T3 B10 Counter Terrorism Public Hearing 3-23-24-04 Fdr- Red Lines- Table of Contents- Hearing Schedule- All Suggested Questions 994

8/14/2019 T3 B10 Counter Terrorism Public Hearing 3-23-24-04 Fdr- Red Lines- Table of Contents- Hearing Schedule- All Sugg

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Red Lines(Particularly sensitive questions that should not be asked)

Diplomacy (Albright, Powell) Private sensitive discussions with friendly foreign officials

Military (Cohen, Rumsfeld) Specific capabilities anddeployments ofmilitary forces Current intelligence and military o perations against al Qaeda

Intelligence Policy (Tenet) Open discussion of capture vs. kill autho rities Specific covert o perations andtheir authoritiesSources and metho ds

National Policy Coordination (Berger, Clarke, Arm itage) Private advice to the Pre sident (fo r current officials) Spe cific discussions of covert action (perguidelines)


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CLANDESTINE & COVE RT ACT IONS U G G E S T E D Q U E S T IO N S FO R G E O R G E J. T E N E T

Designated Commissioners: Fred Fielding & Jamie Gorelick

1) A Global Strategy of Renditions and Disruptions. The CIA pursued a globalstrategy of renditions and disruptions fo r going after al Qaeda in the period before 9-11. The DCI ha s testified that these e f f o r t s prevented a number of terrorist attacksan d saved American lives.a. How effective were the CIA's global efforts at disrupting al Qaeda cellsbefore 9/11?b. Given that al Qaeda was turning out thousands of operatives from its trainingcamps, how much impact did a rendition strategy have on staunchingterrorism before 9/11?

2) Covert Action Strategy. The CIA needed a new strategy in terrorist safe-havenssuch as Afghanistan, where the U.S. government was unable to gain the cooperationof the Taliban movement in arresting or extraditing Bin Ladin. The CIA beganemploying proxy forces to plan operations against Bin Ladin in Afghanistan as earlyas 1997, an d actively used them to carry out operations after August 1998. The CIAmade e f f o r t s to expand proxy options, an d develop more unilateral sources, in a newoperational strategy called "The Plan " introduced in mid-1999. But the proxystrategy continued until 9-11.

a. Without going into specific operations, please describe the CIA's overallcovert action strategy before 9/11.b. What were the goals of this strategy?c. Did the strategy itself, and its goals, change in the years leading up to 9/11 ?d. How effective do you think the CIA's covert action strategy was in meeting

these goals before 9/11?In late 2000, the CIA developed an offensive initiative for Afghanistan focused moreon eliminating the Afghanistan terrorist sanctuary than Bin Ladin himself. The Bushadministration built o n these plans as part o f its Afghan policy.

e. Without going into specific operations, were the CIA's efforts against BinLadin and al Qaeda in the first 8 months of the Bush administrationeffectively different than what it had been doing during th e Clintonadministration?f. Specifically, ho w different was the Bush administration's covert actionstrategy developed before 9/11 from what the CIA had already been pursuing?

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g. If implemented before 9/11, how effective do you think this strategy wouldhave been in reducing the terrorist threat?3) The Assassination Ban. Senior legal advisers in the Clinton adm inistration havetold us that, even before August 1998, they had determined that Executive O rder12333 banning assassination did not apply in the case of Bin Ladin. Killing Bin

Ladin, they explained, -would be justified in terms of self-defense according to the lawof armed conflict.How would a covert action designed to kill Bin Ladin, or which might likelyresult in the death of Bin Ladin, be consistent with the Executive Order banningassassination?

4) Sufficient Covert Action Authority. Some w orking-level officers in the CIA'sCounterterrorist Center (CTC) have told us they never had the covert authority theywanted to effectively go after Bin Ladin before 9/11.a. In your opinion, did the CIA receive appropriate and sufficient covert actionauthority to go after Bin Ladin before 9/11?b. Did you ever express to the policymakers, at any point before 9/11, a concernthat the CIA had insufficient covert action authority to go after Bin Ladin?c. Did you ever ask for authorities regarding Bin Ladin before 9/11 that you didnot get?

5) CIA Direct Action in Afghanistan. Although the CIA did send its officers onhazardous missions in Afghanistan before 9/11, it did not use its own personnel toactively go after Bin Ladin. Yet after 9/11, CI A personnel w ere used to great e f f e c t inAfghanistan against al Qaeda an d Taliban forces, operating in an extremelydangerous environment.

a. Did the CIA ever put its own personnel on the ground in Afghanistan to goafter Bin Ladin rather than relying on proxy forces before 9/11?b. If not, why not?

6) Using Proxies. For three years, from August 1998 to 9/11, the CIA actively usedAfghan tribal assets to gather intelligence an d carry ou t covert actions in Afghanistanagainst Bin Ladin before 9/11. During this p eriod, CIA senior managers told us theyw ere alw ays wary of the reliability of the tribals' intelligence. Moreover, the tribalsdo no t appear to have carried out a single op eration against Bin Ladin or hisprincipal lieutenants before 9-11.

a. Without getting into specific operations, what were the problems and benefitsinvolved in working with the Afghan tribal assets in Afghanistan before 9-11?

b. How reliable w ere they as intelligence reporters?c. How confident were you at the time that they would actually carry out covertactions? Did this confidence increase or decrease over time?

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d. To you knowledge, did the tribals ever carry out any operations against BinLadin before 9-11?One proxy group employed by the CIA in Afghanistan against Bin Ladin was theNorthern Alliance, led by Massoud. This group was the Taliban's strongestopponent. Although he was willing to work with th e CIA, his goals werefocused lesson attacking al Qaeda and more on trying to defeat the Taliban. There wasconsiderable debate within the U.S.government and within the CIAas to howmuch th e U.S. ought to be backingMassoud, given his ties with Iran and drugtrafficking. On the one occasion when th e Northern Alliance attacked a Bin Ladinfacility in Afghanistan (with little e f f e c t ) , without authorization from th e CIA, therewas real anxiety within the CIA about this action.

e. Without getting into specific operations, what were the problems and benefitsinvolved in working with Massoud and his Northern Alliance forces inAfghanistan before 9-11?f. To what extent did Massoud share United States' objectives in Afghanistan?

g. How confident were you in Massoud and his fighters as a proxy force that theCIA could use effectively in Afghanistan?h. Did the tribals ever carry out any covert action operations (other than

intelligence gathering operations) against Bin Ladin before 9-11?The proxy strategy in Afghanistan was clearly ineffective against Bin Ladin. Yet theCIA continued to use proxies to carry out covert action for the entire period before9/11.

i. Did you inform policymakers of the risks involved in using proxiesasopposed to U.S. personnelto carry out covert action in Afghanistan? Pleasediscuss in detail any conversations that you had on this topic withpolicymakers in the period before 9/11.j. Did you ever frankly advise policymakers of the prospects that any of theCIA's proxy forces would carry out a successful operation against Bin Ladinin the period before 9/11?

k. In short, if the proxy force strategy wasn't working, what steps did you take topursue alternatives to use of proxy forces?

1 . What alternatives did you recommend to policymakers?7) Actionable Intelligence. Yesterday, we heard how many senior Department ofDefense officials continually argued that th e CIA's inability to produce "actionable

intelligence " limited their ability to undertake military action in the Afghanistanterrorist sanctuary before 9/11.a. Why was the CIA unable to produce actionable intelligence sufficient to meetthe military's requirements fo r action in Afghanistan before 9/11?b. How is the CIA working with the military to solve this problem now?

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Yesterday, we heard how on three occasions between December 1998 and mid-1999,the C IA 's intelligence was strong enough to set in motion a ctive preparations tolaunch military strikes to kill Bin Ladin. National Security Adviser Berger told theCommission that on each occasion DCI Tenet advised that th e intelligence was notreliable enough to go ahea d with the action.c. National Security Adviser Samuel Berger told the Commission that on each ofthree occasions after August 1998 when policymakers considered usingmilitary action against Bin Ladin in Afghanistan, you advised that theintelligence was not reliable enough to go ahead with the action. Was this infact your advice?d. If so, please explain the general basis for such advice?

8) The U.S.S. Cole. Yesterday, we heard that while most counterterrorism officialsalmost immed iately suspected that al Qaeda was behind th e October 2000 attack onthe U.S.S. Cole, the CIA was never able to provide a definitive judgment ofresponsibility. National Security Adviser Berg er told us that before using militaryforce he neede d his senior intelligence adviser to have come to the conclusion that alQaeda was responsible for the attack.

a. What were your conclusions as to who was responsible for the attack on theU.S.S. Cole, and when did you reach these conclusions?9) Predator. According to several NSC and CIA officers, the CIA's senior managementresisted development of the Predator as a reconnaissance platform in 2000, and onlyagreed to fly Predator over Afghanistan on an experimental basis.

a. Did you originally support the development of Predator in 2000 as areconnaissance platform to use over Afghanistan? Why was there resistancefrom some senior CIA officers for this project?

The Predator's flights in all 2000 were very successful: CIA analysts think that BinLadin was spotted on two occasions.b. In your opinion, did Predator spot Bin Ladin in fall 2000?c. How valuable was the intelligence Predator collected from reconnaissanceflights in fall 2000?

When winter weather prevented further flights, senior managers at the CIA, includingin the CTC, wanted to bring the Predator back to the U.S. and not redeploy thePredator until an armed capability was ready. CIA analysts said that, since th eTaliban had spotted th e Predator in the all, further reconnaissance flights mightjeopardize the effectiveness of future armed flights.

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C IA senior man agers argued with DOD about funding the Predator project, andabout command-and-control issues. There were no Predator flights over Afghanistanin 2001 until after 9/11.d. What were your reasons for opposing flying Predator for reconnaissancepurposes in 2001?e. Why didn't the Predator (reconnaissance or armed) fly in spring/summer2001?f. Did CIA disputes over funding or command-and-control issues have the effectof stalling P redator missions?g. Why did you change your position after the September 4,2001 Principals'Com mittee meeting, and agree to fly reconnaissance flights in 2001?

10) Commission Recommendations. We are considering a range of topics forrecommendations. Currently, the DCI is both the principal analyst of the terroristenemy as well as the comm ander for many operations in the field in the war onterror.a. How has the role of the CIA in fighting terrorism changed post-9/11 ?b. How has the leadership role of the Director of Central Intelligence changedpost-9/11?c. What do you spend most of your time doing? How much of your time is spenton full operations against terrorism, and how much is spent on analysis of theterrorism threat or on other activities? Is this the right balance and use of yourtime?In the DCI's recent Worldwide Threat briefing before the Senate SelectCommittee on Intelligence, he stated that the al Qaeda leadership structure ha sbeen seriously damaged since 9/11, but there is still a significant and ongoingterrorist threat.d. Two and a half years after the 9/11 attacks, why has the U.S. Governmentbeen unable to find Usama Bin Ladin, and other terrorist and Taliban leaderssuch as Ayman al-Zawahiri, or Mullah Omar?e. What kind of conflict is the United States currently inand against whatenemy? Is this a war on "terrorism" or a struggle for the future of the Muslimworld?f. What is the appropriate role of the C IA and the Intelligence C omm unity in thewar, and what role is inappropriate?

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

HEARING AGENDA

STAFF STATEMENTDiplomacy

THE HONORABLE MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHTFormer Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE COLIN L. POWELLSecretary of State

STAFF STATEMENTThe Military

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM S. COHENFormer Secretary of Defense

THE HONORABLE DONALD H. RUMSFELDSecretary of Defense

8 STAFF STATEMENTClandestine and Covert Action9

10

11

1213

THE HONORABLEGEORGE J. TENETDirector of Central Intelligence

STAFF STATEMENTNational Policy Coordination

THE HONORABLE SAMUEL R. BERGERFormer Assistant to the Presidentfo r National Security Affairs

MR. RICHARD A. CLARKEFormer National Coordinator for Counterterrorism

THE HONORABLE RICHARD L. ARMITAGEDeputy Secretary of State

14 REFERENCES


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NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATESEIGHTH PUBLIC HEARING - MARCH 23-24,2004HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, ROOM 216 WASHINGTON, DCCOUNTERTERRORISM POLICY

TUESDAY, MARCH 239:00 - 9:30 a.m. STAFF STATEMENT NO. 5 Diplomacy9:30-11:00 a.m. The Honorable Madeleine K. Albright (Q: Lehman & Roemer)

Former Secretary of State11:00- 12:30p.m. The Honorable Colin L. Powell (Q: Gorelick & Thompson)Secretary of State12:30-1:30 p.m. BREAK1:30-2:00 p.m. STAFF STATEMENT NO. 6 The Military2:00-3:30p.m. TheHonorable William S. Cohen (Q: Fielding & Kerrey)Former Secretary of Defense3:30-5:00p.m. The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld (Q: Gorton & Kerrey)

Secretary of DefenseWEDNESDAY, MARCH 249:00- 9:30a.m. STAFF STATEMENT NO.7 Clandestine and Covert Action9:30-11:00 a.m. The Honorable George J. Tenet (Q: Fielding & Gorelick)Director of Central Intelligence11:00 - 11:30 a.m. STAFF STATEMENT NO. 8 National Policy Coordination11:30-1:00 p.m. The Honorable Samuel R. Berger (Q: Ben-Veniste & Lehman)

Former Assistant to the President fo r National Security Affairs1:00- 2:00p.m. BREAK2:00-4:00p.m. Mr. Richard A. Clarke (Q: Gorton & Roemer)Former National C oordinator fo r Counterterrorism, National Security Council4:00-5:30 p.m. The Honorable Richard L. Armitage (Q: Ben-Veniste & Thompson)Deputy Secretary of State5:30 p.m. Hearing concludes. Press availability to follow.


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DIPLOMACYS U G G E S T E D Q U E S T IO N S F O R M A D E L E I N E K . A L B R I G H T

Designated Commissioners: John Lehman & Tim Roemer

1) Counterterrorism in U.S. Foreign Policy before the East Africa Attacks.a. Upon taking office in January 1997 and through August of 1998, when thetwo U.S. embassies were bombed, what were our major foreign policy

issues?b. Where did terrorism fall in this agenda and what was the diplomatic

strategy to combat it?2) Diplomacy after the Embassy Bombings.

a. Generally, how did diplomacy's role change after the embassies wereattacked?

b. Was there an interagency consensus about what diplomatic steps topursue?

c. What policies did you push to address the question of terrorism?3) Addressing the Afghan Sanctuary. In late 1997, yo u traveled to Pakistanan d publicly said "We are opposed to the Taliban because of...theirdespicable treatment of women an d children an d their general lack of respectfo r human dignity."

a. Given your comments, was Bin Ladin's presence not a concern at thattime?

b. Why did U.N. Ambassador Richardson travel to Afghanistan in April1998? What did he achieve?

c. What was driving our Afghan policy before the east Africa attacks?Describe the extent that human rights, poppy production, efforts to end thecivil war and Bin Ladin's presence shaped our approach?


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4) Enlisting Pakistani Support. As we have heard, Pakistan was the Taliban'sstrongest supporter and thus had the most leverage to move them on the BinLadin issue. But prior to 9/11, Pakistan's military was still assisting th eTaliban.a. In your interview with us, you described tha t, upon taking office, Pakistan

was an incredibly complicated country for the USG and that you wantedto increase engagem ent with that country. You also said that as time wenton, Islamab ad's relationship with the Taliban becam e increasinglyimportant in our agenda. How did American diplomats address theTaliban with the Pakistanis an d what options did we consider and/or use toenlist cooperation? What were their limits? Why did the USG notdesignate Pakistan as a State Sponsor of Terrorism?

b. Some USG officials feared that if Washington punished the Pakistani tooharshly on counterterrorism issues by imposing additional sanctions, thecountry could implode economically. This, they believed, would lead to achaotic situation where Islamic radicals could take control of the countryand its nuclear arsenal. Did you subscribe to this theory? If so, what wasyour basis fo r your decision?

c. You mentioned how congressional sanctions punishing Pakistan or itsnuclear am bitions and dem ocratization problems affected our Pakistanpolicy. How in turn did this affect our Bin Ladin policy? Can youdescribe in more specificity how the Clinton adm inistration addressedcongress on lifting the sanctions?

d. In your interview with us, you mentioned how the USG wanted to increaseengagement with P akistan in hopes of turning them on a number of issues.As we have heard, there were a number of high level diplomaticdispatches to that coun try, especially in the winter and spring of 2000,which included President Clinton. Given these high level interactions,why did they fail to produce results on the Bin Ladin problem?

5) Working with the Saudis. During your interview, yo u characterized ourrelationship with Sau di Arabia as one of the most difficult we had and notedthat the USG constantly reminded them of the dangers posed by Bin Ladin.a. How well did the Saudis cooperate with us on pressuring the Taliban to

expel Bin Ladin? Did other objectives, such as access to Saudi oil,Riyadh's involvement in the Middle East peace process, and the use ofU.S. aircraft from Saudi bases restrict our ability to push them oncounterterrorism? Did we consider withdrawing an y support when theSaudis did not cooperate?


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b. In our interview,yo u said that the USG did not have a clear picture of theproblems associated with Saudi charities that could be funding radicalgroups. What kept us from seeing the "whole picture"? To the extent didthe USG know of the problems relating to Saudi charities; what was doneto address them?c. You mentioned in the interview that the USG raised terrorism financingissues with the Saudi leadership, including Crown Prince Abdullah.When did the USG become concerned with the money emanating from theKingdom? What success did you have in addressing the problem?

6) Sudan as a Terrorist Sanctuary. Despite leaving Sudan in 1996, the USGbelieved that Bin Laden's network apparently remained in that country.a. W hat diplomatic efforts were being conducted by the USG to elicitSudanese cooperation on terrorism generally and al Qaeda specifically?b. Some had alleged that the Sudan ese were w illing to work w ith the U SG onterrorism, but that our hard-line isolation policy toward that countryprevented an y cooperation. Did State aggressivelypursue offers it mayhave received from the Sudanese to cooperate?

In February 1997, Sudan ese Foreign Minister AH Taha, in hopes ofimproving relations and alleviating U .S. concerns for terrorism, sent youa letter inviting a U.S. mission to Sudan. You responded to that letter inMay calling for the Sudanese to take "substantial, co ncrete "steps oncounterterrorism, hum an rights an d reaching a settlement to their civilwar before USG relations could im prove. Was our counterterrorismagenda diluted by other concerns such ending Sudan's civil war? Giventhe fact that the Sudanese had expelled Carlos the Jackal and Bin Ladin,how did the USG measure Sudanese cooperation? W as a forma l systemused to measure their progress?

c. State Department personnel l e f t embassy Khartoum in the winter of 1996.Given tha t terrorism was a top priority for you after the east Africa attacks,why did the State Department not restaff an embassy that could haveprovided valuable diplomatic reporting on terrorist activities in Sudan?7) Assessment of Diplomacy as an Instrument of Counterterrorism.

a. As you look at the record of the Department of State during your tenure,what w ould you have done differently, knowing w hat you know today?b. W hat policies would you change, wha t different steps would you take?


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8) Commission Recommendations. We are considering a range of topics formak ing recomm endations to fight the war on terrorism. What suggestionswould yo u make to the Commission bringing foreign policy back into anational strategy involving the full range of instruments of diplomacy? [TOTHE EXTENT NOT DISCUSSED IN HER ORAL STATEMENT]a. What policies, programs and structures wo uld you change at theDepartment of State?b. What changes in the foreign policy of the United S tates w ould yourecommend?c. What changes do you recommend in U.S. policy toward Afghanistan,Pakistan and Saudi Arabia?d. What message should the United States be conveying to the Muslim andArab world, and how should we be conveying it?


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DIPLOMACYS U G G E S T E D Q U E S T I O N S FO R C O L I N L . P O W E L L

Designated Commissioners: Jamie Gorelick & James Thompson

1) Bush Foreign Policy A genda before 9/11.a. C ould you describe the most pressing fo reign policy issues facing theincoming Bush administration?b. W here would yo u rate counterterrorism on this list? W hat was the basis fo rthat particular concern? D id representatives from the previous administration

voice any concerns to you about this issue? How were they conveyed?c. G enerally, how did the Bush administration seek to address al Qaeda before9/11? W here did diplomacy fit into this strategy? W hat did you see as theelements of continuity and change in the diplomacy used by theadministration to address the al Q aeda threat? How was this diplomacy finetuned as the level of threat reporting increased during the summer of 2001?

2) Pressure on the Taliban. T hrough the spring and early summer of 2001, howwas diplomacy used to pressure the Taliban on the Bin Ladin problem? W a s itproducing any movement by the T aliban on expelling Bin L adin? If not, whynot?a. Both Clinton an d Bush administration envoys demanded that th e Talibanhand over Bin Ladin, an d threatened Taliban represen tatives that "the ywould be held responsible "for an y future Bin Ladin attacks. Thisincluded the threat of preemptive or retaliatory military strikes. T o whatextent was State working with the Pentagon to ensure that such operationswould be ready for use in the event th e U S G h ad to make good on thesethreats? W hat specific military options were ma de available? How didthe military view th e threats being made by State's diplomats?b. In our meeting,you recalled supporting th e notion of aiding the NorthernAlliance. W as this support aimed at staving off its defeat or building itinto a force that could overthrow the T aliban? W hat were the pros andcons of doing so ? Iran an d R ussia w ere providing them with arms andthey were making little progress on the battlefield; would Am ericanassistance really make a difference? W h y w a s there no t robust supportfor this be fore 9/11?


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c. Why did the State Department no t designate the Taliban as a StateSponsor of Terrorism or a Foreign Terrorist Organization?d. Today, what is being done diplomatically in order to prevent Afghanistanfrom once again becoming a terrorist sanctuary?

3) Pakistan. In your discussion with the Commission, yo u mentioned thatWashington's relationship with Islamaba d before 9/11 was a strained one andthere was concern about Pakistan's support for the Taliban.a. Wh at were U.S. priorities regarding Pa kistan before 9/11 ?b. What diplomatic efforts were considered and/or used in hopes ofchanging Pakistan's Afghan policy? Wh y was Pakistan not designated aState Sponsor of Terrorism? Were you aware of the prioradministration's attempt to persuade Islamabad on the Taliban issue?How did their approach differ from those employed by the Bush

administration up until 9/11?c. To what extent did congressional sanctions complicate our approach?Describe State's efforts to seek congressional repeal or waiver of thesesanctions.d. You mentioned to us that on the night of September 13, 2001, you calledPakistan's P rime Minister Pervez Musharraf. Can you describe the

requests you made and the prime minister's responses?e. Wh at is the State Department doing to address the presence of al Qaeda in

Pakistan today? What do you see as the success or lack of success ofAmerican diplomacy in persuading Pakistan to gain control of its frontierareas and apprehending al Qaeda elements?f. During the 1990 's , it appeared that Pakistan's Afghan policy was, aboveall, a result of insecurity with India. Despite US concerns and pressures,Pakistan subscribed to the "strategic depth "argument and aided theTaliban. What is Washington currently doing to alleviate Pakistaniconcerns towards India, which if not reduced, could led them to return torisky and desperate policies including support to Islamic radicals in theKashm ir region?

4) Saudi Arabia. What diplomatic efforts were being conducted by the USG oneliciting Saudi cooperation on terrorism financing, pressuring the Taliban andsharing al Qaeda related intelligence prior to 9/11? How did Riyadh respond?Did the USG consider withdraw ing any support if the Saudis failed to respondpositively?


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a. You met twice with Crown Prince Abdullah before 9/11 but recordsindicate that neither terrorism nor Bin Ladin was discussed at eithermeeting. Wha t was the nature of your discussion in these two m eetingsand other conversations with the Crown Prince?b. In our meeting,yo u described Riyadh's cooperation on counterterrorism

as much improved, especially since the al Qaeda attacks in the Kingdomlast spring. Why did it take almost two years for Saudi cooperation toincrease to an acceptable level? Generally, what is being done today toensure that the Saudis continue w ith this level of cooperation? What isthe Saudi government not doing that it should be?

5) Diplomacy in the Present and Future. How is this adm inistration using foreignpolicy to combat al Qaeda today? Wha t are the tools in the State Depa rtment's"tool box"? Are you using them, and w ith wha t effect?a. As a Pew R esearch survey indicated last year, global attitudes towards the

United States have eroded significantly since 2000 ~ what do you cite asthe cause for this drop and what is being done to remedy it? How are weusing diplomacy to win the hearts an d minds of potential adversaries inthe Islamic world? What needs to be done to reverse these negativeperceptions of the United States, and how important is it to Americanforeign policy to succeed in this effort?b. South Asia and the Middle East are receiving mo st of the USG 's attentionin its war on terror. Wha t are other "at risk" regions a nd what are wedoing to prevent them from becoming the next Afgha nistan? Forexample, w hat is being done in east Africa and south east Asia where

many of the countries have large Muslim populations and porous b orders?6) Commission Recommendations. We are considering a range of topics formaking recommendations to fight the war on terrorism. What suggestions wouldyou ma ke to the Commission bringing foreign policy back into a national strategyinvolving the all the instruments of diplomacy?


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THE MILITARYSUGGESTED QUE S T I ONS FO R W ILLIAM S . C O H E NDesignated Commissioners: Fred Fielding & Bob Kerrey

1) The Role of the Military in Counterterrorism Strategy. The U . S . military'straditional domestic role had been specialized support to state and localauthorities for dealing with the consequences of terrorist attack, and securitysupport for special events. A broad, the role of the U .S . military had been toprovide support for law enforcement, such as military transport fo r renditions ofsuspected terrorists, or support for other agencies as they responded to a terroristattack, such as the East Africa bom bings. U nder Presidential D irective 62, theD efense D epartment did not have a leading role in counter-terrorism efforts duringyour tenure. O verall, the military has been criticized for being reluctant toconduct m ilitary operations against al-Q aeda and Bin Ladin.

a. G iven that some critics believe that the U .S . military could have d onemore to protect A merica against terrorism, do you now think the U .S .military was too focused on defensive, force protection measures asopposed to more aggressive counterterrorism operations?b. G iven that DoD was given no lead agency counterterrorismresponsibilities in Presidential D irective 62, is it not true that the militarywas underused in the U.S. counterterrorism strategy against Bin Laden?c. A s we noted, there were lower level officials in the Pentagon, both civilianand military, w ho sought a more aggressive role for the m ilitary in

counterterrorism efforts after the Embassy bombings. W hy was i t thatthese ideas were not fully developed by the Pentagon in the monthsfollowing those attacks?d. W hat discussions took place within the Pentagon during your tenure onthe establishment of a unified command in the U nited S tates dedicated tohomeland defense, and what happened as a result of those discussions?2) The Military Response to the Embassy Bombings. O n A ugust 7,1998, th e U .S .embassies in N airobi and D ar es Salaam were bombed. O n August 20, 1998, theU .S . m ilitary responded w ith cruise missile attacks against terrorist camps inAfghanistan and a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan.

a. W hat was the military objective of the A ugust 20 cruise missile attackagainst terrorist camps in A fghanistan? W as that objective achieved?W h at lessons did you learn from this attack regarding military actionagainst al Q aeda elements in Afghanistan?b. T he cruise missile attack on the pharmaceutical plant in S udan washeavily criticized at the time. G iven the evidence we have today, do you


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believe now that plant was used by Bin Ladin to make biological orchemical w eapons?c. Recalling the negative reaction to the U.S. m ilitary response at the time,how did that criticism affect your thinking about the use of military forcein defending the United States against the threat posed by al-Qaeda? Wereyou prepared to take further military action? How so?d. Given the controversy following the military strikes, what was yourassessment of the viability of the m ilitary option as part of a strategy todefeat the al-Qaeda terrorist threat that was growing in Afgh anistan?e. What is your view regarding the criticism that some voiced at the time thatthe administration used the military response of A ugust 20 to deflectattention from President Clinton's domestic political concerns?

3) Subsequent Military Planning for Follow-on Operations. On August 20, 1998,General Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued a planningorder for the preparation of follow-on military operations against al-Qaeda inAfghanistan. Although several m ilitary options were developed, we understandthat General Zinni, the commander of U.S. Central Command, was reluctant touse military force due to the high potential f or unwelcome consequences toimportant U .S. interests throughout the region. After our cruise missile attacks onal-Qaeda camps on August 20, 1998, the U.S. military did not undertake anyfurther military operation against al Qaeda and Usama Bin Ladin in Afghanistan.

a. W hat directions did you give the military for the development of militaryplans against Bin Ladin and al-Qaeda in his Afghanistan sanctuaryafter August 20, 1998?b. How did you assess General Zinni's concerns at the time about usingmilitary force in the region in the months following the attacks of August20, 1998. Did these concerns effectively rule out the use of military forceagainst B in Ladin and his al-Qaeda groups in Af ghanistan?c. Given that the Taliban regime, which was harboring Bin Ladin and alQaeda, did have infrastructure, did your guidance to the military includeoperations against the Taliban, or was it solely focused on Bin Laden?Was planning done to conduct military operations against the Taliban?

d. Given the comments by several senior military officers on the practicallimitations in conducting military operations in A fghanistan, d id theseconsiderations effectively rule out the use of U.S. military f orce againstBin Laden in Afghanistan? W hy not?


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4) Domestic Support for a Large Military C ampaign. Several senior military andcivilian officials say that before 9/11 neither the C ongress nor the A mericanpeople w ould have supported a large-scale U .S. military campaign involving two-to-four divisions against the Taliban in Afghanistan.a. What is your assessment of this conclusion?b. Would the nation have supported a large-scale military invasion ofAfghanistan before 9/11 against al-Qaeda and U sama Bin Ladin?

5) Reluctance to Employ Special O perations F orces Against Bin Ladin. When inthe Senate, you were a champion for the establishment of the United StatesSpecial Operations Command, and you pushed this initiative through despiteopposition from many parts of the Pentagon. However, there seems to have beenan unwillingness to use America's very expert Special Operations forces, whichelements had trained for counterterrorism operations, against al Qaeda and UsamaBin Ladin.a. Was there consideration given to directing the U.S. Special OperationsCommand to prepare for conducting special operations in Afghanistanagainst bin Ladin? If so, what were the considerations? How did youview them?b. Why was there a reluctance to use Special Op erations forces in militaryoperations against al Qaeda and Usama Bin Ladin?

6) The Military's Pursuit of Actionable Intelligence. The paramount limitationthat was repeatedly cited by senior military officials on each decision for usingmilitary force w as the lack of "actionable intelligence." We understand that thismeant that the specific location of bin Laden and his key followers was notsufficiently determined to launch military strikes. There were at least threeopportunities to use force against bin Laden before 9/11, however, in each case itwas determined that the intelligence w as not actionable.

a. What was your experience in how the lack of actionable intelligenceinhibited the use of military force against al-Qaeda and Bin Ladin inAfghanistan?b. Given these setbacks in using force, what was your assessment of ourexisting capacity to obtain the required actionable intelligence needed touse military force against al Qaeda and Bin Ladin?c. Since having actionable intelligence was a serious limitation to the use of

military force against this threat to the United States, what steps did youdirect the military take to augment the CIA efforts in acquiring betteractionable intelligence? What was the result of your efforts?


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7) The "Default" Non-Option of a Cruise Missile Attack. Some DoD individualshave described a cruise missile attack as the "default option" for military actionagainst al Qaeda and Bin Ladin targets in Afghanistan before 9/11 because allother options were deemed either too damaging, undesirable, or impracticable.However, the use of cruise m issiles was severely limited by a lack of actionableintelligence and concerns about the killing of large numbers of innocent civilians.a. Was the "default option" really an option? Wasn't a cruise missile attackvery unlikely due to the remote possibility of getting actionableintelligence and the high likelihood of collateral damage?b. Did the Pentagon rely solely on cruise missiles as the method to attack al-Qaeda and Bin Ladin targets in Afghanistan?c. Given the potential for collateral dama ge from a cruise missile attack,what alternatives did the Pentagon seek in order to minimize the effects ofthis adverse consequence forpotential m ilitary operations in Afghanistan?

8) Military R esponse to the Attack on the U.S.S. Cole. On October 12, 2000,suicide bombers rammed into the U.S.S. Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen killing17 U.S. sailors and almost sinking the vessel. The Clinton administration did notlaunch a m ilitary response on either B in Laden or the Taliban in self-defense offurther attacks on the United States.

a. W hat preparations did the military undertake after the U.S.S. Cole incidentto conduct operations if policymakers decided to respond to the attack?b. W hy was there no military response to defend the United States fromfurther attacks following the bombing of the U.S.S. Colel9) Military Support to Diplomatic Pressure. This morning, we heard about the

efforts of the Department of State to threaten Taliban representatives beginning inearly 1999, that "if the Taliban continue to harbor and support B in Ladin, the U .S.will hold the Taliban directly responsible for further attacks against the U.S. byBin Ladin" and that "the U.S. reserves the right to use military force."a. To what extent did the Pentagon work with the Department of State toensure the Taliban understood that this threat was credible and tha t it wasbacked up with ready military capability in case of an attack?b. W as the military prepared to launch a military response against theTaliban to follow-through our diploma tic threat?


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10) Effectiveness of the Transition to the Bush Administration. You have told usthat during the change in administration in January 2001, you briefed SecretaryRumsfeld on approximately 50 items, including the threat posed by al-Qaeda andUsama Bin Ladin. He was also briefed on existing military plans against al Qaedaand Usama Bin L adin-linked targets.a. Where did the al-Qaeda threat to the United States fit into this list of50 items you discussed with Secretary Rum sfeld?b. Did you discuss the matter of responding to the attack on the U.S.S.Cole? Can you tell us what you said to Secretary Rumsfeld?c. Given your keen interest in Bin Laden and the threat he posed to theUnited States, what advice did you give to Secretary Rumsfeld as hewas entering office? Do you think he understood the gravity of thethreat to the United States?

11 ) Comm ission Recommendations. Our report will include recomm endations forthe future.a. Are we winning or losing the war on terrorism, and what should we do asa nation to adjust our strategy and tactics? Is it your perspective that weare relying too much or too little on the use of the military in ourcounter-terrorism policy? What other elements need to be in our policy?b. Specifically, what should the U.S. military do to adjust to the war onterrorism? How should doctrine, organization, and the deployment and useof forces change?c. What is your perspective on Hom eland Defense? What should the militarydo and not do in support of Homeland Defense? W hat do you see as theappropriate role, if any, of the military in domestic intelligence? How do

you see the Posse Comitatus Act apply to such activities?


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THE MILITARYS U G G E S T E D Q U E S T I O N S FO R D O N A L D H . R U M S F E L D

Designated Commissioners: Slade Gordon & Bob Kerrey

1) The Effectiveness of the Transition: During the transition, former SecretaryCohen informed us that he briefed you on 50 items, including al Qaeda, UsamaBin Ladin, an d existing military plans fo r military operations against al Qaeda an dUsama Bin Ladin in Afghanistan. During our recent interview with you inJanuary, you said you had no detailed recollection of the content of thesebriefings.

a. Can you tell us whether al Qaeda and Usama Bin Ladin was emphasizedas a significant threat to the United States as compared with the otheritems discussed during your transition briefing with former SecretaryCohen?

b. During the transition period, both Secretary Powell and National SecurityAdvisor Rice were briefed at length by members of the CounterterrorismSecurity Group, the working group of counterterrorism experts in the U.S.government. We understand that you did not receive such a briefing fromthis group. Why did you not seek a briefing from these experts during thetransition period?

c . T h e outgoing Assistant Secretary of Defense fo r Special Operations andL aw Intensity Conflict, Brian Sheridan, was the Pentagon's senior civilianofficial fo r managing Defense counterterrorism policy during thetransition. H e h as told us that although he had scheduled tw o briefings fo ryou, both were cancelled. In addition, he said he was not able to briefanyone on your transition team. Why did you not seek out a briefing bythis Defense policy expert on counterterrorism during the transition?

2) No OSD Policy Manager for Counterterrorism on 9/11. The AssistantSecretary of Defense fo r Special Operations and L ow Intensity Conflict isformally the senior civilian policy manager fo r counterterrorism in the O ffic e ofSecretary of Defense. Yet this position was unfilled when 9/11 occurred, and itremained unfilled until the summer of 2003. Given that this delay would likelydiminish the Pentagon's role in counterterrorism, can you give us yourexplanation on why there w as no O S D policy manager fo r counterterrorism fo rnearly two and half years?


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3) Early Defense Priorities. You have told us that upon assuming office in January2001, you were consumed with completing the Quadrennial Defense Review,initiating defen se transform ation, and updating ex isting c ontingency plans.Lower-level officials working in the Pentagon during this period state that thenew team at the Pentagon was foc used on other issues, m ost not related tocounterterrorism.a. After you assumed office in January 2001, can you tell us how muchemphasis you devoted to c ounterterrorism issues before 9/11?b. What did you see as the most significant threats to the United States andhow did al Qaeda and Usama Bin Ladin factor into your concerns? What

directions did you give regarding the threat of al Qaeda to Americans?4) No Military Response to the U.S.S. Cole. When you assumed office in January2001, you were aware that just three mon ths earlier on October 12, 2000, suicidebombers rammed into the U.S.S. Cole in the port of A den, Yemen killing 17 U.S.

sailors and almost sinking the vessel. The Clinton administration did notauthorize a m ilitary response. After if was concluded in February 2001 that it wasproba ble that al Qaeda c onducted the attack, the Bush administration did notconduc t military action against Bin Laden.a. Did you review military options to respond to the bombing o f the U.S.S.

Colel Were any preparations ordered by you to respond to the attack onthe U.S.S. Colelb. When yo u learned that al Qaeda was behind the attack, why was there nota military response against al Qaeda?c. Should the United States respond to attacks on its military forces?

5) The Role of the Military in Counterterrorism before 9/11. The military hasbeen criticized fo r being reluctant to conduc t military operations against al Qaedaand Usama Bin Ladin before 9/11. Critics believe that the U.S. military couldhave done more to protect A merica against terrorism.1) Do you now think the U.S. military was too focused on defensive, forceprotection measures as opposed to the use of force in more activecounterterrorism operations before 9/11?2) What was your view on the use of military force in A fghanistan against alQaeda and Usama Bin Ladin during your tenure before 9/11?3) Would the nation have supported a large-scale military invasion ofAfghanistan before 9/11 against al Qaeda and Usam a Bin Ladin?


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6) No Military Planning for New Strategy. Our investigation shows that no newmilitary plans were developed to target al Qaeda or Bin Ladin during your tenurebefore 9/11. It also indicates that the military did not receive any new guidanceon preparing m ilitary options for use against al Qaeda and Bin Ladin targetsduring your tenure before 9/11. At the same time, in the spring and summer 2001,NSC officials state that the administration w as engaged in developing a newcounterterrorism strategy that included a more robust role for the military. Yet,there seem to have been no steps taken in the Department to prepare for apotential new role in counterterrorism.

a. Did you ever receive any requests from the White House to developmilitary plans against al Qaeda and Usarna Bin Ladin that would support anew counterterrorism strategy?b. What directions, if any, did you give the military to develop p lans againstal Qaeda and Usama Bin Ladin targets in the Afghan istan sanctuary bef ore

9/11?7) Actionable Intelligence. The paramount limitation cited by senior D epartment ofDefense officials on every proposed use of military force against al Qaeda andUsama Bin Ladin targets in Afghanistan was the lack of "actionable intelligence."What steps did the m ilitary take to assist the CIA in acquiring better actionableintelligence?8) Military Support to Diplomatic Pressure. This morning we heard about theefforts of the Department of State to threaten the Taliban representatives that

"they would be responsible," for attacks conducted by U sama Bin Lad in,including the threat of U.S. military retaliation against the Taliban.a. To what extent did the Pentagon work with the Department of State toensure the Taliban understood that there was a com mitted militarycomponent of the political-military strategy to threaten the Taliban withmilitary force?b. To what extent was the military prepared to launch a response if there wasan attack by Usama Bin Ladin or al Qaeda?

9) Reorganization for Combating Terrorism: In 2002, the United States SpecialOperations Com mand w as tasked to be the lead command to plan m ilitaryoperations in the global w ar on terror. In addition, the United States No rthernCommand, stood up in October 2002, is responsible fo r homeland defense.

a. How has the decision to make the U.S. Special Operations Command thelead command for planning military operations in the global war on terrorincreased the capabilities and effectiveness of the Department to fight theglobal war on terrorism?


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b. How has the decision to establish a Northern Command increased thecapability of the United States to defend against terrorist attacks in theUnited States?10) Commission Recommendations. Our report will include recommendations for

the future.a. Are we winning or losing the war on terrorism, and what should we do asa N ation to adjust our strategy and tactics? Is it your perspective that weare relying too much or too little on the use of the military in ou rcounterterrorism policy? What other elements need to be in our policy?b. Specifically, w hat should the U.S. military do to adjust to the war onterrorism? How should doctrine, organization, and the deployment and useof forces change?c. What is your perspective on Hom eland Defense? What should themilitary do and not do in support of Homeland Defense? What do you see

as the appropriate role, if any, of the military in domestic intelligence?How do you see the Posse Comitatus Act apply to such activities?


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CLANDESTINE & COVERT ACTIONSUGGESTED QUESTIONS FO R G E O R G E J. T E N E T

Designated Commissioners: Fred Fielding & Jamie Gorelick

1) A Global Strategy of Renditions and Disruptions. The CIA pursued a globalstrategy of renditions and disruptions for going after al Qaeda in the period before 9-11. The DCI ha s testified that these e f f o r t s prevented a number of terrorist attacksand saved Am erican lives.a. How effective were th e CIA's global efforts at disrupting al Q aeda cellsbefore 9/11?b. G iven that al Qaeda was turning ou t thousands of operatives from its training

camps, how m uch impact did a rendition strategy have on staunchingterrorism before 9/11?2) Covert Action Strategy. The CIA needed a new strategy in terrorist safe-havenssuch as Afghanistan, where th e U.S. governm ent was unable to gain th e cooperationof the Taliban movement in arresting or extraditing Bin Ladin. The CIA was usingproxy forces in Afghanistan to plan operations against B in Ladin as early as 1997.Beginning in August 1998, the CIA employed proxy forces to carry out covert actionsagainst Bin Ladin and his principal lieutenants. This strategy continued un til 9/11.

a. What was the CIA's covert action strategy for attacking Bin Ladin and alQaeda in the Afghanistan terrorist sanctuary after th e East Africa Embassybombings in August 1998?b. What were the goals of this strategy, and how effe ctive was it in m eeting thesegoals?c. Would arresting or elim inating Bin Ladin in August 1998 have stopped the9/11 attacks?

In mid-1999, the CIA introduced a new operational strategy called "The Plan, "toexpand proxy options for going after B in Ladin, and develop more unilateral sources(a s opposed to relying on foreign liaison).d. How did the CIA's covert action strategy fo r attacking Bin Ladin and alQaeda in the Afgh anistan terrorist sanctuary change with th e implementationof "The Plan"?e. How effective was "The Plan" in attacking Bin Ladin and al Q aeda?

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In late 2000, the CIA developed an offensive init iative for Afghanistan. It involvedincreasing support to anti-Taliban groups, and a major e f f o r t to back NorthernAlliance forces to (i) try to postpone a victory by the Tal iban army an d (i i) ti e downal Qaeda f ighters in Afgh anis tan. The Bush adm inistration built on these plans aspart of their Afghan policy.

f. What was the CIA doing to attack Bin Ladin and al Qaeda in the first 8months of the Bush administration that was effectively different than what ithad been doing during the Clinton administration?g. How different was the Bush administration's covert action strategy developedbefore 9/11 from what the CIA had already been pursuing?h. If implemented before 9/11, how effective do you think this strategy wouldhave been in reducing the terrorist threat?

3) Capture vs. Kill. National Securi ty Adviser Sam uel Berger testified to theCom mis s ion under oath that he sent specific language to the DCI, regarding covertaction authorit ies against Bin Ladin, which said: you may ki l l him . He also said thatthese authorit ies contained explicit language saying U BL could be killed. TheNat ional Coordinator for Counterterrorism Richard Clarke testified to theCom mis s ion under oath that he had told the DC I that the pres ident wanted Bin Ladindead, and wa s as sured by Tenet that he knew exactly what the pol icymakers ' intentwas .

a. Please describe your understanding of what the policymakers' intent was inemploying covert action against Bin Ladin in Afghanistan from August 1998to the end of the Clinton administration. Did you think the intent was for theCIA to use its assets to kill Bin Ladin?b. W as it your understanding that the CIA was given covert action authority tokill Bin Ladin?

4) The Assassination Ban. Senior legal advisers in the Clinton adminis tration havetold us that, even before August 1998, they had determined that an order from thepres ident to kill Bin Ladin in a covert action would not violate Executive Order12333, banning assassination. Kill ing Bin Ladin, they explained, would be justi f iedin terms of self-defense according to the law of armed conflict.a. W as it your understanding at the time that E. O. 12333 was applicable in thecase of Bin Ladin?b. W as it your understanding that if the CIA had been ordered to kill Bin Ladin

this would have been a violation of the assassination ban?c. W as it your understanding that if Bin Ladin w ere killed in the context of acapture operation that this was not a violation of the assassination ban?

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5) Sufficien t Covert Action Authority. Some working-level officers in the CIA'sCounterterrorist C enter (CTC ) have told us they never had the covert authority theywanted to effectively go after Bin Ladin before 9/11. They complained that theirability to go after Bin Ladin was inhibited b y the act that they could only kill himwithin the context of a capture operation, and that consequently their assets did notthink the U.S. government w as s erious ab out wanting to kill Bin Ladin.a. In your o pinion, did the CIA receive appropriate and sufficient covert actionauthority to go after Bin Ladin befo re 9/11?b. Did you ever express to the policymakers, at any point before 9/11, a concernthat the CIA had insufficient covert action authority to go after Bin Ladin?c. Did you ever ask for authorities regarding Bin Ladin before 9/11 that you didnot get?

6) CIA Direct Action in Afghanistan. After 9/11, the CIA us ed its own personnel togreat e f f e c t in Afghanistan against al Qaeda and Taliban orces, operating in anextremely dangerous environment.Why did the CIA never put its own personnel on the ground in Afghanistan before9/11 in order to capture or kill Bin Ladin?

7) Capabilities of the Tribal Assets. DC I Tenet told the Com miss ion that in spring1998 he "turned o f f " an operation to capture Bin Ladin using C IA employed Afghantribal assets. He said this decision was based on the recommendation of his chiefoperational officers. The operation's prospec t of su c c e s s was described to him at thetime as less than 30%.a. Where were the weak po ints of this op eration? Did your operational officers

have confidence in the ability of the tribal assets to carry out the operation?b. What was the estimated likelihood of the operation being successful, as apercentage? W hat wou ld have been an acceptable percentage, that is, alikelihood of success that would have led you to approve the operation?

For three years, from Augus t 1998 through to 9/11, the CIA continued to employthese Afghan tribal as sets to mount offensive operations agains t Bin Ladin and alQaeda in Afghanistan. About half a dozen tim es during this period the assetsreportedly attempted to ambush Bin Ladin. By fall 1999, briefings by theCounterterrorist Center (CTC ) stated th e tribals ' chances of su c c e s s in capturing BinLadin as less than 10% . [Note: the CIA's ne w operational strategy for going afterB in Ladin and al Qaeda, "The Plan " introduced in all 1999, w as in part a responseto this understanding that the CIA could not rely solely on the tribals to capture BinLadin].

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c. What gave you confidence that CIA's Afghan tribal assets had any morecapability to mount attacks on Bin Ladin after August 1998 than in the springof 1998?d. Did you believe at the time of their reporting that the assets did in fact try toambush Bin Ladin?e. If you had to assign a percentage to the likelihood of the tribal assets carrying

out a successful ambush against Bin Ladin in the period before 9/11, whatwould that number have been?f. Did you ever discuss the capabilities of the tribal assets with policymakersbefore 9-11? Please discuss in detail any such conversations.

8) Massoud and the Northern Alliance. In February 1999, the CIA had authority toemploy the Taliban's strongest opponent, Northern Alliance commander Massoudand his forces in covert action against Bin Ladin. Beginning in mid-1999, the CIAbegan to focus more attention on Massoud, with the recognition that "the enemy ofmy enemy is my friend. " CIA personnel who met up with Massoud to convey to himthe U.S.government's requirement that he capture rather than kill Bin Ladin told usthat Massoud laughed at such a request.

a. To what extent did Massoud share United States'objectives in Afghanistan?By fall 1999, briefings by the Counterterrorist Center (CTC) stated Massoud'schances of success in capturing Bin Ladin as no more than 15%.

b. How confident were you in Massoud and his fighters as a proxy force thatCIA could use against Bin Ladin?c. If you had to assign a percentage to the likelihood of Massoud carrying out asuccessful attack against Bin Ladin in the period before 9/11, what would that

number have been?From 2000 to 2001, the CIA and policymakers gave great consideration to apian touse Massoud's forces to tie down the Taliban an d al Qaeda in Afghanistan, althoughthere was disagreement within the CIA as to how much support to give Massoud. Inearly 2001, CIA analysts warned that the Northern Alliance might be knocked o f f thebattle-field in spring fighting.

d. From 2000 on, were you confident that Massoud would be able to hold backthe Taliban?e. How concerned were you that Massoud could be defeated in 2001, and with

what potential consequences?

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9) Using Proxies. Although the CIA actively used local forces as proxies to carry outcovert actions in Afghanistan, these proxies do not appear to have ever carried out asingle assault against Bin Ladin or his principal lieutenants before 9/11.a. Were you confident at the time that the CIA's va rious proxy forces wouldcapture or kill Bin Ladin during the period befo re 9/11? Did this confidence

increase or decrease at any point?b. Did you inform policymakers of the risks involved in using proxiesasopposed to U.S. personnelto carry out covert action against B in Ladin?Please discuss in detail any conversations that you had on this topic withpolicymakers in the period before 9/11.c. If you had to assign a percentage to the likelihood of any of the CIA's proxyforces either capturing or killing Bin Ladin in the period before 9/11, whatwould that number be?d. Did you ever frankly advise policymakers of the chances that any of the CIA 'sproxy forces would capture or kill Bin Ladin in the period before 9/11?e. In short, if the pro xy force strategy wa sn't working , what steps did you take topursue alternatives to u se of proxy forces?f. What alternatives did you recommend to policymakers?

10) Actionable Intelligence. Yesterday, - w e heard how many senior Department ofDefense officials continually argued that the CIA's inability to produce "actionableintelligence " limited their ability to undertake military action in the Afghanistanterrorist sanctuary before 9/11.a. W hy was the CIA unable to produce actionable intelligence sufficient to meetthe military's requirements for action in Afghanistan befo re 9/11?b. How is the CIA working with the military to solve this problem now?

Yesterday, we heard how on three occasions between December 1998 and May 1999,the CIA's intelligence was strong enough to set in motion a ctive preparations tolaunch military strikes to kill Bin Ladin. National Security Adviser Berger told theCommission that on each occasion DCI Tenet advised that the intelligence was notreliable enough to go ahead w ith the action.c. Please explain the basis for your advising against military action on thesethree occasions.

11 ) Predator. According to several NSC and CIA officers, the CIA's senior mana gementresisted development of the Predator as a reconnaissance platform in 2000, and onlyagreed to fly Predator over Afghanistan on an experimental basis.

a. Did you originally support the development of Predator in 2000 as areconnaissance platform to use over Afghanistan? W hy was there resistancefrom some senior CIA officers for this project?

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The Predator's flights in fall 2000 were very successful: CIA analysts think that BinLadin was spotted on two occasions.b. In your opinion, did Predator spot Bin Ladin in fall 2000?c. How valuable was the intelligence Predator collected from reconnaissanceflights in fall 2000?

When winter weath er prevented further flights, senior managers at the CIA, includingin the CT C, wanted to bring the Predator back to the U.S. and not redeploy thePredator until an armed capability was ready. CIA analysts said that, since theTaliban had spotted th e Predator in the fall, further reconnaissance flights mightjeopardize th e effectiveness of future armed flights.CIA senior manage rs argued w ith DO D about funding the Predator project, andabout command-and-control issues (including wh ether the CIA or the military wouldpull the trigger on the armed Predator). Th ere were no Predator flights overAfghanistan in 2001 until after 9/11.

d. What were your reasons for opposing flying Predator for reconnaissancepurposes in 2001?e. Why didn't the Predator (reconnaissance or armed) fly in spring/summer2001?f. Did CIA disputes over funding or command-and-control issues have the effectof stalling Predator missions?g. W hy did you change your position after the September 4, 2001 Principals'Committee meeting, and agree to fly reconnaissance flights in 2001?

12 ) Commission Recommendations. W e are considering a range of topics forrecommendations. Currently, th e DCI is both th e principal analyst of th e terroristenemy as well as the commander fo r many ope rations in the field in the war onterror.

a. How has the role of the CIA in fighting terrorism changed post-9/11 ?b. How has the leadership role of the Director of Central Intelligence changedpost-9/11?c. What do you spend most of your time doing? How much of your time is spenton full operations against terrorism, and how much is spent on analysis of theterrorism threat or on other activities? Is this the right balance and use of yourtime?

In the DCI's recent Worldwide Threat briefing before th e Senate SelectCom mittee on Intelligence, he stated that the al Qaeda leadership structure h asbeen seriously dam aged since 9/11, but there is still a significant and ongoingterrorist threat.

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d. Two and a half years after the 9/11 attacks, why has the U.S. Governmentbeen unable to find Usam a Bin Ladin, and other terrorist and Taliban leaderssuch as Ayman al-Zawahiri, or Mullah Omar?e. What kind of conflict is the United S tates currently inand against whatenemy? Is this a war on "terrorism"or a struggle for the future of the M uslimworld?f. W hat is the appropriate role of the CIA and the Intelligence C omm unity in thewar, and w hat role is inappropriate?

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NATIONAL POLICY COORDINATIONSUGGESTED QU ESTIONS FO R S A M U E L R. B E R G E R

Designated Com missioners: Richard Ben-Veniste & John Lehman

1) T he First Term of the Clinton Administration. By the time Bill Clinton becamepresident in January 1993, terrorism against the United States had subsided. But theJanuary 1993 killings at CIA headquarters and the February 1993 bombing of theWorld Trade Center put the threat ront and center almost immediately. In 1995 thepresident signed Presidential Decision Directive-39 which called terrorism a"potential national security threat" as well as a "criminal act" and made keepingweapons of mass destruction out of terrorists' hands a top priority. In 1998,Presidential Decision Directive-62 designated lead agencies to plan or and respondto terrorism and created a form ofcounterterrorism czar.a. When did U s a m a B in Ladin an d al Qaeda first come on the scope of theClinton administration as a threat to the U nited States?b. How did the president through you and other policymakersorganize thegovernment to respond to the threat?c. From the early 1990s through 1996, B in Ladin was in Sudan. Some have saidthat th e Sudanese government offered to turn him over to the U SG and toprovide intelligence on al Qaeda. D id Sudan in fact make such overtures?How did the United States respond to them? Was an opportunity to get BinLadin missed?d. Where in the U .S. government w as policy m ade on fighting terrorism in

general and Bin Ladin in particular?e. Before the E ast A frica embassy bombings of A ugust 1998, what was theadministration's strategy fo r dealingwith B in Ladin and al Qaeda? Was itworking?

2) Khobar Towers. You have testified to the Comm ission that there was no doubt inyour mind that the 1996 attack on U .S. Air Force personnel at Khobar Towers inDhahran, Saudi Arabia h ad links to the Iranian governm ent, but you said you werenever sure how high up responsibility wen t inside the regime in Te hran. You said thatpolicymakers worried that military strikes on Iran would kill the Iranian reformmovement and might trigger further Iranian attacks against the U.S. or its allies. Yousaid that the intelligence community never definitively said that Khobar was an Iraniangovernment operation, and if it had, the president would have had to m ake a toughchoice but would have taken the appropriate action.

a. W ho was responsible for the 1996 Khobar Towers attack?b. How and when did you learn who was responsible?c. What did the U .S. government do in response to this attack?


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3) The Second Clinton Administration: The East Africa Embassy Bombings.The United States responded to the August 7, 1998 bombings w ith cruise missile strikeson Bin Ladin camps in Afghanistan and on a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan thatintelligence indicated was producing a precursor for the lethal nerve agent V X . Youtold us the objective of th e strike on Afghanistan was to kill Bin Ladin and hislieutenants, as some extraordinary intelligence indicated they were meeting in one ofth e camps. Y ou said th at following this response, th e president was eager fo r optionsbeyond missile strikes and expressed interest in a "boots on the ground" option. Y ousaid that stealthy comm ando options to capture or kill Bin Ladin or his deputies wereseen by the Pentagon as high-risk, while a full-blown invasion of Afghanistan wasinconceivable in a pre-9/11 world. Following th e August 1998 strikes, N ationalCounterterrorism Coordinator Richard Clarke pushed for an on going series of follow-on strikes on Bin Ladin targets as intelligence becam e ripe.

a. What was the objective of the U.S. missile strikes on al Qaeda camps inAfghanistan on August 20, 1998? Did missing Bin Ladin make the strikes afailure?b. What was the objective of the attack on the al-Shifa plant in Sudan? Did weachieve that objective? How did Congress and the U.S. public react to thesestrikes? Did criticism of the strikes inhibit policymakers from using forceagainst al Qaeda?

c. Were the August 1998 strikes too weak?d. W hy didn 't the administration follow Clarke's recommendation for follow-onmilitary strikes?e. In particular, why didn't the president authorize the use of special operationsforces to go after Bin Ladin in Afghanistan?f. Why was there no stronger military effort in the Afghanistan sanctuary?g. Yesterday, former Secretary of Defense Cohen said that military options inAfghanistan were limited because the CIA was never able to provide"actionable intelligence" on Bin Ladin's location. Do you agree with thatview? Why not use the military itself to gain the intelligence?

4) Using Missiles to Strike Bin Ladin. From December 1998 through May 1999, on atleast three occasions, DCI Tenet provided policymakers w ith intelligence on BinLadin's location good enough that policymakers considered cruise missile strikes totry to kill him. You have told us that while th e possibility of killing or injuringinnocents was always factored in , strikes were n ever ruled out fo r that reason. In eachcase, yo u told us , policymakers chose not to recommend strikes because D CI Tenetadvised that th e intelligence was not strong enough.

a. Why were strikes never authorized?b. To what extent did concerns about harming civilians near Bin Ladin affectpolicymakers' decisions? Were worries about killing civilians ever whatswung a decision?


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c. We don't want to mention specific time windows in this forum. Still, givenboth the time it would take policymakers to decide whether to strike and theflight time for a cruise missile to reach its target, do you think thatpolicymakers would ever have had strong enough intelligence on Bin Ladin'slocation to make the decision to launch a strike?5) Capture vs . Kill. You testified to the Commission that you sent specif ic language toth e DCI regarding covert action authorities against Bin Ladin, which said: you maykill Bin Ladin. You also said that these authorities contained explicit language sayingBin Ladin could be killed. Your point man on counterterrorism, Richard Clarke,

testified privately that he had told the DCI that the president wanted Bin Ladin dead.a. Please describe your understanding of what the president's intent was inemploying covert action against Bin Ladin in Afghanistan from August1998 to the end of the Clinton administration. Did you think the intentwas for the C IA to use its assets to kill Bin Ladin?b. Was it your understanding that the White House was giving the CIA

covert action authority to kill Bin Ladin?c. Were you ever told by DCI Tenet that the CIA had no t been authorized tokill Bin Ladin outside of a planned capture operation?d. By early 2000, how confident were you that the proxy forces the CIA wasusing against Bin Ladin would ever achieve their objectives? Did theyhave the capability to capture orkill Bin Ladenor even to find him?

6) Direct Action inAfghanistan. TheClinton administration never authorizedclandes t ine, unilateral, military direct action in Afghanistan. Nor did i t authorizedirect-act ion us e of CIA personnel in Afghanistan to conduct a capture or killoperation against Bin Ladin.a. After the 1998 embassy bombings, why didn't we put our most highly trained

peopleJoint Special Operations Command units or CIA paramilitaryofficersinto Afghanistan to deal with Bin Ladin?b. Weren't we running real risks of future terrorist attacks by relying on proxiesrather than U.S. forces?

7) The Millennium Plots. In late 1999, the USG learned ofal Qaeda plots to mountattacks against U.S. tourists in Jordan and caught an Algerian jihadist, AhmedRessam, who was on a mission to allegedly bomb Los Angeles International Airport.You told us that during this high threat period, you and your fellow principals metconstantly over th e course of a month to manage an d respond to the threat. After th ethreat ha d passed, you and Clarke led an after-action review to step up U.S. e f f o r t s todisrupt Bin Ladin's network abroad, boost law enforcement 's ability to root outterrorists inside America, an d strengthen immigration and border controls.a. How did you and other cabinet officials manage the al Qaeda threat in the run-up to the Millennium celebrations?


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b. Did the FBI share inform ation it held on al Qaeda during this period? Did thiscontrast with the FBI's willingness to share al Qaeda information previously?If so, why was the FBI willing to share information now? Did that cooperationlast?c. What lessons were learned from this intense threat period w hen al Qaeda wasattempting to attack our homeland? How did these lessons becomeinstitutionalized in the government in the weeks after the threat?d. In the aftermath of the millennium, what institutional changes were madeacross the government to deal with al Qaeda and terrorism?

8) Coercive Diplomacy. From 1998 through the end of the Clinton administration,senior State Department o f f i c i a l s repeatedly warned the Taliban regime that it wouldbe held responsible for any al Qaeda attacks on the United States emanating fromAfghanistan.a. When the United States warns a country that it will use force if that country isresponsible for actions affecting U.S. interests, is it important that we follow

through on any such threats?b. When senior State Department officials warned Taliban officials that it wouldbe held responsible for al Qaeda attacks on the United States, hadpolicymake rs decided to back the warn ing with force? Was the U.S. m ilitaryprepared to strike the Taliban should another attack on the U nited States takeplace? Or was this just a bluff?9) The Attack on the USS Cole. On October 12 , 2000, the USS Cole was bombed inYemen, an d 17 sailors we re killed. You told us that neither the FBI nor the CIApresented the president or his senior advisers with an authoritative judgment that theattack was directed by Bin Ladin or emanated from his Afghanistan-based al Qaeda

network. You o f f e r e d this by way of explanation as to why the adm inistration didn 'trespond militarily to the attack.a. In the days after the October 2000 attack on the Cole, was the presidentadvised who was responsible for the attack?b. When did you know that al Qaeda was behind the attack? Did anyone

seriously think anyone other than al Qaeda could have been responsible?c. If you needed a more definitive judgm ent from the CIA to act, what did youdo to prod the CIA to get you more clarity?d. Why didn't the administration respond militarily for the killing of Americantroops?

e. The USG had repeatedly warned the Taliban that if another attack on the U.S.originated from Afghanistan, it would be held responsible. Why didn't wefollow through on this warning? W hat signal did the absence of a militaryresponse to the Cole send?f. What is the standard of evidence that a president needs to authorize force torespond to an attack?


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10) The Clinton-Bush Transition. Yo u told us that you met during the transition withyour successor, Condoleezza Rice, an d told her that you believed the Bushadministration would spend more time on terrorism in general an d al Qaeda inparticular than any other issue they would d eal with.a. During the transition, what advice did you offer Condoleezza Rice regarding

the al Qaeda threat? How did she respond?b. Did you advise Rice or any other incoming Bush NSC official regarding whowas responsible for the attack on the Colel Did you explain how the Clintonadministration had handled the attack?11) Comm ission Recom mendations. In your prepared statement to the Commission, yo urecommend that the USG work toward improved policy integration,information/intelligence integration,and resource integration. Regarding policyintegration, you say that trad itional bureaucra tic barriers between dom estic andexternally focused agencies need to be taken down.

a. You recommend consolidating the structure of the Homeland SecurityCouncil into the National Security Council. Should this be the first nationalsecurity decision of a new adm inistration? Wh y is this so impo rtant?b. You recommend a Director of National Intelligence. W hy is this soimportant? Is this achievable, given the huge turf battles it would provoke?c. Why do you recommend a domestic intelligence agency? Do you believe theFBI simply cannot do the job? How long would it take to set up, and what doyou do in the meantime to meet the threat? How do you create such an entityconsistent with our traditions of protection of civil rights?d. You stress the importance of fusing open source analysis with collection fromclandestine sources. Were you dissatisfied with the analysis you received inyour time in office? Do you believe the Intelligence Community f ailed toprovide warning of the 9/11 attacks? Does your proposal address orameliorate the problem of warning?e. You have limited your recommendations to structural reform s within the U.S.government. Do you have recommendations on foreign or military policy?Are we pursuing the proper strategy in the war on terrorism? What aspects ofcurrent strategy w ould you change, either to diminish or highlight? Whatrecommendations do you have on public diplomacy? Do we need to changehow we deliver the message or do we need to change the message we deliver?


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COMM ISSION SENSITIVE; CLASSIFICATION TO BE DETERMINED

NATIONAL POLICY C O O RDI N A TI O NS U G G E S T E D QUESTIONS FOR RICHARD A. CLARKE

Designated Com missioners: Slade Gorton & Tim Roemer

1 ) Priorities. You coordinated counterterrorism policy in both the Clinton and Bushadm inistration. O ver the 1990 s, you witnessed a shift in emphasis from state-sponsored terrorism, from countries such as Libya, Syria, an d especially Iran, totransnational terrorism from al Qaeda.a. H ow high a priority was terrorism for NSC policymakers? H ow did thatchange over th e years?b. Should it have been a higher priority, compared to other urgent nationalsecurity issuesRussia, China, Iraq, the Balkans, the M iddle East, and so

onin a pre-9/11 era where the al Q aeda attack that claimed th e mostAm erican lives killed 17 Americans?2) Resources. In 1998, DCI Tenet wrote his s t a f f that no resources were to bespared in what he called a declaration of war against al Qaeda. In February

2001, Paul Kurtz of your NSC o f f i c e wrote Condoleezza Rice that what OMB wassuggesting as the CIA 's budget for fighting al Qaeda in FY2002 was "whollyinadequate. "Afew weeks later, you also urged a sharp rise in CIA funding fore f f o r t s against al Qaeda.

a. Did the U SG ensure that it had enough resources to fight al Qaeda?Enough funding? Enough personnel?b. Did you have particular problems w ith th e CIA? You complained to usthat the CIA wouldn't reprogram one dollar away from other programsfrom translations to the Agency cafeteriato al Qaeda.c. Did you have particular problems with th e FBI? B erger told us that FBI'scounterterrorism resources rose 350 percent under the Clintonadministration, but he doesn't know where th e money w ent.

3) Continuity Versus Change.a. Did you see a sharp break in counterterrorism policy between the Clintonan d Bush administrations? Please explain.b. W as policy development reactive or proactive? W as enough time spenttrying to look ahead an d anticipate the enemy's moves?

4) T he Role of the National Coordinator fo r Counterterrorism Czar. In 1998,President Clinton signed PDD -62, creating the role of the national coordinatorfor counterterrorism a role you held from then until after 9/11.

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COMM ISSION SENSITIVE; CLASSIFICATION TO BE DETERM INEDa. Did your position have enough clout to be effective?b. Did you have the resources, staff, and access yo u needed?

5) The Role of the CSG. You also continued to chair the Counterterrorism SecurityGroup (CSG), a body composed of assistant-secretary-level officials from U.S.agencies. The CSG wore tw o hats: it assessed and responded to terrorist threats,and it served as the main interagency group running counterterrorism policy. Inthe late Clinton administration, it -wound up reporting to a "Small Group " ofcabinet-rank officials; in the pre-9/11 Bush administration, it reported to theDeputies' Committee, not to the Principals.

a. Was the CSG a sufficiently high-ranking body to be effective?b. Should the CSG have reported to the deputies or the principals?i. Did the Clinton-era practice of placing the CSG under the cabinet-level Small Group make it harder to coordinate policy an d keepofficials who weren't CSG members in the loop?ii. Did the Bush-era decision to place the CSG under the deputiesmake for better integrated p olicy, or did it hurt your ab ility to getquick decisions?

6) Understanding the Bin Ladin Threat. Bin Ladin first appeared as a terroristfinancier, then an increasingly influential jihadist, and then finally a terroristmastermind.a. How did you evaluate the quality of intelligence reporting on terrorism ingeneral and al Qaeda in particular, both overseas and at home?b. Did the USG appreciate the severity of the terrorism threat quicklyenough?c. Did the USG focus enough on the possibility of terrorism at home beforethe M illennium plot?

7) The Sudan A llegations. Some critics have alleged that Sudan offered in 1996 tohand over Bin Ladin to the United States or other countries that might havebrought him to justice, and that the Clinton adm inistration failed to pursue thelead. The staff has found no credible evidence of any such o f f e r from Sudan.Moreover, M r. Berger and you testified under oath that yo u never received an ySudanese proposal to hand over Bin Ladin, w hich, you said, Sudan's terror-supporting government w ould never have done.

a. Did Sudan ever offer to turn over Bin Ladin to the United States, SaudiArabia, or any other country that might have brought him to justice?b. Did the Clinton administration turn down potentially useful informationfrom the Sudanese?

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COMM ISSION SENSITIVE; CLASSIFICATION TO BE DETERM INED8) The East Africa Bombings. With th e August 7, 1998 bombings of tw o U.S.embassies in East Africa, which killed 22 4 people, including 12 Americans, alQaeda crossed th e line into massive, direct attacks on U.S. targets. Thirteen dayslater, the US G fired cruise missiles at Bin Ladin camps in Afghanistan, includinga strike on a terrorist conference fired in hopes of killing Bin Ladin himself.Washington also destroyed a Bin Ladin-linkedpharm aceuticals plant in

Khartoum, Sudan, where soil samples taken before th e bombing show ed traces ofa precursor to the lethal nerve agent VX.a. Was the U.S. response adequate? Should anything further have been done?b. Are Rice an d Hadley right to describe these strikes as weak, "tit-for-tat"

responses that might have actually emboldened al Qaeda?c. Did President Clinton's acute political troubles at the time have any effecton the decision-making or the outcome?d. Were we right to bomb the al-Shifa pharmaceuticals plant?e. Why didn't the strike hit Bin Ladin?9) Plan Delenda. In a September 1998 paper by your o f f i c e called "PoliticalMilitary Plan Delenda " a classical allusion evoking ancient Rome's destruction

of it s rival city-state Carthage sought to "immediately eliminate an y significantthreat to Americans "from Bin Ladin's organization. Your plan called for asynergistic e f f o r t : high-level diplomacy to deprive Bin Ladin of his Afghan havenand to ask foreign partners to disrupt cells abroad; stepped-up CIA e f f o r t s ,including top-priority e f f o r t s to keep W MD out of Bin Ladin's hands and useAfghan proxies to seize senior terrorists; a global campaign to dry up terroristfinances; and Pentagon planning to hit Bin Ladin targets in Afgh anistan andSudan.

a. Was Plan Delenda ever approved or discussed by the Small Group orPrincipals Committee? Were bits of it de facto adopted?b. Was anyone else trying to come up with this sort of strategy?c. Could this plan have worked? Was it really tried?10 ) Follow-on Military Strikes. Defense Secretary Cohen, JCS C hairman Shelton,and regional commander G en. Anthony Zinni all recommended against furtherstrikes or ground missions to find Bin Ladin with out reliable intelligence abouth is wh ereabouts; they also argued that rudimentary, easily rebuilt training campswere not worth million-dollar missiles, and that far-flung commando missionscould mean another debacle like th e failed 1980 Deser t O ne raid inside Iran.

Y o u , how ever, consistently advocated an ongoi

Documents

T3 B10 Counter Terrorism Public Hearing 3-23-24-04 Fdr- Red Lines- Table of Contents- Hearing Schedule- All Suggested Questions 994