SURFACE WARFARE AND EW IN THE MISSILE AGE : LESSONS TO

BE LEARNED FROM A SAN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

RADM Guy Jamieson

Deputy C Navy

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INTRODUCTION

• In 1977 the SAN took delivery of its first missile (SSM) equipped Combatant

• These small, Israeli designed, combat proven Fast attack Craft Missile ships(FAC(M)) transformed the way the SAN Surface Warfare Community went about its business.

• An increased awareness of the importance of Electronic Warfare in modern missile warfare took root amongst the SAN Surface Warfare Community

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INTRODUCTION CONTINUED

• This was accelerated by the exposure of the first ships companies to a navy, newly “blooded” in missile warfare.

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On 21 October 1967 INS EILAT was sunk by Styx missiles fired from harbour

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This was a rude shock to the Israeli Navy and they quickly learned their lesson and were prepared for the next war

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7 OCTOBER 1973

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Battle of Baltim: 8 OCTOBER 1973

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A new era of naval warfare was emerging

• Small missile armed ships had proven their capability to operate effectively against much larger combatants

• The lethality of anti-ship missiles was awesome

• You had better fire first and then ensure you are not hit back!!

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Type 12 Frigates were “superseded” by Strike Craft as primary surface combatants in the SAN after a neighbouring country obtained a squadron of OSA II FAC(M) armed with SSN 2B missiles

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So What?

•The point is what can we learn from the past in order to shape our future requirements?

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SCOPE• Doctrine

• The various Strike Craft EW Suites

• The VALOUR Class Frigates

• A new approach?

• The future

• Conclusion

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Capt (Retd) USN, Professor Wayne P. Hughes: Cornerstones of Naval Warfare • People Matter Most

• Doctrine is the Glue of all Tactics

• To know Tactics, know Weapons (systems)

• Attack Effectively First

• The Seat of Purpose is on the Land

• A Ship’s a Fool to Fight a Fort (V Adm Lord Nelson)

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DOCTRINE

Doctrine is the Glue of Tactics

To know Tactics, Know Weapons

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Training Doctrine: Weapons Officers versus Weapons Engineers on Strike Craft• The Israeli training system was adopted for SAN Weapons Officers

• These Officers were trained to a high level of technical competence

• They went into the “nuts and bolts” of their systems

• Down to Circuit Diagram level, they understood deeply how their “kit worked”

• They especially understood their missile

• They were the “de facto” weapons engineers and developed deep technical understanding of how things worked and above all CURIOSITY…………………………

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Tactical Doctrine

• EMCON plans enhanced use of ELINT and ESM

• Formations adopted exploited this factor

• ESM systems soon became primary sensors

• Skills developed further

RA

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Some 18th Century Tactics still worked!

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LEGENDS?• New levels of professionalism were introduced and we saw the

making of EW “legends” in the SAN

• The Captains and Operations Officers treasured these highly skilled EW Operators. They could work magic……..

• BUT sometimes they were wrong

• The Captains and Operations Officers decided to learn more themselves

This is SPY, ALARM

SQUARETIE 320!!!

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OPERATIONS OFFICERS COURSE

• We introduced an Operations Officers Course

• Attended by Combat Officers and Weapon Engineer Officers

• Went into technical details of detection equipment (Passive and Active) as well as ECM

• Started to delve into new Tactics

• We then took more interest in other services as well Research Institutes

• We sent officers and NCOs on the SAAF EW course to gain further knowledge

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VARIOUS EW SUITES

• The Strike Craft were constantly upgraded and went through various combinations of EW Suite

•All in all 4 different suites were employed:• JAPONICA (boats 1,2,3,4,5,6)• TRIDENT (COUPE) (boats 7,8,9)•ABLAZE•CALIBAN

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Strengths and weaknesses• It was hard to beat the original JAPONICA suite (manpower intensive

as it was!)

• The point is we learned from the development, integration and operating of all 4 of these systems and could become “intelligent or discerning buyers”

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Next chapter: The Introduction of the Frigates: Project SITRON Combat Suite

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Frigates compared to FAC(M)• Frigates are large expensive, complex ships compared to FAC(M)

• FAC(M) rely on strength in numbers, frigates on multi-layer survivability.

• Frigates have helicopters. (Helps Frigate stay outside danger zone)

• Frigates have relatively good hard-kill capability compared to FAC(M)

• Frigates generally have good radar capability compared to FAC(M) and are relatively stable platforms for weapons and sensors

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Frigates• EW (ESM) not the primary sensor

• EW provides strong support to AAW and ASMD

• A different approach required

• The first iteration on the SAN frigates was to a large extent experimental and heavily influenced by our Strike Craft heritage

• They can utilise the Helicopter’s ESM systems (and other sensors)

• IS THE EW SUITE ON FRIGATES THE RIGHT ONE FOR MISSIONS OF TODAY AND TOMORROW?

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The Future

• What kind of missions will the SANDF need to conduct in future?

• Defence Review of 2015 reveals some clues

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What are the new Defence Effects we will be required to deliver (DR 15 Ch 3)?• Layered Defence of Nation

• Deterrence (credible)

• Anticipation (of threats)

• Prevention (of Conflict)

• Protection (Air, sea, land, cyber borders, infrastructure, plus citizens and interests)

• Stabilisation

• Intervention

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Remember : The Seat of Purpose is on the Land

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What does this mean?

• We will require the full spectrum of warfare and security capabilities from constabulary to fully fledged warfighting. We will have to conduct operations at home and a long way from home. Whatever we do we will have to ensure we have credible capabilities that provide realistic deterrent value and relevant effects. We may often have to operate close to land in the Littorals.

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The Future Platforms/ Capabilities to be considered (Maritime)• Maritime Domain Awareness (Situational Awareness)

• Maritime Command Post(s) (C2)

• OPVs and IPVs for patrol and rear area defence

• MPA/MSA/ UAV

• Frigate and Submarine upgrades• Deterrence• Expeditionary warfare (Defence in the littorals!!)• Strike???

• Expeditionary capability (possible)• Sea lift• Sea basing• Ship to objective manoeuvre (STOM)• SLOCS & High Value Units protected

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Flexible, deployable weapons and sensors?

Iron Dome tested at sea

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Ashore as well as at sea?

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Some other considerations

• Cyber Warfare

• Reliable/ supportable/ robust systems (expeditionary)

• Interoperability (JIIM)

• Current and future communication systems (e.g. SATCOM vs HF)

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New threats?

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Millimetre wave SSM?Remote control boat bombs?

Finally Some thoughts by Capt Hughes on Littoral Warfare• The uniqueness of the Littoral environment requires tactics and

warships suited to fight in this cluttered environment.

• Is “Network Centric Warfare” appropriate for ships relying on stealth and concealment in the Littoral environment?

• New tactics and warships as well as emerging technologies such as robotic systems will be needed .

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CONCLUSION: QUO VADIS?• While we must always learn from history we must never remain

“trapped in the past”

• Don’t always prepare to fight the “last war”

• We need to think carefully about actual requirements in this resource constrained environment ( all at an affordable cost in ships, aircraft, and systems for command, control, surveillance and intelligence) (Hughes)

• Above all the capabilities we acquire must be RELEVANT and support the missions of the SANDF

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Oh! And remember that situations can change very fast!

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