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SUPPLEMENTTO

The London Gazette0} TUESDAY, the 28th of OCTOBER, 1947

byRegistered as a newspaper

THURSDAY, 30 OCTOBER, 1947

THE ASSAULT PHASE OF THENORMANDY LANDINGS.

The following Despatch was submitted to theSupreme Commander, Allied ExpeditionaryForce on the i6th October, 1944, by AdmiralSir Bertram H. Ramsay, K.C.B., M.V.O.,

' Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, Ex-• peditionary Force.

Office of Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief,Expeditionary Force,

London, S.W.I.*6th October, 1944.

Sir,I have the honour to forward my report of

the opening phase of Operation " Neptune,"the period covered being from my appoint-ment as Allied Naval Commander, Expedition-ary Force, on 25th October, 1943, to the with-drawal of the Naval Task Force Commanderson 3rd July, 1944. The report is lengthy owingto the need to CQver, if only superficially, thevery many different aspects of what is acknow-ledged to be'the greatest amphibious opera-tion in history. Because the report is so bulky,I have decided to write this covering letterin a form which will enable those who wishto do so' to obtain a. bird's eye view of theoperation as a whole, including the preparatoryperiod and the ibuild-up," without going intodetail.

2..Because, in the event, the movements ofover 5,000 ships and craft.proceeded smoothly,and to plan, and because, despite bad weather,the Allied armies and air forces were landedand reinforced, if not quite as quickly as theoptimum planning figure, at least more quicklythan the enemy reinforced his forces by land,it may now appear that the size and com-plexity of the • naval problem was somewhatexaggerated. This was not the case. That

the operation proceeded smoothly and accord-ing to plan was the result of the hard workand foresight of the many thousands concernedin its preparation and of the determination andcourage of the tens of thousands in the Alliednavies and merchant fleets who carried outtheir orders in accordance with .the very highesttraditions of the sea.

Magnitude of the Operation and need for CloseControl.3. From the outset of detailed planning it

was clear that success would be largely de-pendent upon the ability to exercise close andcontinuous control of the thousands of ships andcraft taking part. This overall control wouldhave to embrace.control of loading of all typesof shipping and craft, control of convoy sail-ing, control of tugs, and control of ship re-pairs. Without it time would inevitably belost and the best use could not be made of thegreat resources given to the operation to estab-lish our forces ashore and then to reinforcethem as quickly as possible. As other servicesand authorities besides the navy were inti-mately concerned with many of the problemsconnected with the rapid reinforcement of theExpeditionary Force, it was found necessaryduring planning to set up new organisations tocontrol various aspects of the operation duringthe vital first few weeks in which the tempoof the initial assaults had to be maintained atthe highest pitch. TUROO, BUCO, GOREPand COTUG* accordingly came into being andwere instrumental in the success achieved.

4. iBecause the assaults were .to be carriedout on a narrow front and because 'British and

* Admiralty footnote:T.U.R.C.O.—Turn Round Control Organisation;B.U.C.O.—Build-Up Control Organisation;C.O..R.E.P.—Control Repair Organisation;C.O.T.U.G.—Control Tug Organisation.

5iio SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 30 OCTOBER,. IQ47

U.S. forces had to share port facilities in the Isleof Wight area, it was evident that co-ordina-'tion of naval plans in some detail would benecessary on my level as .the Allied Naval Com-mander-in-Chief. This was effected smoothlydue to the loyal support of both -Task ForceCommanders, but I am aware that the U.S.naval authorities -had to exercise considerablerestraint in submitting to a degree of controlby superior authority on a level higher thanthat to which they were accustomed. In theirreports the U.S. naval commariiders have com-mented that in their view my orders extendedto too much detail. No argument, however,that 'has been produced since the operationhas led me to change my opinion that full co-ordination in detail was necessary on the•highest naval level.

Development of the Plan.5. An outline plan for the operation had been

prepared by *C.O.S.S.A.C. in July, 1943, andwas approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staffat the Quebec Conference. Its; soundness wasproved later in detailed planning as in norespect were its fundamentals altered, though"its scope and range were extended. On thenaval side, as the plan developed so the navalrequirements grew, and for some months wewere planning without being certain that ourfull demands would be met. "This uncertaintywas a constant anxiety to me and was onlyremoved at the eleventh hour.

6. The naval problem that had to be facedcan be briefly summarised as first the breakingof the strong initial crust of the coast defencesby assault together -with the landing of thefighting army formations; and secondly to com-mence, and continue without a'pause for fiveor six weeks, their reinforcement at as higha rate as possible. The first required the co-ordination of the movement of thousands ofships and landing craft and aircraft and thenof their fire power, the second lthe co-ordina-tion of the activities of hundreds of thousandsof men and women of all services, both in theUnited Kingdom and off the .French coast,marshalling, loading, sailing, unloading andreturning at least eight ship convoys a day inaddition to ten or twelve landing craft groups.Considerations of time and space 'did not permitthe use of any unexpected manoeuvre to confusethe enemy: we had simply to drive ahead ingreat strength and to ensure that the organisa-tion was as efficient as it could be, as the timefactor w.as all important.

7-. The one fundamental question on whichthere had to be early agreement was whetherto assault during .darkness .so as to obtain thegreatest measure of surprise on; the beaches,or whether to assault after daylight and torely on the greatly increased accuracy of airand naval bombardment under; these condi-tions. The decision which was made, to makea daylight landing, was in accord with experi-ence in the Pacific against strong defences,when the assaulting force possessed decisivenaval and air superiority, and I am convincedthat this.is the correct answer; under theseconditions. When the decision was made therewere no beach obstructions in 'place on the"Neptune" beaches. Their later.appearance

would almost certainly have caused the decisionto be-revised, .had it been originally made infavour of darkness, and it was very fortunatethat no change was necessary as. all training,and, to some extent, development of weaponswas affected. .It should, however, be notedthat there -was by no means general agreementas to a daylight attack, and that even afterthe initial decision had been agreed betweenthe three Comrnanders-in-Chief of the Expedi-tionary Force at least two ""vain efforts weremade to change it. ^

Administrative Planning.8. Administrative Planning for a major cross-

Channel operation had been carried on in theUnited Kingdom since May, 1942, by a skeletonstaff. As a result, preparations were faradvanced before the operational plan tookshape and the logistic requirements of the latterwere able to be fully met:

Enemy Miscalculations. .9; 'Because the power of manoeuvre at sea.

was so limited the need for keeping the enemyuncertain as to our precise objectives was para-mount. Characteristic wireless traffic accom-panying training and movements of assault .forces had to be controlled. I understand thatthe success of the radio measures taken was-

• an important contributory factor in securing,surprise. Other measures included the berthingof dummy landing craft in Dover 'and N<$reCommands before D day and the parking ofPHOENIX and WHALE Units* at Selsey andDungeness. Arrangements were also made withthe Admiralty for the large number of com-mercial ships thaot were destined for the Thamesand ships for loading to sail in later " Nep-tune " convoys to wait in Scottish ports untilthe operation began. Thus the concentrationof shipping automatically spread itself through-out the ports of the United Kingdom and,although most congested on the South Coast,it was not confined to that area.

10. Tactically, a naval diversion employing-light craft was carried out in the Straits ofDover to support the air bombardment in this;area simultaneously with the main assaults,,whilst a similar diversion was made in theneighbourhood of Cap d'Antifer. In b6th ofthese and also off Cap Barfleur radio counter-measures were employed by aircraft and bythe surface craft taking part to give an appear-ance to enemy radar similar to that presentedby the real forces. . We now know that thesewere very successful and wer,e an instrumentalfactor in enabling our forces to continue for solong towards .the enemy coast before theircomposition could be determined.

Security.11. Complete security was maintained, and!

it is considered that the very highest satisfaction,may be felt-that, despite the many hundreds,who were-for months aware of all the details,of the plan, so far as is known there was no-leakage. Some anxiety was felt on one or two-occasions over individual cases in which ordersor maps were distributed or opened contraryto the instructions given, but no harm is be-lieved to have come of these isolated incidents,and, when the very large number of documents •

* Admiralty footnote: C.O.S.S.A.C.—Chief, of - * Admiralty footnote: PHOENIX and WHALEStaff, Supreme Allied Commander,; General Sir Units were components "of the'artificial (MULBERRY).Frederick Morgan. * , . : . . » harbours^ • • • < • ' . •

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 30 OCTOBER, 1947 5111

is considered, it is perhaps remarkable that sofew grounds for anxiety existed before fullbriefing commenced.

MULBERRY Project.12. The suggestion that artificial harbours

should be constructed in the assault area was,it is believed, first made by Commodore J.Hughes-Hallett, when serving as Chief of Staff(X) to Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, whosuggested the use of sunken ships for thispurpose. The original designs for such har-bours, which were, however, to be constructedof sunken concrete caissons, were prepared bythe War Office. It was apparent soon aftertaking up my appointment that much greaternaval supervision of the preparations and anexperienced naval staff to conduct the operationwere necessary and I asked the Admiralty toappoint Rear-Admiral W. G. Tennant, to takecharge of this matter. From the outset AdmiralTennant was uncertain of the ability of theconcrete PHOENIX Units to withstand evena moderate gale; and their placing had beenestimated under the most favourable condi-tions to take at least 14 days. It was pn hissuggestion that 70 obsolete ships were preparedas block ships, which could be placed in twoor three days and thereby speedily providesome shelter over the 40 miles of beaches be-fore the PHOENIX breakwaters could bebuilt. His foresight was proved in. the galethat blew from igth to 22nd June, as theseblockships alone gave some shelter to the hun-dreds of landing craft and barges on a lee shoreand greatly reduced the number that was dam-aged, as well as making it possible to continueunloading on a small scale.

13. The construction of the units for theMULBERRIES was an undertaking of con-siderable magnitude and coming at a time whenall efforts were already centred on the prepara-tions for " Neptune " proved difficult to com-plete to schedule. As the completion fell be-hind, the difficulties were accentuated by theshortage of tugs, as a regular phased pro-gramme was essential if all units were to bemoved (into their assembly positions beforeD day. Vigorous and continued representationsfor more and more tugs for " Neptune " weremade, both in the United Kingdom and to theU.S.A., and, although there was still not asufficiency to meet the full towing programme,by D day the MULBERRY units were in themain ready and in .their assembly areas, thanksto the initiative and -resource displayed byAdmiral Tennant and his staff. A full reportof the operations of the construction of theMULBERRIES and GOOSEBERRIES • (craftshelters) has been compiled and has been for-warded under separate .cover. In conceptionand execution these harbour shelters wereunique. The damage wrought Iby the Junegale to MULBERRY A, which necessitated theabandonment of the completion of this harbour,does not detract in any way from the valueof the idea, for, had it been constructed simi-larly to MULBERRY B, there is reason to sup-pose that it might have survived to the sameextent.

Pre-D Day Reconnaissance.14. During planning it was necessary to carry

out certain reconnaissances in.the " Neptune "area to check the depths of water, both over

A a

drying rocks and also in the MULBERRYsites, and to examine the nature of the cbeaches,as geological estimate had reported unfavour-ably regarding the latter. This reconnaissancewas carried out between November, 1943, andJanuary, 1944, being confined to the dark moonperiod in each month. Combined OperationsPilotage Parties were employed,, using firstL.C.P. (Sy)*, which were towed towards theFrench coast by M.L.s, and later X-craftf.Their missions were carried out successfully andskilfully, and, so far as is known, only on oneoccasion was a party sighted toy the enemy.As diversions for these reconnaissances, opera-tions were carried out between the ChannelIsland and the Pas de Calais' (both inclusive).Initially these operations consisted of smallscale raids, but were later replaced by offshorereconnaissance by L.C.P.(L)J, similar to the" Neptune " reconnaissance. The diversionoperations were planned by Combined Opera-tions Headquarters and executed by the appro-priate Home Naval Commands.

Administration of Ferry Craft.15. Previous operations have shown the

great difficulties in administering the craft ofthe ferry service during the first few weeksbefore naval shore facilities are properly estab-lished. The problem in " Neptune " wasgreater than ever before, 1,500 craft and bargesand 15,000 .personnel having to be providedfor, but, although, there were individual failuresand resulting hardship, reports show that ingeneral the measures taken proved successfulin maintaining the morale and efficiency ofofficers and men who perforce had to work longhours for days on end.

Salvage, Repair and Fuelling Organisations offbeaches.

16. As the plan envisaged the use of thebeaches for a period of three months it wasevident that provision would have to be madeon a scale hitherto unknown for the salvage,repair-, fuelling and watering of the greatnumber of ships and craft that would bedamaged or that would require fuel or wateroff the enemy coast. A considerable salvagefleet had to be assembled and special ships andlanding barges were fitted for repair work andothers to carry fuel and water. Naval partieswere trained to assist in craft repairs ashore andwere attached to the Assault Forces. Owing tothe widespread damage caused by the four ,days' gale the salvage repair organisation wastested far beyond anything contemplated and,although it seemed at one time that it wouldbe unable to compete, yet in the end it may besaid to have triumphed, assisted as it had tobe by additional resources from the UnitedKingdom.

Training and Rehearsals.17. The training facilities and assault firing

areas were originally provided for a three-divisional assault, and the extension of the planto include five assaulting divisions introducedsome difficulties in providing adequate facilitiesfor the two new divisions. But due to the greatco-operation shown by all concerned, to the

Admiralty footnotes:* L.C.P.(Sy)=—Small personnel landing craft fitted ,

for survey duties.

{ .X-craft—2-men submarines.L.C.P.(L)—Landing Craft Personnel (Large).

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, .30 OCTOBER, 1947

unselfishness of the Commanders whose divi-sions were already nearly trained, land to theinitiative and drive of the Commanders of thenew divisions who had to fit a six months'programme into three, all difficulties were over-come, and on the day Forces G and; U* carriedout their assaults with the precision of yetanother rehearsal. , '

18. It had always been felt that the enemymight -react, when large scale exercises were

•carried out in the Channel. He did not do sountil exercise " Tiger," which was the finalrehearsal for Force U, when during the nightof ayth/28th April three groups ;of E-Boats

.penetrated-the-patrols covering Lyriie Bay anddelivered a successful attack on the (last convoyto sail to the exercise consisting of eight L.S.T. fTwo L.S.T. were sunk and one wa|s damaged,and there was a regrettably high loss of life.Naval defensive measures on this occasion wereundoubtedly on the weak side and this incidentunderlined the need for every available war-ship and craft to take part in the openingphases of " Neptune " when the enemy must beexpected to attack our convoys with everythingat his disposal.

19. The final rehearsals for the other fourassault -forces .took place on 4th May under thecode name of " Fabius ".' Opportunity wastaken to exercise the simultaneous sailing fromthe Isle of Wight area of the three forces basedthere and also to try out the arrangementswhereby A.N.C.X.F.J would assume control ofall operations in 'the Channel. So far as thenaval assault forces were concerned the exer-cises were satisfactory, but a freshening south-westerly wind in the afternoon of the first daycaused the full programme to be curtailed toavoid damage to landing craft. Enemy reac-tion to " Fabius " was negligible, being con-fined to an aircraft attack on a destroyer inone of the covering forces. That it was notgreater, and indeed that our naval preparationsproceeded with so little interruption, must belargely attributed. to the very high degree ofair superiority achieved in the months beforeD day. • Enemy air reconnaissance was slightand infrequent.

Mining.'20. Sea mining is carried on continuously

by the Admiralty and by Bomber Command,but for some months before " Neptune " themining programme was planned to afford direct.assistance to the operation both as regards loca-tion and timing of each . lay. Considerable'success is known to have been" achieved bymines laid during this period under plan" Maple," which was really an integral partof operation " Neptune."

Meteorological.21. Early in planning it was appreciated that

the decision which you as Supreme Commanderwould have to make to launch the operationwould be one. of the most difficult, and far-reaching of the whole war. Not only was goodweather necessary for the assaults, but also forthe period ' immediately following them, toensure a good start for the build-up. Themeteorologists were doubtful of their ability toforecast the weather more^than 48 hours aheadfor certain, which was barely sufficient to coverthe hour of the assaults, as Force U fromDevonshire had to sail 36 hours before H hour.*To assist the .forecasts, two additional U.S.and two British warships were stationed in theAtlantic to transmit weather reports for somedays before D day. For security this pip-

vcedure was also adopted before exercise"Fabius" and this, in addition', served %>practise the meteorological team concerned inmaking their deductions.

Availability of Landing Ships and Craft.22. During planning there were frequent dis-

cussions as to what percentage availability of' landing ships and craft should be taken- for theoperation. The original planning figures of90 per cent, for L.S.T. and 85 per cent, for

. L.C.T. and L.C.I". (L)f were challenged by'Washington who held that the U.S. Navy couldachieve a higher standard of maintenance.

Admiralty footnotes:* H hour—The hour at-which the first flight of

'landing craft "touch down "-on the beach in anassault. ' Formerly known as zero hour.

f L.C.I.(L)—Landing Craft, Infantry (Large).

Admiralty footnotes :

* The organisation of the Expeditionary Force was as follows :-

Force Assembly Ports . Assault Area

Assault Force U f • • •

„ O ...

Follow-up Force B ...

First Build-up Divisions

Assault Force G f • • •

;. ,, J -„ s ...

"Follow-up Force L ...First Build-up Divisions

'•Western Task Force (American)Torbay, Brixham, Dartmouth and Salcombe

Weymouth, Portland and Poole

Plymouth, Falmouth, Helford River andFowey

Bristol Channel ports ...

Eastern Task Force (Briti,Southampton, Solent and Spithead

Southampton, Solent and Spithead ...

Portsmouth, Spithead, Newhaven and Shore-hain :

The Nore and HarwichThames ... ... ... ...

Western flank of U.S. area(UTAH beach)

Eastern flank of- U.S. area(OMAHA beach)

U.S. area\

Western flank of British area(GOLD beach)

Centre of British area (JUNObeach)

Eastern'flank of British area(SWORD beach)

British area1

* f These fdrces were additional to the original plan.

L.S.T. — Landing Ship, Tanks. • < •A.N.C..X.F. — Allied Navai Commander-in-Chief, Expeditionary Force.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 30 OCTOBER, 1947

British Admiralty opinion, on the other hand,supported these estimates in view of the ex-tremely heavy burden that would be thrown onall the repair facilities on the south coastshortly before the operation. Experiencein the Mediterranean had shown that agreater numbei of ships and craft alwaysoffered for .loading for an assault than hadbeen expected, as the incentive of actionhad a clearly salutary effect on repairspreviously deemed essential. While I there-fore really expected the planning figures to beexceeded I was very loath to gamble on thisand I on-ly accepted higher figures for U.S.L.S.T. of 95 per cent, after .Rear-Admiral A. G.Kirk, U.S.N. (Naval Commander, WesternTask Force) had agreed them. In the event,due to the splended efforts of COMLANCRAB-ELEVENTHPHIB* (Rear-Admiral J. Wilkes,U.S.N.), and his staff, the record overall figureof 99.3 per cent, for all types of U.S. landing'ships and landing craft was attained. Thesimilar British figure was 97.6 per cent., and,in my opinion, the very highest credit is due toall concerned in the maintenance and repairorganisations of both countries for this achieve-ment, which is the more outstanding when it isremembered that the majority of the assaultships and craft had to be used -continuouslyduring months of training before the operation.

Increasing Enemy Naval Activity.23. Although the enemy were slow to react

to our much publicised invasion preparationsfrom the end of April onwards, enemy navalactivity in the Channel did increase. On 29thApril in an engagement between two Canadiandestroyers, who were covering a minelayingoperation off He de Bas, and two Elbing class,one of our destroyers and one of the enemy'swere sunk. Throughout the month of Mayenemy E-Boat activity in the Central Channelincreased, and it was apparent that moreE-Boats were being moved to Cherbourg andHavre. Our destroyers and light coastal forcesoperated by Commanders-in-Chief, Portsmouthand Plymouth, were, however, able to keepthe enemy in chefck and to inflict casualtieson him.

24. The first enemy U-Boat was reported inthe Western Channel on 20th May, which

'necessitated a change in the dispositions of ourcovering forces. The Admiralty had someweeks earlier announced their intention ofallotting four A/U Support Groups to Com-mander-in-Chief, Plymouth, to operate in theWestern Channel and to co-operate withCoastal Command in sealing this approach tothe " Neptune " convoy routes. The AirOfficer Commanding-in-Chief, Coastal Com-mand, had similarly made new dispositions tobe effective some weeks before D day in antici-pation of the movement of the U-Boat battleto the Channel. Coastal Command threwthemselves into the preparations for " Nep-tune " with as much enthusiasm as any unitin the Allied Expeditionary Force, 'and I

- personally and the whole Naval ExpeditionaryForce are deeply indebted to them for theefficiency of the measures they adopted, whichwas reflected by the very small scale of U-Boatattack that eventuated.

* Admiralty footnote:COMLANCRABELEVENTHPHIB — Commander

Landing Craft and Bases, nth Amphibious Force.

25. No weapon that the.enemy might haveemployed before D day against our forcescaused me more anxiety than the potentialitiesof minelaying. Mines were employed de-fensively on a considerable scale in the Bayof the Seine during the months prior to D dayand caused the naval plan largely to be framedround the requirements for sweeping our forcesthrough the enemy's minefields. In the sixweeks before D day the enemy also consider-ably intensified his minelaying off the southcoast of England, using aircraft on a scalewhich had not been attempted for over twoyears and introducing two new types of mine.This minelaying was confined to moonlessperiods. Had D day been in such a period itis doubtful 'whether the Portsmouth channelscould have been cleared in time. As it was,no interruption was caused to the rehearsalsnor to the assembly of our forces and it isconsidered that the enemy missed a great oppor-tunity in not still further extending this formof attack. That he did not attempt more wasyet another result of the air superiority weachieved before D day. Towards the end ofMay some aircraft minelaying was combinedwith night air 'bombing attacks on a lightscale on so'uth coast ports, but very few casual-ties were caused to ships and'personnel.

D Day and H Hour.26. No single question was more often dis-

cuss^ed during planning than that of H hour.As H hour was linked to tidal conditions,D day was dependent on it. Until obstructionsappeared on the assault beaches, the argumentwas largely confined to the determination ofthe ideal balance between a sufficiency of lightfor.aimed air and naval bombardment and theminimum daylight approach, taking into con-sideration the number of days to which post-ponement in the case of bad weather would beacceptable in view of the different tidal con-ditions on later days. But as beach obstruc-tions 'in some numbers were erected on 'thebeaches, the need to deal with these dryshod,and therefore to land below them, overcameall previous arguments and H hour and D day

owere finally largely determined by. the position°of these obstacles.

27. As on the western (U.S.) beaches theobstructions were known to be in place furtherdown the beach than on the eastern (British)beaches and as in Force J's sector near lowwater there were some rocks which would bea danger to the assault craft, it w.as finallynecessary to select five different H hours,ranging over a period of one hour and twenty-five minutes. Anxiety was felt on two counts,first, that the earlier H hours in the U.S. Sector,coupled with their requirements to arrive inthe transport area earlier relative to H hour-than the British, might prejudice surprise in thewest before it was lost in the east, and second,that so many H hours might confuse some ormany of the ships and craft taking part. Inthe event the lack of alertness of the enemy

• obviated the first and good briefing preventedthe second.

28. Owing to the need to take account of thelatest photographic reconnaissance showing theexact positions of the obstacles, the final de-cision as to D day and H hour was not madeuntil I7th May. when 5th June was selected,

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 30 OCTOBER, 1947-,

with postponement acceptable to 6th and 7thJune. . '• •Weather-immediately before D Day. 24-hour

Postponement.29. You held the first meeting to discuss the

weather forecast for D day a.m. o'n ist June.The outlook was not very good and it deterior-ated further during the next three days. At themeeting held p.m. 3rd June you decided toallow the movements of the Forces to com-mence, despite the unfavourable., outlook, inview of the many advantages in launching theoperation on the first possible day. But at thenext meeting at 0415 on 4th June it was clearthat conditions the next day would hot ^beacceptable and a postponement of 24 hourswas ordered. By this time all of Force U fromDevonshire and a proportion of Force O fromPortland were at sea, and ships and craft hadto reverse their course and return to harbour.Instructions for this eventuality were includedin the Operation Orders and worked smoothly,except in the case of Force UaA,* who failedto receive the signal ordering the postpone-ment. By 0900 this Force was abjout 25 milessouth of St. Catherine's JPoint and still steer-ing south. Two destroyers and a| Walrus air-craft had to be 'sent at full speed to turn itround. Had this not been.done it is possiblethat the Force would shortly have been de-tected by. the enemy's radar and this wouldundoubtedly have resulted in his increasedvigilance for the next few da^s.

30. The craft of Force U had a bad timepunching .into a head sea on their return west-wards and, " although the whole Force . wasordered into Weymouth Bay, a number ofcraft never managed to enter it. Ponsiderableanxiety was felt throughout 4th June both asto the need of a further postponement with allits resulting loss of efficiency of craft andassault troops, and whether Force'U would bein a fit state to go forward again early .the nextmorning should the decision be made to go onwith the operation. At one time it:was thoughtthat Force U would have to return to Devon-shire to re-form,, but, when it was pointed outthat this would almost certainly result in the*postponement of the operation to the .nextmoon period, Rear-Admiral Kirk, iwith charac-teristic verve, announced his readiness to pro-ceed.

The Passage.31. When .the assault forces again sailed

early on 5th June the weather was still largelyunfavourable for landing craft, but more suit-able conditions had been forecast for the earlyhours of 6th June. Wind was W.S.W.'f Force5 veering to W.N.W. decreasing in force attimes but with strong, gusts; waves were five tosix feet in mid-Channel. Thes;e conditionsmade the passage difficult, and ; considerablediscomfort was experienced "by thb troops em-barked in L.C.T.f and L.C.I.(L). Althoughsome .of the minor landing craft which weredue to arrive p.m. on D day had to put backto harbour and others were delayed, the assaultforces all drove on and almost without excep-, Admiralty footnotes: •

* Force UaA, which was a large and slow assaultconvoy of Force U, was composed of 128 L.C.T. withtheir escort.

t Force 5—Fresh breeze (.16-20 m.-ip.h. at sealevel).

J L.C.T.—Landing Craft, Tanks.

tion arrived off -their beaches, to time. Theperformance of the leading groups of Force Uwas particularly praiseworthy, since, as hasbeen stated, some of these failed to enter har-bo.ur on the postponement, and by H hour their.Commanding Officers had been on their bridgescontinuously for about 70 hours. Out of the128 L.C.T. in Group U2A only seven failed,to take part in the assault, and this figure tookaccount of engine failures as well as fhe stressof the weather.

32. To ensure the correct positioning of thenorthern ends of the 10 approach channels thatwere to be swept across the known enemy mine-fields 10 F.H. 830 buoys had been laid bythree H.DIM.L. of Force J during the night3ist May/ist June.. The buoys were timedto transmit between the hours of 1400 and 2200on six successive 'days, commencing on 4thJune. At 1800 on 5th June, 10 H.D.M.L. tookup position to point these buoys for the AssaultForces, and all reports show that this methodwas wholly satisfactory. A large number ofships was fitted with receivers to obtain posi-tions from the Gee (Q.H.) and Decca (Q.M.)radio navigational systems, both of whichworked fully according to expectations, andnavigation was never regarded as a seriousproblem. The above additional measures weretaken to guard against effective jamming bythe enemy p.m. on D-i should surprise havebeen lost.

Achievement of surprise.33. There was an air of unreality during

the passage of the assault forces across theChannel curiously similar to that on D-i in"Husky" as our forces approached Sicily.The achievement of strategical surprise wasalways hoped for in " Neptune " but was byno means -certain, whereas that of tactical sur-prise had always seemed extremely unlikely.As our forces approached the French coast with-out a murmur from the enemy or from their

.own radio, the realisation that once again;almost complete tactical -surprise had beenachieved slowly dawned. This astonishing feat'cannot be explained by any single factor andmust be attributed in part to all of the follow-ing: the miscalculations of <the enemy; thehigh degree^ of air superiority attained by ourAir Forces, which, drastically reduced the-enemy's air reconnaissance; the bad weatherwhich caused' the enemy to withdraw his E-Boat patrols to Cherbourg; and finally the radiocounter-measures employed by our forces,which, coupled with the diversions against thePas de Calais and Cap d'Antifer, -left^ theenemy in doubt as to the points at whichwe would land even when he had become awarethat the invasion was in progress. Althoughthe unfavourable weather caused difficulties anddamage to craft off the beaches later, theadvantages gained by surprise were so strikingthat your decision to go on despite the weatherwas amply justified. A postponement of onemore day, e.g. till 7th June, would,. in theevent, have proved disastrous owing to theconditions of sea off the beaches. The prob-lems arising out of a postponement of 12 to14 days to the next suitable period are tooappalling even to contemplate.

Minesweepiwg during the Approach."34. The sweeping of 10 approach channels for,

the assault forces represented the largest single

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 30 OCTOBER, 1947 5H5

minesweeping operation that had yet beenundertaken in war. The provision of the neces-sary minesweeping flotillas had only beenachieved by drawing upon some which hadlittle opportunity for practice, and, when myoperation orders were written, it was realisedthat the successful completion of the mine-sweeping tasks would demand a highdegree of skill from all concerned. Sub-sequently the late .appearance of beachobstacles on the assault beaches furthercomplicated the problem, as the alteration in thetime of H hour relative to high water thatresulted meant that it would now be.necessaryfor all flotillas to change sweeps during passageto avoid sweeping with an unfavourable tide.Some flotillas had no opportunity to rehearsethis manoeuvre at all, as.it was not decided onuntil after exercise " Fabius," and the factthat all successfully achieved it is consideredmost satisfactory.

35. Sweeping was carried out in all casesaccording to plan, despite stronger tidal streamsthan had been allowed for and the unfavouralbleweatRer, which made very difficult the opera-tion of the Mark 5 sweeps by M.L.s, and theminesweepers approached . the French coastwithout interference. The early arrival of theWestern Task Force flotillas had been a causeof some anxiety during planning but, becausesurprise was in the event achieved, it had nounfortunate result. The senior officers of theflotillas concerned expressed surprise in theirreports that although the enemy coast at CapeBarfleur was sighted as early as 2000 on 5thJune no batteries opened fire at them and theoperation proceeded unopposed; in this con-nection it may be noted that minesweepersswitched on R.C.M.* at 2-130.Naval Bombardment.

36. It had been planned that ships shouldbe ready to open fire at their pre-arranged tar-gets either from the time when the assaultconvoys came within, range of them or fromthe time when it-was light enough for theenemy to spot his fall of shot visually, which7ever was the later; ibut that, if possible, .fireshould be withheld until it was light enough forair observation. In the event, this provedpossible with the exception of one or two shipsin the Western Task Force, who found it neces-sary to open blind fire against certain batterieswhose fire was more accurate than was thegeneral case.

37. As Bombarding Force D arrived in posi-tion on the Eastern Flank at 0515, a half-hearted attack was made by four enemyE-Boats and some armed trawlers which hadcome out of Havre. The enemy were seenindistinctly against the land and were almostimmediately obscured by the pre-arrangedsmoke'screen laid-by our aircraft, from behindwhich they fired torpedoes. The heavy shipsmanaged to comib the torpedo tracks but theNorwegian destroyer SVENNER was hit andsunk. One enemy trawler was sunk and onedamaged; and the attack was not renewed. Thedanger to friendly forces of smoke laid to apre-arranged plan was plainly exemplified.

38. The fire from enemy batteries, which wasnever severe, was directed initially against bom-barding ships only, and was largely ineffective.

* Admiralty footnote: R.C.M.—Radio Couhter-Measures.

This .is considered to have been due to thecombined success of the pre-D day (bombingprogramme, the heavy air bombardment in theeany hours of D day, and the measures takento prevent the enemy from ranging and spot-ting; and it demonstrates that duels betweenships and coastal batteries are in certain even-tualities feasible provided such precautions aretaken. It must be remembered, however, thatthe scale of coast defence in the assault areawas the lowest on this part of the coast andthe results'would have "been very different., forinstance, in the Pas de Calais. -Much of thesuccess of naval bombardment must be attri-buted to the work of the single-seater fighterspotters, who carried out their tasks tirelesslyand gallantly. Communications between bom-barding ships and spotting aircraft suffered anumber of failures at the start owing mainly tothe novel nature of the technique, but theyimproved rapidly with successive waves ofaircraft.

39. Warships and gun support craft tookpart in the drenching of beach defences immeT'diately prior to the assault. • This fire appearedaccurate, and was of sufficient weight toneutralise and demoralise the defenders, excepton OMAHA Beach where the total failure ofthe day heavy bombers, due to low cloud base,contributed to the much stiffer opposition thanwas found elsewhere. Of the support craftthe L.C.G.(L)* deserves special mention.This craft, which achieved only partialsuccess in the Mediterranean due to lack oftraining and shortcomings in its equipment,was particularly effective and further demon-strated the value in assault of high velocityguns at close range. Since D day it has con-tinued to provide effective direct and indirectfire support.

The Assaults.40. The choice of the " lowering positions "

(U.S. " transport areas ")f had been a matterof- considerable discussion, the conflictingfactors of being outside the range of the enemy'sshjpre batteries and south of the known minedarea having to be balanced. The Eastern Task

1 Force (British) finally cKSse their " loweringpositions " about 7 to 8 miles off shore, whilstthe Western Task Force (U.S.A.) decided toplace them further to seaward, 10 to nj milesout. In the rough weather that obtained whenthe assault forces arrived in the " loweringpositions," the longer passage inshore, for theassault craft from the Western" Task Forceappeared to add appreciably to their difficulties.

41. To mark the approaches to the beachesfor Forces S and J two X-craft were employedas it was very important that Force S shouldnot be too far to the eastward, and the coastin Force J's sector was not distinctive in out-line. These craft had sailed on the night of2nd/3rd June, being towed for part of thepassage. Each submarine received at oioo 5thJune a message that the assault had beenpostponed 24 hours, and, in spite of the diffi-culties of navigation for a craft of very slow

Admiralty footnotes:* L.C.G.(L)—Landing Craft Gun (Large), a type

of " support craft " not actually used for landingmen or material.

t These positions or areas are those in which theships carrying assaulting troops and craft stop tolower these craft and disembark the troops intothem.

5ii6 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE,' 36 OCTOBER, 1947

diving speed in a cross tidal stream, had main-tained their positions off the enemy coast -until.daylight on the 6th June when. they flashedlights to seaward from" the surface in their,.correct positions as a guide to the oncoming.assault craft. It is considered th'at great skilland endurance was shown by the crews ofX.20 and X.23. Their reports of proceedings,which were a masterpiece of understatement,read like the deck log of a surface ship in peace-time, and not of a very small and vulnerablesubmarine carrying out a hazardous, operationin time of war.

«•42. Weather conditions off the assault

beaches immediately before H hour were asfollows: —

Wind—Westnorthwest—force ,4.*Sea.—Moderate—waves .3/4 feet.Sky.—Fair to cloudy with cloud increasing.

These unfavourable conditions interferedto some extent with the release of the assaultcraft and also with the launching of D.D..tanks, f but nevertheless the majority of theleading waves of the assaults touched down atthe right place and at approximately the righttime throughout.the, length of the front. Thefollowing is a brief summary of how eachAssault Force.fared.

Force S (British).43. The leading groups passed; through the

" lowering positions " and approached thebeaches generally on time. Eniemy opposi-tion was restricted to shell fire at craft off thebeaches from (light batteries asijiore. D.D.'tanks were successfully launched but wereovertaken by the L.C.T.(A.V.R.E.)J whichtouched down at the right time and place.Beach obstacles presented some difficulty butlanding craft were, when necessary, driventhrough them relentlessly. Opposition ashorewas initially only moderate, and for some hoursthe chief difficulty in this sector was that ofcongestion on the beaches, as only two exitscould be brought into use.

Force J (British). , ^44. The first touch down was from 10 to f

15 minutes later than planned, a>nd moderate 'opposition was experienced on landing. Onaccount of the -weather1 D.D. tanks were notlaunched but were discharged directly on to thebeach. By 1000, however, all beach objectiveshad been gained and the Army were advancingsteadily, if slowly, inshore against opposition.Several major landing craft were' damaged inthis sector by beach obstacles and TELLER'mines.

o

Force G (British). .45. The assaults landed dead on time but the

left group of L.C.T. (A.V.R.E.) touched downslightly to the eastward. D.D. tanks were not

° launched here on account of the* weather butwere later beached inshore. Considerabledifficulty was experienced in developing JIGbeach on the left, which was enfiladed from the

Admiralty footnotes:' * Force 4—Moderate (breeze (n-i5' m.p.h. at sea

level).t D.D. tanks are tanks fitted with flotation gear

to enable them to swim ashore when disembarkedoutside their wading depth.

f L.C.T. (A.V.R.E.)—Landing Craft carrying tanksfitted with special obstacle clearing equipment usedby R.'E.

outset by two strong points, and it was not until1600 that the situation became stabilised on thatbeach.' Here also a large' number of majorlanding craft were damaged by TELLER minesand beach obstacles.

Force O (U.S.A.). . ' • • .46. Considerable difficulty was experienced

in this sector due to the state of trie sea.Assault craft, on their way inshore had a badtime, a number of craft"were swamped and theassaulting infantry in the remainder in generalarrived on the beach in rather poor shape.D.D. tanks were launched three miles offshoreas planne'd on the left flank but regrettably allbut two or three foundered. Thus the initialattack 'here had to be carried out with littletank support'. On .the right flank D.D. tankswere landed'directly and successfully on to thebeach, but were quickly put out of action byenemy fire. Enemy opposition at the beachexits was severe. The first waves of theassault touched down five minutes late at 0635,but due to the weather, the loss of the D.D.tanks and the failure of some L.C.T.(A)* tokeep their position the order -of landing wassomewhat mixed. Due to the heavy surf, the.difficulty in clearing the beach obstacles, andthe persistent enemy fire directed on thebeaches, the programme of landing troops andvehicles quickly fell behind in time. For abouttwo hours assault troops were pinned to thebeaches. During the rest of the morning pene-trations were made inland but only slowly andby relatively small groups. All naval per-sonnel who witnessed the battle were unanimousin paying tribute to their determination and!gallantry. The supporting destroyers and gunsupport craft stood in close inshore during theperiod of fiercest fighting on the beach andrendered»great support to -the troops. At onetime it was considered that it might be necessaryto land part of Force O through the Force Gbeaches, but this proved unnecessary, as theFirst U.S. Division fought its way off the .beach.towards the end of the fo'renoon and the beachexits could then be developed. A considerablenumber of craft were sunk or damaged in -thissector due to enemy action and the weather.Beach obstacles and mines p'roved particularlytroublesome. The Assault Force Commanderhas reported that the preliminary air bombard-ment planned for this area had struck too far

. inland to affect the beach defences.. Its absencewas severely felt when the landing commencedand fierce opposition was met.

Force U (U.S.A.).• 47. Almost complete surprise appeared to beachieved in this sector. Despite the late arrivalof some groups in the transport area, due tothe weather, assault waves -were generallylanded on time and against only slight enemyopposition. Due to the early loss of two controlvessels the landing was made 2,000 yards tothe south-east of the planned position. Thisproved fortunate, as the obstacles and defencesthere were found to be less formidable thanthose farther north. D.D. tanks were launchedand landed successfully, but did not arrive untilH + 20 minutes. Beach obstacles were relatively

* Admiralty footnote: L.C.T.(A)—Tank LandingCraft strengthened to allow the self-propelled artillerywhich they carried to fire whilst still embarked, -thusproviding an addition to the naval close supportfire.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 30 OCTOBER, 1947. 5117

easily dealt with. There was less sea atUTAH than elsewhere and very good progresswas made in landing troops and vehiclesthroughout the day.

General Remarks on D Day.48. The outstanding fact from ,the naval

point of view was that, despite the unfavour-able weather, in every main essential the planwas carried out as written. Tactical surprise,which had not been expected, was achievedand greatily eased the problem of getting ashorein every sector except at OMAHA. Losses ofships and landing craft of all types were, much•lower than had been expected, but damageto L.C.T. and smaller craft, aggravated byrough weather conditions, was higher than hadbeen allowed for. Only one or two minor airattacks were made on our shipping and on ourlanding beaches during the day. This was aremarkable demonstration of the degree of airsuperiority thac had been attained beforeD day. By the end of D day immediate anxietywas felt on only one count—whether theweather would improve sufficiently quickly toenable the build-up to start as planned.

Commencement of the Build-up.49. .The build-up was planned to commence

immediately on D + i with the arrival of eightship convoys on that day. The convoys allarrived to time "but unloading was severelyrestricted due to the unfavourable weather/wind being force 5 from the north at midday.Anxiety had been felt regarding the passagethrough the Straits of Dover, p.m. on D day,of convoy E.T.P.i, consisting, of nine largepersonnel ships from the Thames. They werethe first large ships to pass the Strait for fouryears, and arrangements were made withCoastal Command for F.A.A. aircraft to assistM.L.s-in laying smoke screens for this andsubsequent convoys. The enemy batteriesopened fire on an M.T. ship convoy that waspreceding it and sank one ship.* I decided,however, that the risk of a daylight passagemust be accepted and convoy E.T.P.i, thenahead of time, was. accordingly turned backuntil the smoke screening M.L.s had had timeto replenish. A most" effective smoke screencomplementary to the shore-based R.C.M.cover was finally laid and convoy E.T.P.ipassed through the Straits at 1700, 6th June,without any enemy interference. This wasthe only personnel ship convoy to be sailed

; from the Thames during the build-up.

Arrival of blockships.• 50. The first convoy of 45 iblockships arrived

in the assault area at 1230 on 7th June and thesinking of these ships was commenced at onceaccording to plan. All five GOOSEBERRYshelters were completed quickly and conformedbroadly to the planned design. The early com-pletion of this project was later found to beof the greatest benefit to the ferry craft off thebeaches and the skilful manner in which thisoperation was conducted reflected great crediton all concerned.

Air Attacks.51. Air attacks or* the beaches and the ship-

ping lying off them were carried out during thenight of 7th-8th June. The attacks were not'serious and only minor damage and casualtieswere caused, ibut, unfortunately, one of the

early attacks soon after midnight coincided withthe arrival of some of our troop-carrying air-craft with airborne reinforcements. TheseDakota aircraft were fired on by ships of theEastern Task Force and at least one of themwas shot down. This most unfortunate inci-dent, which.was a repetition, though happilyon a small scale, of our experiences in Opera-tion " Husky", emphasises the danger ofrouteing our own aircraft over our own navalforces. This had been pointed out repeatedlyduring the planning but the naval objectionshad to give way. to the demands of the AirForce plan.

First Enemy Light Craft Attacks.52. During the night of 6th-7th June, enemy

R-Boats came out from Havre and E-Boatsfrom Cherbourg. Both were intercepted byour coastal forces and the enemy were forcedto retire after suffering damage" Similar sortieswere made almost nightly from Havre andCherbourg during the next few weeks but themeasures taken by the Task Force 'Commandersnearly always prevented the 'enemy from pene-trating the protecting screen.. By inflictingcasualties on the enemy forces on most nightsthat they came out, their offensive spirit wasblunted and the potential threat from themthereby reduced.

Casualties due to Mines. -53. The enemy scored a measure of success

with his mines on D + i when a number ofships were sunk or damaged. .In some cases•this resulted from ships either not following,or being forced out of, the swept channels;and showed clearly that the policy of sailingships in convoy, which 'I had insisted upon,was very necessary during the opening phasesof the operation.

Preventions of U-Boat Attack-54. The concentration of effective U-Boats

in the Biscay ports that had Ibeen made beforeD day showed that it was the enemy's inten-

• tion to launch a .full scale submarine offensiveagainst our invasion shipping as soon as wehad become committed to a major landing.The plan of the Admiralty and Headquarters-Coastal Command was accordingly to floodthe western approaches to the Channel withaircraft in order to keep the U-Boats submergedfor as long as possible and also to operate anumber of A/TJ Support Groups in this area.Initially four of these groups worked underthe' command of Commander-in-Chief,Plymouth, while five more took part in opera-tion " C.A." under the orders of Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches, in conjunction'with escort aircraft carriers. A/S conditions-were generally poor in the Channel area but anumber of promising attacks were made bythese Support Groups during the first four weeksof " Neptune ", including some kills. CoastalCommand also increased their offensive patrolsin the " northern transit area" off the'Norwegian coast iprior to D day. From i6thMav until 3rd July, there were 44 sightings inthis area, 38 of which were attacked and 13-probably sunk. • These operations were of directvalue to the anti-U-Boat operations in tiieChannel and were" a material factor in the defeatthat the enemy undoubtedly suffered hereduring the opening weeks of " Neptune'".

SUPPLEMENT x:c .THE LONDON -GAZETTE, 30 OCTOBER, 1947

55. x The first move by the enemy was when° .it was -reported that five U-Boats had sailed

irom Brest on the 6th June. Oil this nightthere were no less than n U-Boat sightings.by Coastal Command aircraft, six of whichwere attacked. The next night! there were10 more sightings, seven being attacked. After•this vigorous action the enemy tried to approachthe assault area with submarines usingSchnorkel but it was some days before U-Boatspenetrated into the', area of the cross-Channelconvoy routes. " « ,

56. Within the period of this; report thesuccess achieved by U-Boats in the (Channel was•extremely slight. This was primarily due to.the offensive operations of Coastal Commandand of the A/U Support Groups 'covering ourconvoy routes. Between the ist June and3rd July, 1944, Coastal Command aircraft had96 sightings in-the Bay of Biscay and the•Channel and its approaches, 59 attacks weremade, six U-Boats were known to be sunk, andmany other 'attacks were promising.

* *•

.Build-up Improvement in Better Weather.57. From p.m. D + i until D + 8 better

weather enabled the- rate of build-up to beprogressed, despite some shortage ipf ferry craft•due to casualties from the first two days.•Convoys sailed from the U.K. and arrived inFrance on time. As had been anticipated,

' some difficulties naturally arose initially in theassault area with regardrto the great volume ofshipping that had to be unloaded and sailedback to England. This resulted, in a slowerturn round than had been planned, and for aperiod there was some shortage of ships to bereloaded in the U.K. When the conditionswhich obtained at the outset on the Frenchcoast are further considered, "however, it isthought that what* was achieved by the TaskForce Commanders and their subordinates wasin fact very creditable.

Increased Enemy Action.58. Once it was apparent that our landings

•constituted invasion on a major scale, it wasto be expected that the enemy would attemptto interfere with our build-up convoys and withthe shipping off the beaches with all meansavailable to him. Increased enemy' shellingof the beaches, particularly on the eastern flank,was experienced from D + 2 onwards, but no.great success was achieved by the enemy,although unloading in the SWORD sector wasretarded. Our bombarding forces were keptbusy countering enemy shelling of the beachesand also in assisting the .army ashore. It was. evident that the" enemy was reinforcing hisJE-Boats in Havre and E-Boat sorties weremade nightly from Havre and frbm Cherbourg.Indications of the enemy's intentions to laymines in the assault area first became apparent•on 9th June when Naval Commander WesternTask" Force reported attempts to restrict themovements of his bombarding ships by laying amine barrier on his northern flank. During thefirst week, Task Force, Assault Force andAssault Group Commanders were fully occupiedin combating the various forms of attack whichthe enemy tried to bring against the assaultarea, whilst at the same timg developing theirorganisations, first afloat and later ashore, inorder to speed, up the unloading and turn roundof shipping- and craft. Enemy attacks were

very largely beaten off, except in the case ofair mine-laying which later proved almostimpossible to prevent. The similarity of thedefence plans for both .Task Force Areas,which was the result of close co-operationbetween the Task Force Commanders duringplanning, was an important factor in ensuringthe overall security of the-anchorages.-

Destroyer Action off lie -de Bos.59. In the early morning of gth June, Force

26, consisting of eight destroyers operating underthe orders of Commander-in-Chief, Plymouth,made Contact with four enemy destroyers 20miles north-west of the He de Bas. A spiritedaction followed, which resulted in two of theenemy being destroyed and the other two beingdamaged. This action virtually ended thethreat to " Neptune " convoys from attackby enemy destroyers.

Construction of MULBERRIES.60. MULBERRY tows commenced sailing

on D day so that the first PHOENIX, WHALEand BOMBARDON units arrived on the FarShore early on 8th June (D + 2). The laying ofthe BOMBARDON moorings and the sinkingof the PHOENIX breakwaters began at once.The'construction of the MULBERRIES prq-ceeded as quickly as had been expected, andin general all units were accurately placed. The

•weather was on the whole not favourable forcross-Channel tows, and a number of WHALEroadway tows was lost on passage, the.totallosses being in the region of 40 per cent, of theseunits, including damage sustained on the FarShore. On a number of occasions WHALEroadway units having sailed in reasonable con-ditions were overtaken by bad weather half-way across. By D + 5 the CORNCOB break-waters in both harbours were completed and'by D + 8 the PHOENIX detached breakwaterswere .half completed.

Increased Enemy Mining.61. It was soon apparent that the most

serious threat to our shipping in the assaultarea would be enemy minelaying, as this wascarried out at night by both E-Boats and air-craft. Defence against the latter proved ex-tremely difficult as had been expected, aslow-flying aircraft were not picked up insufficient time by radar and so avoided our .nightfighters. The enemy introduced two new typesof mine, both of -which were actuated by thereduction, of pressure caused by a ship passingover them.. One of these could not be sweptunder _any conditions and the other only incertain weather conditions, and a number ofcasualties was early sustained amongst shipsand craft of all types. The problem of sweep-ing ground mines in the congested anchoragesoff the beaches' proved very difficult as the tailswere continually liable to foul other ships andcraft. The uncertainty of the distance fromthe sweeper that an acoustic mine woulddetonate also proved a constant menace toneighbouring ships. .

Bombardment Support of the Land Advance.62. From D Day onwards, Battleships, Moni-

tors, Cruisers, Destroyers and L.C.G.(L) en-gaged enemy targets ashore until our armieshad advanced beyond the range of their guns.Ships and craft on both flanks engaged coast

SUPPLEMENT TO THE-LONDON GAZETTE, soc OCTOBER, 1947

•defence batteries when these fired on our ship-ping or .at the beaches. A large but carefully

. controlled amount of ammunition pf all typeswas expended; replenishment at the home portswas carried out rapidly, due to the excellent^

• provision made at the ports concerned, and to"the efficient organisation evolved by theAdmiralty departments responsible for plan-ning and executing the very complicatedarrangements for supply of ammunition and•exchange of ships' guns. Spotting by fighter.spotters, Air O.P.s, S.F.C.P.s, and F.O.s.B.*,was very successful, though there were someiailures in communication between F.O.s.B. and.ships, particularly in the early stages. Improve-ment in- F.O.B. communications is still re-quired, but failures were in paii due to the-natural tendency to land F.O.B. parties tooearly in the assault, which caused damage totheir equipment and also a high percentage of

. F.O.B. casualties. By common consent shoot-ling was uniformly good and it is considered that•the initial advances inland of our armies werehelped in- no small measure by the navalsupporting fire.

Build-up Difficulties and Delays.63. AS mentioned in paragraph 57 above,

•delays in the turn round of ships and craft•occurred initially' in the assault area <due tothe abnormal conditions obtaining there. Therewere also difficulties in .the United Kingdom,particularly in the Isle of .Wight area and inthe port of Southampton, -due to the largeamount of shipping to be handled in a con-gested area. -The initial congestion in the Isleof Wight anchorage, which was caused by avariety of reasons, led to ships that 'should nothave been there staying there for two or threedays, and there were also some naval delays ingetting ships up to Southampton to reload. Theproblem in the Isle of Wight area was far moredifficult that anywhere else due to the physicalcharacteristics of the anchorage, and it is notconsidered that the delays which occurred,although irritating to the army, were in anyrespects unreasonable. Energetic measureswere taken to clear the Isle of Wight anchor-age, and after the first ten days or so, therewere no major delays in the United Kingdom.The figures of the rate of build-up show thegreat quantity of shipping that was sailed toFrance each day. When these are examinedany serious adverse criticism of the naval

; organisation, either in the United Kingdom or( in France, would seem unwarranted.

Wide scope oj the Operation.64. It is .extremely difficult in a letter of

reasonable length to deal with any complete-ness with the many aspects of the operationas it progressed from day to day. On themajority, of the early days there were perhapsthree or four incidents that in any previousoperation would have been- considered ofoutstanding interest, and it is • only possiblehere to give my general impression of the navaloperations as.'they developed. With 16 con-voys and about the same number of landingcraft groups at any one time at sea in theChannel, exposed to attack by enemy mines,E-Boats, aircraft and U-Boats, with the enemy

* Admiralty footnote:Air O.P.s—Air Observation Posts.S.F.C.P.—Shore Fire Control Party.F.O.B.—Forward Observer, Bombardment.

active on t>oth flanks with his light navalforces and his shore guns, with nightly airminelaying and sometimes air bombing, it wasobvious that each day a number of actions ofdifferent types would be fought against theenemy forces and' that our ships would suffercasualties and damage. The salient" fact, how-ever, was that no matter how the enemyattempted to sink our ships, he was fought,and generally with success. The casualties thatwe sustained were relatively light when 'thevery large number of ships taking part is con-sidered. The build-up proceeded quickly. ByD + 9 half a million men had been landed inFrance and 77,000 vehicles. The millionthman was landed on D + 28, one day after theend of the period covered by this report.

Operations by our Coastal Forces.65. Our coastal forces operating both from

.the United Kingdom and from the assault areahad many successful encounters with enemyE-Boats. Because it was appreciated that itwould not be possible to provide shore radarcover for the cross-Channel convoy route andthe covering patrols on its flanks, Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, decided to extend theradar cover by using frigates fitted with Ameri-can S.L. search radar to control units ofM.T.B.s attached to them. Four frigates wereallocated for this duty and proved very suc-cessful in controlling interceptions in over 30actions. Great spiritlwas shown by all theCoastal Force Commanding Officers concerned,th&Jmajority of whom it should be noted werecivilians a few years, ago.

Difficulties of Aircraft Recognition.66. The S.H.A.E.F.* rules for restrictions to

flying and to A.A. fire are considered to haveworked well, but unfortunately casualties toour own aircraft were caused by naval gunfirein the early stages of the operation, particularlyin the U.S. Sector. Fire discipline and aircraftrecognition in such a diverse fleet of ships andcraft.as was at any one time in the assaultarea was obviously extremely difficult toachieve; and'the situation was much aggravatedby the extremely low cloud base which pre-vailed on most days, and which, by forcingaircraft to fly very low, gave the minimum oftime for their recognition. It is strongly re-commended that in other theatres of war wherecloud base may normally be expected to bemuch higher than in the Channel operations,the restricted height for aircraft should be suchas to keep them outside the effective range ofclose range weapons. The appointment ofRoyal Observer Corps personnel to merchantships to assist in aircraft recognition, which wasa novel experiment, proved most successful andundoubtedly did something towards helping inthis matter.

Buoying and Minesweeping of Channels.67. Minesweeping was carried out con-

tinuously from D + i and during the first fewdays of the operation cha-nnels were'widenedand permanently established from England,to France and along the French coast in theassault area. A very large number of lightbuoys had to be laid to mark the channelsas quickly as possible and this was expedi-tiously carried out by the Trinity House vessels.

* Admiralty footnote: S.H.A.E.F.—Supreme Head-quarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

5120 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 30 OCTOBER, 1947

The greatest co-operation was given by•Captain 'Barber, Superintendent of o TrinityHouse, Cowes, to> whom considerable creditis due. The difficulty of keeping to a -sweptchannel with a strong cross tide ha.d alwaysbeen- foreseen before D day and the attentionof all concerned was drawn to it 'in my Opera-tion Orders. As feared, however, the lightbuoys were roughly treated during the open-ing phases of the operation and: a very largeriunaber of these was sunk.

0

Heavy Air Attack on Havre.68. By- I4th June there was a considerable

concentration of enemy E-Boats in Havre and atmy request Bomber Command icarried out a'heavy attack on the port just before dusk withthe object,of immobilising the enemy craft.This attack was extremely successful and 10E-Boa.ts and three torpedo .boats, are knownto have been sunk, in addition to many otherminor vessels.

Visit of H.M. The King.69. His Majesty The King visited the British

assault area on i6th June in" H.M.S.AiRETHUSA. This visit gave the greatestsatisfaction and encouragement to all Britishnaval personnel on the Far Shore.," On. theother hand it is worth remarking here that Ihad to make strenuous efforts' to reduce theoverall number of official visitors to the. assaultarea during the first few weeks of the operation.The number of persons of greater or lessJdm-portance who produced good reasons for p'ro^ceeding there was alarming, observing that,during their stay, of necessity they occupiedthe time and attention of officers who shouldhave been engaged in other more useful work.

The Northerly Gale.70. From D. day onwards the weather was

never what one expected for June in theChannel and from T4th June 'onwards it de-teriorated steadily apart from a temporaryimprovement during the night ,i7th-i8th Junewhich raised false, hopes of better conditions.Low cloud very largely deprived our armyof their close air support and a moderate- tostrong wind made conditions generally un-favourable for the optimum rate of dischargeof shipping off the beaches "and for the cross-Ohannel- MULBERRY tows. On igth June anorth-easterly gale, unexpected; and unforecast,•began and at once stopped all unloading tothe beaches. Conditions deteriorated rapidlyand a large number of landing craft- was soonin difficultiesr Steps were taken to stopt thesailing of further build-up convoys, but someof those already at sea had; to continue, toprevent congestion in U.K. anchorages. Addi-tional tugs were despatched to the Far Shoreto assist ships and craft in difficulty until theweather moderated. Casualties were sufferedby MULBERRY tows that jwere already atsea and all further sailings of these had alsoto be stopped. By 20th June a large numberof ferry craft had been stranded by the onshorewind and had received serious damage. Allunloading was on this day suspended, althougha quantity of stores had been discharged thetwo previous days in the shelter of MULBERRYB (Arromanches). To meet this situation itwas decided to dry .out, regardless of risk of-damage, a number of stores coasters and all

L.S.T. awaiting discharge.* It had previouslybeens considered that L.S.T. should not dryout except in an emergency, but the opera-tion was so successful when attempted on alarge scale that .thereafter this became thenormal method of discharge. Coasters were .also beached successfully and only a few of.these ships suffered damage. By 2ist June itwas apparent that the continued high seas wereseriously damaging the MULBERRIES. TheBOMBARDONS protecting both harbours"broke adrift and sank and generally proveduseless to withstand weather with wind force6f and above. The damage to blockships andthe PHOENIX breakwaters was iar moresevere at MULBERRY A (St Laurent) thanat Arromanches. GOOSEBERRY I also lostall protective value. The IWHALE piers inIMULBERRY A were 'completely wrecked,chiefly by landing craft being driven down onto them. The gale eased slowly on 22nd June,but the sea did not finally go down until thenext day. *

71. The results of the gale were, to confrontthe Task Force and Assault'Force Commanderswith a very critical situation just at the timewhen their organisations were finally settlingdown and when it was hoped that they andtheir staffs might be withdrawn. It is very^difficul^ to estimate the total effect of the galeon the operation as a whole. An army estimatewas made which suggested that from igth to24th June inclusive the unloading loss due tothe gale was in the neighbourhood of 20,000vehicles and 140,000 tons of stores. The effectof the gale on the arrivals of shipping and.craft in France during these days is shown inthe attached Table A. From the naval point ofview the most serious result was the strandingof about 800 craft of all types, most of whichwere damaged and neaped, as this caused animmediate shortage of ferry craft on the farshore. It was soon also apparent that thedamage done to St. Laurent harbour was verylargely irreparable, and, shortly afterwards,you decided that this harbour would not becompleted but that all remaining resourceswould be devoted to the strengthening ofArromanches to withstand winter conditions.

72. As a result of the gale it was decided thatthe Task Force and Assault Force Commanderswould have to remain in the assault area untilconditions were again normal. • Energeticmeasures were taken to salve all the damagedcraft possible, and new equipment and block-ships were sent over for the MULBERRIES.About 250 additional hull repair ratings drawnfrom the Home Fleet and Home Commandswere brought forward as planned for such anemergency, and an additional repair ship and, areserve port repair party were moved over tothe assault area. The full salvage organisationwas mustered. Due to the energy and resourceof all concerned about 600 stranded craft anda few coasters .and other small vessels weretemporarily repaired and refloated at the nextspring-tides, on 8th July. A further 100 wererefloated a fortnight later.Landing Craft Repair Situation.

73. The numbers of damaged landing craftreturning after the assault were much greater

Admiralty footnotes:* On some beaches the .practice of drying out

L.S.T. had been resorted,to as early as D + 2 day.t Force 6—Strong breeze (2.1-26 m.p.h. at sea

level).

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 30 OCTOBER, 1947 5121

than expected and the repair of craft wasproving difficult in the Portsmouth area beforethe gale. After it, it became clear that thisarea alone would be unable to compete evenwith all the short-term repairs. Directions wereaccordingly given by COREP (Admiralty) toincrease the number of repairs that were under-taken in yards in the southwest and on theaast coast. Throughout the period of this reportthe number of unserviceable L.S.T. and L.C.T.increased slowly day by day and the numberavailable for the build-up accordingly slowlydecreased. This was disappointing to the armywho at times demanded that more t vigorousmeasures should be taken by the naval authori-ties responsible. -I made a number of repre-sentations regarding this to the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, and to the Admiralty,but except for minor improvements they werealways able to show that all that could be donewas already being done. The COREP organisa-tion had been specially set up to meet the heavydemands of " Neptune " and it is clear thatwithout it the distribution for, and early com-pletion of, the repairs of hundreds of shipsand craft would have been entirelyimpracticable.

Release of Warships.74. COMINCH* and the Admiralty began to

press about aoth June for the release of a con-siderable number of warships and landing craftfrom the operation. Some of these wererequired for Operation' " Anvil" (later"" Dragoon ")f and some for service in theFar East. Vessels were released progressivelyas they could be spared but no large with*drawal of bombarding ships was possible untilafter Cherbourg had been captured. Previousexperience in this war had shown the dangerof withdrawing ships from an area before anoperation had fully succeeded, and I wascareful not to agree to the release of shipsbefore I was really satisfied that they couldbe spared.

Naval Bombardment of Cherbourg.75. General BradleyJ had asked for naval

'bombardment of the defences of Cherbourg tosynchronise with his final assault by land. A•Task Force consisting of three battleships andfour cruisers with screening destroyers and.two minesweeping flotillas was formed under•the command of Rear-Admiral M. L. Deyo,

j U.S.N. (C.T.F. 129), and was withdrawn to/ Portland, a few days before the operation for

planning and briefing. The initial plan pro-vided for a preliminary bombardment' at a•range of 28,000 yards to neutralise the long-range batteries, after which ships were to closein to about 14,000 yards and engage targets•designated by the Army. The long-range bom-

.bardment was, however, cancelled at therequest of the army after the ships had arrivedin thedr initial positions, presumably due! tothe uncertainty of the position of our forwardtroops at the time. The bombarding- ships then•closed in to their close-range positions beforethey opened fire. The enemy batteries opened

Admiralty footnotes:* COMINCH—C.-in-C. U.S. Fleet, Navy Depart-

ment, Washington.t ANVIL (later DRAGOON)—The landing on the

.South Coast of France.J General Bradley—In command of U.S. Troops

employed in this sector.

fire with extreme accuracy whilst the force wasturning at slow speed from the approachchannel into the fire support area; To avoid .heavy damage destroyers had to make smokeand the heavier ships to manoeuvre at increasedspeed and, in some cases, without regard tokeeping inside swept water, in order to main-tain manoeuvring searoom. Fire was openedwith all speed on the army's targets but in manycases had very soon to be shifted to the batterieswhich were straddling our ships. Despite theaccuracy of the enemy's fire, by frequent useof helm and alterations in speed the forcemanaged to avoid any but minor casualties anddamage, whilst at the same time continuingaccurate-fire on the enemy's defences. Thebombarding force withdrew ty hours after itfirst came in, by which time it was reported thatall batteries save two had been silenced.. Thisoperation was carried out with skill and deter-mination by Rear-Admiral Deyo, but it is con-sidered unfortunate that it was not found -possible to adhere to the original plan, whichprovided for the initial neutralisation of theenemy long-range batteries as, had betterfortune attended the enemy gunners, theymight well have inflicted heavy damage to ourships at the relatively close range at whichthey were firing.

Increased Casualties due to Mines. v

76. By aJbout 24th^June casualties to our ./_ships due to enemy • mines were becoming • '-serious. This was apparently as much due tothe^ ripening of mines that had already beenlaid" as to new lays that were made by enemyaircraft at night. Special measures were takento reduce all traffic and the speed at which itproceeded within the assault area to a mini-mum. As soon as these regulations were rigidlyenforced, casualties were reduced to smalldimensions. Our sweeping was also largely suc-cessful. By 3rd July it was estimated that,.including spontaneous detonations, nearly 500mines had • been accounted for by our mine-sweepers, and at this date, although the threathad not been completely mastered, it was feltthat the worst was probably over and thatthe build-up and our operations generallywould develop as desired in spite of mining.

Increasing Air Attacks in Assault Area.77. Enemy aircraft were more active at night

during this period and, in addition to continuedoninelaying by low-flying aircraft, attacks bycomposite aircraft and toy torpedo aircraft wereadso reported. It is possible that the enemywere aware that craft on the eastern defenceline were restricted from A.A. fire because air-craft sometimes came in very low over them.The restriction of ships' gunfire at night inorder to give full scope to night fighters willalways remain a most vexed problem, as low-flying enemy aircraft cannot be successfullycountered by night fighters whilst, in this case,A.A. fire is often most effective. .

Capture of Cherbourg.78. The completion of tlje capture of

Cherbourg was effected p.m. 27th-June andno time was lost in commencing a reconnais-sance of the "port and deciding upon salvageoperations. The first naval report on the stateof the harbour showed that severe - damagehad been done to the docks and the arsenal,

5122 SUPPLEMENT 'TO THE LONDON GAZETTE,, 30 OCTOBER, 1947.

whilst the entire' anchorage had ;been heavilymined. All types of mines were .swept duringthe next few 'days in Cherbourg harbour,—moored contact, ground contact, fired on a snagline, moored magnetic, ground rnagnetic, andground acoustic. A great number of ships•had been sunk in the harbour, and full scopewas given to the genius of Commoidore Sullivan,U.S. Navy, in effecting the clearance of theport, which in the event took nearly 90 days.

Sound Army Administrative Position.79. During the first few weeks; of the opera-

tion .frequent representations were made byyour staff and those of your Army Group Com-manders whenever the build-up; appeared tofall any distance* short of the plan. This wasnatural and their desire for the maximum rateof reinforcement and of landing stores was fullyshared by me. Sometimes I felt, however;that their protests were not entirely related tofacts as, so far as I know, the position of theExpeditionary Force was never in doubt fromD + 2 »onwards. The naval view had alwaysbeen that the build-up plan should 'be anoptimum plan at which we should aim butthat its attainment was most improbable, ifonly 'by reason of the naval difficulties inherentin the continuous turn round of such a largevolume of shipping. In the evfent, not onlynaval difficulties were experienced during thefirst few weeks, but also a considerable numberof military ones, especially with regard toloading in .the' port of Southampton, and theprogramme did fall behind as we had expectedthat it would. It was very satisfactory, there-fore, to rne that your Chief AdministrativeOfficer was able to report at his meeting heldon ist July, that the " Commanders in thefield had complete freedom of action so far asthe administrative arrangements were con-cerned ". This, it was considered, confirmedour view that the Navy had in fact met theArmy's requirements for their: reinforcementand maintenance.

Withdrawal of Task Force and .Assault ForceCommanders. Transfer of Naval Com-mand ashore. • ' .

80. During the last few days of June theBritish and U.S. Assault Force Commanderswere successively withdrawn from the assaultarea when conditions "in their sector peimitted.On 25th June, Rear-Admiral £. W. Rivett-Ca'rnac established his Headquarters ashore asF.O.B.A.A.* and Rear-Admiral J.. Wilkessimilarly hoisted his flag as F.Oi West on 27thJune. (Rear-Admiral Sir Philip Vian left theBritish Assault Area on 3Oth June when theCommand was assumed by F.OJB.A.A. Rear-Admiral Alan Kirk withdrew [from the U.S.Assault Area on 3rd July, when F.O. Westassumed command. The withdrawal of allthese officers and the transfer of the two navalcommands to the shore marked the stabilisa-tion of the naval position in the assault areaand the conclusion of the first phase in thecapture of the lodgment area by our armies.Both during the training and planning period,and during the operation, the Task Force andAssault Force Commanders and their subor-dinates rendered the very highest service tothe operation and thus to the Allied cause. The

* Admiralty footnote: F.O.B.AJA.—Flag Officer,British Assault Area.

experience that the majority of them had gainedin other theatres in-previous amphibious opera-tions proved invaluable. They afforded methe^ greatest possible measure of support andassistance and I could not have wished formore loyal or helpfur^commanders.

Comments and, Recommendations of 'TaskForce Commanders.

. 81. A large .number of comments on theoperation and recommendations arising there-from are included in the reports of NavalCommanders Eastern and Western Task Forces. *It is clear that Naval Commander Western;Task Force and his staff had considerable diffi-culty both during .the preparatory period andduring the operation in working in a foreign>.country. and with a command system whichwas unfamiliar to them. The fact that theyovercame these difficulties so well reflects greatcredit on them all. It is obvious that the generalsorganisation and procedure to be adopted forany joint operation must be that of the nation*from whose country it is launched. Although.British and American methods are by no means-similar, we are • now becoming accustomed to>each other's working, and with- the mutualtrust'and goodwill which has obtained in the-past there should be no undue difficulties intthis respect in the future.

My Relations with the Home Commands.82. The introduction of a Flag Officer as.

Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief to conductan operation of the nature and extent of" Neptune " naturally called for a careful con-

sideration of the system of command and divi-sion of responsibilities as between myself and'the respective Home Commariders-in-Chief in-,whose stations I was called upon to.plan and!to operate. It was clear'that whilst I was-charged with the preparation of the naval planand with the formation and training of thenaval assault forces, and later with the chief:naval command of the operation, the executiveimplementation of the plan must very largelyremain in the hands of the Home Commanders-in-chief. From the very outset it was mypolicy to make tnem my agents for this opera-tion and to employ existing organisations,,where these existed, rather than to institutenew ones. This policy worked admirably.

83. Some resentment might 'well have beenfelt by the Commanders-in-chief, Home Com- .mands in the Channel, at receiving directions.,from an authority other than the Admiralty, {especially as all three were senior to me. I 'cannot speak too highly, however, of theunselfish manner in which they accepted thesituation and I would particularly mention:Admiral Sir Charles J. C. Little, Commander-'in-Chief, Portsmouth, ,on whose Command fellthe' main burden of the operation on the naval,side. Admiral of the Fleet Sir John C. Tov.ey(Commander-in-Chief, The Nore) and AdmiralSir Ralph Leatham (Commander-in-Chief,Plymouth} together with Admiral Sir HenryD. Pridham-Wippell (Admiral CommandingDover) also threw themselves wholeheartedly.and unselfishly into our preparations, quickly-grasping the problems ahead of them and re-organising their Commands to deal admirablywith the particular requirements of" Neptune .". . During the operation the co-ordination between the Commands was perfect,.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 30 OCTOBER, 1947 5123:

and the intricate machine worked as if it hadbeen running for years.

Condition.84. I am greatly indebted to my staff, so

admirably led by Rear-Admiral G. E. Creasy,for their magnificent work and outstandingdevotion to duty throughout the long planningperiod and later during the operation. NoCommander-in-Chief has ever been better servedand I count myself fortunate in having hadthe services of so fine a company of officers.

85. I desire also to record my complete satis-faction and admiration for the manner in whichthe ships of our Allies have carried out theirarduous duties, and wliich has contributed somuch towards the liberation of their countries.

86. Finally, I cannot close this letter withoutexpressing my deepest admiration .for the

manner in which the efforts of the many Com-mands of all Services and of both our countries-were directed and co-ordinated by yourself as-Supreme Commander. I deem it a very greathonour to have commanded the Allied navalforces in this great operation under yourinspiring leadership, which more perhaps thaaanything else has been responsible- for thesuccess achieved.

I have the honour to be,Sir,

Your obedient servant,(Signed) B. H. RAMSAY,

Admiral.

GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, U.S. Army,.Supreme Commander,

Allied Expeditionary Force..

TABLE A—ARRIVALS OF MERCHANT SHIPPING AND LANDING CRAFT IN FRANCE

7th June-30th June, 1944, inclusive

(Subsequent to Initial Lift of Assault Forces)

Date

7th June8th June9th June

loth Junenth JuneI2th JuneI3th JuneI4th JuneI5th Junei6th JuneI7th June ' ... '...i8th Juneigth June20th June2ist June22nd June23rd June24th June'25th June26th June27th June28th June29th June30th June

Totals

LibertyShips

172935293017

•1930342527303920——

—14232628

353330

570

Coasters

1729374425683025445229263722

—303339503827 -332924

788

L.S.T.tOS

i~>'i

46

153i395556 *5352624248483

38• 60-

37295538484i45

905

13

L.C.T.

5ino5081805773957648798975

—

—16522

397259

—121

1,442

PersonnelShips

9n10109

ii8988

. 7n82

—1393 -737845

180

L.C.I.(L.) .

j.-3i1828.1618302917181729

.32

——14

5 •15 '139

—1617

372

Note:—Following vessels are not included :—(a) Tankers.(6) Hospital Carriers.(c) Salvage ships and other auxiliaries.

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sr

SOf-

40'-

30'

20-

30'.

50°

50'-

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*— .T

OPERAT!ON "NE PTU N E".Diagram showing* Routes of Assault Forces.

, Sector dividing lines shown thus •"

Scale of Milesto is 20

^ . . | 4

FORCE "0"^_+ ^ /" "V~""~~ --—^-7 AREA \

. V'z"AVr< \^7>xc/*

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/ A \

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^CHERBOURG

V^

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i Northern* i • /~/ -7> > I

4 t 1 *LP* / ' ;

X^ ' / ' «

SSj**e*L ;/^* "•*A.!,-iy-

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Li/n/t o^

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GOLD

i^ACARENTAN</ ^ ^-p

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Kf- CAEN

«f

51°

^D*

-40'

-30'

-20'

-w

50C

-50*

•30'

West tTEasfc

. Based on Admiralty Chart N? 1598

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