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File copy provided by http://www.wll.com. KEEPING THE LIGHTS ON: STRATEGIES FOR COMPATIBILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY IN ELECTRIC POWER NETWORKS. SURVIVABILITY OF COMPLEX NETWORKS. Ira Kohlberg Kohlberg Associates, Inc. South Shore Road Reston, VA 20190. October 27, 2011. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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KEEPING THE LIGHTS ON: STRATEGIES FOR COMPATIBILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY IN
ELECTRIC POWER NETWORKS
SURVIVABILITY OF COMPLEX NETWORKS
October 27, 2011
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Ira KohlbergKohlberg Associates, Inc.11308South Shore Road
Reston, VA 20190
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Threat: Historical Evidence• EMP damages and disrupts electronics—does not directly harm people
Puncture, temporary disconnection of transmission line
Safety devices burning Spark gaps
breakdown
Overhead Transmission Line and Telecommunications Disconnection and Damage
Overheadtransmission line
Malfunction of radio- location
Overheadsignal line
Diesels found damaged, “later”
Loss of communications;many examples
Groundzero
600 km
600 km400 km
600 km
1000 km Long line problems due to EMP “long tail”
Power supply breakdown
Amplification location unit
Power supply breakdown
Signal cable line
Figure presented by General Loborev, Director, Central Institute of Physics and
Technology, June 1994
Observed EMP Anomalies During USSR Atmospheric Testing (circa 1960)
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Threat: Nature and Magnitude of EMP Threats
HOB = 500km
EMP May Produce Simultaneous, Widespread Failure Of High Reliability infrastructure
• Wide area coverage – A million square miles
• Intensity depends on:– Weapon design– Height of burst – Location of burst
• Broad frequency range• Threat to all electronics in exposure
HOB = 100 km
SurfaceZero
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E1 footprint for a 30kT detonation at 100km altitude east of Chicago (unclassified version)
• The US power grid iscomprised of three interconnected systems, the eastern interconnect, the western, and Texas
• A relatively modest yield burst over the eastern US can affect 70% of the total national power generation
A single relatively small weapon can have a radius of impact of nearly 1,000 miles, affecting nearly 70% of the population and industrial production of the USA and Canada, the financial centers and
seat of governments.
Vulnerability of Power Grid Components to E1File copy provided by http://www.wll.com
But Everything Depends on Everything Else:Vulnerability of US National Infrastructure
• One or a few high-altitude nuclear detonations can produce EMP, simultaneously, over wide geographical areas
• Unprecedented cascading failure of our electronics-dependent infrastructures could result
– Power, energy transport, telecom, and financial systems are particularly vulnerable and interdependent
– EMP disruption of these sectors could cause large scale infrastructure failures for all aspects of the Nation’s life
• Both civilian and military capabilities depend on these infrastructures
• Without adequate protection recovery could be prolonged—months to years
C om pressor S tation
Fuel S upply
Oil / G as
S ubstation
P ow er P lant
P ow er S upply Electric Pow er
E nd Office
S w itch ing Off ice
Com m unications
Transport
TrafficL ight Transportation
W ater
E m ergencyC all C enter
H ospitalAm bulance
Em ergencyServices
FederalR eserve
ATM MilitaryInstallations
G overnm entServices
C heckP rocessing
C enter
R eservo irS ubstation
Banking & FinanceFire
S tation
P ension /S ervice P aym ents Treasury D ept.
Leg islative Off ices
B ank
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SCOPE OF PRESENTATION
MODELING THE INTERACTION BETWEEN POWER AND TELECOMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURES FOR A HEMP ATTACK
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Electromagnetic terrorism and potential infrastructure failures has become an extremely serious matter that may be viewed as embracing three major issues:
•Terrorist targets of interest•Effect on civilian and military populations•National response
7
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Effect on Civilian and Military Populations
•Civilian•Susceptibility of Infrastructures •Survivability of Infrastructures •Response of Infrastructures
•Military •Survivability of hardware•Communication survivability
8
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•Approach To Understanding How Coupled Infrastructures Work
•State Variable Theory
• linear approximation
• small perturbations
• infrastructure containing N components
• stability and susceptibility
• recovery time
• Recovery for a realistic segment of the public telephone
• Recovery model for coupled telecom and power infrastructures.
Dynamics of Recovery of Coupled Infrastructures
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PHASE SPACE REPRESENTATION OF POWER AND TELECOMMUNICATION RESPONSE TO HEMP
NO
RM
AL
IZE
D P
OW
ER
NORMALIZED TELECOMMUNICATIONS1.0
1.0
0.0
POWER AND TELECOMMUNICATIONSPLANE
STATE OF POWER
AND TELCOM AFTER
HEMP
DENOTES POSSIBLE TRAJECTORIES AFTER HEMP
INITIAL STATEOF SYSTEM
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The following set of vu-graphs show the theoretically derived conditions for the return to equilibrium.
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0 0
0 0
, ,
, .
TT P
PT P
dTT T P
dtdP
P T Pdt
12
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The following set of vu-graphs show the breakdown of a large network (power and or telecommunications) caused by a HEMP attack.
For illustrative purposes we show this as an evolutionary process although it could happen relatively rapidly.
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To other nodes
Link
Node
AA
BC
E
D
(a) No attack17
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To other nodes
Link
Node
AA
B
E
D
(b) Attack node C
Cluster
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To other nodes
Link
Node
AA
B
E
D
(c) Attack node C and link between nodes D and E
Cluster
Cluster
Cluster
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The following set of vu-graphs show the recovery/ breakdown of Probability-of-Call Blocking and electric power from of a theoretical model of combined power and telecommunication networks.
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POWER AND TELECOMMUNICATION INTERDEPENDENCY
POWERCONTROL
POWER TRANSMISSION
POWER DISTRIBUTION
SCADA
PTNPTNPDN
PDN
PDNPDN
ELECTRICALPOWER
GENERATION
Telecommunications Line
Power Line
FUEL SOURCE
PDN
PDN
PDN
Telecommunications Line
a b
c
d
e
f
a
b
c g
e
fd
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10-2 10-1 1 10 100 1000
protective system
response time after the onset of an event in seconds
FACTS
exciters and PSS
underfrequency load shredding
governor control
AGC
ULTC voltage control
operator –initiated/ manual control
market price update
1 cycle
Data Source: Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions (CERTS)
Grid of the Future White Paper on Real Time Security Monitoring and Control of Powers Systems
Electric Power Response Time After the Onset of an Event
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CONCLUSION
•Modeling the response of large networks that are heavily dependent on electromagnetic effects is still in the formative stage.
•Theoretical models can provide much insight into key factors that influence resilience to terrorist attacks
•Ultimately, detailed models supported by experimental data that predict component and subsystem behavior will be required.
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