ution, the tas
o this further
to a positive
in law, or in
ever a genera
included.
uence, in cas
ers not warra
enlarge any
ulars, and an
res should v
ss of the usu
xpound and
ed from the p
cts of the usu
unconstitutio
at as every su
will be ever r
local influen
rmediate bod
duct of the fo
nnoticed and
he particular
ust always n
remains the
rs or means n
sk would hav
r objection, th
e grant of au
n reason, than
al power to d
se the Congr
anted by its t
y other power
ny one of the
violate their r
urpation will
give effect t
people, who
urpers. The t
onal acts of t
uch act of th
ready to mar
nce in effect
dy between t
ormer, violat
unredressed
r powers, wh
necessarily v
same.
not necessar
ve been no l
that every de
uthority.
n that where
do a thing is
ress shall mi
true meanin
r vested in th
ese were to b
respective co
l depend on t
to the legisla
o can, by the
truth is that t
the federal th
he former wil
rk the innova
ting a change
the State leg
ations of the
d.
hich are the
vary with tha
ry or proper
ess
efect in the
ever the end
given, every
isconstrue th
g. I answer
hem; as if th
be violated;
onstitutional
the executiv
ative acts; an
election of
this ultimate
han of the
ll be an
ation, to soun
e of federal
gislatures and
State
at
is
y
his
he
l
ve
nd
e
nd
d
The p
define
The fo
and fo
conne
in the
and th
The op
war an
forme
will h
indeed
be tho
particu
If th
chang
Union
it is tr
which
James
It is a
intere
to tho
relate.
James
owers deleg
ed. Those wh
ormer will b
oreign comm
ected. The po
ordinary cou
he internal or
perations of
nd danger; th
er periods wi
ere enjoy an
d, the federa
ose scenes of
ular States.
he new Cons
ge which it pr
n than in the
rue, is a new
h no apprehe
s Madison, F
sound and im
sts and circu
se circumsta
.
s Madison, F
ated by the p
hich are to re
e exercised p
merce; with w
owers reserv
urse of affai
rder, improv
f the federal g
hose of the S
ill probably b
nother advan
al powers ma
f danger whi
titution be e
roposes con
invigoration
power; but
nsions are en
Federalist # 4
mportant pri
umstance of
ances and int
Federalist # 5
proposed Co
emain in the
principally o
which last th
ved to the sev
irs, concern t
vement, and p
government
State govern
bear a small
ntage over th
ay be rendere
ich might fav
xamined wit
sists much le
n of its ORIG
that seems to
ntertained.
45
inciple that t
his constitue
terests to wh
56
112
onstitution to
State gover
on external o
he power of t
veral States w
the lives, lib
prosperity o
will be mos
ments in tim
proportion t
e federal gov
ed to the nat
vor their asc
th accuracy
ess in the ad
GINAL POW
o be an addi
the represent
ents. But this
hich the auth
o the federal
rnments are n
objects, as w
taxation will
will extend t
berties, and p
of the State.
st extensive a
mes of peace
to the latter,
vernment. T
tional defens
cendancy ove
and candor,
ddition of NE
WERS. The r
ition which f
tative ought
s principle c
hority and ca
government
numerous an
war, peace, ne
l, for the mo
to all the obj
properties of
and importan
and security
the State go
The more ade
se, the less fr
er the govern
it will be fo
EW POWER
regulation o
few oppose a
to be acqua
can extend no
are of the rep
t are few and
nd indefinite
egotiation,
st part, be
jects which,
f the people,
nt in times o
y. As the
overnments
equate,
frequent will
nments of th
ound that the
RS to the
f commerce
and from
ainted with th
o further tha
presentative
d
e.
of
he
e
,
he
an
There
author
legisla
to affi
that th
by vir
forbid
Alexa
From
not be
quoted
maxim
them u
inappl
obviou
constr
Hav
endea
examp
words
specif
author
useles
In li
Const
cases
is no positio
rity, contrary
ative act, the
irm that the d
he representa
rtue of power
d.
ander Hamilt
these observ
e abolished;
d is contrary
ms had a pre
upon the pre
licable to a c
us sense of i
ruction.
ving now see
avor to ascert
ples. The pla
s, of the natio
fication of pa
rity, because
ss if a genera
ike manner t
titution to co
marks the pr
on which dep
y to the teno
erefore, contr
deputy is gre
atives of the
rs may do no
ton, Federali
vations this c
and that the
y to reason an
cise technica
esent occasio
constitution o
its provision
en that the m
tain their pro
an of the con
onal legislatu
articulars ev
e an affirmat
al authority w
the judicial a
omprehend c
recise limits
pends on cle
or of the com
rary to the C
eater than hi
people are s
ot only what
ist # 78
conclusion r
use attempte
nd common
al sense, cor
on, which, ho
of governme
ns, apart from
maxims relied
oper use and
nvention dec
ure, shall ex
idently exclu
tive grant of
was intended
authority of t
ertain cases
beyond whi
113
earer princip
mmission und
Constitution,
s principal; t
superior to th
t their power
esults: that t
ed to be mad
sense, and t
rresponding w
owever, is n
ent. In relatio
m any technic
d upon will n
d true meanin
clares that the
xtend to certa
udes all pret
f special pow
d.
the federal ju
particularly
ich the feder
ples than that
der which it
can be valid
that the serv
he people th
rs do not aut
the trial by ju
de of the ma
therefore not
with the idea
not the case, t
on to such a
cal rules, is
not bear the u
ng. This will
e power of C
ain enumerat
tension to a g
wers would b
udicatures is
specified. T
ral courts can
t every act o
is exercised
d. To deny th
vant is above
emselves; th
thorize, but w
ury in civil c
axims which
t admissible
as of those w
they would
a subject, the
the true crite
use made of
l be best don
Congress, or
ted cases. Th
general legis
be absurd as
s declared by
The expressio
nnot extend
of a delegated
, is void. No
his would be
e his master;
hat men actin
what they
cases would
have been
. Even if the
who employ
still be
e natural and
erion of
f them, let us
ne by
r, in other
his
slative
well as
y the
on of those
their
d
o
e
ng
ese
d
s
114
jurisdiction, because the objects of their cognizance being enumerated, the specification
would be nugatory if it did not exclude all ideas of more extensive authority.
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 83
Max
There
bound
coinci
Alexa
Safety
Alexa
When
Alexa
... a vi
James
the pe
means
Alexa
For it
most i
whom
xims
is, perhaps,
d to mutual c
ident benefit
ander Hamilt
y from extern
ander Hamilt
n the sword i
ander Hamilt
ictorious and
s Madison, F
ersons from w
s by which it
ander Hamilt
is a truth, w
in danger wh
m they enterta
nothing mo
contributions
t.
ton, Federali
nal danger is
ton, Federali
s once drawn
ton, Federali
d powerful a
Federalist # 1
whose agenc
t is to be atta
ton, Federali
which the exp
hen the mean
ain the least
ore likely to d
s for any com
ist # 7
s the most po
ist # 8
n, the passio
ist # 16
ally is but an
18
cy the attainm
ained.
ist # 23
perience of a
ns of injurin
suspicion.
115
disturb the tr
mmon object
owerful dire
ons of men o
other name f
ment of any
all ages has a
g their rights
ranquillity o
t that does n
ector of natio
observe no b
for a master
end is expec
attested, that
s are in the p
of nations tha
not yield an e
onal conduct
ounds of mo
r.
cted ought to
t the people a
possession o
an their bein
equal and
t.
oderation.
o possess the
are common
of those of
ng
e
nly
Alexa
every
revere
countr
not ex
Alexa
I belie
govern
admin
Alexa
It may
will, i
liberty
Alexa
every
30
Neces
system
Alexa
ander Hamilt
breach of th
ence which o
ry, and form
xist at all, or
ander Hamilt
eve it may be
nment will c
nistration.
ander Hamilt
y safely be re
n all possibl
y by the nati
ander Hamilt
POWER ou
ssity, especia
m of measure
ander Hamilt
ton, Federali
he fundamen
ought to be m
ms a preceden
is less urgen
ton, Federali
e laid down
commonly b
ton, Federali
eceived as an
le contingenc
onal authori
ton, Federali
ught to be pro
ally in politic
es correspon
ton, Federali
ist # 25
ntal laws, tho
maintained in
nt for other b
nt and palpab
ist # 25
as a general
e proportion
ist # 27
n axiom in o
cies, afford c
ty.
ist # 28
oportionate t
cs, often occ
ndingly erron
ist # 35
116
ough dictated
n the breast
breaches whe
ble.
rule that the
ned to the go
our political
complete sec
to its OBJEC
casions false
neous.
d by necessit
of rulers tow
ere the same
eir confidenc
oodness or ba
system that
curity agains
CT Alexand
e hopes, false
ty, impairs t
wards the con
e plea of nec
ce in and ob
adness of its
the State go
st invasions
der Hamilton
e reasonings
that sacred
nstitution of
cessity does
edience to a
s
overnments
of the public
n, Federalist
s, and a
f a
a
c
#
There
axiom
meani
severa
impor
James
The pr
comes
Jame
a right
James
But th
practic
James
The ex
James
A com
author
an est
are two rule
ms. The one i
ing, and be m
al parts cann
rtant part; the
s Madison, F
rudent inqui
s, as whether
s Madison, F
t implies a r
s Madison, F
heoretic reaso
ce.
s Madison, F
xistence of a
s Madison, F
mpact betwee
rity, can pret
ablished doc
es of constru
is that every
made to cons
not be made t
e means sho
Federalist # 4
iry, in all cas
r the advice
Federalist #
emedy
Federalist # 4
oning, in thi
Federalist # 4
a right to inte
Federalist # 4
en independ
tend to no hi
ctrine on the
uction, dictat
part of the e
spire to some
to coincide,
uld be sacrif
40
ses, ought su
be good.
40
43
is as in most
43
erpose will g
43
ent sovereig
igher validit
subject of tr
117
ted by plain
expression o
e common e
the less imp
ficed to the e
urely to be no
other cases,
generally pre
gns, founded
y than a leag
reaties that a
reason as we
ught, if poss
end, The othe
portant shoul
end, rather th
ot so much f
, must be qu
event the nec
d on ordinary
gue or treaty
all the article
ell as founde
sible, to be a
er is that wh
ld give way t
han the end
from whom
ualified by th
cessity of ex
y acts of legi
y between th
es are mutua
ed on legal
allowed som
here the
to the more
to the means
the advice
he lessons of
xerting it.
islative
e parties. It i
ally condition
e
s.
f
is
ns
of eac
breach
please
James
an ext
an abs
James
it is es
the pe
James
It is a
the gr
the po
James
In all
wrest
Jame
It is a
intere
ch other; that
h, committed
e, to pronoun
s Madison, F
tinction of pa
solute extinc
s Madison, F
ssential to lib
eople
s Madison, F
received and
eater the pow
ower, the mo
s Madison, F
very numero
the scepter f
s Madison, F
sound and im
sts and circu
t a breach of
d by either o
nce the comp
Federalist # 4
arties necess
ction of liber
Federalist # 5
berty that th
Federalist # 5
d well-found
wer is, the sh
ore safely ma
Federalist # 5
ous assembli
from reason.
Federalist #
mportant pri
umstance of
f any one art
of the parties
pact violated
43
sarily implie
rty.
50
e governmen
52
ded maxim t
horter ought
ay its duratio
52
ies, of whate
.
55
inciple that t
his constitue
118
icle is a brea
s, absolves th
d and void.
es either a un
nt in general
that where no
t to be its dur
on be protrac
ever characte
the represent
ents.
ach of the wh
he others, an
niversal alarm
l should hav
o other circu
ration; and,
cted.
ers compose
tative ought
hole treaty;
nd authorizes
m for the pub
e a common
umstances af
conversely,
ed, passion n
to be acqua
and that a
s them, if the
blic safety, o
n interest wit
ffect the case
the smaller
never fails to
ainted with th
ey
or
th
e,
o
he
Jame
every
Alexa
the fac
most l
James
A goo
the ha
be bes
James
An ind
affairs
to his
declin
makin
with th
emotio
indisc
wisdo
system
James
s Madison, F
government
ander Hamilt
cility and ex
liable
s Madison, F
od governme
appiness of th
st attained.
s Madison, F
dividual who
s without any
own unstead
ne to connect
ng their fortu
his melanch
ons than the
cretions of ea
om and stabil
matic policy
s Madison, F
Federalist #
t ought to co
ton, Federali
xcess of lawm
Federalist # 6
ent implies tw
he people; se
Federalist # 6
o is observed
y plan at all,
diness and fo
t their fortun
unes out of h
holy distincti
latter, are u
ach other. Ev
lity, may cal
of its wiser
Federalist # 6
56
ontain in itse
ist # 59
making seem
62
wo things: fi
econdly, a k
62
d to be incon
, is marked a
olly. His mo
nes with his;
his. One natio
on, perhaps,
under fewer r
very nation,
lculate on ev
neighbors.
62
119
lf the means
m to be the d
irst, fidelity
knowledge of
nstant to his
at once by al
ore friendly n
and not a fe
on is to anot
, that the form
restraints als
consequentl
very loss whi
s of its own p
diseases to w
to the object
f the means
plans, or pe
ll prudent pe
neighbors m
ew will seize
ther what on
mer, with fe
so from takin
ly, whose aff
ich can be su
preservation
which our gov
t of governm
by which th
erhaps to carr
eople as a sp
ay pity him,
e the opportu
ne individual
ewer of the b
ng undue adv
ffairs betray a
ustained from
n.
vernments ar
ment, which
at object can
ry on his
eedy victim
but all will
unity of
l is to anothe
benevolent
vantage of th
a want of
m the more
re
is
n
er;
he
No go
respec
James
liberty
James
the de
of men
Alexa
in the
Alexa
When
quarte
oppos
imped
Alexa
the sen
Alexa
overnment, a
ctable
s Madison, F
y may be end
s Madison, F
emon of facti
n.
ander Hamilt
main it will
ander Hamilt
n men, engag
er which they
sition from d
diments were
ander Hamilt
nse of respo
ander Hamilt
any more tha
Federalist # 6
dangered by
Federalist # 6
ion will, at c
ton, Federali
be found th
ton, Federali
ged in unjust
y cannot con
doing what th
e to be feared
ton, Federali
nsibility is a
ton, Federali
an an individ
62
y the abuses o
63
certain seaso
ist # 65
hat a power o
ist # 73
tifiable pursu
ntrol, they w
hey would w
d.
ist # 73
always stron
ist # 74
120
dual, will lon
of liberty as
ons, extend h
over the man
uits, are awa
will often be r
with eagernes
gest in propo
ng be respect
well as by th
his scepter ov
n's support is
are that obstr
restrained by
ss rush into i
ortion as it i
ted without b
the abuses of
ver all nume
s a power ov
ructions may
y the bare ap
if no such ex
s undivided
being truly
f power
erous bodies
ver his will.
y come from
pprehension
xternal
m a
of
There
author
Alexa
In the
power
Alexa
there o
provis
Alexa
is no positio
rity, contrary
ander Hamilt
general cou
r over his wi
ander Hamilt
ought alway
sions.
ander Hamilt
on which dep
y to the teno
ton, Federali
urse of huma
ill.
ton, Federali
ys to be a con
ton, Federali
pends on cle
or of the com
ist # 78
an nature, a p
ist # 79
nstitutional m
ist # 80
121
earer princip
mmission und
power over a
method of gi
ples than that
der which it
a man's subs
iving efficac
t every act o
is exercised
istence amou
cy to constitu
of a delegated
, is void.
unts to a
utional
d
Mili
The sm
it; and
submi
jealou
suppo
The
faction
encroa
Alexa
The im
render
Alexa
If, to o
of arm
specta
to prep
As the
presen
govern
blow b
itia
mallness of t
d the citizens
it to its oppre
us acquiescen
ose may be e
army under
n, or an occa
achments ag
ander Hamilt
mprovement
red distant n
ander Hamilt
obviate this
mies in time o
acle which th
pare for defe
e ceremony o
nce of an ene
nment to beg
before we co
the army ren
s, not habitu
essions, neit
nce in a nece
xerted to the
r such circum
asional mob,
gainst the uni
ton, Federali
ts in the art o
nations, in a g
ton, Federali
consequence
of peace, the
he world has
ense before i
of a formal d
emy within o
gin its levies
ould even pr
nders the nat
ated to look
ther love nor
essary evil a
e prejudice o
mstances may
, or insurrect
ited efforts o
ist # 8
of navigation
great measur
ist # 24
e, it should b
e United Stat
s yet seen --
it was actual
denunciation
our territorie
s of men for
repare to retu
122
tural strength
up to the mi
r fear the sol
and stand rea
of their rights
y usefully ai
tion; but it w
of the great b
n have, as to
re, neighbor
be resolved t
tes would th
that of a nat
lly invaded.
n of war has
es must be w
the protectio
urn it.
h of the com
ilitary power
ldiery; they v
ady to resist
s.
id the magis
will be unabl
body of the p
the facility
rs.
to extend the
hen exhibit th
tion incapaci
of late fallen
waited for as
on of the Sta
mmunity an o
r for protect
view them w
a power whi
strate to supp
le to enforce
people.
of communi
e prohibition
he most extr
itated by its
n into disuse
the legal wa
ate. We mus
overmatch fo
tion, or to
with a spirit o
ich they
press a small
e
ication,
n to the raisin
raordinary
Constitution
e, the
arrant to the
t receive the
or
of
l
ng
n
e
All th
storm
We m
by our
create
the me
Here
would
have l
saved
recent
The st
succes
than o
late w
fame;
been e
most o
by tim
Alexa
the St
guardi
will co
ready
to be t
Sche
execu
at kind of po
must be abs
must expose o
r weakness t
ed by our cho
eans necessa
e I expect w
d be at all tim
lost us our in
. The facts w
t to permit u
teady operat
ssfully condu
of stability an
war, have, by
but the brav
established b
other things,
me, and by pr
ander Hamilt
ate legislatu
ians of the ri
onstantly ha
enough, if a
the VOICE,
emes to subv
ution. An arm
olicy by whi
stained from
our property
to seize the n
oice, depend
ary to its pre
e shall be to
mes equal to
ndependence
which from o
s to be the d
tions of war
ucted by a fo
nd vigor, con
their valor o
vest of them
by their effor
, is a science
ractice.
ton, Federali
ures, who wil
ights of the c
ave their atten
anything imp
but, if neces
vert the liber
my, so large a
ch nations a
m, as contrary
and liberty
naked and de
dent on our w
eservation.
old that the m
the national
e. It cost mill
our own exp
dupes of such
against a reg
force of the s
nfirm this po
on numerous
feel and kno
rts alone, ho
e to be acqui
ist # 25
ll always be
citizens agai
ntion awake
proper appea
ssary, the AR
rties of a gre
as seriously
123
anticipate dis
y to the genu
to the mercy
efenseless pr
will, might en
militia of the
l defense. Th
lions to the U
erience forb
h a suggestio
gular and dis
same kind. C
osition. The
s occasions,
ow that the l
owever great
red and perf
not only vig
inst encroach
e to the condu
ars, to sound
RM of their
eat communi
to menace th
stant danger
uine maxims
y of foreign i
rey, because
ndanger that
country is it
his doctrine,
United State
id a reliance
on.
sciplined arm
Consideration
American m
erected eter
liberty of the
t and valuabl
fected by dil
gilant but sus
hments from
duct of the na
d the alarm to
discontent.
ity require ti
hose libertie
and meet th
of a free go
invaders and
e we are afra
t liberty by a
ts natural bu
in substance
es that might
e of this kind
my can only
ns of econom
militia, in the
rnal monume
eir country c
le they were
igence, by p
spicious and
m the federal
ational rulers
o the people,
ime to matur
es, could onl
he gathering
overnment.
d invite them
aid that ruler
an abuse of
ulwark, and
e, had like to
t have been
d are too
be
my, not less
e course of th
ents to their
ould not hav
. War, like
perseverance
d jealous
government
s, and will b
, and not onl
re them for
ly be formed
m
s,
o
he
ve
e,
t,
e
ly
d
by pro
betwe
Alexa
It is no
Union
especi
alway
Alexa
there m
the mi
laws a
Inde
requir
say th
repres
securi
If th
but in
forms
exerte
indivi
In a si
differe
govern
ogressive aug
een the legisl
ander Hamilt
ot easy to co
n as to deman
ially if we ta
ys to be coun
ander Hamilt
might somet
ilitia to prese
against those
ependent of a
re a more per
hat the whole
sentatives of
ity for the rig
he representa
the exertion
of governm
ed with infin
dual State.
ingle State, i
ent parcels, s
nment in eac
gmentations
lature and ex
ton, Federali
onceive a po
nd a force co
ake into our v
nted upon as
ton, Federali
times be a ne
erve the pea
e violent inv
all other reas
remptory pro
e power of th
f the people.
ghts and priv
atives of the
n of that orig
ment, and wh
itely better p
if the person
subdivisions
ch, can take
s; which wou
xecutive, but
ist # 26
ssibility that
onsiderable e
view the aid
a valuable a
ist # 26
ecessity to m
ce of the com
asions of the
sonings upon
ovision agai
he proposed
This is the e
vileges of the
people betra
ginal right of
ich against t
prospect of s
ns intrusted w
s, or districts
no regular m
124
uld suppose n
t a continued
t dangers so
enough to pl
d to be derive
and powerful
make use of a
mmunity and
em which am
n the subject
nst military
government
essential, and
e people wh
ay their cons
f self-defense
the usurpatio
success than
with supreme
s of which it
measures for
not merely a
d conspiracy
formidable
lace our libe
ed from the m
l auxiliary.
a force const
d to maintain
mount to insu
t, it is a full
establishme
t is to be in t
d, after all, th
hich is attaina
stituents, the
e which is p
ons of the na
against thos
e power beco
consists, ha
r defense. Th
a temporary
y for a series
can assail th
erties in the l
militia, whic
tituted differ
n the just au
urrections an
answer to th
ents in time o
the hands of
the only effic
able in civil
ere is then no
aramount to
ational rulers
se of the rule
ome usurper
aving no dist
he citizens m
combination
of time.
he whole
least jeopard
ch ought
rently from
uthority of th
nd rebellions
hose who
of peace to
f the
cacious
society.
o resource le
o all positive
s may be
ers of an
rs, the
tinct
must rush
n
dy,
he
s.
eft
125
tumultuously to arms, without concert, without system, without resource; except in their
courage and despair. The usurpers, clothed with the forms of legal authority, can too often
crush the opposition in embryo.
The smaller the extent of the territory, the more difficult will it be for the people to form a
regular or systematic plan of opposition, and the more easy will it be to defeat their early
efforts. Intelligence can be more speedily obtained of their preparations and movements,
and the military force in the possession of the usurpers can be more rapidly directed
against the part where the opposition has begun. In this situation there must be a peculiar
coincidence of circumstances to insure success to the popular resistance.
The obstacles to usurpation and the facilities of resistance increase with the increased
extent of the state, provided the citizens understand their rights and are disposed to defend
them. The natural strength of the people in a large community, in proportion to the
artificial strength of the government, is greater than in a small, and of course more
competent to a struggle with the attempts of the government to establish a tyranny.
But in a confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to be entirely the
masters of their own fate. Power being almost always the rival of power, the general
government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments,
and these will have the same disposition towards the general government. The people, by
throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate.
If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of
redress. How wise will it be in them by cherishing the union to preserve to themselves an
advantage which can never be too highly prized!
It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system that the State governments
will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against invasions of the public
liberty by the national authority. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretenses
so likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of men, as of the people at large. The
legislatures will have better means of information.
They
and th
which
comm
protec
The
utility
agains
should
head w
The ad
others
efforts
We
by the
a large
of the
When
capab
who a
for the
The ap
the res
Alexa
If a w
to be u
can discover
he confidenc
h they can co
municate with
ction of their
great extent
y against the
st the enterpr
d be able to q
with fresh fo
dvantages ob
s; and the mo
s would be r
should recol
e resources o
e army; and
community
n will the tim
le of erectin
are in a situat
eir own defe
pprehension
sources of ar
ander Hamilt
ell-regulated
under the reg
r the danger
e of the peop
ombine all th
h each other
r common lib
t of the coun
attacks of a
rises of amb
quell the res
orces.
btained in on
oment the pa
renewed, and
llect that the
of the countr
as the mean
y will proport
me arrive that
g a despotism
tion, through
ense, with all
n may be con
rgument and
ton, Federali
d militia be t
gulation and
at a distance
ple, they can
he resources
in the differ
berty.
ntry is a furth
foreign pow
bitious rulers
sistance of on
ne place mus
art which had
d its resistan
e extent of th
y. For a long
ns of doing th
tionably incr
t the federal
m over the g
h the medium
l the celerity
nsidered as a
d reasoning.
ist # 28
the most natu
d at the dispo
126
e; and posse
n at once ado
of the comm
rent States, a
her security.
wer. And it w
s in the natio
ne State, the
st be abando
d been reduc
ce revive.
he military fo
g time to com
his increase,
rease.
government
great body of
m of their St
y, regularity,
a disease, for
ural defense
osal of that b
ssing all the
opt a regular
munity. They
and unite the
We have alr
would have p
onal councils
e distant Stat
oned to subd
ced to submi
orce must, at
me it will no
the populat
t can raise an
f the people
tate governm
and system
r which there
e of a free co
body which i
e organs of c
r plan of opp
y can readily
eir common
ready experi
precisely the
s. If the feder
tes would be
due the oppos
ission was le
t all events,
ot be possibl
tion and natu
nd maintain
of an immen
ments, to take
m of independ
e can be foun
ountry, it oug
is constituted
ivil power
position, in
y
forces for th
ienced its
same effect
ral army
e able to mak
sition in
eft to itself, i
be regulated
e to maintain
ural strength
an army
nse empire,
e measures
dent nations?
nd no cure in
ght certainly
d the guardia
he
t
ke
its
d
n
?
n
y
an
of the
over th
and th
If the
call fo
the em
oblige
of pre
In o
of the
Const
the ex
his on
Alexa
The sa
be des
call ou
the for
It wou
its dec
office
that a
would
or of a
It bein
POSS
national sec
he militia in
he pretext to
federal gove
or the militar
mployment o
ed to recur to
venting its e
rder to cast a
Union, it ha
titution for re
xecution of h
nly auxiliary.
ander Hamilt
ame persons
spotic and un
ut the POSS
rmer exceed
uld be as abs
clared power
rs who may
right to enac
d involve tha
abolishing th
ng therefore
SE COMITA
curity. If stan
n the same bo
such unfrien
ernment can
ry arm in sup
of a different
o the latter. T
existence tha
an odium up
as been rema
equiring the
his duty; whe
.
ton, Federali
s who tell us
nlimited info
E COMITA
ds it.
surd to doubt
rs would inc
be intrusted
ct laws nece
at of varying
he trial by ju
evident that
ATUS is entir
nding armies
ody ought, a
ndly instituti
command th
pport of the
t kind of forc
To render an
an a thousand
pon the powe
arked that th
aid of the PO
ence it has b
ist # 29
in one breat
orm us in the
ATUS. The la
t that a right
clude that of
d with the ex
ssary and pr
the rules of
ury in cases r
t the supposi
rely destitute
127
s are dangero
s far as poss
ions.
he aid of the
civil magistr
ce. If it cann
n army unnec
d prohibition
er of calling
ere is nowhe
OSSE COM
een inferred
th that the po
e next that it
atter, fortuna
t to pass all l
requiring th
ecution of th
roper for the
f descent and
relating to it.
tion of a wa
e of color, it
ous to libert
sible, to take
e militia in th
rate, it can th
not avail itsel
cessary will
ns upon pape
forth the mi
ere any prov
MITATUS to
d that military
owers of the
t has not auth
ately, is as m
laws necessa
he assistance
hose laws as
imposition
d of the alien
.
ant of power
t will follow
ty, an efficac
e away the in
hose emerge
he better dis
lf of the form
be a more c
er.
ilitia to exec
vision in the
assist the m
y force was
e federal gov
hority suffic
much short of
ary and prop
of the citize
s it would be
and collectio
nation of lan
to require th
that the con
cious power
nducement
encies which
spense with
mer, it will b
ertain metho
cute the laws
proposed
magistrate in
intended to
vernment wil
cient even to
f the truth as
per to execute
ens to the
e to believe
on of taxes
ded property
he aid of the
nclusion whic
h
be
od
s
be
ll
s
e
y,
ch
has be
the mi
was in
make
Alexa
"The p
injurio
milita
nor ev
To ob
under
might
charac
public
labor
people
To att
an ext
would
people
this be
year.
"Bu
misch
digest
militia
een drawn fr
ilitia, is as un
ntended to be
use of it wh
ander Hamilt
project of di
ous if it were
ary movemen
ven a month,
lige the grea
arms for the
be necessar
cter of a wel
c inconvenie
of the countr
e, would not
tempt a thing
tent would b
d not long be
e at large tha
e not neglect
t though the
hievous or im
ted plan shou
a.
rom it, in its
ncandid as i
e the sole in
en necessary
ton, Federali
sciplining al
e capable of
nts is a busin
, that will su
at body of th
e purpose of
ry to acquire
ll-regulated m
ence and loss
ry to an amo
t fall far shor
g which wou
e unwise: an
e endured. Li
an to have th
ted, it will b
scheme of d
mpracticable;
uld, as soon
application
t is illogical
strument of
y?
ist # 29
ll the militia
f being carrie
ness that requ
uffice for the
he yeomanry
f going throu
the degree o
militia, woul
s. It would fo
ount which, c
rt of a millio
uld abridge th
nd the experi
ittle more ca
hem properly
e necessary
disciplining
; yet it is a m
as possible,
128
to the author
. What reaso
authority, m
of the Unite
ed into execu
uires time an
attainment o
and of the o
ugh military
of perfection
ld be a real g
orm an annu
calculating u
on pounds.
he mass of l
iment, if ma
an reasonabl
y armed and
to assemble
the whole na
matter of the
be adopted
rity of the fe
on could ther
merely becau
ed States is a
ution. A tole
nd practice.
of it.
other classes
exercises an
n which wou
grievance to
ual deduction
upon the pre
abor and ind
ade, could no
ly be aimed a
equipped; a
them once o
ation must b
utmost impo
for the prop
ederal govern
re be to infer
use there is a
as futile as it
erable expert
It is not a da
s of the citize
nd evolutions
uld entitle th
the people a
n from the pr
esent number
dustry to so c
ot succeed, b
at with respe
and in order
or twice in th
be abandoned
ortance that
er establishm
nment over
r that force
power to
t would be
tness in
ay, nor a wee
ens to be
s, as often as
em to the
and a serious
roductive
rs of the
considerable
because it
ect to the
to see that
he course of
d as
a well-
ment of the
ek
s
s
e
f a
The at
select
need.
well-t
it.
This w
any tim
formid
inferio
rights
devise
Alexa
There
the mi
the na
our ne
daily m
feeling
Alexa
If ther
militia
undert
slaver
who h
ttention of th
corps of mo
By thus circ
trained militi
will not only
me oblige th
dable to the
or to them in
and those o
ed for a stand
ander Hamilt
is somethin
ilitia that on
ame of comm
eighbors, our
mingling wi
gs, sentimen
ander Hamilt
re should be
a? If there sh
take a distan
ry upon a par
had meditate
he governme
oderate size,
cumscribing
ia ready to ta
y lessen the c
he governme
liberties of t
n discipline a
f their fellow
ding army, a
ton, Federali
ng so far-fetc
e is at a loss
mon sense ar
r fellow-citiz
th the rest of
nts, habits, a
ton, Federali
an army to b
hould be no
nt and distres
rt of their co
d so foolish
ent ought par
upon such p
the plan, it w
ake the field
call for milita
ent to form an
the people w
and the use o
w-citizens. T
and the best p
ist # 29
ched and so e
s whether to
re our fears t
zens? What
f their count
and interests
ist # 29
be made use
army, whith
ssing expedi
ountrymen, d
as well as so
129
rticularly to
principles as
will be possi
d whenever th
ary establish
n army of an
while there is
of arms, who
This appears
possible sec
extravagant
treat it with
to end if we m
shadow of d
trymen and w
?
e of as the en
her would the
ition for the p
direct their c
o wicked a p
be directed
will really f
ible to have
he defense o
hments, but i
ny magnitud
s a large bod
o stand ready
to me the on
curity agains
in the idea o
gravity or w
may not trus
danger can th
who particip
ngine of desp
e militia, irri
purpose of r
ourse, but to
project to cru
to the forma
fit it for serv
an excellent
of the State s
if circumstan
de that army
dy of citizens
y to defend t
nly substitut
t it, if it shou
of danger to
with raillery
st our sons, o
here be from
pate with them
potism, what
itated at bein
riveting the c
o the seat of
ush them in
ation of a
vice in case o
t body of
shall require
nces should
can never be
s, little if at a
their own
te that can be
uld exist."
liberty from
... Where in
our brothers
m men who a
m in the sam
t need of the
ng required t
chains of
the tyrants,
their
of
at
e
all
e
m
,
are
me
e
to
imagin
an abu
Alexa
The on
vision
force
been e
of this
That t
succes
unifor
establ
patien
prepar
dream
like th
Extrav
to the
federa
with th
The h
carried
one tw
the Un
To the
in thei
ned intrench
used and inc
ander Hamilt
nly refuge le
nary supposit
for the proje
employed to
s danger.
the people an
ssion of men
rmly and sys
ishment; tha
ntly behold th
red to burst o
ms of a delirio
he sober appr
vagant as the
resources of
al governmen
he people on
ighest numb
d in any cou
wenty-fifth p
nited States,
ese would be
ir hands, off
hments of po
censed peopl
ton, Federali
eft for those
tion that the
ects of ambit
little purpos
nd the States
n ready to be
stematically
at the govern
he gathering
on their own
ous jealousy
rehensions o
e supposition
f the country
nt: still it wo
n their side w
ber to which,
untry does no
part of the nu
an army of
e opposed a
ficered by me
ower, and to
e?
ist # 29
who prophe
federal gove
tion. The rea
se indeed, if
s should, for
etray both; th
pursue some
nments and t
g storm and c
n heads must
y, or the misj
of genuine p
n is, let it, ho
y, be formed
ould not be g
would be abl
, according t
ot exceed on
umber able to
more than tw
militia amou
en chosen fr
130
make them a
esy the down
ernment may
asonings con
f it could be n
a sufficient
hat the traito
e fixed plan
he people of
continue to s
t appear to e
judged exagg
atriotism.
owever, be m
d; and let it b
going too far
le to repel th
to the best co
ne hundredth
o bear arms.
wenty-five o
unting to nea
rom among t
an example
nfall of the S
y previously
ntained in the
necessary no
period of tim
ors should, th
for the exten
f the States s
supply the m
everyone mo
gerations of
made. Let a r
be entirely at
r to say that
he danger.
omputation,
h part of the w
. This propor
or thirty thou
ar half a mill
themselves,
of the just v
State governm
y accumulate
ese papers m
ow to dispro
me, elect an
hroughout th
nsion of the
should silent
materials unti
ore like the in
f a counterfei
regular army
t the devotio
the State gov
a standing a
whole numb
rtion would
usand men.
lion of citize
fighting for
vengeance of
ments is the
e a military
must have
ove the realit
uninterrupte
his period,
military
tly and
il it should b
ncoherent
it zeal, than
y, fully equa
on of the
vernments
army can be
ber of souls;
not yield, in
ens with arm
their commo
f
ty
ed
be
al
or
n
ms
on
131
liberties and united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and
confidence. It may well be doubted whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be
conquered by such a proportion of regular troops. Those who are best acquainted with the
late successful resistance of this country against the British arms will be most inclined to
deny the possibility of it.
Besides the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of
almost every other nation, the existence of subordinate governments, to which the people
are attached and by which the militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the
enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple government of any
form can admit of. Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms of
Europe, which are carried as far as the public resources will bear, the governments are
afraid to trust the people with arms.
And it is not certain that with this aid alone they would not be able to shake off their yokes.
But were the people to possess the additional advantages of local governments chosen by
themselves, who could collect the national will and direct the national force, and of officers
appointed out of the militia by these governments and attached both to them and to the
militia, it may be affirmed with the greatest assurance that the throne of every tyranny in
Europe would be speedily overturned in spite of the legions which surround it.
Let us not insult the free and gallant citizens of America with the suspicion that they would
be less able to defend the rights of which they would be in actual possession than the
debased subjects of arbitrary power would be to rescue theirs from the hands of their
oppressors. Let us rather no longer insult them with the supposition that they can ever
reduce themselves to the necessity of making the experiment by a blind and tame
submission to the long train of insidious measures which must precede and produce it.
James Madison, Federalist # 46
Min
... the
often
the su
James
No ma
his jud
reason
many
indeed
citizen
James
The in
that re
If a
which
admin
violen
form o
or inte
James
nority ri
public good
decided, not
uperior force
s Madison, F
an is allowed
dgment, and
n, a body of
of the most
d concerning
ns?
s Madison, F
nference to w
elief is only t
faction cons
h enables the
nistration, it m
nce under the
of popular g
erest both th
s Madison, F
ights
d is disregard
t according t
of an intere
Federalist # 1
d to be a jud
d, not improb
men are unf
important ac
g the rights o
Federalist # 1
which we are
to be sought
sists of less t
e majority to
may convuls
e forms of th
overnment,
e public goo
Federalist # 1
ded in the co
to the rules o
sted and ove
10
dge in his ow
bably, corrup
fit to be both
cts of legisla
of single per
10
e brought is
t in the mean
than a major
defeat its si
se the societ
he Constituti
on the other
od and the rig
10
132
onflicts of riv
of justice and
erbearing ma
wn cause, bec
pt his integri
h judges and
ation but so m
sons, but con
that the caus
ns of control
ity, relief is
nister views
ty; but it will
ion. When a
hand, enabl
ghts of other
val parties, a
d the rights o
ajority.
cause his int
ity. With equ
parties at th
many judicia
ncerning the
ses of faction
lling its effec
supplied by
s by regular v
l be unable t
majority is i
les it to sacri
r citizens.
and that mea
of the minor
terest would
ual, nay with
he same time
al determina
e rights of la
n cannot be
cts.
the republic
vote. It may
to execute an
included in a
ifice to its ru
asures are too
r party, but b
certainly bia
h greater
e; yet what ar
ations, not
arge bodies o
removed an
can principle
clog the
nd mask its
a faction, the
uling passion
o
by
as
re
of
d
e,
e
n
Exten
probab
other
it to d
Jame
It is o
of its r
Differ
by a c
There
comm
compr
unjust
first m
author
societ
minor
The se
all aut
be bro
or of t
James
d the sphere
ble that a ma
citizens; or i
discover their
s Madison, F
f great impo
rulers, but to
rent interests
common inte
are but two
munity indepe
rehending in
t combinatio
method preva
rity. This, at
ty may as we
r party, and m
econd metho
thority in it w
oken into so
the minority
s Madison, F
e and you tak
ajority of the
if such a com
r own streng
Federalist #
ortance in a r
o guard one p
s necessarily
erest, the righ
methods of
endent of the
n the society
on of a major
ails in all gov
t best, is but
ell espouse th
may possibly
od will be ex
will be deriv
many parts,
, will be in l
Federalist # 5
ke in a greate
e whole will
mmon motiv
gth and to act
10
republic not
part of the so
y exist in diff
hts of the mi
f providing a
e majority --
so many sep
rity of the w
vernments p
a precarious
he unjust vie
y be turned a
xemplified in
ved from and
interests an
ittle danger
51
133
er variety of
have a com
ve exists, it w
t in unison w
only to guar
ociety again
ferent classe
inority will b
gainst this e
- that is, of th
parate descri
hole very im
possessing an
s security; be
ews of the m
against both
n the federal
d dependent
d classes of
from interes
f parties and
mmon motive
will be more
with each oth
rd the society
nst the injusti
es of citizens
be insecure.
vil: the one
he society it
iptions of cit
mprobable, if
n hereditary
ecause a pow
major as the r
parties.
republic of
on the socie
citizens, tha
sted combina
interests; yo
e to invade th
difficult for
her.
y against the
ice of the oth
s. If a majori
by creating
tself; the oth
tizens as wil
f not impract
or self-appo
wer independ
rightful inter
the United S
ety, the socie
at the rights o
ations of the
ou make it le
he rights of
r all who feel
e oppression
her part.
ity be united
a will in the
er, by
ll render an
ticable. The
ointed
dent of the
rests of the
States. Whils
ety itself will
of individua
e majority.
ess
l
n
d
st
l
ls,
Mis
It has
countr
of men
choice
accide
Alexa
Let Am
bound
system
terms
Alexa
Civil p
great e
judicio
Alexa
there i
are inv
restrai
Alexa
scellaneo
been freque
ry, by their c
n are really c
e, or whether
ent and force
ander Alexan
mericans dis
d together in
m superior to
of the conne
ander Hamilt
power, prop
extent, and c
ous arrangem
ander Hamilt
is in the natu
vested with t
in or direct i
ander Hamilt
ous
ently remarke
conduct and
capable or n
r they are fo
e.
nder Hamilto
sdain to be th
a strict and
o the control
ection betwe
ton, Federali
erly organiz
can in a man
ment of subo
ton, Federali
ure of sovere
the exercise
its operation
ton, Federali
ed that it see
example, to
not of establi
orever destin
on, Federalis
he instrumen
indissoluble
of all transa
een the old a
ist # 11
ed and exert
nner reproduc
ordinate insti
ist # 13
eign power a
of it to look
s.
ist # 15
134
ems to have b
decide the i
shing good g
ed to depend
st # 1
nts of Europ
e Union, con
atlantic force
and the new w
ted, is capab
ce itself in e
itutions.
an impatienc
k with an evi
been reserve
important qu
government
d for their po
pean greatnes
ncur in erecti
e or influenc
world!
ble of diffusin
every part of
ce of control
il eye upon a
ed to the peo
uestion, whe
from reflect
olitical const
ss! Let the th
ing one grea
ce and able to
ng its force
f a great emp
that dispose
all external a
ople of this
ether societie
tion and
titutions on
hirteen State
at American
o dictate the
to a very
pire by a
es those who
attempts to
es
es,
e
o
the ex
the dis
Alexa
If the
Union
defeat
Alexa
[spea
institu
James
... a so
comm
practic
place
James
To for
that w
Alexa
xecution of th
scretion of th
ander Hamilt
interposition
n, they have
ted.
ander Hamilt
aking of poor
uted to remed
s Madison, F
overeignty o
munities, as c
ce it is subve
of the mild a
s Madison, F
rm a safe and
we should be
ander Hamilt
he plans, fra
he ill-inform
ton, Federali
n of the State
only NOT T
ton, Federali
rly instituted
dy.
Federalist # 1
ver sovereig
contradisting
ersive of the
and salutary
Federalist #
d satisfactor
well acquain
ton, Federali
amed by the c
med and preju
ist # 15
e legislature
TO ACT, or
ist # 16
d governmen
19
gns, a govern
guished from
e order and e
coercion of
20
ry judgment
nted with th
ist # 21
135
councils of t
udiced opini
s be necessa
TO ACT EV
nts] they incr
nment over g
m individuals
ends of civil
f the magistra
of the prope
e extent and
the whole, w
ion of every
ary to give ef
VASIVELY,
rease the mis
governments
s, as it is a so
polity, by su
acy.
er remedy, it
d malignity o
will always fl
part.
ffect to a me
, and the me
schief which
s, a legislatio
olecism in th
ubstituting v
t is absolutel
of the disease
fluctuate on
easure of the
easure is
h they were
on for
heory, so in
violence in
ly necessary
e.
e
To giv
a majo
numbe
Alexa
The im
render
Alexa
IT WA
stop a
PRIVI
failure
experi
attemp
anothe
chang
Alexa
The ci
Alexa
ve a minority
ority is requi
er to that of
ander Hamilt
mprovement
red distant n
ander Hamilt
AS a thing h
at that happy
ILEGE, and
e in this deli
ience, and if
pts to rectify
er; we may t
ge for the bet
ander Hamilt
itizens of Am
ander Hamilt
y a negative
isite to a dec
the lesser nu
ton, Federali
ts in the art o
nations, in a g
ton, Federali
hardly to be e
mean which
d combines th
cate and imp
f we are not c
y and amelio
try change af
tter.
ton, Federali
merica have
ton, Federali
upon the ma
cision) is, in
umber.
ist # 22
of navigation
great measur
ist # 24
expected tha
h marks the
he energy of
portant point
cautious to a
orate our syst
fter change;
ist # 26
too much di
ist # 26
136
ajority (whic
its tendency
n have, as to
re, neighbor
at in a popula
salutary bou
f governmen
t is the great
avoid a repet
tem we may
but we shall
iscernment t
ch is always
y, to subject
the facility
rs.
ar revolution
undary betwe
nt with the se
t source of th
tition of the
y travel from
l never be lik
to be argued
the case wh
the sense of
of communi
n the minds o
een POWER
ecurity of pri
he inconveni
error in our
m one chimer
kely to make
into anarchy
here more tha
f the greater
ication,
of men shou
R and
ivate rights.
iences we
future
ical project t
e any materi
y.
an
uld
A
to
ial
the law
will b
legisla
Thus t
incorp
consti
laws.
Alexa
A gov
of the
is resp
sense
Alexa
There
situati
which
Alexa
Happy
and vi
Alexa
ws of the Co
ecome the S
ative, execut
the legislatu
porated into
itutional auth
ander Hamilt
vernment oug
objects com
ponsible, fre
of the peopl
ander Hamilt
are strong m
ion and will
h they particu
ander Hamilt
y will it be fo
irtue enough
ander Hamilt
onfederacy a
SUPREME L
tive, and jud
ures, courts, a
the operation
hority extend
ton, Federali
ght to contai
mmitted to its
e from every
le.
ton, Federali
minds in eve
command th
ularly belong
ton, Federali
for ourselves
h to set so glo
ton, Federali
as to the enum
LAW of the l
dicial in each
and magistra
ns of the nat
ds; and will b
ist # 27
in in itself ev
s care, and to
y other contr
ist # 31
ery walk of li
he tribute du
g, but from t
ist # 36
s, and most h
orious an ex
ist # 36
137
merated and
land; to the o
h State will b
ates, of the re
tional govern
be rendered
very power r
o the comple
rol but a rega
ife that will
ue to their me
the society in
honorable for
xample to ma
d legitimate o
observance o
be bound by
espective me
nment as far
auxiliary to
requisite to t
ete execution
ard to the pu
rise superior
erit, not only
n general.
r human nat
ankind!
objects of its
of which all
the sanctity
embers will
r as its just a
the enforcem
the full acco
n of the trust
ublic good an
r to the disad
y from the cl
ture, if we ha
s jurisdiction
officers,
of an oath.
be
and
ment of its
mplishment
ts for which
nd to the
dvantages of
lasses to
ave wisdom
n
it
f
Person
conve
propri
make
conve
are bu
others
James
Energ
to that
good g
advan
people
legisla
James
The ex
legisla
limits
The pr
eccles
to be c
been m
The ju
etc., is
indete
ns of this ch
ention, not on
iety of reflec
allowances
ention, as a b
ut men and o
s.
s Madison, F
gy in governm
t prompt and
government.
ntages annex
e, which are
ation is not m
s Madison, F
xperience of
ators and jur
of different
recise extent
siastical law,
clearly and f
more industr
urisdiction o
s not less a s
erminate lim
aracter will p
nly without a
cting that a f
for the error
body of men,
ought not to a
Federalist # 3
ment is essen
d salutary ex
. Stability in
ed to it, as w
among the c
more an evil
Federalist # 3
f ages, with t
rists, has bee
codes of law
t of the comm
, the law of c
finally establ
riously pursu
f her several
source of fre
its by which
proceed to a
a disposition
faultless plan
rs which may
, were liable
assume an in
37
ntial to that s
xecution of th
n governmen
well as to tha
chief blessin
in itself than
37
the continue
en equally un
ws and differ
mon law, an
corporations
lished in Gre
ued than in a
l courts, gen
quent and in
h they are res
138
an examinati
n to find or t
n was not to
y be chargea
e; but will ke
nfallibility in
security aga
he laws whic
nt is essential
at repose and
ngs of civil s
n it is odious
ed and combi
nsuccessful i
rent tribunal
nd the statute
s, and other l
eat Britain, w
any other par
neral and loca
ntricate discu
spectively ci
ion of the pla
to magnify fa
be expected
able on the fa
eep in mind t
n rejudging t
ainst external
ch enter into
l to national
d confidence
society. An ir
s to the peop
ined labors o
in delineatin
ls of justice.
e law, the ma
local laws an
where accura
rt of the wor
al, of law, of
ussions, suff
ircumscribed
an submitted
faults; but wi
d. Nor will th
fallibility to w
that they the
the fallible o
l and interna
o the very de
character an
e in the mind
rregular and
ple
of the most e
ng the severa
aritime law,
nd customs,
acy in such s
rld.
f equity, of a
ficiently deno
d.
d by the
ill see the
hey barely
which the
emselves also
opinions of
al danger and
efinition of
nd to the
ds of the
d mutable
enlightened
al objects and
the
remains still
subjects has
admiralty,
oting the
o
d
d
l
James
Exper
discrim
execu
James
It cou
citizen
their d
James
How d
James
But th
but to
impati
James
And h
legisla
on the
James
s Madison, F
rience has in
minate and d
utive, and jud
s Madison, F
ld not be unk
ns, througho
deliberations
s Madison, F
difficult it is
s Madison, F
he mild voice
o often drow
ient avidity
s Madison, F
how the trade
ative jurisdic
e internal rig
s Madison, F
Federalist # 3
structed us t
define, with
diciary
Federalist # 3
known to th
out this great
s.
Federalist # 4
s for error to
Federalist # 4
e of reason, p
wned, before
for immedia
Federalist # 4
e with Indian
ction can be
ghts of legisla
Federalist # 4
37
that no skill
sufficient ce
37
em that the h
t empire, wer
40
escape its o
41
pleading the
e public bodi
ate and immo
42
ns, though n
regulated by
ation, is abso
42
139
in the scienc
ertainty, its t
hopes and ex
re turned wi
wn condemn
e cause of an
ies as well as
oderate gain
not members
y an external
olutely incom
ce of govern
three great pr
xpectations o
th the keene
nation.
n enlarged an
s individuals
.
of a State, y
l authority, w
mprehensibl
nment has ye
rovinces -- t
of the great b
est anxiety to
nd permanen
s, by the clam
yet residing w
without so fa
le.
et been able t
the legislativ
body of
o the event o
nt interest, is
mors of an
within its
ar intruding
to
ve,
of
s
there a
Const
wound
James
I take
during
tempe
superi
James
[Rega
before
under
This c
among
canno
societ
James
The fe
people
James
are certain p
titution that a
d to the othe
s Madison, F
no notice of
g the calm of
estuous scene
iority of stre
s Madison, F
arding the de
e the adoptio
this Constit
can only be c
g other reaso
ot be stranger
ty has the ma
s Madison, F
ederal and St
e, constituted
s Madison, F
parts of the S
a violent blo
er.
Federalist # 4
f an unhappy
f regular gov
es of civil vi
ngth to any p
Federalist # 4
ecision to] "c
on of this Co
tution than u
considered a
ons, for the s
rs to the pret
agical effect
Federalist # 4
tate governm
d with differ
Federalist # 4
State constitu
ow cannot be
43
y species of p
vernment, ar
iolence, may
party with w
43
consider all
onstitution as
under the Con
as a declarato
satisfaction o
tended doctr
of dissolvin
43
ments are in
rent powers
46
140
utions which
e given to the
population a
re sunk below
y emerge into
which they m
debts contra
s being no le
nfederation.
ory propositi
of the foreig
rine that a ch
ng its moral o
fact but diff
and designe
h are so inter
e one withou
abounding in
w the level o
o the human
may associate
acted and en
ess valid aga
"
ion; and may
gn creditors o
hange in the
obligations.
ferent agents
ed for differe
rwoven with
ut communic
n some of th
of men; but w
n character a
e themselves
gagements e
ainst the Unit
y have been
of the United
political for
s and trustees
ent purposes
the federal
cating the
e States, wh
who, in the
nd give a
s.
entered into
ted States
inserted,
d States, who
rm of civil
s of the
.
ho,
o
it is on
advan
James
If it be
opinio
numbe
man h
in pro
Jame
We ar
which
confid
opinio
produ
whilst
reform
expec
is app
James
Let us
found
nly within a
ntageously ad
s Madison, F
e true that al
on in each in
er which he
himself, is tim
portion to th
s Madison, F
re to recollec
h repressed th
dence of the
ons on great
uced by a uni
t no spirit of
med, could m
t to be usual
rehended.
s Madison, F
s consult exp
d.
certain sphe
dministered.
Federalist # 4
ll governmen
ndividual, an
supposes to
mid and caut
he number w
Federalist #
ct that all the
he passions m
people in th
national que
iversal resen
f party conne
mingle its lea
lly placed do
Federalist # 4
perience, the
ere that the f
46
nts rest on op
nd its practica
have enterta
tious when l
with which it
49
e existing co
most unfrien
heir patriotic
estions; of a
ntment and in
ected with th
aven in the o
o not present
49
e guide that o
141
federal powe
pinion, it is n
al influence
ained the sam
left alone, an
is associated
nstitutions w
ndly to order
leaders, whi
universal ar
ndignation a
he changes to
operation, Th
t any equival
ought always
er can, in the
no less true
on his condu
me opinion.
nd acquires f
d.
were formed
r and concor
ich stifled th
rdor for new
against the an
o be made, o
he future situ
lent security
s to be follow
e nature of th
that the stren
duct, depend
The reason
firmness and
d in the midst
rd: of an enth
he ordinary d
and opposit
ncient gover
or the abuses
uations in wh
y against the
wed whenev
hings, be
ngth of
much on the
of man, like
d confidence
t of a danger
husiastic
diversity of
te forms,
rnment; and
s to be
hich we mus
danger whic
ver it can be
e
e
e
r
st
ch
James
It is no
nature
devote
compr
variety
James
In pro
the go
be a w
by adv
John J
If man
had be
genera
Alexa
the tru
admin
Alexa
s Madison, F
ot possible t
e, continued
e the interva
rehensive int
y of importa
s Madison, F
oportion as th
ood of the wh
weak one ind
vancing the
Jay, Federali
nkind were t
een adjusted
al scene of a
ander Hamilt
ue test of a g
nistration.
ander Hamilt
Federalist # 5
that an assem
in appointm
als of public
terests of the
ant errors in t
Federalist # 6
he United St
hole be more
deed if it sho
good of each
ist # 64
to resolve to
d to the most
anarchy, and
ton, Federali
good governm
ton, Federali
52
mbly of men
ment for a sho
occupation t
eir country,
the exercise
62
tates assume
e and more a
ould forget th
h of the part
agree in no
exact standa
the world a
ist # 65
ment is its ap
ist # 68
142
called for th
ort time and
to a study of
should, if lef
of their legi
a national f
an object of
hat the good
s or member
institution o
ard of perfec
desert.
ptitude and t
he most part
led by no pe
f the laws, th
ft wholly to
islative trust
form and a n
attention, an
of the whole
rs which com
of governmen
ction, society
tendency to p
from pursui
ermanent mo
he affairs, an
themselves,
t.
national char
nd the govern
e can only b
mpose the w
nt, until eve
y would soo
produce a go
its of a priva
otive to
nd the
, escape a
acter, so wil
nment must
be promoted
whole.
ry part of it
on become a
ood
ate
ll
But th
Magis
when
the co
afterw
Alexa
No ad
system
best th
as pro
Alexa
I neve
all col
as of t
Alexa
[Quot
a large
work
mere d
work;
FEEL
their f
Alexa
he principal a
strate is this:
a well-timed
ommonwealt
wards to reca
ander Hamilt
dvocate of th
m, though it
hat the prese
omises every
ander Hamilt
er expect to s
llective bodi
the good sen
ander Hamilt
ting Hume's
e state or soc
of so great d
dint of reaso
EXPERIEN
LING of inco
first trials an
ander Hamilt
argument for
in seasons o
d offer of pa
th; and which
all.
ton, Federali
he measure c
may not be p
ent views and
y species of s
ton, Federali
see a perfect
ies must nece
nse and wisd
ton, Federali
Essays, Vol
ciety [says h
difficulty tha
on and reflec
NCE must gu
onveniences
nd experimen
ton, Federali
r reposing th
of insurrecti
ardon to the i
h, if suffered
ist # 74
an be found
perfect in ev
d circumstan
security whic
ist # 85
t work from
essarily be a
dom of the in
ist # 85
l. I, page 128
he], whether
at no human
ction, to effec
uide their lab
must correct
nts."
ist # 85
143
he power of p
on or rebelli
insurgents or
d to pass uni
who will no
very part, is,
nces of the c
ch a reasona
imperfect m
a compound,
ndividuals of
8: "The Rise
monarchica
genius, how
ct it. The jud
bor; TIME m
t the mistake
pardoning in
ion, there are
r rebels may
improved, it
ot declare as
upon the wh
ountry will p
able people c
man. The resu
, as well of t
f whom they
e of Arts and
al or republic
wever compre
dgments of m
must bring it
es which the
n this case in
e often critic
y restore the
may never b
his sentimen
hole, a good
permit; and
can desire.
ult of the del
the errors an
y are compos
d Sciences."]
can, on gene
ehensive, is
many must u
to perfectio
ey inevitably
n the Chief
cal moments
tranquillity
be possible
nt that the
d one; is the
is such a one
liberations o
d prejudices
sed.
] "To balanc
ral laws, is a
able, by the
unite in the
n, and the
y fall into in
s
of
e
of
s
ce
a
A NA
The es
a who
anxiet
Alexa
ATION witho
stablishment
ole people, is
ty.
ander Hamilt
out a NATIO
t of a Consti
s a PRODIG
ton, Federali
ONAL GOV
itution, in tim
Y, to the com
ist # 85
144
ERNMENT
me of profou
mpletion of
T is, in my vi
und peace, by
which I look
iew, an awfu
y the volunt
k forward w
ul spectacle.
tary consent
ith trembling
of
g
145
Monetary system
The extension of the prohibition to bills of credit must give pleasure to every citizen in
proportion to his love of justice and his knowledge of the true springs of public prosperity.
The loss which America has sustained since the peace, from the pestilent effects of paper
money on the necessary confidence between man and man, on the necessary confidence in
the public councils, on the industry and morals of the people, and on the character of
republican government, constitutes an enormous debt against the States chargeable with
this unadvised measure, which must long remain unsatisfied; or rather an accumulation of
guilt, which can be expiated no otherwise than by a voluntary sacrifice on the altar of
justice of the power which has been the instrument of it.
In addition to these persuasive considerations, it may be observed that the same reasons
which show the necessity of denying to the States the power of regulating coin prove with
equal force that they ought not to be at liberty to substitute a paper medium in the place of
coin. Had every State a right to regulate the value of its coin, there might be as many
different currencies as States, and thus the intercourse among them would be impeded;
retrospective alterations in its value might be made, and thus the citizens of other States be
injured, and animosities be kindled among the States themselves.
The subjects of foreign powers might suffer from the same cause, and hence the Union be
discredited and embroiled by the indiscretion of a single member. No one of these
mischiefs is less incident to a power in the States to emit paper money than to coin gold or
silver. The power to make anything but gold and silver a tender in payment of debts is
withdrawn from the States on the same principle with that of issuing a paper currency.
James Madison, Federalist # 44
Nat
barr
Every
procee
perma
distric
And if
their p
of the
affecti
legisla
memb
object
The S
too of
happin
the ind
James
the me
rather
intere
James
ional co
reling)
yone knows t
eds from the
anent interes
cts in which
f they do not
particular Sta
Union, and
ions and con
atures will b
bers of the fe
ts.
tates will be
ften be decid
ness, but on
dividual Stat
s Madison, F
embers [of th
r of partisans
st
s Madison, F
oncerns
that a great p
e disposition
st of the State
they reside.
t sufficiently
ate, how can
the dignity a
nsultations?
e unlikely to
ederal legisla
e to the latter
ded according
the prejudic
tes.
Federalist # 4
he Continen
s of their resp
Federalist # 4
sacrifice
proportion o
of the mem
e to the parti
y enlarge the
n it be imagin
and respecta
For the same
o attach them
ature will be
r what count
g to their pro
ces, interests
46
ntal Congress
pective State
46
146
ed to loc
f the errors c
mbers to sacri
icular and se
eir policy to
ned that they
ability of its
e reason that
mselves suffi
likely to att
ties and town
obable effec
, and pursuit
s] have but t
es than of im
cal inter
committed b
ifice the com
eparate view
embrace the
y will make
government
t the membe
iciently to na
tach themsel
ns are to the
ct, not on the
ts of the gov
too frequentl
mpartial guar
rests (po
by the State l
mprehensive
ws of the coun
e collective w
the aggregat
t, the objects
ers of the Sta
ational objec
lves too muc
former. Me
e national pro
vernments an
ly displayed
rdians of a co
ork
legislatures
and
nties or
welfare of
te prosperity
s of their
ate
cts, the
ch to local
asures will
osperity and
nd people of
d the characte
ommon
y
d
f
er
147
Novelty of the Constitution
But why is the experiment of an extended republic to be rejected merely because it may
comprise what is new? Is it not the glory of the people of America that, whilst they have
paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not
suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the
suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons
of their own experience?
To this manly spirit posterity will be indebted for the possession, and the world for the
example, of the numerous innovations displayed on the American theater in favor of
private rights and public happiness.
Had no important step been taken by the leaders of the Revolution for which a precedent
could not be discovered, no government established of which an exact model did not
present itself, the people of the United States might at this moment have been numbered
among the melancholy victims of misguided councils, must at best have been laboring
under the weight of some of those forms which have crushed the liberties of the rest of
mankind.
Happily for America, happily we trust for the whole human race, they pursued a new and
more noble course. They accomplished a revolution which has no parallel in the annals of
human society. They reared the fabrics of governments which have no model on the face of
the globe. They formed the design of a great Confederacy, which it is incumbent on their
successors to improve and perpetuate. If their works betray imperfections, we wonder at
the fewness of them.
James Madison, Federalist # 14
Pap
A rage
any ot
Union
likely
In the
for the
James
The ex
propo
The lo
money
the pu
republ
this un
guilt,
justice
In add
which
equal
coin. H
differe
retrosp
injure
per mon
e for paper m
ther imprope
n than a parti
to taint a pa
extent and p
e diseases m
s Madison, F
xtension of t
rtion to his l
oss which Am
y on the nec
ublic council
lican govern
nadvised me
which can b
e of the pow
dition to thes
h show the ne
force that th
Had every S
ent currencie
pective alter
d, and animo
ey
money, for a
er or wicked
icular memb
articular coun
proper struct
most incident
Federalist # 1
the prohibiti
love of justic
merica has s
essary confi
ls, on the ind
nment, const
easure, which
be expiated n
wer which has
se persuasive
ecessity of d
hey ought no
State a right t
es as States,
rations in its
osities be kin
an abolition o
d project, wil
ber of it, in th
nty or distric
ture of the U
to republica
10
on to bills o
ce and his kn
sustained sin
dence betwe
dustry and m
itutes an eno
h must long
no otherwise
s been the in
e considerati
denying to th
ot to be at lib
to regulate th
and thus the
value might
ndled among
148
of debts, for
ll be less apt
he same prop
ct than an en
Union, theref
an governme
f credit mus
nowledge of
nce the peace
een man and
morals of the
ormous debt
remain unsa
than by a vo
nstrument of
ions, it may
he States the
berty to subst
he value of i
e intercourse
t be made, an
g the States t
an equal div
t to pervade t
portion as su
ntire State.
fore, we beho
ent.
t give pleasu
f the true spr
e, from the p
d man, on the
people, and
t against the
atisfied; or ra
oluntary sac
f it.
be observed
power of re
titute a pape
its coin, ther
e among them
nd thus the c
themselves.
vision of pro
the whole bo
uch a malady
old a republi
ure to every
rings of publ
pestilent effe
e necessary c
d on the chara
States charg
ather an accu
rifice on the
d that the sam
egulating coi
er medium in
re might be a
m would be
citizens of ot
operty, or for
ody of the
y is more
ican remedy
citizen in
lic prosperity
ects of paper
confidence i
acter of
geable with
umulation o
e altar of
me reasons
in prove with
n the place o
as many
impeded;
ther States b
r
y
y.
in
f
h
of
be
The su
discre
misch
silver.
withdr
James
It has
contra
has be
furnis
They
Const
money
under
of the
Alexa
ubjects of fo
edited and em
hiefs is less in
. The power
rawn from th
s Madison, F
been asked
adistinction f
een already e
h examples
are not, for i
titution and w
y, notwithsta
the Constitu
terms.
ander Hamilt
oreign power
mbroiled by
ncident to a
to make any
he States on
Federalist # 4
what is mea
from those "
explained. A
of it.
instance, to e
will have no
anding, be em
ution and no
ton, Federali
rs might suff
the indiscret
power in the
ything but go
the same pr
44
ant by "cases
arising unde
All the restric
emit paper m
connection
mitted, the c
t the laws of
ist # 80
149
fer from the
tion of a sing
e States to em
old and silve
rinciple with
s arising und
er the laws o
ctions upon t
money; but th
with any law
controversies
f the United
same cause,
gle member.
mit paper m
er a tender in
h that of issui
der the Const
of the United
the authority
he interdicti
w of the Uni
s concerning
States, in th
, and hence t
. No one of t
money than to
n payment o
ing a paper c
titution," in
d States"? Th
y of the State
on results fr
ited States. S
g it would be
he ordinary s
the Union be
these
o coin gold o
f debts is
currency.
he difference
e legislatures
rom the
Should paper
e cases arisin
ignification
e
or
e
s
r
ng
Par
Will it
consti
encroa
But ex
that so
more p
extend
James
a mere
not a s
of all
James
chment
t be sufficien
itution of the
aching spirit
xperience as
ome more ad
powerful me
ding the sphe
s Madison, F
e demarcatio
sufficient gu
the powers o
s Madison, F
barrier
nt to mark, w
e governmen
t of power?
sures us that
dequate defe
embers of th
ere of its act
Federalist # 4
on on parchm
uard against t
of governme
Federalist # 4
rs insuff
with precisio
nt, and to tru
t the efficacy
ense is indisp
he governmen
tivity and dra
48
ment of the c
those encroa
ent in the sam
48
150
ficient
on, the bound
st to these p
y of the prov
pensably nec
nt. The legis
awing all po
constitutiona
achments wh
me hands.
daries of the
archment ba
vision has be
cessary for th
slative depar
ower into its
al limits of th
hich lead to a
ese departme
arriers agains
een greatly o
he more feeb
rtment is eve
impetuous v
he several de
a tyrannical
ents in the
st the
overrated; an
ble against th
erywhere
vortex.
epartments i
concentratio
nd
he
is
on
151
Part-time legislature
The representatives of each State will not only bring with them a considerable knowledge
of its laws, and a local knowledge of their respective districts, but will probably in all cases
have been members, and may even at the very time be members, of the State legislature
James Madison, Federalist # 56
Peo
It has
had a
severa
validit
right o
Owing
might
mainta
had re
The p
our na
fabric
PEOP
origin
Alexa
If the
but in
forms
Alexa
The g
should
depen
ple - the
not a little c
ratification b
al legislature
ty of its pow
of legislative
g its ratificat
repeal the la
ain that a pa
espectable ad
ossibility of
ational gover
of America
PLE. The stre
nal fountain o
ander Hamilt
representativ
the exertion
of governm
ander Hamilt
enius of repu
d be derived
ndence on the
e ultima
contributed t
by the PEOP
es, it has bee
wers, and has
e repeal.
tion to the la
aw by which
arty to a com
dvocates.
f a question o
rnment deep
n empire ou
eams of nati
of all legitim
ton, Federali
ves of the pe
n of that orig
ment
ton, Federali
ublican liber
d from the pe
e people by
ate sourc
o the infirmi
PLE. Resting
en exposed to
s in some ins
aw of a State
h it was ratif
mpact has a ri
of this nature
per than in th
ught to rest o
onal power o
mate authorit
ist # 22
eople betray
ginal right of
ist # 28
rty seems to
eople, but tha
a short durat
152
ce of aut
ities of the e
g on no bette
o frequent an
stances given
e, it has been
fied. Howeve
ight to revok
e proves the
he mere sanc
n the solid b
ought to flow
y.
their constit
f self-defense
demand on
at those intru
tion of their
thority
existing fede
er foundation
nd intricate q
n birth to the
n contended
er gross a he
ke that comp
necessity of
ction of deleg
basis of THE
w immediate
tuents, there
e which is p
one side not
usted with it
appointmen
eral system th
n than the co
questions co
e enormous
that the sam
eresy it may
pact, the doct
f laying the f
gated author
E CONSENT
ely from tha
e is then no r
aramount to
t only that al
t should be k
nts; and that
hat it never
onsent of the
oncerning the
doctrine of a
me authority
be to
trine itself h
foundations
rity. The
T OF THE
at pure,
resource left
o all positive
ll power
kept in
even during
e
e
a
as
of
g
this sh
on the
length
electio
in gov
single
James
If we
govern
name
body o
a limit
It is es
not fro
tyrann
aspire
republ
James
In ord
to the
power
author
On ex
found
for the
hort period th
e contrary, re
h of time the
ons; and a fr
vernment req
e hand.
s Madison, F
resort for a c
nment are es
on, a govern
of the people
ted period, o
ssential to su
om an incon
nical nobles,
e to the rank
lic.
s Madison, F
der to ascerta
foundation
rs are to be d
rity by which
xamining the
ded on the as
e special pur
he trust shou
equires that t
same. A fre
requent chan
quires not on
Federalist # 3
criterion to t
stablished, w
nment which
e, and is adm
or during goo
uch a govern
nsiderable pro
exercising t
of republica
Federalist # 3
ain the real c
on which it i
drawn; to the
h future chan
e first relation
sent and rati
rpose; but, o
uld be placed
the hands in
equent chang
nge of measu
nly a certain
37
the different
we may defin
h derives all
ministered by
od behavior.
nment that it
oportion or a
their oppress
ans and claim
39
character of t
is to be estab
e operation o
nges in the g
n, it appears
ification of th
n the other,
153
d not in a few
which powe
ge of men wi
ures from a fr
duration of p
principles o
ne a republic
its powers d
y persons ho
.
be derived f
a favored cla
sions by a de
m for their go
the governm
blished; to th
of those pow
government
s, on one han
he people of
that this asse
w, but a num
er is lodged
ill result from
frequent chan
power, but t
on which diff
c to be, or at
directly or in
olding their o
from the gre
ass of it; oth
elegation of
overnment th
ment, it may b
he sources fr
wers; to the e
are to be int
nd, that the C
f America, g
ent and ratif
mber of hand
should conti
m a frequent
nge of men:
the execution
fferent forms
least may b
ndirectly from
offices durin
eat body of th
herwise a han
their powers
he honorable
be considere
rom which it
extent of them
troduced.
Constitution
given by dep
fication is to
ds. Stability,
inue for a
t return of
whilst energ
n of it by a
s of
estow that
m the great
ng pleasure f
he society,
ndful of
s, might
e title of
ed in relation
ts ordinary
m; and to the
is to be
puties elected
be given by
gy
for
n
e
d
y
the pe
and in
ratific
author
not be
James
They m
to giv
nomin
their g
since
toward
inform
numbe
James
Truth,
depen
James
Whils
itself w
indivi
major
James
eople, not as
ndependent S
cation of the
rity of the pe
e a national b
s Madison, F
must have re
e way to sub
nal and nuga
governments
it is impossi
ds their obje
mal and unau
er of citizen
s Madison, F
, no less than
nd on the sen
s Madison, F
st all authorit
will be brok
duals, or of
rity.
s Madison, F
individuals
States to whi
several State
eople themse
but a federal
Federalist # 3
eflected that
bstance; that
atory the tran
s as to them
ible for the p
ect; and it is
uthorized pro
s.
Federalist # 4
n decency, re
ntiments and
Federalist # 4
ty in it will b
en into so m
the minority
Federalist # 5
composing o
ich they resp
es, derived f
elves. The ac
act.
39
t in all great
a rigid adhe
nscendent an
shall seem m
people sponta
therefore ess
opositions, m
40
equires that
sanction of
46
be derived fr
many parts, in
y, will be in l
51
154
one entire na
pectively bel
from the sup
ct, therefore,
changes of e
erence in suc
nd precious r
most likely to
aneously and
sential that s
made by som
the event in
their commo
rom and dep
nterests and
little danger
ation, but as
long. It is to
preme author
, establishin
established g
ch cases to th
right of the p
o effect their
d universally
such change
me patriotic a
every case s
on constitue
pendent on th
classes of ci
from interes
composing
be the assen
rity in each S
ng the Consti
governments
he former w
people to "ab
r safety and
y to move in
s be institute
and respectab
should be su
ents.
he society, th
itizens, that t
sted combin
the distinct
nt and
State the
itution will
s forms ough
would render
bolish or alte
happiness,"
n concert
ed by some
ble citizen o
upposed to
he society
the rights of
nations of the
ht
er
or
f
e
There
author
legisla
to affi
that th
by vir
forbid
Alexa
It is no
repres
more r
the pe
limits
provin
A con
theref
act pro
varian
course
statute
Nor
legisla
where
people
than th
by tho
is no positio
rity, contrary
ative act, the
irm that the d
he representa
rtue of power
d.
ander Hamilt
ot otherwise
sentatives of
rational to su
eople and the
assigned to
nce of the co
nstitution is,
fore belongs
oceeding fro
nce between
e, to be prefe
e, the intenti
does this co
ative power.
e the will of t
e, declared in
he former. T
ose which ar
on which dep
y to the teno
erefore, contr
deputy is gre
atives of the
rs may do no
ton, Federali
e to be suppo
f the people t
uppose that t
e legislature
their author
ourts.
in fact, and m
to them to a
om the legisl
the two, tha
erred; or, in
ion of the pe
onclusion by
It only supp
the legislatu
n the Consti
They ought to
e not fundam
pends on cle
or of the com
rary to the C
eater than hi
people are s
ot only what
ist # 78
osed that the
to substitute
the courts w
in order, am
rity. The inte
must be rega
ascertain its m
lative body.
at which has
other words
ople to the i
y any means
poses that th
ure, declared
itution, the ju
o regulate th
mental.
155
earer princip
mmission und
Constitution,
s principal; t
superior to th
t their power
Constitution
their will to
were designed
mong other th
erpretation o
arded by the
meaning as w
If there shou
the superior
, the Constit
ntention of t
suppose a su
e power of t
in its statute
udges ought
heir decision
ples than that
der which it
can be valid
that the serv
he people th
rs do not aut
n could inten
o that of their
d to be an in
hings, to kee
f the laws is
e judges as, a
well as the m
uld happen t
r obligation a
tution ought
their agents.
uperiority of
the people is
es, stands in
to be govern
ns by the fund
t every act o
is exercised
d. To deny th
vant is above
emselves; th
thorize, but w
nd to enable
r constituent
ntermediate b
ep the latter w
s the proper a
a fundament
meaning of a
to be an irrec
and validity
to be prefer
f the judicial
s superior to
opposition t
ned by the la
damental law
of a delegated
, is void. No
his would be
e his master;
hat men actin
what they
the
ts. It is far
body betwee
within the
and peculiar
al law. It
any particula
concilable
ought, of
rred to the
l to the
both, and th
to that of the
atter rather
ws rather tha
d
o
e
ng
en
r
ar
hat
e
an
156
This exercise of judicial discretion in determining between two contradictory laws is
exemplified in a familiar instance. It not uncommonly happens that there are two statutes
existing at one time, clashing in whole or in part with each other and neither of them
containing any repealing clause or expression. In such a case, it is the province of the
courts to liquidate and fix their meaning and operation. So far as they can, by fair
construction, be reconciled to each other, reason and law conspire to dictate that this
should be done; where this is impracticable, it becomes a matter of necessity to give effect
to one in exclusion of the other.
The rule which has obtained in the courts for determining their relative validity is that the
last in order of time shall be preferred to the first. But this is a mere rule of construction,
not derived from any positive law but from the nature and reason of the thing. It is a rule
not enjoined upon the courts by legislative provision but adopted by themselves, as
consonant to truth and propriety, for the direction of their conduct as interpreters of the
law. They thought it reasonable that between the interfering acts of an equal authority that
which was the last indication of its will should have the preference.
But in regard to the interfering acts of a superior and subordinate authority of an original
and derivative power, the nature and reason of the thing indicate the converse of that rule
as proper to be followed. They teach us that the prior act of a superior ought to be preferred
to the subsequent act of an inferior and subordinate authority; and that accordingly,
whenever a particular statute contravenes the Constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial
tribunals to adhere to the latter and disregard the former.
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 78
Peo
The sm
it; and
submi
jealou
suppo
The
faction
encroa
Alexa
If the
but in
forms
Alexa
Were
the St
the ad
though
should
and, o
The op
but in
preven
ple mus
mallness of t
d the citizens
it to its oppre
us acquiescen
ose may be e
e army under
n, or an occa
achments ag
ander Hamilt
representativ
the exertion
of governm
ander Hamilt
it admitted,
ate governm
dvantage in th
h unfriendly
d not too gro
of course, by
pposition of
flame the ze
nted or repai
st protec
the army ren
s, not habitu
essions, neit
nce in a nece
xerted to the
r such circum
asional mob,
gainst the uni
ton, Federali
ves of the pe
n of that orig
ment
ton, Federali
however, th
ments to exten
he means of
y to the natio
ossly violate
y means on th
f the federal
eal of all part
ired, if at all
ct thems
nders the nat
ated to look
ther love nor
essary evil a
e prejudice o
mstances ma
, or insurrect
ited efforts o
ist # 8
eople betray
ginal right of
ist # 28
hat the federa
nd its power
f defeating su
onal governm
the oaths of
he spot and d
government
ties on the si
, without the
157
selves fr
tural strength
up to the mi
r fear the sol
and stand rea
of their rights
ay usefully a
tion; but it w
of the great b
their constit
f self-defense
al governme
r beyond the
uch encroach
ment, be gene
f the State of
depending o
, or the inter
ide of the St
e employmen
rom the
h of the com
ilitary power
ldiery; they v
ady to resist
s.
aid the magis
will be unabl
body of the p
tuents, there
e which is p
nt may feel
e due limits,
hments. If an
erally popul
fficers, it is e
on the State a
rposition of f
tate, and the
nt of means
governm
mmunity an o
r for protect
view them w
a power whi
strate to supp
le to enforce
people.
e is then no r
aramount to
an equal dis
the latter wo
n act of a pa
ar in that Sta
executed imm
alone.
federal offic
evil could n
which must
ment
overmatch fo
tion, or to
with a spirit o
ich they
press a smal
e
resource left
o all positive
sposition wit
ould still hav
articular Stat
ate, and
mediately
cers, would
not be
t always be
or
of
ll
th
ve
te,
resorte
measu
fail to
the me
The d
the of
embar
occasi
large S
happe
hardly
But
govern
They w
cause.
Plans
The sa
produ
volunt
was m
govern
James
The on
vision
force
been e
of this
ed to with re
ure of the fed
be the case,
eans of oppo
isquietude o
fficers of the
rrassments c
ions, would
State, very s
ened to be in
y be willing t
ambitious en
nments wou
would be sig
. A correspo
of resistance
ame combin
uced by the d
tarily renoun
made in the o
nment to suc
s Madison, F
nly refuge le
nary supposit
for the proje
employed to
s danger. Th
eluctance and
deral govern
, or even a w
osition to it a
of the people
Union; the
created by leg
oppose, in a
serious impe
unison, wou
to encounter
ncroachmen
uld not excite
gnals of gene
ndence wou
e would be c
ations, in sh
dread of a for
nced, the sam
other. But wh
ch an extrem
Federalist # 4
eft for those
tion that the
ects of ambit
little purpos
at the people
d difficulty.
nment be unp
warrantable m
are powerful
; their repug
frowns of th
gislative dev
any State, dif
diments; and
uld present o
r.
nts of the fed
e the opposit
eral alarm. E
uld be opened
concerted. O
hort, would r
reign, yoke;
me appeal to
hat degree of
mity?
46
who prophe
federal gove
tion. The rea
se indeed, if
e and the Sta
158
On the othe
popular in pa
measure be s
l and at hand
gnance and, p
he executive
vices, which
fficulties not
d where the
obstructions
deral governm
tion of a sing
Every govern
d.
One spirit wo
esult from an
and unless t
o a trial of fo
f madness co
esy the down
ernment may
asonings con
f it could be n
ates should,
er hand, shou
articular Stat
so, which ma
d.
perhaps, refu
magistracy
would often
t to be despi
sentiments o
which the fe
ment on the
gle State, or
nment would
ould animate
an apprehens
the projected
orce would b
ould ever dr
nfall of the S
y previously
ntained in the
necessary no
for a sufficie
uld an unwar
tes, which w
ay sometime
usal to co-op
of the State;
n be added o
sed; would f
of several ad
ederal gover
authority of
of a few Sta
d espouse th
and conduc
sion of the fe
d innovation
e made in th
rive the feder
State governm
y accumulate
ese papers m
ow to dispro
ent period o
rrantable
would seldom
es be the cas
perate with
; the
on such
form, in a
djoining Stat
rnment woul
f the State
ates only.
he common
ct the whole.
ederal, as wa
ns should be
he one case a
ral
ments is the
e a military
must have
ove the realit
f time, elect
m
e,
tes
ld
as
as
ty
159
an uninterrupted succession of men ready to betray both; that the traitors should,
throughout this period, uniformly and systematically pursue some fixed plan for the
extension of the military establishment; that the governments and the people of the States
should silently and patiently behold the gathering storm and continue to supply the
materials until it should be prepared to burst on their own heads must appear to everyone
more like the incoherent dreams of a delirious jealousy, or the misjudged exaggerations of
a counterfeit zeal, than like the sober apprehensions of genuine patriotism.
Extravagant as the supposition is, let it, however, be made. Let a regular army, fully equal
to the resources of the country, be formed; and let it be entirely at the devotion of the
federal government: still it would not be going too far to say that the State governments
with the people on their side would be able to repel the danger.
The highest number to which, according to the best computation, a standing army can be
carried in any country does not exceed one hundredth part of the whole number of souls; or
one twenty-fifth part of the number able to bear arms. This proportion would not yield, in
the United States, an army of more than twenty-five or thirty thousand men. To these
would be opposed a militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their
hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their common
liberties and united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and
confidence. It may well be doubted whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be
conquered by such a proportion of regular troops.
Those who are best acquainted with the late successful resistance of this country against
the British arms will be most inclined to deny the possibility of it. Besides the advantage of
being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation,
the existence of subordinate governments, to which the people are attached and by which
the militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more
insurmountable than any which a simple government of any form can admit of.
Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe, which are
carried as far as the public resources will bear, the governments are afraid to trust the
people with arms. And it is not certain that with this aid alone they would not be able to
shake
govern
nation
attach
the thr
which
Let us
be les
debase
oppre
reduce
submi
James
The tr
tempo
few ye
and w
give a
have r
actuat
charac
I am u
circum
choice
schem
I am u
watch
off their yok
nments chos
nal force, and
hed both to th
rone of every
h surround it
s not insult th
s able to def
ed subjects o
ssors. Let us
e themselves
ission to the
s Madison, F
rue question
orary regulat
ears, and a h
well-guarded
a negative an
received with
tes the State
cter of every
unable to con
mstances wh
e of, sixty-fiv
me of tyranny
unable to con
h and which p
kes. But wer
sen by thems
d of officers
hem and to t
y tyranny in
.
he free and g
fend the righ
of arbitrary p
s rather no lo
s to the nece
long train o
Federalist # 4
to be decide
tion, be dang
hundred or tw
power of leg
nswer to this
h regard to t
legislatures,
y class of citi
nceive that th
hich can spee
ve or a hund
y or treacher
nceive that th
possess so m
re the people
selves, who c
appointed o
the militia, it
n Europe wou
gallant citize
hts of which
power would
onger insult t
essity of mak
f insidious m
46
ed, then, is w
gerous to the
wo hundred
gislating for
question, w
the present g
, and the prin
izens.
he people of
edily happen
dred men wh
ry.
he State legi
many means
160
e to possess
could collec
out of the mi
t may be affi
uld be speed
ens of Ameri
they would b
d be to rescu
them with th
king the expe
measures wh
whether the s
e public liber
for a few mo
the United S
without first o
genius of the
nciples whic
f America, in
n, will choose
ho would be
islatures, wh
of counterac
the addition
ct the nationa
ilitia by these
irmed with t
dily overturn
ica with the
be in actual
ue theirs from
he suppositio
eriment by a
hich must pre
smallness of
rty? Whether
ore, be a safe
States? I mu
obliterating e
people of A
ch are incorp
n their prese
e, and every
disposed to
hich must fee
cting the fed
nal advantage
al will and d
e governmen
the greatest a
ned in spite o
suspicion th
possession t
m the hands
on that they
a blind and ta
ecede and pr
f the number
r sixty-five m
fe depositary
ust own that
every impres
America, the
porated with
ent temper, o
y second year
form and pu
el so many m
deral legislatu
es of local
direct the
nts and
assurance th
of the legion
hat they wou
than the
of their
can ever
ame
roduce it.
r, as a
members for
y for a limite
I could not
ssion which
spirit which
the political
or under any
r repeat the
ursue a
motives to
ure, would
at
s
uld
r a
d
I
h
l
fail eit
comm
in any
recom
dare, w
What
requir
from t
moder
the nu
James
the Ho
recolle
minds
compe
is to b
there f
title to
I wi
restrai
its ful
societ
can co
It crea
few go
degen
from m
ther to detec
mon constitue
y short time,
mmending the
within the sh
change of ci
res a prophet
the circumst
rate period o
umber of han
s Madison, F
ouse of Repr
ection of the
s by the mod
elled to antic
be reviewed,
forever to re
o a renewal o
ll add, as a f
ining them f
l operation o
ty. This has a
onnect the ru
ates between
overnments
nerates into ty
making lega
ct or to defea
ents. I am eq
in the Unite
emselves to
hort space of
ircumstance
tic spirit to d
ances now b
of time, I mu
nds proposed
Federalist # 5
resentatives
eir dependen
de of their ele
cipate the mo
and when th
emain unless
of it.
fifth circums
from oppress
on themselve
always been
ulers and the
n them that c
have furnish
yranny. If it
al discriminat
at a conspira
qually unable
ed States, any
the choice o
f two years,
s time, and a
declare, whic
before us, an
ust pronounc
d by the fede
55
is so constit
nce on the pe
evation can b
oment when
hey must des
s a faithful di
stance in the
sive measure
es and their f
deemed one
e people toge
communion o
hed example
be asked, w
tions in favo
161
acy of the lat
e to conceive
y sixty-five
of the people
to betray the
a fuller popu
ch makes no
nd from the p
ce that the lib
eral Constitu
tuted as to su
eople. Before
be effaced b
n their power
scend to the
ischarge of t
situation of
es, that they
friends, as w
e of the stron
ether.
of interests a
es; but witho
what is to rest
or of themsel
tter against th
e that there a
or a hundred
e at large, wh
e solemn tru
ulation of ou
part of my p
probable stat
berties of Am
ution.
upport in the
e the sentime
by the exerci
r is to cease,
level from w
their trust sh
f the House o
can make no
well as on the
ngest bonds
and sympath
out which eve
train the Hou
lves and a pa
he liberties o
are at this tim
d men capab
ho would eit
ust committed
ur country ma
pretensions.
te of them w
merica canno
e members an
ents impress
ise of power,
, when their
which they w
hall have esta
of Represent
o law which
e great mass
by which hu
hy of sentime
ery governm
use of Repre
articular cla
of their
me, or can b
ble of
ther desire or
d to them.
ay produce
But judging
within a
ot be unsafe
n habitual
sed on their
, they will be
exercise of i
were raised;
ablished thei
tatives,
will not hav
s of the
uman policy
ents of which
ment
esentatives
ss of the
e
r
g
in
e
it
ir
ve
h
societ
laws;
a spiri
If this
legisla
liberty
James
WE H
could
would
regula
emplo
exclus
it imp
. . . T
reflect
body o
conce
season
but th
invade
govern
incred
Alexa
ty? I answer:
and, above a
it which nou
spirit shall e
ature, as wel
y.
s Madison, F
HAVE seen t
not, without
d be the dang
ating its own
oyed in such
sion of other
racticable to
The improbab
tion, that it c
of the people
ive that this
ns, be violate
at so fundam
ed to the pre
nment witho
dible.
ander Hamilt
: the genius o
all, the vigila
urishes freedo
ever be so fa
ll as on the p
Federalist # 5
that an uncon
t hazard, be
ger on the ot
n elections to
a manner as
rs by confini
o the citizens
bility of the a
could never b
e, headed an
characterist
ed, in respec
mental a priv
ejudice of the
out occasioni
ton, Federali
of the whole
ant and man
om, and in r
ar debased a
people, the p
57
ntrollable po
committed t
ther side; tha
o the Union i
s to promote
ing the place
s at large to p
attempt may
be made wit
nd directed b
ic right of fr
ct to a particu
vilege, in a co
e great mass
ing a popula
ist # 60
162
e system; the
ly spirit whi
return is nour
s to tolerate
eople will b
ower over th
to the State l
at is, from co
itself. . . . B
e the election
es of election
partake in th
y be satisfact
thout causing
by the State g
reedom may,
ular class of
ountry so sit
s of the peop
ar revolution
e nature of ju
ich actuates
urished by it.
a law not ob
e prepared to
e elections t
legislatures.
onfiding the
But it is alleg
n of some fav
n to particula
he choice.
torily inferre
g an immedi
governments
, in certain tu
f citizens, by
tuated and en
ple by the del
n, is altogethe
ust and const
the people o
bligatory on
o tolerate an
to the federa
Let us now
ultimate righ
ed that it mi
vorite class o
ar districts an
ed from this
iate revolt of
s. It is not di
turbulent and
y a victorious
nlightened, s
liberate poli
er inconceiv
titutional
of America -
the
nything but
l governmen
see what
ht of
ight be
of men in
nd rendering
single
f the great
ifficult to
d factious
s majority;
should be
cy of the
vable and
-
nt
g
Poli
The so
public
legisla
enterp
inform
They h
repetit
preced
James
The in
of libe
own c
they c
underg
what i
which
Ano
sagaci
mass o
manne
those
thems
state o
for the
icy chan
ober people
c councils. T
ative interfer
prising and in
med part of th
have seen, to
tions, every
ding.
s Madison, F
nternal effec
erty itself. It
choice if the
cannot be un
go such ince
it will be tom
h is little kno
other effect o
ious, the ent
of the people
er affecting t
who watch t
selves, but by
of things in w
e many.
nges
of America
They have se
rences, in ca
nfluential sp
he communi
oo, that one
subsequent
Federalist # 4
ts of a mutab
will be of li
laws be so v
derstood; if
essant chang
morrow. Law
own, and less
of public inst
erprising, an
e. Every new
the value of
the change, a
y the toils an
which it may
are weary of
en with regr
ases affecting
peculators, an
ity.
legislative in
interference
44
ble policy ar
ittle avail to
voluminous t
they be repe
ges that no m
w is defined
s fixed?
tability is the
nd the money
w regulation
the differen
and can trac
nd cares of th
y be said wit
163
f the fluctua
ret and indig
g personal ri
nd snares to
nterference i
being natur
re still more
the people th
that they can
ealed or revis
man, who kno
to be a rule o
e unreasonab
yed few ove
concerning
nt species of p
e its consequ
he great bod
th some truth
ating policy w
gnation that s
ights, becom
the more ind
is but the fir
rally produce
calamitous.
hat the laws
nnot be read
sed before th
ows what the
of action; bu
ble advantag
r the industr
commerce o
property, pr
uences; a ha
dy of their fe
h that laws a
which has di
sudden chan
me jobs in the
dustrious an
rst link of a l
ed by the eff
It poisons th
are made by
, or so incoh
hey are prom
e law is toda
ut how can th
ge it gives to
rious and uni
or revenue, o
resents a new
arvest, reared
llow-citizen
are made for
irected the
ges and
e hands of
nd less
long chain o
fects of the
he blessings
y men of the
herent that
mulgated, or
ay, can guess
hat be a rule
o the
informed
or in any
w harvest to
d not by
ns. This is a
the few, not
f
s
eir
s
e,
t
James
What
knows
James
It may
good o
will h
incons
and ge
the ex
any gi
greate
defeat
numbe
Alexa
s Madison, F
prudent mer
s not but tha
s Madison, F
y perhaps be
ones; and m
ave little we
stancy and m
enius of our
xcess of lawm
iven period a
er stability in
ting a few go
er of bad on
ander Hamilt
Federalist # 6
rchant will h
at his plans m
Federalist # 6
e said that the
ay be used to
eight with tho
mutability in
government
making, and
as much mor
n the system
ood laws wil
es.
ton, Federali
62
hazard his fo
may be rende
62
e power of p
o the one pu
ose who can
the laws, wh
ts. They will
to keep thin
re likely to d
of legislatio
ll be amply c
ist # 73
164
rtunes in any
ered unlawfu
preventing ba
urpose as we
n properly es
hich form th
l consider ev
ngs in the sam
do good than
on. The injur
compensated
y branch of
ul before the
ad laws inclu
ll as to the o
stimate the m
he greatest b
very instituti
me state in w
n harm; beca
ury which ma
d by the adv
commerce w
ey can be exe
udes that of
other. But thi
mischiefs of t
lemish in the
ion calculate
which they h
ause it is favo
ay possibly b
antage of pr
when he
ecuted?
preventing
is objection
that
e character
ed to restrain
happen to be
orable to
be done by
reventing a
n
at
165
Property
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the
liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same
opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy that it was worse than the
disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly
expires. But it could not be a less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life,
because it nourishes faction than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is
essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.
The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the
reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will
be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his
opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former
will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves.
The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not
less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is
the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of
acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately
results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective
proprietors ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them
everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different
circumstances of civil society.
A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other
points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously
contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes
166
have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties,
inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and
oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity
of mankind to fall into mutual animosities that where no substantial occasion presents itself
the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly
passions and excite their most violent conflicts.
But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal
distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever
formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors,
fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile
interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized
nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views.
The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern
legislation and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary
operations of government.
James Madison, Federalist # 10
Pur
The pr
memb
extern
superi
Alexa
Was, t
the pr
not th
govern
a certa
sovere
We ha
kings,
shape
institu
that th
to be p
be fitt
Jame
it is th
James
rpose of
rincipal purp
bers; the pres
nal attacks; th
intendence o
ander Hamilt
then, the Am
ecious blood
at the people
nments of th
ain extent of
eignty?
ave heard of
, not kings fo
that the soli
utions of a di
he public goo
pursued; and
ted for the at
s Madison, F
he reason, alo
s Madison, F
governm
poses to be a
servation of
he regulation
of our interco
ton, Federali
merican Revo
d of thousand
e of America
he individual
f power and
f the impious
or the people
id happiness
ifferent form
od, the real w
d that no form
ttainment of
Federalist #
one, of the p
Federalist # 4
ment
answered by
the public p
n of commer
ourse, politic
ist # 23
olution effec
ds spilt, and
a should enjo
l States, that
be arrayed w
s doctrine in
e. Is the sam
of the peop
m? It is too ea
welfare of th
m of govern
this object.
45
public, that o
49
167
y union are th
eace, as wel
rce with othe
cal and comm
cted, was the
the hard-ear
oy peace, lib
t particular m
with certain d
the old worl
me doctrine to
le is to be sa
arly for polit
he great body
nment whatev
ought to cont
hese the com
ll against int
er nations an
mercial, with
e American C
rned substan
berty, and sa
municipal est
dignities and
rld, that the p
o be revived
acrificed to t
ticians to pre
y of the peop
ver has any o
trol and regu
mmon defens
ternal convul
nd between t
h foreign co
Confederacy
nce of millio
afety, but tha
tablishments
d attributes o
people were
d in the new,
the views of
esume on ou
ple, is the su
other value t
ulate the gov
se of the
lsions as
the States; th
untries.
y formed, wa
ons lavished,
at the
s, might enjo
of
made for
in another
f political
ur forgetting
upreme objec
than as it ma
vernment.
he
as
,
oy
ct
ay
Justice
be pur
James
Gover
indivi
A goo
the ha
be bes
are de
attenti
James
e is the end o
rsued until it
s Madison, F
rnment is ins
duals. Jame
od governme
appiness of th
st attained. S
eficient in the
ion has been
s Madison, F
of governme
t be obtained
Federalist # 5
stituted no le
es Madison,
ent implies tw
he people; se
Some govern
e first. I scru
n paid to the
Federalist # 6
ent. It is the
d, or until lib
51
ess for prote
Federalist #
wo things: fi
econdly, a k
nments are d
uple not to as
last.
62
168
end of civil
berty be lost
ction of the
54
irst, fidelity
knowledge of
eficient in b
ssert that in
society. It ev
in the pursu
proptery tha
to the object
f the means
oth these qu
American go
ver has been
uit.
an of the per
t of governm
by which th
ualities; most
overnments
n and ever w
sons of
ment, which
at object can
t governmen
too little
will
is
n
nts
169
Qualifications for office
Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose merit may recommend
him to the esteem and confidence of his country. No qualification of wealth, of birth, of
religious faith, or of civil profession is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint the
inclination of the people.
James Madison, Federalist # 57
170
Ratification; Method and significance of
First. -- In order to ascertain the real character of the government, it may be considered in
relation to the foundation on which it is to be established; to the sources from which its
ordinary powers are to be drawn; to the operation of those powers; to the extent of them;
and to the authority by which future changes in the government are to be introduced.
On examining the first relation, it appears, on one hand, that the Constitution is to be
founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America, given by deputies elected
for the special purpose; but, on the other, that this assent and ratification is to be given by
the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct
and independent States to which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and
ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme authority in each State the
authority of the people themselves. The act, therefore, establishing the Constitution will
not be a national but a federal act.
James Madison, Federalist # 39
Reb
But it
passed
well a
I answ
the fir
federa
use of
forme
exigen
light,
Alexa
WE H
could
would
regula
emplo
exclus
it imp
. . . T
reflect
body o
conce
season
but th
invade
bellion
may be agai
d for executi
and as fully u
wer in the sec
rst instance,
al governmen
f its powers,
ed, and take s
ncy may sug
must always
ander Hamilt
HAVE seen t
not, without
d be the dang
ating its own
oyed in such
sion of other
racticable to
The improbab
tion, that it c
of the people
ive that this
ns, be violate
at so fundam
ed to the pre
in asked, Wh
ing the powe
upon the sim
cond place th
of the prope
nt should ov
the people,
such measur
ggest and pru
s be determin
ton, Federali
that an uncon
t hazard, be
ger on the ot
n elections to
a manner as
rs by confini
o the citizens
bility of the a
could never b
e, headed an
characterist
ed, in respec
mental a priv
ejudice of the
ho is to judg
ers of the Un
mple grant of
hat the natio
er exercise of
verpass the ju
whose creatu
res to redress
udence justif
ned by the n
ist # 33
ntrollable po
committed t
ther side; tha
o the Union i
s to promote
ing the place
s at large to p
attempt may
be made wit
nd directed b
ic right of fr
ct to a particu
vilege, in a co
e great mass
171
ge of the nec
nion? I answ
f those powe
onal governm
f its powers,
ust bounds o
ure it is, mu
s the injury d
fy. The propr
nature of the
ower over th
to the State l
at is, from co
itself. . . . B
e the election
es of election
partake in th
y be satisfact
thout causing
by the State g
reedom may,
ular class of
ountry so sit
s of the peop
essity and pr
wer first that t
ers as upon th
ment, like ev
, and its cons
of its authori
ust appeal to
done to the C
riety of a law
powers upo
e elections t
legislatures.
onfiding the
But it is alleg
n of some fav
n to particula
he choice.
torily inferre
g an immedi
governments
, in certain tu
f citizens, by
tuated and en
ple by the del
ropriety of t
this question
he declarator
very other, m
stituents in t
ty and make
the standard
Constitution
w, in a const
n which it is
to the federa
Let us now
ultimate righ
ed that it mi
vorite class o
ar districts an
ed from this
iate revolt of
s. It is not di
turbulent and
y a victorious
nlightened, s
liberate poli
the laws to b
n arises as
ry clause; an
must judge, in
the last. If th
e a tyrannica
d they have
n as the
titutional
s founded.
l governmen
see what
ht of
ight be
of men in
nd rendering
single
f the great
ifficult to
d factious
s majority;
should be
cy of the
be
nd
n
he
al
nt
g
govern
incred
Alexa
[Spea
citizen
extrem
to sub
Alexa
nment witho
dible.
ander Hamilt
aking of thos
ns, not less t
mes of their r
bstitute men w
ander Hamilt
out occasioni
ton, Federali
se who woul
tenacious tha
respective S
who would b
ton, Federali
ing a popula
ist # 60
ld devise unj
an conscious
tates to the p
be disposed
ist # 60
172
ar revolution
just election
s of their righ
places of ele
to avenge th
n, is altogethe
n rules:] Wou
hts, would fl
ection, to ove
he violated m
er inconceiv
uld they not
flock from th
erthrow their
majesty of th
vable and
fear that
he remotest
r tyrants and
he people?
d
173
Representatives to control purse strings
a constitutional and infallible resource still remains with the larger States by which they
will be able at all times to accomplish their just purposes. The House of Representatives
cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose the supplies requisite for the support of
government.
They, in a word, hold the purse --- that powerful instrument by which we behold, in the
history of the British Constitution, an infant and humble representation of the people
gradually enlarging the sphere of its activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far as
it seems to have wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the
government.
This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual
weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people,
for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and
salutary measure.
James Madison, Federalist # 58
Rep
Is it no
depen
should
willin
and th
his ass
and th
Alexa
It is a
intere
to tho
relate.
James
presenta
ot natural th
ndent on the
d take care to
ng to allow th
he necessity
sent are the t
he constituen
ander Hamilt
sound and im
sts and circu
se circumsta
.
s Madison, F
atives to
at a man wh
suffrages of
o inform him
hem their pro
of being bou
true and they
nt.
ton, Federali
mportant pri
umstance of
ances and int
Federalist # 5
know th
ho is a candid
f his fellow-c
mself of their
oper degree
und, himself
y are the stro
ist # 35
inciple that t
his constitue
terests to wh
56
174
he will o
date for the f
citizens for th
r disposition
of influence
f and his post
ong cords of
the represent
ents. But this
hich the auth
of consti
favor of the
the continuan
ns and inclin
e upon his co
terity, by the
f sympathy b
tative ought
s principle c
hority and ca
ituents
people, and
nce of his pu
nations and sh
onduct? This
e laws to wh
between the
to be acqua
can extend no
are of the rep
who is
ublic honors
hould be
s dependence
hich he gives
representativ
ainted with th
o further tha
presentative
,
e,
s
ve
he
an
Rep
A repu
place
James
Let us
The
delega
rest; s
latter m
The
views
may b
will b
regula
the pe
thems
On the
or of s
suffra
small
public
In th
repres
few; a
publican
ublic, by wh
s Madison, F
s examine th
two great po
ation of the g
econdly, the
may be exte
effect of the
by passing t
best discern t
e least likely
ation it may w
eople, will be
selves, conve
e other hand
sinister desig
ges, and then
or extensive
c weal; and i
he first place
sentatives mu
and that how
n form; i
hich I mean a
Federalist # 1
he points in w
oints of diffe
government,
e greater num
ended.
e first differe
them throug
the true inter
y to sacrifice
well happen
e more conso
ened for the
d, the effect m
gns, may, by
n betray the
e republics a
it is clearly d
e it is to be re
ust be raised
wever large it
ingredie
a governmen
10
which it vari
erence betwe
, in the latter
mber of citiz
ence is, on th
gh the mediu
rest of their
e it to tempor
n that the pub
onant to the
purpose.
may be inver
y intrigue, by
interests of
are most favo
decided in fa
emarked tha
d to a certain
t may be they
175
ents of
nt in which t
es from pure
een a democ
r, to a small
ens and grea
he one hand,
um of a chose
country and
rary or parti
blic voice, pr
public good
rted. Men of
y corruption,
the people. T
orable to the
avor of the la
at however sm
n number in o
y must be lim
the scheme o
e democracy
cracy and a r
number of c
ater sphere o
, to refine an
en body of c
whose patri
al considera
ronounced b
d than if pron
f factious tem
, or by other
The question
election of p
atter by two
mall the repu
order to guar
mited to a ce
of representa
y, ...
republic are:
citizens elect
of country ov
nd enlarge th
citizens, who
iotism and lo
ations. Under
by the repres
nounced by t
mpers, of loc
r means, first
n resulting is
proper guard
obvious con
ublic may be
ard against th
ertain numbe
ation takes
first, the
ted by the
ver which th
he public
ose wisdom
ove of justic
r such a
sentatives of
the people
cal prejudice
t obtain the
s, whether
dians of the
nsiderations.
e the
he cabals of a
er in order to
he
e
f
es,
a
o
guard
cases
in the
large t
a grea
In th
the lar
practic
suffra
the mo
It m
which
you re
lesser
too lit
forms
to the
James
Exten
probab
other
it to d
James
... in a
they a
against the
not being in
small repub
than in the s
ater probabili
he next place
rge than in th
ce with succ
ges of the pe
ost attractive
must be confe
h inconvenien
ender the rep
interests; as
ttle fit to com
a happy com
national, the
s Madison, F
d the sphere
ble that a ma
citizens; or i
discover their
s Madison, F
a democracy
assemble and
confusion of
n proportion
blic, it follow
mall republi
ity of a fit ch
e, as each rep
he small rep
cess the vicio
eople being m
e merit and t
essed that in
nces will be
presentative
s by reducing
mprehend an
mbination in
e local and p
Federalist # 1
e and you tak
ajority of the
if such a com
r own streng
Federalist # 1
y the people m
d administer
f a multitude
to that of the
ws that if the
ic, the forme
hoice.
presentative
ublic, it will
ous arts by w
more free, w
the most diff
this, as in m
found to lie
too little acq
g it too much
nd pursue gre
n this respect
particular to
10
ke in a greate
e whole will
mmon motiv
gth and to act
10
meet and exe
it by their re
176
e. Hence, the
e constituent
proportion o
er will presen
will be chos
l be more dif
which electio
will be more
fusive and es
most other ca
e. By enlargi
quainted with
h, you rende
eat and natio
t; the great a
the State leg
er variety of
have a com
ve exists, it w
t in unison w
ercise the go
epresentative
e number of
ts, and being
of fit charact
nt a greater o
sen by a gre
fficult for un
ons are too o
likely to cen
stablished ch
ases, there is
ing too much
h all their lo
er him undul
onal objects.
and aggregat
gislatures.
f parties and
mmon motive
will be more
with each oth
overnment in
es and agent
f representati
g proportion
ters be not le
option, and c
eater number
nworthy cand
often carried;
nter on men
haracters.
a mean, on
h the number
ocal circumst
ly attached to
The federal
te interests b
interests; yo
e to invade th
difficult for
her.
n person; in
ts. A democr
ives in the tw
ally greatest
ess in the
consequently
r of citizens i
didates to
; and the
who possess
both sides o
r of electors
tances and
o these, and
Constitution
being referred
ou make it le
he rights of
r all who feel
a republic
racy,
wo
t
y
in
s
of
,
n
d
ess
l
conseq
region
As the
permi
will in
republ
people
James
The g
should
depen
this sh
Stabil
for a l
of elec
energy
by a s
James
The fi
govern
with th
Revol
to rest
quently, mu
n. James Ma
e natural lim
t the most re
nclude no gr
lic is that dis
e to meet as
s Madison, F
enius of repu
d be derived
ndence on the
hort period th
ity, on the co
length of tim
ctions; and a
y in governm
ingle hand.
s Madison, F
irst question
nment be str
he genius of
lution; or wit
t all our poli
st be confine
adison, Fede
mit of a demo
emote citizen
eater numbe
stance from
often as may
Federalist # 1
ublican liber
d from the pe
e people by
he trust shou
ontrary, requ
me the same.
a frequent ch
ment require
Federalist # 3
that offers i
rictly republi
f the people o
th that honor
tical experim
ed to a small
eralist # 14
ocracy is that
ns to assemb
er than can jo
the center w
y be necessa
14
rty seems to
eople, but tha
a short durat
uld be placed
uires that the
A frequent c
hange of mea
s not only a
37
itself is whet
ican. It is ev
of America;
rable determ
ments on the
177
l spot. A rep
t distance fro
ble as often a
oin in those
which will ba
ary for the ad
demand on
at those intru
tion of their
d not in a few
e hands in w
change of m
asures from
certain dura
ther the gene
vident that no
with the fun
mination whi
e capacity of
public may b
om the centr
as their publ
functions, so
arely allow th
dministration
one side not
usted with it
appointmen
w, but a num
which power
men will resu
a frequent c
ation of powe
eral form and
o other form
ndamental pr
ch animates
f mankind fo
be extended o
ral point whi
ic functions
o the natural
he represent
n of public a
t only that al
t should be k
nts; and that
mber of hand
is lodged sh
ult from a fre
change of me
er, but the ex
d aspect of t
m would be re
rinciples of
every votar
or self-govern
over a large
ich will just
demand, an
l limit of a
tatives of the
affairs.
ll power
kept in
even during
ds.
hould continu
equent return
en: whilst
xecution of i
the
econcilable
the
ry of freedom
nment.
nd
e
g
ue
n
it
m
James
What,
questi
politic
found
If w
govern
name
body o
a limit
It is es
not fro
tyrann
aspire
republ
Jame
The re
govern
does n
every
their p
It is a
applie
preten
experi
s Madison, F
, then, are th
ion to be sou
cal writers to
d. ...
we resort for
nment are es
on, a govern
of the people
ted period, o
ssential to su
om an incon
nical nobles,
e to the rank
lic.
s Madison, F
epublican pr
n the conduc
not require a
transient im
prejudices to
just observa
es to their ve
nd that they a
ience that th
Federalist # 3
he distinctive
ught, not by r
o the constitu
a criterion t
stablished, w
nment which
e, and is adm
or during goo
uch a govern
nsiderable pro
exercising t
of republica
Federalist #
rinciple dema
ct of those to
an unqualifie
mpulse which
o betray their
ation that the
ery errors. Bu
always reaso
hey sometime
39
e characters o
recurring to
utions of diff
to the differe
we may defin
h derives all
ministered by
od behavior.
nment that it
oportion or a
their oppress
ans and claim
39
ands that the
o whom they
ed complaisa
h the people
r interests.
e people com
ut their good
on right abou
es err; and th
178
of the republ
principles b
fferent States
ent principles
ne a republic
its powers d
y persons ho
.
be derived f
a favored cla
sions by a de
m for their go
e deliberate s
y intrust the m
ance to every
may receive
mmonly inten
d sense woul
ut the means
he wonder is
lican form?
but in the app
s, no satisfac
s on which d
c to be, or at
directly or in
olding their o
from the gre
ass of it; oth
elegation of
overnment th
sense of the
managemen
y sudden bre
e from the ar
nd the PUBL
ld despise th
s of promotin
s that they so
Were an ans
plication of t
ctory one wo
different form
least may b
ndirectly from
offices durin
eat body of th
herwise a han
their powers
he honorable
community
nt of their aff
eeze of passi
rts of men, w
LIC GOOD.
he adulator w
ng it. They k
o seldom err
swer to this
the term by
ould ever be
ms of
estow that
m the great
ng pleasure f
he society,
ndful of
s, might
e title of
should
fairs; but it
on, or to
who flatter
This often
who should
know from
r as they do,
for
179
beset as they continually are by the wiles of parasites and sycophants, by the snares of the
ambitious, the avaricious, the desperate, by the artifices of men who possess their
confidence more than they deserve it, and of those who seek to possess rather than to
deserve it.
When occasions present themselves in which the interests of the people are at variance
with their inclinations, it is the duty of the persons whom they have appointed to be the
guardians of those interests to withstand the temporary delusion in order to give them time
and opportunity for more cool and sedate reflection. Instances might be cited in which a
conduct of this kind has saved the people from very fatal consequences of their own
mistakes, and has procured lasting monuments of their gratitude to the men who had
courage and magnanimity enough to serve them at the peril of their displeasure.
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 71
Rep
It has
countr
of men
choice
accide
Alexa
the Ho
recolle
minds
compe
is to b
there f
title to
I w
restrai
its ful
societ
can co
It crea
few go
degen
from m
societ
publics r
been freque
ry, by their c
n are really c
e, or whether
ent and force
ander Hamilt
ouse of Repr
ection of the
s by the mod
elled to antic
be reviewed,
forever to re
o a renewal o
ill add, as a
ining them f
l operation o
ty. This has a
onnect the ru
ates between
overnments
nerates into ty
making lega
ty? I answer:
require
ently remarke
conduct and
capable or n
r they are fo
e.
ton, Federali
resentatives
eir dependen
de of their ele
cipate the mo
and when th
emain unless
of it.
fifth circum
from oppress
on themselve
always been
ulers and the
n them that c
have furnish
yranny. If it
al discriminat
: the genius o
enlighte
ed that it see
example, to
not of establi
orever destin
ist # 1
is so constit
nce on the pe
evation can b
oment when
hey must des
s a faithful di
stance in the
sive measure
es and their f
deemed one
e people toge
communion o
hed example
be asked, w
tions in favo
of the whole
180
ened citi
ems to have b
decide the i
shing good g
ed to depend
tuted as to su
eople. Before
be effaced b
n their power
scend to the
ischarge of t
e situation of
es, that they
friends, as w
e of the stron
ether.
of interests a
es; but witho
what is to rest
or of themsel
e system; the
izenry
been reserve
important qu
government
d for their po
upport in the
e the sentime
by the exerci
r is to cease,
level from w
their trust sh
f the House
can make no
well as on the
ngest bonds
and sympath
out which eve
train the Hou
lves and a pa
e nature of ju
ed to the peo
uestion, whe
from reflect
olitical const
e members an
ents impress
ise of power,
, when their
which they w
hall have esta
of Represen
o law which
e great mass
by which hu
hy of sentime
ery governm
use of Repre
articular cla
ust and const
ople of this
ether societie
tion and
titutions on
n habitual
sed on their
, they will be
exercise of i
were raised;
ablished thei
ntatives,
will not hav
s of the
uman policy
ents of which
ment
esentatives
ss of the
titutional
es
e
it
ir
ve
h
laws;
a spiri
If th
legisla
liberty
James
A goo
the ha
be bes
are de
attenti
James
and, above a
it which nou
his spirit sha
ature, as wel
y.
s Madison, F
od governme
appiness of th
st attained. S
eficient in the
ion has been
s Madison, F
all, the vigila
urishes freedo
all ever be so
ll as on the p
Federalist # 5
ent implies tw
he people; se
Some govern
e first. I scru
n paid to the
Federalist # 6
ant and man
om, and in r
o far debased
people, the p
57
wo things: fi
econdly, a k
nments are d
uple not to as
last.
62
181
ly spirit whi
return is nour
d as to tolera
eople will b
irst, fidelity
knowledge of
eficient in b
ssert that in
ich actuates
urished by it.
ate a law not
e prepared to
to the object
f the means
oth these qu
American go
the people o
t obligatory o
o tolerate an
t of governm
by which th
ualities; most
overnments
of America -
on the
nything but
ment, which
at object can
t governmen
too little
-
is
n
nts
Res
An ind
affairs
to his
declin
makin
with th
emotio
indisc
wisdo
system
James
No go
respec
stabili
James
pectabil
dividual who
s without any
own unstead
ne to connect
ng their fortu
his melanch
ons than the
cretions of ea
om and stabil
matic policy
s Madison, F
overnment, a
ctable; nor b
ity.
s Madison, F
lity abro
o is observed
y plan at all,
diness and fo
t their fortun
unes out of h
holy distincti
latter, are u
ach other. Ev
lity, may cal
of its wiser
Federalist # 6
any more tha
e truly respe
Federalist # 6
oad
d to be incon
, is marked a
olly. His mo
nes with his;
his. One natio
on, perhaps,
under fewer r
very nation,
lculate on ev
neighbors.
62
an an individ
ectable witho
62
182
nstant to his
at once by al
ore friendly n
and not a fe
on is to anot
, that the form
restraints als
consequentl
very loss whi
dual, will lon
out possessin
plans, or pe
ll prudent pe
neighbors m
ew will seize
ther what on
mer, with fe
so from takin
ly, whose aff
ich can be su
ng be respect
ng a certain
erhaps to carr
eople as a sp
ay pity him,
e the opportu
ne individual
ewer of the b
ng undue adv
ffairs betray a
ustained from
ted without b
portion of o
ry on his
eedy victim
but all will
unity of
l is to anothe
benevolent
vantage of th
a want of
m the more
being truly
rder and
er;
he
183
Rights given up upon joining society
Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government; and it is equally
undeniable that whenever and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it some of
their natural rights, in order to vest it with requisite powers.
John John Jay, Federalist # 2
184
Seat of government - exclusive legislation over
[Regarding power to] "exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over such
district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States and the
acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States; and to
exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislatures of the
States in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards,
and other needful buildings."
The indispensable necessity of complete authority at the seat of government carries its
own evidence with it. It is a power exercised by every legislature of the Union, I might say
of the world, by virtue of its general supremacy. Without it not only the public authority
might be insulted and its proceedings interrupted with impunity, but a dependence of the
members of the general government on the State comprehending the seat of the
government for protection in the exercise of their duty might bring on the national councils
an imputation of awe or influence equally dishonorable to the government and
dissatisfactory to the other members of the Confederacy.
This consideration has the more weight as the gradual accumulation of public
improvements at the stationary residence of the government would be both too great a
public pledge to be left in the hands of a single State, and would create so many obstacles
to a removal of the government, as still further to abridge its necessary independence. The
extent of this federal district is sufficiently circumscribed to satisfy every jealousy of an
opposite nature. And as it is to be appropriated to this use with the consent of the State
ceding it; as the State will no doubt provide in the compact for the rights and the consent of
the citizens inhabiting it; as the inhabitants will find sufficient inducements of interest to
become willing parties to the cession; as they will have had their voice in the election of
the government which is to exercise authority over them; as a municipal legislature for
local purposes, derived from their own suffrages, will of course be allowed them; and as
the authority of the legislature of the State, and of the inhabitants of the ceded part of it, to
concu
of the
James
The n
govern
proper
particu
Union
object
conce
James
ur in the cess
Constitution
s Madison, F
ecessity of a
nment, is no
rty deposited
ular State. N
n may depen
tions and scr
rned in ever
s Madison, F
ion will be d
n, every ima
Federalist # 4
a like authori
ot less eviden
d in them, re
Nor would it
d to be in an
ruples are he
ry such estab
Federalist # 4
derived from
aginable obje
43
ity over forts
nt. The publi
equire that th
be proper fo
ny degree de
ere also obvi
blishment.
43
185
m the whole p
ection seems
s, magazines
ic money exp
hey should b
or the places
pendent on a
ated by requ
people of the
s to be obvia
s, etc., estab
pended on s
be exempt fro
on which th
a particular m
uiring the co
e State in the
ated.
lished by the
uch places,
om the autho
he security o
member of i
ncurrence of
eir adoption
e general
and the publ
ority of the
of the entire
it. All
f the States
lic
Sen
one br
James
It is ce
may d
Union
which
capaci
been d
princi
safegu
Alexa
It is a
govern
and pr
branch
be in a
requir
the am
James
ate; Nat
ranch of the
s Madison, F
ertainly true
destroy the n
n to the possi
h could not h
ities, wholly
done it woul
ple, and wou
uard which t
ander Hamilt
misfortune i
nments, that
rove unfaithf
h of the legis
all cases a sa
ring the conc
mbition or co
s Madison, F
ture of t
legislature i
Federalist # 5
that the Stat
national gove
ibility of inju
have been av
y from a plac
ld doubtless
uld certainly
they will enjo
ton, Federali
incident to r
t those who a
ful to their im
slative assem
alutary check
currence of t
orruption of
Federalist # 6
the
is a represen
58
te legislature
ernment. . .
ury from the
voided witho
ce in the orga
have been in
y have depriv
oy under thi
ist # 59
republican go
administer it
mportant tru
mbly distinct
k on the gov
two distinct b
one would o
62
186
tation of citi
es, by forbea
. So far as t
e State legisl
ut excluding
anization of
nterpreted in
ved the State
s provision.
overnment, t
t may forget
ust. In this po
t from and d
vernment. It
bodies in sch
otherwise be
izens, the oth
aring the app
that construc
latures, it is a
g the States,
f the national
nto an entire
e governmen
though in a l
t their obliga
oint of view
dividing the p
doubles the
hemes of usu
sufficient.
her of the St
pointment of
ction may ex
an evil; but i
in their poli
l governmen
dereliction o
nts of that ab
less degree t
ations to thei
a senate, as
power with a
security to t
urpation or p
tates
f senators,
xpose the
it is an evil
itical
nt. If this had
of the federa
bsolute
than to other
ir constituent
a second
a first, must
the people by
perfidy, whe
d
al
r
ts
y
ere
Slav
It wer
not be
immed
James
It oug
twenty
loudly
James
very
re doubtless t
een postpone
diate operati
s Madison, F
ght to be con
y years may
y upbraided t
s Madison, F
to be wished
ed until the y
ion.
Federalist # 4
sidered as a
terminate fo
the barbarism
Federalist # 4
d that the pow
year 1808, or
42
great point g
orever, withi
m of modern
42
187
wer of prohi
r rather that
gained in fav
in these Stat
n policy
ibiting the im
it had been
vor of human
es, a traffic w
mportation o
suffered to h
anity that a p
which has so
of slaves had
have
eriod of
o long and s
d
o
Stan
Safety
ardent
life an
contin
securi
be mo
Alexa
The in
appen
Alexa
Thus w
engine
armie
Alexa
The sm
it; and
submi
jealou
suppo
nding ar
y from extern
t love of libe
nd property i
nual danger,
ity to institut
ore safe, they
ander Hamilt
nstitutions ch
ndages of mil
ander Hamilt
we should, i
es of despoti
s.]
ander Hamilt
mallness of t
d the citizens
it to its oppre
us acquiescen
ose may be e
rmies
nal danger is
erty will, afte
incident to w
will compel
tions which h
y at length be
ton, Federali
hiefly allude
litary establi
ton, Federali
n a little tim
ism which h
ton, Federali
the army ren
s, not habitu
essions, neit
nce in a nece
xerted to the
s the most po
er a time, giv
war, the conti
l nations the
have a tende
ecome willin
ist # 8
ed to are STA
ishments.
ist # 8
me, see establ
have been the
ist # 8
nders the nat
ated to look
ther love nor
essary evil a
e prejudice o
188
owerful dire
ve way to its
inual effort a
most attach
ency to destr
ng to run the
ANDING AR
lished in eve
e scourge of
tural strength
up to the mi
r fear the sol
and stand rea
of their rights
ector of natio
s dictates. Th
and alarm at
ed to liberty
roy their civi
e risk of bein
RMIES and
ery part of th
f the old wor
h of the com
ilitary power
ldiery; they v
ady to resist
s.
onal conduct
he violent de
ttendant on a
y to resort for
il and politic
ng less free.
the correspo
his country th
rld. [Speakin
mmunity an o
r for protect
view them w
a power whi
t. Even the
estruction of
a state of
r repose and
cal rights. To
ondent
he same
ng of standin
overmatch fo
tion, or to
with a spirit o
ich they
f
d
o
ng
or
of
The
faction
encroa
Alexa
garriso
perma
practic
from t
profou
expen
indust
would
Alexa
As far
those
are lea
that th
the po
Alexa
If, to o
of arm
specta
to prep
army under
n, or an occa
achments ag
ander Hamilt
ons must eit
anent corps i
cable, would
their occupa
und peace. A
nse of a frequ
trious pursui
d be as burde
ander Hamilt
r as an army
hands of wh
ast likely to
he people are
ossession of t
ander Hamilt
obviate this
mies in time o
acle which th
pare for defe
r such circum
asional mob,
gainst the uni
ton, Federali
ther be furnis
in the pay of
d be pernicio
ations and fam
And if they c
uent rotation
its of individ
ensome and
ton, Federali
may be con
hich the peop
be jealous. F
e commonly
those of who
ton, Federali
consequence
of peace, the
he world has
ense before i
mstances may
, or insurrect
ited efforts o
ist # 8
shed by occa
f the governm
ous. The mil
milies to per
could be prev
n of service,
duals, would
injurious to
ist # 24
nsidered as a
ple are most
For it is a tru
y most in dan
om they ente
ist # 25
e, it should b
e United Stat
s yet seen --
it was actual
189
y usefully ai
tion; but it w
of the great b
asional detac
ment. The fir
itia would n
rform that m
vailed upon
and the loss
form conclu
the public as
dangerous w
likely to be
uth, which th
nger when th
ertain the lea
be resolved t
tes would th
that of a nat
lly invaded.
id the magis
will be unabl
body of the p
chments from
rst is imprac
not long, if at
most disagree
or compelle
of labor and
usive objecti
s ruinous to
weapon of p
jealous than
he experienc
he means of i
ast suspicion
to extend the
hen exhibit th
tion incapaci
As the cerem
strate to supp
le to enforce
people.
m the militia
cticable; and
t all, submit
eable duty in
d to do it, th
d disconcerti
ions to the s
private citiz
ower, it had
n in those of
e of all ages
injuring thei
n.
e prohibition
he most extr
itated by its
mony of a fo
press a small
e
a, or by
d if
to be dragge
n times of
he increased
ion of the
cheme. It
zens.
better be in
f which they
s has attested
ir rights are i
n to the raisin
raordinary
Constitution
ormal
l
ed
d,
in
ng
n
denun
territo
men f
prepar
All th
storm
We m
by our
create
the me
Here
would
have l
saved
The fa
permi
regula
kind. C
The A
occasi
that th
howev
acquir
Alexa
the pe
liberty
nciation of w
ories must be
for the protec
re to return i
at kind of po
must be abs
must expose o
r weakness t
ed by our cho
eans necessa
e I expect w
d be at all tim
lost us our in
.
acts which fr
t us to be the
ar and discip
Consideratio
American mil
ions, erected
he liberty of
ver great and
red and perfe
ander Hamilt
eople of Ame
y from stand
war has of lat
e waited for
ction of the S
it.
olicy by whi
stained from
our property
to seize the n
oice, depend
ary to its pre
e shall be to
mes equal to
ndependence
rom our own
e dupes of su
plined army c
ons of econo
litia, in the c
d eternal mon
their country
d valuable th
ected by dili
ton, Federali
erica may be
ding armies i
te fallen into
as the legal w
State. We mu
ch nations a
m, as contrary
and liberty
naked and de
dent on our w
eservation.
old that the m
the national
e. It cost mill
n experience
uch a sugges
can only be s
omy, not less
course of the
numents to t
y could not h
hey were. W
igence, by pe
ist # 25
e said to hav
n time of pe
190
o disuse, the
warrant to th
ust receive t
anticipate dis
y to the genu
to the mercy
efenseless pr
will, might en
militia of the
l defense. Th
lions to the U
e forbid a rel
stion. The st
successfully
s than of stab
e late war, ha
their fame; b
have been es
ar, like most
erseverance,
ve derived an
eace.
presence of
he governme
the blow bef
stant danger
uine maxims
y of foreign i
rey, because
ndanger that
country is it
his doctrine,
United State
liance of this
teady operati
y conducted b
bility and vig
ave, by their
but the brave
stablished by
t other thing
, by time, an
n hereditary i
an enemy w
ent to begin
fore we could
and meet th
of a free go
invaders and
e we are afra
t liberty by a
ts natural bu
in substance
es that might
s kind are too
ions of war a
by a force of
gor, confirm
r valor on nu
est of them fe
y their effort
gs, is a scienc
nd by practic
impression o
within our
its levies of
d even
he gathering
overnment.
d invite them
aid that ruler
an abuse of
ulwark, and
e, had like to
t have been
o recent to
against a
f the same
m this positio
umerous
feel and know
ts alone,
ce to be
ce.
of danger to
m
s,
o
on.
w
Alexa
The le
two ye
new re
face o
They
of an a
confid
Alexa
the St
guardi
will co
ready
to be t
Sche
execu
by pro
betwe
Alexa
It has
of an a
once p
resour
ander Hamilt
egislature of
ears, to delib
esolution on
of their const
are not at lib
army, if they
dence.
ander Hamilt
ate legislatu
ians of the ri
onstantly ha
enough, if a
the VOICE,
emes to subv
ution. An arm
ogressive aug
een the legisl
ander Hamilt
been said th
army to the p
possessed of
rces in that v
ton, Federali
f the United S
berate upon t
n the point; a
tituents.
berty to vest
y were even
ton, Federali
ures, who wil
ights of the c
ave their atten
anything imp
but, if neces
vert the liber
my, so large a
gmentations
lature and ex
ton, Federali
hat the provis
period of tw
f a force larg
very force su
ist # 26
States will b
the propriety
and to declar
in the execu
incautious e
ist # 26
ll always be
citizens agai
ntion awake
proper appea
ssary, the AR
rties of a gre
as seriously
s; which wou
xecutive, but
ist # 26
sion which l
wo years wou
ge enough to
ufficient to e
191
be obliged by
y of keeping
e their sense
utive departm
enough to be
not only vig
inst encroach
e to the condu
ars, to sound
RM of their
eat communi
to menace th
uld suppose n
t a continued
limits the app
uld be unava
awe the peo
nable him to
y this provisi
g a military f
e of the matt
ment perman
e willing to r
gilant but sus
hments from
duct of the na
d the alarm to
discontent.
ity require ti
hose libertie
not merely a
d conspiracy
propriation o
ailing, becaus
ople into sub
o dispense w
ion, once at
force on foot
ter by a form
nent funds fo
repose in it s
spicious and
m the federal
ational rulers
o the people,
ime to matur
es, could onl
a temporary
y for a series
of money fo
se the execu
bmission, wo
with supplies
least in ever
t; to come to
mal vote in th
or the suppor
so improper
d jealous
government
s, and will b
, and not onl
re them for
ly be formed
combination
of time.
r the suppor
utive, when
ould find
from the ac
ry
o a
he
rt
a
t,
e
ly
d
n
rt
cts
of leg
posses
Alexa
It is no
Union
especi
alway
Alexa
there m
the mi
laws a
Ind
requir
say th
repres
securi
If th
but in
forms
exerte
indivi
In a si
differe
govern
islature. But
ssion of a fo
ander Hamilt
ot easy to co
n as to deman
ially if we ta
ys to be coun
ander Hamilt
might somet
ilitia to prese
against those
dependent of
re a more per
hat the whole
sentatives of
ity for the rig
he representa
the exertion
of governm
ed with infin
dual State.
ingle State, i
ent parcels, s
nment in eac
t the question
rce of that m
ton, Federali
onceive a po
nd a force co
ake into our v
nted upon as
ton, Federali
times be a ne
erve the pea
e violent inv
f all other rea
remptory pro
e power of th
f the people.
ghts and priv
atives of the
n of that orig
ment, and wh
itely better p
if the person
subdivisions
ch, can take
n again recu
magnitude in
ist # 26
ssibility that
onsiderable e
view the aid
a valuable a
ist # 26
ecessity to m
ce of the com
asions of the
asonings upo
ovision agai
he proposed
This is the e
vileges of the
people betra
ginal right of
ich against t
prospect of s
ns intrusted w
s, or districts
no regular m
192
urs, upon wh
n time of pea
t dangers so
enough to pl
d to be derive
and powerful
make use of a
mmunity and
em which am
on the subjec
nst military
government
essential, and
e people wh
ay their cons
f self-defense
the usurpatio
success than
with supreme
s of which it
measures for
at pretense c
ace?
formidable
lace our libe
ed from the m
l auxiliary.
a force const
d to maintain
mount to insu
ct, it is a full
establishme
t is to be in t
d, after all, th
hich is attaina
stituents, the
e which is p
ons of the na
against thos
e power beco
consists, ha
r defense. Th
could he be p
can assail th
erties in the l
militia, whic
tituted differ
n the just au
urrections an
l answer to th
ents in time o
the hands of
the only effic
able in civil
ere is then no
aramount to
ational rulers
se of the rule
ome usurper
aving no dist
he citizens m
put in
he whole
least jeopard
ch ought
rently from
uthority of th
nd rebellions
hose who
of peace to
f the
cacious
society.
o resource le
o all positive
s may be
ers of an
rs, the
tinct
must rush
dy,
he
s.
eft
193
tumultuously to arms, without concert, without system, without resource; except in their
courage and despair. The usurpers, clothed with the forms of legal authority, can too often
crush the opposition in embryo. The smaller the extent of the territory, the more difficult
will it be for the people to form a regular or systematic plan of opposition, and the more
easy will it be to defeat their early efforts.
Intelligence can be more speedily obtained of their preparations and movements, and the
military force in the possession of the usurpers can be more rapidly directed against the
part where the opposition has begun. In this situation there must be a peculiar coincidence
of circumstances to insure success to the popular resistance.
The obstacles to usurpation and the facilities of resistance increase with the increased
extent of the state, provided the citizens understand their rights and are disposed to defend
them. The natural strength of the people in a large community, in proportion to the
artificial strength of the government, is greater than in a small, and of course more
competent to a struggle with the attempts of the government to establish a tyranny.
But in a confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to be entirely the
masters of their own fate. Power being almost always the rival of power, the general
government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments,
and these will have the same disposition towards the general government. The people, by
throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights
are invaded by either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of redress. How
wise will it be in them by cherishing the union to preserve to themselves an advantage
which can never be too highly prized!
It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system that the State governments
will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against invasions of the public
liberty by the national authority. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretenses
so likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of men, as of the people at large.
The legislatures will have better means of information. They can discover the danger at a
distance; and possessing all the organs of civil power and the confidence of the people,
they c
resour
States
The
utility
agains
should
head w
the op
was le
We
by the
a large
of the
When
capab
who a
for the
The ap
the res
Alexa
If a w
to be u
of the
over th
and th
can at once a
rces of the co
s, and unite t
great extent
y against the
st the enterpr
d be able to q
with fresh fo
pposition in o
eft to itself, i
should recol
e resources o
e army; and
community
n will the tim
le of erectin
are in a situat
eir own defe
pprehension
sources of ar
ander Hamilt
ell-regulated
under the reg
national sec
he militia in
he pretext to
adopt a regul
ommunity. T
their commo
t of the coun
attacks of a
rises of amb
quell the res
orces. The ad
others; and t
its efforts wo
llect that the
of the countr
as the mean
y will proport
me arrive that
g a despotism
tion, through
ense, with all
n may be con
rgument and
ton, Federali
d militia be t
gulation and
curity. If stan
n the same bo
such unfrien
lar plan of op
They can rea
n forces for
ntry is a furth
foreign pow
bitious rulers
sistance of on
dvantages ob
the moment
ould be rene
e extent of th
y. For a long
ns of doing th
tionably incr
t the federal
m over the g
h the medium
l the celerity
nsidered as a
d reasoning.
ist # 28
the most natu
d at the dispo
nding armies
ody ought, a
ndly instituti
194
pposition, in
adily commu
the protectio
her security.
wer. And it w
s in the natio
ne State, the
btained in on
the part whi
wed, and its
he military fo
g time to com
his increase,
rease.
government
great body of
m of their St
y, regularity,
a disease, for
ural defense
osal of that b
s are dangero
s far as poss
ions.
n which they
unicate with
on of their c
We have alr
would have p
onal councils
e distant Stat
ne place mus
ich had been
s resistance r
orce must, at
me it will no
the populat
t can raise an
f the people
tate governm
and system
r which there
e of a free co
body which i
ous to libert
sible, to take
y can combin
each other i
common libe
ready experi
precisely the
s. If the feder
tes would be
st be abando
n reduced to
revive.
t all events,
ot be possibl
tion and natu
nd maintain
of an immen
ments, to take
m of independ
e can be foun
ountry, it oug
is constituted
ty, an efficac
e away the in
ne all the
in the differe
erty.
ienced its
same effect
ral army
e able to mak
ned to subdu
submission
be regulated
e to maintain
ural strength
an army
nse empire,
e measures
dent nations?
nd no cure in
ght certainly
d the guardia
cious power
nducement
ent
t
ke
ue
d
n
?
n
y
an
If the
call fo
the em
oblige
of pre
In o
of the
Const
the ex
his on
Alexa
The sa
be des
call ou
the for
It wou
its dec
office
that a
would
or of a
It bein
POSS
has be
the mi
was in
make
federal gove
or the militar
mployment o
ed to recur to
venting its e
rder to cast a
Union, it ha
titution for re
xecution of h
nly auxiliary.
ander Hamilt
ame persons
spotic and un
ut the POSS
rmer exceed
uld be as abs
clared power
rs who may
right to enac
d involve tha
abolishing th
ng therefore
SE COMITA
een drawn fr
ilitia, is as un
ntended to be
use of it wh
ernment can
ry arm in sup
of a different
o the latter. T
existence tha
an odium up
as been rema
equiring the
his duty; whe
.
ton, Federali
s who tell us
nlimited info
E COMITA
ds it.
surd to doubt
rs would inc
be intrusted
ct laws nece
at of varying
he trial by ju
evident that
ATUS is entir
rom it, in its
ncandid as i
e the sole in
en necessary
command th
pport of the
t kind of forc
To render an
an a thousand
pon the powe
arked that th
aid of the PO
ence it has b
ist # 29
in one breat
orm us in the
ATUS. The la
t that a right
clude that of
d with the ex
ssary and pr
the rules of
ury in cases r
t the supposi
rely destitute
application
t is illogical
strument of
y?
195
he aid of the
civil magistr
ce. If it cann
n army unnec
d prohibition
er of calling
ere is nowhe
OSSE COM
een inferred
th that the po
e next that it
atter, fortuna
t to pass all l
requiring th
ecution of th
roper for the
f descent and
relating to it.
tion of a wa
e of color, it
to the author
. What reaso
authority, m
e militia in th
rate, it can th
not avail itsel
cessary will
ns upon pape
forth the mi
ere any prov
MITATUS to
d that military
owers of the
t has not auth
ately, is as m
laws necessa
he assistance
hose laws as
imposition
d of the alien
.
ant of power
t will follow
rity of the fe
on could ther
merely becau
hose emerge
he better dis
lf of the form
be a more c
er.
ilitia to exec
vision in the
assist the m
y force was
e federal gov
hority suffic
much short of
ary and prop
of the citize
s it would be
and collectio
nation of lan
to require th
that the con
ederal govern
re be to infer
use there is a
encies which
spense with
mer, it will b
ertain metho
cute the laws
proposed
magistrate in
intended to
vernment wil
cient even to
f the truth as
per to execute
ens to the
e to believe
on of taxes
ded property
he aid of the
nclusion whic
nment over
r that force
power to
h
be
od
s
be
ll
s
e
y,
ch
Alexa
"The p
injurio
milita
nor ev
To ob
under
might
charac
public
It wou
which
millio
so con
succee
with r
order
in the
"Bu
misch
digest
militia
of a se
case o
of wel
requir
ander Hamilt
project of di
ous if it were
ary movemen
ven a month,
lige the grea
arms for the
be necessar
cter of a wel
c inconvenie
uld form an a
h, calculating
on pounds. T
nsiderable an
ed, because
respect to the
to see that th
course of a
t though the
hievous or im
ted plan shou
a. The attent
elect corps o
of need. By t
ll-trained mi
re it.
ton, Federali
sciplining al
e capable of
nts is a busin
, that will su
at body of th
e purpose of
ry to acquire
ll-regulated m
ence and loss
annual dedu
g upon the pr
To attempt a t
n extent wou
it would not
e people at la
his be not ne
year.
scheme of d
mpracticable;
uld, as soon
tion of the go
of moderate s
thus circums
ilitia ready to
ist # 29
ll the militia
f being carrie
ness that requ
uffice for the
he yeomanry
f going throu
the degree o
militia, woul
s.
ction from th
resent numb
thing which
uld be unwis
t long be end
arge than to
eglected, it w
disciplining
; yet it is a m
as possible,
overnment o
size, upon su
scribing the p
o take the fie
196
of the Unite
ed into execu
uires time an
attainment o
and of the o
ugh military
of perfection
ld be a real g
he productiv
bers of the pe
would abrid
e: and the ex
dured. Little
have them p
will be neces
the whole na
matter of the
be adopted
ought particu
uch principle
plan, it will b
eld wheneve
ed States is a
ution. A tole
nd practice.
of it.
other classes
exercises an
n which wou
grievance to
ve labor of th
eople, would
dge the mass
xperiment, if
more can re
properly arm
ssary to assem
ation must b
utmost impo
for the prop
ularly to be d
es as will rea
be possible t
er the defens
as futile as it
erable expert
It is not a da
s of the citize
nd evolutions
uld entitle th
the people a
he country to
d not fall far
s of labor an
f made, coul
easonably be
med and equi
mble them o
be abandoned
ortance that
er establishm
directed to th
ally fit it for
to have an ex
se of the Stat
t would be
tness in
ay, nor a wee
ens to be
s, as often as
em to the
and a serious
o an amount
short of a
d industry to
ld not
e aimed at
ipped; and in
once or twice
d as
a well-
ment of the
he formation
service in
xcellent bod
te shall
ek
s
s
t
o
n
e
n
dy
This w
at any
be for
all inf
rights
devise
Alexa
There
the mi
the na
our ne
daily m
feeling
Alexa
If ther
militia
undert
slaver
who h
imagin
an abu
Alexa
will not only
y time oblige
rmidable to t
ferior to them
and those o
ed for a stand
ander Hamilt
is somethin
ilitia that on
ame of comm
eighbors, our
mingling wi
gs, sentimen
ander Hamilt
re should be
a? If there sh
take a distan
ry upon a par
had meditate
ned intrench
used and inc
ander Hamilt
y lessen the c
e the governm
the liberties o
m in disciplin
f their fellow
ding army, a
ton, Federali
ng so far-fetc
e is at a loss
mon sense ar
r fellow-citiz
th the rest of
nts, habits, a
ton, Federali
an army to b
hould be no
nt and distres
rt of their co
d so foolish
hments of po
censed peopl
ton, Federali
call for milit
ment to form
of the people
ne and the u
w-citizens. T
and the best p
ist # 29
ched and so e
s whether to
re our fears t
zens? What
f their count
and interests
ist # 29
be made use
army, whith
ssing expedi
ountrymen, d
as well as so
ower, and to
e?
ist # 29
197
tary establish
m an army of
e while there
se of arms, w
This appears
possible sec
extravagant
treat it with
to end if we m
shadow of d
trymen and w
?
e of as the en
her would the
ition for the p
direct their c
o wicked a p
make them a
hments, but
f any magnit
e is a large b
who stand re
to me the on
curity agains
in the idea o
gravity or w
may not trus
danger can th
who particip
ngine of desp
e militia, irri
purpose of r
ourse, but to
project to cru
an example
if circumsta
tude that arm
body of citiz
eady to defen
nly substitut
t it, if it shou
of danger to
with raillery
st our sons, o
here be from
pate with them
potism, what
itated at bein
riveting the c
o the seat of
ush them in
of the just v
ances should
my can never
zens, little if
nd their own
te that can be
uld exist."
liberty from
... Where in
our brothers
m men who a
m in the sam
t need of the
ng required t
chains of
the tyrants,
their
vengeance of
d
r
at
n
e
m
,
are
me
e
to
f
A stan
provis
conseq
precau
rashly
exert a
which
James
[Spea
safety
liberti
James
The on
vision
force
been e
of this
That t
succes
unifor
establ
patien
prepar
dream
like th
nding force,
sion. On the
quences may
ution. A wis
y preclude its
all its pruden
h may be inau
s Madison, F
aking of the
y are happily
ies.
s Madison, F
nly refuge le
nary supposit
for the proje
employed to
s danger.
the people an
ssion of men
rmly and sys
ishment; tha
ntly behold th
red to burst o
ms of a delirio
he sober appr
therefore, is
smallest sca
y be fatal. O
e nation will
self from any
nce in dimin
uspicious to
Federalist # 4
navy:] The
such as can
Federalist # 4
eft for those
tion that the
ects of ambit
little purpos
nd the States
n ready to be
stematically
at the govern
he gathering
on their own
ous jealousy
rehensions o
s a dangerou
ale it has its i
On any scale i
l combine al
y resource w
nishing both
its liberties.
41
batteries mo
n never be tur
41
who prophe
federal gove
tion. The rea
se indeed, if
s should, for
etray both; th
pursue some
nments and t
g storm and c
n heads must
y, or the misj
of genuine p
198
s, at the sam
inconvenien
it is an objec
ll these cons
which may be
the necessity
.
ost capable o
rned by a pe
esy the down
ernment may
asonings con
f it could be n
a sufficient
hat the traito
e fixed plan
he people of
continue to s
t appear to e
judged exagg
atriotism.
me time that i
nces. On an e
ct of laudabl
iderations; a
ecome essen
y and the da
of repelling f
erfidious gov
nfall of the S
y previously
ntained in the
necessary no
period of tim
ors should, th
for the exten
f the States s
supply the m
everyone mo
gerations of
it may be a n
extensive sca
le circumspe
and, whilst it
ntial to its sa
anger of reso
foreign enter
vernment aga
State governm
y accumulate
ese papers m
ow to dispro
me, elect an
hroughout th
nsion of the
should silent
materials unti
ore like the in
f a counterfei
necessary,
ale its
ection and
t does not
afety, will
orting to one
rprises on ou
ainst our
ments is the
e a military
must have
ove the realit
uninterrupte
his period,
military
tly and
il it should b
ncoherent
it zeal, than
ur
ty
ed
be
199
Extravagant as the supposition is, let it, however, be made. Let a regular army, fully equal
to the resources of the country, be formed; and let it be entirely at the devotion of the
federal government: still it would not be going too far to say that the State governments
with the people on their side would be able to repel the danger. The highest number to
which, according to the best computation, a standing army can be carried in any country
does not exceed one hundredth part of the whole number of souls; or one twenty-fifth part
of the number able to bear arms.
This proportion would not yield, in the United States, an army of more than twenty-five or
thirty thousand men. To these would be opposed a militia amounting to near half a million
of citizens with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves,
fighting for their common liberties and united and conducted by governments possessing
their affections and confidence.
It may well be doubted whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be conquered by
such a proportion of regular troops. Those who are best acquainted with the late successful
resistance of this country against the British arms will be most inclined to deny the
possibility of it. Besides the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over
the people of almost every other nation, the existence of subordinate governments, to
which the people are attached and by which the militia officers are appointed, forms a
barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple
government of any form can admit of.
Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe, which are
carried as far as the public resources will bear, the governments are afraid to trust the
people with arms. And it is not certain that with this aid alone they would not be able to
shake off their yokes. But were the people to possess the additional advantages of local
governments chosen by themselves, who could collect the national will and direct the
national force, and of officers appointed out of the militia by these governments and
attached both to them and to the militia, it may be affirmed with the greatest assurance that
the throne of every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned in spite of the legions
which surround it.
200
Let us not insult the free and gallant citizens of America with the suspicion that they would
be less able to defend the rights of which they would be in actual possession than the
debased subjects of arbitrary power would be to rescue theirs from the hands of their
oppressors. Let us rather no longer insult them with the supposition that they can ever
reduce themselves to the necessity of making the experiment by a blind and tame
submission to the long train of insidious measures which must precede and produce it.
James Madison, Federalist # 46
Statgove
The d
or an a
object
organi
necess
author
confed
The p
makes
repres
impor
the ter
Alexa
It is ce
may d
Union
which
capaci
If this
the fed
absolu
Alexa
te goverernmen
efinition of a
association o
ts of the fede
ization of th
sity, for loca
rity of the un
deracy.
proposed Co
s them const
sentation in t
rtant portions
rms, with the
ander Hamilt
ertainly true
destroy the n
n to the possi
h could not h
ities, wholly
had been do
deral princip
ute safeguard
ander Hamilt
rnmentsnt
a confederat
of two or mo
eral authority
e members b
al purposes;
nion, it woul
nstitution, so
tituent parts
the Senate, a
s of sovereig
e idea of a fe
ton, Federali
that the Stat
national gove
ibility of inju
have been av
y from a plac
one it would
ple, and wou
d which they
ton, Federali
need vo
te republic se
ore states int
y are mere m
be not abolis
though it sho
ld still be, in
o far from im
of the nation
and leaves in
gn power. Th
ederal gover
ist # 9
te legislature
ernment. . .
ury from the
voided witho
ce in the orga
d doubtless h
uld certainly
y will enjoy
ist # 59
201
oice in f
eems simply
to one state.
matters of dis
shed; so long
ould be in pe
n fact and in
mplying an a
nal sovereign
n their posses
his fully corr
rnment.
es, by forbea
. So far as t
e State legisl
ut excluding
anization of
have been int
have depriv
under this pr
federal/n
y to be "an a
The extent,
scretion. So
g as it exists
erfect subord
theory, an a
abolition of t
nty, by allow
ssion certain
responds, in
aring the app
that construc
latures, it is a
g the States,
f the national
terpreted int
ved the State
rovision.
national
ssemblage o
modification
long as the
, by a consti
dination to t
association o
the State gov
wing them a
n exclusive a
n every ration
pointment of
ction may ex
an evil; but i
in their poli
l governmen
to an entire d
government
l
of societies,"
ns, and
separate
itutional
the general
f states, or a
vernments,
direct
and very
nal import o
f senators,
xpose the
it is an evil
itical
nt.
dereliction o
ts of that
a
f
f
202
States' rights
I affirm that (with the sole exception of duties on imports and exports) they [the states]
would, under the plan of the convention, retain that authority in the most absolute and
unqualified sense; and that an attempt on the part of the national government to abridge
them in the exercise of it would be a violent assumption of power, unwarranted by any
article or clause of its Constitution.
An entire consolidation of the States into one complete national sovereignty would
imply an entire subordination of the parts; and whatever powers might remain in them
would be altogether dependent on the general will. But as the plan of the convention aims
only at a partial union or consolidation, the State governments would clearly retain all the
rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively
delegated to the United States.
This exclusive delegation, or rather this alienation, of State sovereignty would only exist in
three cases: where the Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive authority to the
Union; where it granted in one instance an authority to the Union, and in another
prohibited the States from exercising the like authority; and where it granted an authority
to the Union to which a similar authority in the States would be absolutely and totally
contradictory and repugnant.
I use these terms to distinguish this last case from another which might appear to resemble
it, but which would, in fact, be essentially different; I mean where the exercise of a
concurrent jurisdiction might be productive of occasional interferences in the policy of any
branch of administration, but would not imply any direct contradiction or repugnancy in
point of constitutional authority.
The necessity of a concurrent jurisdiction in certain cases results from the division of the
sovereign power; and the rule that all authorities, of which the States are not explicitly
divested in favor of the Union, remain with them in full vigor is not only a theoretical
consequence of that division, but is clearly admitted by the whole tenor of the instrument
which
notwit
pointe
reside
The te
circum
interp
refute
Alexa
Was, t
the pr
not th
govern
a certa
sovere
We ha
kings,
shape
institu
that th
to be p
be fitt
James
the St
the fed
h contains th
thstanding th
ed care in tho
e in the State
enth section
mstance is a
retation out
s every hypo
ander Hamilt
then, the Am
ecious blood
at the people
nments of th
ain extent of
eignty?
ave heard of
, not kings fo
that the soli
utions of a di
he public goo
pursued; and
ted for the at
s Madison, F
ates will reta
deral head; a
e articles of
he affirmativ
ose cases wh
es to insert ne
of the first a
clear indicat
of the body
othesis to the
ton, Federali
merican Revo
d of thousand
e of America
he individual
f power and
f the impious
or the people
id happiness
ifferent form
od, the real w
d that no form
ttainment of
Federalist # 4
ain all pre-ex
and that this
the propose
ve grants of
here it was d
egative claus
article consis
tion of the se
of the act, w
e contrary.
ist # 32
olution effec
ds spilt, and
a should enjo
l States, that
be arrayed w
s doctrine in
e. Is the sam
of the peop
m? It is too ea
welfare of th
m of govern
this object.
45
xisting autho
exclusive de
203
d Constitutio
general auth
deemed impr
ses prohibiti
sts altogether
ense of the c
which justifie
cted, was the
the hard-ear
oy peace, lib
t particular m
with certain d
the old worl
me doctrine to
le is to be sa
arly for polit
he great body
nment whatev
orities which
elegation can
on. We there
horities, there
roper that the
ing the exerc
r of such pro
convention, a
es the positio
e American C
rned substan
berty, and sa
municipal est
dignities and
rld, that the p
o be revived
acrificed to t
ticians to pre
y of the peop
ver has any o
h may not be
n only exist
e find that,
e has been th
e like author
cise of them
ovisions. Th
and furnishe
on I have ad
Confederacy
nce of millio
afety, but tha
tablishments
d attributes o
people were
d in the new,
the views of
esume on ou
ple, is the su
other value t
e exclusively
in one of thr
he most
rities should
by the State
his
es a rule of
dvanced and
y formed, wa
ons lavished,
at the
s, might enjo
of
made for
in another
f political
ur forgetting
upreme objec
than as it ma
y delegated t
ree cases:
es.
as
,
oy
ct
ay
to
where
particu
to the
the St
Alexa
e an exclusiv
ular authorit
States; or w
ates would b
ander Hamilt
ve authority i
ty is granted
where an auth
be utterly inc
ton, Federali
is, in express
to the Union
hority is gran
compatible.
ist # 82
204
s terms, gran
n and the ex
nted to a Uni
nted to the U
xercise of a li
ion with wh
Union; or wh
ike authority
ich a similar
here a
y is prohibite
r authority in
ed
n
Stat
fede
the St
guardi
will co
ready
to be t
Alexa
there m
the mi
laws a
Ind
requir
say th
repres
securi
If th
but in
forms
exerte
indivi
In a si
differe
govern
tes to gu
eral/nati
ate legislatu
ians of the ri
onstantly ha
enough, if a
the VOICE,
ander Hamilt
might somet
ilitia to prese
against those
dependent of
re a more per
hat the whole
sentatives of
ity for the rig
he representa
the exertion
of governm
ed with infin
dual State.
ingle State, i
ent parcels, s
nment in eac
uard aga
ional go
ures, who wil
ights of the c
ave their atten
anything imp
but, if neces
ton, Federali
times be a ne
erve the pea
e violent inv
f all other rea
remptory pro
e power of th
f the people.
ghts and priv
atives of the
n of that orig
ment, and wh
itely better p
if the person
subdivisions
ch, can take
ainst enc
overnme
ll always be
citizens agai
ntion awake
proper appea
ssary, the AR
ist # 26
ecessity to m
ce of the com
asions of the
asonings upo
ovision agai
he proposed
This is the e
vileges of the
e people betr
ginal right of
ich against t
prospect of s
ns intrusted w
s, or districts
no regular m
205
croachm
ent
not only vig
inst encroach
e to the condu
ars, to sound
RM of their
make use of a
mmunity and
em which am
on the subjec
nst military
government
essential, and
e people wh
ray their con
f self-defense
the usurpatio
success than
with supreme
s of which it
measures for
ments of
gilant but sus
hments from
duct of the na
d the alarm to
discontent.
a force const
d to maintain
mount to insu
ct, it is a full
establishme
t is to be in t
d, after all, th
hich is attaina
stituents, the
e which is p
ons of the na
against thos
e power beco
consists, ha
r defense. Th
f
spicious and
m the federal
ational rulers
o the people,
tituted differ
n the just au
urrections an
l answer to th
ents in time o
the hands of
the only effic
able in civil
ere is then no
aramount to
ational rulers
se of the rule
ome usurper
aving no dist
he citizens m
d jealous
government
s, and will b
, and not onl
rently from
uthority of th
nd rebellions
hose who
of peace to
f the
cacious
society.
o resource le
o all positive
s may be
ers of an
rs, the
tinct
must rush
t,
e
ly
he
s.
eft
206
tumultuously to arms, without concert, without system, without resource; except in their
courage and despair. The usurpers, clothed with the forms of legal authority, can too often
crush the opposition in embryo. The smaller the extent of the territory, the more difficult
will it be for the people to form a regular or systematic plan of opposition, and the more
easy will it be to defeat their early efforts.
Intelligence can be more speedily obtained of their preparations and movements, and the
military force in the possession of the usurpers can be more rapidly directed against the
part where the opposition has begun. In this situation there must be a peculiar coincidence
of circumstances to insure success to the popular resistance.
The obstacles to usurpation and the facilities of resistance increase with the increased
extent of the state, provided the citizens understand their rights and are disposed to defend
them. The natural strength of the people in a large community, in proportion to the
artificial strength of the government, is greater than in a small, and of course more
competent to a struggle with the attempts of the government to establish a tyranny.
But in a confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to be entirely the
masters of their own fate. Power being almost always the rival of power, the general
government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments,
and these will have the same disposition towards the general government.
The people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate.
If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of
redress. How wise will it be in them by cherishing the union to preserve to themselves an
advantage which can never be too highly prized!
It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system that the State governments
will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against invasions of the public
liberty by the national authority. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretenses
so likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of men, as of the people at large. The
legislatures will have better means of information.
They
and th
which
comm
protec
The
utility
agains
If the
would
be aba
reduce
revive
We
by the
a large
of the
When
capab
who a
for the
The ap
the res
Alexa
Were
the St
can discover
he confidenc
h they can co
municate with
ction of their
e great exten
y against the
st the enterpr
federal army
d be able to m
andoned to s
ed to submis
e.
e should reco
e resources o
e army; and
community
n will the tim
le of erectin
are in a situat
eir own defe
pprehension
sources of ar
ander Hamilt
it admitted,
ate governm
r the danger
e of the peop
ombine all th
h each other
r common lib
nt of the coun
attacks of a
rises of amb
y should be a
make head w
subdue the op
ssion was lef
ollect that the
of the countr
as the mean
y will proport
me arrive that
g a despotism
tion, through
ense, with all
n may be con
rgument and
ton, Federali
however, th
ments to exten
at a distance
ple, they can
he resources
in the differ
berty.
ntry is a furt
foreign pow
bitious rulers
able to quell
with fresh for
pposition in
ft to itself, it
e extent of th
y. For a long
ns of doing th
tionably incr
t the federal
m over the g
h the medium
l the celerity
nsidered as a
d reasoning.
ist # 28
hat the federa
nd its power
207
e; and posse
n at once ado
of the comm
rent States, a
ther security
wer. And it w
s in the natio
l the resistan
rces. The ad
others; and
ts efforts wou
he military f
g time to com
his increase,
rease.
government
great body of
m of their St
y, regularity,
a disease, for
al governme
r beyond the
ssing all the
opt a regular
munity. They
and unite the
. We have al
would have p
onal councils
nce of one St
dvantages ob
the moment
uld be renew
force must, a
me it will no
the populat
t can raise an
f the people
tate governm
and system
r which there
nt may feel
e due limits,
e organs of c
r plan of opp
y can readily
eir common
lready exper
precisely the
s.
tate, the dist
btained in on
t the part wh
wed, and its r
at all events,
ot be possibl
tion and natu
nd maintain
of an immen
ments, to take
m of independ
e can be foun
an equal dis
the latter wo
ivil power
position, in
y
forces for th
rienced its
same effect
ant States
e place must
hich had been
resistance
be regulated
e to maintain
ural strength
an army
nse empire,
e measures
dent nations?
nd no cure in
sposition wit
ould still hav
he
t
t
n
d
n
?
n
th
ve
208
the advantage in the means of defeating such encroachments. If an act of a particular State,
though unfriendly to the national government, be generally popular in that State, and
should not too grossly violate the oaths of the State officers, it is executed immediately
and, of course, by means on the spot and depending on the State alone.
The opposition of the federal government, or the interposition of federal officers, would
but inflame the zeal of all parties on the side of the State, and the evil could not be
prevented or repaired, if at all, without the employment of means which must always be
resorted to with reluctance and difficulty. On the other hand, should an unwarrantable
measure of the federal government be unpopular in particular States, which would seldom
fail to be the case, or even a warrantable measure be so, which may sometimes be the case,
the means of opposition to it are powerful and at hand.
The disquietude of the people; their repugnance and, perhaps, refusal to co-operate with
the officers of the Union; the frowns of the executive magistracy of the State; the
embarrassments created by legislative devices, which would often be added on such
occasions, would oppose, in any State, difficulties not to be despised; would form, in a
large State, very serious impediments; and where the sentiments of several adjoining States
happened to be in unison, would present obstructions which the federal government would
hardly be willing to encounter.
But ambitious encroachments of the federal government on the authority of the State
governments would not excite the opposition of a single State, or of a few States only.
They would be signals of general alarm. Every government would espouse the common
cause. A correspondence would be opened. Plans of resistance would be concerted. One
spirit would animate and conduct the whole.
The same combinations, in short, would result from an apprehension of the federal, as was
produced by the dread of a foreign, yoke; and unless the projected innovations should be
voluntarily renounced, the same appeal to a trial of force would be made in the one case as
was made in the other. But what degree of madness could ever drive the federal
government to such an extremity?
James
The on
vision
force
been e
of this
That t
succes
unifor
establ
patien
prepar
dream
like th
howev
Let a r
entirel
that th
The h
carried
one tw
This p
thirty
of citi
fightin
their a
circum
s Madison, F
nly refuge le
nary supposit
for the proje
employed to
s danger.
the people an
ssion of men
rmly and sys
ishment; tha
ntly behold th
red to burst o
ms of a delirio
he sober appr
ver, be made
regular army
ly at the dev
he State gove
ighest numb
d in any cou
wenty-fifth p
proportion w
thousand me
izens with ar
ng for their c
affections an
mstanced cou
Federalist # 4
eft for those
tion that the
ects of ambit
little purpos
nd the States
n ready to be
stematically
at the govern
he gathering
on their own
ous jealousy
rehensions o
e.
y, fully equa
votion of the
ernments wi
ber to which,
untry does no
part of the nu
would not yie
en. To these
rms in their h
common libe
nd confidenc
uld ever be c
46
who prophe
federal gove
tion. The rea
se indeed, if
s should, for
etray both; th
pursue some
nments and t
g storm and c
n heads must
y, or the misj
of genuine p
al to the reso
federal gove
th the peopl
, according t
ot exceed on
umber able to
eld, in the Un
e would be op
hands, office
erties and un
ce. It may we
conquered by
209
esy the down
ernment may
asonings con
f it could be n
a sufficient
hat the traito
e fixed plan
he people of
continue to s
t appear to e
judged exagg
atriotism. Ex
urces of the
ernment: stil
e on their sid
to the best co
ne hundredth
o bear arms.
nited States,
pposed a mi
ered by men
nited and con
ell be doubte
y such a pro
nfall of the S
y previously
ntained in the
necessary no
period of tim
ors should, th
for the exten
f the States s
supply the m
everyone mo
gerations of
xtravagant a
country, be
ll it would n
de would be
omputation,
h part of the w
.
an army of
ilitia amount
chosen from
nducted by g
ed whether a
oportion of re
State governm
y accumulate
ese papers m
ow to dispro
me, elect an
hroughout th
nsion of the
should silent
materials unti
ore like the in
f a counterfei
as the suppos
formed; and
not be going
e able to repe
a standing a
whole numb
more than tw
ting to near h
m among the
governments
a militia thus
egular troop
ments is the
e a military
must have
ove the realit
uninterrupte
his period,
military
tly and
il it should b
ncoherent
it zeal, than
sition is, let i
d let it be
too far to sa
el the danger
army can be
ber of souls;
wenty-five o
half a millio
emselves,
s possessing
s
s. Those wh
ty
ed
be
it,
ay
r.
or
or
n
o
are be
arms w
Beside
almos
are att
enterp
form c
Notwi
carried
people
And it
But w
thems
appoin
militia
Europ
Let us
be les
debase
oppre
reduce
submi
James
The tr
tempo
few ye
est acquainte
will be most
es the advan
st every othe
tached and b
prises of amb
can admit of
ithstanding t
d as far as th
e with arms.
t is not certa
were the peop
selves, who c
nted out of th
a, it may be
pe would be
s not insult th
s able to def
ed subjects o
ssors. Let us
e themselves
ission to the
s Madison, F
rue question
orary regulat
ears, and a h
ed with the la
t inclined to
ntage of bein
r nation, the
by which the
bition, more
f.
the military e
he public res
ain that with
ple to posses
could collect
he militia by
affirmed wit
speedily ove
he free and g
fend the righ
of arbitrary p
s rather no lo
s to the nece
long train o
Federalist # 4
to be decide
tion, be dang
hundred or tw
ate successfu
deny the pos
ng armed, wh
e existence o
e militia offic
insurmounta
establishmen
sources will b
this aid alon
ss the additio
t the nationa
y these gove
th the greate
erturned in s
gallant citize
hts of which
power would
onger insult t
essity of mak
f insidious m
46
ed, then, is w
gerous to the
wo hundred
210
ul resistance
ssibility of it
hich the Ame
f subordinat
cers are appo
able than an
nts in the sev
bear, the gov
ne they woul
onal advanta
al will and di
rnments and
est assurance
pite of the le
ens of Ameri
they would b
d be to rescu
them with th
king the expe
measures wh
whether the s
e public liber
for a few mo
e of this coun
t.
ericans poss
te governmen
ointed, form
ny which a si
veral kingdo
vernments a
ld not be abl
ages of local
irect the nati
d attached bo
e that the thro
egions which
ica with the
be in actual
ue theirs from
he suppositio
eriment by a
hich must pre
smallness of
rty? Whether
ore, be a safe
ntry against t
sess over the
nts, to which
ms a barrier a
imple govern
oms of Europ
are afraid to t
le to shake o
government
ional force, a
oth to them a
one of every
h surround it
suspicion th
possession t
m the hands
on that they
a blind and ta
ecede and pr
f the number
r sixty-five m
fe depositary
the British
e people of
h the people
gainst the
nment of any
pe, which ar
trust the
off their yoke
ts chosen by
and of office
and to the
y tyranny in
t.
hat they wou
than the
of their
can ever
ame
roduce it.
r, as a
members for
y for a limite
y
re
es.
y
ers
uld
r a
d
and w
give a
have r
actuat
charac
their p
and ev
dispos
the St
many
a cons
unable
States
of the
to betr
fuller
makes
from t
the lib
Const
The ex
person
Federa
We m
encroa
well-guarded
a negative an
received with
tes the State
cter of every
present temp
very second
sed to form a
ate legislatu
means of co
spiracy of th
e to conceive
s, any sixty-f
people at la
ray the solem
population o
s no part of m
the probable
berties of Am
titution. Jam
xecutive and
ns employed
alist # 84
may safely rel
achments of
power of leg
nswer to this
h regard to t
legislatures,
y class of citi
per, or under
year repeat t
and pursue a
ures, which m
ounteracting
he latter again
e that there a
five or a hun
arge, who wo
mn trust com
of our countr
my pretensio
e state of them
merica canno
mes Madison
d legislative
d in every de
ly on the dis
f the national
gislating for
question, w
the present g
, and the prin
izens. I am u
any circums
the choice o
a scheme of t
must feel so m
the federal l
nst the libert
are at this tim
ndred men ca
ould either d
mmitted to th
ry may prod
ons. But judg
m within a m
ot be unsafe
n, Federalist #
bodies of ea
epartment of
sposition of t
l authority.
211
the United S
without first o
genius of the
nciples whic
unable to con
stances whic
of, sixty-five
tyranny or tr
many motive
legislature, w
ties of their c
me, or can b
apable of rec
desire or dare
hem. What ch
duce requires
ging from th
moderate per
in the numb
# 55
ach State wil
f the national
the State leg
Alexander H
States? I mu
obliterating e
people of A
ch are incorp
nceive that th
ch can speed
or a hundre
reachery. I a
es to watch a
would fail ei
common con
e in any sho
commending
e, within the
hange of circ
s a prophetic
he circumstan
riod of time,
ber of hands
ll be so many
l administrat
gislatures to e
Hamilton, Fe
ust own that
every impres
America, the
porated with
the people of
dily happen,
d men who w
am unable to
and which p
ither to detec
nstituents. I
ort time, in th
g themselves
short space
cumstances
c spirit to dec
nces now be
, I must pron
proposed by
y sentinels o
tion Alexan
erect barrier
ederalist # 85
I could not
ssion which
spirit which
the political
f America, in
will choose
would be
o conceive th
possess so
ct or to defea
am equally
he United
s to the choic
of two year
time, and a
clare, which
efore us, and
nounce that
y the federal
over the
nder Hamilto
rs against the
5
I
h
l
n
,
hat
at
ce
rs,
h
d
on,
e
212
Suffrage; voters qualifications
Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the rich, more than the poor;
not the learned, more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more
than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great
body of the people of the United States.
James Madison, Federalist # 57
Suin
It is in
withou
exemp
every
of the
ideal.
Alexa
The co
sovere
indepe
Alexa
ng a sov
nherent in th
ut its consen
ption, as one
State in the
convention,
ander Hamilt
ontracts betw
eign, and hav
endent of the
ander Hamilt
vereign
he nature of s
nt. This is the
e of the attrib
Union. Unle
, it will rema
ton, Federali
ween a natio
ve no preten
e sovereign w
ton, Federali
sovereignty n
e general sen
butes of sove
ess, therefor
ain with the
ist # 81
on and indivi
nsions to a co
will.
ist # 81
213
not to be am
nse and the g
ereignty, is n
e, there is a
States and th
iduals are on
ompulsive fo
menable to th
general prac
now enjoyed
surrender of
he danger in
nly binding o
orce. They c
he suit of an i
ctice of mank
d by the gove
f this immun
ntimated mus
on the consc
confer no righ
individual
kind; and the
ernment of
nity in the pl
st be merely
ience of the
ht of action
e
an
Tax
It is ev
experi
consid
to enf
disapp
Alexa
In so o
much
Ameri
kind, f
this la
In Am
on suc
Alexa
The g
Alexa
... per
way th
Alexa
xes
vident from
ience we hav
derable sums
force the coll
pointed, and
ander Hamilt
opulent a na
more tolerab
ica, far the g
from impost
atter descript
merica it is ev
ch duties.
ander Hamilt
enius of the
ander Hamilt
sonal proper
han by the im
ander Hamilt
the state of t
ve had on th
s by direct ta
lection have
the treasurie
ton, Federali
ation as that o
ble, and from
greatest part
ts and from e
tion.
vident that w
ton, Federali
people will
ton, Federali
rty is too pre
mperceptible
ton, Federali
the country,
e point itself
axation. Tax
in vain been
es of the Sta
ist # 12
of Britain, w
m the vigor o
of the nation
excises. Duti
we must a lon
ist # 12
ill brook the
ist # 12
ecarious and
e agency of t
ist # 12
214
from the ha
f that it is im
x laws have i
n tried; the p
ates have rem
where direct t
of the govern
nal revenue i
ies on impor
ng time depe
e inquisitive
invisible a f
taxes on con
abits of the p
mpracticable
in vain been
public expect
mained empt
taxes from s
nment, much
is derived fr
rted articles
end for the m
and peremp
fund to be la
nsumption.
people, from
to raise any
multiplied;
tation has be
ty.
superior wea
h more pract
rom taxes of
form a large
means of rev
ptory spirit o
aid hold of in
the
very
new method
een uniforml
alth must be
ticable than
f the indirect
e branch of
venue chiefly
f excise law
n any other
ds
ly
in
t
y
ws.
[Spea
patrol
Alexa
A nati
Alexa
Person
subjec
Alexa
It is a
nature
withou
this ob
not alw
eluded
proper
Alexa
... ther
one sh
aking of tax
s are necessa
ander Hamilt
ion cannot lo
ander Hamilt
nal estate (as
cted to large
ander Hamilt
signal advan
e a security a
ut defeating
bject, the say
ways make f
d; and the pr
r and moder
ander Hamilt
re must be in
hape or anoth
collection pa
arily armed
ton, Federali
ong exist wit
ton, Federali
s has been b
contribution
ton, Federali
ntage of taxe
against exces
the end prop
ying is as jus
four." If duti
roduct to the
rate bounds.
ton, Federali
nterwoven in
her.
atrols:] The
would be int
ist # 12
thout revenu
ist # 12
efore remark
ns by any oth
ist # 12
es on articles
ss. They pre
posed -- that
st as it is wit
ies are too hi
e treasury is n
ist # 21
n the frame o
215
arbitrary and
tolerable in
ue.
ked), from th
her means th
s of consump
scribe their o
t is, an exten
tty that, "in p
igh, they les
not so great
of the govern
d vexatious
a free countr
he difficulty
han by taxes
ption that th
own limit, w
nsion of the r
political arith
ssen the cons
as when the
nment a gen
powers with
ry.
y of tracing it
on consump
hey contain i
which cannot
revenue. Wh
hmetic, two
sumption; th
ey are confin
neral power o
h which the
t, cannot be
ption.
n their own
t be exceede
hen applied t
and two do
he collection
ned within
of taxation, i
ed
to
is
in
Mo
which
compl
the res
ingred
ensue
eligibl
atroph
Alexa
in the
will b
It mig
least b
Alexa
The ta
be sub
be ma
indeed
consu
Alexa
It is no
regula
establ
oney is, with
h sustains its
lete power, t
sources of th
dient in every
: either the p
le mode of s
hy, and, in a
ander Hamil
usual progre
e found at le
ght be demon
burdensome.
ander Hamilt
axes intended
bdivided into
ade to both, y
d, as to the la
umption
ander Hamilt
ot contended
ating the pro
ishment of t
propriety, c
life and mot
therefore, to
he communit
y constitutio
people must
supplying the
short course
lton, Federal
ess of things
east equal to
nstrated that
.
ton, Federali
d to be comp
o those of th
yet the reaso
atter, by whi
ton, Federali
d that the nu
portion of th
the same rule
onsidered as
tion and ena
procure a re
ty will perm
on. From a d
be subjected
e public wan
e of time, pe
list # 30
s, the necessi
its resource
the most pro
ist # 35
prised under
e direct and
oning upon it
ich must be u
ist # 36
umber of peo
hose who are
e for the app
216
s the vital pr
ables it to per
egular and ad
mit, may be re
eficiency in
d to continua
nts, or the go
rish.
ities of a nat
s. Alexande
oductive sys
r the general
those of the
t seems to be
understood d
ople in each S
e to represen
portionment o
rinciple of th
rform its mo
dequate supp
egarded as a
this particul
al plunder, a
overnment m
tion, in every
er Hamilton,
stem of finan
denominati
e indirect kin
e confined to
duties and ex
State ought n
nt the people
of taxes will
he body polit
ost essential
ply of revenu
an indispensa
lar, one of tw
as a substitut
must sink into
y stage of its
, Federalist #
nce will alwa
on of interna
nd. Though t
o the former
xcises on art
not to be the
e of each Sta
l probably b
tic; as that
functions, A
ue, as far as
able
wo evils mus
e for a more
o a fatal
s existence,
# 30
ays be the
al taxes may
the objection
r branch. An
ticles of
e standard fo
ate. The
e as little
A
st
e
y
n
d
or
217
contested; though the rule itself, in this case, is by no means founded on the same
principle. In the former case, the rule is understood to refer to the personal rights of the
people, with which it has a natural and universal connection. In the latter, it has reference
to the proportion of wealth of which it is in no case a precise measure, and in ordinary
cases a very unfit one. But notwithstanding the imperfection of the rule as applied to the
relative wealth and contributions of the States, it is evidently the least exceptionable
among the practicable rules
James Madison, Federalist # 54
218
Term limits
The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side not only that all power
should be derived from the people, but that those intrusted with it should be kept in
dependence on the people by a short duration of their appointments; and that even during
this short period the trust should be placed not in a few, but a number of hands. Stability,
on the contrary, requires that the hands in which power is lodged should continue for a
length of time the same. A frequent change of men will result from a frequent return of
elections; and a frequent change of measures from a frequent change of men: whilst energy
in government requires not only a certain duration of power, but the execution of it by a
single hand.
James Madison, Federalist # 37
Titl
Could
decisi
federa
each o
James
Nothin
This m
they a
than th
Alexa
es of no
d any further
ve one migh
al and the Sta
of the latter.
s Madison, F
ng need be s
may truly be
are excluded
hat of the pe
ander Hamilt
obility
r proof be req
ht be found in
ate governm
Federalist # 3
said to illustr
denominate
there can ne
eople.
ton, Federali
quired of the
n its absolut
ments; and in
39
rate the impo
ed the corner
ever be serio
ist # 84
219
e republican
te prohibition
its express g
ortance of th
rstone of rep
ous danger th
complexion
n of titles of
guaranty of t
he prohibitio
publican gov
hat the gover
n of this syst
f nobility, bo
the republic
on of titles of
vernment; for
rnment will
em, the mos
oth under the
an form to
f nobility.
r so long as
be any other
st
e
r
Tre
little d
obliga
the im
Alexa
Laws
operat
part o
other
To pro
resort
same
indisp
differe
divers
the sam
To av
of a nu
one co
settle
Alexa
But it
infere
aties
dependence i
ations of goo
mpulse of any
ander Hamilt
are a dead le
tion. The tre
f the law of
laws, be asc
oduce unifor
, to one SUP
authority wh
pensable. If t
ent final dete
sities in the o
me court dif
oid the confu
umber of ind
ourt paramou
and declare
ander Hamilt
is said that t
nce can be d
is to be plac
od faith, and
y immediate
ton, Federali
etter without
eaties of the U
the land. Th
ertained by j
rmity in thes
PREME TRI
hich forms th
there is in ea
erminations
opinions of m
ffering from
fusion which
dependent ju
unt to the res
in the last re
ton, Federali
the laws of t
drawn from t
ed on treatie
which oppo
interest or p
ist # 15
t courts to ex
United State
heir true impo
judicial dete
se determina
IBUNAL. A
he treaties th
ach State a co
on the same
men. We oft
each other.
h would unav
udicatories, a
st, possessin
esort a unifo
ist # 22
the Union ar
this, or what
220
es which hav
ose general c
passion.
xpound and
es, to have an
ort, as far as
erminations.
ations, they o
nd this tribu
hemselves. T
ourt of final
e point as the
en see not on
voidably resu
all nations ha
ng a general
rm rule of ci
re to be the s
t would they
ve no other s
consideration
define their
ny force at a
s respects ind
ought to be s
unal ought to
These ingred
jurisdiction
ere are court
nly different
ult from the
ave found it
superintende
ivil justice.
supreme law
y amount to,
sanction than
ns of peace a
true meanin
all, must be c
dividuals, m
submitted, in
o be institute
dients are bot
, there may b
ts. There are
t courts but t
contradictor
t necessary to
ence and aut
w of the land.
if they were
n the
and justice to
ng and
considered a
must, like all
n the last
ed under the
th
be as many
endless
the judges o
ry decisions
o establish
thorized to
What
e not to be
o
as
f
221
supreme? It is evident they would amount to nothing. A LAW, by the very meaning of the
term, includes supremacy. It is a rule which those to whom it is prescribed are bound to
observe. This results from every political association.
If individuals enter into a state of society, the laws of that society must be the supreme
regulator of their conduct. If a number of political societies enter into a larger political
society, the laws which the latter may enact, pursuant to the powers intrusted to it by its
constitution, must necessarily be supreme over those societies and the individuals of whom
they are composed. It would otherwise be a mere treaty, dependent on the good faith of the
parties, and not a government, which is only another word for POLITICAL POWER AND
SUPREMACY.
But it will not follow from this doctrine that acts of the larger society which are not
pursuant to its constitutional powers, but which are invasions of the residuary authorities of
the smaller societies, will become the supreme law of the land. These will be merely acts
of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as such. Hence we perceive that the clause
which declares the supremacy of the laws of the Union, like the one we have just before
considered, only declares a truth which flows immediately and necessarily from the
institution of a federal government. It will not, I presume, have escaped observation that it
expressly confines this supremacy to laws made pursuant to the Constitution; which I
mention merely as an instance of caution in the convention; since that limitation would
have been to be understood, though it had not been expressed.
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 33
222
Usurpation
[Quoting Montesquieu]: "It is very probable" (says he *) "that mankind would have been
obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a SINGLE PERSON, had they
not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican,
together with the external force of a monarchical, government. I mean a CONFEDERATE
REPUBLIC.
"This form of government is a convention by which several smaller states agree to
become members of a larger one, which they intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of
societies that constitute a new one, capable of increasing, by means of new associations,
till they arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the
united body.
"A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may support itself without
any internal corruptions. The form of this society prevents all manner of inconveniences.
"If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he could not be
supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the confederate states. Were he to
have too great influence over one, this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that
which would still remain free might oppose him with forces independent of those which he
had usurped, and overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation.
"Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states, the others are
able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain
sound. The state may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may
be dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty.
"As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys the internal happiness of
each; and with respect to its external situation, it is possessed, by means of the association,
of all the advantages of large monarchies."
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 9
AN O
last ad
indivi
of the
might
Allow
confes
admin
author
appea
Comm
charm
ought
privat
other
provid
It is th
usurp
power
that re
of the
Alexa
A wea
or the
once b
OBJECTION
ddress may p
dual citizens
Union too p
be judged p
wing the utmo
ss I am at a l
nistration of
rities of that
ars to me to h
merce, financ
ms for minds
in the first i
te justice bet
concerns of
ded for by lo
herefore imp
the powers w
rs would be
eason, would
national gov
ander Hamilt
ak constitutio
usurpation o
begun, will s
N of a nature
perhaps be li
s of America
powerful, an
proper to leav
ost latitude t
loss to disco
the general g
description.
hold out slen
ce, negotiatio
governed by
instance to b
tween the cit
a similar nat
ocal legislatio
probable that
with which t
as troubleso
d contribute
vernment.
ton, Federali
on must nec
of powers re
stop at the sa
different fro
ikewise urge
a. It may be
nd to enable i
ve with the S
to the love o
over what tem
government
. The regulat
nder allureme
on, and war
y that passio
be lodged in
tizens of the
ture, all thos
on, can neve
t there should
they are con
me as it wou
nothing to th
ist # 17
essarily term
equisite for t
alutary point
223
om that whic
ed against th
said that it w
it to absorb t
States for loc
of power whi
mptation the
could ever f
tion of the m
ents to ambi
seem to com
on; and all th
the national
same State,
se things, in
er be desirab
d exist a disp
nnected; beca
uld be nugat
he dignity, to
minate in dis
he public sa
t, or go forw
ch has been s
e principle o
would tend to
those residua
cal purposes
ich any reaso
persons intr
feel to divest
mere domesti
ition.
mprehend all
he powers ne
depository.
the supervis
short, which
ble cares of a
position in th
ause the atte
tory; and the
o the import
solution for
afety. Wheth
ward to the da
stated and an
of legislation
o render the
ary authoriti
s.
onable man
rusted with t
t the States o
ic police of a
l the objects
ecessary to th
The admini
sion of agric
h are proper
a general jur
the federal co
empt to exerc
e possession
tance, or to t
want of pro
her the usurp
angerous ext
nswered in m
n for the
government
ies, which it
can require,
the
of the
a State
which have
hose objects
stration of
culture and o
to be
isdiction.
ouncils to
cise those
of them, for
the splendor
per powers,
ation, when
treme, must
my
t
I
e
of
r
depen
assum
out of
James
there m
the mi
laws a
Ind
requir
say th
repres
securi
If th
but in
forms
exerte
indivi
In a si
differe
govern
tumul
courag
crush
The sm
regula
efforts
nd on the con
mptions of po
f the full exe
s Madison, F
might somet
ilitia to prese
against those
dependent of
re a more per
hat the whole
sentatives of
ity for the rig
he representa
the exertion
of governm
ed with infin
dual State.
ingle State, i
ent parcels, s
nment in eac
tuously to ar
ge and despa
the oppositi
maller the ex
ar or systema
s. Intelligenc
ntingencies o
ower called f
rcise of the l
Federalist # 2
times be a ne
erve the pea
e violent inv
f all other rea
remptory pro
e power of th
f the people.
ghts and priv
atives of the
n of that orig
ment, and wh
itely better p
if the person
subdivisions
ch, can take
rms, without
air. The usur
on in embry
xtent of the t
atic plan of o
ce can be mo
of the mome
for, on press
largest const
20
ecessity to m
ce of the com
asions of the
asonings upo
ovision agai
he proposed
This is the e
vileges of the
e people betr
ginal right of
ich against t
prospect of s
ns intrusted w
s, or districts
no regular m
t concert, wi
rpers, clothe
yo.
territory, the
opposition, a
ore speedily
224
nt. Tyranny
ing exigenci
titutional aut
make use of a
mmunity and
em which am
on the subjec
nst military
government
essential, and
e people wh
ray their con
f self-defense
the usurpatio
success than
with supreme
s of which it
measures for
ithout system
d with the fo
e more diffic
and the more
obtained of
has perhaps
ies, by a defe
thorities.
a force const
d to maintain
mount to insu
ct, it is a full
establishme
t is to be in t
d, after all, th
hich is attaina
stituents, the
e which is p
ons of the na
against thos
e power beco
consists, ha
r defense. Th
m, without re
orms of lega
cult will it be
e easy will it
f their prepar
s oftener gro
fective consti
tituted differ
n the just au
urrections an
l answer to th
ents in time o
the hands of
the only effic
able in civil
ere is then no
aramount to
ational rulers
se of the rule
ome usurper
aving no dist
he citizens m
esource; exc
al authority, c
e for the peop
t be to defea
rations and m
own out of th
itution, than
rently from
uthority of th
nd rebellions
hose who
of peace to
f the
cacious
society.
o resource le
o all positive
s may be
ers of an
rs, the
tinct
must rush
cept in their
can too often
ple to form a
at their early
movements,
he
n
he
s.
eft
n
a
225
and the military force in the possession of the usurpers can be more rapidly directed
against the part where the opposition has begun. In this situation there must be a peculiar
coincidence of circumstances to insure success to the popular resistance.
The obstacles to usurpation and the facilities of resistance increase with the increased
extent of the state, provided the citizens understand their rights and are disposed to defend
them. The natural strength of the people in a large community, in proportion to the
artificial strength of the government, is greater than in a small, and of course more
competent to a struggle with the attempts of the government to establish a tyranny.
But in a confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to be entirely the
masters of their own fate. Power being almost always the rival of power, the general
government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments,
and these will have the same disposition towards the general government. The people, by
throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights
are invaded by either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of redress. How
wise will it be in them by cherishing the union to preserve to themselves an advantage
which can never be too highly prized!
It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system that the State governments
will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against invasions of the public
liberty by the national authority. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretenses
so likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of men, as of the people at large. The
legislatures will have better means of information.
They can discover the danger at a distance; and possessing all the organs of civil power
and the confidence of the people, they can at once adopt a regular plan of opposition, in
which they can combine all the resources of the community. They can readily
communicate with each other in the different States, and unite their common forces for the
protection of their common liberty.
The great extent of the country is a further security. We have already experienced its
utility against the attacks of a foreign power. And it would have precisely the same effect
agains
should
head w
the op
was le
We
by the
a large
of the
When
capab
who a
for the
The ap
the res
Alexa
But it
infere
suprem
term,
observ
This r
laws o
societ
to the
societ
st the enterpr
d be able to q
with fresh fo
pposition in o
eft to itself, i
e should reco
e resources o
e army; and
community
n will the tim
le of erectin
are in a situat
eir own defe
pprehension
sources of ar
ander Hamilt
is said that t
nce can be d
me? It is evi
includes sup
ve.
results from
of that societ
ties enter into
powers intru
ties and the i
rises of amb
quell the res
orces. The ad
others; and t
its efforts wo
ollect that the
of the countr
as the mean
y will proport
me arrive that
g a despotism
tion, through
ense, with all
n may be con
rgument and
ton, Federali
the laws of t
drawn from t
dent they wo
premacy. It i
every politic
ty must be th
o a larger po
usted to it by
individuals o
bitious rulers
sistance of on
dvantages ob
the moment
ould be rene
e extent of th
y. For a long
ns of doing th
tionably incr
t the federal
m over the g
h the medium
l the celerity
nsidered as a
d reasoning.
ist # 28
the Union ar
this, or what
ould amount
s a rule whic
cal associatio
he supreme r
olitical societ
y its constitu
of whom they
226
s in the natio
ne State, the
btained in on
the part whi
wed, and its
he military f
g time to com
his increase,
rease.
government
great body of
m of their St
y, regularity,
a disease, for
re to be the s
t would they
t to nothing.
ch those to w
on. If individ
regulator of
ty, the laws
ution, must n
y are compo
onal councils
e distant Stat
ne place mus
ich had been
s resistance r
force must, a
me it will no
the populat
t can raise an
f the people
tate governm
and system
r which there
supreme law
y amount to,
A LAW, by
whom it is pr
duals enter i
their conduc
which the la
necessarily b
osed.
s. If the feder
tes would be
st be abando
n reduced to
revive.
at all events,
ot be possibl
tion and natu
nd maintain
of an immen
ments, to take
m of independ
e can be foun
w of the land.
if they were
y the very m
rescribed are
into a state o
ct. If a numb
atter may ena
be supreme o
ral army
e able to mak
ned to subdu
submission
be regulated
e to maintain
ural strength
an army
nse empire,
e measures
dent nations?
nd no cure in
What
e not to be
eaning of th
e bound to
of society, th
ber of politic
act, pursuan
over those
ke
ue
d
n
?
n
he
he
cal
nt
It wou
govern
But it
pursua
the sm
of usu
Hence
like th
and ne
escape
Const
that lim
Alexa
the mo
the pr
Congr
of the
the su
which
strikin
Jame
[Rega
into ex
govern
uld otherwis
nment, whic
will not foll
ant to its con
maller societi
urpation, and
e we perceiv
he one we ha
ecessarily fro
ed observati
titution; whic
mitation wo
ander Hamilt
ost minute p
etext for gra
ress have bee
ir chartered
ubject; and w
h seems to ha
ng defects of
s Madison, F
arding the] "
xecution the
nment of the
e be a mere
ch is only an
low from thi
nstitutional p
ies, will beco
d will deserv
ve that the cla
ave just befo
om the instit
on that it exp
ch I mention
uld have bee
ton, Federali
provisions be
adual and un
en betrayed,
authorities w
would be no i
ave provided
f the old.
Federalist #
"power to ma
e foregoing p
e United Stat
treaty, depen
other word f
is doctrine th
powers, but w
ome the sup
ve to be treat
ause which d
ore considere
tution of a fe
pressly conf
n merely as a
en to be und
ist # 33
ecome impor
observed usu
, or forced by
would not a l
inconsiderab
d no less stud
42
ake all laws
powers, and
tes, or in any
227
ndent on the
for POLITIC
hat acts of th
which are in
reme law of
ed as such.
declares the
ed, only decl
ederal gover
fines this sup
an instance o
erstood, thou
rtant when th
urpations of
y the defects
little surpris
ble argument
diously for t
which shall
all other pow
y departmen
e good faith o
CAL POWE
he larger soc
nvasions of th
f the land. Th
supremacy o
lares a truth
rnment. It wi
premacy to l
of caution in
ugh it had n
hey tend to o
f power. A li
s of the Conf
e those who
t in favor of
the lesser tha
be necessar
wers vested b
nt or office th
of the partie
R AND SUP
iety which a
he residuary
hese will be
of the laws o
which flows
ill not, I pres
aws made pu
n the convent
ot been expr
obviate the n
ist of the cas
federation, i
have paid n
f the new Con
an the more
ry and proper
by this Cons
hereof."
s, and not a
PREMACY
are not
y authorities
merely acts
of the Union
s immediatel
sume, have
ursuant to th
tion; since
ressed.
necessity or
ses in which
into violation
no attention t
nstitution,
obvious and
r for carryin
stitution in th
.
of
n,
ly
he
ns
to
d
ng
he
228
. . . There are four other possible methods which the Convention might have taken on this
subject. They might have copied the second article of the existing Confederation, which
would have prohibited the exercise of any power not expressly delegated; they might have
attempted a positive enumeration of the powers comprehended under the general terms
"necessary and proper"; they might have attempted a negative enumeration of them by
specifying the powers excepted from the general definition; they might have been
altogether silent on the subject, leaving these necessary and proper powers to construction
and inference.
. . . As the powers delegated under the new system are more extensive, the government
which is to administer it would find itself still more distressed with the alternative of
betraying the public interests by doing nothing, or of violating the Constitution by
exercising powers indispensably necessary and proper, but, at the same time, not expressly
granted.
. . . for in every new application of a general power, the particular powers, which are the
means of attaining the object of the general power, must always necessarily vary with that
object, and be often properly varied whilst the object remains the same.
Had they attempted to enumerate the particular powers or means not necessary or proper
for carrying the general powers into execution, the task would have been no less
chimerical; and would have been liable to this further objection, that every defect in the
enumeration would have been equivalent to a positive grant of authority.
. . . No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is
required, the means are authorized; wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every
particular power necessary for doing it is included.
. . . If it be asked what is to be the consequence, in case the Congress shall misconstrue this
part of the Constitution and exercise powers not warranted by its true meaning. I answer
the same as if they should misconstrue or enlarge any other power vested in them; as if the
general power had been reduced to particulars, and any one of these were to be violated;
the same, in short, as if the State legislatures should violate their respective constitutional
author
and ju
in the
more
The tr
of the
the for
the inn
effecti
betwe
forme
unredr
James
The tr
tempo
few ye
and w
give a
have r
actuat
charac
I am u
circum
choice
schem
I am u
watch
rities. In the
udiciary depa
last resort a
faithful repr
ruth is that th
federal than
rmer will be
novation, to
ing a change
een the State
er, violations
ressed.
s Madison, F
rue question
orary regulat
ears, and a h
well-guarded
a negative an
received with
tes the State
cter of every
unable to con
mstances wh
e of, sixty-fiv
me of tyranny
unable to con
h and which p
first instanc
artments, wh
a remedy mu
resentatives,
his ultimate r
n of the State
e an invasion
sound the al
e of federal r
legislatures
s of the State
Federalist # 4
to be decide
tion, be dang
hundred or tw
power of leg
nswer to this
h regard to t
legislatures,
y class of citi
nceive that th
hich can spee
ve or a hund
y or treacher
nceive that th
possess so m
ce, the succe
hich are to ex
ust be obtaine
annul the ac
redress may
e legislatures
n of the right
larm to the p
representativ
and the peo
e constitution
44
ed, then, is w
gerous to the
wo hundred
gislating for
question, w
the present g
, and the prin
izens.
he people of
edily happen
dred men wh
ry.
he State legi
many means
229
ss of the usu
xpound and
ed from the p
cts of the usu
be more con
s, for this pla
ts of the latte
people, and t
ves. There be
ople intereste
ns are more l
whether the s
e public liber
for a few mo
the United S
without first o
genius of the
nciples whic
f America, in
n, will choose
ho would be
islatures, wh
of counterac
urpation will
give effect t
people, who
urpers.
nfided in aga
ain reason th
er, these will
to exert their
eing no such
ed in watchin
likely to rem
smallness of
rty? Whether
ore, be a safe
States? I mu
obliterating e
people of A
ch are incorp
n their prese
e, and every
disposed to
hich must fee
cting the fed
l depend on t
to the legisla
o can, by the
ainst uncons
hat as every
l be ever rea
r local influe
h intermediat
ng the condu
main unnotic
f the number
r sixty-five m
fe depositary
ust own that
every impres
America, the
porated with
ent temper, o
y second year
form and pu
el so many m
deral legislatu
the executiv
ative acts; an
election of
stitutional ac
such act of
ady to mark
ence in
te body
uct of the
ced and
r, as a
members for
y for a limite
I could not
ssion which
spirit which
the political
or under any
r repeat the
ursue a
motives to
ure, would
ve
nd
cts
r a
d
I
h
l
fail eit
comm
in any
recom
dare, w
What
requir
from t
moder
the nu
Jame
the Ho
recolle
minds
compe
is to b
there f
title to
I wi
restrai
its ful
societ
can co
It crea
few go
ther to detec
mon constitue
y short time,
mmending the
within the sh
change of ci
res a prophet
the circumst
rate period o
umber of han
s Madison, F
ouse of Repr
ection of the
s by the mod
elled to antic
be reviewed,
forever to re
o a renewal o
ll add, as a f
ining them f
l operation o
ty. This has a
onnect the ru
ates between
overnments
ct or to defea
ents. I am eq
in the Unite
emselves to
hort space of
ircumstance
tic spirit to d
ances now b
of time, I mu
nds proposed
Federalist #
resentatives
eir dependen
de of their ele
cipate the mo
and when th
emain unless
of it.
fifth circums
from oppress
on themselve
always been
ulers and the
n them that c
have furnish
at a conspira
qually unable
ed States, any
the choice o
f two years,
s time, and a
declare, whic
before us, an
ust pronounc
d by the fede
55
is so constit
nce on the pe
evation can b
oment when
hey must des
s a faithful di
stance in the
sive measure
es and their f
deemed one
e people toge
communion o
hed example
230
acy of the lat
e to conceive
y sixty-five
of the people
to betray the
a fuller popu
ch makes no
nd from the p
ce that the lib
eral Constitu
tuted as to su
eople. Before
be effaced b
n their power
scend to the
ischarge of t
situation of
es, that they
friends, as w
e of the stron
ether.
of interests a
es; but witho
tter against th
e that there a
or a hundred
e at large, wh
e solemn tru
ulation of ou
part of my p
probable stat
berties of Am
ution.
upport in the
e the sentime
by the exerci
r is to cease,
level from w
their trust sh
f the House o
can make no
well as on the
ngest bonds
and sympath
out which eve
he liberties o
are at this tim
d men capab
ho would eit
ust committed
ur country ma
pretensions.
te of them w
merica canno
e members an
ents impress
ise of power,
, when their
which they w
hall have esta
of Represent
o law which
e great mass
by which hu
hy of sentime
ery governm
of their
me, or can b
ble of
ther desire or
d to them.
ay produce
But judging
within a
ot be unsafe
n habitual
sed on their
, they will be
exercise of i
were raised;
ablished thei
tatives,
will not hav
s of the
uman policy
ents of which
ment
e
r
g
in
e
it
ir
ve
h
degen
from m
societ
laws;
a spiri
If th
legisla
liberty
James
There
author
legisla
To den
servan
thems
author
Alexa
encroa
people
consti
The tr
upon f
less vi
nerates into ty
making lega
ty? I answer:
and, above a
it which nou
his spirit shal
ature, as wel
y.
s Madison, F
is no positio
rity, contrary
ative act, the
ny this woul
nt is above h
selves; that m
rize, but wha
ander Hamilt
achments ha
e they are th
itutional obst
ruth is that th
for permane
irtue and eff
yranny. If it
al discriminat
: the genius o
all, the vigila
urishes freedo
ll ever be so
ll as on the p
Federalist # 5
on which dep
y to the teno
erefore, contr
ld be to affir
his master; th
men acting b
at they forbi
ton, Federali
ave generally
he warmest d
tacles to arre
he general G
nt effects. P
ficacy than a
be asked, w
tions in favo
of the whole
ant and man
om, and in r
far debased
people, the p
57
pends on cle
or of the com
rary to the C
rm that the d
hat the repres
y virtue of p
d.
ist # 78
y originated
defenders of
est them in a
GENIUS of a
articular pro
are commonl
231
what is to rest
or of themsel
e system; the
ly spirit whi
return is nour
d as to tolerat
eople will b
earer princip
mmission und
Constitution,
deputy is grea
sentatives of
powers may
with the men
popular libe
a favorite car
a governmen
ovisions, thou
ly ascribed to
train the Hou
lves and a pa
e nature of ju
ich actuates
urished by it.
te a law not
e prepared to
ples than that
der which it
can be valid
ater than his
f the people
do not only
n who endea
erty, but who
reer.
nt is all that c
ugh not alto
o them; and
use of Repre
articular cla
ust and const
the people o
obligatory o
o tolerate an
t every act o
is exercised
d.
s principal; th
are superior
what their p
avor to persu
o have rarely
can be substa
gether usele
the want of
esentatives
ss of the
titutional
of America -
on the
nything but
of a delegated
, is void. No
hat the
r to the peop
powers do no
uade the
y suffered
antially relie
ess, have far
f them will
-
d
o
ple
ot
ed
232
never be, with men of sound discernment, a decisive objection to any plan which exhibits
the leading characters of a good government.
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 83
Veto
An ab
admitt
encroa
Alexa
The pr
virtue
that th
rights
its del
which
the po
one is
throug
Alexa
They w
keep t
likely
legisla
amply
Alexa
o power
bsolute or qu
ted, by the a
achments of
ander Hamilt
ropriety of th
in the execu
he love of po
of other me
liberations; t
h itself, on m
ower in quest
to increase
gh haste, ina
ander Hamilt
will conside
things in the
to do good t
ation. The in
y compensate
ander Hamilt
r
ualified negat
ablest adepts
f the latter up
ton, Federali
he thing [vet
utive, but up
ower may so
mbers of the
that impressi
maturer reflec
tion upon th
the chances
advertence, o
ton, Federali
er every insti
same state i
than harm; b
njury which
ed by the ad
ton, Federali
tive in the ex
in political
pon the form
ist # 66
to] does not
pon the suppo
metimes bet
e governmen
ions of the m
ction, would
he executive
in favor of t
or design.
ist # 73
itution calcu
in which the
because it is
may possibl
dvantage of p
ist # 73
233
xecutive upo
science, to b
mer.
turn upon th
osition that t
tray it into a
nt; that a spir
moment may
condemn. T
is to enable
the commun
lated to restr
y happen to
favorable to
ly be done b
preventing a
on the acts o
be an indispe
he suppositio
the legislatur
disposition
rit of faction
y sometimes
The primary
him to defen
nity against t
rain the exce
be at any gi
o greater stab
by defeating
number of b
of the legislat
ensable barri
on of superio
ure will not b
to encroach
n may somet
hurry it into
inducement
nd himself; t
the passing o
ess of lawma
iven period a
bility in the s
a few good
bad ones.
tive body is
ier against th
or wisdom o
be infallible;
upon the
times pervert
o measures
t to conferrin
the secondar
of bad laws,
aking, and to
as much mor
system of
laws will be
he
or
t
ng
ry
o
re
e
234
A man who might be afraid to defeat a law by his single VETO might not scruple to return
it for reconsideration, subject to being finally rejected only in the event of more than one
third of each house concurring in the sufficiency of his objections.
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 73
War
It is to
make
monar
and ob
affron
partisa
sovere
intere
John J
Safety
ardent
life an
contin
securi
be mo
Alexa
It is o
author
Alexa
r
oo true, how
war whenev
rchs will oft
bjects merely
nts, ambition
ans. These a
eign, often le
sts of his peo
John Jay, Fe
y from extern
t love of libe
nd property i
nual danger,
ity to institut
ore safe, they
ander Hamilt
f the nature
rity.
ander Hamilt
ever disgrac
ver they have
en make war
y personal, s
n, or private c
and a variety
ead him to e
ople.
deralist # 4
nal danger is
erty will, afte
incident to w
will compel
tions which h
y at length be
ton, Federali
of war to inc
ton, Federali
ceful it may b
e a prospect
r when their
such as a thir
compacts to
of other mo
ngage in wa
s the most po
er a time, giv
war, the conti
l nations the
have a tende
ecome willin
ist # 8
crease the ex
ist # 8
235
be to human
of getting an
r nations are
rst for milita
aggrandize
otives, which
ars not sancti
owerful dire
ve way to its
inual effort a
most attach
ency to destr
ng to run the
xecutive at th
n nature, that
nything by it
to get nothin
ary glory, rev
or support th
h affect only
ified by justi
ector of natio
s dictates. Th
and alarm at
ed to liberty
roy their civi
e risk of bein
he expense o
t nations in g
t; nay, that a
ng by it, but
venge for pe
heir particul
y the mind of
ice or the vo
onal conduct
he violent de
ttendant on a
y to resort for
il and politic
ng less free.
of the legisla
general will
absolute
t for purpose
ersonal
lar families o
f the
oice and
t. Even the
estruction of
a state of
r repose and
cal rights. To
ative
es
or
f
d
o
236
If, to obviate this consequence, it should be resolved to extend the prohibition to the raising
of armies in time of peace, the United States would then exhibit the most extraordinary
spectacle which the world has yet seen -- that of a nation incapacitated by its Constitution
to prepare for defense before it was actually invaded. As the ceremony of a formal
denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse, the presence of an enemy within our
territories must be waited for as the legal warrant to the government to begin its levies of
men for the protection of the State.
We must receive the blow before we could even prepare to return it. All that kind of policy
by which nations anticipate distant danger and meet the gathering storm must be abstained
from, as contrary to the genuine maxims of a free government. We must expose our
property and liberty to the mercy of foreign invaders and invite them by our weakness to
seize the naked and defenseless prey, because we are afraid that rulers, created by our
choice, dependent on our will, might endanger that liberty by an abuse of the means
necessary to its preservation.
Here I expect we shall be told that the militia of the country is its natural bulwark, and
would be at all times equal to the national defense. This doctrine, in substance, had like to
have lost us our independence. It cost millions to the United States that might have been
saved. The facts which from our own experience forbid a reliance of this kind are too
recent to permit us to be the dupes of such a suggestion.
The steady operations of war against a regular and disciplined army can only be
successfully conducted by a force of the same kind. Considerations of economy, not less
than of stability and vigor, confirm this position. The American militia, in the course of the
late war, have, by their valor on numerous occasions, erected eternal monuments to their
fame; but the bravest of them feel and know that the liberty of their country could not have
been established by their efforts alone, however great and valuable they were. War, like
most other things, is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, by perseverance,
by time, and by practice.
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist # 25
Let us
moder
exting
Alexa
To jud
destru
the mi
specul
human
Alexa
Of all
those
Alexa
s recollect th
rate or unam
guish the am
ander Hamilt
dge from the
uctive passio
ild and bene
lations of las
n character.
ander Hamilt
the cares or
qualities wh
ander Hamilt
hat peace or w
mbitious we m
mbition of oth
ton, Federali
e history of m
ns of war re
eficent sentim
sting tranqui
ton, Federali
r concerns of
hich distingu
ton, Federali
war will not
may be, we c
hers.
ist # 34
mankind, we
ign in the hu
ments of pea
illity would b
ist # 34
f governmen
uish the exerc
ist # 74
237
always be le
cannot count
e shall be com
uman breast
ace; and that
be to calcula
nt, the directi
cise of powe
eft to our op
t upon the m
mpelled to c
with much m
to model ou
ate on the we
ion of war m
er by a single
ption; that ho
moderation, o
conclude that
more powerf
ur political sy
eaker spring
most peculiar
e hand.
owever
or hope to
t the fiery an
ful sway tha
ystems upon
gs of the
rly demands
nd
an
n
238
Appendix 1- The Constitution
Preamble
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
Article. I.
Section. 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.
Section. 2.The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every
second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have
the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature.
No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five
Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when
elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which
may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be
determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to
Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other
Persons [Modified by Amendment XIV]. The actual Enumeration shall be made within
three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every
subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of
Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have
at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New
Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode‐Island and
Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New‐York six, New Jersey four,
Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South
Carolina five, and Georgia three.
239
When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority
thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.
The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have
the sole Power of Impeachment.
Section. 3.The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each
State, chosen by the Legislature thereof [Modified by Amendment XVII], for six Years; and
each Senator shall have one Vote.
Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall
be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first
Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the
Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so
that one third may be chosen every second Year; and if Vacancies happen by Resignation,
or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may
make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then
fill such Vacancies [Modified by Amendment XVII].
No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and
been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an
Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.
The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no
Vote, unless they be equally divided.
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the
Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the
United States.
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that
Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is
tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the
Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office,
and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the
United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.
240
Section. 4.The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places
of chusing Senators.
The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the
first Monday in December [Modified by Amendment XX], unless they shall by Law appoint
a different Day.
Section. 5.Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its
own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a
smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the
Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House
may provide.
Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.
Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the
same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and
Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of
those Present, be entered on the Journal.
Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other,
adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two
Houses shall be sitting.
Section. 6.The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their
Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States.
They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from
Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to
and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall
not be questioned in any other Place.
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be
appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have
been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time;
and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either
House during his Continuance in Office.
241
Section. 7.All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but
the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall,
before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States;[2] If he
approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in
which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal,
and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall
agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House,
by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it
shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by
yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be
entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the
President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him,
the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their
Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of
Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be
presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect,
shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of
the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations
prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
Section. 8.The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of
the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States;
To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes;
To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States;
To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of
Weights and Measures;
242
To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the
United States;
To establish Post Offices and post Roads;
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences
against the Law of Nations;
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning
Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a
longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such
Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the
States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the
Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding
ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress,
become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority
over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same
shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock‐Yards, and other needful
Buildings; — And
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
243
Section. 9.The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing
shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one
thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such
Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.
The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases
of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.
No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.
No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or
Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.
No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.
No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of
one State over those of another; nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be
obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made
by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all
public Money shall be published from time to time.
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any
Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of
any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or
foreign State.
Section. 10.No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters
of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and
silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports
or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws;
and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports,
shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject
to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or
Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State,
244
or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent
Danger as will not admit of delay.
Article. II.
Section. 1.The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the
Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number
of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the
State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person
holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.
The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two Persons, of
whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they
shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which
List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the
United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall,
in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and
the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be
the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed;
and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of
Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them
for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the
said House shall in like Manner chuse the President. But in chusing the President, the
Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State having one Vote; a
quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two thirds of the
States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after
the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the
Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have
equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice President [Modified by
Amendment XII].
The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they
shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of
the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall
245
any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five
Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or
Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on
the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death,
Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer
shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be
removed, or a President shall be elected [Modified by Amendment XXV].
The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall
neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been
elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United
States, or any of them.
Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or
Affirmation: — "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of
President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution of the United States."
Section. 2.The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the
United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of
the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective
Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the
United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads
of Departments.
246
The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess
of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next
Session.
Section. 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the
Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary
and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of
them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of
Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive
Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.
Section. 4. The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be
removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors.
Article. III.
Section. 1. The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
Section. 2.The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority; — to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls; — to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; — to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party; — to Controversies between two or more States;
— between a State and Citizens of another State [Modified by Amendment XI]; —
between Citizens of different States; — between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which
a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other
Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to
247
Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make.
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial
shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not
committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may
by Law have directed.
Section. 3.Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying War against
them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be
convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or
on Confession in open Court.
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of
Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person
attainted.
Article. IV.
Section. 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and
the Effect thereof.
Section. 2.The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in the several States.
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from
Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the
State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction
of the Crime.
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into
another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such
Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or
Labour may be due [Modified by Amendment XIII].
Section. 3.New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State
shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be
formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of
the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.
248
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in
this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or
of any particular State.
Section. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application
of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against
domestic Violence.
Article. V.
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose
Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds
of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either
Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified
by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One
thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses
in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate [Possibly abrogated by Amendment XVII].
Article. VI.
All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this
Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under
the Confederation.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several
State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of
the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution;
249
but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust
under the United States.
Article. VII.
The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the
Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.
The Word, "the," being interlined between the seventh and eighth Lines of the first Page,
The Word "Thirty" being partly written on an Erazure in the fifteenth Line of the first
Page, The Words "is tried" being interlined between the thirty second and thirty third
Lines of the first Page and the Word "the" being interlined between the forty third and
forty fourth Lines of the second Page.
Attest William Jackson
Secretary
done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the Seventeenth
Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven
and of the Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth In witness whereof
We have hereunto subscribed our Names,
Go. WASHINGTON — Presidt.
and deputy from Virginia
New Hampshire {
JOHN LANGDON
NICHOLAS GILMAN
Massachusetts {
NATHANIEL GORHAM
RUFUS KING
Connecticut {
250
WM. SAML. JOHNSON
ROGER SHERMAN
New York . . . .
ALEXANDER HAMILTON
New Jersey {
WIL: LIVINGSTON
DAVID BREARLEY.
WM. PATERSON.
JONA: DAYTON
Pennsylvania {
B FRANKLIN
THOMAS MIFFLIN
ROBT MORRIS
GEO. CLYMER
THOS. FITZ SIMONS
JARED INGERSOLL
JAMES WILSON
GOUV MORRIS
Delaware {
GEO: READ
GUNNING BEDFORD jun
JOHN DICKINSON
RICHARD BASSETT
JACO: BROOM
251
Maryland {
JAMES MCHENRY
DAN OF ST THOS. JENIFER
DANL CARROLL
Virginia {
JOHN BLAIR
JAMES MADISON jr
North Carolina {
WM. BLOUNT
RICHD. DOBBS SPAIGHT
HU WILLIAMSON
South Carolina {
J. RUTLEDGE
CHARLES COTESWORTH PINCKNEY
CHARLES PINCKNEY
PIERCE BUTLER
Georgia {
WILLIAM FEW
ABR BALDWIN
In Convention Monday, September 17th, 1787.
Present
The States of
252
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, MR. Hamilton from New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia.
Resolved,
That the preceeding Constitution be laid before the United States in Congress assembled,
and that it is the Opinion of this Convention, that it should afterwards be submitted to a
Convention of Delegates, chosen in each State by the People thereof, under the
Recommendation of its Legislature, for their Assent and Ratification; and that each
Convention assenting to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice thereof to the United
States in Congress assembled. Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention, that as
soon as the Conventions of nine States shall have ratified this Constitution, the United
States in Congress assembled should fix a Day on which Electors should be appointed by
the States which have ratified the same, and a Day on which the Electors should assemble
to vote for the President, and the Time and Place for commencing Proceedings under this
Constitution. That after such Publication the Electors should be appointed, and the
Senators and Representatives elected: That the Electors should meet on the Day fixed for
the Election of the President, and should transmit their Votes certified, signed, sealed and
directed, as the Constitution requires, to the Secretary of the United States in Congress
assembled, that the Senators and Representatives should convene at the Time and Place
assigned; that the Senators should appoint a President of the Senate, for the sole purpose
of receiving, opening and counting the Votes for President; and, that after he shall be
chosen, the Congress, together with the President, should, without Delay, proceed to
execute this Constitution.
By the Unanimous Order of the Convention
Go. WASHINGTON — Presidt.
W. JACKSON Secretary.
253
Appendix 2 - The Federalist Papers – Links
# Date Title
1 1787 Oct 27 General Introduction
2 1787 Oct 31 Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
3 1787 Nov 3 Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence (continued)
4 1787 Nov 7 Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence (continued)
5 1787 Nov 10 Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence (continued)
6 1787 Nov 14 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
7 1787 Nov 15 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
(continued) and Particular Causes Enumerated
8 1787 Nov 20 Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
9 1787 Nov 21 The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction
and Insurrection
10 1787 Nov 22 The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction
and Insurrection (continued)
11 1787 Nov 24 The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a
Navy
12 1787 Nov 27 The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue
13 1787 Nov 28 Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government
14 1787 Nov 30 Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory
Answered
15 1787 Dec 1 Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
16 1787 Dec 4 Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
254
(continued)
17 1787 Dec 5 Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
(continued)
18 1787 Dec 7 Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
(continued)
19 1787 Dec 8 Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
(continued)
20 1787 Dec 11 Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
(continued)
21 1787 Dec 12 Other Defects of the Present Confederation
22 1787 Dec 14 Other Defects of the Present Confederation (continued)
23 1787 Dec 18 Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the
Preservation of the Union
24 1787 Dec 19 Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
25 1787 Dec 21 Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
(continued)
26 1787 Dec 22 Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the
Common Defense Considered
27 1787 Dec 25 Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the
Common Defense Considered (continued)
28 1787 Dec 26 Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the
Common Defense Considered (continued)
29 1788 Jan 9 Concerning the Militia
30 1787 Dec 28 Concerning the General Power of Taxation
31 1788 Jan 1 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued)
255
32 1788 Jan 2 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued)
33 1788 Jan 2 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued)
34 1788 Jan 5 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued)
35 1788 Jan 5 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued)
36 1788 Jan 8 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued)
37 1788 Jan 11 Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper
Form of Government
38 1788 Jan 12 The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the
Objections to the New Plan Exposed
39 1788 Jan 16 Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
40 1788 Jan 18 On the Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government
Examined and Sustained
41 1788 Jan 19 General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution
42 1788 Jan 22 The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
43 1788 Jan 23 The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
(continued)
44 1788 Jan 25 Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
45 1788 Jan 26 Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State
Governments Considered
46 1788 Jan 29 The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
47 1788 Jan 30 The Particular Structure of the New Government and the
Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts
48 1788 Feb 1 These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No
Constitutional Control Over Each Other
256
49 1788 Feb 2 Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One
Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a
Convention
50 1788 Feb 5 Periodical Appeals to the People Considered
51 1788 Feb 6 The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks
and Balances Between the Different Departments
52 1788 Feb 8 The House of Representatives
53 1788 Feb 9 The House of Representatives (continued)
54 1788 Feb 12 Apportionment of Members of the House of Representatives
Among the States
55 1788 Feb 13 The Total Number of the House of Representatives
56 1788 Feb 16 The Total Number of the House of Representatives (continued)
57 1788 Feb 19 The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the
Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with
Representation
58 1788 Feb 20 Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as
the Progress of Population Demands Considered
59 1788 Feb 22 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of
Members
60 1788 Feb 23 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of
Members (continued)
61 1788 Feb 26 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of
Members (continued)
62 1788 Feb 27 The Senate
63 1788 Mar 1 The Senate (continued)
64 1788 Mar 5 The Powers of the Senate
257
65 1788 Mar 7 The Powers of the Senate (continued)
66 1788 Mar 8 Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for
Impeachments Further Considered
67 1788 Mar 11 The Executive Department
68 1788 Mar 12 The Mode of Electing the President
69 1788 Mar 14 The Real Character of the Executive
70 1788 Mar 15 The Executive Department Further Considered
71 1788 Mar 18 The Duration in Office of the Executive
72 1788 Mar 19 The Same Subject Continued, and Re‐Eligibility of the Executive
Considered
73 1788 Mar 21 The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto
Power
74 1788 Mar 25 The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning
Power of the Executive
75 1788 Mar 26 The Treaty‐Making Power of the Executive
76 1788 Apr 1 The Appointing Power of the Executive
77 1788 Apr 2 The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the
Executive Considered
78 1788 Jun 14 The Judiciary Department
79 1788 Jun 18 The Judiciary Continued
80 1788 Jun 21 The Powers of the Judiciary
81 1788 Jun 25
The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial
Authority
82 1788 Jul 2 The Judiciary Continued
258
83 1788 Jul 5
12
The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury
84 1788 JulAug 16
Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution
Considered and Answered
85 1788 Aug 13
Concluding Remarks
259
Appendix 3 - Chronology of the Federalist Papers
Year Month Day Event Pro- Anti- Subject Opposes
1781 Mar 1 Articles of Confederation adopted
1786 Sep. 14 Annapolis Convention
1787 Feb 21 Congress calls for convention in Philadelphia
1787 Apr 16 Madison's Virginia Plan
May 25 Constitutional Convention opens
May 29 Virginia Plan
Jun 15 New Jersey Plan
Jun 18 Hamilton Plan
Jul 16 Great Compromise
Aug 6 First Draft
Sep 17 Final version approved, Conv. closes
Oct 5 Centinel #1
Responsibility, Checks
Federalist #10, 51
Oct 6 James Wilson
Oct 8 Federal Farmer #1
Extended republics, taxation
Federalist #8, 10, 14, 35, 36
Oct 9 Federal Farmer #2
Extended republics, taxation
Federalist #8, 10, 15, 35, 36
Oct 18 Brutus #1 Extent of union, States' Rights, Bill of Rights,
Federalist #10, 32, 33, 35, 36,
260
Taxation 39, 45, 84
Oct 22 John DeWitt #1
Need for stronger union
Federalist #1-6
Oct 27 Federalist #1
John DeWitt #2
Need for stronger union
Federalist #1-6
Oct 31 Federalist #2
Nov 5 John DeWitt #2
Bill of Rights Wilson (Nov. 28), Federalist #84
Nov 14 Federalist #6
Nov 22 Federalist #10
Nov 27 Cato #5 Executive powers Federalist #67
Nov 29 Brutus #4 House of Representatives
Federalist #27, 28, 52-54, 57
Nov 30 Federalist #14
Dec 7 Delaware ratifies
Dec 12 Pennsylvania ratifies
Dec 18 New Jersey ratifies
Federalist #23
Penn. Minority
Extent of union, States' Rights, Bill of Rights, Taxation
Federalist #10, 32, 33, 35, 36, 39, 45, 84
Dec 27 Brutus #6 Broad construction, taxing powers
Federalist #23, 30-34
1788 Jan 2 Georgia ratifies
Jan 3 Cato #7 Regulating election
Federalist #59
Jan 9 Connecticut ratifies
Jan 16 Federalist #39
261
Jan 24 Brutus #10 Defense, standing armies
Federalist #24-29
Jan 26 Federalist #45
Jan 31 Brutus #11 Judiciary Federalist #78-83
Feb 6 Massachusetts ratifies
Federalist #51
Feb 7 Massachusetts proposed amendments
Brutus #12, Pt. 1
Judiciary Federalist #78-83
Feb 14 Brutus #12, Pt. 2
Judiciary Federalist #78-83
Feb 19 Federalist #57
Feb 27 Federalist #62
Mar 15 Federalist #70
Mar 20 Brutus #15 Judiciary Federalist #78-83
Apr 10 Brutus #16 Senate Federalist #62, 63
Apr 26 Maryland ratifies
May 23 S. Carolina ratifies
May 28 Federalist #78, 84
Jun 5,7 Patrick Henry
Nature and powers of Union
Federalist #1, 14, 15
Jun 21 New Hampshire ratifies; the 9th state
Jun 20-27
Melancton Smith
Representation in Congress
Federalist #52-57, 62-63
Jun 25 Virginia ratifies
Jun 27 Virginia proposed