Supporting the Syrian Opposition

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Supporting the Syrian Opposition

Lessons from the Field in the Fight Against ISIS and Assad

By Hardin Lang, Mokhtar Awad, Ken Sofer, Peter Juul, and Brian Katulis September 2014


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Supporting the SyrianOppositionLessons from the Field in the Fight Against

ISIS and Assad

By Hardin Lang, Mokhtar Awad, Ken Sofer, Peter Juul, and Brian Katulis

September 2014


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1 Introduction and summary

4 U.S. policy on Syria moves toward a new phase in 2014

7 Current snapshot of the Syrian conflict

13 The National Coalition and the interim government

17 Supreme Military Council

19 Free Syrian Army fighters on the ground

22 The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood

25 The Islamic Front: Salafists opposed to ISIS and Assad

30 Al-Nusra Front and ISIS

32 Lessons from the field

36 Conclusion

38 About the authors

39 Endnotes

Contents


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1 Center for American Progress | Supporting the Syrian Opposition

Introduction and summary

Tis summers evens in Iraq and Syria were a wake-up call regarding he hrea posed

by he Islamic Sae o Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS. Te groups capure o erriory

and is vicious crimes agains humaniy promped he Obama adminisraion o

ake argeed miliary acion in Iraq.1Tese acions achieved angible resuls, bu

hey also raised quesions abou he nex seps or U.S. policy in boh Iraq and Syria.

Te problems o hese wo counries are now inerwinedas ISISs desrucion

o border poss and declaraion o a new Caliphae demonsrae. In Damascus,Presiden Bashar al-Assads regime remains in power more han hree years afer

many prediced is downall was imminen. During he pas year, he regime used

genocidal acions o regain limied conrol in cerain pars o wesern and norhern

Syria. Ye, is reach is limied in large swahes o he counry, paricularly in he eas.

Te orces opposing Presiden Assad are in an alarming saedisorganized, weak,

and ofen a odds wih one anoher. Wih he Unied Saes now more deeply engaged

in addressing he hrea posed by ISIS in Iraq, i aces a conundrum abou wha o do

abou ISIS in Syria. Te wors-case scenarioa Syria divided beween he Assad

regime in Damascus and a erroris sancuary in pars o he norh and eashas

already aken shape.

Te weakness o capable and reliable Syrian parners who are poised o figh ISIS

and he Assad regime is a cenral challenge or a U.S. sraegy o couner ISISs rise.

Te Obama adminisraion has indicaed is willingness o increase suppor or such

parners. In his address o he Wes Poin cade corps in May, Presiden Barack

Obama declared ha he would increase suppor or hose in Syria who offer he bes

alernaive o erroriss and brual dicaors.2On June 26, he Obama adminisraion

announced addiional assisance o veted moderae opposiion orces ha arefighing boh he Assad governmen and ISIS and asked Congress o auhorize

$500 million o rain and equip hese fighers.3On Sepember 10, Presiden

Obama again called on Congress o give his adminisraion he addiional

auhoriies and resources o suppor he Syrian opposiion.4


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Bu a major effor o arm, rain, equip, and enable possible U.S. parners inside

Syria is no easy ask. Te Obama adminisraion finds isel in a cach-22.

Poenial U.S. parners are weak, causing he Obama adminisraion o hold

back addiional meaningul suppor. Bu hese hird way orcesmoderae

alernaives o Assad and ISISremain weak because hey do no have orga-

nized and well-coordinaed assisance.

o beter undersand he challenges he Unied Saes aces as i prepares o ramp up

effors in Syria, a research eam rom he Cener or American Progress inerviewed

more han 50 Syrian opposiion poliical represenaives, miliary commanders,

aciviss, fighers, and Islamiss in Jordan, Lebanon, and urkey. Tose inerviewed

included members o he Syrian Naional Coaliion, reerred o in his paper as he

Naional Coaliion; he inerim Syrian governmen; he Supreme Miliary Council;

he Free Syrian Army; he Syrian Muslim Broherhood; and he Islamic Fron. Tis

research and repor is par o a our-counry sudy based on in-deph, qualiaive

inerviews conduced in Egyp, unisia, and Jordan on he role o Islamis acorsin he Arab uprisings ha began in 2011.5

A cenral conclusion o his research is ha he Unied Saes sill has an opporuniy

o build parnerships in Syria as par o he wider effor o comba ISIS and o build a

oundaion or a ransiion rom he Assad regime. Te Cener or American Progress

previously released a repor deailing how a sepped-up effor o suppor Syrias

opposiion fis wih an overall regional sraegy o comba ISIS.6As he Unied

Saes prepares o increase is role in Syria, here are five key lessons ha policy-

makers should keep in mind:

The urgency of the situation in Syria requires swifter U.S. action.Tis

summers evens indicae how rapidly he siuaion on he ground in boh Syria

and Iraq can evolve. Te remnans o he hird-way Syrian opposiion are under

siege in Aleppo and elsewhere. Proposed unding mechanisms, such as he $500

million or veted Syrian opposiion orces, mus make heir way hrough he

pipeline more expediiously o have a chance or impac on he ground.

Stronger regional coordination is required to make support to the opposi-

tion effective. Compeiion beween counries such as Saudi Arabia and Qaarhas helped ragmen he non-ISIS opposiion. So long as his compeiion is no

moderaed, addiional U.S. assisance o he opposiion is unlikely o resul in

real uniy o effor agains ISIS. A susained U.S. diplomaic effor in he region

will be required o insulae he effor in Syria rom his compeiion and maxi-

mize he impac o new resources.


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Additional support to the opposition should prioritize the fight against ISIS.

Te Unied Saes should no drop is objecive o removing he Assad regime

rom power as i pursues he deea o ISIS. However, ISIS presens a more serious

hrea o he sabiliy o he Middle Eas and U.S. ineress in he region. Te

deea o ISIS should be prioriized over he removal o Assad, hough he later

should remain a long-erm U.S. objecive. Addiional U.S. assisance o opposiiongroups should be designed and delivered wih his sequencing in mind.

The effort to support a reliable and effective Syrian opposition will take

time. Given heir curren lackluser sae, i will ake imeperhaps several

yearso urn veted opposiion groups ino an effecive fighing orce capable

o aking on boh ISIS and he Assad regime. Righ now, hese groups are unable

o ully absorb all he assisance ha he Unied Saes could offer. Bu groups

wihin Syrias opposiion ha have access o resources exer greaer influence

over he allegiances o he small local unis ha make up mos o he opposiion.

Providing access o hese resources may help U.S.-backed groups becomeceners o graviy and speed up he process. Te effor will require navigaing deep

poliical divisions wihin he opposiioni should no be viewed as simply a

echnical securiy assisance program.

Syrian Salafi jihadists, such as the Islamic Front, will remain a long-term U.S.

policy challenge.Te Islamic Fron and oher Salafi jihadi groupsa sel-

described Syrian alibanwill remain a policy challenge or he Unied Saes

even afer he end o Syrias civil war. Alhough i lacks he ransnaional ambi-

ions o ISIS, he Islamic Fron is comprised o ens o housands o conservaive

Salafi fighers. I he Islamic Fron unravels in he ace o pressure rom ISIS and

he Assad regime, hese fighers may well deec o ISIS. I he Islamic Fron

survives, he Salafi fighers associaed wih i are likely o challenge moderae

elemens or opposiion leadership as ocus urns o he Assad regime.

Wih a litle more han wo years lef in office, he Obama adminisraion has an

imporan opporuniy o sabilize he hear o he Middle Eas hrough a rein-

vigoraed and reengaged U.S. leadership role ha leverages Americas unique

capabiliies in he miliary, securiy assisance, and inelligence arenas. Te key o

broadening U.S. engagemen in Syria is osering parnerships and providing supporo reliable and effecive parners. Te Obama adminisraion has wisely ruled ou

puting boos on he ground in Syria. Bu over he pas hree years, i has shied away

rom deeper engagemen o suppor orces ha oppose he Assad regime, and his

helped creae an opening or orces such as ISIS o emerge. Tis summers wake-up

call is drawing U.S. policy on Syria ino a new phase, and i should move orward

wih a more ocused effor o suppor Syrias opposiion.


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U.S. policy on Syria moves toward

a new phase in 2014

As he peaceul proess in Syria urned ino a mulidimensional civil war charac-

erized by localized conflic over he pas hree years, he Unied Saes has vocally

suppored he aspiraions o he Syrian opposiion and provided hem wih some

resources. Bu he Obama adminisraion has hus ar declined o engage miliarily

in he conflic or provide he level o miliary suppor necessary or he opposiion

o deea he Assad regime. Te Unied Saes has insead preerred o combine

public suppor or he opposiion wih effors o pursue a diplomaic soluion in

concer wih Russia, address he humaniarian oll o he conflic, and limi hehrea o Syrian exremis groups o he U.S. homeland. U.S. policy on Syria has

had wo disinc phases since 2011, and i now appears o be shifing ino a hird.

Phase 1: Diplomatic support for a political transition, spring 2011

to spring 2012

During he firs year o he uprising in Syria, he Unied Saes was a vocal public

supporer o he peaceul proesors and led he inernaional condemnaion o

he Assad regimes response. U.S. Ambassador o Syria Rober Ford was a visible

supporer o he peaceul proess, and he Obama adminisraion released sae-

mens ha criicized he Assad regime.7Presiden Obama announced in Augus

2011, For he sake o he Syrian people, he ime has come or Presiden Assad o

sep aside.8Te Unied Saes also played an imporan role in mobilizing he

inernaional communiys response o he crisis. In he firs hal o 2012, he

Unied Saes pushed or wo resoluions in he U.N. Securiy Council, calling or

a democraic ransiion in Syria, boh o which Russia and China veoed despie

significan suppor rom he res o he council.9


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Phase 2: Limited material support to the opposition and continued

focus on negotiated political transition, spring 2012 to winter 2014

Te Unied Saes reporedly began o provide nonlehal assisance o he Free Syrian

Army in he spring o 2012.10I was sending small arms and ani-ank weapons

direcly o selec rebel brigades by June 2013.11

Te CIA was allegedly running asmall raining program or rebel fighers ou o Qaar by all 2013.12Meanwhile,

U.S. policy remained ocused on prevening he Syrian civil war rom desabilizing

is neighborsurkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Israel. NAO deployed Pario

missile bateries on he urkish-Syrian border o help proec urkey, one o is

member saes.13Te Unied Saes provided $1.7 billion in humaniarian aid, hal

o which wen o help neighboring counries handle he reugee crisis.14

Following a large-scale chemical weapons atack in Damascus in Augus 2013,

Presiden Obama announced ha he Unied Saes would respond wih air srikes

agains he Assad regime.15Tis hrea led o an agreemen ha eliminaed Syriasdeclared chemical weapons sockpile by July 2014.16

Troughou his period, he Obama adminisraion sough a negoiaed poliical

soluion o he conflic hrough he U.S.-backed peace alks in Geneva ha would

keep Syrian governmen insiuions inac during he ransiion bu require ha

Presiden Assad leavean irreducible requiremen o he opposiion.17Te Unied

Saes made several atemps o unie he opposiion ino a coheren body ha could

handle such a ransiion, replacing he dysuncional Syrian Naional Council wih

he larger, more inclusive Syrian Naional Coaliion and providing $287 million o

bolser he poliical opposiions effors inside and ouside o Syria.18

U.S.-backed effors o bring a negoiaed poliical setlemen ailed during he 2014

Geneva alks, as boh he opposiion and regime sharply disagreed on he uure

o he Assad regime.19Furhermore, mos rebel fighers inside Syria did no back

he process since Assads miliary offensive escalaed as he alks were aking place.

Phase 3: Combating the ISIS threat, spring 2014 to present

U.S. policy on Syria has begun o seadily shif is ocus o counererrorism during

he pas five monhs. In May, Presiden Obama proposed a $5 billion Couner-

errorism Parnerships Fund o build up he Middle Eass counererror capaciy

o figh hreas such as ISIS, including $500 million o ramp up he effor o rain


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and arm he Syrian opposiion. On Sepember 10, Presiden Obama announced a

new sraegy o degrade and deea ISIS, including an effor o srenghen he Syrian

opposiion as a counerweigh o ISIS.20I is unclear wheher he expanded suppor

or he opposiion is ocused on urning he ide agains Presiden Assad, fighing ISIS

in Syria, or boh. Bu he Unied Saes acions signal he beginning o a hird phase

in U.S. policyone ha is more-direcly engaged in eliminaing exremiselemens such as ISIS along he Syrian-Iraqi border.

Recen evens in Iraq and Syria, paricularly he rise o ISIS, are likely o draw he

Unied Saes more deeply ino Syria. Te presiden recenly auhorized surveillance

flighs over Syria o collec inelligence on ISIS arges, laying he groundwork or

poenial airsrikes here in he uure.21Te Obama adminisraion has saed i

wans Presiden Assad o leave power while avoiding a ailed sae in Syria. However,

i now sees he opposie: Assad is sill in power and a ailed sae has emerged.


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Current snapshot of the

Syrian conflict

During he pas year, he Assad regime has made a series o gains agains opposiion

orces in he wesern hal o he counry. Alhough hese gains should no be under-

esimaed, hey have no ye produced he sraegic shif necessary or he regime

o regain ull conrol o Syrias erriory and quell he armed insurgency. Fighing

coninues, primarily in he norhern provinces o Aleppo and Idlib, he souhern

counryside o Damascus, and Daraa. Alhough regime deea looks less likely

han a any poin in he pas hree years, vicory remains elusive. Since June, ISISs

Iraq campaign has alered he sraegic equaion in Syria o he derimen o bohhe regime and he opposiion.

Military situation

Prior o he ISIS offensive, Assad regime orces ook conrol o he ciy o Homs,

ollowing an evacuaion deal ha allowed opposiion fighers o flee, and also

encircled opposiion-held Aleppo.22While he regime slowly advances agains

rebel-held regions in he wes, ISIS has made significan gains agains he opposiion

orces in he eas. Coming off recen successes in Iraq, ISIS capured a gas field,

wo major miliary bases, and a sraegic airbase rom he regime; hese fighs lef

hundreds dead and he enire easern province o ar-Raqqah wih no regime miliary

presence.23ISIS is also rapidly advancing wesward wih is sighs se on rebel-held

villages and recapuring posiions in Aleppo and Idlib los o he rebels earlier his

year.24Boh Islamis and non-Islamis rebel acions are now cooperaing more closely

han ever beore, as hey share he same grave hrea rom ISIS. Rebel acions in

he souh, mainly he Islamic Frons Jaish al-Islam, have largely eliminaed he

ISIS presence in heir areas. Tey coninue o cooperae wih he Al Qaeda affiliae

al-Nusra Fron in ani-regime miliary operaions in he souhern heaer, recenlycapuring Syrias only border crossing wih Israel.25


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A he same ime, he regime has compleed he ranser o is known chemical

weapon sockpiles or desrucion by he inernaional communiy.26Despie he

sockpile ranser, he regime used chlorine gas his year prior o he deadline or

weapons desrucion.27I remains unclear i he regime may sill possess less

sophisicaed precursors o chemical weapons agens.

Syria appears o be setling ino a our-way de aco pariion beween he regime,

a poliically inchoae opposiion, ISIS, and he Democraic Union Pary, or PYDa

Kurdish secessionis movemen ha conrols hree enclaves in he norh. Te lines

Damascus

Turkey

Iraq

Jordan

Israel

Lebanon

ofDamascu

s

Thecountrysid

e

Homs

Daraa

Idlib

Aleppo

ar-Raqqah

Deir Ezzor

al-Hasakah

Hama

Kurdish forces

Syrian rebels

Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS

Regime/pro-regime forces

Disputed

Border crossing

FIGURE 1

Approximate areas of control in Syria as of August 2014

This map does not reflect the specific locations of al-Nusra Front, which is mixed in with the Syrian rebels. Many areas of control frequently change hands, and some pockets of control are not shown.Source: Various news outlets, consulted open source maps by Thomas van Linge, Political Geography Now, and Wikipedia.


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o his pariion flucuae wih he miliary siuaion, such as ISISs recen offensive

agains he regime in he eas. No pary is poised o achieve a major breakhrough

ha alers he sraegic balance wihou significan exernal inervenion. Meanwhile,

he humaniarian siuaion coninues o deeriorae. Te Assad regime is likely o

exend is policy o sarve or kneel.28Ongoing fighing will coninue o drive

boh displacemen and he need or humaniarian aid.

Political situation

Tere is a manies asymmery beween he Assad regime and he opposiion

when i comes o heir respecive poliical siuaions. On he surace, he emba-

led regime presens isel as more inernally cohesive and, o his end, held a shampresidenial elecion his spring in which Presiden Assad won 88.7 percen o he

voe.37Te opposiion, in conras, is openly acionalized, is poliically disorga-

nized, and operaes largely as an exile organizaion. Te Naional Coaliionini-

The Assad regime has an estimated 125,000 regular military forces at its disposal,

taking into account defections and casualties.29However, the number of loyal

troops may be closer to 50,000.30These regular forces are supplemented by roughly

100,000 fighters in the paramilitary National Defense Forces, as well as 4,000 to 5,000

Hezbollah fighters and 2,000 to 5,000 fighters from Iraqi Shia militias, many of whom

retreated to Iraq to fight ISIS there.31In addition, Irans Revolutionary Guard provides

an estimated several hundred to 1,500 fighters on the ground in Syria.32

The anti-Assad opposition remains factionalized. In February, Director of National

Intelligence James Clapper estimated that the Syrian insurgency numbered between

75,000 and 115,000 combatants organized into 1,500 separate groups.33Clapper also

estimated that jihadi fighters from ISIS, al-Nusra Front, and Salafi extremist group

Ahrar al-Sham numbered more than 20,000, with more than 7,500 foreign fighters

from approximately 50 countries joining the conflict.

34

A more recent estimate fromthe National Counterterrorism Center put the number of foreign fighters at 12,000.35

The Islamic Front, a group of ultraconservative Syrian Salafi brigades, is estimated to

number anywhere between 40,000 and 60,000 fighters.36

Forces on the ground


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ially ormed o replace he unrepresenaive and dysuncional Syrian Naional

Council, or SNC, which is now simply a member o he new umbrella Naional

Coaliionhas suffered rom similar challenges. Tese bodies ailure o deliver

on miliary assisance rom he Wes weakened heir posiion in he eyes o many

Syrians who hoped o see Assads quick removal rom power. Furhermore, recen

repors ha he Naional Coaliion has dissolved he exising inerim governmenor poliical reasons only reinorce his sense o poliical dysuncion.38

Te opposiion suffers rom a lack o sable leadership, a problem exacerbaed by

he compeiion or influence among regional acors. Saudi Arabia and Qaar have

led his compeiion by backing opposing candidaes or leadership posiions

wihin he Naional Coaliion, mos recenly demonsraed by he re-elecion o

Saudi-backed Naional Coaliion Presiden Hadi al-Bahra and ormer Presiden

Ahmad al-Jarba beore him.39Te Qaar-backed acion pulled ou o he Naional

Coaliion, and one o is leading members hreaened o orm a new poliical body

wih he commander o he Islamic Fron.40

Tis inernal poliical discord has undercu he opposiions miliary and diplomaic

work. Srained personal relaions beween he hen-head o he Supreme Miliary

CouncilGen. Salim Idriss, viewed as par o he Qaar blocand hen-Presiden

Jarbaviewed as par o he Saudi blocled o Idriss removal and replacemen

wih Gen. Abdul-Ilah al-Bashir al-Noeimi, a Jarba ally who is similarly seen as close

o Saudi Arabia.41Moreover, he Qaar-backed acion boycoted he Naional

Coaliions voe on paricipaion in he Geneva peace alks.42

A significan disconnec remains beween he Naional Coaliionbased in

Isanbul, urkeyand hose in Syria.43As one U.S. governmen official in Gazianep,

urkey, old CAP, he Naional Coaliion has mishandled many o is relaionships

wih he local councils esablished inside Syria since 2011.44One Naional Coaliion

member who coordinaes wih inernal acors said ha he organizaion prevens

local councils rom selecing heir own represenaives o he coaliion.45Te

same Naional Coaliion member explained ha his is largely due o he ac ha

Qaari-backed members ounded and financed he local councils, which he new

Saudi-backed leadership sough o change.46Tis disconnec beween he Naional

Coaliion and aciviss wihin Syria isel remains a major sumbling block or heopposiion as a whole.


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Humanitarian situation

Syrias humaniarian siuaion grows increasingly dire he longer he conflic drags

on. Te U.N. High Commissioner or Reugees, or UNHCR , has regisered more

han 2.9 million Syrians as reugees in neighboring counries.47Alhough he

Unied Saes has pledged more han $2 billion in humaniarian aid o Syria and

is neighbors since 2011, he Unied Naions has received jus one-quarer o he

$2.28 billion in humaniarian donaions i requesed or 2014.48

Geographically, he humaniarian siuaion appears wors in and around Aleppo

and Damascus, according o U.N. daa. Te Unied Naions saes ha here are

2.4 million people in Aleppo in need o humaniarian aid and nearly 1.55 million

people in and around Damascus.49

2,979,354 total refugees

FIGURE 2

Number of displaced Syrians

Note: Total refugees include 23,367 elsewhere in North Africa.

Source: U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Syria," available at http://www.unocha.org/syria

(last accessed September 2014); Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, "Syria Regional Refugee Response,"available at http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php (last accessed September 2014).

Syria

Turkey843,779

Lebanon

1,176,971

6,450,000 total internallydisplaced persons

Jordan615,792

Egypt139,501

Iraq215,303


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Making maters worse, he Assad regimes consolidaion o is miliary posiion

wihin Syria has made i more recalciran on humaniarian access o Syrian

civilians. U.N. Under-Secreary-General or Humaniarian Affairs and Emergency

Relie Coordinaor Valerie Amos said in mid-June ha providing humaniarian aid

has acually become more difficul, no easier.50Prior o he regimes June 3 sham

elecion, aid agencies were able o negoiae or access wih provincial governors,bu he regime now says ha everyhing has o be cenralized hrough

Damascus.51In response, he U.N. Securiy Council unanimously passed a

resoluion in July auhorizing he delivery o humaniarian aid o Syria wihou

prior approval rom Damascus.52

In addiion o conducing large-scale miliary atacks on civilians, he Assad regime

has used hunger as a weapon agains large numbers o innocen civilians.53A he

same ime, he disinegraion o he counry has opened he space or radical groups

such as ISIS o commi large-scale arociies and crimes agains humaniy.


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The National Coalition and the

interim government

Syrias main poliical opposiion remains a work in progress and largely in exile. I

is hamsrung by inernal ragmenaion, a lack o conac wih hose who remain

inside Syria, and regional compeiion. Tese acors have served o preven he

opposiion rom cohering ino a unified eniy capable o eiher overhrowing he

Assad regime or governing Syria afer is all.

Te inernaional ace o Syrian opposiion is he Naional Coaliion or Syrian

Revoluionary and Opposiion Forces, commonly reerred o as he NaionalCoaliion.54Formed in November 2012 rom a coaliion o opposiion groups

during meeings in Doha, Qaar, i is he main Syrian opposiion group in exile.

Te Unied Saes considers i o be he legiimae represenaive o he Syrian

people.55Te coaliion is organized around a council led by Presiden Hadi al-Bahra.

Bahra was he Naional Coaliions chie negoiaor a he Geneva peace alks and

has close links o Saudi Arabia.56

Te Naional Coaliion seeks o unie he Syrian poliical opposiion around a

provisional governmen ha would lead Syria ollowing he collapse o he Assad

regime. I aims o provide inernaional donors wih a legiimae, unified channel

or all aid o he rebellion. Bu he Naional Coaliion lacks a developed poliical

program. As one senior member underscored, Te coaliion isn a poliical pary,

is a coaliion. We represen he mosaic o Syrian poliical lie, has why we can

say: Heres he poliical agenda well pu orward.57

Te Naional Coaliion ormed an inerim Syrian governmen in March 2013.58

Based in Gazianep, urkey, he inerim governmen is charged wih channeling

assisance o rebels inside Syria and presening an alernaive o he Assad regime

in rebel-held erriories. Te inerim governmen has sruggled wih his mandae.Qaar gave he inerim governmen $55 million o help mee needs inside o Syria,

bu limied unding and presence inside o Syria have complicaed he inerim

governmens abiliy o deliver significan assisance.59


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Political infighting and competition

Relaions beween he inerim governmen and he Naional Coaliion have been

rocky. As one acivis observed, Te mos difficul hing wihin he opposiion

was he level o disrus beween hem.60Members o each insiuion are openly

criical o heir counerpars in he oher. Some members o he inerim govern-men, usually hose suppored by Qaar, seek o porray hemselves as a response

o he inadequacies o he Saudi-engineered Naional Coaliion leadership. As one

o he highes-ranking members o he inerim governmen pu i, Te opposiion

has largely ailed o pu he revoluion on he righ rack. Te inerim governmen

has he opporuniy o give ciizens basic services. Tis is essenial. Te Naional

Coaliion could no do his.61

Te January 2014 Geneva conerence became a major source o division inside

he poliical opposiion. Advocaes o paricipaing in he Geneva peace alks were

accused o pursuing reconciliaion wih he regime.62Tis spli beween pro- andani-Geneva coaliion members occurred a he same ime ha he inernaional

communiy was demanding uniy among he opposiion. Te pro-Geneva acion

proved incapable o developing a dialogue wih hose opposed o he peace alks.

Te quesion o going o Geneva should have been decided by a majoriy o he

coaliion because his was a big urning poin, said one prominen member o he

SNC.63Te collapse o he alks in early 2014 lef he Naional Coaliion deeply

divided and, in many cases, discredied hose associaed wih Geneva.

Lack of presence inside Syria

Te lack o presence inside Syria hinders he abiliy o he Naional Coaliion and

he inerim governmen o mee he needs o Syrians living in opposiion-conrolled

erriory. I also undercus he poliical legiimacy o he insiuion in he eyes o

many Syrians. As one senior U.S. governmen official based in urkey observed,

In a nushell, his has been he problem o he exernal opposiion. People don

have much aih and don see much effeciveness.64

Tis lack o presence complicaes atemps by he Naional Coaliion and heinerim governmen o uniy he pachwork o local acors who are opposed o he

Assad regime. Par o he problem is ha here is so much disuniy in he liberaed

areas. You have all hese rivalries going on. Is very hard or hem o deal wih

disagreemens, said one U.S. diploma.65Deracors claim he Naional Coaliion


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ailed o inves he ime and resources required o navigae his pachwork.

Insead, i adoped shorcus, appoining allies o posiions on local councils. As

one acivis deeply involved wih civil sociey groups on he ground noed:

Te National Coalition didnt map out the situation on the ground or who are

the major councils. What they did is nepotism. Tey named people close to them;theyd say you are the head o councils. Tey received $8 million om Qatar and

gave it to them in cash to establish legitimacy. Since then, the [National Coalition]

has been struggling to give legitimacy to the people they appointed.66

As a resul, some argue ha he poliical opposiion in exile derives is legiimacy

rom is inernaional recogniion. One acivis observed, Te opposiion has

ailed miserably o roo isel in he ground. Is a floaing virual opposiion [ha

is] ocused on inernaional relaions and delegiimized on he ground.67He

added, In he las eigh monhs, [he Naional Coaliion] has been undermined

by he Islamic Fron. Tey can no longer serve as represenaives on he ground.Tey ailed o have any auhoriy over he people on he ground.68

The generational divide

Te Naional Coaliion is also divided along generaional lines. Te original proess

in Syria were largely led by youh aciviss wih ew poliical affiliaions. A Naional

Coaliion leader refleced, Te youh movemen wasn ideologically based, hey

jus waned reedom.69Tese aciviss had ew ies o he small-bu-esablished

class o radiional opposiion figures who were linked o poliical paries wih

well-known ideologies and had sruggled agains he Assad regime or decades.

Aciviss differeniae beween his radiional opposiion and he revoluion.

As one acivis pu i, Te opposiion has been batling he regime or a long ime

bu ailed o sar a revoluion.70

However, members o he radiional opposiion have since come o dominae he

Naional Coaliion. Tey were given prominence and acceped ino he revoluion,

as one acivis pu i, because we hoped o ollow he Libya model and hough

ha an exernal opposiion could bring in inernaional suppor. People houghheyd ge a no fly zone he day afer he Naional Coaliion was ormed.71Bu he

inabiliy o hese leaders o deliver greaer miliary suppor rom he inernaional

communiy calls ino quesion heir suppor among he younger class o Syrian

aciviss who ound heir voice in 2011.72


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Regional and international influence

Regional and inernaional acors coninue o exercise a heavy degree o influence

over he poliics o he Syrian opposiion. Te relaionship beween differen

groupseven individualsand heir oreign backers has conribued o divisions

wihin he opposiion and weakened is effeciveness. As one senior acivis andounding member o he SNC pu i, We would no have wha we see now wihou

inernaional dynamics and oreign unding. Everyone picks a parner and sars

supporing i wihou coordinaion. Tis basically led o his disinegraion.73

In reacion o his dynamic, some rebel groups on he ground began o presen

hemselves in ways ha mee he ineres o unders, usually Salafiss rom he Gul.

Te compeing poliical agendas o Saudi Arabia and Qaar, in paricular, have

been a major issue driving disinegraion on he ground. You have wo wealhy

counries hrowing money a he opposiion and elling hem o annihilae each

oher, coninued he acivis.74

Te curren leadership o he Naional Coaliion is srongly perceived as aligned

wih Saudi Arabia. Former Presiden Ahmad al-Jarbas links o Saudi Arabia are

widely known and undersood o be an indicaor o his allegiance and ha o he

immediae leadership group around him. One U.S. official noed ha Presiden

Jarba is a member o he prominen Shammar ribe and is relaed by marriage o a

branch o he Saudi royal amily.75Jarbas Saudi ies were a source o ension wih

some opposiion members who believed ha Saudi Arabia used is influence o

help esablish and hen direc he Naional Coaliion. Curren Presiden Bahra,

who was eleced o he presidency in July when Jarba hi his one-year erm limi, is

seen as similarly close o he Saudi camp.76

Absence of strategy

Te ailure o he 2014 Geneva peace process undercu any hope o achieving a

negoiaed end o he crisis or he immediae uure. In he words o a senior

Geneva negoiaor or he Naional Coaliion, Tere is no soluion bu a poliical

soluion, bu now he poliical soluion is in a coma.77Some senior opposiion

figures acknowledge ha he Naional Coaliionand indeed he opposiionmore broadlydoes no have a sraegy or he uure, nor would hey be prepared

o ake charge i he regime ell. A SNC leader said, I was dreaming o he regime

collapsing. Now is a nighmare scenario. I you wake up and you find [Assad] on

a plane, i will be caasrophic.78


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Supreme Military Council

Te Supreme Miliary Council osensibly serves as he command srucure o he

Free Syrian Army, or FSA. Is primary goal is o unie he various armed groups in

he rebellion and evenually esablish a naional army. Te SMC is comprised o a

30-person council o leaders rom various armed opposiion groups across Syria.

I receives financial and maerial suppor rom he Unied Saes and several

European and Gul counries. Some o is members also receive limied weapons

and ammuniion rom hese counries; however, he SMC isel is no a condui

or U.S. miliary assisance.79

Relaions beween he SMC and is poliical counerpars have been difficul.

Members o he Naional Coaliion complain ha he SMC leadership operaes as

an independen body. Te SMC has also suffered rom a crisis o leadership. Is

firs leader, Gen. Salim Idriss, was sacked in February and replaced by Gen.

Abdul-Ilah al-Bashir al-Noeimia ormer brigadier general in he Syrian Army

and a close personal ally o hen-Naional Coaliion Presiden Jarba.80

In inerviews, members o he poliical opposiion, he SMC regional commands,

and FSA fighers inside Syria were deeply divided abou he replacemen o Gen.

Idriss and Presiden Jarbas auhoriy o do so. One FSA figher aligned wih he

Idriss camp said, Te SMC was pressured by Jarba o push ou Idriss. In

general, he FSA sill looks o he old SMC leadership and srucure because he

changes were no legal.81

o dae, he SMC has largely been limied o a coordinaion and represenaion

role wih litle abiliy o exercise command and conrol over FSA orces on he

ground. As wih he Naional Coaliion and he inerim governmen, he SMC has

ailed o esablish a significan presence inside Syria. Nor has he SMC been ableo ulfill is aspiraion o serve as a cenral clearing house or assisance o he

armed opposiion. One member o he poliical opposiion said:


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We were hoping the SMC would be a base o operations, but they werent able to

effectively distribute aid. ... oday, we dont have a military council that is unified.

Te SMC in both its old and new orms cant gain the trust o the Syrian people.82

Te uure o he SMC remains in quesion. In June, nine regional SMC commanders

resigned in proes o he reorganizaion, dealing a major blow o Gen. Bashirs efforso consolidae auhoriy over he organizaion.83Soon afer, he inerim govern-

men announced he dissoluion o he SMC and called or a replacemen body

saffed by rebel commanders on he ground.84However, hen-Presiden Jarba

sepped in o dismiss he decree and insis on he coninuaion o he SMC in is

curren configuraion.85Tis sor o poliical jockeying has repeaedly undermined

he abiliy o he opposiions mos senior miliary body o deliver on is mandae.

Te recen ormaion o a Revoluionary Command Council, or RCC, in early

Augus by armed acions inside Syria has urher diminished he SMCs relevance.

Te RCC now boass a membership o almos 40 armed groups.86Te councilincludes key FSA acions and he major acions o he Islamic Fron, which had

reused SMC leadership and even seized SMC resources and supplies inside Syria.

I he Syria-based RCC proves a success, i may effecively replace he largely

exiled SMC.


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Free Syrian Army fighters

on the ground

Te limiaions o he poliical and miliary leadership in exile will coninue o

presen obsacles or a reliable and effecive opposiion o Presiden Assad and

ISIS. Bu a review o hose groups direcly involved in he fighing in Syria suraces

key dynamics ha U.S. policymakers will ace as hey increase unding o he

armed opposiion.

Localized fighting groups

Te vas majoriy o opposiion fighers operae in highly localized groups, ofen

deending heir homeowns and neighborhoods. One senior official in he Naional

Coaliion assered ha hese unis orm he backbone o he opposiion: Tese unis

may be very smallmaybe 250 peoplebu hey represen he majoriy o he

opposiion.87A number o Syrians inerviewed believe ha hese smaller ormaions

acually consiue some o he mos capable eniies in he opposiion. Te mos

effecive fighing orces are he local orces who are effecive a deending heir home

owns,88said one Syrian Naional Council member.

Te larger opposiion groups reporedly ousource he acual fighing o hese

smaller unis. According o a senior Syrian Muslim Broherhood leader:

Te big names you hear about, they come to areas and make deals. Tey say, Well

give you ammunition and supplies in exchange or handling this area or that

checkpoint. So these smaller groups are really the ones operating on the ground.89

Fighers rom differen groups ofen join orces a he acical level in order o

carry ou specific operaions. Operaion rooms have been esablished in urbanareas and oher localiies o aciliae acical coordinaion agains specific regime

arges. As a senior Syrian Muslim Broherhood leader pu i:


23/47


Te people all operate om the same operating room. Teres a call or action

and then people volunteer to implement the action. I its a big operation, these

larger groups control the strategy.90

The Syrian Revolutionaries Front and Harakat Hazm

Perhaps he bes known o he major Free Syrian Army groups is he Syrian

Revoluionaries Fron, or SRF. Te SRF is a collecion o 14 opposiion acions

wih 10,000 o 15,000 fighers combined.91Tese groups joined orces a he end

o 2013 under he leadership o Jamal Maarou, a ormer consrucion worker

rom Idlib province.92SRF was esablished o couner he Islamic Fron and was

one o he firs groups o ake on ISIS. In addiion o suppor rom he Unied

Saes, SRF reporedly receives exensive suppor rom Saudi Arabia.93

A second groupHaraka Hazm, or Seadas Movemenwas he subjec omedia atenion earlier his year afer videos suraced o is fighers employing

U.S.-made ani-ank missiles.94Formed in January, Haraka Hazm claims o have

some 5,000 fighers drawn rom 22 differen opposiion unis.95Te group

describes isel as a revoluionary, poliical organizaion wih a miliary wing ...

working o bring down he regime in Syria.96In inerviews wih CAP his spring,

Haraka Hazm represenaives described in some deail he naure and scope o

assisance i has received via a cover U.S. rain-and-equip program, which is

aimed a increasing he capabiliies o veted opposiion orces.

Te nonideological naure o hese groups, specifically wih regard o poliical

Islam, disinguishes hem rom oher rebel groups. Like many oher saes in he

Middle Eas, Syria lacks a liberal poliical culure. Insead, he dominan ideologi-

cal currenswheher communis, pan-Arab naionalis, or Islamisare illiberal

and offer weak commimens o or ourigh rejecion o pluralisic democracy. In

his environmen, nonideological brigades such as SRF and Haraka Hazm claim

o figh on behal o he popular demands o he iniial uprising, such as civil

liberies and democraic elecions, insead o defining an ideology ha ranscends

he curren conflic.

Te oher larger ormaions o opposiion fighers currenly appear o be organized

around ulraorhodox Salafi or jihadi ideologies. Some groups, such as al-Nusra

Fron and ISIS, harbor ransnaional aspiraions, which have been embedded ino

he Syrian conflic. Ohers, such as he Salafi brigades o he Islamic Fron, have


24/47


naional objecives bu view he civil war as a batle or Syrias Sunni Muslim

ideniy and he implemenaion o Sharia, or Islamic law, raher han democracy.

Te nonideological naure o SRF and Haraka Hazm makes hem comparaively

more moderae han hese Salafi groups. A he same ime, nonideological fighers

are suscepible o he rising influence o Salafism in he absence o an overarching

narraive o guide heir sruggle.

Organizaions such as Haraka Hazm atemp o compensae or his lack o

ideology by describing hemselves in erms akin o a social movemen. Haraka

Hazm represenaives describe a hree-sage sraegy. Te firs and curren sage is

a miliary effor o opple he regime. Once Presiden Assad alls, Haraka Hazm

would divide is effors beween he radiional securiy and poliical asks o

pos-conflic ransiion. In he final sage, Haraka Hazm would re-esablish isel

as a poliical or social movemen afer key ransiion benchmarks have been me,

including drafing a new consiuion and holding elecions.97Haraka Hazm

differeniaes isel rom rebel groups ha are engaged in predaory behavior. I alsopresens isel as modes in ambiion wih no designs on a pos-Assad hrone. A

he same ime, Haraka Hazm represenaives presen heir organizaion as disinc

rom exising opposiion poliical srucures wih litle ineres in inegraion.

Disconnect from the Supreme Military Council and the National Coalition

Boh he SRF and Haraka Hazm show some degree o deerence o he Naional

Coaliion and he SMC bu remain skepical o heir uiliy. As one senior SRF

represenaive observed, When i comes o he SMC we wan o see some-

hing on he ground. Tose ouside he borders o Syria are he complee opposie

rom hose inside.98SRF represenaives wen on o underscore ha he group

had received litle financial suppor rom he SMC and insised ha SRF unis did

no ake orders rom he SMC chain o command. Senior represenaives o

Haraka Hazm were more respecul in heir one bu disagreed wih he decision

o replace Gen. Idriss wih Gen. Bashir.99When pressed, Haraka Hazms represen-

aives acknowledged ha he SMC played litle role in heir organizaions

decisionsa posiion made all he more sriking by he presence o Haraka

Hazm commanders on he SMCs leadership council.


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The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood

Te Syrian Muslim Broherhood, or SMB, is he only group wih prior hisorical

experience o organized, violen conronaions wih he Assad regime. A 1970s

resisance campaign ended in abjec ailure when he SMB ormed a miliary arm

and conroned he regime, resuling in he inamous Hama massacre o 1982.100

Since hen, SMB membership has been a capial offense in Syria. oday, he SMB

is largely an exile organizaion. A senior leader esimaed ha he SMB has beween

7,000 o 10,000 members inside Syria, many o whom remain clandesine.101

Bu he SMB appears o be using he proraced naure o he Syrian conflic ore-esablish isel inside he counry. As he same senior SMB leader pu i:

Every action tries to plant its roots in the current environment in Syria. Its not just

jihadis building schools but seculars and nationalists too. Afer 50 years o absence

o political thought, everyone is trying to create an environment or themselves. 102

As par o his effor, he SMB is working o expand is influence hrough a series o

avenues ranging rom he Naional Coaliion o a pachwork o small, armed groups.

Te SMB was more influenial during he iniial sages o exile opposiion poliics,

and criics ofen accused i o dominaing hese srucures overly or by proxy.103

Indeed, he SMB leveraged suppor rom Qaar o play kingmaker in he early days

o he Naional Coaliion bu suffered a seback when Saudi Arabia ook on a more

prominen role in 2013.104Saudi Arabia has been deeply suspicious o he Muslim

Broherhood elsewhere in he region and has clashed wih Qaar over he laters

suppor o he Muslim Broherhood in Egyp and unisia.105Despie personal

assurances rom Riyadh ha Saudi Arabias regional ani-Broherhood policies do

no apply o Syria, SMB aciviy and influence in opposiion poliics appears o

have receded.106


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Te SMB is also acive on he humaniarian ron, and is members und several

chariies. Due o poliical sensiiviies, he SMB ends o adop a low profile in is

suppor o specific chariy groups. Criics accuse i o giving cover suppor o

such groups as a means o exend is poliical influence on he ground in Syria,

poining o groups such as Waan, or Homeland, as evidence o his sraegy.107

Bu his reflex agains sel-idenificaion may well be a byproduc o he decades orepression ha SMB members experienced.

In addiion o is humaniarian aciviies, he SMB has launched a concered effor

o exend is reach by unding a nework o small rebel groups. Tis sraegy is

parly inormed by he SMB-unded Syrian Cener o Research and Sudies, which

racks rebel groups and analyzes batlefield dynamics.108A SMB leader and he

ceners presiden, cynically observed:

[Te rebels] are ready to accept support om anyone but do not give loyalty to

the under. Teir loyalty is to the support you give themthe money andresources. A fighter can work with you or a year and take orders, but afer a

year, hell leave you [when the unding stops].109

Te SMB unds hese groups hrough is own veting procedure independen o

he Supreme Miliary Council. I uses mechanisms such as he Commitee o

Proec Civilians, or CPC, which make[s] conac wih exising miliias and

link[s] hem o he Broherhood hrough financial and logisical suppor.110

Te SMB financed he consolidaion o small local armed groups under umbrella

o he Shields o he Revoluionary Council in 2012. Tis group sel-idenifies as

par o he Free Syrian Army bu mainains direc operaional linkages wih he

SMB.111Members o he SMB repor exensive ravel across rebel-held erriory

and mee and recrui armed groups:

We meet them, vet them, and then nominate them to iendly countries or

support. Te SMC has no presence, no control over what happens on the

ground. Tey are simply aid distributors. Tere hasnt been a group who has

been ormed without our consultation. Te rebel groups know they need our help

to get anything om the outside.112

Te SMB, however, has had limied success in peneraing he larger armed

opposiion groups, as well as hose wih robus ideological programs. One senior

SMB leader claimed ha he group had links o some 200 fighers operaing inside

he Al Qaeda affiliae al-Nusra Fron and ha al-Nusra and he hardline Ahrar


27/47


al-Sham could be convinced o accep elecions a he end o war.113Bu here is

litle o sugges ha he SMB can exercise influence over hese more hardline

organizaions. Members o he Islamic Fron were ouspoken in heir misrus o

he SMB and disdain or is school o poliical Islam.114

Te overall impac o he SMB on he naional direcion o he rebellion remainsmarginal. Te SMB appears o be playing a long game wih a ocus on local

acorsone based on an assumpion ha he war will no be over anyime

soon.115Is wai-and-see sraegy is rooed in he hard lessons o pas experience in

which i overplayed is miliary hand wih Assad regime. Insead, he SMB seeks

o diversiy is invesmens across he rebel landscape and hen leverage hese

invesmens o srenghen is poliical posiion boh wihin he opposiion and

wih donors who wish o suppor orces ha offer an alernaive o ISIS and Assad.


28/47


The Islamic Front: Salafists

opposed to ISIS and Assad

Any effor o inves in a reliable and effecive orce ha opposes boh Assad and

ISIS aces a poliical and miliary challenge rom a coaliion o Islamis milian

groups known as he Islamic Fron. Largely Salafi in is poliical-religious ideology,

he Islamic Fron appears ar more capable han oher groups on he batlefield

due o boh is large size and is ideological cohesion, even hough i has aced cus

in unding and suppor in recen monhs. Combined wih he Islamic Frons

exclusionary ideology, his relaive cohesion represens a challenge no only o he

hird-way opposiion, bu also o he prospec o an inclusive pos-Assad poliicalsysem in Syria.

Te Islamic Fron has become he larges coaliion o armed Islamis opposiion

groups in Syria over he pas year. Founded in November 2013, he Islamic Fron is

esimaed o conrol beween 40,000 o 60,000 fighers.116Te Islamic Fron was

born ou he merger o wo older alliances: he Syrian Islamic Fron, composed o

Ahrar al-Sham, Liwa al-Haqq, and Ansar al-Sham, and he Syrian Islamic Liberaion

Fron, composed o Suqour al-Sham, Jaish al-Islam, and Liwa al-awhid.117Te

much smaller Kurdish Islamic Fron also joined laer.118Pressure resuling rom

limied access o resources and sraegic disagreemens beween he wo major blocs

may evenually resul in he ormal breakup o he group along is wo older alliances.

However, hese groups sill pose he same challenge wheher hey are unied or no.

In ac, a racured and weakened Islamic Fron may be even more challenging

because is ens o housands o Salafi fighers are he op recruis or ISIS as i

conrons Islamic Fron roops wih eiher deah or allegiance.

Te ormaion o he Islamic Fron marked an atemp by he main Salafi fighing

orces o gain influence over he ideological direcion o he opposiion. Islamic Fron

acions el underrepresened in boh he SMC and he Naional Coaliion, whichailed o unie disparae opposiion acions under a naional banner.119Te Islamic

Fron has managed o overcome some geographical divides ha have prevened

naional-level acion and also provided an ideological projec o uniy is fighers.


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Leaders o he Islamic Fron agreed o divide leadership posiions evenly beween

he wo older alliancesAhrar al-Sham and Jaish al-Islam. Ahrar al-Sham effecively

dominaes he leadership o he Islamic Fron and conrols is key posiions,

including he poliical commitee and he Sharia commitee. Conrol o he poliical

commitee includes he auhoriy o designae enemies and gives Ahrar al-Sham

disproporionae influence over he Islamic Frons overall miliary sraegy.Moreover, Ahrar al-Shams conrol o he Sharia commitee gives i he auhoriy o

issue religious opinions ha are, in heory, binding or all members o he Islamic

Fron.120Tis seems o have been a major driver behind recen disagreemens

beween Ahrar al-Sham and acions ouside is older alliance, namely Jaish

al-Islam and is ambiious leader Zahran Alloush, who has resened he srong

exercise o conrol by Ahrar al-Sham.

The Is lamic Front s ideology

Te Islamic Frons acions hew o an ulraconservaive Salafi inerpreaion o

Islam ha aims, according o is iniial charer, o consruc an Islamic sociey in

Syria ruled by he law o God.121In inerviews, Islamic Fron represenaives

sruggled o expand on he meaning o an Islamic sociey or provide more clariy

on a vision or pos-war Syria. Tis is, in par, a produc o Syrias nearly nonexisen

pre-war Islamis poliical environmen, as well as he Islamic Frons ambiious

desire o presen isel as a big en or Syrias Islamis currens, specifically he

ideology-obsessed Ahrar al-Sham.

One Islamic Fron Sharia commitee member rom Ahrar al-Sham suggesed ha

his group is bes compared o he aliban in Aghanisan.122Many Islamiss believe

he alibans Islamic Emirae successully ounded a local base o suppor in war-orn

Aghanisan rom which i was able o enorce Sharia law. Senior religious auhori-

ies in he Islamic Fron believe heir movemen is similarly poised o lead Syria o

embrace is rue Islamic naure.123In so doing, he Islamic Fron aims o disance

isel rom he acics o ransnaional jihadiss such as Al Qaeda and ISIS and

signal o ousiders ha heir inenion is no o pursue an agenda ouside o Syria.

Te Islamic Fron is he poenial swing voe among he ragmened ani-AssadIslamis orces in Syria: Is Salafi fighers could ideniy eiher wih heir Syrian

naional ideniy or, acing cerain condiions, subscribe o he more-exreme

views o ISIS. Tis is differen rom he groups leadership, which has pracical

reasons or rejecing he ransnaional jihadism o ISIS and Al Qaeda. Is leaders


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believe hese groups have ailed a heir objecives. As Islamic Fron Sharia

commitee member Abu Yehiya al-Hamawi observed in an essay iled oward an

Enlighened Creed:

Te most prominent ailure o Salafi-Jihadism is its inability to unite with the

Ummah [Muslim community]. What happened in many cases is that Salafi-Jihadism ailed to convince people o its project and so it transormed [itsel] into

a undamentalist pariah in its communities.124

Compeiion and conronaion wih ISIS inormed he organizaions ounding

charer and is caegorical rejecion o democracy. According o a senior member

o he Islamic Frons poliical commitee rom Ahrar al-Sham, he documens

rejecion o democracy and appeal o ulraconservaive Islamis principles were

rooed in a poliical imperaive o provide an Islamis vision o compee wih ha

o ISIS.125Te charer was shor on specifics and led o some inernal complains.

One member o he Islamic Fron poliical commitee rom Suqour al-Sham

refleced, [Te declaraion] is oo vague. Don jus say you don wan democracy,

bu raher say wha you wan insead.126A senior member in he Islamic Fron

miliary commitee rom Jaish al-Islam said, Te declaraion is sill no a clear

vision ye.127A poliical commitee member rom Jaish al-Islam added, An

Islamic sae is a dream, no an objecive.128

In an apparen effor o clari y and broaden is appeal, he Islamic Fron joined

wih oher Islamis acions o sign he Covenan o Revoluionary Honor in

May.129Te documen made no reerence o an Islamic sae and insead called or

a sae o law, reedom, and jusice.130Is signaories rejeced exremism and

commited hemselves o Syrias diverse muli-ehnical and muli-secarian social

abric.131Te declaraion marked an atemp reach ou o non-Salafi brigades in

he figh agains ISIS. I remains o be seen i his effor will be successul, bu i

signals a level o acical pragmaism ha may se he Islamic Fron apar rom he

ransnaional jihadiss o ISIS.

The Is lamic Front s strategy

Te Islamic Fron is posiioning isel o challenge he legiimacy o he Naional

Coaliion, Supreme Miliary Council, and oher srucures associaed wih he

opposiion. I dismisses hese insiuions as ineffecive, unrepresenaive, and


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corrup. A member o he poliical commitee rom Suqour al-Sham explained ha

he commitee is an alernaive o he ailed poliical work o he Naional Coaliion.132

Anoher senior member o he Islamic Frons miliary commitee rom Jaish

al-Islam sressed, Te Syrian revoluion mus have poliical represenaion rom

people inside Syria who are orming a body or he revoluion.133Afer rejecing

he auhoriy o he SMC lae las year, he Islamic Fron seized conrol o hemain SMC weapons depos in norhern Syria along he urkish border.134As a

senior member o Suqour al-Sham explained:

Te interim government cannot implement projects on the ground. But our work

is building towards an [Islamic state]. Te [Islamic Front] is still new and it

cannot quickly orm a state. o build a state correctly, the oundations must

be strong.135

Te Islamic Fron has also esablished a legal sysem o govern he areas under is

conrol. Raher han deauling o rudimenary Sharia cours, Islamic Froninerlocuors spoke o uniying a liberaed Syria under he Arab Leagues Unified

Arab Law wih modified Syrian law.136A member o he Islamic Fron poliical

commitee rom Suqour al-Sham confirmed, We use [Unified Arab Law] in cours.

Tere are hose who accep ha and hose who are agains i [bu] because

here is chaos, here mus be a law.137

Despie his progress, he Islamic Fron has also begun o suffer rom significan

reducions in exernal suppor. A number o observers claim ha unds rom he

Gul saes may have dried up in response o U.S. pressure o resric financing o

Islamis groups. ensions beween is larger members, including Jaish al-Islam and

Ahrar al-Sham, have also srained he group. When he Revoluionary Command

Council was ormed, he iniial inclusion o Jaish al-Islam and exclusion o Ahrar

al-Sham suggesed ha he groups may no longer be working ogeher.138

Alhough deep disagreemens exis beween he wo groups, Ahrar al-Sham laer

joined he RCC, and boh groups have hus ar absained rom explicily saing

heir inen o dissolve he union beween heir alliances. Beore his, Jaish

al-Islams leader Zahran Alloush publicly criicized he Covenan o Revoluionary

Honor signed by he Islamic Frons poliical commitee, indicaing ha he ound

is language oo sof, aking a more orhodox sance han Ahrar al-Sham.139

Bu here are signs ha he ongoing assaul on Aleppo rom boh he Assad regime

and ISIS may have convinced elemens o he Islamic Fron o se aside heir

differences and complee heir merger. Te Islamic Fron declared in July ha


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groups fighing under is banner in Aleppo would cease using heir individual

names and come under he command o a miliary leader rom Liwa al-awhid.

Jaish al-Islam has also indicaed is ull merger wih Suqour al-Sham, a group ha

was in is previous alliance.140Tis comes eigh monhs afer he ounding o he

Islamic Fron. Tese ull mergers, along wih how he alliance responds o he

recen deah o Ahrar al-Sham leader Hassan Aboud, will serve as a limus es orhe long-erm viabiliy o he Islamic Fron.141


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Al-Nusra Front and ISIS

Te wo major jihadi orces are al-Nusra Fron, an Al Qaeda affiliae, and he Islamic

Sae o Iraq and al-Sham, a ormer Al Qaeda affiliae ha began reerring o isel as

simply he Islamic Sae in June. Te superior fighing capabiliies and experience o

hese wo groups have made hem a major acor in he rebel landscape. Al-Nusra

Fron was ounded in lae 2011 when he Islamic Sae in Iraq, or ISIpredecessor

o odays ISISspecifically asked al-Nusra Fron leader Muhammad al-Jawlani

wih overhrowing he Assad regime and imposing jihadi rule in Syria.142Te Unied

Saes designaed al-Nusra Fron as a oreign erroris organizaion in December 2012on he grounds ha a hierarchical relaionship exised beween i and ISI, which he

U.S. Sae Deparmen also reerred o as Al Qaeda in Iraq, or AQI, a he ime. 143

While ISI did play a crucial role in esablishing al-Nusra Fron, ricion beween

he wo erroris organizaions emerged in he monhs ollowing he Sae

Deparmens designaion.

ISI leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced he ormaion o ISIS, a merger beween

ISI and al-Nusra Fron, in April 2013.144However, Jawlani issued his own saemen

disavowing he merger and pledging allegiance o Al Qaeda cenral leader Ayman

al-Zawahiri.145Zawahiri atemped o mediae beween he wo groups. He saed

ha Baghdadi had no consuled wih Al Qaedas cenral leadership and ha al-Nusra

Fron was an independen organizaion. Baghdadi responded by rejecing Zawahiris

auhoriy.146Zawahiri ulimaely disowned ISIS and declared al-Nursa Fron he sole

Al Qaeda ranchise in Syria.147

In addiion o his leadership sruggle, ISIS and al-Nusra Fron iniially differed in

heir acics. Since he spli, al-Nusra Fron has been less brual in is reamen o

local populaions han ISIS and cooperaed wih oher rebel groups, including heIslamic Fron and he Free Syrian Army.148A member o he Aleppo Miliary

Council, or insance, spoke reely abou operaional cooperaion wih al-Nusra

Fron in he field.149Al-Nusra Frons approach appeared more closely aligned

wih Al Qaedas new sraegy o building consiuencies in hos counries. In so


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doing, Al Qaeda hopes o avoid he groups misakes in Iraq, where is affiliaes

insigaed a civil war ha consumed he Sunni communiy hey purpored o

deend and led o is expulsion a he hands o Sunni ribes. However, al-Nusra

Fron has largely allen ou o avor in rebel Syria due o is increased aggressive-

ness as i sruggles o be an alernaive o ISIS.

ISISs rapid advance in Syria and Iraq and is sel-proclaimed ounding o he

Caliphae in June have significanly weakened al-Nusra Fron.150Al-Nusras mos

prized erriory was along he Iraqi border and in he province o Deir Ezzor, where

i produced some 10,000 barrels o oil a day.151ISIS recenly capured muliple

border owns and compelled ribal leaders o pledge allegiance o he group,

enhancing is conrol o Syrias border region wih Iraq.152Tis projecion o srengh

compelled al-Nusra Fron fighers and oher rebels o eiher deec or surrender.153

Te deecion o al-Nusra fighers o ISIS has complicaed al-Nusra Frons

relaionship wih oher rebel groups. In an apparen atemp o asser is jihadicredenials, al-Nusra Fron has adoped a more conronaional posure oward he

Syrian opposiion. For example, al-Nusra Fron aggressively urned agains he

Syrian Revoluionaries Fron in Idlib province in July.154Tese atacks are

hreaening o escalae ino a ull-blown conronaion beween al-Nusra Fron

and he Free Syrian Army. Ta same monh, al-Nusra Fron leader Jawlani

announced his inenion o ound an emirae in Syria, an atemp o persuade

disillusioned fighers rom deecing o ISIS.155


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Lessons from the field

Tis summers evens in Iraq and Syria have promped he Obama adminisraion

o become more deeply engaged in boh counries, represening a new phase in

U.S. policy. Te curren rajecory o he conflic in Syria is paricularly worrisome,

and argeed U.S. air srikes in Iraq and, going orward, in Syria are no likely o

change he undamenal naure o he ISIS hrea or aler he basic archiecure o

he Syrian civil war on heir own. As he Obama adminisraion prepares o

implemen ramped up suppor or a hird-way alernaive o he Assad regime and

ISIS, five overarching lessons rom his field research will help shape a smareroverall sraegy or U.S. engagemen in Syria.

1. The urgency of the situation in Syria requires swifter U.S. action

Presiden Obama firs proposed $500 million in addiional assisance o he

Syrian opposiion in June. I will have been a leas hree monhs beore Congress

akes acion on his reques. In he inerim, batlefield dynamics have changed

significanly, and hey have no avored hose opposiion orces ha he Unied

Saes seeks o back.

In he shor erm, he Unied Saes should bolser is effors o work direcly wih

veted armed groups on he ground o srenghen heir capaciy and build heir

command srucures. As par o his effor, he Unied Saes will need o immediaely

reinorce elemens o he hird-way opposiion orces ha are currenly fighing a

rear-guard batle or survival agains boh he regime and ISIS in Aleppo and Idlib.

I hese pockes o non-Islamis Free Syrian Army fighers can hold on, hey could

serve as he building blocks o a Syrian parner agains ISIS. Bu ime is o he

essence, and heir siuaion deerioraes by he day. I hese elemens are deeaed,he Unied Saes and is regional parners will have o sar rom scrach.

In addiion, here is an urgen need o reach ou o local Sunni ribes in Syrias

easern region. Tese ribes will play an imporan role in any long-erm effor o

comba ISIS and deny i sae haven. Some o hese ribes have demonsraed a


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willingness o figh ISIS and have already los hundreds in comba.156Te Unied

Saes should engage hese ribes direcly or hrough parners in he region o

reinorce heir posiion and ensure ha hey have an alernaive o he Assad

regime in building alliances agains ISIS.

2. Stronger regional coordination is required to make support to

the opposition effective

Te wave o poliical change ha swep he Middle Eas in 2011 se in moion an

inense regional compeiion or power. Tis compeiion goes beyond he

radiional Sunni-Shia divide ino an inra-Sunni figh or legiimacy beween

regional blocs.157Te Syrian opposiion has become a casualy o his sruggle.

Saudi Arabia, Qaar, and ohers in he region have backed differen proxies in he

Syrian opposiion who depend on oreign resources o figh. In addiion, privae

donors, mainly rom he Gul, have provided an independen source o unding oexremis groups. Tis compeiion has exacerbaed he ragmenaion o he

Syrian opposiion orces. Any serious effor o galvanize he Syrian opposiion o

push back agains ISIS and o moun a real challenge o he Assad regime mus

manage his regional compeiion. o his end, he Unied Saes will need o

underake a susained and vigorous diplomaic effor in he region.

3. Additional support to the opposition should prioritize the fight

against ISIS

Any effor o bolser assisance o he Syrian opposiion mus be based on a clear

undersanding o U.S. prioriies in he region. In his new, hird phase o U.S.

policy, he deea o ISIS is a higher prioriy han he ransiion o power rom

Presiden Assad.

Te Obama adminisraions policy is ha Presiden Assad mus go, and here is good

reason or i. Tere is no quesion ha Assad is largely responsible or he blood-

shed and hardship ha his people have endured over he pas hree years, as repres-

sion sparked he firs uprising and hen degeneraed ino a vicious civil war. He hascommited war crimes, including he use o chemical weapons on his own people,

and creaed he larges reugee crisis in he hisory o he U.N. High Commissioner

or Reugees.158Bu i is also clear ha, while he Unied Saes had already begun

o ramp up is suppor or he Syrian opposiion, i was he rise o ISIS and

specifically is desabilizaion o Iraq ha spurred he Obama adminisraion o ac.


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Going orward, he Obama adminisraion will need o be clear wih Congress,

he American people, and is parners in he region ha U.S. effors in Syria will

ocus firs and oremos on conaining and degrading ISIS. Tis is no o sugges

ha he adminisraion should change is policy wih regard o Assad or, as some

have suggesed, make common cause wih his regime in he figh agains ISIS. In

Syria, he enemy o our enemy is no our riendbu nor is his removal our opprioriy. o sugges oherwise could risk boh he efficacy and credibiliy o he

effor. Te diplomacy, poliics, and kineics o a campaign agains a rising erroris

orce in Syrias norh and eas will differ rom one designed o dislodge Presiden

Assad. Te later remains an imporan objecive criical o he long-erm sabiliy

o Syria bu should be se aside in he near erm in avor o deeaing ISIS.

4. The effort to support a reliable and effective Syrian opposition

will take years

Te curren sae o disarray among Syrias opposiion orces suggess ha a long-

erm effor o suppor more cohesion is required. Tis process may ake several years.

Te Syrian opposiion remains ragmened and gripped by inernal compeiion.

Mos opposiion fighers are organized ino relaively small unis ha are deending

heir localiy wih no sraegic objecive or inheren ideology. Tere is litle sense o

how hese unis fi ogeher ino a wider sraegy. Te siuaion is no beter on he

poliical ron. Te Naional Coaliion and is inerim governmen exis only in exile

and are deeply divided. Tese divisions exend o he Supreme Miliary Council,

which coninues o suffer rom leadership coness. In heir mos hones momens,

senior opposiion figures acknowledge heir deficiencies. Te Syrian opposiion

and our allies don have a sraegy. I Assad is oppled onigh, Id be scared because

we don have a plan,159observed a Naional Coaliion member.

Given he opposiions curren sae, here is a limi o he speed wih which

opposiion fighers can absorb exernal resources. As represenaives o Haraka

Hazm underscored, Were no asking or an unlimied flow o [weapons] or

anyhing unrealisic like ha. We lack a sabilized flow o weapons and qualiaive

raining [ha] allows or uure planning o pursue new ground or ake on more

fighers.160

Te Unied Saes and is regional parners will need o calibrae heirassisance o he absorpive capaciy o he fighers hey are atemping o empower.

Duraion and predicabiliy o supply will be as imporan as he volume o he

flow o weapons, ammuniion, and equipmen i hird-way acions are o compee

in he markeplace o opposiion fighers.


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5. The Islamic Front and Syrias Salafi jihadists will remain a long-

term U.S. policy challenge

One paricularly horny challenge is how he Unied Saes will deal wih hardline

Islamiss ha oppose ISIS, including hose fighing wih he Islamic Fron. Clashes

wih he Assad regime and ISIS, a crippling atack agains is leadership, and herepored reducion in unding rom sae sponsors have pu significan pressure on

he Islamic Fron. Tis has aken a oll on he cohesion o he Islamic Fron, bu

he 40,000 o 60,000 so-called Syrian aliban who figh under he Islamic

Frons banner remain greaer in number and capabiliy han he Free Syrian Army

elemens ha are receiving U.S. assisance. As one senior moderae acivis

observed, Te Islamic Fron has a naional-level objecive and can mobilize and

deploy fighers across [areas o responsibiliy] and localiies.161As he Unied

Saes increases suppor or he Syrian opposiion, policymakers mus decide wha

role hey see or hese Salafi jihadi fighers. I he Islamic Fron were o implode as

an umbrella organizaion, here is a very real risk ha many o is fighers will joinISIS. I i survives, a U.S.-backed moderae opposiion may find isel in conflic

wih elemens o he Islamic Fron.


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Conclusion

Syrias civil war began wih he same spark as he oher popular uprisings ha

swep hrough he Middle Eas in 2011. Te Assad regime responded o peaceul

proess wih vicious orce, commiting arociies ha creaed incenives or

regime opponens o use orce o change Syrias governmen. Despie hundreds o

millions o dollars o suppor and raining flowing o he Syrian opposiion rom

Saudi Arabia, Qaar, urkey, and he Unied Saes, among ohers, he lack o

cohesion among he Syrian opposiion has conribued o he Assad regimes

abiliy o remain in conrol o cerain pars o he counry. Te weakness o heSyrian opposiion, combined wih he Assad regimes brualiy, creaed a vacuum

in many pars o Syria, which ISIS had now filled.

More han hree years o conflic in Syria have been devasaing: Nearly 200,000

people are dead, 9 million are displaced, and he regional spillover is affecing

urkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq.162ISISs blizkrieg ino norhern Iraq his

summer was a wake-up call, promping he Obama adminisraion o ake argeed

miliary acion and heighen diplomaic engagemen wih Iraqs poliical leaders.

Te hrus o U.S. engagemen has wisely ocused on working wih reliable and

capable parners inside Iraq using careully calibraed miliary acion and securiy

suppor. Tese iniial acions are seps in he righ direcion, represening a

judicious use o limied and principled orce linked o clear poliical and securiy

objecives. While hese moves are necessary, hey are also incomplee wihou

heighened measures inside Syria as well.

ISISs acions his summer demonsrae ha he Iraq-Syria border is no longer

uncional and ha he wo counries problems have merged ino a single heaer o

operaion. Te challenge or he Obama adminisraion is o rea Iraq and Syria as

an inegraed problem se wih coordinaed acion and wihou resoring o oversim-plified measures ha redraw borders. Te Unied Saes is now poised o work wih

parners in Iraq o apply addiional orce and pressure agains ISIS. One risk in doing

his, however, is ha ISIS migh well redeploy is cener o graviy back ino Syria.


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As weak and divided as he non-jihadi Syrian opposiion is now, he Unied Saes

needs o ake measured seps o increase he opposiion orces capaciy o couner

he rise o ISIS in he shor erm while mainaining a long-erm goal o a poliical

ransiion in he Syrian governmen. Te mos immediae and urgen hrea or

U.S. ineress is he rise o ISIS, and is deea is paramoun.

Increased suppor o he build a hird-way Syrian opposiion is one imporan

pillar o degrade ISIS. Bu in he process o providing his assisance and raining,

he Unied Saes should remain ocused on he longer-erm objecives o an end

o he Syrian conflic and a peaceul governmen ransiion ha keeps he coun-

rys insiuions inac. Par o his process involves providing a regular, reliable,

and organized sream o assisance o he Syrian opposiion.

Unlike Iraq, here are no good opions when i comes o he figh agains ISIS or

he Assad regime in Syria. Facions o he Free Syrian Army ace an uphil l

sruggle and mos are preparing or a long war. Larger groups such as he SyrianRevoluionaries Fron have highly localized bases o suppor and are resriced

in heir abiliy o projec orce. Te abiliy o ac a he naional level remains an

aspiraion. Beneficiaries o U.S. assisance inside he hird-way armed opposiion

acknowledge ha here are limiaions on he speed wih which hey can absorb

exernal suppor and he pace a which hey can effecively grow.

Neverheless, i is unaccepable and a clear and credible hrea o American ineress

or ISIS o conrol large swahs o ungoverned erriory in Iraq and Syria. ISIS poses

a serious hrea o Middle Eas sabiliy; is vicious crimes agains humaniy have

devasaed housands. Gul sae compeiion, religious divisions, and poliical

insabiliy in he region coninue o hreaen o undermine he figh agains ISIS.

Te Unied Saes canno mee his hrea alonei needs key acors in he region

o pull heir weigh and ake consrucive seps oward sabiliy. ISIS can only be

deeaed by deermined acion rom an inernaional and regional coaliion, and

Syrias civil war will only come o an end afer a broad range o counries decide

ha enough is enough. Reinvigoraed U.S. leadership and engagemen on Syria in

he nex wo years represens an opporuniy o help sabilize he hear o he

Middle Eas.


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About the authors

Hardin Langis a Senior Fellow a he Cener or American Progress, where he

ocuses on U.S. naional securiy and mulilaeral affairs, Middle Eas policy, and

he role o Islamiss in he region. He comes o CAP wih 18 years o experience in

peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and sabilizaion, including a 12-year career wih heUnied Naions. Mos recenly, Lang was a senior ellow in he inernaional

securiy program a he Cener or Sraegic and Inernaional Sudies.

Mokhtar Awadis a Research Associae wih he Naional Securiy and Inernaional

Policy eam a he Cener or American Progress. His work ocuses on Islamis

groups, Middle Easern poliics, and U.S. oreign policy oward he region. Prior o

joining CAP, he was a junior ellow in he Middle Eas Program a he Carnegie

Endowmen or Inernaional Peace. He has been published in Foreign Policy, Te

Washington Post, and is he auhor o Te Salafi Dawa o Alexandria: Te Poliics o

A Religious Movemen, in Current rends in Islamist Ideology.

Ken Soferis he Associae Direcor or he Naional Securiy and Inernaional

Policy eam a he Cener or American Progress, where his work ocuses on U.S.

naional securiy sraegy and U.S. policy in he Middle Eas. Soer graduaed wih

a bachelors degree rom he Universiy o Souhern Caliornia, where he sudied

poliical science and inernaional relaions wih a ocus on U.S. oreign policy. He

sudied Arabic and Middle Eas poliics in boh Cairo, Egyp, and Amman, Jordan.

Peter Juulis a Policy Analys a he Cener or American Progress wih a ocus on

U.S. policy in he Middle Eas and Souh Asia. A six-and-a-hal-year CAP veeran,

Juul holds an undergraduae degree in inernaional relaions and poliical science

rom Carleon College in his naive Minnesoa and a masers degree in securiy

sudies rom he School o Foreign Service a Georgeown Universiy. He is he

co-auhor o Serving Americas Veterans, a reerence book on veerans affairs, and

has published commenary in U.S. News and World Report, heAtlanta Journal-

Constitution, and he Foreign Policyblog nework. He has also appeared on radio

and elevision news programs including Alhurra and Al Jazeera English.

Brian Katulisis a Senior Fellow a he Cener or American Progress, where hiswork ocuses on U.S. naional securiy policy in he Middle Eas and Souh Asia.

Kaulis has served as a consulan o numerous U.S. governmen agencies, privae

corporaions, and nongovernmenal organizaions on projecs in more han wo

dozen counries, including Iraq, Pakisan, Aghanisan, Yemen, Egyp, and

Colombia. From 1995 o 1998, he lived and worked in he Wes Bank, he Gaza

Srip, and Egyp or he Naional Democraic Insiue or Inernaional Affairs.


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Endnotes

1 After ISIS advances in Mosul and other parts of Iraq inearly June, the Center for American Progress released apolicy brief calling for targeted military strikes combinedwith an effort to advance a more cohesive regionalstrategy to address the threats posed by ISIS. See BrianKatulis, Hardin Lang, and Vikram Singh, On the Brink:

Managing the ISIS Threat in Iraq (Washington: Centerfor American Progress, 2014), available athttp://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2014/06/17/91993/on-the-brink.

2 The White House, Remarks by the President at theUnited States Military Academy CommencementCeremony, Press release, May 28, 2014, available athttp://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/28/remarks-president-united-states-military-academy-commencement-ceremony.

3 Julian E. Barnes, Adam Entous, and Carol E. Lee, ObamaProposes $500 Million to Aid Syrian Rebels, The WallStreet Journal, June 26, 2014, available athttp://online.wsj.com/articles/obama-proposes-500-million-to-aid-syrian-rebels-1403813486.

4 The White House, Statement by the President on I SIL,

Press release, September 10, 2014, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/statement-president-isil-1.

5 Hardin Lang, Mokhtar Awad, and Brian Katulis,Fragmenting Under Pressure: Egypts Islamists SinceMorsis Ouster (Washington: Center for AmericanProgress, 2014), available at http://www.american-progress.org/issues/security/report/2014/03/05/85281/fragmenting-under-pressure;Hardin Lang, MokhtarAwad, Peter Juul, and Brian Katulis, Tunisias Strugglefor Political Pluralism after Enn ahda (Washington:Center for American Progress, 2014), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2014/04/03/87049/tunisias-struggle-for-political-pluralism-after-ennahda; Brian Katulis, Hardin Lang,and Mokhtar Awad, Jordan in the Eye of the Storm:Continued U.S. Support Necessary with Ongoing Regional

Turmoil (Washington: Center for American Progress,

2014), available athttp://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2014/06/12/91448/jordan-in-the-eye-of-the-storm.

6 Brian Katulis, Hardin Lang, and Vikram Singh, DefeatingISIS: An Integrated Strategy to Advance Middle EastStability (Washington: Center for American Progress,2014), available athttp://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2014/09/10/96739/defeating-isis-an-integrated-strategy-to-advance-middle-east-stability .

7 Mary Beth Sheridan, Low-key U.S. diplomat transformsSyria policy, The Washington Post,July 12, 2011,available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/low-key-us-diplomat-transforms-syria-policy/2011/07/12/gIQAc5kSBI_story.html;ScottWilson, How the U.S. message on Assad shifted,Washington Post Checkpoint Blog, August 18, 2011,available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/

checkpoint-washington/post/how-the-us-message-on-assad-shifted/2011/08/18/gIQAfPZxNJ_blog.html.

8 The White House, Statement by President Obama onthe Situation in Syria, Press release, August 18, 2011,available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/08/18/statement-president-obama-situation-syria.

9 Neil MacFarquhar and Anthony Shadid, Russia andChina Block U.N. Action on Crisis in Syria, The New YorkTimes,February 4, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/world/middleeast/syria-homs-death-toll-said-to-rise.html?pagewanted=all;Michelle Nichols, Russia, China Veto Syria R esolution

From UN Security Council, The Huffington Post, July 19,2012, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/19/russia-china-syria_n_1686172.html.

10 Mark Hosenball, Exclusive: Obama authorizes secretU.S. support for Syrian rebels, Reuters, August 1, 2012,available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/01/us-usa-syria-obama-order-idUSBRE8701OK20120801;Eric Schmitt, C.I.A. Said to Aid in Steering Arms toSyrian Opposition, The New York Times, June 21, 2012,available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/21/world/middleeast/cia-said-to-aid-in-steering-arms-to-syrian-rebels.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

11 C. J. Chivers and Eric Schmitt, Arms Airlift to Syria RebelsExpands, With Aid from C.I.A., The New York Times,March24, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/25/world/middleeast/arms-airlift-to-syrian-rebels-expands-with-cia-aid.html?pagewanted=all; Mark

Mazzetti, Michael R. Gordon, and Mark Landler, U.S. IsSaid to Plan to Send Weapons to Syrian Rebels,TheNew York Times,June 13, 2013, available athttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/world/middleeast/syria-chemical-weapons.html?hp&_r=0.

12 Greg Miller, CIA ramping up covert training program formoderate Syrian rebels, The Washington Post,October2, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-ramping-up-covert-

Documents

Supporting the Syrian Opposition