T3 B18 Jenkins Working Docs 2 of 3 Fdr- 11-29-03 Jenkins Outline- Information on the Predator 015

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11/29/03 UnclassifiedInformation on the PredatorIn early Summer 2000, there were a number of military options floating around. O ne thatcaptured the attention of Clarke was the use of the forty-nine-foot unmanned flyingdrone, the Predator, armed w ith precision video and infrared cameras, to locate binLaden. (B&S, 32 1). The Predator w as one, the use of a prox y force into the field againstUBL was the second and arming the N orthern A lliance forces was the third.There were different objections to this idea:1. Pentagon folks did not like the idea of the new battlefield surveillance systembeing adapted for an intelligence mission.2. CIA vo iced opposition, "They had to cram it down the throat of the A gency."3. DO of C IA concerned because it is paramilitary and w ould "screw up myrelationship with the host government." (B&S, p. 321)4. Some in intelligence believed it intriguing an d backed the idea.In the summ er of 2000, first round of tests conducted in the US to acquaint the 1C withthe Predato r's capabilities.1. flight tests o ver Afgh anistan began in September2. the drone failed to take off properly in first test3. another was sent afloat and Clarke later shown a videotape of Arabs andsomeone likely to be U BL . A CD of this tape was shown to Clinton andBergerThe Predator flew twelve times over Afghanistan1. one flight was aborted2. most of the missions dedicated to viewing sites UBL believed to frequent3. three times believed they spotted UBL , twice on film shot by the drone and

once in real time as he emerged from his house outside Kandahar4. In DC, a debate began over if that was UB L5. Later, Taliban radar tracked the drone and M iG fighters were sent to interceptit. These failed and fly right past the drone6. The tests ended in October as winter arrived in Afghanistan and a battle beganin DC over the future of the programMoney issues1. After the first drone crashed, there was a bill to pay2. CIA had not budgeted for this and did not want to compensate the Pentagon3. Program was suspended: whowould cover further costs - satellite time for

relaying pictures for example - was unclear4. Price tag approximately $200,000.5. In December 20 00, Secretary of the Air Force, Whit Peters, found the moneybut the future of the program was not assured. [B&S, p. 322-323]Clarke remained interested in the P redator1. the program was not yet back on track, despite successes

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11/29/032. CIA and DOD continued to argue after AF paid for the damage to earlier one3. The two argued as to who would pay for lost craft in the future - CIA did notwant to pay. [B&S, p. 3364. CIA was still unsure, but backed the idea of trying to arm the drone (seebelow)

Nature of the program1. the nature or the program changed2. discussions began about adding a weapon on the Predator3. W hy: if can see UBL in real time and fire a missile, that would take secondsto strike4. Problem: launching cruise missiles and not knowing if the target wouldremain in place for hours would disappearWeaponizing the Predator

1. Air Force began experimenting with mounting a Hellfire C missile - a laserguide, hundred-pound air-to-surface m issile- on the craft2. however, now, the Predator would not fly over Af ghan istan in the spring, asplanned, and so could not provide the possible second thread of intelligenceindicating UBL 's whereabouts3. not enough drones or technicians to hand le them do to reconnaissance andtesting at once4. the subma rines had been taken off station in the Arabian Sea5. Any near term chance of striking terrorists with CM was foreclosed.6. The armed predator idea was originally slated for 3 years of testing andmodifications before it was deployed7. Clarke an d Cressey worked on the AF to compress the program an d completein 3 months (C ressey also wanted to get the Predator into action)8. Tests for the drone w ere conducted in late spring and early summ er9. Cressey watched the Predator test in Nevada and thought the outcomeexcellent (watched the Predator fire from thousands o feet at a replica ofUBLs house outside Kandahar

Hold-ups1. Test not enough to get the Predator deployed to A fghan istan2. raised a host of issues discussed for months following3. Whose finger on the trigger w hen the Predator went after UBL the AF orCIA? If the Predator's control unit was in another country, would thatcountry's permission be required to fire the missile? What was the chain ofcommand for such an operation? Whowould issue the decision to fire - theCIA ? White House? IF the W hite House, who in the W hite House? D id therehave to be a list of approved targets if the President w as not readily available?[B&S, p. 338]

Change in CIA's position1. The Ag ency's position on the Predator ha d changed by the Summer of 2001

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11/29/032. its enthusiasm for the Predator had waned3. individuals at Langely did not want responsibility for the program, despitestrong advocacy of prominent people in the 1C for the program4. Record of the debate in incomp lete5. C IA obstaclesa. Objected that the Hellfire missile had not done enough damage t the

mock UBL houseb. A bigger drone was needed to ensure sufficient destructionc. DO argued it wanted to use the mo ney to push harder for hum ansourcesd. WH responded that it thought the DO had enough money for thatpurposee. Argued it was not appropriate for C IA to operate the Predator. Theresponsibility belonged to the A ir Force, w hich deployed aircraft thatcarried ordinancef. DO heard to say if used with lethal force an d responsibility fo r thislaid at the C IA 's doorstep, it would endanger the lives of CIAoperatives around the worldg. the AF responded that if it had the mission, it would use B-52s and not"some spindly drone."h. The generals raised other issues: where could UB L be targeted? Couldhe be hit in a mosque? W hat about the issue of the placement of thecontrol unit in a foreign country?

i. "Predator was a hornet's nest." [B&S, p. 344]First Principles M eeting to discuss As-Qaeda, September 4, 20011. Rice asked, who is going to run it? Would it do the job?2. raised at the meeting the Hellfire missile was not a penetrator and there was

concern it would hit the roof of a structure and not destroy the target3. Mo nitors the SF used scored the test at somehow below the 85% killprobability that was desirable4. AF w anted m ore testing. The first shot was the best the US wo uld get.5. Who would operate the Predator?a. Tenet: it would be a mistake for CIA to operate an d fire a weapon."Over his dead body."b. WH responded - that decision is for the Presidentc. Meyers: if we do it, we'll do it with CM. If it is CA, it belongs to the1C.d. "Any possibility of agreement was slipping away."

6. What about an operation fo r reconnaissance only and not an armed Predatora. Tenet: more palatable, but CIA still needs to review the matter7. Test another weapon besides the Hellfire?a. Who would fire an armed Predator was deferred."The meeting ended. There was no decision on Predator and no strategy toforward to the President." [B&S, p. 346]

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November 20011. The armed Predator flew over Afghanistan2. it identified a house w here a large al-Qaeda meeting w as taking place3. Navy F/A-18 fighter were alerted an d bombed the house4. Predator fired tw o Hellfire missiles w hen th e inhabitants emerged5. Milled Muhammad Atef, al-Qaeda's military chief fo r nearly a decade.[B&S, p. 349]

Rotation of submarines in Arabian S ea continued1. once more in 2000 a report arrived that detailed bin Laden's whereabouts for abrief w indow of time2. Missiles were spun. Tenet called Berger an d told him , "W e don't have it."

Interview with Stephen Hadley by Bart GellmanH adley notes that the Predator w as armed an d shown to be able to work by June2001 how ever, it did not get deployed.

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T3 B18 Jenkins Working Docs 2 of 3 Fdr- 11-29-03 Jenkins Outline- Information on the Predator 015