Survey on Nuclear Weapons Policy...nuclear weapons--India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. Q3. Were you aware or not aware that the U.S.has agreed to actively work together with

Survey on Nuclear Weapons Policy Fielded by: Nielsen Scarborough Fielding Dates: January 7 – February 1, 2019

Total Sample: 2264 registered voters; Sample size: Sample A: 1133; Sample B: 1131 Margin of Error: Full Sample: +/- 2.1%; Sample A/B: +/- 2.9%

Today we are going to do a survey on what policies the U.S. should have in regard to nuclear weapons. This survey will take about 25 to 30 minutes to answer. Since you have taken a survey with us before, you know that we will make no effort to sell anything to you and your answers will remain confidential. If at any time you find that you do not want to answer a question feel free to skip it and move on to the next one. *Note: Text in brackets was not shown to the respondents. [SAMPLE DRAWN AND DIVIDED INTO 2 HALF SAMPLES A,B] [FULL SAMPLE] We will give you some background on nuclear weapons, introduce you to some current debates, and then ask for your opinion on a number of important questions. You do not need any background or previous experience in the subject. As you probably know, nuclear weapons are very destructive. The bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 would now be considered a relatively ‘small’ nuclear weapon. It immediately killed 66,000 people and about 74,000 died from injuries and radiation. Most nuclear bombs or warheads today are many times more powerful than that and could immediately kill 200,000 to 400,000 people, with nearly twice that many dying or getting sick from the radiation. [OVERVIEW OF US AND OTHER COUNTRIES ARSENALS] Here is some background on the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Just to clarify, when talking about nuclear weapons a nuclear bomb is generally called a “warhead.” The U.S. has about 4,000 nuclear warheads of various types. It spends about $11 billion a year to maintain its arsenal and developing new nuclear weapons. About 1,650 are large ‘strategic’ nuclear warheads (which means they can be used against targets many thousands of miles away, including in Russia or China) that are ready to be used, some within minutes or hours. Some are on missiles--on land and on submarines. Others are for bombers.

The U.S. also has about 150 smaller non-strategic warheads for U.S. warplanes in Europe, plus a few hundred more in the U.S. These can be substantially less powerful than the Hiroshima bomb, but some are more powerful. The United States also has about 2,200 additional nuclear weapons in storage. These could be deployed, but it would take time. Q1. Based on what you have heard so far, is the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal

1. much bigger than you expected 2. somewhat bigger than you expected 3. about the same as you expected 4. somewhat smaller than you expected 5. much smaller than you expected

Much bigger

Somewhat bigger

Total bigger

About the same

Total smaller

Somewhat smaller

Much smaller

Refused / Don't know

National 24.5% 22.0% 46.5% 40.9% 12.2% 9.8% 2.4% 0.3% GOP 14.5% 19.7% 34.2% 49.2% 16.5% 14.6% 1.9% 0.2% Dem. 32.0% 24.7% 56.7% 35.0% 8.0% 5.8% 2.2% 0.3% Indep. 27.8% 20.0% 47.8% 37.7% 13.8% 9.4% 4.4% 0.7% Cook's PVI (D-R) Very red 20.5% 21.9% 42.4% 44.1% 13.3% 11.3% 2.0% 0.1% Red 24.4% 20.6% 45.0% 41.8% 12.9% 9.7% 3.2% 0.3% Lean red 25.0% 26.4% 51.4% 37.1% 11.2% 9.1% 2.1% 0.4% Lean blue 23.1% 20.6% 43.7% 43.2% 12.3% 10.0% 2.3% 0.8% Blue 28.9% 22.4% 51.3% 36.6% 12.1% 10.0% 2.1% 0.0% Very blue 26.4% 19.8% 46.2% 43.2% 10.1% 7.3% 2.8% 0.5%

Now we are going to look at the nuclear arsenals of other countries. Russia has slightly more nuclear warheads in total (about 4,350) than the U.S. and slightly fewer strategic weapons (1,600) ready to be delivered across long distances (meaning they can reach the U.S.). The rest are also in storage. China has about 280 nuclear warheads, including about 70 on missiles that can reach the U.S. All 280 are in storage and would require some preparation before they could be used. North Korea is estimated to have 10-20 or more nuclear warheads. It has missiles of varying ranges, including a few capable of hitting most places in the continental United States. U.S. experts have not determined that North Korea has the ability to put nuclear warheads on those missiles.

France has 300 nuclear warheads, with about 80 ready to be launched on short notice. The United Kingdom has 215 warheads with 40 ready to be launched on short notice. The warheads of India (130-140), Pakistan (140-150) and Israel (about 80) are all in storage and would require some preparation before they could be used.

Q2. So, looking at all of the nuclear weapons in the world, are they:

1. much more than you expected 2. somewhat more than you expected 3. about the same as you expected 4. somewhat fewer than you expected 5. much fewer than you expected

Much more

Somewhat more

Total more

About the same

Total fewer

Somewhat fewer

Much fewer

Refused / Don't know

National 28.4% 27.4% 55.8% 29.0% 15.0% 12.2% 2.8% 0.2% GOP 22.9% 26.9% 49.8% 34.7% 15.4% 14.0% 1.4% 0.3% Dem. 32.3% 28.6% 60.9% 24.6% 14.2% 10.3% 3.9% 0.3% Indep. 30.7% 25.3% 56.0% 27.7% 16.3% 13.0% 3.3% 0.0% Cook's PVI (D-R) Very red 24.6% 31.7% 56.3% 31.3% 12.3% 11.1% 1.2% 0.1% Red 27.4% 26.3% 53.7% 30.4% 15.6% 13.5% 2.1% 0.3% Lean red 31.5% 29.7% 61.2% 22.6% 16.1% 14.1% 2.0% 0.2% Lean blue 27.0% 24.6% 51.6% 32.9% 14.9% 13.0% 1.9% 0.5% Blue 31.1% 26.4% 57.5% 25.5% 17.0% 10.4% 6.6% 0.0% Very blue 29.7% 25.1% 54.8% 30.6% 14.4% 10.5% 3.9% 0.3%

As you may know, if the U.S. and Russia were to have a major nuclear war, hundreds of nuclear weapons would reach the United States and millions of people would be killed. Similarly, hundreds of U.S. weapons would reach Russia and millions would die there. This is true regardless of which side attacks first. This state, in which both the U.S. and Russia are vulnerable to a massive attack, has been in place since the 1950s. Since then, the U.S. has developed more accurate weapons that could take out some Russian weapons before they were launched. It has also developed some defensive capacity to destroy a small number of missiles after they were launched, although Russia has developed many ways to counter these missile defenses and make them ineffective. Thus, the U.S. continues to be vulnerable to a devastating nuclear strike by Russia, just as Russia continues to be vulnerable to a devastating nuclear strike by the U.S. Countries with smaller nuclear arsenals also have the potential to inflict massive damage on each other and on other countries as even one nuclear weapon can kill hundreds of thousands of people. Prompted by concerns about the destructive potential of nuclear war, the U.S. and other countries have developed a number of treaties to limit and reduce nuclear weapons and that set the objective of eliminating them. [Arms Control Treaties] [NPT] One of these agreements is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was established in 1970. It now includes nearly every country in the world. At the time of signing, the only countries that had nuclear weapons were the U.S., the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China. All of the signing countries that did not have nuclear weapons promised not to develop them. They also agreed to allow international monitoring of their civilian nuclear energy programs to ensure they were not secretly developing nuclear weapons. The signing countries that had nuclear weapons (including the U.S.) agreed not to help any other country get nuclear weapons

and to pursue negotiations to stop the arms race and reduce the number of nuclear weapons. All countries signing agreed to work toward complete disarmament, under strict international control. Four countries have not signed the agreement or have withdrawn from it and have produced nuclear weapons--India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. Q3. Were you aware or not aware that the U.S. has agreed to actively work together with other nuclear powers to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons?

Aware Not aware Ref/DK National 82.2% 17.6% 0.2% GOP 86.3% 13.5% 0.2% Dem. 80.7% 19.2% 0.2% Indep. 76.5% 23.1% 0.4% Cook's PVI (D-R) Very red 85.3% 14.7% 0.0% Red 86.3% 13.7% 0.0% Lean red 79.5% 19.9% 0.6% Lean blue 83.1% 16.1% 0.8% Blue 80.0% 20.0% 0.0% Very blue 77.7% 22.3% 0.0%

[US Russian Treaties] As you may know, the U.S. and Russia (previously the Soviet Union) have entered into a number of treaties that have substantially reduced the number of nuclear warheads on each side. Extensive inspection systems were put in place to confirm that both sides abide by the agreements. There is some debate about these U.S.-Russian arms control treaties. Here is an argument in favor of U.S.-Russian arms control treaties: Q4. Before they had arms control treaties, the U.S. and Russia (then the Soviet Union) built tens of thousands of nuclear weapons with the goal of trying to achieve a superior position. This raised tensions, increased the risk of nuclear war, and multiplied the amount of destruction that could occur if a nuclear war broke out. No matter how many weapons the U.S. had, the Soviet Union did whatever it needed to do to make sure that it could still destroy the U.S. in an all-out war. Since entering into arms control agreements, the U.S. and Russia have dismantled thousands of nuclear weapons so that their arsenals are a fraction of what they were before and have made it much harder for either side to think that it might be able to win a nuclear war. By having extensive inspection systems, both sides understand more clearly what weapons the other side has, so there is less suspicion. Both sides gain assurance that the other side cannot achieve a decisive advantage.

How convincing or unconvincing do you find this argument?

Very

convincing Somewhat convincing

Total convincing

Somewhat unconvincing

Very unconvincing

Total unconvincing Ref/DK

National 16.3% 53.1% 69.4% 24.3% 5.5% 29.8% 0.8% GOP 9.0% 57.6% 66.6% 28.0% 4.7% 32.7% 0.7% Dem. 24.3% 50.0% 74.3% 18.9% 6.1% 25.0% 0.7% Indep. 10.7% 51.2% 61.9% 30.8% 6.2% 37.0% 1.2% Cook's PVI (D-R) Very red 8.5% 58.0% 66.5% 27.2% 5.7% 32.9% 0.6% Red 16.8% 54.0% 70.8% 23.4% 5.2% 28.6% 0.6% Lean red 17.3% 52.6% 69.9% 25.7% 4.2% 29.9% 0.3% Lean blue 12.8% 53.3% 66.1% 26.5% 5.8% 32.3% 1.6% Blue 21.0% 51.7% 72.7% 19.9% 5.6% 25.5% 1.7% Very blue 22.8% 48.0% 70.8% 22.5% 6.7% 29.2% 0.0%

Here is an argument against such U.S.-Russian arms control treaties: Q5. The problem with arms control treaties is that they are based on the idea that we should accept that we are vulnerable to a devastating nuclear attack. But we should not accept it. We should not be limited by arms control treaties. They tie our hands and prevent us from using our technological advantages to develop better offensive and defensive weapons that may be able to reduce and ultimately eliminate this vulnerability. Even if the U.S. does not gain complete invulnerability, having a superior arsenal would put us in a better position to deter Russian aggression. It puts us in a stronger position so that in any confrontation with Russia they would be more likely to feel that they have to back down. Arms control treaties prevent us from gaining that superior arsenal. How convincing or unconvincing do you find this argument?

Very


Total convincing


Very unconvincing



Q6. So do you approve or disapprove of the U.S. continuing to have arms control treaties with Russia?

Approve Disapprove Ref/DK National 82.8% 16.0% 1.1% GOP 84.3% 14.9% 0.9% Dem. 82.6% 16.3% 1.2% Indep. 80.1% 18.2% 1.7% Cook's PVI (D-R) Very red 84.7% 14.3% 1.0% Red 84.5% 14.2% 1.3% Lean red 83.2% 16.1% 0.7% Lean blue 85.9% 13.8% 0.3% Blue 82.1% 17.4% 0.5% Very blue 77.5% 19.3% 3.2%

While existing arms control agreements do impose some limits, there is still the question of what kind of nuclear arsenal the U.S. should have. We are going to tell you about several different requirements that some people think U.S. nuclear forces should meet. Some of these objectives could be met with fewer nuclear weapons than we currently have. Pursuing others might involve having a larger number or greater variety of more technologically advanced weapons. [Minimum Retaliatory Capability] Some people say that the U.S. should have an arsenal that meets the following minimum requirement: As long as other countries have nuclear weapons, the U.S. must have, at a minimum, enough nuclear weapons that could not be destroyed by an all-out surprise nuclear attack, so that the U.S. could always retaliate with a major nuclear strike. This potential retaliatory strike needs to be destructive enough that no country could think that there would be any advantage in attacking the U.S. with nuclear weapons. Here is an argument in favor of the U.S. having a nuclear arsenal that meets this minimum requirement: Q7. As long as there are countries in the world with nuclear weapons, the U.S. government needs to make sure that no country can possibly think that it makes sense to attack the U.S. with nuclear weapons. That means that, even after suffering an all-out nuclear attack, the U.S. would have to have enough nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the attacker. If a potential attacker knows the U.S. response would be so destructive it would outweigh anything the attacker might hope to gain, then it won’t attack in the first place. The U.S. government has a responsibility to its people to deter a nuclear attack by always having this ability to retaliate.

Very


Total convincing


Very unconvincing



Here is a counter argument: Q8. Using nuclear weapons is both immoral and impractical. They would kill hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians, most of whom would have had nothing to do with the decision to go to war. Even many military experts agree that nuclear weapons are simply unusable because they are too destructive and too likely to lead to all-out escalation. If the U.S. is unable to inflict massive destruction this will not necessarily lead to the U.S. being attacked. Most countries in the world do not have nuclear weapons and yet they are not being attacked or threatened with a nuclear attack. Furthermore, if America were attacked, it can respond with its enormous arsenal of conventional (non-nuclear) military forces which is the most powerful in the world.

Very


Total convincing


Very unconvincing



So once again, here is the proposed minimum requirement:

As long as other countries have nuclear weapons, the U.S. must have, at a minimum, enough nuclear weapons that could not be destroyed by an all-out surprise nuclear attack, so that the U.S. could always retaliate with a major nuclear strike. This potential retaliatory

strike needs to be destructive enough that no country could think that there would be any advantage in attacking the U.S. with nuclear weapons.

Q9. Do you favor or oppose maintaining a U.S. arsenal that meets this minimum requirement for the U.S. nuclear arsenal?

Favor Oppose Ref/DK National 84.9% 14.1% 0.9% GOP 94.2% 5.2% 0.6% Dem. 78.8% 20.1% 1.1% Indep. 79.8% 18.9% 1.3% Cook's PVI (D-R) Very red 90.6% 7.9% 1.5% Red 86.2% 13.2% 0.6% Lean red 84.9% 14.0% 1.1% Lean blue 85.0% 14.5% 0.5% Blue 80.1% 19.6% 0.3% Very blue 82.7% 15.6% 1.7%

Q10. How many nuclear weapons do you think the U.S. needs to have that would survive an all-out nuclear attack and could then be used for retaliation?

Median Ref/DK National 1000 18.2% GOP 3000 16.8% Dem. 1000 18.2% Indep. 1000 21.6% Cook's PVI (D-R) Very red 2500 18.2% Red 1000 18.3% Lean red 1500 20.3% Lean blue 2000 19.3% Blue 1000 17.9% Very blue 1000 16.0%

[Low yield warheads] Some people think that fulfilling this minimum requirement of having a substantial number of nuclear weapons that would survive an all-out nuclear attack is adequate for the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Others think that there are additional requirements that the U.S. needs to meet and that necessitate having more nuclear weapons than this minimum. One such additional requirement is based on the possibility that an enemy might make a limited first strike attack against the U.S. or an ally, using only a specific type of nuclear

weapon. The requirement is that the U.S. must be able to retaliate with a nuclear strike using only weapons that are similar to the ones used by the enemy in terms of their explosive power, their speed, and how close they are to the area of conflict. This means that the U.S. needs different types of weapons and enough of each type to conduct a significant nuclear strike that could cause more damage than the initial attack. This argument is coming up in a current debate about whether the U.S. needs to respond to new types of Russian nuclear weapons by having something similar. The focus of this concern is that the Russians have been developing warheads with relatively low explosive power—about half the size of the Hiroshima bomb—that they could put on missiles as well as other means of delivery. If Russia were to use such a weapon against a U.S. ally close to Russia, the U.S. already has the ability to respond with warheads that have similarly low explosive power. But right now the U.S. can only deliver them by bombers, and it would take up to a few hours for the bombers to reach their targets. Some people say that this is a problem and the U.S. should put nuclear warheads with low explosive power on submarine missiles that travel more quickly. Here is an argument in favor of putting nuclear warheads with relatively low explosive power on missiles on submarines: Q11. Russia has been developing small nuclear warheads that can be delivered with missiles or other means. This suggests that they believe they can use these nuclear weapons to their advantage in a conflict involving a nearby country or a European country that is a U.S. NATO ally. They might mistakenly believe that they could use such a nuclear weapon and the U.S. would feel that it is in a weaker position because it could not retaliate in kind and, thus, had better not retaliate. The U.S. would be able to retaliate with small nuclear warheads that can be delivered by bombers, but the bombers would take a few hours to reach their targets, while the ones on Russian missiles will get there in a matter of minutes. Also bombers, being slower, are more likely to get hit by Russian air defenses. Of course, the U.S. has more powerful nuclear warheads on submarines that it could deliver quickly, but the Russians might assume that the U.S. would not want to use them, for fear that the Russians would retaliate with its more powerful weapons--maybe even against the U.S. homeland. Therefore, we must be able to quickly deliver a warhead similar in power to theirs. The best way to do that is to put such a warhead on missiles carried by a U.S. submarine.

Very


Total convincing


Very unconvincing



Here is a counter argument: Q12. It makes no sense that the Russians would think that they could launch a nuclear attack with a small nuclear warhead and that the U.S. would back down and not retaliate because it would take longer for its bombers to arrive at the target. Shortening delivery time is not going to change Russian thinking--the bomb would still be plenty destructive when it gets there. Even if Russian air defense hit some of the bombers, there would be so many that some would get through, especially the hard-to-detect Stealth bombers. This kind of rationale for building nuclear weapons is just another excuse for the Pentagon and the weapons industries to keep building more weapons. Furthermore, developing these new, faster small weapons for submarines may create the impression to the Russians that the U.S. is trying to improve its ability to use nuclear weapons against Russia for a limited strike. This would be destabilizing, as it is likely to lead Russia to pursue countermeasures.

Very


Total convincing


Very unconvincing



Here is another argument in favor of putting nuclear weapons with relatively low explosive power on missiles on submarines:

Q13. If our European allies see Russia building these relatively low explosive-power warheads that could be used against them and the U.S. does not respond by having a corresponding weapon, our allies may think that the U.S. commitment to defend Europe is wavering. This could weaken the alliance and make European countries start to be more accommodating to Russia. This would not be in the U.S. interest.

Very


Total convincing


Very unconvincing



Here is a counter-argument: Q14. Having more weapons is not the right way to assure our allies that the U.S. nuclear deterrent will keep them safe. The U.S. nuclear arsenal already has many kinds of weapons and they are overwhelming and effective. The best way to assure our allies is to maintain close relations and reaffirm our commitment to defend them. While some military officials in a few allied countries might want such weapons, many political leaders and citizens see building such weapons as heightening tensions and increasing the risks of nuclear war in their region.

Very


Total convincing


Very unconvincing



Q15. So, having considered these arguments, do you think the U.S. should or should not put nuclear warheads with relatively low explosive power on missiles on submarines?

Should Should not Ref/DK National 65.2% 33.5% 1.2% GOP 76.8% 21.8% 1.4% Dem. 55.9% 43.4% 0.8% Indep. 64.1% 33.7% 2.3% Cook's PVI (D-R) Very red 70.8% 27.7% 1.5% Red 66.1% 33.3% 0.6% Lean red 66.8% 30.9% 2.3% Lean blue 67.0% 31.3% 1.7% Blue 58.2% 41.8% 0.0% Very blue 61.4% 37.4% 1.2%

Q16. Regardless of whether you think the U.S. needs to develop this particular weapon, as a general principle do you think that: 1. If the U.S. has a substantial number of nuclear weapons that would survive an all-out

surprise nuclear attack against the U.S., and could then be used to retaliate with a major nuclear strike, that is enough.

2. The U.S. needs more than this ability to retaliate with a major nuclear strike. It also needs to be able to retaliate against a major attack using only a type of weapon similar to the type the enemy used, in terms of their explosive power, their speed, and how close they are to the area of conflict.

Option 1 Option 2 DK/Ref National 49.1% 43.0% 7.9% GOP 42.8% 51.3% 5.9% Dem. 56.2% 35.0% 8.8% Indep. 43.6% 45.8% 10.6% Cook's PVI (D-R) Very red 43.5% 47.5% 9.0% Red 51.1% 41.0% 7.9% Lean red 48.2% 45.1% 6.7% Lean blue 53.7% 39.9% 6.4% Blue 45.2% 43.3% 11.5% Very blue 52.1% 40.8% 7.2%

[HALF SAMPLE A] [First Use] All of the options that we have been considering so far have been for how the U.S. should deter a nuclear attack or respond with nuclear weapons to a nuclear attack. We will now consider the question of what the U.S. stance should be on using nuclear weapons in response to a non-nuclear attack--in other words, whether the U.S. should ever use nuclear weapons first. Right now, the United States promises never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against countries that do not have nuclear weapons and have allowed international inspectors to verify that they are not trying to build them. But, for all other cases, the U.S. has been publicly ambiguous about whether it might use nuclear weapons first and under what conditions. U.S. officials, under some administrations, have commented that the United States would consider responding with nuclear weapons to a major non-nuclear attack on an ally (such as a Russian invasion of a NATO country), or one involving biological or chemical weapons. But this has not been a formal U.S. policy and such statements have varied with different administrations. There are two opposing proposals for changing the position of ambiguity on whether the U.S. might use nuclear weapons first, in response to a non-nuclear attack. These are: Proposal 1: The U.S. should explicitly declare it would consider using nuclear weapons first and state what kinds of non-nuclear attacks would prompt the U.S. to consider doing so. Proposal 2: The U.S. should explicitly declare it will never use nuclear weapons first. Here is an argument in favor of declaring that the U.S. will consider using nuclear weapons first in response to a number of specific types of non-nuclear attacks: Q17. There are many important threats against the U.S. vital interests over and above the threat of a nuclear attack. To protect against those threats we should make it clear and unambiguous that the use of nuclear weapons is on the table. We must ensure that an adversary knows that the U.S. is ready to use its most powerful weapons in retaliation for a major attack—including a non-nuclear one—against our most important assets. This will convince them that they cannot get away with attacking our allies, our civilians, our infrastructure, our nuclear weapons or our systems for controlling them. They will know that the consequences would be so devastating that they will not consider making such attacks in the first place.

Very


Total convincing


Very unconvincing



Here is a counter-argument: Q18. It is easy to say that we will deter bad behavior with the explicit threat of nuclear weapons. But sometimes deterrence fails. What then? Would we really want to use nuclear weapons in response to a non-nuclear attack? We must never forget how significant it would be to cross the nuclear threshold for the first time since Hiroshima and Nagasaki 73 years ago. If we were to use a nuclear weapon first, there would be a serious likelihood that a nuclear weapon would be used in response which would kill many thousands of Americans. Just declaring that we will consider using nuclear weapons first could make other countries feel freer to use nuclear weapons and make countries without nuclear weapons feel more compelled to get them. In response to a non-nuclear attack, the U.S. has many powerful non-nuclear forces that can inflict enough damage to deter an adversary.

Very


Total convincing


Very unconvincing



Here is an argument in favor of the U.S. declaring that it will never use nuclear weapons first: Q19. While it can be justified to use nuclear threats to deter a country from attacking us or our allies with nuclear weapons, there is no way to justify using nuclear weapons for other purposes. Even if the United States were to only use a small nuclear weapon against a purely military target, many thousands of civilians could still be killed. The chances are very high it would escalate to a major nuclear war that could kill many millions. If countries believe the U.S. might use nuclear weapons first, countries with small nuclear arsenals would be more motivated to expand their arsenal to make sure the U.S. does not push them around with nuclear threats. It sends a signal to the world that the use of nuclear weapons is an ordinary military option, which it is not. Besides, the U.S. has tremendous non-nuclear military power that it can always use. The U.S. should declare unambiguously that it will never use nuclear weapons first.

Here is a counter argument: Q20. Declaring unambiguously that the U.S. would never use nuclear weapons first would effectively tie one of our arms behind our back. There are many important threats that the U.S. is seeking to deter other than a nuclear attack--such as a large-scale non-nuclear attack against our allies, or the use of chemical or biological weapons. Letting our enemies think we might use nuclear weapons in response to those kinds of attacks makes them nervous and might help deter them. It is also important for our allies to believe that, in an extreme case, we might be ready to use nuclear weapons to protect them from a non-nuclear attack. If it becomes clear that that will not happen, they may decide that they need nuclear weapons too. That would not be in our interest.

Very


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Very unconvincing



Very


Total convincing


Very unconvincing



Q21. So now, what do you think the U.S. stance should be on using nuclear weapons first in response to a NON-NUCLEAR attack? 1. Explicitly declare that the U.S. would consider using nuclear weapons first and state what

kinds of non-nuclear attacks would prompt the U.S. to consider doing so. 2. Continue to be ambiguous, by not stating whether the U.S. would consider using nuclear

weapons first 3. Explicitly declare that the U.S. will never use nuclear weapons first

Explicitly declare that the U.S. would consider using nuclear weapons first and state what kinds of non-nuclear

attacks would prompt the U.S. to consider doing so.

Continue to be ambiguous, by not

stating whether the U.S. would consider using nuclear weapons first

Explicitly declare that the U.S. will

never use nuclear weapons first Ref/DK

National 17.9% 56.9% 21.6% 3.6% GOP 19.5% 63.9% 13.1% 3.5% Dem. 15.8% 50.6% 30.0% 3.6% Indep. 20.2% 56.7% 18.9% 4.2% Cook's PVI (D-R) Very red 23.1% 61.3% 15.4% 0.3% Red 17.8% 55.6% 20.2% 6.4% Lean red 18.6% 53.3% 25.0% 3.1% Lean blue 21.6% 51.9% 21.5% 5.0% Blue 10.3% 63.6% 23.8% 2.3% Very blue 15.6% 56.0% 24.0% 4.4%

[Question 22a-22f Were Only Presented To Those Who Said “Explicitly Declare…” On Q21 As Well As Those Who Skipped the Question] Here are some types of non-nuclear attacks. Please select whether you think the U.S. should declare that it would consider using nuclear weapons first in response to: Q22a. A major non-nuclear attack on the military forces of the United States or other countries that are our partners or allies


Q22b. A major attack using chemical or biological weapons on the U.S. or other countries that are our partners or allies


Q22c. A major non-nuclear attack on civilians in the U.S. or other countries that are our partners or allies


Q22d. Non-nuclear attacks on infrastructure in the U.S. or other countries that are our partners or allies


Q22e. Non-nuclear attacks on the nuclear forces of the U.S. or our allies


Q22f. Non-nuclear attacks on the systems that provide warning about attacks on the U.S. or our allies and assessments of the damage caused


[Limiting Presidential First Use] Here is a related proposal that has been put forward as a bill in Congress. As you may know, only the President has the authority to order the launch of nuclear weapons and he is not required to consult with or get approval from Congress. The proposed bill would change that. The President would still have the authority to use nuclear weapons in response to the launch of a nuclear strike against the U.S. or an ally. But, to use nuclear weapons first, the President would first have to consult Congress and Congress would have to issue a declaration of war on the country the U.S. would be attacking with nuclear weapons. Here is an argument in favor of this proposal: Q23. The choice to start a nuclear war is the most significant decision any president can make. No individual, particularly one who would likely be under tremendous stress, should be able to make this decision alone, except in the event of a nuclear attack on the country, when particularly swift decision-making might be necessary. The Founders entrusted the decision to go to war to Congress, not to the president acting alone. Initiating nuclear hostilities is certainly an act of war and should require Congressional consent.

Very


Total convincing


Very unconvincing



Here is an argument against this proposal: Q24. The Constitution states that the President is the Commander in Chief and he clearly has the authority to use military force to defend the nation from attack. The last time Congress formally declared war was during World War II. If Congress imposes this requirement on the President, that would make it extremely hard to get the necessary approval, so potential adversaries might no longer believe that the United States would use nuclear weapons in response to a major non-nuclear attack. That could weaken deterrence and be very dangerous.

Very


Total convincing


Very unconvincing



Q25. So in conclusion, do you think Congress should or should not pass a law that says: • the President would still have the sole authority to order the use of nuclear weapons in

response to a nuclear attack.

• to use nuclear weapons first, the President would first have to consult Congress and Congress would have to issue a declaration of war on the country to be attacked with nuclear weapons.


[HALF SAMPLE B] [INF Treaty] We are now going to explore some debates surrounding arms control treaties that limit the number and types of nuclear weapons that countries can have. Currently, there is a debate about the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty, also known as the INF treaty. This treaty was signed by former President Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987. It prohibits the U.S. and Russia (then the Soviet Union) from having land-based missiles with flight ranges between 310 to 3,420 miles. It was the first treaty to ban a whole class of weapons and included unprecedented on-site inspections. The U.S. has accused Russia of violating the treaty, but Russia has denied it. Similarly, Russia has accused the U.S. of violating the treaty, but the U.S. has also denied it. There is a debate now about whether the United States should withdraw from the treaty in response to what it sees as Russian violations. If the U.S. were to formally withdraw, it must make an announcement and then there is a six month period before it becomes final. Here is an argument in favor of the U.S. initiating the process of withdrawing from the INF Treaty: Q26. Russia has violated the INF treaty for years. In dialog with the Russians about this problem—over two presidential administrations--the Russians have refused to admit their violations. We cannot let Russia cheat without consequences. We cannot let them have this new type of weapon while we are constrained. It is time for the U.S. to take strong action and start the process of withdrawing from the Treaty. During the six months that the process takes, the Russians might finally be willing to admit that they’ve cheated and make the necessary changes. If not, we need to follow through and withdraw. After all, the Treaty has not been very good for the U.S., since it has restrained us from building missiles of the same range that we could deploy in Asia, while China has been free to develop them and has in fact been building a lot of them. So, freeing the U.S. up to develop intermediate range forces may have advantages for us.

Total

convincing Very

Convincing Somewhat Convincing

Somewhat Unconvincing

Strongly Unconvincing

Total Unconvincing Ref. / Dk

National 64.6% 19.6% 45.0% 25.5% 8.8% 34.3% 1.2% GOP 79.9% 28.6% 51.3% 15.4% 4.0% 19.4% 0.7% Dems 52.8% 14.3% 38.5% 32.6% 13.9% 46.5% 0.8% Indep. 62.7% 13.7% 49.0% 28.5% 5.0% 33.5% 3.8% Cook's PVI (D-R) Very red 23.4% 50.6% 74.0% 19.6% 4.7% 24.3% 1.8% Red 17.7% 50.5% 68.2% 19.6% 11.8% 31.4% 0.4% Lean red 16.1% 45.6% 61.7% 33.0% 4.2% 37.2% 1.1% Lean blue 23.0% 39.7% 62.7% 25.6% 10.7% 36.3% 1.1% Blue 20.7% 43.1% 63.8% 25.6% 7.8% 33.4% 2.8% Very blue 18.5% 39.6% 58.1% 28.7% 12.7% 41.4% 0.5%

Here is a counter argument: Q27. The INF Treaty has played a very important role in European security for more than thirty years. These weapons were especially dangerous because they were very accurate and powerful, and could destroy leadership and military targets in minutes. Our NATO allies still support the agreement and do not want the United States to make it legal again for Russia to deploy weapons that could destroy European capitals with almost no warning. We should make a more concerted effort to negotiate with the Russians. There are viable ways to address both sides concerns. Russia has said that it will work with the United States to do this. Being free to put new intermediate range land-based missiles in Asia would not provide an important benefit. We have plenty of other nuclear and non-nuclear weapons there that can do what we need. Finally, most of our European and Asian allies do not want us to put intermediate-range missiles on their territory, so it is not clear that we would gain anything from withdrawing from the INF Treaty.

Total

convincing Very

Convincing Somewhat Convincing

Somewhat Unconvincing

Strongly Unconvincing

Total Unconvincing Ref. / Dk

National 67.8% 21.3% 46.5% 25.3% 6.3% 31.6% 0.6% GOP 58.3% 13.8% 44.5% 31.4% 9.8% 41.2% 0.6% Dems 77.2% 30.2% 47.0% 19.0% 3.5% 22.5% 0.3% Indep. 62.9% 12.8% 50.1% 29.3% 6.6% 35.9% 1.2% Cook's PVI (D-R) Very red 15.0% 41.1% 56.1% 36.2% 5.9% 42.1% 1.7% Red 23.3% 44.4% 67.7% 27.2% 4.7% 31.9% 0.4% Lean red 18.1% 55.5% 73.6% 20.2% 5.4% 25.6% 0.8% Lean blue 23.0% 42.0% 65.0% 25.8% 8.7% 34.5% 0.4% Blue 28.0% 46.4% 74.4% 16.9% 8.8% 25.7% 0.0% Very blue 21.1% 48.8% 69.9% 25.4% 4.7% 30.1% 0.0%

Q28. So now, do you think the U.S. should: 1. start the six month process of withdrawing from the INF Treaty, and if the Russians do not make the

changes the U.S. seeks, withdraw from the Treaty. 2. stay within the INF Treaty and redouble efforts to work with the Russians to address concerns of

both sides.

1. start the six-month process of withdrawing from the INF Treaty, and if the Russians do not

make the changes the U.S. seeks, withdraw from the Treaty.

2. stay within the INF Treaty and redouble efforts to work with the Russians to address

concerns of both sides. Ref/Dk National 30.0% 66.4% 3.6% GOP 42.8% 54.7% 2.5% Dems 19.5% 76.9% 3.7% Indep. 30.9% 63.2% 6.0% Cook's PVI (D-R) Very red 39.1% 58.6% 2.3% Red 25.3% 69.7% 5.0% Lean red 28.1% 68.3% 3.6% Lean blue 33.6% 63.2% 3.2% Blue 29.1% 66.9% 4.1% Very blue 26.7% 70.7% 2.6%

[Extending New START] Another debate is over whether the U.S. and Russia should extend an arms control agreement called the New START Treaty. It was signed in 2010 and approved by the U.S. Senate by a vote of 71-26. The Treaty requires each side to limit its deployed strategic nuclear warheads (the kind that can reach the other country) on land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles and long range bombers to equal levels. Extensive verification systems were put in place. There are now 18 on-site inspections per side each year, plus various forms of information sharing about each side’s arsenal. The New START Treaty expires in 2021, but can be extended for five years if both sides agree. Here is an argument in favor of the U.S. agreeing to extend the New START Treaty: Q29. If New START expires without a replacement, there would be no limits on U.S. and Russian long-range nuclear weapons for the first time since 1972. Extending New START is important for U.S. national security because it keeps the number of Russian nuclear weapons that could reach the United States much lower than it was during the Cold War. The inspections and information sharing are very valuable and reassuring for both sides, building confidence and reducing misperceptions. Having limits that will last for many years also provides predictability and stability. History has shown that without legally binding limits, both sides will probably build more nuclear weapons—it is always very hard to resist the pressures to do so—leading to a new arms race.

Very


Total convincing


Very unconvincing



Here is a counter argument: Q30. We should let New START expire. Russia has been violating another arms control treaty on intermediate range weapons, so why should we reward them by extending New START? Moreover, the United States needs the freedom to expand its arsenal of long-range nuclear weapons if it perceives a new or heightened threat in the future. It’s not that we need to develop any more long-range nuclear weapons right now—in fact our political and military leaders say we have enough for now. But, the world has become a more dangerous place in recent years, so that could change. We need to keep our options open. As for the benefits of information sharing, we can continue to do that on a voluntary and informal basis without having to tie our hands with restrictions on our nuclear arsenal.

Very


Total convincing


Very unconvincing



Q31. So now, do you favor or oppose the U.S. agreeing to extend the New START Treaty that limits U.S. and Russian strategic weapons and requires extensive inspections and information sharing?

Favor Oppose Ref/DK

National 82.0% 16.1% 1.9% GOP 76.8% 20.6% 2.5% Dem. 88.9% 9.8% 1.3% Indep. 73.8% 23.9% 2.3% Cook's PVI (D-R) Very red 76.1% 22.1% 1.8% Red 77.9% 20.5% 1.6% Lean red 80.8% 14.8% 4.5% Lean blue 85.1% 13.1% 1.8% Blue 86.5% 13.2% 0.3% Very blue 87.9% 10.5% 1.7%

[HALF SAMPLE A] [ICBMs] As discussed above, the U.S. has strategic weapons—that can reach Russia or China—on submarines, bombers, and land-based missiles. Currently, there is a debate is about what the U.S. should do with its large land-based strategic missiles. The U.S. has about 400 of them that are active and ready to be used. All of them are aging and are scheduled to be replaced by 2030. However, some people say that they should not be replaced, but phased out instead. Here is an argument for phasing out U.S. land-based ballistic missiles: Q32. When land-based missiles were first developed they were more accurate than submarine-based missiles. But now submarine-based ones are just as accurate and we have a lot of warheads—945—on these missiles, and they are not vulnerable to attack. We also have lots of nuclear bombers. There are several good reasons for phasing out the land-based missiles. First, they can be easily destroyed by potential enemies because they can’t be hidden. Second, because they are so vulnerable there is the danger U.S. decision makers might think they need to launch them first in a crisis before they are destroyed. Third, U.S. decision makers might launch them in response to a false alarm saying they are under attack—such false alarms have happened more than once—mistakenly initiating a nuclear war. Fourth, according to the Congressional Budget Office, if the U.S. were to phase out these weapons it could save $120-140 billion. Finally, even without these land-based missiles the U.S. would still have more than a thousand strategic weapons on submarines and bombers, which are not vulnerable to a surprise attack.

Very


Total convincing


Very unconvincing



Here is a counter argument: Q33. For many decades now the U.S. has had three different means of delivering strategic nuclear weapons. This redundancy makes it clearer to any enemy that the U.S. will always be able retaliate with overwhelming destructive power. While submarines are not vulnerable now, it is possible that an adversary might achieve a technical breakthrough and be able to attack them. Removing one of the three legs of this triad would send a signal of weakness and a lack of determination. In a conflict, it would take a lot of Russian weapons to destroy U.S. land-based missiles, so if we phase them out this will free up some of the Russian weapons. Simply put, the more options that we have in our nuclear arsenal the better. The triad of land-based missiles, submarine-based missiles, and bombers has served us well and we should not take the risky course of abandoning a key part of it.

Very


Total convincing


Very unconvincing



Another debate is about whether, if the U.S. phases out its land based missiles, it should increase the number of warheads on its submarines and bombers. Here is an argument in favor of increasing the number of warheads on submarines and bombers: Q34. If we are going to phase out the land-based missiles, we should at least make sure that we keep the same number of warheads. Lowering the total number of warheads from 1,550 to 1,150 would be a serious drop. The Russians could still have 1,550 warheads so they might think they would have an advantage.

Very


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Very unconvincing



Here is a counterargument: Q35. Having 1,150 warheads would be more than plenty for assuring that we can deter any potential enemy from attacking us. Building additional warheads for submarines and bombers would be expensive and unnecessary.

Very


Total convincing


Very unconvincing



Q36. So now, do you think the U.S. should: 1. replace its land-based missiles by building new land-based missiles 2. phase out its land-based missiles and increase the number of warheads on submarines and

bombers to 1,550 (savings over replacing them would be about $120 billion) 3. phase out its land-based missiles while keeping 1,150 warheads on its submarines and

bombers (savings over replacing them would be about $140 billion)

1. replace its land-based missiles by

building new land-based

missiles

2. phase out its land-based missiles and increase the number of warheads on submarines and bombers to 1,550 (savings over replacing them would be about

$120 billion)

3. phase out its land-based missiles while keeping 1,150 warheads on its submarines and bombers (savings over

replacing them would be about $140 billion) Ref/Dk

National 31.9% 27.7% 32.9% 7.4% GOP 40.9% 32.9% 20.4% 5.7% Dem. 24.0% 26.3% 42.3% 7.5% Indep. 31.5% 18.3% 38.5% 11.7% Cook's PVI (D-R) Very red 37.0% 28.4% 29.7% 4.9% Red 34.7% 29.6% 28.5% 7.2% Lean red 33.1% 25.4% 32.7% 8.8% Lean blue 33.0% 30.1% 27.2% 9.7% Blue 26.3% 25.3% 40.8% 7.6% Very blue 24.3% 28.3% 40.3% 7.0% [HALF SAMPLE B] [CTBT] The last topic we will explore is about testing nuclear weapons. Testing means to actually explode a nuclear weapon to make sure it works as intended. Here is some background. Between 1942 and the mid-1990s, about two thousand nuclear tests were conducted across the world, mostly by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In the early 1990s, the United States decided that it did not need to develop any more kinds of nuclear weapons, and that its priority should be convincing other countries not to test in order to acquire nuclear weapons or pursue more advanced nuclear weapons than they already had. The U.S. adopted a moratorium on testing nuclear weapons. In the mid-1990s, most of the countries in the world signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which completely banned all nuclear tests. Preventing testing makes it very hard for countries to develop new warheads.

A global monitoring system was put in place to watch for evidence of nuclear explosions and report to the global community. Three countries with nuclear weapons--India, Pakistan, and Israel--did not sign it and later North Korea withdrew. The U.S. signed the Treaty, but the Senate voted against ratifying it. A few other countries did not ratify it as well. So, the Treaty is not officially in force. But the global monitoring system remained in place. More significantly, since the late 1990s all countries but one have abided by a moratorium on testing, meaning they have all stopped testing nuclear weapons for the last two decades. The one exception is North Korea, which has conducted several tests recently. The U.S. has continued to abide by the moratorium, though it has said that it would reserve the right to resume testing if it is needed to assure the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons. To date, U.S. officials have assessed that there is no need for testing for those purposes. The current administration has said that it will continue to abide by the moratorium, though it reserves the right to resume testing if it is deemed necessary to ensure the effectiveness as well the safety of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Q37. Do you approve or disapprove of the U.S. continuing to abide by the moratorium on nuclear testing?

Approve Disapprove Ref/DK National 86.8% 12.1% 1.1% GOP 85.1% 14.3% 0.6% Dem. 89.6% 9.4% 1.0% Indep. 82.8% 14.6% 2.7% Cook's PVI (D-R) Very red 91.0% 8.8% 0.3% Red 85.3% 13.4% 1.3% Lean red 84.9% 13.7% 1.4% Lean blue 88.0% 11.5% 0.6% Blue 84.1% 15.3% 0.6% Very blue 88.0% 9.7% 2.4%

Now, imagine that the U.S. has a technological innovation that some weapons developers think might make it possible for the U.S. to make a new type of nuclear weapon that could more effectively destroy some, but not all, of the nuclear weapons of an adversary. Developing such a new type of weapon would require that the U.S. test it, which would break the moratorium on testing nuclear weapons. The question is whether, under these circumstances, the U.S. should or should not develop and test a new weapon, breaking the moratorium against testing nuclear weapons.

Here is an argument in favor: Q38. Anything that we can do to reduce the number of weapons that could reach the U.S. or its allies is something we should do. It could save lives and reduce damage to our military forces and infrastructure. Even if the new weapon could not destroy all of the adversary’s nuclear weapons, it still might give us an edge so that we could end a conflict on better terms than if we were not to have it. Knowing this, our potential enemies would be more deterred from thinking of attacking us in the first place.

Very


Total convincing


Very unconvincing

Total unconvincing

Ref/ DK


Here is a counter argument: Q39. Even if the U.S. were able to destroy a few more of an enemy’s nuclear weapons than it can now, the U.S. would still be vulnerable to a major attack. Further, adversaries would surely develop countermeasures that would make the new capability ineffective or simply build more nuclear weapons that are less vulnerable. More importantly, if the U.S. were to break the moratorium, other countries would feel free to develop and test new types of nuclear weapons. Countries that now have less technologically advanced nuclear arsenals could end up posing a greater threat to us. It is better to keep the moratorium in place.

Very


Total convincing


Very unconvincing



Q40. So again, imagine that the U.S. has a technological innovation that some weapons developers think might make it possible for the U.S. to make a new type of nuclear weapon that could more effectively destroy some, but not all, of the nuclear weapons of an adversary. In such a case, do you think the U.S. should or should not develop and test the new type of weapon, breaking the moratorium against testing nuclear weapons?


Thank you so much for completing the survey! Your response is very valuable to us.

Documents

Survey on Nuclear Weapons Policy...nuclear weapons--India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. Q3. Were you aware or not aware that the U.S.has agreed to actively work together with