SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES - School of Lawlaw2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell archives/75-6527_ingrahamwrightopinion1st.pdfSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 75-6527 James Ingraham,

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 75-6527

James Ingraham, by his Mother and Next Friend, Eloise

Ingraham, et al., Petitioners,

v.

Willie J. Wright, I, et al.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

rMarch -, 1977]

MR. JusTIClD PoWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents questions concerning the use of corporal punishment in public schools: first, whether the paddling of students as a means of maintaining school discipline constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and second, to the extent that paddling is constitutionally permissible, whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the schools to supplement traditional common law safeguards with prior notice and an opportunity to be heard.

I

Petitioners James Ingraham and Roosevelt Andrews filed the complaint in this case on January 7, 1971 . in the United States District Court for the District of Florida.1 At the time both were enrolled in the Charles R. Drew Junior High School in Dade County, Fla., Ingraham in tho eighth grade and Andrews in the ninth. The complaint contained three counts, each alleging a separate cause of action for depriva~

1 As Ingraham and Andrews were minorH, the complaint was filed in the names of Eloise Ingraham, James' mother, and Willie EYcrett, Roosevclt.'s father.

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2 INGRAHAM v. WRIGHT

tion of constitutional rights, under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981-1988. Counts one and two were individual damage actions by Ingraham and Andrews based on paddling incidents that alkgedly occurred in October 1970 at Drew Junior High School. Count three was a class action for decla.ratory and injunctive relief filed on behalf of all students in the Dade County schools.~ Named as defendants in all counts were respondents Willie J. Wright (principal at Drew Junior High School) , Lemmie Deliford (an assistant principal) , Solomon Barnes (an assistant to the principal) , and Edward L. Whigham (superintendent of the Dade County School System) .8

Petitioners presented their evidence a.t a week-long trial before the District Court. At the close of petitioners' case, respondents moved for dismissa.l 'of count three "on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief," Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 41 (b) , and for a ruling that the evidence would be insufficient to go to a jury on counts one and two.~ The District Court granted the motion

~ Th e D14rirt. Comt ccr1ificd the class, nnclr r Fed . Rnl c Civ. Pror. 23 (b)(2) and (r)(l) , a ~ follows

"All student.~ of t-he Dade Count~· School s~·s t rm who a re snbjert to the corporal pnn ishmrnt polirip,.: i ~,.:u rd b.\· 1 hr Dr frndant , Dade County Rchool Board . . .. " App. 10. One student was f' perifirally excepted from the class by requrA

" The complain t nbo namrrl Daclr C"ounty Rrhool Bonn! [lS a defendant , but. the C"ourt of Appc[l l ~ lwlcl th:1t. th r Bonrcl \\' fl S not nmrnahle to snit undrr 42 U . S. C. ~~ 1081-1988 nncl cli,.:mif',.: rrl thr ~·nit. ngflinst the Boflrd for wnnt of jurisdiction. 525 F. 2cl 909 (197G). This nf'prrt of the Court of Ap peal:;' judgment. i ~ no1 br fore 11s.

• Petition ers had wfli\'(' rl1heir right to jury trial on the cl:iims for dflmfl ges in rount:; one nne! two, but rrspondt\nt s h:1cl not . The District Conrt prorredrd initially to hrar e,·iclencr on]~· on count three, the rlnim for injnnctiYe rr li ('f. At the rlo~c of prtit ioner,.: ' rase, howC\·er, the parti('~ ngrocd thnt the c\·idrnre ofTrred on ronnt three (togethrr with certain st.ipulntrd testimony) would be conf' idcrrd , for pnrpoocs of n motion for· dirert•ed verdict , as if it h:t d nl ~o hrcn offerrd on counts one nnd two. It

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INGRAHAM v. WRIGHT 3

as to all three counts. and dismissed the complaint without hearing evidence on behalf of the school authorities. App. 147-156.

Petitioners' evidence may be summarized briefly. In the 1970-1971 school year many of the 237 schools in Dade County used corporal punishment as a means of maintaining discipline pursuant to Florida legislation and a local school board regulation.G The statute then in effect authorized limited corporal punishment by negative inference, proscribing punishment which was "degrading or unduly severe" or which was inflicted without prior consultation with the principal or the teacher in charge of the school. Fla .. Stat. Ann. ~ 232.27 (1961).6 The regulation, Dade County School Board Policy

was undC'rst.ood that re~pondrnts coulct rNtRsert a right to jur;.· trial if the motion were denied. App. 147.

r. Tho cvidC'nce does not show how many of the Rchool~ actually employed corporal punishment as a mC':ms of maintaining disciplinr. The nuthorizat.ion of the practice b~· thr School Board extrndC'd to 231 of the f'chools in tl1C' 1970-1971 school ye:u, but 16 of thosC' ~chools did not ndmini~ter corporn.! punishment as a mnt.ter of school polie?. App. 141-143.

6 In the 1970-1971 sehool .\·rar , § 2:32.27 pro\·iclrd: "Each teacbrr or other membrr of thC' Rtnff of an~· >:chool shnll as:-:ume

such authority for the control of pupils fl." may be as~ignrd to him h~· the principal and shall keep good ordC'l' in t.he chs~room nne! in other plarrs in which he is assigned to hr in chnrgr of pupil;;, hut he >:hall not inflict rorporal punishment before con~ulting the principal or tC'arhrr in charge of the school, and in no cnsc shn II :-:urh pnni~hment be drgmding or undul~· seycre in its nature .. . . "

Effcf'tin• .Tul~· 1, 1976. 1lw Florida Lrgi.,Jnturc :mwndrd thr law gonrningcorporal punishment. Section 282.27 now rcack

"Snbjrct to law nnd to thr rule~ of thn cli.4rirt srhool board, f':lf'h tnachrr· or other membrr of thf' staff of an~' 8rhool shall have f'U<'h nuthorit~· for the ront.rol and di.;ciplinr of stndrnts ns may be as,ignrrl to him b~· the principal or hi~ designntcd rrprc;;entnti,·c and ~hall krrp good ordrr in the rlassroom :mel in otlwr plnc•r" in whirh he i~ :11'.•ignC'd to br in rhnrgn of Rtudcnts . If a tenrhrr feC'l s that. corpoml punishment i.;; nccef'...;ar~· . at least the following prorrdurril shall hn followed:

"(1) The usc of corpornl puni~hm~'nt "hall bl' apprO\ WI in principlr by

-.

75-6527-0PINION


5144, contained explicit directions and limitations.7 The authorized punishment consisted of paddling the recalcitrant student on the buttocks with a flat wooden paddle measuring

1he principal hrfore it is u~rd. but npprO\·al i~ not norr~snr.v for rnch :opeeifir instanrr in which it is n"rd.

"(2) A t.eachrr or prinripnl may admini~trr corpornl pnnishmrnt onb• in thr prosrncr of :mother adult who is informrd hrforrhnnd. nnrl in the :otud0nt's pre."cnro of the rra:oon for thr pnnishmrnt.

"(3) A tearhrr or prinripal who hns nrlministcrrd pnnishmrnt ;:hall, upon ref]uest , provide thr pupil's pnrrnt or gnnrdinn wi1h n writtrn expinna tion of the ronson for the puni:ohml?nt and the namr of thr othrr adult who wns prosont."

Fin. Stat. Ann. § 2~2.27 (1(.)77 Snpp.) (codifil'r'~ notntion omittrd). Corporn! punishmPnt is now dPfinPd as "the modrrutr usf' of ph~·8 ical forre or ph~·sirnl rontnrt by a 1Parlwr or TJrincipnl ns mL~v hr nrr<"'snrY to mnintain diPriplinr or to rnforro school rules." § 228.041. Thr lor:1l school boards nrr rxpres~l:v nuthorizrd to adopt rules goYrrning .~tndrnt conduct nnd disrinline :md nrr dirertrd to mnko nvnilnblc rodr.~ of :otudent conduct. § 230.23 (6). Trn<'hers nnd princinnL~ nrr given immunity from civil and criminnl linbilit~· for enforcing diowiplin:JD' mlrs. "relxrrpt. in the rnsc of exrf'ssh·r forrr or cruel and unmnml puni;:hmrnt ... . "· § 2~2.275.

7 In the 1970-1(.)71 school ~·rar. Policy 5144 nuthorizrd rorpornl punishmPnt wherp thr fnilnre of other means of serking cooperntion from the student made it;: use norrs;;nry. Tho regulation specified that the 11rinripn I should detrrminc the nrees~it.v for corporal punishment. thnt thr :otudent should undcrstnnd the seriousne>:s of the offense and the rr:1son for the punishment, nnd thnt the punishment. should be ndmini;:tcred in the presence of another adult in rireumstnnrcs not calrulntrd to hold the student up to shnme or ridirulc. Thr rpgulntion rnutionrrl ngninst nRing corporn l punishment ngninst a student under ps~•chologirn I or mrrlir:~l

trca.tmcnt., nnd wnrncd thnt the person ndministrring ihr pnnishmrnt "must realize his own prrsonnl Jinbilitics" in nny cnsr of ph~·sirnl injnr~'· Apn. 17.

Whilr this litig:1tion w:1~ prncling in the District Court. the Dnde Connt.y School Bonrd :1memlrd Poliry 5144 to st:md:ndizc thr size of the paddlr~ u~ed in arcordnncr with the drsrript.ion in the text. to proRrribe .-triking a child with :t pndcllr el~rwherc than on tho buttocks, to limit i he permis;;;ible number of "lich" (fh·c for elementary and intcrmedinte grndrs nnd sc1·cn for junior and senior 12:r:1drs), :~nd to rrqnirr :1. contcmporanrous

.-

75- 6.i27-0 1'11\IO~

INGHAHAJ\1 v. WRIGHT 5

less than two feet long. three to four inches '"ide. ami ahout one-half inch thick. The normal punishment \Yas Hmited to one to five "licks'' or blows with the paddle and resulted in no appa.rent physical injury to the student. School authorities viewed corporal punishment as a less drastic means of discipline than suspenRion or expulsion. Contrary to tlw procedural requirements of the statute and regulation, teachers often paddled students on their own authority without first consulting the principaJ.R

Petitioners focused on Drew Junior High School. the school in which both Ingraham and Andrews '"ere enrolled in the fall of 1970. In an apparent reference to Drew. the District Court found that "rtJhe instances of punishment '"'hich could be characterized as severe, accepting the students' testimony as credible, took place in one junior high school." App. 152. Tho evidence. c011si~ting mainly of tho testimony of 16 students. suggests that the regime at Drew was exceptionally harsh. The testimony of Ingraham and Andrews. in support of their individua-l claims for damages, is illustrative. Because he ''"as slow to respond to his teacher's instructions. Ingraham was subjected to more than 20 licks '>dth a paddle while being held over a table in tho principa]'s office. The paddling was so severe that he suffered a hematoma ·o requiring medical attention a.nd keeping him out of school for 11 da.ys.1

(}

explann.t.ion of the need for thr pnniRhmcnt to 1hr student and n. mb~equrnt. notification to tl10 pn.rrnts. App. 1~0-1~2.

8 Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F. 2d 248, 255, and n. 7 (original panel opinion), va,cn.tcd on rehr:uing, 525 F. 2d 909 (1976); App. 51. 142, 152; Exhibits 14, 15.

9 Stedman's Medical Dirtionn.ry (23cl cd. 1976) drfincs "lwmntomn." as

"raJ locnlized mas..;;; of extra.va~ated blood 1hat iH rrlatiYcly or romplrtely confined within an organ or tissue ... : the blood is u~uall~· clotted (or partly clotted), and, dcprnding on how long it ha,; brcn thcrr, may manifeo; t \'n.rious degrees of organization and dcroloriza1 ion."

10 App. 4--5, 20-22, 71-88, 1~3-140.

75-0527-0PINION


Andrews was paddled several times for minor infractions. On two occasions he was struck on his arms, once depriving him of the full use of his arm for a week.11

The District Court made no findings on the credibility of the students' testimony. Rather, assuming their testimony to be credible, the court found no constitutional basis for relief. With respect to count three, the class action, the court concluded that the punishment authorized and practiced generally in the county schools violated no constitutional right. App. 148, 155. With respect to counts one and two, the individual damage a.ctions, the court concluded that while corporal punishment could in some cases violate the Eighth Amendment, in this case a jury could not lawfully find "the elements of severity, arbitrary infliction, .unacceptability in terms of contemporary standards, or gross disproportion which are necessa.ry to bring 'punishment' to the constitutional level of 'cruel and unusual punishment.'" App. 148-149.

A panel of the Court of Appeals voted to reverse. 498 F. 2d 248 (1976). The panel concluded that the punishment was so severe and opprPssive as to violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and that the procedures outlined in Policy 5144 failed to satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause. Upon rehearing. the en bane court rejected these conclusions and affirmed the judgment of the District Court. 525 F. 2cl 909 (1976). The full court held that the Due Process Cla.use did not require notice or an opportunity to be heard:

"In essence, we refuse to set forth, as constitutionally mandated, procedural standards for an activity which is not substantial enough on a constitutional level, to justify

11 App. 5-6, 107-116. The simibr experiences of several other students a.t Drew, to which they individually testified in the District Court, are summarized in the original panel opinion in the Court of Appeals, 495 F. 2d 248, 257-259, vacated on rehearing, 525 F. 2d 909.

75-6527-0PINION


the time a.nd effort which would ha.ve to be expended by the school in adhering to those procedures or to justify further interference by federal courts into the internal affairs of public schools." !d., a.t 919.

The court also rejected the petitioners' substantive contentions. The Eighth Amendment, in the Court's view, was simply ina.pplicable to corporal punishment in public schools. Stressing the likelihood of civil and criminal liability in state law, if petitioners' evidence were believed, the court held that "[t]he administration of corporal punishment in public schools, whether or not excessively administered, does not come within the scope of Eighth Amendment protection." ld., at 915. Nor was there any substantive violation of the Due Process Clause. The court noted that "r p] addling of recalcitrant children has long been an acceptable method of promoting good behavior a.nd instilling notions of responsibility and decorum into the mischievous heads of school children." Id., at 917. The court refused to examine instances of punishment individually:

"We think it a misuse of our judicial power to determine, for example, whether a teacher has acted arbitra.rily in paddling a particular child for certain beha.vior or whether in a particular instance of misconduct five licks would ha.ve been a more appropriate punishment than ten licks." Ib·i,d.

We granted certiorari, limited to the questions of cruel and unusua.l punishment and procedural due process. 425 U. S .. 990.12

12 We denied re,·icw of a third question prrscnt ed in the petition for certiorari:

"Is the infliction of RC\·erc corporal puni~lm1<'nt upon publir Hrhool students arbitrary, rapririous and tmrelated 1o arhir,·ing any lrgilima1e educational purpo~c and thrrcforc Yiolati,·c of the Dur Prorrs,.; Cbu~r of the Fourteenth Arncndmrnt '?" Pet i1 ion for Ccr1 iorari 2.

7 5-6.527 -OPINION


II

The questions before us must be considered in light of the attitudes of this Nation toward corporal punishment as a means of mainta.ining discipline in school. In defining the breadth of the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty, through which the Eighth Amendment is applicable to the States, Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514 (1068), this Court has often found it critical to determine whether the State's power has been exercised within the limits of "civilized standards,"· Francis ex rel. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459, 468 (1047) (Frankfurter. J. , concurring). or 'Yhethcr a procedural safeguard is "necessary to a.n Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty.'r Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 149 n. 14 (1968). We therefore bPgin by examining the way in which our traditions and our laws have responded to the use of corporal punishment in public schools.

The use of corporal punishment in this country as a means of disciplining schoolchildren dates back to the colonial period.13 It has survived the transformation of primary and secondary education from the colonials' reliance on optional private arrangements to our present system of compulsory education laws and dependence on public schoo]s.14 Despite the general abandonment of corporal punishment as a means

1 3 See H . Falk, Corpor:~l Puuishment 11-48 (1941); N. Bdw:~rdR & H. Richey, The School in the Amrrir:~n Soci:~l Order 112-113 ( 1947).

14 Public and compul~ory education existed in New Engl:~nd brfore the Revolution, see N. Edw:~rdl' & H. Riehry, supra, at 50-68, 78-81, 97-113, but the demand for free public schools as we now know them did not gain momentum in the country as a whole until 1hr mid-1800s, and it was not until 1918 that compul;;;ory school att-endance lmvs were in forre in all the States. See Brown v. Bom·d of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 489 n. 4 (1954), citing Cubberley, Public Education in the United StM.es 408-423, 563-565 (1934 ed.); cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 226, and n. 15 (1972) .

75-6:127-0PI.:\ION

INGRAIIAl\1 v. iVRIGHT

of punishing criminal offenders,'" the practice continues to play a role in the public education of schoolchildren in most parts of the country.' 0 Professional and public opinion is sharply divided on the practice,17 and has been for more than a century.18 Yet "·e can discern no trend toward its elimination.

At common law a single principle has governed the use of corporal punishment since before the American Revolution: teaehers may imposr reasonable but not excessive force to· discipline a child.' 9 Blackstone catalogued among the "absolute rights of individuals" the right "to security from the corporal insults of menaces, assaults. beating and "·ounding,'r I Blackstone, Commrntarirs """134. but he did not regard it a "corporal insult'' for a tracher to inflict "moderate correctionn on a child in his care. To the extent tha.t force 'vas "necessary to answer the purposes for which [the teacherl was employed,n Blackstone viewed it as "justifiable or lawful." I Blackstone.

'"See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F. 2d 571, 579-580 (CAS 196R): H. Fnlk, supra, at 85-SR.

lG See K. Larson & l\1. Karpa~. EffectiYe Secondary School Di~eiplinr

146 (1963); Reitman, Follman & Lndd, Corporal Puni~lnnrnt in Public Schools 2-5 (ACLU Report 1972).

17 For samplings of srholarly opi11ion on the u,;c of corporal puni.~lnnent in the schools, see F. Reardon & R. Re~rnold~, Corporal Puni~hment in Pennsylvania 1-2, 34 (1975); National Education Association, Rrport of the Task Force on Corporal Punishment (1972); K. Jame<, Corporal Punishment in the Public Schools 8-16 (1963). Opinion sun·r~·H tn krn since 1970 have consistently shown a majority of teachrrs and of the p;rneral public favoring modrratc UR<' of corporal puni~lmwnt in 1hr lower grade.';. See F. Reardon & R. Reynold.;, supra, at 2, 23-26; Delaware Department of Education, Rrport on the Corporal Punishment Run·ry 48 (1974); Reitman, Follman & Ladd, supra, :·tt 34-35; National Education Association, supra, at 7.

18 See H. Falk, supra, 66-69; cf. Cooper v. Mc.lunkin, 4 Ind. 290 (1853). 19 Roo I. F. Harper & F . .TameR, The Law of Torts 288-292 (1956);

Prorhl, Tort Liability of Teachers, 12 Vand. L. Hev. 723, 734-738 (1959); W. Prosser, Law of Torts 136-137 (4th ed. 1971).

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Commentaries *134, III Blackstone, Commentaries «·120. The basic doctrine has not changed. The prevalent rule in this country today privileges such force as a teacher or administrator "reasonably believes to be necessary for [the child's] proper control, training, or education." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 147 (1). To the extent that the force is excessive or unreasonable, the educator in virtually all States is subject to possible civil and criminalliability.20

Although the early cases viewed the authority of the teacher as deriving from the parents,21 the concept of parental delegation has been replaced by the view-more consonant with compulsory education laws-that tho State itself may impose such corporal punishment as is reasonably necessary "for the proper education of the child and for tho maintenance of group discipline." I Harper & James, The Law of Torts § 3.20, at 292. 22 All of tho circumstances are to be taken into account in determining whether the punishment is reasonablein a particular case. Among tho most important considerations are the seriousness of the offense, the attitude a.nd past behavior of the child. tho nature and severity of the punishment, the a.ge a.nd strength of the child, and the availability of less severe but equally rffcctivc means of discipline. I d., at 2fl0-291; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 150 Comments c-e.

Today, the common law rule permitting reasonable corporal

20 SC'e cnsC's cit.ed n. 2!), infra. The criminnl codes of many Stntes include provi~ions explicitly rrcognizing the irnrhrr'R common lnw priYilrgr to inflict reasonnble corpor:1l pnni~hmcnt. E. g., Ariz. Rev. Stnt .. § 18-246 (A) (1) (1!)56); Conn. Gen. Stnt. Ann. § 53a-1S (1976 Supp.); Ncb. Rev. Stat. § 28--840 (2) (1975): New York Prnal Code § 35.10 (McKinney 1975); Ore. Rev. Stat.§ 161.205 (1) (1971).

21 Sec Proehl, sup.ra, at 726, nne! n. 13. 22 Toclny, corporal punishment in school j,; ronditioncd on pnrcnt:tl

appro\·:tl in on])· two State~, California and "\Vi~con~in. Cal. Edurat ion Code, c. 1010, § 49001 (HJ7G); IJionow \". Woods, 35 Wis. 59 (1874). This Court ha.-; held in a summary a.ffirmancr that parental appronl of corpor:ll puni~hmcnt i;,; not. ron,~tiiutionall.v required. Baker v. Owcr1, 423: U. 8. 907, :tff'g 395 F. Supp. 294 (MUNC 197:3).

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punishment prevails in most States. Of the 23 States that have addressed the problem through legislation, 21 have authorized the moderate usc of corporal punishment in public schools.23 Of these States only a few have elaborated on the common law test of reasonableness, typically providing for approval or notification of the child's pa.rents,21 or for infliction of punishment only by tho principal ~r. or in tho presence of an adult witness.w Only two Sta.tcs. Massachusetts and Rhode Island, ha.ve prohibited all corporal punishment in their public schools.27 vVhcre the legislatures have not acted. the state courts have uniformly preserved the common law rule permitting teachers to use reasonable force in disciplining children in their chargr. 2

R

2a Cal. Edurn.tion Code, r. 1010, §§ 49000-49001 (1976); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 14, § 701 (1974); Fin. Stat. Ann. § 2~2.27 (1977 Supp.); Gro. Codr Ann. §§ 32-835, 32-836 (1961); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 298-16 (1968); Ill. Ann. Stat., c. 122, §§ 24-24, 34-84a (1970-1977 Supp.); Ind. Code Ann. § 20-8.1-5-2 (1975): Mel. Ednc. Code Ann., Art. 77, § mm (1975) (in sperified rounties); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann., § 340.756 (1976); Mont. RC\·. Codes Ann. § 75-610!) (1947); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 392.46.'i (1973); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 115-146 (197.5); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3319.41 (1972); Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 70. § 6-114 (1966); Penn. Cons. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, § 13-1317 (1976-1977 Rupp.); S.C. Code§ 21-776 (197.5 Supp.): S. D. Comp. L1tws Ann. § 13-32-2 (1975); Vt. Stat. Ann. § 13-32-2 (1975); Va. Codo Ann. § 22-231.1 (1950); W. Vn. Code, § 18A-5-1 (1971); Wyo. Stat. § 21.1-G.J (Hl75 Snnp.).

2 ' Cnl. Edurntion Code, r. 1010, § 49001 (1976) (requiring prior parentnl approval in writing); Fl::t. Rtnt .. Ann. § 2~2.27 (3) (Hl77 Snpp.) (requiring a written explanation on ref']ne~t); Mont. nr,·. Codt'~, § 75-6109 (1947) (requiring prior pnrrnt.al notifirntion if po~~ihlr).

2" Drl. Code Ann .. Tit. 14, § 701 (1!)74): :\1d. Ann. CodP. Art. 77, § 98n ( 1975).

~nDel. Code Ann., Tit .. 14, §701 (1974); Fla. Stat. Ann. §232.27 (1!)77 Supp.); Haw. Rrv. Stat~. § 298-16 (1968); Mont. nr,·. Codrs, § 75-6109 (1947).

27 Ma<'>'. Grn. La.ws Ann. r. 71, § 37G (1976-1977 Supp.); N .. T. Stat. Ann. 18:\: 6-1 (West) (1968).

28 E. g., Suits\'. Glover, 260 Ala. 449, 71 Ro. 2d 49 (1954); Ln Frentz v. Gallagher, 105 Ariz. 255, 462 P. 2d 804 (HlG!)); Berr?J \'. Arnold School

75- 6527-0PINION


Against this background of historical and contemporary approval of reasonable' corporal punishment, we turn to the constitutional questions before us.

III

The Eighth Amendment provides, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessi,·e fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Bail, fines and punishment traditionally have been associated with the criminal process, and by subjecting the three to parallel limitations the text of the Amendment suggests an intention to limit the power of those entrusted with the criminal law function of government. An examination of the history of the Amendment and the decisions of this Court construing the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment confirms that it was designed to protect those convicted of criilles. We adhere to this longstanding limita.tion and hold that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to the paddling of children as a means of maintaining discipline in public schools.

A

The history of the Eighth Amrnclment is well known.2n·

The text was taken , almost verbatim, from a provision of the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, which in turn derived

District, 199 Ark. 1118, 137 S. W. 256 (1940); Andreozzi v. Rubano, 145 Conn. 280, 141 A. 2d 639 (195R) ; Tinlcham v. Kole, 252 Iowa 1303, 110· N. W. 2d 258 (1961); Carr v. Wright, 423 S. W. 2d 521 (Ky. 1968); Christman v. Hickman, 225 lVIo. App. 828, 37 S. W. 2cl 672 (1931); Kidder v. Chellis, 59 N . H. 473 (1879); People v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d 909,. 319 N. Y. S. 2d 731, 734-735, a.ff'd, 30 N. Y. 2d 734 (1971) ; Simms v. School District No . 1, 508 P . 2d 236 (Ore. App. 1973) ; Marlar v. Bill, 18 Tenn . 100, 178 S. W. 2d 634 (1944); Prendergast v. Masterson, 196 S. W. 246 (Tex. 1917) .

'l."!l Sec Gregg v. Georgia, - U. S. -, - - - (1976) (plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 314 (1972) (MAHSHALL, J ., concurring); Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishmt>nts Inflicted :. The Original Meaning, 57 Cal. L. Rev. 839 (1969) .

75-G527 -OPI:\TT0::\1

INGRAHAM v. WRTGIIT 13'

from the English Bill of Rights of 1689. The English version, adopted after the accesssion of William and Mary, was intended to curb the excesses of English judgrs under thereign of James II. Historians have viewed the English provision as a reaction eithrr to the "Bloody Assize," the treason trials conducted by Chief Justice Jeffreys in 1685 after the abortive rebellion of the Duke of Monmouth.:w or to theperjury prosecution of Titus Oates in the same year.:n In either case, the exclusive concern of the English version was the conduct of judges in enforcing the criminal law. The original draft introduced in the House of Commons provided: 3

2'

"The rrquiring excessive bail of persons committed in criminal cases and imposing excessive fines. and illegal punishments, to be prevented."

Although the reference to "criminal cases" was eliminated from the final draft. the preservation of a similar reference in the preamble 33 indicates that the deletion was without substantive significance. Thus. Blackstone treated each of the provision's three prohibitions as bearing only on criminal proceedings and judgments:"

30 See I. Brant, The Bill of Ri~hts 155 ( 19G5). 31 Sec Gra.nucci, supra, 852-860. 32 !d., at 855. ""The preamble proYidrd in part:

"WHEREAS the late Kin~ Jame~ the Second, by the assistance of divers C\·il counsellors, judges, and ministrr~ cmployrd by him, did endmYor to sulwert and extirpate ... ihc law~ and librrLies of this kingdom.

"10. And excossi\·c bail hath been required of per~<ons committed in criminal cases, to elude ihr hrnefit of ihr laws made for thr liberty of the subjects.

"11. And exces:;ive fine~ ha vc bern imposrd; and illrgal and cruel puni~hments inflicted .... " R. Perry, Sources of Our Lihertic~ 245-24G (1959).

34 4 Blackstone, Commentaries lC·297 (bail), lC·379 (fines and other punishments).

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The Americans who adopted the language of this part of the English Bill of Rights in framing their own state and federal constitutions 100 yea.rs later feared the imposition of torture and other cruel punishments not only by judges acting beyond their lawful authority, but also by legislatures engaged in making the laws by which judicial authority would be measured. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,371- 373 (1910). Indeed, the principal concern of the American Framers appears to have been with tho legislative definition of crimes and punishments. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446-447 (1890); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U, S. 238, 263 (1972) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). But if the American provision was intended to restrain government more broadly than its English model, the subject to which it was intended to apply-the criminal process-was the same.

At the time of its ratification, tho original Constitution was criticized in the Massachusetts and Virginia. Conventions for its failure to provide any protection for persons convicted of crimes.3

" The views of the critics ultimately prevailed. When tho Eighth Amendment '\\'as adopted by the First Congress. only one representativ0. Livermore, spoke out against it. His ob,i ection, in substance, was that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause might hav0 had the effect of outlawing what w0rc then the common criminal punishments of hanging,

sr. Abrahnm Holmes of Mal'.<;arhusc1ts rompbinrd ~pccifically of the absence of a provi~ion rc~tr:~ining; Cong;rr~s in its power to drtcrminc "what kind of punishments sh:~ll be innict,cd on pN::<ons ronYictcd of crime~." 2 .T. Elliot'~ Drbatc~ l 11 (2d rd. 1876). Patrick Hrnry was of thr Pamc mind:

"What Pay~ our [Virginia] bill of rights?-'t.hnt excessiYe bail ought not to be reqnirrd , nor cxrcs~iYc finr~ impo~rd , nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.' Arc you not, thrrcforr, now rnlling on those gcntlrmcn who arc to compose Congrr~s. to prrs<·ribc trinls nnd drfine puni~hmcnts

without t.hiil control? Will they find sentiment~ there similar to this bill of rights? You let them loosr; you do more-you depart from thcgcniu~ of your country .... " 3 .T . Elliot's Dcb:ttr . ..; 447.

75-6527-0PINION


whipping, and carcroppiug. 1 Annals of Congress 782-783 (1789). The objection was not heeded, "precisely because the legislature would otherwise have had the unfettered power to prescribe punishments for crimes." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S., at 263 (BRENNAN, J., concurring).

B

In light of this histo·ry, it is not surprising to find that every decision of this Court considering whether a punishment is "cruel and unusual" within the meaning of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments has dealt with a criminal punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble,- U.S.- (1976) (incarceration without medical care); Gregg v. Georgia, - U. S. -(1976) (execution for murder); Furman v. Georgia, supra (excution for murder); Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514 (1968) ($20 fine for public drunkenness); Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 ( 1962) (incarceration as a criminal for addiction to narcotics); Trap v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86 (Hl58) (plura.lity opinion) (expatriation for desertion); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459 (1947) (execution by electrocution after a failed first attempt); Weems v. United States, supra (12 years' imprisonment and other penalties for falsifying an official document); Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126 (1903) (10 years' imprisonment for conspiracy to defrancl); In re Kemmler, supra (execution by electrocution); Wilke1·son v. Utah, 0!1 U. S. 130 (1879) (execution hy firing squad); Pervear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475 (1867) (fine and imprisonment at hard lahor for bootlegging).

These decisions rccognir.c that t.hc Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause circumscribes the criminal procef'ls in three ways: first, it limits the methods of punishment that can be imposPd on those convicted of crimes. e. g., Est f' lle v. Gamble, supra; Trap v. Dulles, supra; second, it proscribes punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime. e. g.,

75-6527-0PINlON


Weems v. United States, supra, and third, it imposes substantive limits on what can be made criminal and punished as such, e. g., Robinson v. California, SUJYra. We ha.ve recogni:r,ed the last limitation as one to be applied sparingly. "The· primary purpose of fthe Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause] has always been considered, and properly so, to be directed at the method and kind of punishment imposed for· the viola.tion of criminal statutes .... " Powell v. Texas, supra, 392 U. S., at 532.

In the few cases where the Court has had occasion to confront claims that impositions outside the criminal process constituted cruel and unusual punishment, it has had no difficulty finding the Eighth Amendment inapplicable. Thus. in Pong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698 (1893), the Court held the Eighth Amendment inapplicable to the deportation of aliens on the ground that "deportation is not a punishment for crime." ld., at 730; see Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924); Bugajcwitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585 (1913). And in Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U. S. 72 (1959), the Court sustained a judgment of civil contempt, resulting in incarcera~ tion pending compliance with a subpoena, aga.inst a claim that the judgment imposed cruel and unusual punishment. It "·as emphasized that the case involved "essentially a civil remedy designed for the benefit of other parties . . . exercised for centuries to secure compliance with judicial decrees." I d., at 81, quoting Green v. United States, 356 U. S. 165, 197 (Hl58) (dissenting opinion).36

~6 In urging us to extend the Eighth Amendment to ban school paddlings, petitioners rely on the many derisions in which this Court has held that the prohibition against "cruel and unusual" punishments is not "fastened to the obsolete but may acquire mraning as public opinion beromcs enlightened by a humane ju. tire." Gregg v. Georgia, supra, -U. S., at -; see, e. g., T1'0p v. Dulles, supra, 356 U. S., n.t 100-101 (plurality opinion); Weems v. United States, supra, 217 U. S., at 373 .

7.'5-0.)27-0PINION

INGHAIIAl\1 v. WHIGHT 17

c Petitioners acknowledge that the original design of the

Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was to limit criminal punishments, but urge nonetheless that the prohibition should be extended to ban the paddling of school children. Observing that the Framers of the Eighth Amendment could not have enYisioned our prescnt :::;ystem of public and compulsory education, with its opportunities for noncriminal punishments, petitioners contend that extension of the prohibition against cruel punishments is necessary lest we afford greater protection to criminals than to schoolchildren. It would he anomalous, they say, if schoolchildren could be beaten without constitutional redress, while hardened criminals suffering the same beatings at the hands of their jailors have a valid claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Jackson Y. Bishop. 404 F. 2d 571 (CA8 1968); cf. Est( lle v. Gamble, supra. As superficially plausible as this argument seems. we reject the claimed a.na.logy to criminal puni:::;hments and decline to extend the Eighth Amendment.

The prisoner and the schoolchild stand in "·holly different circumstances, separated by the harsh facts of criminal conviction and inca.rceration. The prisoner's conviction entitles the State to classify him as a "criminal," and his incarceration deprives him of the freedom "to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471. 482 (1972); see Meachum v. Fano, - U. S. - (1976). Prison brutality, as the Court of Appeals observed in this case, is "part of the total

This reliance is misplaced. Our Eighth Amendment drrisions haYe refrrred to "evolving standanb of derrnry", Trop v. Dulles. S7t pra. at 101, only in determining wlwther criminal punishments are "cruel and llll11SU:1l" undrr the Amendment. We not.r, howm·er, that "evolving stnndanls of decency" may still br relc,·ant in drtcrmining thr rcquirrmrnfs of the Due Process Clau~c of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Part IV, infra.

7 5-6527 -OPINION


punishment to which the individual is subjected for his crime and, as such , is a proper subject for Eighth Amendment scrutiny." 525 F. 2d, at 914-915. See Johnson v. Gliclc, 481 F. 2d 1028, 1032 (CA2 1973). Even so, the protection afforded by the Eighth Amendment is limited. After incarceration, only the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," Estelle v. Gamble, - U. S., at-, quoting Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at -, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.

The school child has little need for the protection of the Eighth Amendment. Though attendance may not always be voluntary, the public school remains an open institution. Except perhaps when very young, the child is not physically restrained from leaving school during school hours; and at the end of the school da.y, the child is invariably free to return home. Even while at school, tho child brings with him the support of family and friends and is rarely apart from teachers and other pupils "·ho may witness and protest any instances of m istrea.tmen t.

The openness of the public school and its supervision by the community afford significant safeguards against the kinds of abuses from which the Eighth Amendment protects the prisoner. In most communities where corporal punishment is permitted in the schools, these safeguards arc reinforced by the legal constraints of the common law. Public school teachers and administrators arc privileged at common law to inflict only such corpora1 punishment as is reasonably necessary for the proper education and discipline of the child; any punishment going beyond the privilege may result in both civil and criminal liability. See Part II, s~tpra. As long as the schools are open to public scrutiny, there is no reason to believe that the common law constraints will not effectively remedy and deter excesses such as those alleged in this case.

But even in those isolated instances where it becomes necessary to invoke the protection of the Constitution, the school child has no need to turn to the Eighth Amendment. For

75-6527-0PINION


the child can claim ample protection under the Fourteenth Amendment:

"In our system, State-invented schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over children. Students in school as well as out of school arc 'persons' under the Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State." Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U. S. 503, 511 (1969); see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 ( 1975); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 ( 1943).

We therefore conclude that when public school teachers or administrators impose disciplinary corporal punishment. the Eighth Amendment is inapplicable. The pertinent constitutional question is whether the imposition is consonant with the requirements of due process of law, a question we now consider.

IV The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any State depriva

tion of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Application of this prohibition requires the familiar t'Yostage analysis: '"e must first ask whctlwr the asserted individual interests arc encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of "life, libc,rty or property"; if protected interests are implicated. we then must decide what procedures or remrdies constitute "clue process of law." j),f orrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Board of Regc'11ts v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-572 (1072). Sec Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267 ( 1975). Follo"·ing that analysis here. we find that thr paddling of a schoolchild implicates the child's constitutionally protected interest in personal security, but we hold that the traditional common law remedies arc fully aclcquatr to afford due procc~s of law.

75-6527-0PINION


A

"[T] he range of interests protected by procedural due procC'Ss is not infinite." Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, at 570. We have repeatedly rejected "the notion that any grievous loss visited upon a person by the State is sufficient to invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause." .Meachum v. Fano, - l..T. S., at-. Due process is requirC'd only when a decision of the State implicates an interest within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. And "to detC'rm.ine whether due process requirements apply in the first placr, we must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest at stake." Roth, supra, at 570-571.

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, later incorporated in the Fourteenth, was intended to give Americans at least the protection against governmental powrr that they had enjoyed as :Englishmen against the power of the Crown. The liberty prrserved from deprivation without due process included the "right generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262· U. S. 390, 399 (Hl23). Among the historic liberties so prote-cted was the right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on personal security. See Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 Cornell L. J.--- (1977). Indeed, under the common law before the American Revolution, the right "to security from the corporal insults of menaces, assaults, beating, and wounding" was· viewed-subject to traditional priv.ileges-as among the "absolute rights of individuals." I Blackstone, Commentaries *134. 37

37 The 39th article Magna Charl{l protected this right of personal security against deprivation "except by the legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the land." Perry, supra, at 17. By subsequent enactments of Parliament during the time of Edward III , the right wn::; protected from deprin1tion cxrPpt '·by due procc,.:s of law." Sec ShaHurk.

>

75-63~7-0PI~IO~

INGRAIIAJ\1 v. WRTGIIT 2I

While the contours of this historic liberty interest in the context of our federal system of government haYc not been clPfinecl prccisely,as they always have be0n thought to ('llcompass the interest of a citizen in the cuPtody of the state to be free from bodily punishment by persons acting under color of state law. It is fundamental that such puniPhment cannot he imposed exc0pt in accordance with ntH' proress of la·w. United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 300, 317-318 (HJ4G). Thus, this Court has held repeatedly that police violate the Due Process Clause when they deliberately inflict physical punishment on persons in cnRtoclv on charges of crim0. United States v. Price, 383 U. R. 7R7, 702-703 (1966); wnz1·ams v. United States, 341 U. 8. 70, 101 (1951); Scre1cs v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 . 106 (1045).

This constitutionally protected interest in not being subjected to physical punishmc1it is at stake in this case.

The True Meaning of the Term "Libert~·." 4 Hnrv. L. nc,·. ~o."i, ~7:3-:374

(1S91). ~R See, r. g., Rochin ,._California, ~..J-2 LT. R. 165 (19.12) (poliC'e hrutnlity

again"t incJi,·iduals in ru~tody on chnrgrs of rrimr); Skinnrr 1·. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-542 (1042) (~terilizntion); .Jacobson v. Mnssnr·husrtts, 197 U. S. 11 (1905) (1·arrinntion); Union Parific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250, 251 (1R91) (phY:'iral l'Xamiuations); rf. fCC"· Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 , 479 (1R9-!).

The right of personal sl'rmit.v is nlso protectrd by the Fourth Amendment, which was made :l]Jplirablc to the States through the Fourteenth berause its protection was ,·ie1red as "implicit in the 'ronre]Jt of ordrrcd liberty' ... enshrined in the histor~· nnd the basir constitulionnl dorumrnt;; of English-speaking people;;." Wolff v. Colomdo, 83R U. S. 25, 27-28 (1949). It has been said of the Fourth Amendment that its ''01-crriding function ... is to proteet. per~onal privacy aJl.d dignity ng:1 in~t unwarrnlltccl intrusion by the Rtate." Sclwerber v. California , 3R..J. U.S. 757, 767 (1966). But the principal conrern of thn.t Amendment·~ pmhibition against unreasonable senrche.> and ~;cizurcs is with intrusion., on privary in the course of criminal invesligations. See Whalen v. Ror,- U.S.-, - n. 32 (1977). Petitionrrs do not contend that the Fourth Amendment applies, nccording to its tcrm"A to corporal puni~lunrnt in public school.

7 5-6527 -OPINION


There is, of course, a de minimis level of imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned. But at least where school authorities, acting under color of state law, unjustifiably punish a child in their care by deliberately inflicting appreciable physical pain, we hold that they invade an interest in liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.Rn

B

"fT] he question remains what process is due." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S., at 481. Were it not for the common law privilege permitting teachers to inflict reasonable corporal punishment on children in their care, and the availability of the traditional remedies for abuse. the case for requiring advance procedur;:tl safeguards "·ould be strong indeed. But here we deal with a punishment-paddlingwithin that tradition, and the question is whether the common ln.w remedies are adequate to afford due process.

" I rn 1 Ue prOCeSS,' Unlike SOme legal ruleS iS 110t a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. . . . Representing an attitude of fairness ... 'due process' is compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions. and stout confidence in the strength of the democratic faith which we profess .... " Joint-Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. R. 123. 16~-163 (Hl51) (Frankfurter, .J., concurring).

Whether in this case the common law remedies for excessive corporal punishment constitute due process of law requires

:wunlike Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. 8. 565 (Hl7."i) , this cnse do<':; not invoke the stnt<'-rrrn t0d property intNrst in pnblir rdurn t ion. The purpose of corporal pnni.<hment i~ to cotTC'rt n rhild'~ brhnYior \\"ithout intrrrupting his eduration. That corporal pnni~hmcnt mny. in n nHC' cn~e, han' the unintcndrd eff<'ct of trmporarily rrmovin11: n child from srhool affords no basis for concluding that the practice itRelf depri1·cs studrnts of property protrrtrd by the Fourtcrnth Amrndmrnt.

75-6527-0PINION


an analysis of the competing interests a.t stake, viewed against the background of "history, reason, [and] the past course of decisions." Tho analysis requires consideration of three distinct factors: "first, the private interest that will be affected ... ; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest ... and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and, finally, the [state] interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Jlrfathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167-168 (1974) (PowELL, J., concurring).

1

Because it is rooted in history, the child's liberty interest in avoiding corporal punishment while in the care of public school authorities is subject to historical limitations. Under the common law, an invasion of personal security gave rise to a right to recover damages in a subsequent judicial proceeding. III Blackstone, Commentaries *120-121. But the right of recovery was qualified by the concept of justification. Thus, there could be no recovery against a teacher who gave only "moderate correction" to a child. Ibid. To the extent that the force used was reasonable in light of its purpose, it was not wrongful, but rather "justifiable or lawful." /d., at "'120.

The concept that reasonable corporal punishment is justifiable continues to be rccogni%ec1 in the la\YS of most States. Sec Part II, supra. It represents "the balance struck by our country," Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (HJ61) (Harlan, J .. dissenting), between the child's interest in personal security and the traditional view that some limitRd corporal punishment may be necessary in the course of a child's education. Under that longstanding accommodation of inkrcsts, there ca.n be no deprivation of substantive rights under the Due

i5-6527-0PINION


Process Clause as long as disciplinary corporal punishment is within the limits of the common law privilege.

To be sure, the concept of liberty is not frozen in history. "Great concepts like liberty were purposely left to gather m.caning from experience." National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tide'water Transfer Co., 337 U. S. 582, 646 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). If state laws governing an aspect of libNty come into tension with "stanclarcls of decency more or less universally accepted." Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 4.52, 469-470 (1946), they may not survive constitutional scrutiny. But there is no evidence here of any grneral rejection of the common law privilege governing corporal punishment in public schools.

2

Florida has continued to recognize, and indeed has strengthened by sta.tute, the common law right of a child not to be subjectrd to excessi\'C corporal punishment in school. Under Florida law the teacher and principal of the school decide in the first instance whether corporal punishment is reasonably neeessary under tho circumstances in order to discipline a child who has misbehaved. But they must exercise prudrnce and restraint. If the punishment inflicted is lawr found to have beC'11 excessive-not reasonably believed at tho time to be necessary for the child's discipline or training-the school authorities inflicting it may be held liable in damages to the child and, if malice is shown. they may be subject to criminal prosecution.40 Where the State thus preserves the judicial

10 Sec pp. 3-5, supra. The prohibition against "degrading" or unncccssnrily "severe" corporal punishment in former § 232.27 ha been construed as a statement of the common law principle. Sec 1937 Op. Fla. Atty. Gen. 169; cf. 1957 Op. Fla. Atty. Geu. 7, 8. Petitioners concN.ic that a tcncher who inflicts excessive puni8hment on a child may be held both ('ivilly and criminally liable under Florida law. Petitioners' Brirf ;3;{ n. 11, 34; Tr. of Arg. 17, 52-53. Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 827.03 (3) (107G) makes malirious punishment of a child a felony.

7 5-6527-0 PIA' JON

INGRAIIAJ\I v. WRIGHT 25·

safeguards that existed in common law, there is good reason to conclude that those remedies constitute clue process of la"·.41

Petitioners nonetheless argue that the traditional remedies are not adequa.te to protect against the type of harsh mistreatment they received at DrPw Junior High School. They insiRt that the common law remedi0s should be supplemented by the administrative saf0gnards of prior notice and a lwaring. This is not a friYolous argument. The school disciplinary process is not "a totally accurate. unerring process, neYPr mistaken and ncvcr 1111fair ... ," Goss, supra, at 579, anrl as a general rule we haw found some kind of prior hearing necessary to guard against arbitrary impositions on inter-

'11 "rPJ rior hen rings mi!J;ht be cnt irrl~· di.-<prnsrd with in m:1 n~· circ·um

r;t nnrc~ in whirh the ~Ia tc'~ condurt, if not ndr(Junt rl~· .in~tifif'd. would ron~titute a common lnw tort. This. wonlrl lc:wc the injur('(l 11laintiff in prrri~cly the snmf' post me ~~~ n rommon-1:1\\' pin in tiff. n ncl t hi~ prorcdnrn 1 ron~CfJUCnre would be fJuitP hnrmonious with tbr suh~t:wti1r Yirw th:1t the fourteenth nmrndmcnt cnrompnR~C'f' the same librrtir~ ns thosr protrrtrcl by the rommon lnw." 1\'Tonn)!hnn. Of "Librrty" n1~<l "Prop<:'rt~·." 62 Cornrll L . .J. -, - (1977) (footnot.c omitted). Rrc Rnnner v. C'n·ughlin, 517 F. 2d 1311,1319 (1975). moclifircl <'ll bnnr. IH5 F. 2d 565 (C.'\7 1970).

11 is true that. tho~<' who rlaim thr protrl'tion of the C'on~titution

n)!ain~t the action of the stntr arc not ordinarily limited to rrlief in stnte rourts. See Mnnroe v. Papc, :365 U.S. 167 (19Gl). But in thi~ rontcxt the relief avnilable in frdPral rourt. np~rt from that nJTordrd by the Fourth AmenclmPnl, is rompnrativrl:v limitrd. Srr Johnson v. Glick, 4S1 F. 2d 1028, 1032-1033 (CA2 107:3). Tlml', the Comt hns rrrognizrd the right. of one in the eu'-'lody of tho Rktte not to be phyRirnlly ]1tmi~hrd only wlwrc the punishm<>nt i~ "bound to oJTcnd C\'C'II hardened srn~ibilitics," Rochin Y. California. 342 U. S., at 174, 172. or wlwre it "offend;:; some principle of jmtire RO rooted in the t rndit ions and I'Om:ricnre of our peopk n::; to be rnnkrd a.~ fnndament<tl." Sn·ews v. UniLrd States, 325 U.S. 91, 95 (194.5), quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934). Di~riplinnry rorporn.l J1tmishmf'nt that would br rcn;:;onnblc nnd<:'r the common lnw ns it has brrn prcsrn·cd in most State::; cnrmot hr snid to mcrt the::;e threshold stanclnrcl~ for n federal rnuse of action.

7 5-6527 -OPINION


ests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S., at 569-570; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 557-558 (1974); cf. Friendly, supra.

But in this case there can be no deprivation of liberty unless the punishment exceeds the bounds of the common

. ~ law privilege, and the common law remedies have always been Jfficrf"' considercd"'to minimize the threat of constitutional violations.

5 There is a relevant analogy in the criminal law. Although the Fourth Amendment specifically proscribes "seizure" of a person without probable cause, the risk that police will act unreasonably in arresting a suspect is not thought to require an advance determination of the facts. In United States v. Watson, 423 U. R. 411 ( 1976), we reaffirmed the traditional common law rule that police officers may make warrantless public arrests on probable cause. Aithough we observed that an advance determination of probable cause by a magistrate would be desirable. we declined "to transform this judicial preference into a judicial rule when the judgment of the Nation and Congress has for so long been to authorize warrantless public arrests on probable cause .... " I d., at 423; sec id., at 429 (PowELL, J .. concurring). Despite the distinct possibility that a police officer may improperly assrss the facts and thus unconstituti011ally deprive an individual of lihrrty. we declined to drpa.rt from the traditional rulr by which the officer's prrcrption is subjected to judicial scrutiny only after the fact."12 Thrrc is no more reason to require advance procPdural safeguards for intrusions on personal securitv to which the Fourth Amendment does not apply."'

·~Tho rrnsonnblcnr~s of n Fonrf h Amrndmrnt ini nt~ion m:1~' br subjrrird to snbsrqurnt judi(•ial ~rru1inv in n .~ tnt.r tori. or rriminnl nrtion ngninst thr lrrw rnforrrmrnt offirrr. Monroe v. Pope. 2o5 U. 8. 107 (1901); Ri?'f118 , •. Six Unknown Named Agrnts. 402 U. R. 2SS (1971). or in ::t

suppression hrnring to clrtcrminr whri her thr fmit~ of thr ini rmion mn:v be nRrd in a criminnl lrinl. Mapp v. Ohio. 207 U. ~. 642 (19ol).

" 1 Thr sub~tnntivr proirri ion rrrogni;r,rd in snrh ra~rs ns Rochin nnri 8rrr1rs docs not rcndi ly trnnsln1e into nclvnnrr prorrclurnl Rnfrl!;llnrds.

75-6527-0PINION


3

But even if the incremental benefit of advance procedural safeguards were clear, the question would remain whether tho benefit could justify the cost. Acceptance of petitioners' claims would work a transformation in the law governing corporal punishment in Florida and most other States. Given the impracticability of formulating a rule of procedural due process that varies with the severity of the particular imposition:4 the prior hearing petitioners seek ·would have to precede any paddling, however moderate or trivial.

Such a universal constitutional requirement would significantly burden the use of corpora.] punishment as a disciplinary measure. Hearings-even informal hrarings- require time, personnel, and a diversion of attention from norrnal school pursuits. School authorities may well choose to abandon corporal punishment rather than incur the burdens of complying with the procedural requirements. Teachers, properly concerned with maintaining authority in the classroom, may well prefer to a.voicl ally risk that a hearing will result in a rejection of their recommendation that punishment is necessary. Paradoxically, such an alteration of disciplinary policy

Tho nature of the right iH such t.hat its clepriYation can be tested: "only by :111 npprn i~:ll of the totality of fnrts in a l,!;i,·en C:tl"e. That which ma:v. in one setting, constitute a cl<>nial of fumhmcnt:d f:Jirne..:~. Hhorking to the uni,·er.·ml sense of juHtice, rna~·. in other circurnsttmccs, and in light of other ronsidcmtions, fall ~horl of rmrh dc>ninl." Scrr?l' Y. Uuited 8tat,"s, 325 U. S. 91 , 95 (19-l5) .

41 "rPJ rorcduml due prOC<'SS mlcH nrc shaped by the risk of error inhc>rent in the trut-h-finding prore~s as a pplicd to the gclH'r:dit~· of ca.~c;;,

not the rare exceptions .... " Mathews \'. Eldridge, 42-t U. 8 ., at 3-+4. In this rn ~e petitioners' e,·iclcncc snggc,;t s that corporal puni~hmcnt in Dade County wa;;:, "with the exception of a few r:IHe~ .... unremarkable in phy,;ical se\·crity." App. 152. The in~kuwc., of SPYNe p1111i ' hmcnt n t Drew to which pet it ioner~ and ot.her,.; t r~ t ifiecl were except ion~ to the prc,·ailing practice in Dade Count~', " ·hich was not Hhown to he inron~i~tcnt with common law princiJllcs . Cf. App. 149.

75-6527-0PINION


is most likely to occur in the ordinary case where the contemplated punishment is well within the common law privilege.

Elimination or curtailment of corporal punishment would br welcomed by many as a societal advance. But when such a policy choice may result from this Court's determination of an assrrtf'd right to clue process. rather than from the norrnal processes of community rl<'bate and legislative action, the societal costs cannot br dismissed as insubstantial." 5 We are reYiewing here a lf'gislative .i udgment, rooted in history and reaffirmed in the la"·s of many States, that corporal punishment serves important educational interests. This judgment must be virw('(i in light of thr disciplinary problems commonplace in the schools. As noted in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S., at 580, infractions of rules calling for "discipline are frequent occurrencrs and ~omctimes require immediate, effective action." Assessment of the nrecl for, and the appropriate means of maintaining, school discipline a.re committed generally to the discretion of school authorities subject to state law. "fTl he court has rPpratedly rmphasizcd the nred for affirming the comprehensiw authority of the states and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools."· Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U. S., at 507.

"At some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual affected and to society in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S., at 348. We

•s "Tt may be true that prorrdural rrgularity in disciplinary prorrrdinp;s promotes a sense of institutional raJ1port and oprn communication, a perception of fair treatment, and prm·idrs 1he offender and hiR fellow students a showcase of drmocrary at work. B11f ... frJc.~pect for democratic institutions will equally dissipate if they are thought too ineffectual 1o provide their students an environment. of order in which the <'cillrrttional prorc: s may go forward .... " Wilkin~on, Goss v. Lopez: The SupremeCourt as School Superintrndent, 1975 Sup. Ct. Rev. 25, 71-72.

75-G.i27-0PIXIO~

INGR.\liAl\I v. WRIGliT

think that point has been reached in this cnsC'. In v1cw of the openness of our schools and the common law safeguards that already exist, the risk of error that may result in violation of a schoolchild's right of personal security can only be regarded as minimal. The requirement of additional administrative safeguards under the banner of tlw Constitution might reduce that risk marginally, but would also entail a Rignificant intrusion into an area of primary educational responsibility. We conclude that. where the traditional cmnmon law remedies arc available, the Due Process Clause docs not require additional procedural safeguards before the imposition of corporal punishment in the public schoolR.

v Petitioners cannot prevail on either of the theories before

us in this case. The Eighth Arnendment's prohibition against cruel and unnsual punishments is inapplicable to school padcllings, and the Fourteenth Amendment's rC'q uircment of procedural due process is Ratisfied by Florida's prcsc'rvation of conunon law remedies. \Ve therefore agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioners' evidence a.:ffords no basis for injunctive relief, and that petitioners cannot recover damages on the basis of any Eighth Amendment or procedural clue process violation.

The Court of Appeals' judgment, howe,·er, rests in part on a premise which our decision calls into question. The Court of Appeals concluded that it had no mandate to determine whether Ingraham and Andrews individually had stated valid claims for damages under ~ 1983 because, in its view, no substantial constitutional interest was implicated in this case. But \Ve have concludecl that a child in the custody of public school authorities has a liberty interest, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, in not being subjected to unjustified corporal punishment. It is unclear whetlwr the Court of Appeals would have reached the same result on the issue of

75-6527-0PINION

30 INGRAHAM v . WRIGHT

substantive rights under the Fourteenth Amendment had it r taken ou~ view of the constitutional interest at stake. We

therefore think it appropriate to afford the Court of Appeals an opportunity to reconsider these individual claims for damages if the parties so desire! 6

The judgment of the Court of Appeals on count three of the complaint is affirmrd. The judgment on counts one and two is vacated and the case remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

4 6 The quP~~ Lion whethrr petitioner~' evidence i1> suilicient to make out a violation of substantive rights under the Due Process Clause was not independently briefPd or argued in this Court.. See n. 12, supra. Accordingly, except insofar as our discussion of the procedural i s~;ues necessarily bears on the question of substantive right;;, we express no view on thC' proper disposition on remand.

g,A_.4,~~ ,:P~~

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~...: .... .,...)

No. 75-6527 ~ ~%*-1 James Ingraham, by his Mother

and Next Friend, Eloise Ingraham, et al.,

Petitioners, v.

Willie J. Wright, I , et al.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

fMarch -, 1977]

MR. JusTICE PoWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents questions concerning the use of corporal punishment in public schools: first, whether the paddling of students as a means of maintaining school discipline constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and second, to the extent that paddling is constitutionally permissible, whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the schools to supplement traditional common law safeguards with prior notice and an opportunity to be heard.

I

Petitioners James Ingraham and Roosevelt Andrews filed the complaint in this case on January 7, 1971. in the United States District Court for the District of Florida.1 At the time both were enrolled in the Charles R. Drew Junior High School in Dade County, Fla., Ingraham in the eighth grade and Andrews in the ninth. The complaint contained three counts, each alleging a separate cause of action for depriva-

1 As Ingraham and Andrews were minors , the rompbint. was filrd in ihe names of Eloi~e Ingraham, Jnmcs' mothrr, nnd Willie E\·erctt, Roosevrlt's father .

7 5-6527 -OPINION


tion of constitutional rights, under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981-1988. Counts one and two were individual damage actions by Ingraham and Andrews based on paddling incidents that allegedly occurred in October 1970 at Drew Junior High School. Count three was a class action for declaratory a.nd injunctive relief filed on behalf of all students in the Dade County schools.2 Named as defcnda.nts in all counts were respondents Willie J. Wright (principal at Drew Junior High School). Lemmie Deliford (an assistant principal), Solomon Barnes (an assistant to the principal), and Edward L. Whigham (superintendent of the Dade County School System).3

Petitioners prC'sented their evidence at a. week-long trial before th<: District Court. At the close of petitioners' case, respondents moved for dismissal of count three "on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no ril!:ht to relief," Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 41 (b), and for a. ruling that the evidence would be insufficient to go to a jury on counts one and two.~ The District Court granted the motion

2 Thr Di.-otrict Court certified the rlas~. under Frd. Rul<:> Civ. Pror. 2:3 (b) (2) and (<') (1), :1s follows

"All students of t.he Dade Count~· School s~·stf'm who :ur cmbject to the roq1oral punishment polirie~ i;.:~ued b~· the Defend:1nt, D:1de Count~·

School Bo:1rd .... " App. 19. One student wa~'< specifir:1lly except.ed from the rbss by requ~t..

"The romphint. al;.:o named Dade County R<•hool Board as n. defcnclnnt, hut. the Court of Appeals hrld thnt. the Board w:1s not amenable to suit undPr 42 U. S. C . ~~ 1981-1!)88 and di~mi"sed the suit ag:1inst the Board for want of jurisdiction. 525 F. 2d 90!) (19713). This a::pert of the Court of Appcab' jucl~!:ment . i...: not hrforr us.

4 Petitioners h:1cl waiYed thrir right to jury trial on the rl:tims for damages in count~ one and two. but rcsponclrnt s had not. The DiHtrict Comt prorecclecl initi:1ll~· to hrar eYidrnrr only on rount three, the rlaim for injnnr1in• rc•Jipf. At thr rlo~e of prtitioncr;;' r:tse, however, the partir.,; a.grccd that. thr e\·iclrnr<:> o1Trrrcl on count thrrr (to~ethrr with certain :-;tipul:t.trd t~timony) would be ronsiclcrrd, for purposes of a motion for dirrct·ecl \·crclict, a;; if it h:1d nh;o been offered on counts one and two. It

75-6527-0PINION


as to all three counts. and dismissed the complaint without hearing evidence on behalf of the school authorities. App. 147-156.

Petitioners' evidence may be summarized briefly. In the 1970-1971 school yea.r many of the 237 schools in Dade County used corpora.! punishment as a means of maintaining discipline pursuant to Florida legislation anrl a local school board rcgulation.5 The statute then in effect authorized limited eorporal punishment by negative inference, proseribing punishment which was "degrading or unduly severe" or which was inflicted without prior consultation with the principal or the teacher in charge of the school. Fla. Stat. Ann. ~ 232.27 (1961).~ The regulation, Dade Connty School Board Policy

wns und('rstood thnt r('sponrl('nts could r('n~<Eert n right to jury trial if the motion were denied. App. 147.

5 Tho evidence dDffi not f'how how mn.ny of the schools actually emplo~·ed corporal punishment as a mmns of maintaining di,:eiplin('. Tho n.uthorizn.tion of the prnctic<' b~- tho School Bon.rd <'xknd('d to 231 of tho ,:chools in the 1970-1971 school year, but 16 of tho,c;<' i'chools did not ndmini"tcr rorpor!ll punishment ns a matter of 1<rhool poliry. App. 1+1-143.

6 In the 1970-1971 school ~·car, § 232.27 providrcl: "En.rh tcach('r or other member of the stnff of nn~· school "hnll :1~""11me

surh n.uthority for the rani rol of pupil~ n<; may be ns,:igncd to him by the primipnl and shall kr('p good ordrr in the rln,:sroom :1nd in other plarrs in whieh he is assignee! to hr in rhnrgc of pupils, but l}(' skill not inflict corporal punishmrnt h('fore rom,ulting th(' prinripnl or trnrhrr in rhnrge of tho school, nne! in no rnse skdl such pnnishrn('Jlt br d('grnding or unduly S('\·rrr in its nntnr(' .... "

Eff('rti\·(' July 1, 1976. tlw Florida Lcgislnturc nm('m)('d thr l:m gOY('rningcorporal pllllishrn('nt. Section 282.27 now rr.nck

"8ubjrct to law :llld to the ntlc~ of the cbtrict school ho:ml, Pnrh teacher or othrr member of tlH' staff of nn:v school ~'hall hnw suf'h nut horit~· for the control and di-;eiplinc of l'tndcnts ns mn.y be as~igncd to him b~· the principal or hi-; dei'ignatrd rcprc~rntntiY<' m1d shall kc('p good orclrr in thP eln.":;:room and in othrr pbc('.-' in which he is nosignrd to ho in rhnrg(' of student<'. If a t('achrr fc('L~ thnt. corpornl pnni~hrncnt i:-< ncrr:-t<~nr~·. nt lc:~~t. th(' following procrclum>:-<hrtll br foliO\\"('{!:

"(1) The u~r of rorpor:d puni>hmrnt ~hnll b(' npprowcl in prinripl(' by

75-6527-0PINION


5144, contained explicit directions and limitations.7 Theauthorized punishment ronsist('d of paddling the rrcalcitrant student on the buttocks with a flat wooden paddle measuring

11w principal bPfor<> it is u~ed, but npprovnl i'i not neres~nr~· for rnrh sprrifir instanr<> in which it is usrd.

"f2) A t.eachrr or principnl mny ndmini~ter rorpornl TJ11Tli~hmrnl onlv in tlw presence of :mother ndult who is informrcl brforehand, nnd in the f;tudent's pr<*"<>nrr of the rl'a~on for thr punishml'nt".

"(~) A tearh<>r or prinripnl who hns ndminist rrrd puni~hmrnt sh:~ll, upon request. providr thr pupil's pnrrnt or gnardi:m wilh :1 wriltrn <>xpbnation of thr reason for the runishment. :~nd the nnmr of thr of hrr adult who w:1R present."

Fin. Stat. Ann. §2~2.27 (1977 Supp.) (rodifier's notation omitted). Corporal punishment is no\Y drfinrd as "the moderate 11sr of ph~·~ir:1l forre or ph~·siral conl:-~rt b~· a tenrher or prinrip:~l :-~s mn~· hr nerr:-~nrv to mnint:~in di~riplinr or to rnforre s~hool rules." ~ 228.041. Thr Jornf school boardR arr rxpres~l~· nut horizrd to :~dopt rules governing studrnt ron duct nnd di~riplilw ~nd n rr directrd to make avnilnble rodr~ of Rl udrnt conduct. § 2~0.23 (6). Trarhrrs and prinripnls nrr gi\·rn immunity from civil nnd criminal li:~bilit~- for enforcing disriplinnr~· nllr><. "frlxrept in the c:~se of exrrssive forrc or crurl and unno::11al puniRhmrnt ... .'~

§ 2~2.275. 7 In the 1970-1971 school ~·<>ar. Policy 5144 :1uthorizrcl rorporn l puni."h

ment whrrr th<> f:~ilure of other means of serking cooprration from the student made its nsr nerrs~nry. Tho regulation sp<>rifird th:Jt ihr prinripnl should drtrrmine tlw necr,.<:sily for corporal punishment. th:1t thr student should underRtnnd th<> srriousnel"s of the offense and thr rer~o::on for the pnnishm<>nt. nnd thn.t. the punishment. should br ndmini~t rrrd in the presence of anothrr adnlt in rirrnmstanc<>.<; not c:~lrnlnted to hold tho student up to sh:1mr or ricliculr. The rrgnlntion cautionrd ngninst nsing corporal punishmrnt :1gainst a student under psychologir:1l or mrdicnl tre:~tment, and warned th:1t the p<>rson administering thr punishmrnt "must realize his own perso11:1.l liahilities" in any rao::r of phyRirnl injur~··

App. 17. 'Vhile t.his litig:-~tion wns prnding in tlw Distrirl Court, thr Dndr

County School Board :-~mendrd Policy 5144 to st:~ndardize the sizr of the pr~.dcUes used in accordmwc with the description in thr text, to prosrrihe st.riking a child with a pa.dcllc el~ewhere than on the bnttorkR, to limit t.he pennissible number of "!irks" (fi,-e for elementary :~nd intermediate grndrs and se,·cn for junior and ~cnior gmdrs), and io rcCJuirr n contemporaneous

i .1-G.j:.?i-Ol'I.:\10X

INGHAHAM v. WRlGIIT 5

less than two feet long. three to four inches \Yide. and about one-half inch thick. The normal punishment was limited to one to five "licks'' or blows \Yith the paddle and resultrd in no appa.rent physical injury to tho student. School authorities viewed corporal punishment as a kss drastic mrans of discipline than suspension or expulsion. Contrary to tlte procedural requirements of tho statute and regulation. tearhers often paddlecl stmlcntf' on their own authority without first consulting the prinr.ipa.J.8

Petitioners focused on Drew Junior High School. the school in '"hich both Ingraham and Andre,,·s \Yere enrolled in thr fall of 1070. In an apparent rcff'rencc to Drew. the District Court found that "[t]he instances of punishment which could be chamctrrized as severe. accepting the students' testimony as credible. took place in one junior high school." App. 152. The evidence. consisting ma.inly of tho testimony of 16 students. sugg0sts that the rf'gime at Drew \Yas 0xceptiona1ly harsh. The testimony of Ingraham and Andrews. in support of their individual claims for damages. is illustrativE'. B0cause l10 ,,·as slow to respond to his teachN's instructions. Ingraham was subjected to more than 20 licks with a paddle while being held over a table in the principal's office. The paddling wa.s so severe that he sufferrd a hematoma 9 requiring medical attPntion and kE'eping him out of school for 11 days.1

(}

cxpbnn,t.ion of the need for thr punif'hmrnt to 1 he Rtndrnt and n. ~llbf'C

qurnt. no1 ification to the parrntR. App. 130-1il2. s Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F. 2d 248, 255, nnd n. 7 (original p:mcl

opinion), vacated on rehr:tring, 525 F. 2d 909 (1976); App. 51. H2, 152; Exhibi1s 14, 15.

9 Stcdm:.n's Medical Diet ion:trr (23cl eel. 1976) drfinc.o; "hematoma" as

"raJ localized muss of ext.r~wn><ated blood that is rrlatiYr!y or complrtel~· confined within nn organ or tissue ... : the blood is u'n:-~II:v rlotted (or partly elot.ted), mtd, deprncling on how long it has brrn thrre, mn~· m:-tnifest Yarious degrees of organization nnd derolori?.n.tion."

10 App. 4-5, 20-22, 71-88, 133- 140.

75-6527-0PINION


Andrews was paddled several times for minor infractions. On two occasions he was struck on his arms, once depriving him of the full use of his arm for a week.n

The District Court made no findings on the credibility of the· students' testimony. Rather, assuming their testimony to be credible, the court found no constitutional basis for relief. With respect to count three, the class action, the court concluded that the punishment authorized and pra.cticed generally in the county schools violated no constitutional right. App. 148, 155. With respect to counts one and two, the individual damage actions, the court concluded that while corporal punishment could in some cases violate the Eighth Amendment, in this case a jury could not lawfully find "the elements of severity, arbitra.ry infliction. unacceptability in terms of contemporary standards. or gross disproportion which are necessary to bring 'punishment' to the constitutional level of 'cruel and unusual punishment.'" App. 148-149.

A panel of the Court of Appeals voted to reverse. 498 F. 2d 248 (1976). The panel concluded that the punishment was so severe and oppressive as to violate the Eighth a.nd Fourteenth Amendments, and that the procedures outlined in Policy 5144 failed to satisfy the requirC'ments of the Due Process Clause. Upon rehearing. the en bane conrt rejected these conclusions and affirmed the judgment of the District Court. 525 F. 2d 909 (1076). The full court held that the Due Process Clause did not require notice or an opportunity to be heard:

"In essence, we refuse to set forth, as constitutionally mandated, procedural standards for an activity which is not substantial enough on a constitutional level, to justify

11 App. 5-6, 107-116. The simibr experirnrr.,; of several other students a.t Drew, to which they individunJly testified in the District Court, are summarized in t.hc original pnncl opinion in the Court of Ap11enls, 405 F. 2d 248, 257-2!)9, varnted on rehcnring, 525 F. 2d 909.

75-0527-0PINION


the time and effort which would have to be expended by the school in adhering to those procedures or to justify further interference by federal courts into the internal affairs of public schools." /d., a.t 919.

The court also rejected the petitioners' substantive contentions. The Eighth Amendment, in the Court's view, was simply inapplicable to corporal punishment in public schools. Stressing the likelihood of civil and criminal liability in state law, if petitioners' evidence were believed, the court held that " [ t] he administration of corporal punishment in public schools, whether or not excessively administered, does not come within the scope of Eighth Amendment protection." /d., at 915. Nor was there a.ny substantive violation of the Due Process Clause. The court noted tha.t "[p] addling of recalcitrant children has long been an acceptable method of promoting good behavior and instilling notions of responsibility and decorum into the mischievous heads of school children." /d., at 917. The court refused to examine instances of punishment individua.lly:

"We think it a misuse of our judicial power to determine, for example, whether a teacher has acted arbitrarily in paddling a particular child for certain behavior or whether in a particular instance of mif!conduct five licks would have been a more appropriate punishment tha.n ten licks." Ibid.

We granted certiorari. limited to the questions of cruel and unusual punishment and procedural dne process. 425 U. S. 990.1 ~

12 We denied rc,·iew of n. third CJue,;tion prrsented in thr prt it ion for· certiorari:

"Is the infliction of se,·ere rorpoml pnni;.;hmcnt upon public Hrhool student s arbitrary, raprir·ious and unrrlatrd to :t('hir,·ing any lrgitim:ltr educn.tional purpo~e and therefore YiolatiYe of tlw Dur Prorc~s Cl:msr of the Fourteenth Amrnclmrnt ?" Petition for Crrt iomri 2.

75-6527-0PINION


II

The questions before us must be considered in light of the attitudes of this Nation toward corpora.l punishment as a means of maintaining discipline in school. In defining the· breadth of the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty, \ 1 through which the Eighth Amendment is applicable to the States. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), this Court has often found it critical to determine whether the State's power· has been exercised within the limits of "civilized standards," Francis ex rel. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459, 468 (1947) (Frankfurter. J., concurring) .1or whether a pr~·a.l safeguard is I 1 "necessary to a.n Anglo-American regime of ordered ' 1iberty."· \ Duncan v. LnU?'siana, 391 U. S. 145, 149 n. 14 (1968). We therefore begin by examining the way in which our traditions and our la.ws have responded to the use of corporal punishment in public schools.

The use of corporal punishment in this country as a means of disciplining schoolchildren dates back to the colonial period.13 It has survived the transformation of primary and secondary education from the colonials' reliance on optional private arrangements to our present system of compulsory education la.ws and dependence on public schools.14 Despite the general abandonment of corporal punishment as a means

18 See H. Falk, Corporal Punishment 11-48 (1941); N. EdwnrdR & H. Richey, The School in the Amrriran Social Order 112-113 (1947).

14 Public and compulsory cdurntion existed in New England hcforc the Revolution, sec N. Ed"·nrcls & H. Richey, supra, at 50-68, 78-81, 97-113, but the demand for free public schools as we now know them did not gain momentum in the country as a whole until the mid-1800;;, nnd it was not until 1918 that compuL~ory ~rhool ntt.enclancc laws were in force in nil the States. Sec Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 489 n. 4 (1954), citing Cubberlcy, Public Education in thr United Stntrs 408-423, 563-565 (1934 cd.); cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 226, nnd n. 15 (1972).

75-6527-0J'INIO~

INGR .\IL\l\1 v. WHIGHT

of punishing criminal offenders/" the practice continues toplay a role in the public education of schoolchildren in most r>arts of the country.' r. Professional and public opinion is sha.rply divided on the practice,11 and has been for more than a century.18 Yet Ke can discern no trend toward its elin1ination.

At common law a single principle has governed thr use of corporal punishme11t sincf' before the American Revolution: teachers may imposf' reasonable but not excessive force to discipline a child.' 9 Blackstonr cata.Ioguecl among the "absolute right.•:; of individuals" the right "to security from the corporal insults of menaces, assaults, heating and wounding." I Blackstone, Commrntaries -r-·134. but he did not rrgard it a "corporal insult" for a teacher to inflict "moderate correction" on a child in his care. To the extent that force " ·as "necessary to answer the purposes for which r the teacher l wa.s employed," Blackstone viewrd it as "justifiable or lawful." I Blackstone,

' " See Jackson v. Bishop, 40.J. F. 2d 571 , 579-5RO (CAS HJ6~ ): II . F;tlk , supra, at 85-~8.

1 6 See K . Lar~on & M . Karpn.~. F.ffrcti,·e Seconda1;,· School Di~<' iplinr

146 (1963); Reitman, Follman & Ladd , Corporal PuniHhnwnt in Public Schools 2-5 (ACLU Report HJ72) .

17 For samplings of scholarly opinion on the u~e of corporal ptmi~hment in the schools, sec F. Rea rdon & R. Re~·nold~ , Corporal Puni~hmcnt in Pennsylvania 1-2, 34 (1975) ; National Eduration Association, Rrport of the Task Forcr on Corporal Puni~hment (1972) ; K. .Tame.~, Corporal Punishment in the Public School<> 8-16 (1963). Opinion .un·ryH takrn since 1970 have consistent])' Rhown a majority of teachers and of the gen r ral public favoring modrratc usr of rorporal puni~hment in the lower grades. See F. Reardon & R Reynold;;, supra, at 2, 23- 26; Delaware Drpartment of Education , Rrport on the Corporal Punil'hment Snn·cy 48 (1974) ; Reitman , Follman & Lacld, supra, at 34--35; National Education A~sociation , supra, at 7.

1 ~ Sre H . Falk, supra, 66-69; ef. Cooper v. McJunkin, 4 Ind. 290 (1853) . 1 n Sec I. F . fbrper & F . Jamc.<:, The Law of Torts 288-292 (1956) ;

Proehl, Tort Liability of Teachers, 12 Yand. L. H.C\' . 723, 734--738 (1959) ; W. Prosdcr, Law of Torts 136- 137 (4th cd. 1971) .

75-6527-0PINION


Commentaries *134, III Blackstone, Commentaries *120. The basic doctrine has not changed. The prevalent rule in this country today privileges such force as a teacher or administrator "reasonably beliews to be necessa.ry for [the child's] proper control, training, or education." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 147 (1). To the extent that the force is excessive or unreasonable, the educator in virtually all States is subject to possible civil and criminal liability.!!'()

Although the early cases viewed the authority of the teacher as deriving from the pa.rents,21 the concept of parental delegation has been replaced by the view-more consonant with compulsory education laws-that the State itself may impose such corporal punishment as is reasonably necessary "for the proper education of the child and for the maintenance of group discipline." I Harper & James, The Law of Torts ~ 3.20, at 292.22 All of the circumstances are to be taken into account in determining whether the punishment is reasonable in a particular case. Among the most important considerations are the seriousness of tho offense. the attitude and past behavior of the child. the nature and severity of the punishment, the a.ge and strength of the child, and the availability of lesR severe but equa.lly effective means of discipline. I d., at 200-2!H; Restatement (Second) of Torts~ 150 Comments c-e.

Today, the common law rule permitting reasonable corporal

20 See cast'~ cit.ed n. 29, infra.. The criminal rode..~ of m'lny States include provi~ions explicitly rrf'o~nir.ing the 1earhrr'f< common lnw pri,·ilegr to inflict rc:tsonable corporal pnni~hmrnt. E. g., Ariz. Re\'. St:tt. § 13-246 (A) (1) (19.'i6); Conn. Crn. Stat. Ann. § 53a-1S (1976 Snpp.); Nrb. Rev. Stat. § 2R-840 (2) (1975); New York Prnal Code § 35.10 (McKinney 1975); Ore. Rev. Stat.§ 161.205 (1) (1971).

~~See Proehl, supra, :tt 726, and n. 13. 22 Today, rorpoml pnni~hmrnt in sC'hool i:-; ronditionrcl on pnrrn1af

appro,·al in on]~· two Statr~. California nnd Wi~consin. Cal. Eclucntion Code, r. 1010, § 49001 (1976); Monow Y. Woods, 35 Wis. 59 (1874). Thi~ Court. ha;; held in a ~mnmary affirm:1nec lhn1 parrntnl npproYnl of corporal punishment is Ito(. ron.,1itut.ionallr rrqnirrcl. Bakrr v. Owrn, 423: U. S. 907, aff'g 395 F. Snpp. 29-l (l\1D~C 197.5) .

75-6527-0PINION


punishment prevails in most States. Of the 23 States that have addressed the problem through lPgislation, 21 have authorized the moderate usc of corporal punishment in public schools.23 Of these States only a few have elaborated on the common law test of reasonableness, typically providing for approval or notification of the child's parents,2

• or for infliction of punishment only by the principal 2

" or in the presence of a.n adult witness. 2

r. Only two States, Massa.chusetts and Rhode Island, have prohibited all corporal punishment in their public schools.27 Where the legislatures ha.vc not acted, the state courts have uniformly preserved the common law rule permitting teachers to use reasonable force in disciplining children in their chargP.2

R

2 ~ Cnl. FAiucation Code, c. 1010, §§ 49000-49001 (1976); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 14, §701 (1974); Fla. Stat. Ann. §232.27 (1977 Supp.); Geo. Code Ann. §§ 32-835, 32-836 (1061); Hnw. Rev. Stnt. § 298-16 (Hl6R); Ill. Ann. Stat.., c. 122, §§ 24-24, 34-R4n, (1976-1977 S11pp.); Ind. Code Ann. § 20-iU-5-2 (1975); Md. Ed11c. Code Ann., Art. 77, § 9813 (1975) (in specified ro11ntirs): Mich. Comp. Lnws Ann., § 340.756 (Hl76); Mont. Rrl". Codrs Ann. § 75-6109 (1947): Nev. Rev. Stn1. § 392.46.'i (1973); N. C. Grn. Stat. § 115-146 (1975); Ohio Rc\". Code Ann. § 331!).41 (Hl72): Okla. Stnt. Ann., Tit. 70. § 6-114 (1966); Penn. Cons. Stat. Ann., Tit. 1R, § 13-1317 (1976-1977 Supp.); S. C. Codr § 21-776 (1975 Supp.): fl. D. Comp. La.ws Ann. § 13-32-2 (1975): Vt. Stat. Ann. § 13-32-2 (1975); Va. Code Ann. § 22-231.1 (1950); W. Va. Code, § lRA-5-1 (Hl71): Wyo. Stat. §21.1-6-! (1975 S11np.).

21 Cal. Educn,t ion Codr, r. 1010, § 49001 ( 1976) (requiring prior pnrrntnl approval in writing): Fla. Stnt. Ann. § 232.27 (3) (1977 S11pp.) ( rrquiring n, written t'Xplnnnt ion on rrq11rst); Mont. Rr,·. Cork<, § 7,')-6109 (1947) (ref!uiring prior pnrrnfnl notifica.1ion if pos~ihlr).

2 " Dr!. Code Ann., Tit. 14. § 701 (1074): 1\Tcl. Ann. Codr. Art. 77. § nsn (1975).

zr.nrl. Code Ann., Tit. 14, §701 (1974): Fb. Rt.at. Ann. §232.27 (1977 Supp.); Haw. Rrv. Stat>~. § 298-16 (1968); Mont. nr,·. Codr~,

§ 7.'5-6109 (1947). 27 1\fn>'~. Gen. Ln.w~ Ann. r. 71, § 37G (1976-1977 flupp.); N . .J. Rtat.

Ann. 18_\: 6-1 (Wrst) (Hl6R). 2 ' E. g., Suits \". GloN'T, 260 Ab. 440, 71 flo. 2d 40 (1954); La Frrntz v.

GaUaghcr, 10.5 Ariz. 255, 462 P. 2d 804 (1960); Berry \'. Arnold School

75-6527-0PINION


Against this background of historical and contemporary approval of reasonable corporal punishment, we turn to the· constitutional questions before us.

III

The Eighth Amendment provides, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fine's imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Bail. fines and punishment traditionally have been associated with the criminal process, and by subjecting the thrw to parallel limitations the text of the Amendment suggests an intention to limit the power of those entrusted with the criminal law function of government. An examination of the history of the Amendment and the decisions of this Court construing the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment confirms that it was designed toprotect those convicted of crimes. We adhNe to this longstanding limita.tion and hold that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to the paclclling of children as a means of maintaining discipline in public schools.

A

The history of the Eighth AmC'ndment is well known.29'

The text was taken, almost verbatim, from a provision of the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, which in turn derived

District, 199 Ark. 1118, 137 S. W. 256 (1940); Audreozzi v. Rubano, 145 Conn. 280, 141 A. 2d 639 (1958); Tinkham v. Kale, 252 Iow:L 1303, 110' N. W. 2d 258 (1961); Carr ' ' · Wright, 423 S. W. 2d 521 (Ky. 1968); Christman v. Hickman, 22.5 Mo. App. 828, 37 S. W. 2d 672 (1931); Kidder v. Chellis, 59 N.H. 473 (1879); People v. Jackson, 65 Mi~c. 2d 909,. 319 N. Y. S. 2d 731, 734-735, aff'd, 30 N. Y. 2d 734 (1971); Simms v. School District No.1, 508 P. 2d 236 (Ore. App. 1973); Marlar v. Bill, 18 Tenn. 100, 178 S. W. 2d 634 (1944); Prende1·gast v. Masterson, 196 S. W. 246 (Tex. 1917).

"2fl See Gregg v. Georgia., - U. S. -, - - - (1976) (plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 314 (1972) (MARSHALL, .T., concurring); Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:· The Original Meaning, 57 CalL. Rev. 839 (1969).

75-6.527-0PI:\'lON

INGRAHAM v. WHTGHT l:f

from the English Bill of Rights of 1689. The English version, adopted after the acccsssion of William and Mary. was intcT1decl to curb tho excesses of English judges under the reign of James II. Historians have viewed the English provision as a reaction either to the "Bloody Assize." the treason triaJs conducted by Chief Justice Jeffreys in 1685 after the abortive rebellion of the Duk0 of Monmouth.~0 or to the perjury prosecution of Titus Oates in the same year."' In either case, the exclusive concern of the English version was the conduct of judges in enforcing the criminal law. The original draft introduced in the House of Commons provided: 32

"The requiring excessive bail of persons committed in criminal cases and imposing excessive fines. and illegal punishments, to be prevented."

Although the reference to "criminal cases" was eliminated from the final draft, the presPrvation of a similar reference in tho preamble 33 indicates that the deletion was "·ithout substantive significance. Thus. Blackstone treated each of the provision's three prohibitions as bearing only on criminal proceedings and judgments.~•

30 Sre I. Brant, The Bill of Ri~rh t.s 155 ( 19fl5). :n See Gra.nurci, supra, 852-860. 3 ~ l d .. at 855. :<:<The preamble ]Jro1·iclcd in part:

"IVIIEREAS the late King .Tamrs tho Second, by the :-tssistancr of divrrs eYil counsellors, judges, and mini~trr~ r.mployed by him, did endr.:-t 1·or to suh1·crt :-tnd oxtirpate ... the laws and librrties of thi~ kingdom.

"10. And cxcessiYe b:-til hath been required of pcr~ons committed in criminal c:-tscs, to elude the benefit of thr laws made for the libe1i~· of the snbjects.

"11. And excessive finn~ ha.Ye bPrn impo~rcl; :wd illegal :-tnd cmel puni~hment~ inflicted .... " R. Perry, Rource~ of Our Libertirs 245-246 (1959).

:I< 4 Bhckf't.onr, Commrntn.ries •:·297 (bail), -K·379 (fines and other punishments).

7 5-6527 -OPINION


The Americans who adopted the language of this part of the English Bill of Rights in framing their own state and federal constitutions 100 years later feared the imposition of torture and other cruel punishmmts not only by judges acting beyond their lawful authority, but also by legislatures engaged in making the laws by which judicial authority would be measured. Weems v. Unit('d States, 217 U.S. 349,371-373 (1910). Indeed, the principal concern of the American Framers appears to have been with the legislative definition of crimes and punishments. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446-447 (1890); Furman v. Georg1'a, 408 U, S. 238, 263 (1972) (BRENNAN, J., concurring), But if the American provision was intended to restrain government more broadly than its English model, the subject to which it was intended to apply-the criminal process-was the same.

At the time of its ratification. the original Constitution was cdticized in the Massachusetts and Virginia Conventions for its failure to provide any protection for persons convicted of crimrs.~~ The vie"·s of the critics ultimately prevailed. ? 'Vhen the Righth Amendment "·as adopted by the First Con-~ress. only on<' representative. Livermore, spoke out against it. His objection. in suhstanPe. was that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause might havr ~ the effect of outlawing what were then the common cdminal punishments of hanging,

ar. Ahr:~h:1m Holmp;:; of l\1:1~;-:arhn~cttR rompbinrd ~pccifirally of the :1bRrnre of a. proyi;.:ion rr~tr:1ining Congrr~H in it~ powrr to dc1crminc "whnt kind of pnni;:;hmcn1s .shall he innirtrd on J)er~ons conYi<'ied of rrimrs."· 2 .T. Elliot';.: Drbate.-; 111 (2d eel. 1876). Pntric-k Hrnr~· wns of the ~a me mind:

"'What ~ay~ onr rvirginia] hill of rights?-'1h:~t cxccssi\'C bail ought not 1o be re(juirPcl, nor cxrr~~i\·c fine.-; impo~ed, nor rrurl and UllllSUalJ)l111i~h

mcnts inflieird.' Arc yon not, therefore, now rnlliug on those gentlemen who nrc to compose Congre~~. to prr~cribr trial,., nne! drfinc ]HIIli~hments without this eontrol? Will the~' find scutimrnts 1herr similar 1o this hill of rights? You let. them loose; yon do more-you drp:1rt from thcgeniu::; of your countr~· .... " ;3 .T. Elliot'~ Dcbatr~ 447.

75-6527-0PINION


whipping, and earcroppmg. 1 Anna.ls of Congress 782-783 ( 1789). The objection was not heeded, "precisely because tho legislature would otherwise have had the unfettered power to prescribe punishments for crimes." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S., at 263 (BRENNAN, J., concurring).

B

In light of this history, it is not surprising to find that every decision of this Court considering whether a punishmE'nt is "cruel and unusual" within the meaning of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendmrnts has dealt with a criminal punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble,- U.S.- (1976) (incarceration without medical care); Gregg v. Georgia, - U. S. -(1976) (execution for murder); Furman v. Georgia, supra (excution for murder); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) ($20 fine for public drunkenness); Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 (1962) (incarceration as a criminal for addiction to na.rcotics); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion) (expatriation for desertion); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 320 U. R. ,459 (1947) (execution by elrctrocution after a failed first attempt); Weems v. United States, supra (12 years' imprisonment and other penalti~s for falsifying an official document); Hmvard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126 (1903) (10 years' imprisonment for conspira.cy to defraud); In re Kemmler, supra (execution by el<'ctrocution); Wilkerson v. Utah, 90 U. S. 130 (1879) (execution by firing squad); Pervear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475 (1867) (fine and imprisonment at hard labor for bootlegging).

These decisions rccogni?.e that thr C'rnrl and Unusual Punishment Clause circumscribes the crimina] process in three r ways: first. it limits the methods of punishment that can be imposed on those convicted of crimes. e. g., Estelle v. Gamble, supra; Trap v. Dulles, supra; srcond. it proscribes punishment grossly disproportionate to . the severity of the crime. e. g.,

75-6527-0PINION


Weems v. United States, supra, and third, it imposes substantive limits on "·hat can be made criminal and punished as such, e. g., Robinson v. Calijor11ia, supra. We have recognized the last limitation as one to be applied sparingly. "The prima.ry purpose of [the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause] has always been considered. and properly so. to be· directed at the method and kind of punishment imposrcl for thr violation of crim!nal statutes .... " Powell "· Texas. supra, 392 U.S., at 532.

In the few cases "·here the Court has had occasion to confront claims that impositions outside the criminal process constitutrd cruel and unusual punishme11t, it has had no difficulty finding the Eighth Amendment inapplicable. Thus. in Ji'ong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698 (1893). the Court held the Eighth Amendment inapplicable to the deportation of aliens on the ground that "deportation is not a punishment for crime." !d., at 730; see Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585 (1913). And in Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U. S. 72 (1959), the Court sustained a judgment of civil contempt, resulting in incarceration pending compliance vYith a subpoena, aga.inst a claim that the judgment imposed cruel and unusual punishment. It "·as emphasized that the casr involved "essentially a civil remedy designed for the benefit of other parties . . . exercised for centuries to secure compliance with judicial decrees." I d., at 81, quoting Gr-een v. United States, 356 U. S. 165. 197 (1 !)58) (dissenting opinion). '1a

~GIn urging u~ to extend the Eighth Amendment to ban school paddlings, petitioners rrly on the many deci~ions in which this Court has held that the prohibition against "cruel and unusual" puni~hments i ~ not "fastened to the ob:mlrtc but. may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." Gregg v. Georgia, supra, -U. S., at -; sec, e. g., Tmp v. Dulles, supm, 356 U. S., at 100-101 (plurality opinion); Weems v. United States, supra, 217 U. S., nt 373.

75- G.i::?l-0 1'1 :\'10~

INGRAilAl\I v. '\YRIGITT 17

c Petitioners acknowledgt' that the original design of the

Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was to limit criminal punishments, but urge nonetheless that the prohibition should be extended to ban the paddling of school children. Observing that the Framers of the Eighth Amendment could not have en visioned our present ~ystem. of p11 blic :mel compulsory eel ucation, with its opportunities for noncriminal punishments, petitioners contend that extension of the prohibition against cruel punishments is necessary lest \Ye afford greater protection to criminals than to schoolchildren. It would be anomalous. they say, if schoolchildren could be beaten without con-stitntiona.l redress. while hardened criminals suffering; the same 7 beatings at the hands of their jailors ha.ve a valid claim under the Eighth Amendment. Rce Jacks~n \r. BtSTi'op, 404. F. 2d 571 (CAS 1968); cf. Estelle v. Gamble, sup.~a. As super-ficially plausible as this argument 1<cems, we reject the clainwd analogy to criminal punishments and decline to extend the Eighth Amendment.

The prisoner and the schoolchild stand in wholly different circumstances, separaterl by the harsh facts of criminal conviction and incaJ·ccration. The prisoner's conviction entitles the State to classify him as a "criminal," and his incarceration deprives him of the freedom "to be with family and friends anrl to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.'r .Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 F. S. 471. 482 (1972); see Meachum v. Fano, - U. S. - (1976). Prison brutality, as the Court of Appeals observed in this case. is "part of the total

This reliance is misplnred. Our Eighth Amendment. deri~ion~ hnve referred to "evolving standard::; of decency", Trop v . Dullrs, supra. at 101, only in determining whrthrr criminnl pnni~hmenls nrc "erne! nnd unu~nnl" under the Amendment. We note. howcYer, thnt "evoh·ing ~t:mdnrds of dcrenry" may s till br re]C\·n nt in clrtcrmining the rrqnirrmrnt~ of thC' Due Procc.'s Cln.n~c of the Fourtrrnth Amendment. Sec Pnrt. IV, infra.

75-6527-0PINION


punishment to which the individual is subjected for his crime and, as such, is a proper subject for Eighth Amendment scrutiny." 525 F. 2d, at 914-915. See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F. 2d 1028, 1032 (CA2 1973). Even so, the protection afforded by the Eighth Amendment is limited. After incarceration, only the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," Estelle v. Gamble,- U. 8., at-, quoting Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at -, con:stitutes cruel and. unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.

The school child has little need for the protection of the Eighth Amendment. Though attendance may not always be voluntary, the public school remains an open institution. Except perhaps "·hen very young, the child is not physically restrained from leaving school during school hours; and at the end of the school da.y, the child is invariably free to return home. Even while at school, the child brings with him the ,support of family and friends and is rarely apart from teachers and other pupils who may witness and protest any instances of mistrea.tment.

Tho openness of the public school and its supervision by the community afford significant safeguards against the kinds of abuses from which the Eighth Amendment protects the prisoner. In most communities where corporal punishment is permitted in the schools. these saJeguards are reinforced by the legal constraints of the common la.w. Public school teachers and administrators arc privilcgPd at common Jaw to inflict only such corporal punishment as is reasonably necessary for the proper education and discipline of the child; any punishment going beyond the privilege may result in both civil and criminal liability. See Part II, supra. As long as the schools a.re open to public scrutiny, there is no reason to believe that the common law constraints will not effectively remedy and deter excesses such as those a.Uegcd in this case.

But even in those isolated instances where it becomes necessary to invoke the protection of the Constitution, the school child has no need to turn to the Eighth Amendment. For

7 5-6527 -OPINION


the child can claim ample protection under the Fourteenth Amendment:

"In our system, State-invented schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over children. Students in school as well as out of school are 'persons' under the Constitution. They a.re possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to tho State." Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U. S. 503, 511 (1969); see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975); Brown v. Board of Educa.tion, 347 U. S. 483 (1954); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

We therefore conclude that \Yhen public school teachers or administrators impose disciplinary corporal punishment, the Eighth Amendment is inapplicable. The pertinent constitutiona.l question is whether the imposition is consonant with the requirements of due process of Jaw, a question we now consider.

IV The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any State depriva

tion of life, liberty or property ''"ithout due process of law. Application of this prohibition requires the familiar t"·ostage analysis: \YC' must first a:;:k whether the asserted individual interests are encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of "life, liberty or property"; if protected interests are implicated. " ·r then ·must decide what procedures 7 or remedies constitute "dur proce~s of la''"·" J.1 orrissey v. '---- -Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1912); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 569-572 ( 1972). Ser Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267 (1975). Following that analysis hero, we fincl that the paddling of a schoolchild implicates thr child's constitutionally protccted inte-rest in personal ~urity. but we hold that the traditional common / ~ law remedies arc fully adequate to afford due procel's of law.

75-6527-0PINTON


A

"[Tlhe range of interests ])rotected by procedural due procrss is not infinite." Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, at 570. \Ve have repeatedly rrjt>cted "the notion that any grievous loss visited upon a person by the State is sufficient to invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause." M eacltum v. Ji'arw, - 1T. S., at-. Due process is required only when a decision of the State implicates an interest within the protection of the Fourtrrnth Amendment. And "to detrrminc whether clue process requirements apply in the first placr, we must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest at stake." Roth, supra, at 570-571.

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, latrr incorporated in the Fourteenth, was intended to give Americans at least the protection against governmental power that they had rnjoyed as Englishmen against the power of the Crown. The liberty prosrrved from deprivation without due process included the "right generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as rssential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Afeyer v. Nebraska, 262· U. S. 390, 399 (1023). Among the historl.c liberties so protected was thA right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on personal security. See Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 Cornell L. J. ---- (1977). Inclrccl, under the common law before the American Revolution, the right "to security from the corporal insults of menaces, assaults, beating, and wounding" was viewed-subject to traditional privileges-as among the "absolute rights of individuals." I Blackstone, Commentaries *134.B7

~ 7 The 39th :trtide Magna Charta protect rd this right of prrs01ml security against clrprivat ion "rxccpt by the legal judgment of hiH prcrs or by the law of the bncl." Perry, supra, at 17. By subsC'qurnt rnactments of Parliament during the time of Edwnrd III, the right was protected from deprinttion except "by clue proccs~ of law." Sec Shattuck.

)

75-o5~7-0PI~IO:\f

INC:TIAII.i\JVI v. WRIGHT 21

·while the contours of this historic liberty interest in the context of our fedrra.l system of government ha,·e not been definrd preciscly,38 they ahvays have been thought to encompass the interest of a ritizf'n in the cuf:tody of thC' state to· he free from bodily punishment by JWrsons acting under color of state law. It is fundamental that such punishment rannot be imposed rxrf'pt in accordance "·ith clur prorec:;;s of law. United States v. Lm•ett, 328 U. S. 303. 317-iH8 ( 1946). Thus. this Court has lwlcl rep('atf'dly that police violatC' the Due Process Clause whrn they deliberately inflict physical punishmellt on persons in custody on charges of crimr. United States v. Price, 383 U. ~. 787. 792--703 (1966); Williams v. United States, 341 F. ~. 70. 101 (1951); Scre1cs v. United States, 325 U. S. 91. lOG (194f1).

This constitutiona11y protected interest in not bring subjected to physical pnnishmrnt is at stake in this rase.

The True Meanin~ of thr Term "Lihrrt~·." 4 Hnn·. L. nr,·. 8oi'i. :~n-874 (1~01).

"~Sec, e. g., Rochin , .. California. 342 r. 8. 1o5 (19fi2) (polirr hrulnlity a~nin~t iuclividuab in rn~tody on rhnr~rs of crime); Skinnrr , .. Oklahoma, 31() U. S. 535, 541-5+2 (1042) (Rtcrilizalion); Jacobson "· 1\fassar-lmsctts, 197 U. 8. 11 (1905) (,·nrrinntion); Union Pacific R. Co. "· Bot8ford, 1-n n. S. 250, 251 (1B9l) (phY:=:icnl ('Xnmination .~); cf. ICC Y. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 470 (1S94).

The rip;ht of per~onnl ~rrmity is nl~o ]1l'Oiectccl b~r the Fourlh c'\mendmcnt, which was made applicable to the Rtate~ throu~h thc Fomtecnth because its protection was Yirwcd ai' "implicit in the 'conccpt of ordcrecl libcrt y' . . . enshrined in t hc hi-;t or.'· and the basic coni't it ut iomil documc>nt:;; of English-speakin~ pcoplc~." Wolff v. Colorado, 3:38 F. 8. 2.'5, 27-28 (1949). It. has been s:1id of the Four1 h Amendrnrnt 1 hat it,; "m·crridin~ function ... i~ to protect per~onnl prin1cy n.nd di~nily ng:1inst llll

wnrranled intru~ion by the Rtatc." Srhnerb!'r v. Califomia. :384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). But the principal ronrrrn of that Amcndmrnt ·~ prohibition against unreasonable searchc:; and seizure:; is with intm~ion'i on privnry in thc course of criminal investigation~. Scc Whalen ''· Roe,- U. R. -, - n. 32 (1977). Pctitioncr,; do not contend that thc Fourth .t\mendmcnt applic::;, :wcordin~ to its terms to corporal puni.-dm1ent in public school. A.

75-6527-0PINION


There is, of course, a de minimis level of imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned. But at least where school authorities. acting under color of state law, unjustifiably punish a child in their care by deliberately inflicting appreciable physical pain. WC' hold that they invade a.n interest in liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.an

B

"fT]he question remains what process is due." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S., at 481. Were it not for the common law privilege permittin~ teachers to inflict reasonable corporal punishment on children in their ca.re, and the availability of the traditional remedies for abuse, the case for requiring advance procedural safeguards would be strong indeed. But here we deal with a punishment-paddlingwithin that tradition, and the question is whether the common law remedies are adequate to afford due process.

"'[Dlue process.' unlike some legal rules is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. . . . Representing an attitude of fairness ... 'clue process' is compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions, and stout confidence in the strength of the democratic faith which we profess .... " J01'nt-Anti-Fasdst Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123. 162-163 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.. concurrin~).

W11<'ther in this case the common law remedies for excessive corporal punishment constit11te due process of law requires

an Unlike Goss v. Lopez, 41!) U.S. 565 (1975), thi~ case doc . .:; not inYoh·e the state-created prOJ1Crty interest in publir cdurrttion. The pmpoRc of rorpora.l puni~hmcnt is to correct a child's brhavior without interruptinghis education. Th:Jt corporal puni~hment mny. in a rare ca~e. lun·e the unintended effect of temporarily remoYin~ a child from school nfford~ no basis for concluding that the 11rnrt ice itsrlf drpri\·c~ studrnts of property protected by thr Fonrt cent h Amendment.

75-6527-0PINION


an analysis of the competing interests at stake, viewed against the background of "history, reason, [and] the past course of decisions." The analysis requires consideration of three distinct factors: "first, tho private interest tl1at will be affected ... ; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest ... and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and, finally, the r state] interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167-168 (1974) (PowELL, J., concurring).

1

Because it is rooted in history, the child's liberty interest in avoiding corporal punishment while in the care of public school authorities is subject to historical limitations. Under the common law, an invasion of personal security gave rise to a right to recover damages in a subsequent judicial proceeding. III Blackstone, Commentaries ""120-121. But the right of recovery was qualified by the concept of justification. Thus, there could be no recovery against a teacher who gave only "moderate correction" to a child. Ibid. To the extent that the force used was reasonable in light of its purpose, it was not wrongful, but rather "justifiable or lawful." !d., at ~·120.

Tho concept that reasonable corpornl punishment is justifiable continues to be recognized in the laws of most States. See Part II, supra. It represents "the balance struck by our country," Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J .. dissenting), bet·ween the child's interest in personal security and the traditional view that some limited corporal punishment may be nec<'ssary in the course of a child's education. Under that longstanding accommodation of interests. there can be no deprivation of substantive rights uncler the Due

75-6.527-0PINION


Process Clause as long as disciplinary corporal punishment is within the limits of the common law privilege.

To be sure, the concept of liberty is not frozen in history. "Great concepts Jike liberty \Yere purposely left to gather meaning from experience." National Mutual Ins. Co. v_ Tidewater Transfer Co. , 337 U. S. 582, 646 (Frankfurter, J., . dissenting). If state hms governing an aspect of liberty \ rom0 into tension with "stanrlards of decency more or less universally accepted," Lmdsia.na ex rel. Franc1:s v. Resweb,er, t 320 U. S. 452, 469-470 (1946), they ma.y not survive consti- \ tutional scrutiny. But tlwrc is no evidence here of any p;C'neral rejection of the common law privilege governin~ corporal punishment in public schools.

2

Florida has continued to recognize, and indeed has strengthened by statute, the common law right of a child not to be subjected to excessive corporal punishment in school. Under Florida law the teacher and principal of the school dccide in the first instance whether corporal punishment is reasonably neceso:ary under the circumstances in order to discipline a child who has misbehaved. But they must exercise prudence and restraint. If the punishment inflicted is lat<:'r found to have been excessive-not rC'asonahly believed at the time to be necessary for the child's discipline or training-the school authoritiC's inflicting it may be held liable in damages to the child and, if malice is shown. they may be subject to criminal prosecution.40 Where the Rtate thus preserves the judicial

10 See pp. 3-5, supra. The prohibition ngnim<t "degrnding" or unneccsRa rily "~everc" corporal punishment in former § 232.27 has bC'en ron~ trued as a statemC'nt of the rommoJJ law prinriplc. Sre 1937 Op. Fla. Atty. Gen. 169; cf. 1957 Op. Fla. Atty. Gen. 7, 8. Petitionrrs concrdc that a tcnrher who inflicts exeC' sive punishment on tl child mny bC' hrld both ('ivilly and criminally liable under Florida. law. Petition<'r~' l3rid a3 n. 11, 34; Tr. of Arg. 17, 52-53. Fb. Stnt. Ann. § 827.03 (3) (1976) makes malicious punishment of a child a felony.

7 5-G.527 -OPl :\'"TON

INGRAHAM v. WRIGHT 25·

safeguards that existed in common law, there is good reason to conclude that those remedies constitute clue process of ]aw.41

Petitioners nonetheless argue that the traditional remedies arc not adequate to prokct against the type of harsh mistreatment they receiverl at Drew Junior High School. They insist that the common law remedies should he supplemented by the administrative Rafeguarcls of prior notice and a hearing. This is not a frivolous argument. The school discipli11ary process is not "a totally acruratf', unerring process, never mistaken and never unfair ... ,' ' Goss, supra, at 579, and as a general rule we haw found some kind of prior hearinp; necessary to guarrl against arbitrary impositions on inter-

'11 "rPJrior hearings might br cntird~· di:-;pcn8cd with in manY rircumRtn nrrR in which the Rtntr'~ conduct, if not ndrl]mtr!Y .in~tifird. wonld ron~titute n common l:tw tort. Thi• would lr:wr thr injurrd plnintiff in prrri~ely tho snm0 po3turr flR n common-l:tw plaintiff. nnd thi>' procrdurnl ron~rl]urnre would be l]nitr hnrmonious \rith the ~nb~tnnt i1·r Yirw t hnt the fomtcent h nmrnrlmrnt rnrompa~RrR the same libcrt irR nR 1 boRe prot0rted by the common lnw." lVTon:1gh:tn . Of "Libert/' nnd "Proprrt)·." 62 Cornell L . .T. -, - (Hl77) (footnote omittrd). Rrr Ronne1· v. Covahlin . . 517 F. 2d 1311. 1319 (197!1). modifird rn bane .. 545 F. 2d .565 (CA7 1976).

It iR true that thoRo who rlnim thr ])rotrction of tho C'on~titution~ ngninRt the action of tho Rtntr arr not ordina.rily limitrd to rrlief in state l courts. See Monroe v. Pa7Je, 365 U. S. 167 (1961). Bnt. in thi.< context thr rrlief a1·a ilnble in frdrral court. npnrt from that ntTordrd by the Fourth Amendment, is rompnrati' elv limited. Sec Johnson v. Glick, 4R1 F. 2d 1028, 1032-1033 (CA2 H.l73). Thul', the Court hn fi rrcognizrd the right of one in the cn~tody of the Rt.ate not to be ph)r~icall~r

puni~bed only where thr punishment ifi "bou nd to offrncl C\'Cn h:Hdrned srnsibiliti es," Rochin v. Califomia, 342 U. S., at 174, 172, or whrre it "offend~ some ·principle of 'j ust ire so rooted in the trndit iom; nnd conscience of our proplr ns to he r~lllked ns fu ndamental." Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 95 (1945), quoting Snyder v. llfassarhusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934). Disciplinary corporal puni~hmrnt t hn t would be rea::;on::~ble undrr the common law as it has bern pre.,orwcl in most State,; cannot be said to meet the-Se thr0shold standards for n. frclcml cause of action.

I

I

\

75-6527-0PINION


ests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S., at 569-570; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 557-558 (1974); cf. Friendly, supra.

But in this case tl1C'rr can be no deprivation of liberty t unless the punishment exceeds the bounds of the common /

, , ,J Law privilege, and the common law remedies have always been

5 \,A Ef'cll' considrredA to minimize the threat of constitutional violations. ~ - There is a relevant analogy in the criminal law. Although the

Fourth Amendment specifically proscribes "seizure" of a person without probable ca usc, the risk that police will act unrca~onably in arresting a suspect is not thought to require an advance drtermination of the facts. In United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976), we reaffirmed the traditional common ]my rul.e that police officers may make warrantless public arrc ts on probable cause. Although we observed that an advance determination of probable cause by a magistrate would be desirable, we dcclin0d "to transform this judicial preference into a judicial rule when the judgment of the Nation and Congress has for so long been to authorize warrantless public arrests on wobablc cause .... " I d., at 423: sec id., at 429 (PowELL, J., concurring) . Despite the distinct possibility that a policr officer may improperly ass0ss the facts and thus unconstitutionally deprive an individual of liberty. we declined to depart from the traditional ru 1c by "·hich the officer's perception is subj0ctecl to judicial scrutiny only after the fact.4 ~ Thc>rC' is no more reason to r0quire advance procedural safeguards for intrusions on personal security to which the Fourth Amendment docs not apply.'"l

4 ~ Thr. rr:tsounblrnr~s of n Fomth Amrndmrnt in1ru,ion m:t\' hr ~uhjrrtrd to snbi"C'fJ1H'nt judiri;l !'rru1in~· in a <it!1tr tortor rrimi;1al :trtion ngnlnr-:t thr ln\v rnforrrtnrnt offirrr. Afonrnr \·. Papr, :~R5~ R. ·167 (1901); Ri1'C'11S Y. 8ix Unknn1l'n Namrd Agl'nts. 40:3 LT. 8. 3RR (Hl71). or in n suppn·s~ion hr~ring to dctrrminr whrthrr il1<' fruits of thr int ru~ion m:t~; hr usrd in n. rrimin:1l trial. !11 amJ , .. Ohin. 307 U. 8. 6~3 ( HlolT.

1 " The snbstnntivc protcrjion rcrognizrd in such rMrs n~ Rorhin am! \ <1 8trr?I'S clor;.; not rrndil~· 1ran~latr into [lrh-:tnrr proccduml snfrgu:trds.

75-6527-0PINION


3

But even if the incremental benefit of advance procedural safeguards were clear, the question would remain whether the benefit could justify the cost. Acceptance of petitioners' claims would work a transformation in the law governing corporal punishment in Florida and most other States. Given the impracticability of formulating a rule of procedural due process that varies with the srvcrity of the particular imposition:• the prior hearing petitioners seek would have to precede any paddling. however moderate or trivial.

Such a universal constitutional requirement would significantly burden the use of corporal punishment as a disciplinary measure. Hearings-even informal hearings-require time, personnel, a.nd a diversion of attention from normal school pursuits. School authorities ma.y well choose to abandon corporal punishment ra.ther than incur the burdens of complying with the procedural requirements. Teachers, properly concerned with maintaining authority in the classroom. may well prefer to avoid any risk that a hearing will result in a rejection of their recommendation that punishment is necessary. Paradoxically, such a.n alteration of disciplinary policy

The nature of thr right i~ surh that its drpri,·ation rtln he tc.~trd:

"on!~· b~· an apprai~al of the tot:dit~· of fart,.; in a gi,·cn ra,;r. That \Yhirh may, in one ~rtting, ronRtiiutr a d0nial of fundamental fairnr-~. shocking io the uni,·er~al scn~e of .iu~ticc, mn~·. in other rirrmn"tanrrs, and in light. of ot lwr ronf'idcrations, fall short of ~-<ueh drnial." Scrcu• ' ' · United 8tatPs, ~2.5 U. S. 91, 95 (1045).

14 "rPJrorrrlural rluc prorrss rulr~ arr 'h·qwd by thr ri~k of rrror inhrrent in the trnth-finrling ]Jrorr~~ a' applied to the grnrralit~· of rasC"', not the ra.rr cxrrption.~ .... " Mathews "' Elrlridae, 424 U. R .. at 3~4. In this case petitioner~' r,·idrnre ~up;grstH th:tt corpor:tl Jmnil'hmrnt in Dade County was, "with thr rxrrption of a frw ra~r~ .... m1rrmarklble in ph~·~ie:tl RCYrrity." App. 152. Tlw in~tamp.; of srn'rr pHni ,; hmrnt :II Drl'\Y to whic·h pctitionrr" :1ncl othrr~ tp~tifiPd wcrr rxrrption-.; to the prrn1iling pr:lcti<'r in D:1d0 County , "·hirh waH not ~hown to hr inron~i~tcnt with common bw Jlrinripks. Cf. App. 149.

75-6.527-0PINION


is most likely to occur in the ordinary case where the contemp1atcd punishment is well within the common law privilege.

"Elimination or curtailment of corporal punishment "·ould bc welcomed by many as a societal advance. But when such a policy choice may result from this Court's determination of an assert0d right to duc process, ra.ther than from the normal processes of community debate and legislative action, the socictal costs cRnnot br dismissed as insubstantial.•" \Ve arc rcviewing hrre a legislative judgment, rooted in history and rcaffirmed in the la\\'S of man~' States. that corporal punishment serves important eclncational interests. This judgment must be virwcrl in light of thc disciplinary problems commonplace in the schools. As noted in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S., at 580, infractions of ruks calling for "discipline are frequcnt occurrrnces and sometimes require immediate, cffective action." Asscssment of the need for, and the appropriate means of maintaining. school discipline ar committed gener- is ally to the discretion of school authorities subject to state la.w. "rTl he court has repcateclly emphasized the need for affirm-ing the comprehcnsiYe authority of the states and of school officials, consistent with fundamcntal constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools." Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S., at 507.

"At some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual affected and to society in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be out·weighecl by the cost." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S .. at 348. We

«;"It, may he tme that prorrdural rrgulari1y in disciplinar)· procrrding~ promotes a sr.nse of institutional rapport [tlld open communicn1ion, a prrception of fnir treatment, 3 nd pro\·icki-l the offender rmd hiR frllow st.udcnts a. showra~c of drmorrnry at, work. But . ... [r]rHpcrt for democratic institutions will equnlly di~Ripatc if they arc thought too ineffectual to provide their students an cm·ironment of ordrr in which thr rdura1ion:tl prorc"s may go forward .... " Wilkinson, Goss v. Lopez: Thr Suprrme Court as School Superintendent, 1975 Sup. Ct. Rev. 25, 71-72.

75-Gti27-0l'lNJON

INGRAHAJ\1 v. WHIGHT

think that point has bee11 reached in this cas<'. In v1ew of the openness of our schools and the common law safeguards that already exist, the risk of error that may result i11 violation of a schoolchild's right of personal sc>curity can only be regarded as minimal. The requirement of additional administrative safeguards under the banner of the Constitution might reduce that rif'k marginally, but would also entail a significant intrusion into an area of primary educational responsibility. 'Ve conclude that. where the traditional common law remedies are available, the Due Process Clause does not require additional proceclura.J safeguards before the imposition of corporal punil"hmf'nt in the public schools.

v Petitioners cannot prevail on either of the theories before

us in this cas<'. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cru<'l and unusual punishments is inapplicable to school paddlings, and the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement of procedural due process is 8atisficcl by Florida's preservation of common law remedies. 'Ve therefore agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioners' evidence affords no basis for injunctiYe relief, and that petitioners cannot recover damages on the basis of any Righth Amendment or procedural clue l)l'Ocess violation.

The Court of Appeals' judgment, however, rests i11 part on a premise which our decision calls into question. Tho Court of Appeals concluded that it had no mandate to determine whether Ingraham and Andrews individually had stated valid '1 claims for damages under ~ 1983 because, in its vievv. no substantial constitutional interest was implicated in this case. But we have concluded that a child in the custody of public school authorities has a liberty interest, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, in no£1)'C!i1g subjected to u~~d CQ.!]2Q!'3,l ... HJ1qi§.!:nn{'nl It. is unclear whetner the ~f Appeals would have reached the same result on the issue of

75-6527 -OPINION


substantive rights under the Fourteenth Amendment had it ~ taken ou~ view of the constitutional interest at stake. We therefore think it appropriate to afford the Court of Appeals an opportunity to reconsider these individual claims for dam- · ages if the parties so desire.40

The judgment of the Court of Appeals on count three of the complaint is a.ffirmcd. The judgment on counts one and two is vacated and the case remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1 6 The question whether petition er~' evidence is sufficienL to make out a violation of substantive rights under the Due Process Clause was not independently briefed or argued in this Court . See n . 12, supra. Accordingly, except insofar as our discussion of the procedural issues necessarily bears on the question of substantive rights, wo express no view on the proper disposition on remand .

7

Documents

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES - School of Lawlaw2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell archives/75-6527_ingrahamwrightopinion1st.pdfSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 75-6527 James Ingraham,