T2 B5 Other Teams Workplans Fdr- Workplan Team 6 (Item 4- Interview Candidates- Redacted- No Withdrawal Notice) 620

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NATIONAL COMMISSIONON TERRORIST ATTACKSUPON THE UNITED STATES

TEAM #6 WORKPLANLAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS

INSIDE THE UNITED STATES

Team Members: Barbara GreweMichael JacobsonPeter RundletLance Cole

Premise StatementItem 1 Key Questions of the InvestigationItem 2 Suggested Readings and Briefing PlanItem 3 Document RequestsItem 4 Interview Candidates

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYCOMMISSION SENSITIVETeam #6

Premise Statement

The September H terrorist attacks were carried out by 19 hijackers, who livedopenly and freely in the U nited States fo r varyin g periods of time prior to the attacks.The six leaders of the plot spent considerable time training in the U nited States for theattacks, traveling throu gho ut the coun try durin g this time. The U .S. IntelligenceCommunity generally, and the FBI more sp ecifically, were aware prior to attacks thatthree of these individu als had ties to al-Qa'ida. Althoug h the plot was primarily financedan d orchestrated from overseas, th e hijackers also had contact with an d receivedassistance from a num ber of individuals in the Un ited States. Some of the hijackers'associates were kn ow n to the F BI prior to September 11 throu gh its counterintelligenceand counterterrorism investigations. The FBI also had other indications of a possibleattack in the summer of 2001, including the M oussaoui investigation, the Phoenix EC,and the U .S. Intelligence Community's heightened state of alert.

Based on prev ious reviews, it is now clear that the FBI did not respondaggressively and appropriately to all of the available intelligence, and failed in manyrespects to "connect the dots" prior to the attacks. Less closely studied is the extent towhich the FBI's inability to detect the hijackers' activities and associations while in theUnited States represented a systemic intelligence failure. Was the hijackers' ability toavoid detection by the FBI while in the United States an indication of excellentoperational tradecraft by the hijackers, or does it represent a failure on the part of theFBI? If the former, can changes be made to detect this type of tradecraft in the future? Ifthe latter, wh at accounts fo r these failures?To answer these questions, our team will have to develop a comprehensiveunderstanding of the U .S. Governmen t's efforts pre-September 11 to collect, process,analyze, and disseminate intelligence on terrorist activity in the U nited States. O urreview will focus no t only on the FBI itself, which had primary responsibility fo r thesematters, but also on the FBI's relationship w ith other entities w ith important roles in thisprocess, such as state and local authorities, other federal agencies, and foreignintelligence and law enforcemen t partners. By understanding th e problems with thesystem pre-September 11, it will be clearer w hat the specific failures were, w hy theyoccurred, and will help us better explain w hy the FBI w as unab le to learn abou t or stopthe attacks.Finally, we will review the current state of the U.S. Government's domesticintelligence efforts, to assess whether they are adequate to remedy the pre-September 11systemic problems identified through the course of our investigation. If not, we willmake recom men dations to address the se problems.

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FOR OFFICIAL U SE ON LYC OM M I S S I ON SE NSI TI VE In w h a t w a y s did the FBI fail to adequa tely col laborate, coordinate , and shareinformation re levant to the September 11 at tacks with foreign law enforcementand intel l igence partners, local and state la w enforcement authori t ies, and otherfederal agencies prior to the attacks, and what accounts for any failures in thisregard? Wh at par t icular ly glar ing or significa nt failures stand out in terms of the FB I'sinability to prevent th e Septem ber 11 attacks, and what accounts for thesefailures? Are the FBI's traditional law enforcement mission and resulting organizationalstructures and cultures incompatible with a successful counterterrorism program?

4. How is foreign intelligence information regarding terrorist activity in the UnitedStates collected, processed, analyzed and disseminated today? What has changedsince September 11, and how effectively is the system currently working?

W h a t are the ingredients of a successful dom estic intelligence/counterterrorismsystem? What degree of collaboration, coordination, and information sharing isrequired between th e FBI, state and local authorities, foreign intelligence andlaw enforcement partners, and other federal agencies to have a successfulsystem? W ha t role should private sector entities (e.g., data aggregating andinformation technology com panies) play in this system? Does the current system provide for the adequa te collection, processing,analysis, and dissemination of counterterrorism-related intelligence, and if not,w h a t are the primary barriers to success? W h a t are the pros and cons, including transition costs and feasibility, ofestablishing a separate agency to handle counterintelligence and foreignintell igence collection within th e United States? W h a t can w e learn from other countries' approaches to and experiences withdomestic intel l igence issues? W hat additional legal and policy changes, if any, are necessary and appropriatefo r the U.S. Government to establish a succes sful domestic intel l igencecapability?

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Item 2: Suggested Readings and Briefing PlanA. Reading List

1. Relevant portions of the Joint Inquiry Classified Final R eport, includ ing Sen atorSh elby's A dditional V iews [W hy it is relevan t: The Joint Inquiry has alreadyperformed considerable investigation on the performance of the FBI relating tothe September 11 attacks. In determining the scope and focu s of ourinvestigation, the Com mission should be aware of wha t the Joint Inquiry foundand concluded. Senator Shelby's additional views contain important and relevantconclusions about th e systemic problems with the FBI prior to the attacks.]

2. Joint Inquiry Unclassified Staff Statements, dated: September 24, 2002 (assupplemented on October 17, 2002) and October 8, 2002. [Why it is relevant:these statements cover a number of topics relevant to our investigation including:th e Phoenix Electronic Communication, th e M oussaoui investigation, th einformation regarding aircraft as weapons, and the U.S. Intelligence Com mu nity'shandling of the information regarding the hijackers prior to the attacks.]

3. Selected portions of the October 2002 Markle Foundation Task Force report onNational Security in the Information Age. [Why it is relevant: contains importantpolicy recomm endations for the U .S. Governm ent relating to the impact ofinformation and inform ation technology on national security.]4. Senator John Edwards's February 2003 on e page fact sheet on the proposedcreation of a Hom eland Intelligence Agency. [W hy it is relevant: the fact sheetcontains some of the arguments in favor of the creation of a new domestic

intelligence agency.]5. Jeff Smith 's June 18, 2002 Washington Post Op-Ed, entitled "Haste and theHomeland Plan," on homeland security an d domestic intelligence. [Why it isrelevant: the op-ed briefly describes the problem s w ith the current system, and hisproposals to remedy these problems.]6. "Mission Impossible," written by Jean Kum agai, published in IEEE Spectrum on -line Journal, dated A pril 7, 2003 on the FBI's information sharing andtechnological problems. [Why it is relevant: the article discusses the well-knownproblems with the FBI's technology and information systems, an d assesses

whether the current p roposals are likely to remedy these problems.]7. The Cell, by John M iller [W hy it is releva nt: the author provides a detailedexplanation of why he believes the FBI and CIA failed to.prevent th e September

11 attacks. He traces the origins of al-Qa'ida in the United States, beginning inthe early 1990s, and how the U.S. G overnment failed to adequately respond tothis growing threat.]

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYC O MMI SSI O N SENSITIVEB. Recommended Briefers

1. Eleanor Hill , Staff Director, Join t Inquiry Staff2. Glenn Fine, Inspector General, Department of Justice3. Jeff Smith, former G eneral Coun sel, Central Intelligence Agency4. M ike Leavitt , Governor of Utah during 2002 S alt Lake Olympics5. Jeff Jonas, CEO of Systems Research and Development6. Bill Crowell, former D eputy D irector of NS A7. Oilman Louie, In-Q-Tel8. Professor Philip Heymann, Kennedy School of Governm ent, Harvard Un iversity

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Item 3: Document Requests1. In cons ultation with team #1, requests on hijackers' associates, al-Qa'idadetainees, an d updated timelines an d lists of pending investigations from theFBI's 9/11 investigation (codenamed "PENTTBOM.")2. Training curricula from new agent training , counterterrorism in-services, an dfrom FBI College of Analytical S tudies.3. Statistics from select FBI Field Offices, regarding agen t assignments tocounterterrorism investigations (referred to as "bum rates," which indicate agentman-hours actually spent on particular matters) from 1993-Present.4. Copy of the pre-September 11 an d most up to date M anual of Investigative andOperational Guidelines.5. Copy of the pre-September 11 and most up to date Manual of Administrativeand Operational Procedures.6. Internal FBI docum ents on the post-9/11 counterterrorism reform s, includin gdocuments relating to the creation of the Office of Intelligence and the ReportsOfficer program.7. Memoranda of Un derstanding between the FBI and state/local law enforcementagencies in cities w here the hijackers resided or operated.8. In consultation w ith team #3 , written comm unications from the NationalSecurity Council to the FBI or the Department of Justice containingcounterterrorism strategy, policy an d guidance, 1998-September 20 , 20019. Written com munications from the FBI to the N ational Security Council oninternational terrorism matters, 1998-September 20, 200110. Any DOJ or NSC briefing materials relating to counterterrorism or domesticintelligence issues created for the Bush-Cheney Transition Team.11 . Any policy statements, directives, or guidance from the Attorney G eneral,Deputy Attorney General, or Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Divisionto the FBI or to U.S . Attorneys' Offices on Counterterrorism matters from 1998-Present, not relating to individual investigations.12. Annual Field Office Reports or other documents outlining annualcounterterrorism priorities an d strategies from select from FBI Field Offices,1998-Present.

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FOR OFFICIAL U SE O N L YC O M M I S S I O N SENSITIVE13. Copy of the pre-September 11 and most up to date A ttorney GeneralGuidelines for Foreign Intelligence and Coun terintelligence In vestigations.14. Copy of policy directives regarding th e creation of the Department ofHom eland Security, and its role in counterterrorism policy, operations, analysis,and collection.15. Copy of annual report on the FBI's National Foreign Intelligence Programbudget , produced by the Director of Central Intell igence's CommunityManagement Staff, FY1995-FY2004.16. FBI's annual Congressional Budget Justification Books, FY1995-FY200417. Department of Homeland Security's budget request fo r FY2003-FY2004

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Item 4: Interview Candidates*List of possible interviews at FBI field office in the areas where the hijackerslived and operated relating to: (1 ) the hijackers' activities and associations in theUnited States; (2) the way that these field offices collected, processed, analyzed,an d disseminated information about potential terrorist ac tivity prior to 9/11,(3 ) the offices' focus on counterterrorism an d al-Qa' ida prior to the attacks:

FBI agents involved in the investigation of hijackers' activities an dassociations (in conjun ction with team #1), analytic personnel, languagespecialists, counterterrorism managers.

*List of possible interviews related to pre-9/11 coordination an d informationsharing between the FBI and state/local law enforcement in the cities where thehijackers resided, an d between FBI Legal Attaches an d their foreign lawenforcement an d intelligence partners in countries where the hijackers lived an doperated:

State/local law enforcement personnel, including those who have servedon FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces in Los Angeles, Phoenix, SanDiego, Newark, Miami, Washington, D.C., Tampa, an d Jacksonville.

Current FBILegal Attaches in Spain, Germany, United Arab Emirates,Saudi Arabia, an d Yemen, an d Legal Attaches in place prior to 9/11.*List of possible interviews related to Justice Department leadership in settingFBI counterterrorism priorities, policy, an d budget, and in directing FBIinvestigative activity prior to September 11:

DOJpersonnel: Attorney General Ash croft, Deputy Attorney GeneralLarry Thompson, former Attorney General Reno, former Deputy AttorneyGeneral Holder, Jim Reynolds, former Deputy Attorney General Gorelick,Barry Sabin, Chris Wray, David Kris, Assistant A ttorney General V ietDinh, D O J budget personnel, Ronnie Edelman, former Assistant AttorneyGeneral Jim Rob inson, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Alice Fischer,Counsel David Nahmias, Fran Townsend, Ron Lee, Bruce Schwartz, MarkRichard, Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff, USAs an d AUSAsin relevant jurisdictions.

FB I personnel: Louis Freeh, M aryanne Wood son, R ose R udd en, AssistantDirector Finance Division, Tom Pickard, former Section Chief MichaelRol ince, former Executive Assistant Director Dale Watson.

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*List of possib le in terview s re la ted to W hite House leadership in set t ing FB Icounterterrorism priorities, policy, and in direct ing FB I invest igat ive act ivi ty priorto September 11 (in conjunction with team #3):FBIpersonnel\1 Law Enforcement Privacy

, NSC personnel: Daniel Benjamin, Steve Simon, M ara Rudm an, M ary, McCarthy, Jamie Baker, Jim Steinberg, G eneral Kerrick, Dick Clarke.*List of possible in terview s related to the Director o f Central Intellige nce'sleadership in setting FB I counterterrorism priorities, policy, bud get, and indirecting FB.I investigative activity prior to September 11 (in conjunction withteam #2): \ FBI personnel'.} 9/ll Law Enforcement Privacy-

Dale Watson, Michael Kolince CIA personnel} [ George Tenet, Joan Dempsey, Mike S.,

"Gang of Eight" (FBI and CIA executives' group)*List of possible interviews to understand and evaluate the effectiveness of thecurrent approach to domestic intelligence/counterrorism.

FB I FBI Executives:

Director Boh Mueller . Executive. Assistant Director Pat D'AmurcT- tO f f i c e of Intelligence:

JMaureen Baginski . Information dissemination/reports officer cadre:

FBI technology Issues: \ / ,SCOPE user management group, TRILOGY,use r t r ianage ipen t group, FBIHeadquarters and fieldanalysts, iformer CIO B qb Dies,,ClO Darwin Jo hn ,Mitretek personnel. \

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J9/11 Law EnforcementF O R O F F I C I A L U S E O N L Y ; privacYC O M M I S S I O N SENSITIVE ;

Training for agents and analytic personnel: \g Division officials, Office of Intelligence personneheadquarters analysts. / ;

Centralization of intelligence operations:Special A g e n t s inI [ National Joint Terrorism Task

Force personnel. \ Expanded Joint Terrorism Task Force Efforts/

State/local: \d pilot projects: Dallas FBI Early Response NetwPolice Department, CATIC, Criminal Intelligence Division, Los AngelesCounty Sheriff Department's Terrorism Early Warning Group, St. LouisGateway I nformation Sharing Initiative, John M iljer, A ssistant to L.A.P.D.Commissioner, Ray Kelly , N Y PD Commissioner,:David Co h e n , NYP D

Use of private sector data gathering and mining capabilities:Officials from Ch o i c e po i n t an d A x i o m . iO th e r U.S. Government Agencies i

Terrorist Threat Integration Center (in conjunction; with team #2):John Brennanj [relevant N SC officials Central Intelligence Agency: \e Tenet, Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Homeland

Security Winston WileyJ |; Department of Homeland Security: . i iKaren Morr, Frank L ibutt i , Paul R e d m o n d i Justice Department, including legQl and policy reform.:DO J personnel: Attorney General ^shcrojft, Deputy Attorney General

Larry Thompson, Assistant Attorney General M ichael C hertoff , A ssis tantAttorney General Viet Dinh, Barry Sabin,j David Nahmias FB I personnel: Director Bob M u e ll e q |S pi k e B o w ma n ,Jack Liv ingston, Ke n Wainstein . \ Legislative branch personnel: Senatqrs: Graham^ Shelby, Specter,Grassley, Edwards, Gregg; Congressrfleni Sensenbrenner, Goss, Conyers.Current and f o rme r staff: Vicki Divolli Steve Cash, Chris Ford, Bruce

C ohen, John G anno n, Suzanne SpaldirigJ Beryl Howard, John Gannon.

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FO R OFFICIAL U SE O N L YCO MM I S S IO N S E NS I T IV E*List of possible interviews related to curren t and future domestic in tel l igencepolicy issues and considerations:

Current an d former FBI and CIA officials:Howard Shapiro, Bear Bryant, John McGaffm, Jeff Smith, Judge Webster,Dale Watson, James Woolsey, Jim Simon. Current an d former White House officials:John Podesta, Jim Steinberg, Jamie Baker, Mary DeRosa, Dan Benjamin,Dick Clarke Civil liberties organizations:Jerry Berman, Jim Dempsey, Tim Edgar, Kate Martin, David Cole, JoeOnek, Ann Beeson Other current and former government officials:Brent Scowcroft, James Gilmore, Zoe Baird, John Hamre, GaryHart, Senator Edwards' staff, Ambassador Bremer, WarrenR u d m a n , former Chief Judge of the FISA Court, Royce Lamberth Officials from other agencies with a role in domestic intelligencecollection and analysis:

CIA National Resources Division headquarters officials and fieldpersonnel in New York, L.A. and Detroit, Defense HUM ECT Servicesofficials; intelligence officials from: DEA, Secret Service, INS, CoastGuard and Customs, Homeland Security

Foreign intelligence and law enforcement personnel:United Kingdom, M IS: Tristam R., Nigel S., Scotland Yard & HomeOfficeAustralia, ASIO: Michael T.Canada, CSIS: Barry D., AllisonM ., J im G.

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Documents

T2 B5 Other Teams Workplans Fdr- Workplan Team 6 (Item 4- Interview Candidates- Redacted- No Withdrawal Notice) 620