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The London Gaze~Of TUESDA Y, the 14th of OCTOBER , I947

Publigb2~ by }tutborttvRegistered as a newspap~r

THURSDAY, I6 OCTOBER., I947- ----- - - -

SINKING OF THE GERMAN BATT LESHIPBISMARCK ON 27TH MAY, 194L

Th e following Despatch was submitted to theL ords Commissioners of the Admiralty on theSlh j uly , 194I, by Admiral Sir J OHN C.TOVE Y , K. C.B" D.S. O" Commander-in­Chief, Home Fleet .

Home Fleet,5th j uly, 194L

Be pleased to lay before the Lords Commis­sioners of the Admiralty the following despatchcovering the opera tions leading to the sinkingof the German battleship BIS~IARCK onTuesday , 27th ~Iay, 1941. All times are zoneminus 2 .

First R eports of Enemy .2. In the second week of May an unusual

amount of German air reconnaissance betweenJ an Mayen Island and Greenland was noticed,It seemed possible tha t the obj ect of th is recon­naissance was to locate the ice-limits eitherwith a view to an attack on J an Mayen Island ,or to assist some ship to break in or out ofthe North Sea, through the Denmark Strait .On rath May . accordingly, I asked the FlagOfficer-in-Charge, Iceland, for a report of theice conditions round J an Mayen Island. Thereport showed that the approach was possibleonly from between south and south-west, withice blocking all other dir ections. Reports oftroop movements in Norway, a false alarm ofan air invasion of Iceland and an air reconn ais­sance of Scapa Fl ow all continued to direct myattention towards the Denmark Stra it ; and onT8th May I instructed SUFFOLK, who was enpatrol. to keep a spedal watch on the passagein both directions close to the ice. The Rear­Admiral Command ing, Fi rst Cruiser Squ adron ,in H .M.S. NORFOLK, sailed from Hvalfiordt he next day and relieved SUFFOLK, who:retu rned to Hvalfiord to refuel.

3. Early on e rst May a report was receivedof 1 1 merchant vessels and 2 heavily-screenedlarge warships northbound in the Kaltegat theday before. Later in the day the warshipswere located at Bergen and identified from airphotographs as one Bismarck class battleshipand one Hipper class cruiser. There wer~ in­dications that these two were contemplating ara id on the ocea n trad e rou tes (Admiraltymessage 1828 /21st May) though, if th is were so,it seemed unlikely that they would stop at aplace so convenient for air reconnaissance asBergen. Two other pointers were a report (un­reliable) of a U-boat, north of Iceland , and anattack by a German aircraft on ThorshavenWJT sta tion .

4- The following dispositions were made : -(a) HOOD (Captain Ralph Kerr, C.B.E .),

flying the flag of Vice-Admiral Lancelot E .Holland, C.B., Vice-Admiral Commandin g,Battle Cruiser Squadron, and PRI~CE OFWALES (Captain J ohn C. Leach, M.V.O.),screened by E LECTRA (Commander CecilW . May), ANTHONY (Lieute nant-Com­mander J ohn ' M. Hodges), ECHO(Lieutenant-Commander Cecil H . de B.Newby), ICAR US (Lieutena nt-CommanderColin D. Maud , D .S .C.), ACHATES(Lieutenant-Commander Viscount J ocelyn ),and ANTELOPE (Lieutena nt-CommanderRoger B. N. Hicks, D .S.O.), were sailed fromScapa to Hvalfiord . .

(b) BIRMINGHAM (Captain AlexanderC. G. Madden) and MANCH ESTE R(Captain Herbert A. Packer), on patrol inthe Iceland-Faeroes passage, were orderedto fuel at Skaalefjord and resume pat rol.

(c) SUFFOLK (Captain Robert M. Ellis),who had just arrived at Hvalfiord after beingrelieved by NORFOLK (Capta in Alfred J . L .Phillins), flyin g the flag of Rear-AdmiralWilliam F . Wake-Walk er . C.B .. O.B.E ..Rear-Admiral Commanding, F irst Cruiser

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBER, 1947•

Squadron , in the Denmark Strait, wasordered to rejoin the Rear-Admiral Comman­ding, First Cru iser Squadron, al ter compJe!­ing with fuel. In order to conserve fuel, thismovement was deferred, SUFFOLK beingsailed to arrive on patrol just before theearliest possible time of arrival of the enemy.

(d) ARETHU SA (Captain Alex C.Chap man), who was due at Reykj avik withthe Vice-Admiral Comma nding, Orkn eysand Shetlands, on a visit of inspection toIceland , was ordered to remain at Hvalfiordat the disposal of the Rear-Admiral Com­man ding, First Cruiser Squadron.

(e) KING GEORGE V (Captain Wilfrid R.Pa tterson, C.V.O.), flying the flag of theCommander-in-Chief, Home Fleet,GALATEA (Captain Edward W. B. Sim),

.flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Alban T. B.Curteis, C.B. , Rear-Admiral Commanding,Second Cruiser Squadron, AURORA(Cap tain William G. Agnew), KE NYA(Captain Michael ~f. Denny, C.B .),NE PTUNE (Capla in Rory C. O' Conor),and the remaining three Home F leetdestroyers ACTI VE (Lieutenant-CommanderMichael W. Tornkinson), PUNJ ABI (Com­mand er Stuart A. Buss, M.V.a.), andNESTOR (Commander Conrad B. Alers­Hankey , ID.S.C.), were brought to shortnotice at Scapa. INGLEFIELD (Capta inPercy Todd, D.S.a.; Cap tain (D), Third

. Destroyer Flotilla) and INTREPID (Com­mander Roderick C. Gordon, D.S.O.) arrivedon zznd May and joined this force, as didHER:l!IONE (Captain Geoffrey N. Oliver)on completing the repair of her fourth turret.

(f) The sailing of VICTORIOUS (CaptainHenry C. Bovell) and REPULSE (CaptainWilliam G. Tennant, C.B.. M.V.O.) in Con­voy W.S. 8B was cancelled by the Admiraltyand they were placed at the disposal of theCommand er - in - Chief, Home Fleet .VICTORIOUS was already at Scapa andRE RULSE was ordered to sail from the Clydeto join.

(g) The submarine ~flNERVE (Lieutenantde Vaisseau P . M. Sommeville) on patrol offSouth West Norway was moved to thevicinity of position 61° 53' N . 3° 15' E ., andthe P .31 (Lieutenant J ohn B. de B. Kershaw)was sailed from Scapa to patrol west ofStadtlandet.

(il) A bembing attack by Royal Air Forceaircraft was arranged for the dark hoursand a reconnaissance of the coast fromTrondheim to Kristiansand South for firstlight on aznd May. Neither of these wasable to establish definitely whether the enemywas still at Bergen , owing to the fog and lowcloud over the Norwegian coast, but someof the bombers attacked ships in harbour.

(i) The Admiralt y transferred 828 Squad­ron of Albacores to Sumburgh , to attack th eenemy at Bcrzen . I had hoped to embarkthem in VICTORIOUS in place of herFulmars, but when it became kn own that theenemy had sailed, it was too late to do so.

5. The lack of furt her news abou t the enemy 'smovements was disturbing: and the need wasfelt of an air patrol similar to " Sentinel "(since established) across the rout e betweenNorwegian waters and the Northern Straits to

repor t if the enemy left. Here, too, weatherconditions were bad, WI th large stretches ofIog, bu t it would have beeu possible with theaid of A.S.V.• to maintain some sort ofwatch . t

6. This state of uncertainty conti nued untilthe evening of aznd May, when the Comman ?­-ing Officer, R .N. Air Station, Ha tston (CaP~

Henry L, St .J. F ancourt), on his own initiative,despatched an aircraft to try to break throu~hthe fog belt to the Norwegian coast. This air­craft carried Commander Geoffrey A.Rotherham a .B.E., the executive officer ofthe station' and a Naval observer with muchexperience, and was piloted by Lieutenant (A)~oel E. Goddard, R. N.V.R. Flymg almost atsurface level, they succeeded in penetratingto the fiords and carried out a search of theposition where the enemy ships had been ph.oto­graphed . Finding nothing there, they exammedBergen harbeur, und er heavy fire, an dreported that the ships h:>-d saile? Th is ~kilfuland determined reconnaissance IS deserving ofthe highest praise, as is the initiative of CaptainFancourt in ordering it.

7. The report of the departure of the war­ships an d convoy reached me at 2000 on zzndMay and, in view of the qua lifications of !heaircraft crew, I had no hesitahon. In acceptingit. Th ere seemed to be four possible explana­tions of the enemy's intentions: -

(a) The convoy.might cont ain importantmilitary stores for Northern Norway andhave gone on up the Leads. Movements oftroops to Kirkenes had been reported forsome weeks.

(b) The convoy might contain a raidingforce be und for Iceland, possibly with a viewto capturing an aerodrome for operationsagainst Reykjavik and Hvalfiord.

(c) The battleship an d cruiser . might betrying to break out on to the trade routes.Th is s»theory had the support of Admiraltyintelligence. If it were correct , the furtherquestion arose of which passage the enemywould select. Such information as was avail­able suggested that on all previous occasionsthe Denmark Strait route had been taken,and this was therefore considered the mostlikely; but the passages between Iceland a ndScotland could not be ruled out, especiallyin view of the enemy's stop at Bergen .

(d\ The battleship and crui ser might havecovered an important convoy over thedanzerous sea passage as far as the InnerLeads, and might now be return ing to theBaltic .

8. The thi rd possible move carried the grea termenace to our interests and dispositions weretherefore made to meet it. These dispositionsalso gave a reasonable possibility of interfering,before it was too late, with an y attemptedlanding in Iceland,

(a) SUFFOLK was sailed to join the Rear-Admiral Comma ndin g, First CruiserSquadron , in the Denmark Strait.

Ad miralty foot notes:-'" A.S .V.-radar equipment in aircraft.t At the request of the Admiralty, ~asta.l Com­

mand carried out the more southerly . at r patrols atthis time and there were insufficient A.S.V. aircraftleft to fiy any further patrols.

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SUPPLEMENT TO TH E LONDON GAZETTE , I6 OCTOBER, I947

(b). ARETHUSA was sailed to join MAN­CHESTER and BIRMINGHAM in the Ice­land-Faeroes passage. These ships were dis­posed by MANCHESTER in equal areasbetween 61° N. IQ o 30' W., and 64° N.IS" W. Five trawlers were on their normalpatrol west of these areas.

(c) The Vice-Admiral Comma nding, BattleCruiser Squadron. with !his force then onpassage to H valfiord , was instructed to coverthe pa trols in the Denmark Stra it and theIceland-Faeroes passage, operating north of62~ N. .

(d) KING GEORGE V, VICTORIOUS,GALATEA, AURORA, KENYA, HER­~IlONE and seven destroy ers sailed fromScapa at 2245 to cove r the passages , operat­ing south of 62° N. LANCE (Lieute nant­Command er Ralph W . F . Northcott) wascompelled to return to Scapa with boilertrou ble, but REPULSE and three destroyersof the Western Approaches Command joinednorth-west of the Butt of Lewis on the fore­noon of 23rd May . I had intended to detachtwo cruisers to patrol the Faeroes-Shetlandspassage, but I finally decided to keep all fourin company with me. '

(e) Air reconnaissance of all the passagesbetween Greenland and the Orkneys and ofthe Norwegian coast was asked for, as wellas reconnaissance of forces approaching Ice­land. An additional air patrol line about260 miles west of the Iceland-Faeroes pas­s~e was also established by the AdmiralCommanding Western Approaches.

. 9. It was desirabl e that the cruiser patrolsIn the passages. and the heavy ships as well,should be as nearly complete with fuel as pos­sible when the BISMARCK was located . Theproblem involved in ensuring this, during thelong period between her location a t Bergen andthe repor t of her departure, was not an easy one.H th e BISMARCK had chosen the Iceland­Faeroes passage, the cruisers which were sentto refuel at Sk:>alefjord would only just havebeen In time to intercept her when they resumedtheir patrol. The force in company with mewas likewise sailed at the latest possiblemoment; for it was obvious that fuel wouldbecome a vital factor before the operation wascompleted .

ro. The battlefleet proceeded to the nort h­westward until reachin g latitude 60° N., farenough north to be in a position to deal withan attack' on Iceland or a possible break back.and then steered west. Th ere had been aninterval of 29 hours between the time the enemywas last seen at Bergen and the time they werefound to have left, so no accurate estimationof their " furth est on " position could be made;but the time of their first sighting by SUFFOLKshowed later that th ey must have sailed on theevening of arst May, soon after they had beenphotographed at Bergen and long liefole theirdeparture was discovered. '

First Sighting.n. Tl., e air patrols arranged for 23rd May

were seno usly depleted by weather conditions .Two sorties were carried out in the Iceland­Faeroes gap, the more westerly one backing itup was maintained only from 1300 to 1700,.while. th e Dcn,!,ark Striiit patrol did not fly ata ll. though I did not learn of this until later ... ~ . -'- _. :,. A 1.

12. Th e Rear-Admiral Commanding, FirstCruiser Squadron, had issued the followingsignalled i nstructions to NOR FOLK andSUFFOLK :-

" SUFFOLK is to patrol within R .D.F."distance of the ice-edge on line running north­east and south-west. Southern end of 3 hourbeat to be on line 3IQ o from Staa lbierg Huk.The time at southern end to be at 2200 andevery 6 hours thereafter. When clear inshoreNORFOLK will patrol about IS miles abeamof you . When thick inshore NORFOLK willpatrol to cover inshore passage. NORFOLKwill make contact with you at I 300B j 24thMay in position 66° 45' N. 26° W. to checkposition. Investigate ice up to minefield onparting company to-day Friday ."

13. On the aft ernoon of 23rd May the atmo­spheric conditions in the Denmark Strait wereunusual, being clear over and close ,to the ice,and misty between the ice and the land.SUFF OLK took advantage of this to movefurther to the .eastward across the top of theminefield than would otherwise have beenprudent anJ kept close to the edge of the mistso as to have cover hand y if the BIS)IARCKwere sighted at close range. NORFOLKpatrolled 1:) miles on the beam of SUFFOLK'spatrol. .

14. Shortly aft er turning back to the south­westward on completing her investigation ofthe ice-edge, SUFFOLK at 1922 sighted theBISMAI<CK, followed by the PRI NZ EUGEN,7 miles on the starboard quarter, steaming thesame course as herself. SUFFOLK made anenemy report, increased to full speed andaltered to 150 0 to take cover in the mist and tomake for the gap in the minefield if unable toround its northern edge. She was able. how­ever, to keep under cover and to follow theBISMARCK round the minefield. mainta iningtouch by R .D.F. Her alert look-out and theintelligent use mad e of the peculiar weatherconditions enabled SUFFOLK, after this shortrange sighting. to avoid being engaged. At2028 she sighted the enemy again, reportedthem and once more retired into the mist. Atthe same nme, NORFOLK, who had mean­while been closing. also made contact. this timeat a range of 6 miles. The BIS~IARCK open edfire. but NORFOLK retired safely under asmoke screen. though some salvos fell closeenough to th row splinters on board .

IS . This repor t from NORFOLK (2032 j23rdMay) was the first intimation that I receivedof the enemy being sighted . as none ofSUF FOLK's reports up to date had been re­ceived in the battl efleet. The two cruisers pro­ceeded to shadow wich great skill in very diffi­cult conditions. There were rain storms, snowstorms, ice floes and mirage effects, which occa­siona lly deceived SUFFOLK into thinking thatthe enemy had closed to very short range.SUFFOLK took up a position on the sta rboardquarter of the enemy within R .D.F. range ofthe edge of the ice. to ensure that the enemycould not turn back unseen between her andthe ice; NORFOLK on the port quarte r coveredany Possible turn to the southward . The Rear­Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron ,reports tha t a third . smaller, ship was thought

Admiyalty· [ootn ote>-:• R.D.F.-rad",~, , ,

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SUPPLEMENT TO TH E LONDON GAZETTE , 16 OCTOBER, 1947

•

to be present ; but SUFFOLK never saw thisship and in view of her position it is consideredthat its presence is not established. It is curious,however, that PRINCE OF WALES also ob­tained 3 echoes soon after meeting the enemy.It is possible that two separa te R. D.F . echoeswere being received from the BISMARCK.Aircraft from Iceland were also sent to shadow.and one made a report of enemy's course andspeed -to NOR FOLK.

Battle Cruiser Force.16. HOOD and PRINCE OF WALES and

their screen were meanwhile closing at highspeed. Ihcy arrived in the vicinity of theenemy sooner than I had expected. At 020S theVice-Admiral Commanding, Battle CruiserSquadron turned to a course nearly parallel tothat of the enemy to wait for the relative posi­tions to become clear and for daylight. Theopposing forces were in close proximity at thistim e, and it is possible th at the ship sighted byNORFOLK at 0229 was the PRINCE OFWALES. During the rest of the night PRINCEOF WALES obtained frequent DJI" bea ringsof NORFOLK and SUFFOLK and passed th emin to the Vice-Admiral Commanding, BattleCruiser Squadron . At 0340 H OOD andP RINCE OF WALES increased to 28 knot sand altered in to make contact.

17. It was the intention of the Vice-Admiral'Commanding, Battle Cruiser Squadron, thatHOOD and PRINCE OF WALES shou ldengage the l3ISMARCK, leaving the PRINZEUGE N to the cruisers, bu t the Rear-AdmiralCommanding, First Cruiser Squadron, was notaware that the battle-crui ser force was so near;NORFOLK and SUFFOLK, therefore, shadow­ing from the eastward and northwardrespectively at a range of about IS miles,were not in a position to engage the PRINZE UGE N who was now stationed ahead of theBISMARCK on a course of 240" .

18. HOOD and PRINCE OF WALES sightedthe enemy at 0S3S from a direction just beforehis beam and came into action at 0553 steeringto close the range as fast as possible. All threesh ips opened fire practically simultaneously ata range of about 25.000 yards. The shootingof both the HOOD and the BISMARCK wasexcellent from the start and both scored hitsalmost at once. The BISMARCK's second ort hird salvo started a fire in HOOD in thevicinity of the port after 4-inchmounting.Th is fire spread rapidly an d, at 0000, just afterthe ships had turned together to open ' A'arcs, t HOOD was straddled again : there was anuge explosion between th e after funnel and themainmast and the ship sank in 3 or 4 minutes.

.She had fired only S or 6 salvos. The loss byone unlucky hit of this famous ship with Vice­Admiral Lancelot E rnest Holland, C.B.,Captain Ralph Kerr, C.B .E ., and her fine com­pany . was a grievous blow .

19. PRINCE OF WALES had sta rted offwell for so new and unpractised a ship andhad stra ddled with her sixth salvo . She hadbeen engaging the BISMARCK, while herselfbeing engaged by the PRINZ EUGEN. After

Admiralty foot notes:-• D / F-direct ion finding.t 'A ' arcs are the arcs on which all guns of a

ship's main armament will bear, thus allowing themto fire simultaneously at the enemy .

emptying her aircraft in preparation for a night:encounter, she had been unable to I:l'fuel it intime to fly off before contact was made. It wasjust ab out to be catapulted when it was hit bysplinters and had to be jettisoned" As soon asHOOD had been disposed of, the BISMARCKshifted her main and secondary armament firequickly and accurat ely on to the PRINCE OFWALES. The range was now about 18,000yards an d PRINCE OF WALES' starboards.2s-inch ba ttery had also come into action .Within a very few minutes she was hit by fourrs-inch an d three smaller, probab ly 8-inchshells; her compass platform was da maged andmost of the people on it killed or wounded ;both forward H .A. Directors an d the starboardafter one were out of action; one four-gunnedtu rret ha d jammed and the . ship was holedunderwa ter aft. The Rear-Admiral Command­ing, First Cruiser Squadron, reports thatPRINCE OF WALES' salvos were now fallingshort and had a very large spread. The Com­manding Officer considered it expedientt emporarily to break off the action and, at06I3, turned away under smoke. Th e rangeon ceasing fire was 14.600 yards .

20. SUFFOLK reported that the BISMARCKhad suffered three hit s, but neither the Rear­Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron,nor PRINCE OF WALES ha d been able toobserve any hits for certai n, though blacksmoke had been seen at times. Her fire at anyrate was still very accurate. (It is now knownthat she did probab ly suffer thr ee hits, one ofwhich caused her to leave an oil trac k and mayhave had a considerable effect on herendurance.)

21. The Rear-Admiral Commanding, ..FirstCruiser Squadron, ordered the destroyers in thearea to search for survivors of th e HOOD andtold PRINCE OF WALES to remain in com­pany with him and maintain her best speed.By 0720 she had cleared away most of thedebris on the bridge. and resumed conning fromthe compass pla tform ; two guns of ' Y , turretwere again in action and her best speed had beenreported as 27 knots.

Decisionto Break Off the Action.22. The Commanding Officer of the PRIN CE

OF WALES in his report says :-.. Some explanation remains to be made

as to my decision to break off the engage­ment aft er the sinking of H. M.S. HOOD­a decision which clearly invites most criticalexaminat ion . Prior to the disaster to HOODI felt confident that together we could dea ladeq uately with the BIS~fARCK and herconsort. The sinking of the HOOD obviouslychanged the immediate situation, and therewere three further considerations requiringto be weighed up , of which the first two hadbeen in my mind before action was joined.namely: -

(a) The practical certainty that owingto mechan ical ' teething troubles ' a fulloutput from the main armament was not tobe expected. .

(b) The working up of the ship aftercommissioning had only just reached astage where I had felt able to report toth e Commander-in-Chief , Home Fleet, thatI considered her reasonably fit to take partin service operations. This was the first

SUPPLEMENT TQ THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBER, 1947

occasion on which she had done so. Fromthe gunnery point of view the personnelwas inun ensely keen and well dnlled, butinexperienced.

(c) The likelihood of a decisive con­centration being effected at a later stage .In all the circumstances I did not consider

it sound tactics to continue single-handed theengagement with two German ships, both ofwhom might be expected to be a t the peak oftheir efficiency. Accordingly I turned awayand broke off the action pending a morefavourable opportunity ."

23. Th e Rear-Admiral Conunanding, FirstCruiser Squadron, in his report says :-

.. At 1545 Admiralty signal 1445* had beenreceived. At that time I had no evidencethat the enemy's speed was in any wayreduced by da mage and I d id not considerit likely that he would fight or that we couldcatch him, as his policy was obviouslyevasion.

The question whether I should re-engagewith PRINCE OF WALES had been exercis­ing my mind for some time before the receiptof this signal. The factors to be consideredwere as follows:- In the first place, thesta te of efficiency of PRINCE OF WALES.I had seen her forced out of action afterIQ minutes' engagement, at the end of whichher salvos were falling short and had a verylarge spread indeed. As a resu lt of the actionshe was short of one gun and her bridge waswrecked. She was a brand new ship, withnew turrets in which mechanical breakdownshad occurred and were to be expected, apartfrom damage, and she had ha d a bare mini­mum period for working up . I had beenunable to observe for certa in any hits on theBISMARCK and her shooting had givenstri king proof of its efficiency . To put it ina nutshell, I did not and do not consider thatin her then state of efficiency the P RINCEOF WALES was a match for theBISMARCK.

This, however, was in no way a decidingfactor. My object was the destruction of theBIS~IARCK and I knew that other forceswere on the way to intercept her. I hadtherefore two broad alternatives, one to en­sure that she was intercepted by the Com­mander-in-Chief, the other to attempt herdestruction with my own force.

This second alternative involved my beingable to bring her to action and this requiredan excess of speed. r had no evidence that,with PRI NCE OF WALE S reduced to 27knots, I possessed it . If, however, theattempt had shown that we could overtake herI would have had to engage with the wholeforce and press the action to a range at whichthe 8-inch cruisers' fire would be effective­and could be spotted- namely 20,000 yardsor less.

In view .01 the relative efficiency of the twoheavy ships I was of the opinion that such an

Admiralt y tootnote:-:• Admiralty signal 1445/24 asked the Rear-Admiral

Commanding, rst Cruiser Squadron , to state: -(i) the remaining percentage of the BISMARCK's

. fighting efficiency; •(H) what ammunition she had expended;(Hi) the reasons for her frequent alterations of

cou rse; . . . ,(iv ) his intention as regards the PRINCE OF

'VALES re-engaging.

action would almost certainly result asfollows. A gradual reduction ot PRINCE OFWALES' gunfire due to materi al tailures anddam age, in return for which the BISMARCKwould receive some damage. That suchdamage, though it would affect her fightingefficiency, would also have any large effecton her speed I considered improbable, as ina modern well-protected ship the most tha tcould be expected would be some loss ofdraught due to damaged funnels or fans, orwaterline damage forward or aft.

At the ran ge to which th e action must bepressed the cruisers might well be left to bearthe brunt of the BISMARCK's and PRINZEUGEN 's fire and suffer a reduction of speeddue to hits in their large and unprotectedmachinery spaces or waterline. I should thenhave a damaged PRINCE OF WALES, andpossibly damaged cru isers, with which to tryand main tain touch with a BISMARCKdamaged but still capable of a high speed.

The alternative was to ensure her inte r­ception bv the Conunander-in-Chief. This Ifelt I had good reason for thinking I couldachieve . At this time I was expecting theCommander-in-Chief to be able to make con­tact about oroo] on the 25th-before dark.Land I saw no reason why our success so far inkeeping touch should not continue. Even ifwe had to wait till next day for the Com­mand er-in-Chief, the conditions of darknesswere no more difficult than those of lowvisibility with which we had been able to dealby the use of R.D.F. and it would ouly bedark from 0200 to 0500."(t This was due to a miscalculation . The

earliest the Commander-in-Chief could arrive,even if he forecast exactly the enemy 's move­ments , was between 0600 and 0700! 25th May. )

"The decision was not an easy one. Iappreciated that my force was superior innumber and the weight of the moral factorsinvolved . I could not feel, however, thatPRI NCE OF WALES in her then sta te ofefficiency was 'Worth her face value or thatmy extra cruiser would counterbalance herweakness. But for th e probability of a T ! B*attack from VICTORIOUS and interceptionby the Commander-in-Chief the situationwould ha\'0 been fundamenta lly different, andany other course but to re-engage could nothave been considered.

As it was , however, the alternatives couldbe summed up as follows :-

(i) To engage with my whole force; thishad possibilities 'varying from the highlyproblematical result of the destruction ofthe enemy, through the gamut of a longstem chase at high speed which would makeinterception by the Commander-in-Chiefimpossible, to that of being driven off withloss of speed and inability to keep touch.

(ii) Against this was the alteruative ofcontinuing to keep touch, with the possi­bility th at we might fail to do so, thoughwith PRINCE OF WALES in support Ihad no fear of being driven off.Weighing these alternatives, I chose the

latter. This did not preclude the possibilityof attacking the enemy, but in so doing myobject must be to ensure iuterception rather

Admiralty footn ote :-.* T I Bc.-Torpedo j Bomb er aircraft .

4852 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, T6 OCTOBEI~ , 1947

than attempt his destru ction, and on thispolicy I acted.

Their Lordships' signal had enquired my.. intentions " as regards re-engaging withP RI NCE OF WALES. I was careful in myreply to state my " opinions " and not myintentions, and I was grateful that They leftthe matter to my judgment. "

24. After full consi deration of the facts, Iam of the opinion that this decision was justi­fied and correct. Some of the factors affectingit require emph asis. The PRINCE OFWALES, with many of the cont racto r' s work­men still on board, had joined the Fleet on25th March . It was not till 27th April th atthe last of her turrets could be accepted fromthe cont ractors and that practice drills with thewhole main armament could be started.Captai n Leach had been able to repor t on I7thMay , short ly before the Fleet sailed for thisoperation, that he considered his ship fit tooperate; but neither he nor I interp reted thatreport as implyin g that she was fully worked up .Her turrets, of a new and untried model, wereknown to be liable to teething troubles andcould already be seen to be suffering them.The effects of all this on her gunnery had beenwitn essed by the Rear-Admiral Commanding,First Cruiser Squad ron, and he knew, in addi­tion, that her bridge was seriously damaged,that she had taken in 400 tons of water aftand could not exceed 27 knots. The BIS­MARCK and PRINZ EUGE N, on the otherhand, after working up for many months underideal conditions in the Baltic, had given evi­dence of a very high degree of efficiency : theBISMARCK had been hit, but the Rear­Admira l Commanding. F irst Cruiser Squadron,could see no sign of damage.

25. In these circumstances, the senior officeron the spot was clearly justifi ed in his con­clusion that he was more likely to achieve hisobject of ensuring the enemy's destruction bykeeping touch until the approaching reinforce­ments should arrive. If these powerful rein­forcements had not been in the vicinity, theproblem would, of course, have been a differentone.

26. At 1445 the Admiralty asked the Rear­Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron,to report on the percentage fighting efficiency ofthe BIS~fARCK and requested his intentionsas regards P RINCE OF WALES re-engaging.The Rear-Admiral Commanding, First CruiserSquadron, replied that the BISlIIARCK'sefficiency was uncertain but high , an d that heconsidered that PRINCE OF WALES " shouldnot rc-engage until other heavy ships are in con­tact unless interception fails. Doubtful if shehas speed to force action. " F rom his reply Iassumed that the Rear -Admiral Commanding,First Cruiser Squadron, would not force actionunless the situation changed materia lly, or in­structions were received either from theAdmiral ty or myself. I had complete confidencein Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker's judgment , nordid I wish the enemy to be forced away to thewestward.

Shadowing during Daylight on 24th May .27. After the action had been broken off,

the three ships continued to shadow. Theenemy proceeded on a south-westerly course,with minor alterations, until 1240. They triedhard , by frequent alterations of course and

speed , to th row off the shadowers ; and therapid variations of visibility , between two andseventeen miles, were of great assistance tothem; but their efforts were without success.SUFFOLK, using her R .D .F . in a masterlymanner to overcome the difficulties of varyingvisibility , shadowed from the sta rboa rd quarterto cover any attempt to break back along theice; NORFOLK, with P RI NCE OF WAL ES incompany, kept out on the port quar ter to ensurethe detection of any alteration to the southward.About I 240 the enemy seem to have abandonedhope of evasion by daylight, for they turnedsouth, presumably to gain sea-room for anotherattempt by night, and reduced to 24 kn ots.

Movements of the Baitlefleet . .28. At the time the first report of th e sight ­

ing of the enemy was received by me, KIN GGEO RGE V, with RE PU LSE , VICTORIOUS,GALATEA, AURORA,KENYA,HERlIlI ONEand nine destroyers in company , was inapproximate position 60° 20' N. 13 0 ,\V. I ha d ­always thought the enemy , when breaking out,.might have long distance aircraft reconnoitringahead of them, to give warning of any of ourforces in a position to intercept; if either orboth of our cap ita l ship forces were reported,the enemy might turn back th rough the Den­mark Strait or shape course and speed to avoidcontact. I therefore altered course to 280 0

and increased to 27 knots with the idea ofreaching a position from which I could inter­cept the enemy to the eastward of the DenmarkStrait, and at th e same time be able to rein­force HOOD and PRI!\CE OF WALE S if theywere able to bring him to action and reduce hisspeed, or force him in my direction. As moreinforma tion was received, it became clear thatthe enemy intend ed to continue his at tempt tobreak out ; though there was still the chancethat he would turn back when he encounteredHOOD and PRINCE of WALE S or, if HOODand PRI NCE OF WALES were to the west­ward of him when contact was made, he mightendeavour to break to the south or south­eastward.

29. The sink ing of the H OOD and thedam age to PRINCE OF WALES made it un­likely that the enemy wculd be forced to turnba ck, an d the best hope lay in interception bymy force, though th is would not become pos­sible unless he reduced his speed. Course wasaltered accordingly to 2600, and lat er to 2400.Reports suggested that the enemy was keepinga few miles off the edge of the ice, possiblyin the hope of findin g thick wea ther . F rom mypoin t of view the greate st danger lay in hishugging the coast of Greenland, and thenmaking his way to the westward, where Isuspected he might have an oiler ; for , if hecould refuel, he would be able to use higherspeeds than KING GE ORGE V could main ­tain and so get away.

30. The enemy's altera tion to the southwardand his reduction of speed were a great relief.although there seemed a good chance tha t hewas leading our forces into a concentration ofU-boats. Tt suggested that he did not knowof my force and it made interception possible.

31. There was still a grave risk of his gettingaway by sheer speed , and th ough I kn ew thelack ,·f experience of the crew, of the aircraftin VICTORIOUS and of VICTORIOUS's own

S UPPL E MENT TO TH E LONDON GAZETTE, T6 OCTOBE R , 1947

officers and ship's company, 1 decided 1 mustcall upon their aid in an endeavour to reducethe BISMARCK' s speed and to ensure mybeing able to bring her to action with KINGGEORGE V and REPULSE-a call they re­sponded to with such splendid ?illlantry andsuccess .

32. I therefore detached the Rear-AdmiralCommanding, Second Cruiser Squadrou, at1509 with VI CTORIO US and the four cruiserswith instructions to steer the best course to getwithin 100 miles of the enemy and deliver aT / B attack. Though VICTOR IOUS wouldbe of great value in company with me the nex tmorning to locate the enemy if they escapedduring the uight , a red uction of speed was themore importan t objec t and could only beachieved by detaching her at this stage.

33. KI NG GEORGE V and Imp ULSEsteered an intercepting course with the objectof bringing the enemy to action soon after sun­rise with the sun low behind us. The situationat this time was as follows :-

(a) The enemy appeared to have settleddown to a course of 180 0 at abo ut 22-24knots. They were, for no apparent reason,zig-zagging. Th ey were shadowed bySUFFOLK from astern an d by PRINCE OFWALE S and NORFOLK from the portqu arter. The BI SMARCK ha d suffered somedamage but retained her fighting efficiency ,though an aircraft had repo rted tha t shewas leaving an oil wake. Their reducedspeed was probably dictated by the needfor economy of fuel and to afford an oppor­tunity of breaking contact by an increaseof speed after dark . PRINCE OF WALE Shad two guns out of act ion and considerabledamage to her bridge.

(b) KING GEORGE V and REPULSEwere closing from the eastward and would ,if the enemy held their course, make con­tact about 083°, half an hour after sunrise.REPULSE was short of fuel, bu t had justenough to fight a short act ion and thenreach Newfoundland . By midnight all des­troyers had left for Reykjavik to fuel.

(c) RODNEY (Ca pta in F rederick H . G.Dalrympl e-Hamilton), with three dest roye rs ,was approaching from the south-eastwardand would ioin about 1000. "

(dl RA MILLIES (Captain Arthur D ..n Read) was approaching from the south,

steerin g to get to the westward of the enemy,and would make contact about 1100.

Attack by Aircraft of VICTORIOUS .34. Th e Rein -Admiral Commanding, Second

Cruiser Squadron, with his force proceeded at28 knots on the course which would bring himsoonest within 100 miles. He hoped to"get near'enough to launch the attac k bv 2 TOO . but ash ort engage ment with PRINCE OF WALEScaused the enemy to make ground to, the west­ward; and it became apparent thatVICTORIOUS could not be withi n TOO milesof them beforeztoo. : Th e Rear.Admiral Com­manding. Second ,Cruiser Squadron , thereforeordered the striking"force to be flown off at2200, some 1 20 miles from the objective.

. 35 . VICTORIOUS had ' only just commis­sioned. She was about to carrv a large consign­ment of crated Hurricanes to Gibraltar, there

to be assembled and flown to Malta, when shewas put under my command for this opcratiou. .The only operational aircraft she had on boardwere nine Swordfish of 825 and six Fulmarsof 802 Squadron . She ha d only ha d a weekto work up and the Fulmar crews were farfrom fully trained . The Comm anding Officerhad decided that nothing less than the whole of825 Squadron could be exp ected to produceany result in a torpedo attack. He realisedthat the F ulmars were far from ideal for sha dow­ing, but decided to use them to maintain touch,in the hope of being able to lau nch anothertorpedo attack in the morning.

36. Th e nine Swordfish were flown off at2 2 IO, followed at 2300 by three F ulmars andat 0100 by two more as reliefs. The weatherwas showery with squalls; wind north-westerlyfresh; visibility good except during showers.Sunset was at 0052.

37. 825 Squadron, by very good naviga tionand with the assistance of the A.S .V . locatedthe BISMAR CK at 2330 and altered to thesouthward with the object of ma king theirattack from ahead. The cloud was increasingand they lost touch , but after circling roundfor some time located NORFOLK and PRINCEOF WALE S and were re-directed by the for­mer. A few minutes later the ·A.S.V. gearagain indicated a ship and the squadron brokecloud to deliver their attack , only to find them­selves over a United States coastguard cutter.The BI SMARCK was six miles away and,observing this incident, opene d H .A . barragefire, keeping it up throughou t the attack . Ei ghtaircra ft got in their attacks , the ninth losingtouch in a cloud layer and failing to find thetarget. At least one hit was obtained.

38. This attack, by a squadro n so lately em­barked in a new carrier in unfavourable weatherconditions, was magnificently carried out andreflects the greatest credit on all concerned.There can he littl e doubt that the hit was largelyresp onsible for the BI SMARCK being finallybrought to action and sunk. * The value ofA.S.V. was once more demonstrated; withont it,it is doubtful whethe r an y a tta ck would havebeen possible .

39. The Fulmars, whose ' object was toshadow and to distract the enemy, were lesssuccessful. Only one of each group madecon tact and these did not succeed in holdingthe enemy for long. The crews were inex­perienced, some of the observ ers finding them­selves in a two-seater aircraft for the firsttime, with a wireless set , tuned only on deckand no homing beacon. Night shadowing isa task which tries the most experienced ofcrews and it is not surprising in these difficultconditions th at they failed to achieve it. Theutmost , gal lantry was shown by the crews ofthe se aircra ft in the ir a ttem pt. Two of theFulmars failed to return , but the crew ofone was rescued later by a merchant vessel.

Adm iralt y iootnote:-;* It is now known that the hit received in the

action with the HOOD about 0600 on May aath andthe resulting loss of oil fuel caused Admiral Lutjensto decide at 0800 f24 to make for the French coast .The torpedo hit by the VICTORIOUS at 001S/25 nodoubt confirmed him in this decision . The imme­diate and principal cause however of the BISMARCKbeing brought to action was the hit at 210S/26thMay by the aircraft of .the ARK ROY AL. whichdemolished her rudder and left her out of control.

4854 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBER, 1947

40. The Rear-Admiral Commanding, SecondCruiser Squadron, meanwhile, had been steam­ing towards the position of the BlS~lARCK,

to shorten the return journey of the aircraft.The homing beacon of VICTORIOUS hadbroken down and the return of the strikingforce unfortunately coincided with a rain squallround the ship. They missed her in the dark­ness and it was necessary to home them byDIF on medium frequency and to carry outan all-round sweep with a signal proj ector.It was with considerable relief that the Rear­Admiral Commanding, Seoond Cruiser Squadron,sighted them at 0155, one hour after they weredue and uncomfortably close to the end oftheir endurance. The homing procedure wascontinued for the benefit of the missing Fulmarsuntil 0250 when the Rear-Admiral Command­ing. Second Cruiser Squadron. was regretfullycompelled to order VICTORIOUS to stop it.It was by then quit e dark and searchlightsweeps in waters close to the enemy . and whereattack by submarines had to be expected. weretoo hazardous, Course was set to close thelast reported position of the enemy, in prepara­tion for a search at dawn; this course was alsoconsidered to be the best calculated to avoidan encounter before daylight .

First Cruiser Squadron and PR INCE OFWALES.

41. Throughout the afternoon NORFOLK ,SUFFOLK and PRINCE OF WALES con­tinued to shadow. The enemy 's alterat ions ofcourse to the southward and south-eastwardand their reduction of speed were all in ourfavour. The Rear-Admiral Commanding, FirstCruiser Squadro n, endeavoured further to delaythem, and so to assist me to intercept , byengaging the enemy from astern : but the enemymust have made an alteration of course tothe south-westward while the shadowing forcewas temporarily out of touch, for when hedid come within gun range at 1840, the Rear­Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron,found himself still on the port quarter insteadof astern. A few salvos were exchanged atlong range. and the brief action had the un­desirable result of forcing the enemy furtherto the westward. away from my force. Theunreliability of PRINCE OF WALES' arma­ment was demonstrated once more, as two gunsagain went out of action.

42. The Rear-Admiral Commanding. FirstCruiser Squadron, considered the possibility ofworking to the westward of the enemy to forcethem towards me; but the risk of :osing touchaltogether was too great and he continuedshadowing as before, instructing PRINCE OFWALES not to open fire except in response toenemy fire.

43. J ust when the torpedo attack by theaircraft of VICTORIOUS was developing, theShadowing ships were confused by an Americancoastguard cutter, which appeared on the bear­ing of the enemy. and touch was again tem­porarily lost. It was regained at olI5, but thelight was very bad ' and only two salvos werefired .

44. By 0140 it was getting dark and SUF­FOLK was ordered to act independently andkeep touch by R.D.F., the CommandingOfficer having previously been instructed toconcentrate on the BISMARCK if the enemy

should separate. Expe rience had suggestedthat the l<.D.F . of PRiNCE OF WALl:.:> wasnot reliahle; the R.D.F. fitted in NORFOLKhad the disadvantage of working on limitedbow bearings only, so that she would losetouch at once if forced to turn away. TheRear-Admiral Commanding. First CruiserSquadron. therefore. with NORFOLK andPRINCE OF WALES. maintained a positionin close support of SUFFOLK.

Loss of TO/It".45. The loss of touch, when it came, was

caused primarily by over-confidence. TheR.D.F. had been giving such consistently goodresults and had been used so skilfully that ithad engendered a false sense of security . Theattention nf the Rear-Admiral Commanding.First Cruiser Squadron. had been drawn, bothby the Admiralty and by me. to the evidentdanger of U-boat attack. and he had orderedthe ships in company to zig-zag. SUFFOLKwas shadowing from the extreme range of herinstrument, losing touch on those parts of herzig-zag which took her furthest from the enemy.The enemy altered sharply to starboard whileSUFFOLK was moving to port and , by thetime she got back, had gone. It is of interestthat on both her last two contacts at 0229 andat 0306, SUFFOLK detected two ships; it wouldappear that the PRINZ EUGE N was still incompany with the BISMARCK.'Search-Morning of 25th May.

46. SUFFOLK searched towards the enemy'slast bearing until it became certain that theyhad succeeded in evading and theu reportedthe fact (at 0401). The Commanding Officerdecided that it was essential first to allow foran increase of speed. coupled with a smallalteration to starboard. since failure to do sonow could not subsequently be retrieved. Heacted accord ingly . By lIOO his curve of searchhad covered enemy courses up to 220

0• The

Rear-Admiral Commanding, First CruiserSquadron, informed me that the enemy hadprobably made a 90° turn to the west, or hadturned back and cut away to the eastwardunder the stern of the shad owers, At 0620 hedetached PRI NCE OF WALES to join me andhimself searched to the westward, north ofSUFFOLK.

47. When I heard that the enemy bad suc­ceeded in breaking away from the shadowingforce, it seemed probable that they would eithermake for an oiler or they would make for adockyard. If the former, they would prob­ably steer north-west towards the Davis Strait.which offered an excellent hiding place foran oiler. or southwards towards where an oilerwas suspected to be ' operating in about25° 30' N. 42° W. If they were making for adockyard port . they could steer 'north-east forthe North Sea or south-east for Brest, the Straitsof Gibraltar orDakar, In view of the limitedcapabilities of VICTORIOUS, I had insufficientforces to search all the possible courses ' of theenemy. , I therefore decided to cover the pos­sibility that they were joining a tanker. fnr thesetwo ships, refuelled, at large in the Atlantic,would constitute a much more serious andimmediate menace ' to our interests than theywould, damaged, in a French or German port .Admiralty jootnote>«

ill It is now known that the PRIN Z EUGE~ partedcompany from the BISMARCK at about 1814 on 24thMay.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, T6 OCTOBE R, 1947

48. The enemy's courses west of south werebeing covered by SUFFOLK and, to a lesserextent, by NORFO LK and PRINCE OFWALES. KING GEORGE V worked acrossto the south-westward to cover a southerlycourse, allowing for an increase of speed bythe enemy. Consideration was given to flyingoff th e Walrus from KI NG GEORGE V tosearch the perimeter astern of the ship and socover a: south-easterly course of the enemy;but the swell was such that the sacrifice of theaircraft would almo st certainly result, and Idid not wish to expose KING GEORGE V toU-boat attack whilst picking up the crew. Sub­sequent analysis shows that such a search mightpossibly have located the BISMARCK.

49. The Rear-Admiral Commanding, SecondCruiser Squ adron, was ordere d by signal toorganise an air and surface search, withVICTORIOUS and his four cruisers , north­west of the last known position of the enemy.\Vhen I issued these instructions, I estimatedthat the Rear-Admiral Commanding, SecondCruiser Squ adron , and VICTORIOUS werewell to th e northward of this position; but inpoint of fact he had been steaming south athigh speed and was now close to it. It isprobable therefore that the air search carrie dout did not extend as far as the circle on whichthe enemy now was and would not have foundthem even if the aircraft had searche d to theeastward, as the Rear-Admiral Commanding,Second Cru iser Squadron, and the CommandingOfficer of VICTORIOUS had originallyintended .

50. Th is completed the immediate search ,leaving a sector between north and south-eastunwatched. Th e search was backed up to acertain extent by the ships which had beendetached by the Admiralty from various otherduties and which were approaching the scene.RODNEY recovered her screen , which hadearlier been forced by bad weather to .dropastern , and took up an extremely well­chosen position on the route for the Bay ofBiscay . RAMILLI ES patrolled to the south­ward of KING GEORGE V and PRINCE OFWALES. EDINBURGH (flying the flag ofCommodore Charles M. Blackman, D.S.O.,Commodore Commanding, Eighteenth Crui serSquadron), who had been patrolling off theBay of Biscay and had been sent by theAdmiralty to act as relief shadower, was nearthe track for- Gibraltar. In addi tion, · somedegree of search was provided by REPULSE ,whom I had been compelled to detach to New­foundland for fuel, and by LONDON (CaptainReginald M. Servaes, C.B.E.), who had beeninstructed by the Admiralty to search for anenemy ta nker believed to be in the arearound 25° 30' N. 42° W. Force If H." some1,300 miles to the south-eastward, had beeninstructed by the Admiralty to steer to interceptthe BISMARCK from the southwa rd .

SI. The track of the BISMARCK as drawnon the attached strategical plot (see Plan I) isprobably reasonably accurate. It shows hownarrowly she avoide d contact with the variousBritish forces during her run east. She startedby crossing about roo miles astern of KINGGEORGE V at · 0800 on 25th May and thenpassed about 50 miles from RODNEY and 45miles from EDINBURGH. On the next day

she passed B5 miles under the stern of convoyW.S . BB and 25-30 miles ahead of theCap tain (D), Four th Destroyer Flotilla, whohad parted company with this convoy. It isunderstood that the Captain (D), FourthDestroyer Flotilla , had disposed the convoyescort to the westward of the convoy in thehope that the BISMAR CK would be deflectedif she appeared steaining towards it .

52. At 1030 on 25th May, a series of D/Fbearings was received from the Admiralty whichindicated that the enemy was breaking backacross the Atlantic. The signals appeared tooom e from the same ship which had trans­mitted several signals soon afte r the T I Battac k of the night before; they could thereforerea sonably be attributed to the BISMARCK.These bearings, as plotted in KI NG GEORGE V,showed a position too far to the northward.which gave the misleading impression that theenemy was making for the North Sea . I broad­cast this posit ion of the enemy and instructedall Home Fleet forces to search accordingly ,PRINCE OF \VALES had not yet joined, butthe course of KING GEORGE V was altered to0550

, 27 knots, to make for the Iceland­Faeroes gap.

53. A position of the enemy transmitted bythe Admiralty made it clear that the enemy wasmaking for a French port and had a lead ofabout roo miles. The accuracy of the informa­tion which was issued by the Admiraltythroughout this stage of the operati on and thespeed with which it was passed out werebeyond praise. The situation could be clearlyenvisaged by all the forces concerned and Iwas able to preserve wireless silence.

5+ KI NG GEORGE V, RODNEY, NOR­FOLK, EDINBURGH and Force " H" allproceeded at their best speed towards the Bayof Biscay; and a sweep was flown in the eveningby Coastal Command flying boats as far aslongitud e 30° W. When this failed to locatethe enemy, two cross-over patrols by flyingboats were arranged to start at 1000 on 26thMay, across his probable track. In addition tothese forces, COSSACK (Captain (D), Fourth 'Destroyer Flotilla), with SIKH (Comma nderGraham H . Stokes), ZULU (Commander HarryR. Graham , D.S.O.), MAORI (CommanderHarold T . Arrnstrong, D.S.C.), and the PolishShip PIORUN (Commander E. Plawski) weredetached by the Admiralty from convoyW.S. BB ear ly on 26th May and instructed tojoin and screen KING GEORGE V and ROD­NE Y, to be joined by J UPITER (Lieu tenant­Commander Norman V. J . T . Thew) fromLondonderry; and DORSETSHIRE (CaptainBenjamin C. S. Martin) , on receipt of the firstenemy report, reported that she intended to ­leave convoy S.L. 74, which she was escorting,and came up from the south-west to interceptand shadow.

Other Dispositions,55: Meanwhile, those forces which could not

reach the most probable track of the ' enemywere moving to cover alternative possible move­ments. MANCHESTER' and- BIRl\lINGHA.'Iftook . up the - Iceland-Faeroes patrol . arid

-ARETHUSA that of the Denmark Strai t , withair patrols of all the northern passages to assist.The Rear-Admiral Commanding, Second

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE , 16 OCTOBER , 1947

Cruiser Squadron, in GALATEA, with VIC­TORIOUS, KE NYA , AURORA andHERMIONE in company, proceeded towardsthe Iceland-Faeroes passage, carrying out airsearches on the way. The cruisers had notenough fuel left to escort VICTORIOUS to th eBay and she could not be allowed to proceedunescort ed.

56. Two Swordfish aircraft were lost duringair searches on 25th and 26th May; but th ecrew of one of them had a remarkable escape.The aircraf t landed alongside a ship's lifeboa t,unoccupied but complete with provisions andwater, and the crew spent nine days in the boatbefore being picked up by a merchant vessel.One of the FuJrnar crews was also rescued by amerchant vessel.

57. PRINCE OF WALES also proceededtowards Iceland; and destroyers were sent outto screen her and VICTORIOUS. SUFFOLK,after her search, was too short of fuel to steamat the high speed necessary to come up withthe BI SMARCK; consid era ble forces were better.placed than she was for intercepting an enemymovement to the south -eastward and the Com­manding Officer considered he would be betteremployed covering VI CTORIOUS in thenorthern area, where there was nothing . morepowerful than a 6-inch cruiser. He thereforeset course to the north-eastward until he wasinstructed, on zfith May, to proceed to an areain the Davis Str ait sou th-west of Cape F ar ewelland search for enemy supply ships .

58. Two et her precautions were taken by theAdmiralty : the F lag Officer Commanding ,North Atlantic, was instructed to arrange airand submarine pat rols to prevent passage of theStraits of Gibraltar , NELSON being sailed fromFreetown to reinforce; and LONDON' was re­called from her search for a ta nker and in­structed to escort convoy S.L. 75, which wasapproaching the area west of the Bay of Biscay.

59. At lIOO on 25th May , wh en in position410 30' N. 170 IQ' W., the Flag Officer Com­manding. Force " H " (Vice-Admira l SirJ ames F . Sornerville, K. C.B ., D .S.O. ) inRENOWN (Captain Rhoderick R. McGrigor),with ARK ROYAL (Ca ptain Loben E . H .Maund) and SHEFF IELD (Ca ptain CharlesA. A. Larcom) in company , was instructed bythe Admiralty to act on the assumption tha t theenemy was proceeding to Brest. Course was setfor a favourable initial position and a com­prehensive scheme of air search, to cover allenemy speeds between 25 and IS kno ts, wasprepared for the following day :

60. No information had been received since23rd May of the two German bat tlecru isers atBrest , so a security patrol was flown off in themorning to search to the west and northwardin case one or both of these ships should be atsea in support of the B IS~IARCK. Ten Sword­fish were flown off at 0835 on zoth May for thefirst search, whose western edge was next to theflying boat patrols arranged by the Admiralty .It had been hoped to thicken the search withFulmars, but the weather conditions renderedthis impracticabl e. The wind was from 3200,force 7,* sea rough , sky overcast, visibility 10-12miles; the round down of ARK ROYA L was

Admiralty tootnote>--• Wi nd force 7-moderate gale, 2j -33 m. p.h.

rising and falling 56 feet and the handling ofaircraf t on deck was extremely difficult. Whilethe search was in progress Force " H " pro­ceeded to reach a pos ition to windward, so thatthe operati on of aircraft would not be impededby subsequent movements of the BISMARCK,if the latt er were located.

The BISMARCK L ocated.61. At IQ30 on 26th May one of the Coastal

Command flying boats on cross-over patrolsighted and report ed the BISMARCK. TheFlag Officer Commanding, Force " H " , onreceipt of this report , ordered ARK ROY AL tofly off two shadowing aircraft filled with longrange ta nks to gain touch, as he feared thatthe flying boat's position might be inaccuratein view of the weather conditions and the dis­tance from her base. (It was, in fact, about 35miles in error.) Three-quarters of an hour afterthe first sighting , one of ARK ROYAL's search­ing aircraft also located the enemy , followedshortly by another. The flying boat reported atthis tim e that her hull had been holed byshrapnel a nd soon after she lost touch. Thereports of thc aircraft from ARK ROYALplaced the enemy about 20 miles north of hercorrect position, but this error was due to thereference position passed out by the F lag OfficerCommanding, Force " H ", and was correctedlater in the day.

62. The BIS~fARCK was sh adowed con­tinuously by aircraft from ARK ROYAL forthe rest of the day and excellent reports weremade. Particular credit is due to the crewsof these aircra ft whose part, though unsp ec­tacular and often forgotten, is as important andfreque ntly as dangerons as that of the aircraftwhich att ack with torpedoes. The Flag OfficerCommanding, Force "H H , manoeuvred hisforce throughout the day to maintain theweather gage for flying op era tions, to avo idloss of bearing on the BISMARCK and to keepwithin 50 miles of her to facilitate the launchingof T I B attacks . He was instructed by theAdmiralty tha t HENOWN was not to becomeengaged with the BISMARCK unl ess the latt erwas already heavily engaged by either KINGGE ORGE V or RODNEY. •

63. Th e first report of the BISM AR CK placedher about I30 miles south of me, steering asouth-easterly course at 2 2 knots. It was evi­dent that she had too great a lead for KINGGEORGE V to come up with her unless herspeed could be further reduced or she couldbe deflected from her course; our only hopelay in torpedo attacks by the aircra ft of ARKROYAL.

Fuel .64. The shortage of fuel in th e Home Fl eet

battleships was a matter of grave anxiety;KING GEORGE V had only 32 per cent. re­maining, and RODNEY reported that she wouldhave to part company at 0800 the next morn­ing. When these ships joined compa ny laterin the day, they had to share an A IS screenof three destroyers (SOMAL I (Captain CliffordCaslon ) , TARTAR (Commander Lionel P .Skipwith) and MASHONA (CommanderWilliam H . Selby )) and even. these were dueto leave that night for Jack of fuel. Therewere known to be several U-boats in the areaand it was safe to assume that every av ailabledestroyer and U-boat in the porls of Western

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, r6 OCTOBER, -1947 4857

France would also be ordered ' to Sea . TheAdmiralty had also warned me to expect heavyair attack. It was therefore essential to allowa sufficient reserve of fuel to enable the battle­ships to return to Unit ed Kingdom ports at areasonably high speed . The loss ofHOOD andthe dam age to PRINCE OF WALES had leftKING GEORGE V as the only effective capitalship remaining in Home Waters. I was . notprepared to expose her unscreened at lowspeed to almost certain attack by U-boats unlessth ere was very good prospect of achieving aresult commensurate with the risk. I there­fore decided that un less the enemy's speed hadbeen reduced . KING GEOR GE V should re­turn at 2400 on 26th May 'to refuel.

First T IB Attack.65. The speed of KING GEORGE V was re­

duced to 22 knots at 1705 on zfith May toeconomise fuel and ROm'lEY, who had by the nbeen overhauled, was formed astern. I hadrecommended the Flag Officer Commanding,Force " H, " to remain with ARK ROYAL ; hewas maintaining his position on the beam of theBISMARC K and had detached SHEF FIELD toshadow. The visual signal ord ering this lattermovem ent was not repeated to ARK ROYAL,an omission which, as will be seen later, hadserious consequences.

66. A striking force ~f 15 Sword fish, one ofwhich had to return , was flown off at 1450;they were armed with Duplex pistols set to30 feet instead of 34 feet, in consequence of thedoubt which the n existed in ARK ROYALwhether the enemy ship was the BISMARCKor the PRINZ EUGEN. The weath er wasparticularly bad in the vicinity of the targetand reliance was placed on the A.S.V . setcarried in one of the aircraft; this aircraftlocated a ship at 1550, about 20 miles from theexpected position of the enemy, and an attackthrough the cloud was ordered. The ship de­tected was SHEFFIELD. of whose presencenear the BIS1IARC K the striking force was notaware, and eleven torpedoes were dropped ather. Two of the torpedoes exploded on hittingthe water, and three more on crossing the wake,the remainder being success fully avoided bySHEFFIELD . who, with grea t forb earance, didnot fire a single rou nd in reply .

67. The flying boat was still shadowing,though her reports now differed widely in posi­tion from those of the aircraft of ARK ROYAL.Her signals were made on H / F' and her posi­tion could not therefore be checked by D I F.She report ed twice during the afte rnoon that shewas being attacked by enemy aircraft . bu tthese were pro bably shadowing Swordfish fromARK ROYAL.

Second T I B Attack .68 . A second striking force of I S aircraft

was launched at , 1915. Owing to the limitednumber of serviceable aircraft, it had beennecessary to re-arm and refuel most of thosewhich had taken part in the first attack. Inview of the apparent failures with Duplex'pistols in the first attack, contact pistols wereempl oyed on th is occasion . The striking forcewas ordered to make contact with SHEFFIELDbefore launching the attack and the latter wasinstru cted to home the striking force by D I F.

Admiralty iootnotei-:-• H/F-high frequency .

69. The aircra ft ' approached SHEFFIELDbelow the clouds and then climbe d to 6,000 feetto make thei r final approach . The ,weather inthe vicinity of SHEFFIELD appeared to beideal for a synchonised torpedo a ttack , bu twhen the aircra ft cam e near the BIS~IARCK,

they found that she was under a cold front.A thick bank of cloud with base about 700 feetand ' top between 6,000 and ro.ooo feet was~ncountered an d the force beca me split up . Thetorpedo attacks ha d therefore to be made bysub-flights or pa irs of airc raf t over a long pen odin the face of intense and accurate fire; th eywere pressed home with a galla ntry and ~eter­

mination which cannot he praised too highly .One aircraf t. having lost touch with his sub­flight . returned to SHEFF IELD for a freshrange and bearing of the enemy and went In

again by himself in the face of very heavyfire to score a hit on the port side of theBIS)IARCK. At least two hits were scored .one of which so damaged the BIS1IARCK'srud ders that she was un able to keep off thewind, which providentially was from the nor~­

west . for any length of time; a result whichARK ROYAL a nd her aircraft crews ha d wellearned and which ensu red my being able tobring the BISlIARCK to action next morni ng.

70. When I received the . first report thatthe BISMARCK ha d alte red course to 3400I dared not hope that it was more than a tem­porary altera'Ion to avoid a T I B attack; afurther report four minutes later that she wassteering 0 00 0 suggested, however, that herru dders had been damag ed and that she hadbeen forced up into the wind towards KI NGGEORGE V an d RODNEY. I immediatelyturned towards our estimated position of theBISMARCK in an, endeavour to mak e contactin time to engage her from the eastward in thefailing light. But with frequent rain squallsand gathering dar kness the light conditions be­came too unreliable, and with no certainty ofthe enemy's position or of that of our ownforces, but with continnation of the damageto the enemy and the knowledge that the Four thDestroyer F lotilla was shadowing. I decidedto haul off to the north -north-east ward a ndwork round to engage from the westward atdawn.

71. The Flag Officer Comman ding. Force" H ." had informed me that no furt her T I Battacks were possible that even ing an d thathe was preparing all remaining Swordfish fora strong attack at dawn. He w as" instructedto keep not less than 20 miles to the south­'ward of the BIS1IARCK so as to be clear ofmy approach,

Night Shadowing and Attack by Destroyers.72 . SHEFF IE LD made her las t enemy

report at 2140 on 26th May . At this timethe BISMARCK turned and fired six accura teIs-inch salvos at her, at a range of nine miles.SHEFFIELD turne d away at full speed andmade smoke, but suffered a few casualties fromsplinters. Th e turn caused her to lose touch,but shortly afterwards she made contact ,,:ithth e Captain (D), Fourth Destroyer. F lotIlla(Captain Philip L. Vian, D .S.O.), m COS­SACK, who with MAORI . ZULU. SIK H andthe P olish destroyer PIORUN, was approachingthe BISMARCK. The Captain (D), FourthDestroyer Fl otilla, as I knew he would. ha ddecided to shadow a nd attack the BISMARCK,

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBER , 1947

instead of screening KING GEORGE V andROD NEY; and was wisely proceedmg at highspeed, in spite of fuel shortage, to get in touchbefore dark . Ships were spread 2.5 miles apartat right angles to the estimated bearing ot theenemy . The approximate bearing and distanceof the enemy was obtained from SHEFFIELDan d, in view of the heavy sea running, speedwas reduced and the flotilla manoeuv red toavoid a high speed end-on contact . .

73. The BIS)IARCK was sighted byPIORUN, on the port wing, at 2238, just afterthe last shadowing aircraf t left to return toARK ROYAL : destroyers were ordered to takeup stations for shadowing: at 2242 the enemyopened a heavy fire on PIORUN, who made aspirited reply before turning away nnder smoke.It was evident to the Captain (D), FourthDestroyer Flotilla , that the enemy's speed hadbeen so seriously reduced by the torpedobomber attack that interception by the battle­fleet was a certainty, provided that the enemycould be held . He therefore dec ided that hismain object was to keep touch and his secon­dary ob ject to attack with torpedoes if hethought this would not involve the destroyersin serious losses. He ordered the destroyersto attack independently as opportunity offered.

74· Throughout the night and until 0845 on27th May , when the battlefleet came into action,these destroyers mai ntained touch in spite ofheavy seas, rain squalls and low visibility .They were freque ntly and acc urately engagedby the main and secondary armam ents of theBISMARCK, who was apparently firing byR .D.F. ; but by skilful handlin g they avoidedserious damage and suffered a very small Dum­ber of casnalties. The four ships of the 7thDivision all delivered torpedo attacks duringthe night, COSSACK and MAORI ma king twoeach; hits were scored by COSSACK andby MAORI, the latter 's torpedo causing a fireon the forecastl e of the BISMARCK; SIKHmay also have scored a hit .

75. The Comma ndin g Officer of the PIORU;\,had not worked with the Fourth DestroyerFlotilla before an d he therefore decided towait unti l last to deliver his attack as he didnot wish to interfere with the flotilla and wasnot fully conversant with the ir methods. Hehad drawn the BIS)IARCK's fire for an hourd uring the period of dusk, hoping that thiswould assist the other destroyers to get in the irattacks, but after dark he retired to a distanceof some 6 10 8 miles to wait for them to finish .He had not succeeded in regain ing touch when ,at 0500, he was ordered by the Captain (D),Fourth Destroyer Flotilla, to proceed toPlymouth to fuel if not in contact with theenemy . The Captain (D), Fourth DestroyerF lotilla, knew that Commander P lawski wouldcertainly attack the enemy as soon as he couldfind him : cond itions as light came would notbe easy and the Captain (D), Fourth DestroyerFlotilla, was concerned lest a val uable ship anda fine crew should be lost withou t need.P IORUN cont inued to search un til 0600 andleft 'an hour later.

76 . The conduct of the night operati ons bythese five destroyers under the Captain (D),Fourth Destroyer Flotilla , was a model of itskind . In heavy weather, frequently underfire, they hung on to their prey with the utmostdetermination , hit her with torpedoes and

delivered her to me the next morning. withoutsuffering dam age, other than by sp linters, toany of their ships.

77. During the night NORFOLK arrived inthe area and made her way round to the north­eastward of the enemy , ready to flank markfor the battleships in the morning : E DIN ­BURGH was compelled to leave for London­derry owing to lack of fuel (she arrived there.with 5i per cent . remaining) : and the DORSET­SHIRE was also approaching, to arrive soonafter the battlefleet joined action . KINGGEORGE V and RODNEY worked round tothe westward ready to engage at dawn.

78. The BISMARCK was making frequentalterations of cou rse, possibly involuntary, andit was difficult to gauge her progress from thefrequent course reports which were received.As was only to be expec ted with forces whichhad been widely separated in weather unsuit­able for taking sights, considerable differencesin reckoning were now apparent. I instructeddestroyers to fire starshell to indicate the posi­tion of the enemy, but frequent rain squa llsprevented these from being seen in KINGGEORGE V, while the Captain (D), FourthDestroye r Fl otilla , repo rted that the react ionsof the BI SMARCK to this practice were un­pleasant. Destroyers in touch were then in­structed to transmit on medium frequency sothat bearings m ight be' obtained by D I F , bntsome had t heir aeria ls she! away an d ZULUhad a smashed deck insula tor , which causedenough sparking when transmitt ing to illuminatethe whole ship . It becam e evident that therelative posi tions were not known with suffi­cient accuracy for a d awn approach to bepracticable. The visibi lity, too, was uncertain;and I decided to wait for full light .

ACTION OF 27TH MAY.

Weather : Wind.Lnort h-west, force 8."\ Veather- overcast; rain squalls .Visibility-c-rz-rg miles .Sea an d swell---45.Sunrise-c-cyzz ,

Choice of Tactics.79. It was clea r from the reports of the

ships which had come under her fire that, inspite of the damage she had already receivedfrom guns and torpedoes, the gun armamenta nd oontrol of the BISMARCK were notserionsly affected . Everything suggested, how­ever , that her ru dders had been so seriouslyda maged that she could not steer; in the strongwind prevailing, she could, by working herengines, haul off the wind only for sho rt periods.So it was possible for me to select the direc­tion and time of my approach and to close towhatever ra nge I chose. The experience ofthe Four th Destroyer Flotilla made it clear tha tthe BISMARCK had R.D.F which rangedaccurately up to 8,00 0 yards; by day , she conldrange very accurately up to about 24,000 yards,eithe r by means of the excellent stereoscopicrangefinders the Germans have always had orpossibly by R.D.F. r •

80. I decided to approach with the ad­vantages of wind, sea and light and as nearlyend-on as possible, so as to provide a difficulttarget and to close quickly to a range at whichra pid hitt ing could be ensured. I hoped that

Admiralt y footnote:-• Wind force 8-fresh gale. 34-40 m .p. h.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE , 16 OCTOBER, 1947

the sight of two battleships steering straightfor th em would shake the nerves of the range­tak ers and control officers, who had already.hud four anxious days and nigh ts.

The A pproach.Sr. Between 0600 and otoo, D/F bearings

-of a series of reports by MAORI enabled th erelat ive position of the enemy to be deducedwith reasonable accuracy. Th e BIS~IARCK

h ad settled down to a course of about 3300, atIO knots. The horizon to the north-eastwardwas clear and the light good, but south of eastwere rain squalls and a poor background.The strong wind and heavy sea made it mostundesirable to fight to windward. I decidedto approach on a bearing of west-north-westand, if the enemy held his course, to deployto the southward, engaging him on oppositecourse at a range of about 15,000 yards andsubsequently as events might dictate. At0737, when the enemy bore 1200, 21 miles,course was altered to 0800 to close : RODNEYwas stationed on a bearing of 010 0 and in­structed not to close within six cables of mea nd to ad just her own bearing. NORFOLKwas shadowing from the north-westward, readyto car ry out flank marking for the battleships,and at 0820 she came in sight and providedme with a visual link. It had been necessaryto alter course on the way in to avoid rainsqualls and to allow for the reported altera tionsof course of the BISMARCK, but at 0843 shecame in sight, bear ing II8°, 25,000 yards,steering directly towards us, our course atthis time being 1100.

The A ction.82. RODNEY opened fire at 0847, followed

one minute. lat er by KING GEORGE V an dthen by the ll1SMA~CK. The BIS~!ARCK

had turned to sta rboard to open • A' ar cs,and directed her fire at ROD:'·lEY. This turnof th e enemy made it look as if it would bebetter for us to deploy to the nor th-eastward,and I hoisted the signal to turn to 0850; th eBIS~IARCK, however, almost immediat elyaltered back to port , so the negative washoisted and I indicated my intention toturn to 1700. RODNEY, who wished to openher 'A ' arcs, had anticipated th e haulingdown of the first signal and started to altercourse to port ; KI NG GEORGE V also hada ltered 200 to starboard to open her distancefrom RODNEY ; so that the ships were wellseparated. which was entirely in accordancewith my wishes. The BISMARCK's fire wasaccurate at the start, though it soon began tofall off; she made continual alterations ofcourse, but it is doubtful whether these weredelibera te.

83. The -range was now 2 0 ,000 yards anddecreasing rapidly, the general trend of theenemy's course being directly towards us.Shortly after our turn to the southward, themS~IARCK shifted her fire to KINGGEORGE V. By 0905 both KING GEORGEV and RODNEY had their secondary arma­ments in action. At this stage the effect ofour gunfire was difficult to assess, as hits byarmour piercing shell are not. easily seen; butafter ha lf an hour of action the BISMARCKwas on fire in several places and virtually outof control. Only one of 'her turrets remainedin action and the fire of this and of her-secondary armament was wild and erratic.But she was still steaming.

84. Some interference from our own funneland cordite smoke had been experienced, and at0917 the course of the battlefleet was alteredtowards the enemy and right round to nort h,RODN EY again anticipating the signal. Whenth e turn had been completed, the lines of fireof KING GEORGE V and RODNEY wereapproximately at right angles; a heavy volwneof fire could he produced without interferencein spotting between the two ships. DORSET­SHIRE had been firing intermittently since0902 from the other side of the enemy, as hadNORFOLK from her flank marking position .

S5. In order to increase the rate of hitting,the battleships continued to close, the rangeeventually coming down to 3,300 yards. By1015 the BISMARCK was a wreck, without agun firing, on fire fore and aft and wallowingmore heavily every moment. Men could beseen jumping overboard, preferring death bydrown ing in the stormy sea to the appallingeffects of our fire. I was confident th at theBISMARCK could never get back to harbourand that it was only a matter of hours beforeshe would sink.

86. Th e shortage of oil fuel in KINGGEORGE V and RODNEY had become acute.It was not merely a ma tter of having sufficientoil to reach one 'of our harbours : I had to con­sider the possibility of damage to fuel tanksby a near miss from a bomb or a hit by a tor­pedo ; this might easily result in the ship beingstopped in an area where V-boats were knownto be concentrating, and where I had beenwarn ed to expect heavy air attack. Furthergunfire would do Jittle to hasten the BIS­MARCK's end . I th erefore decided to breakoff the action with KING GEORGE V andROD:-IEY, and I instr ucted any ships still withtorpedoes to use them on the BIS}IARCK.DORSETSHIRE anticipated my order and tor­pedoed the BIS~IARCK a t close range on bothsides : she sank at 1037 in position 480 09' N.160 0]' W. Although her sinking had been seenfrom the after Director Control Tower in KINGGEORGE V, the fact did not become knownto me unt il IIOO and I informed the FlagOfficer Commanding, Force "H " , that Icould not sink the BISMARCK with gunfire:this signal (1045/ 27th May), which was per­haps un fortun ately phrased, was addressedonly to him and was intended to ensure that heshould take any steps which might help tohasten her sinking: when intercepted byothers, it may have caused some misunder­standing.

87. Th e BIS~[ARCK had pu t up a mostgallant fight against impossible odds, worthyof the old days of the Imperial German Navy ,and she went down with her colours still flying.DORSETSHIRE picked up four officers, in­cluding the Th ird Gunnery Officer, and 75ratings; ~[AORI picked up 24 ra tings; but at"40 DORSETSHIRE sight ed a suspiciousobject , which might have been a V-boat, andships were compelled to abandon the work ofrescue. Some of the remaining survivors mayhave been rescued by the Spa nish cruiserCANARIAS.

88. From the information available, itappears that the BIS~[ARCK suffered threehits by gunfire on 24th May, one hit by , air­craft torpedo on 25th May and two on 26thMay, two hits by destroyer torpedoes early 00

4860 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBER, 1947

27th May, one by RODNE Y's . torpedo, andthe subsequent h eavy pounding by gunfire. A1the end of this she was in a sinking condition,and the final torpedoes from DORSE TSHIREonly hastened her end. A few casualties andslight damage from splinters were incurred inSHEFF IELD and the destroyers of the F our thDestroyer Fl otilla during the night of 26th /27th May ; there were no casualties or damageto any of our ships during the subsequent dayaction. .

. 8g. In ' KING GEORGE V W / T trans­mission on" power . on certain wavelengths

.interfered . with reception on RD.F. For. this reason I was unable during theaction to keep the Admiralty fully in­formed of its progress, especially in viewof the fact that I had been warned toexpect heavy attack by enemy aircraft, andI did not wish to risk being fixed by D / F . TheBISMARCK's sinking was reported as soon asit was known and a description 'of the engage­ment was deferred until it was practicable totransmit a -long. signal ~ by wi reless, Thislimitation applies in some degree to all shipsand will have to be borne in mind in thefuture. .

Return of the Fleet.go. KING GE ORGE V a nd RODNEY with

COSSACK, SIKH and ZULU, proceeded to thenorthward, DORSETSHIRE and MAORIrejoined at 12 3 0 , and the screen was augmentedby JUPITER during the afte rnoon . Nin efurther destroyers had joined by 1600 thefollowing ' day . Several signals were receivedon 28th May, indi cating that air attacks on thefleet were impending. but only four enemy air­cra ft appea red . One of these bombed thescreen without effect , while another jettisonedits solitary bomb on being attacked by aBlenh eim fighte r . MASHONA and TARTAR,roo miles to the southward, were heavilyattacked, MASHONA being sunk at noon , withthe loss of one officer and 45 ratings; TARTARshot down one of the attacking aircraft.PlORUN un derwent six attacks by aircraft onher way back to Plymouth; all were drive n offby gunfire.

g1. RODNEY, screened by MAORI, SIKHand COLUMBI A (Lieutena nt-CommanderSomerville W . Davis), was detached to theClyde at 1700; DORSE TSHIRE was detachedto the Tyne at 2316; KING GEORGE V wasdelayed by fog, but eventually anohored inLoch Ewe at 1230 on 29th May . GALATEA(Rea r-Admiral Commanding, Second CruiserSquadron ), AURO RA and PRINCE OFWALES arrived at Hvalfiord on 27th May ;EDINBURGH (Commodore Commanding,Eighteenth Cruiser Squadron) arrived atLondonderry on 28th May and NORFOLK(Rear-Admiral Comm anding, First Cru iserSquadron) at the Clyde on zqth May ; Force" H " returned to Gibraltar.

Conduct of Officers and Men.92 . Although it was no more than I expected,

the co-opera tion, skill an d understanding dis­played by all forces dur ing this prolonged chasegave me the utm ost satisfaction . F lag andCommanding Officers of detached units in­variably took the action I would have wished ,before or without receiving instructions fromme. The conduct of all officers and men of

. -

the F leet which I have the hono ur to commandwas in accordance with the traditions of theService. Force " H" was handled withconspicuous skill throughout the operation byVice-Admiral Sir J am es F . Somerville, K.C.B .,D.S.O. , and contributed a vital share in itssuccessful conclusion.

SuPPly of l njormation and Disposition 0/Forces .

93. The accuracy of the enemy informationsupplied by the Admiralty and the speed withwhich it was passed were remarkable, and thebalance struck between information and instruc­tions passe d to the forces out of visual touchwith me was ideal. The disposition of Force" H ," RODNE Y an d the other forces placed atmy disposal, completed my own dispositionsand enabled me to avoid breaking W / T silenceat a time when this was particularly importan t .

(Signed) J ACK C. TOVEY,Admiral. .

Commandcr-in-Chiei,Home Fleet.

H .M.S . R ENOW N ,4th J une, 1941.

To: The~ Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet.The following report of the operations cul­

minating in the destruction .of the Germanbattleship BISMARCK is forwa rded in accord­ance with Admira lty message 0032 of 28th>Iay, 1941.

25th May .2. At 0330 on Sunday, 25th May , Force

.. H " was in position 39° 3S' N.-14° I D' \V.,steering 310° at 24 knots. At this time instruc­tions were received to steer to interceptBISMARCK from the southward. Th e enemyhad last been located in position 560 30' N.36000' W . at 0306 when SUFFOLK lost touch .The existing course and speed was thereforemaintained.

3. At 0400 instructions were received thatdestroyers should be sent back to Gibraltarbefore it became necessary to fuel them, asFo rce "H" might be required for extendedoperations. The three screening destroyers weretherefore detached at oooo with instructions totransmit two signals when ISO miles clear, oneinforming the Admi ralty of the position, courseand speed of Force " H " at 0730, and theother requesting Commander - in - Chief ,Plym outh , to keep me fully informed of theresults of Brest reconnaissance.

4. At rroo, when in positi on 410 30' N.17° I D' \V., orders were received for Force.. H .. to act on the assumption that the enemyhad tu rned towards Brest at 0300 /25 . Cou rsewas therefore altere d to 3600.

5. At 1215 Force .. H .. a ltered course to345° to reach the initial position, for an airsearch a .m ./26 based on the assumption thatthe "enemy 's maximum speed of advance was notmore than 25 kno ts. It was my intentio n toca rry out, if necessary , three searches of th earea across the Bay of Biscay allowing for theenemy makin g a substantial detour. to the south­ward, The first search was designed to cover

-"n'emy speeds of 25 to 21 knots , the second 21

•SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBER , 1947 4861

reached the limit of their search I dec ided notto recall them by wireless, but informed ARKROYAL that I would continue the presentcourse and speed until they had returned when .a full scale striking force was to be prepared. '

13. At IIr4 the Cata lina reported that herh ull had been holed by shra pnel and requestedinstru ctions. I asked ARK ROYAL how manyaircraft would be required to ensure gain ingcontact ; she replied 6 but proposed to fly offthe two aircraft fitted with long range tan ksat once to carry out a square search.

15. The two . shadowers were relieved asnecessary throughout the day. Touch wasmaintained continuously and excellent reportstran smitted until th e shadowers were finallyrecalled at 2230.

16. Ord ers were received from Admi ralty atlf45 that RENOWN was not to becomeengaged with BISMARCK unless the latter wasalready 'heavily engag ed by either KINGGEORGE V or RODNEY.

17. The Comma nder-in-Chief, Home Fleet .report ed his position at 1050 as 510 37' N.20° 42' W., dosing the ship reported by theCatalina , and requested Admiralty confirmationthat the report did not refer to RODNEY.This was oonfirmed by Admiralty .

r8. At 1208 the Catalina reported 4 UN' 050°10 miles steeri ng 140° from position KRG74731. It was assumed that these were fourof th e five destroyers which had just partedfrom Convoy W .S.8B, and who were now some50 m iles W:N.W . of the BIS MARCK.

14. At this time (II25) the Ca talina losttouch and I instructed ARK ROYAL tosend at least 4 aircraft. Before these oouldbe flown off one of ARK ROYAL' , aircra ftreported in touch (at Ilr4) bu t also reportedthe enemy as a cruiser and gave the positionof the enemy as 77 m iles to the west of Force•• H " . This was some 25 miles further tothe eastward than the Catalina' s repor t butwas considered to be a more accurate positionin view of the shorter time interval betweendeparture and sight ing . Seven minutes Iat~r asecond aircraft of the reconnaissance gamedtouch and reported that the enemy was a battle­ship. The aircra ft on tr ack 305° was the firstto sight followed by th e aircraft on track 285° ·There were five more aircraft to the northwardof these two an d three more to the s outhward.Th ese aircraft were on thei r way b ack to theARK ROYAL when touch was first gained. Th e10nO' ranee shadowers were flown off at noonand the ~ajori ty of the reconnaissance landedon. Force " H" was then manoeuvred to thesouth-east on a course 140 0 at 24 knots , myintention being to maintain the weather g~ge

.for flying operations, to avoid loss of bearingon mSAIARCK, and to keep with in about 50miles of the enemy to facilita te the launch ingof T IB attacks. Should it be desirable forRENOWN to attack unsupported it was myintention to do so from up wind and asternwith the ob ject of causing him to tu rn and th usslowup his retreat , and also to enable full useto be made of smoke.

to 18 knots and the third 18 to 15 knots, F orce.. H H maintaining an intercepting position tothe eastward throughout.

26th May.6. During the night the nor th-westerly wind

and sea increased, and speed had to be reducedto 23 knots at 2fl5 , to 21 knots at 2340, to19 knots at 0020 an d finally to 17 knots atOII2 .

7. In consequence of this redu ction of speed,which the BISMAR CK with a Icllowing seawould not have suffered, course was altered to000° at 0300/ 26 to reach the best position forflying off the search .

8. -The lates t intelligence regarding theGenn an battle cruisers was contained in a re­connaissance report that they were still at Brestat r5 '5 / 23. This lack of information causedme some anxiety as I could not entirely dis­count the possibility that one or both battle­cru isers might have put to sea to supportBISMARCK. With this possibility in view asecurity patrol was flown off at 0716 to searchto the west and northward before assumingA / S duties.

9. It had been intended that the first searchshould cover the area bounded by 47° 30' N.21° 30' W ., 49° 00' N. 23° 40' W ., 52° 25' N.20° 00' W., 51° 40' N. 17° 00' W ., but owingto the head seas experienced du ring the nightthe area for the search, measuring some 280miles by I 20 miles was transferred 35 miles 'to the south-cast.

10. Ten Swordfish were flown off at 0835from p osition 48° 26' N. 19° 13' W . Twocross-over patrols by Catalinas, arranged by theAdmi ra lty, lay along the western edge ofARK ROYAL's reconnaissan ce. Weatherconditions at this time were wind from320° force 7, sea rough , sky overcast , visibility10-12 miles. It had been hoped to increa se thedensity of the search by the use of Fulmars,but weather conditions rendered this impractic­able. AR K ROYAL's round down was risingand falling 56 feet at times, as measured bysextant . T he handling of the aircraft on theflight deck was always difficult a nd several slidbodily across the deck which was wet withspray .

r r . At 0930 the A/S patrol was landed on ;no relief was flown off in order that everyavailable aircraft should be available for atorpedo stri king force. Wh ilst the search wasin progress Force " H " proceeded at 15 kn otson a course of 0 15 0 to reach a position towindward so that the operation of aircraftwould not be impeded bv subseq uent al tera­t ions of oourse of the BISMARCK should thelat ter be located .

12. At f030 a Catalina (Duty Z) made arepor t of " r BS 240° 5 miles steering I SO fromposition KR GP 33r3 " . Th is report, received atroso. placed the enemy 2850 Il2 miles fromRENOWN . An a mplifying report five minuteslater ga ve the enemy 's speed as 20 knots. c Iinstru cted ARK ROYAL to fly off twoshadowers fitted with long range tanks to gaintouch , as I feared the Catalina's position mightbe somewhat inaccurate in view of the weatherconditions and the distance from · her base.As the reconnaissance aircraft had already

Admimlty footno te :-" UN-unknown vessel. •

•4862 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZE T T E , 16 OCTO B E R , 1947

19. At 1201 the Commander-in-Chief, HomeFleet, reported that his position at 1I00 , was51° 33' N. 20° 43' W., course '50°, altering to130° at 1I55, speed 26 knots.

20. It was evident at this stage that unlessaircraft from ARK RO YAL could rednce theenemy 's speed he could not be overhauledhy our batteships till 'well within range ofbombing aircraft from the French coast thefollowing day. It was also doub tful whetherthe Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet. wouldhave sufficient fuel to enable him to continuethe chase nntil the following day .

21. At 1315 I detached SHEFFIELD withorders to close and shadow the enemy. whowas then some 40 miles south-west ofRENOWN who was in position 49° 39' N.18' 58' W. at '330. Th e V/S* signal orderingthis movement was . not repeated to ARKROYAL. and as will be seen later this omissionhad serious consequences.

22. ARK I{OYAL informed me that after theinterrogation of observers who had sighted theenemy ship. considerable doubt arose, whetherthe ship was in fact BISMARCK or PRINZEUG EN. In consequence the torpedoes of thestriking force, which was then being ranged,were set to 30 feet instead of 34 as originallyintended . The torpedoes were fitted withDu plex pistols. The striking force of 15Swordfish took off at ' 450 in position 49° 35' N.18° 30' W. One aircraft had to return andmade a successful emergency landing with the 'torpedo in place just aft er the last of the strikingforce had left the deck. It had been intendedto carry out a synchronised diversion byFulmars. but this had to be abandoned owingto sea and cloud conditions .

23. Weather and cloud conditions were par­ticnlarly bad over the target area when thestriking Iorce took off. Reliance was thereforeplaced on the A.S.V. set carried in one of theaircraft of th e strik ing force. This aircraftlocated a ship 20 miles from the position givento the leader on taking off. This ship wasSHEFF l ELD, of whose presence nearBIS)IARCK the striking force were not aware.A situation report mad e to Admiralty at 1345containing the information that SHEFFIELDhad been detached to shadow had been receivedby ARK ROYAL. but had not been decodedbefore the striking force left.

24. At I550 on reaching a position over thesupposed target an attack through the cloudwas ordered , and eleven torpedoes were drop pedat SHEFFIE LD. The latter increased to fullspeed and took successful avoiding action. Ofthe eleven torp edoes dropped, two were ob-

, served by SHEFF IELD to explode on hittingthe water and three more exploded when cross­ing her wake. During this unfortunate incidentit is satisfactory to record that not a singleround was fired at th e attacking aircraft byan y gun in SHEFFIELD. where the mistakehad been immediately appreciated.

25. At '52" the Catalina reported havinglost touch with th e enemy in position 47° 30' N.19° oo' W. Both this report and the precedingone at r330 placed the enemy 60 miles southof the position reported by aircraft from ARK

Admiralt y footn ote:-• V IS-visual signal.

ROYAL. It was assumed that the discrepancywas probably caused by navigational errors inthe Catalina . Th e latter made infrequentreports and, as H / F was employed, could notbe D / Fd . The need for frequent reports ona D/ F-able wave was stro ngly felt throughoutthe operation,

26. At "55' , the Commander-in-Chief, HomeF leet, reported his position , course and speedas 50 0 18' N. 18 0 45' W., 1280

• 26 knots. andthat RODNEY bore IOOo eleven miles fromhim. This was the first definite informationthat had been received of RODNEY since hersignal timed 0900/ 25. Course was altered to140 0 at 1650 to maintain position onBISMARCK, who had been reported steeringthat course at '340.

27. At 1632 the Catalina signalled that shewas being attacked by enemy aircraft , typ eunknown. She had previously made this signalat 1345 but on each occasion the alarm wascaused by the ARK ROYAL 's shadowingSwordfish.

28. Th e striking force returned to ARKROYAL at ' 720. Owing to the motion on theship the three aircraft who had realised thatthe target was friendly and who had not firedtheir torpedoes, were ordered to drop thembefore landing . on. Meanwhile the reliefshadowers had reported that th e enemy shipwas definitely BISMARCK.

29. On completion of landing on speed wasincreased to 29 knots to regain lost ground, andby reducing the distance from th e enemy toassist the next strik ing force in gaining contact.

30. At 1747 SHEFF IEL D 'gained touch withBISMARCK and made her first enemy report .Reing in some doubt regarding the Commander­in-Chief's intentions . I requested his position,course and speed and asked whether he wishedme to leave the carrier and join him. I addedthat should no reply be received I would remainwith the carrier. A second striking force of 15aircraft was prepared with all possible speed .Owing to the limited nnmber of serviceableaircraft to provide this number, it was necessaryto refuel and rearm most of the aircra ft thathad just returned.

31. At Ig00 the Polish destroyer PlORUNwas sighted 9 miles to the southw ard and thebearing and distance of the enemy passed toher. The latt er portion of the signal, instruct­ing destroyers to shadow and attack as oppor­tuni ty offered. was not passed owing tovisibility closing down. Hav ing sightedPIORUN, it appeared evident that the fourdestroyers which had been reported by theCatalina at 1208 as 4 UN and had also beensighted by first striking force, were Capt ain(D), 4th Destroyer Flotilla in COSSACK, withZULU, MAORI and SIKH in company . Toassist these destroyers and the striking force inmak ing contact , SHEFFIELD was ordered tomake her call sign for D / F-ing purposes.

32. The second str iking force took off at1915 in position 48° 35' N. 16' 54' W., whenthe enemy bore 167°. 38 miles. In view of thefailures with Duplex pistols in the precedingattack, contact pistols were ' employed on thisoccasion, torpedoes being set to'run at 22 feet.The str iking force had orders to make ' contactwith SHEFFIELD before launching the atta ck,

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBER, 1947 4863

both to ensure gaining contact with the enemyand to avoi d any possibility of SHEFFIELDbeing mistaken for the target. SHEFFIELDwas instructed to home the striking force byD / F.

33. The aircraft approached SHEFFIE LD at1955 below the clouds and then climbed to aheight of 6,000 'feet. The weather conditions atth is time appeared to be ideal for a synchro nisedtorpedo attack, cloud 7I roths from 2,000 to5,000 feet. During the climb contact was lostwith SHEFFIELD but regained at 2035 whena bearing and dista nce (lIO " 12 miles) ofBISMARCK was passed by SHEFFIELD byYI S. The force took depa rture for the targetin sub flights in line astern at 2040. On nearingthe. enemy a thick bank of cloud with baseabout 700 feet and top between 6,000 and10 ,0 0 0 feet was encountered and the forcebecame split up . At 2047, when it wascalculated that the enemy would be in a suit­able position for an attack down wind fromastern, No. I sub flight dived throu gh thecloud, but on reaching the base the enemy wasseen four miles down wind to the eastward.Position for an attack on the port beam wasgained by approaohing just in L'lC clouds , andthe final dive to attack was made at 2055. Oneaircraft from No . 3 sub flight followed closelyand also attacked from the port beam . Thisaircraft observed a hit on BISMARCK abouttwo-thirds of her length from forward. All fouraircraft came under intense and accurate firefrom the first moment of sighting until out ofrange.

34. No. 2 sub flight, ' having climbed to9,000 feet in cloud, dived down on a bearingobtained by A.S.Y. and two aircraft a ttackedfrom the starboard beam under intense fire.The third aircraft having lost touch with hissub flight in the clouds returned to SHEFFIELDfor a range and bearing on the target. Havingobtained .th is he pressed home a lone and deter­mined attack from the port bow in face of veryheavy opposition, and his crew saw the torpedostrike BISMARCK amidships port side.

35. No. 4 sub flight followed No. 3 sub flightinto the cloud and became iced up at 6,600feet. After seven minutes the aircraft divedand found a clear patch a t 2,000 feet.BISMARCK was sighted almost at onceengaging No. 2 sub flight to starboard. All fouraircraft circled astern of the targ et and attackedsimulta neously from port coming under heavyfire. One aircraft was hit many times and bothpilot and air gunner were wounded, theobserver being uninjured. 175 holes werecounted in this aircralt which had to be writt enoff as one of the longerons had been cut.

36. No. 5 sub fligh t of two aircraft lost contactwith the remainder and with each other in thecloud. H aving started to ice up at 7,000 feetthey came down and when .still in cloud at3,500 feet one was engaged by A.A. fire. Oncoming out ol the cloud this pilot saw the enemyahead of him and down wind so retired into thecloud, being engaged continuously while gaininga more favo urable position. He eventua llycame in low on the BISMARCK's starboardbow and dropped just outside 1,000 yards. Theother ai rcra ft of ' this sub flight made threea ttempt s to come in but was so heavily engaged

B

on each appearance that he finally jettisonedhis torpedo and, returned to ARK ROYAL. , .

37. No. 6 sub flight followed into the cloudand when at 6,300 feet turned 40 degrees 'tiJport and climbed clear at 7,450 feet, wait ed forabout 15 minutes and returned to SHEFF IE LDfor another ran ge and bearing of the enemy .These two aircraft then searched at sea leveland attacked on the star board beam . 'Intensefire prevented close ap proach and one droppedat about 4,000 yards while the other returned tothe carrier and jettisoned b"fore landing on ~ .

38. The striking Iorce allack took muculonger than had been anticipa ted (2055 to ~I25)

owing to bad weather conditions aroundBISMARCK who appeared to be under a coldfront.

39. At 2040 a signal was received from Com­man der-in-Chief. H ome Fleet, giving his posi­tion, course and speed at I800 'as 49 ' 48' N.17" 33' W., lOO ·, 22 knots, with RODNEYin company. He also stated that unless theenemy's speed was reduced he would have -toreturn in KING GEORGE ' y 'at ' midnight torefuel, leaving RODNEY to continue the chase .He recommended that RE NOWN should re­main with AI{K RO YAL.

40. During and after the torpedo attack onBISMARCK shadowing aircra tt reported fre­quent alterations of course and that she wasmaking smoke. On receipt of these reports!{ENOWN and ARK l{OYAL altered course a,requisite to maintain a position some 40 milesdistant from the enemy in order that flyingopera tions could not be unexpectedly ham­pered . It appeared possible that BIS~IARCK

was endeavouring to shake off shadow~ beforedark; on the other hand she might h'Ive suf­fered damage to shafts or steering gear as aresult of the torpedo a ttacks.

41. Owing to the time taken to deliver theT I B attack insufficient light remained to carryout another attack before dark . Aircraft couldha ve flown off but in the failing light locatio nof the target would have been difficult , friendmight have been mistaken for foe and certainlymany of the aircraft would have ta iled to regainthe carrier. It was therciore decided to main­tain shadowing aircraft as long as possible andconcentrate on preparing all remaining Sword­fish for a strong striking force at dawn.

42. Commander-in-Chief, H ome F leet, re,quested that aircraft migh t give the destroyer.a visual link with the enemy aud A!U( l{OYALwas instructed to comply . The two shadowingaircratt were ordered to remain in touch as longas possible and establish this link belore return­ing. They lett the BISMARCK. at 2230 and ,at ter making a detour in heavy rain, locatedthe destroyers . ' By this time, however, theywere not certain of their own position and wereunable to assist the destroyers : These two air­cratt were DI Fd back to ARK ROYAL, landingon at 2320 when it was practically dark.

43· At 2220 AR K lWYAL reported tha t onetorpedo. had definitely hit BlSMAI{CK amid­ships, and Commander-in-Chief, Home ' Fl eet,was informed accordingly' at 2225. Later, in­formation was received from ARK ROYA Lthat a second hit had most probably ,been, ob­taine d aft, and Comma nder-in-Chief was agair.informed at 2240 . .. r •• • r~J o

4864 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBER, 1947

51. At 0115 a flash was seen bearing 152 0,

followed four minutes later by heavy gunflashes. Course was altered to 210

0 to keepclear to the westward. During th e middlewatch the destroyers carried out attacks, andsignals were received between 0202 and 0210sta ting that ZULU, MAORI and COSSACKhad attacked, the last two claiming one hiteach . MAORI added tha t there was an ex­tensive fire on the forecastle.

52. At 0210, Rear-Admiral Commanding,r st Cruiser Squadron, reported his intentionto keep to the nor thward and flank mark forKING GEORGE V and RODNEY. At 0301DORSETSHIRE repo rted her posi tion, cour seand speed which indicated she would crosssome 10 to IS miles ahe ad of RENOWN.

53. Th e destroyers were instructed by, Com­ma nder-in-Ch ief, Home Fl eet, that after allattacks were completed they were to fire 'star­shell every half hour to ind ica te the positionof the enemy. whose course and speed -wasnow reported as 310 0. 8 knots. -J ... l:>

(

54. During the night Commander-in-Chief,Home Fleet, experienced difficulty in makingdestroyers transmit their call signs on 1\1 /F*in ord er that D / F bearings could be obtained.Many D / F bearings obtained proved to bemaccurate and caused considerable doubt asto the exact position of the enemy .

55. At 0335 I informed Commander-in-Chief0 1 ,my POSlllOll and reported st arsncll had beenseen bearing 100 0

> and that an aircraft wouldbe flown ort AI{K ROYAL at °5°0 to spot forKI NG GEORGE V.

56. At 06IO I ordered SHEFFIELD who hadsignalled .her position at 0500 to obtain andpass a D /F bearing of MAORI who was intouch with the enemy. The third class bearingof II8° which she gave put BISMARCK furthersouth than her previously estimated position.

57. At dawn visibility was 'low, and afterconsu ltation with ARK ROYAL I decided todelay flymg off the striking force as therewas a serious risk of mis taking friend for foeand I was in considerable doubt as -to thepos ition of KING GE01{GE V and RODNEY.1iaving informed the Commander-in-Chief,Home Flee t, that the striking force "wouldarrive at 0715, I later info rmed him that -theattac k was postponed on account of lowvisibility, and later still that I had cancelledthe attack on account of the. difficulty ofidentifying our own ships in the existingvisibidty. I was satisfi ed tha t until the situa­tion clarified it was undesirable to fly off thestriking force.

58. While these signa ls were being passedthe destroyers' reports of the pos ition of theBISMARCK suggested she might be as much as60 miles to the northward of RENOWN .Course was therefore altered to the northward,and at 0810 aft er ARK ROYAL had struck~own her aircraf t as it ~as impossiblein -~~i.st­mg weather conditions to keep them tanged,

"MAOR I was Sighted to thenorthward,"MAORIreported the enemy as being 'oog O-distfut i i:miles from her and thereby only' 17 iniles :trom

. RENOWN . The latest" estimate previous to this'repoi t placed BISMARCK '- 40 miles · from

44- SHEFFIELD made her las t enemy repor tat 2140. At th is time BI SjIARCK turned andfired six accurate Is-in. salvo s at SHEFFIELDat a range of 9 miles . The latter turned awayat full speed and made smoke but suffered afew casualties and superficial damage fromsplinters. These casualties consisted of Ikilled , z dangerou sly woun ded who have sincedied, two seriously an d six slightly wounded .All were ratings. After this SliEF F IELD losttouch but at 2r42 sighted Captain (D), 4th.Destroyer F lotilla, in COSSAC]{ with 3 otherdestroyers closing the enemy and signalled thelast observed bearing and distance ofBISMARCK.

45. At 2251 ZULU made a contact and re­ported the enemy steering 110 0 . From this timeonwards Captain (D), 4th Destroyer Fl otillaand his destroyers maintained contact, report­ing the enemy's course as 110

0, 060

0, 3400

and finally by mid night 3100 into. the sea.Rear-Admiral Commanding, rSth CruiserSquadron in EDINBURGH was sighted to thewestward at 2315 .

46. J ust before midni ght a signal was re­ceived tram Commander-m-Chief, Home Fleet,giving his position, course and speed at 2215as 49 0 IO' N. IS ° 29' W., 170°, 21 kno ts, withRODNEY in company. Shortly aft erwardsRear-Admiral Commanding, 18th CruiserSquadron, reported his position, course andspeed as 48 c 32' N. I S0 22' W ., 0250, 13 knots,that he had no fuel left for shadowing and wasproceeding to Londonderry.

47. At 2345 I informed Commander-in-Chief,H ome Fl eet, of my position (48° 42' N.IS ° I I"',) W. j, that no furt her T /B a tta ck waspossible that evening and that I intended turn­ing west for a short distance to keep clear ofhim. Shortly afterwards I received his inten­tions to engage from the westward at dawnand directions that RENOWN and ARKROYAL were to keep not less than 20 milesto the southward of BISMARCK. Course andspeed was adjusted during the night to comply .

27th May .48. At 0036 ARK ROYAL reported that aft er

bein g torpedoed, BISMARCK made two com­plete circles and reduced speed. I informedCommander-in-C hief, Home F leet, accordinglyat 0046. -

- 49. It was evid ent the Co mmander-in-Ch ief,Home Fleet, was in some doubt regarding theposition of BISMARCK. I therefore reportedto him at OII2 that the estimated bea ring anddistance of the enemy -from me at 2345 was165c 41 miles.

50. The situa tion at this time w as as follows.RENOWN and ARK ROYAL some 40 milesto the northward of BISMARCK, worki nground to the west to reach a position to thesouthward ; Commander-in -Chief, H om e Fleet ,proceeding southward to engage at daw n; andRear -Admiral - Commandi ng, rsr - CruiserSquadron , working "round to the - north -east.DORSETSHIREwho had left S.L. 74 at0930 /26 in .position 44 0 08' N . 24°50' W .was closing from the south-west . SHEF­FIELD's position was not known exactly butassumed to be in vicinity of BISMARCK .an dto the westward of the latt er. . Admiralty . [ootnote--s-

'" M/F-medium frequency.

L.

SUPPLEMENT TO TH E LONDON GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBEl{, 1947 41)()5

I'ENOW N. As contact w as now definitelyestablished course was altered to 180 Q to rangethe striking force and aircraft were flown off at0926 in position 470 16' N. IS OSI ' W .

59. In the 'meantime the spotting aircraftwhich had been flown off a t 0509 had becomelost in rain, failed to establish con tact byW I T with KIN G GE ORGE V and eventuallyhad to be D IFd back . .

60. After sighting }IAOR I I considereddetaching ARK ROYAL to the southwa rd torange the striking force, keeping RE NOW N inthe vicinity of ;\lAOIU ready to supportKING GEORGE V and RODNEY as required .I decided h owever that the a ppearance ofRENOW N on . the scene before K INGGEORGE V estab lished contact was un desir­able in view of the low visibility and further­more it was imperative to afford ARK ROYALthe maximum degree of protection shouldKI NG GEORG E V fail to establish con tact andth us leave th e th ird st riking force as the onlymeans of dealing with BISMARCK.

61. Heavy gunfire was heard to the north­ward at 0855 but no report was received in­dicating what ship or ships were in action .

- - - - -J:2._At 0940 SHEFF IELD appeared from thewestward, and I ordered her to join ARKRO YAL on a course of 2900 while RENOWNturned towards the scene of action to investi­gate. ARK ROYAL was instructed to fly offa sp otting aircraft for RENOWN.

63· At 0952 a signal was int ercepted fromCommander-in-Chief, Home F leet, orderingdestroyers to close. Five minutes before thisI had informed Commander-in-Chief, HomeFleet, th at SHEF F IELD and ARK ROYALhad been detached, and -that RE NOWN wasclosing him from the southward ; I alsorequested his position, course and speed.

64. The Commander-in-Chiefs signal order­ing the destroyers to close coupled with NOR­FOLK's signa l that she had ceased flank mark­ing and Rear-Admiral Commanding, r stCrui ser Squadron 's signal ord ering DORSET ­SHIRE to torpedo BI S:VIARCK at close range,led me to suppose that the action was success­fully concluded so in vie w of th e Adm iraltysignal which had just been receiv ed indicatingthat a heavy scale of air attack was to beexpected I decided to rejoin AR K ROYAL toafford A.A. protection. I inform ed Commander ­in-Chi ef, Home Fl eet, ac cordi ngly at 0953.

65· At 1025 as I still had no definite in­formation I asked Commande r-in-Chief if heha d d isposed of the enemy; he replied th at shewas still afloat, adding three minutes later tha the could not get her to sink by gunfire. Shortlyafterwards Commander-in-Chief also informedme th at he h ad been forced to discont inue th eaction on account of fuel. I was about to orderthe T / B striking force to finish off the BIS­MARCK when DORSETSH IRE, who had beenorde red by Rear-A dmiral Comm anding, r stCrui ser Squadron to torpedo the enemy at closera nge , reported at 1034 that the BISMARCKwas sinking an d at 1039 that she had be ensun k .

66. The torpedo striking force from ARKROYAL located the BISMARCK just in timeto see the finish of the action. Th e enemy was

C

do wn in the water, on fire and silenced.DORSETSHIRE was seen to be in closeproxim ity to BI SMARCK and would have beenendangered by a torpedo attack on the latt er.The striking force therefore closed · KINGGEORGE V for instructions but could obtainno answer eitherby VI S or W I T. The strikingforce then returned to the vicinity of theBISMARCK and were in time to see DORSET­SH IRE sink her with torp edoes from closerange.

67. Meanw hile at 0955 a n enemy aircra ft hadbeen sighted by RE NOWN and engaged .About th is time COSSACK and NORFOLKboth reported that they were being bombed.SHEF F IELD'S R.D .F. was not efficient owingto damage from splin ters when she had beenengaged by BISMARCK. Enemy aircraft weresighted from time to time and engaged when­ever they came out of the clouds. Weatherconditions prevented the use of fighters. Thereappeared to be both Focke-Wolfes and Heinkelspresent .

68. Th e str iking force returne d about IIT5and were ordered to jettison their torpedoesbefore landing on as the motion of the ship waseven greater than the p revious day and to landon with torpedoes would have jeopardised theaircraft. Whilst landing on was in progress aHeinkel came out of the clouds an d dropped astick of two large and about five smaller bombs600 yards astern and to por t of ARK RO YAL.Th is was the last interference experienced byForce " H " . Lan ding on was completed byIT52, and from then on the air appea red clearof enemy aircraft and course was shaped to thesouthward at 24 kno ts.

(Signed) .I . F . SOMERVILLE,Vice A dmiral.

Flag Officer Commanding,Force U H ".

APPEN DI X .

ClI;\STAL C OM.\TAND O PERATIONS IN C ONNECTION\YITH THE BIS1IARCK AND PRINZ E UGEN2 I ST-2 7T H Mxv, 194 1.

May z sst,At 1300 hour s an aircraft of P. R. U . located

and ph otographed one Bismarck class battleshipand one Hipper class cruiser at anchor in smallfiords near Bergen.

The weather deteriorated during the afternoonand evening but a strike of 6 Whitleys of No . 6I 2Squadro n and 12 Hudsons of Nos. 220 an d 269Squadrons took off between 2150 and 2330hours to attack. Owing to bad weather con­dit ions only 2 H udsons dropped bombs, andpoor visibility prevented any results b eingobserved.May zznd.

Aircraf t patrolled off th e Nor wegian coastfrom first light but weather conditions by 10 0 0hours had forced all of them to return . Blen­heims of No. 248 Squadron maintained meteoro­logical sorties off the coast all day reportingthe weather conditions, which became worsewith 10 I ro cloud down to sea level,t1 Sunderlands of No . 201 Squadron maintaineda patrol up the meridian of SO West betweenlati tud es 6220 N aud 6500 N from 0930, but hadto return at 1100 on account of fog with nilvisibi litv . .

4866 SUl:PLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE , 16 OCTOBER, 1947

At 1930 a Fleet Air Arm Maryland succeededip penetra ting to the anchorages and found thebillets empty and no sign of the vessels inBergen roadstead.

May 23rd .The Norwegian coast patrols could not take

off owing to weather conditions . Sunderlandsof No. 201 Squadron carried out a patrol be­tween the Faeroes and Iceland from 0650-2000and Hudsons of No. 220 Squadron patrolledbetween the Shetlands and Faeroes from0400-1250, when they had to be recalled as thebase was closing down. Catalinas of No. 210Squadron, after a delayed start due to weather,patrolled to the south of Iceland from 1300-1650when they also had to be recalled as the basesin United Kingdom were closing down .Iceland based aircraft should have patrolledthe Denmark Strait but here again weather con­ditions of continuous rain, cloud 10 / 10 at 300feet and visibility of 1,000 yards forced theabandonment of all flying. These conditions im­proved slightly towards the end of the day and,after the sighting of the enemy force by H. i\I.Ships SUFFOLK and , 'ORFOLK at 1922 and2028 respectiv ely . it was found possible to getaircraft off at 2225 and 2320 to locate andsha dow the enemy.

May 24th.The Sunde rland of No. 201 Squad ron which

had taken off from Rey kjavik sent a first sigh t­ing rep ort of the enemy at 0620 and followedthis up with four subsequent amplifying sig­nals, the last being at ogoo. The action be­tween the BISMARCK and H .M. ShipsP RI NCE OF WALES and HOOD was wit­nessed and bearing and distance of enemy sig­nals given to H.M.S. NORFOLK. The Sun­derland also signalled the position of survivorsof H.M .S . HOOD at 1000 and the fact thatBI SMARCK was leaving a large trail of oilfuel.

The Hudson of No. 269 Squadron which ha dtake n off at 2320 on the 23rd May did not locatethe enemy , but another Hudson of the sameSquadron did so and reported at 0554. Th isaircraft also witnessed the action in whichH.M.S. HOOD was sunk, and continuedshadowing un til 0808. A third Hudson locatedand sha dowed the enemy from 0905 till 1340.

A Catalina of No. 240 Squa dron from Reyk­javik contacted the enemy at 1432, shadowinguntil 1640. During this time frequent bearingsand distances of the enemy were given to thetwo cruisers and the PRINCE OF WALES.Fire was opened on this aircraft by both enemyshins from time to time. Finally , a Catalinaof No . 210 Squadro n took off at 16r2 , but didnot sight the enemy in worsening weather visi­bility althongh all thre e H. M. Ships were sightedat 2127 and a formation of F .A.A. aircraft at0035 on the 25th . During the day 6 a ircraft ofNo. 2 2 Squadron armed with torpedoes flewfrom Wick to Kal dadarnes in Iceland as a strikeforce, tozcther with Catalina and Sunderlandreinforcex'nents.

May 25thrt ( 0306 hours contact with the enemy force

was lost by the two shadowing cruisers and inorder to assist re-location a long range sweepby Ca talinas was organised. This sweep wasdesigned to cover either a break back to Norway

or a course shaped by the enemy for F renchBiscay ports . The Catal inas took off at 1345an d did not land back until 1030 on ztith May .Some of our own surface forces were sightedbut no positive enemy sighting was made,although one CataJ ina at orao on 26th Maypassed over the wake of a heavy ship whichgave no answer to challenge or signals. Theaircraft circled for an hour but in the darknessan d low cloud at 500 feet it was impossible toestablish any identity . The position, courseand estimated speed of this unknown ship wassignalled to base but fuel supply would notpermit shadowing until dawn. As it was, thisai rcraft did not land hack until r203 on 26th1Iay .

Jlay 26thAs additional precautions to prevent a break

back to Norway , Hu dsons of No. 269 Squadronpatrolled the Denmark Strait throughou t theday in very bad weather conditions, a furthersweep was carried out south of Iceland by

two Sunderlands, one Catalina and one Hudson,and a continuous patrol was maintained betweenthe Faeroes and Iceland by two Sunderlands.

To endeavour to 'prevent an unseen escapeinto a French Biscay port two patrols wereplaced athwart the estimated line of advancefrom the last sighted position of the enemytowards the Bay of Biscay. On the initiativeof the A.O.C.-in-C ., Coastal Command, thesouthern of these two patrols was somewhat, tothe south of the genera l appreciat ion as to thelikely course steered by th ese two ships. ACatalina of No. 240 Squadron flew the nor thernpatrol and a Catalina of No. 209 Squ adron thesouthern patrol. Both were on patrol by 0930hours.

At 1030 hours aircraft .. Z" of No. 209Sqnadron sight ed the BIS1lARCK and sent afirst-sighting report. An amplifying report wassent five minutes later while the aircraft wastaking cover in cloud. At 1039 cloud cover wasinadvertently broken almost over theBI SMARCK, which immediately opene d fire,an d before cloud could be regained the aircraftwas hit by shrapnel an d holed in several places.The other Catalina was diverted to assist in theshadowing and made a sighting report at 1328.Meanwhile "Z " of No. 209 Squadron hadlost touch in worsening visibility at 1045.Efforts to re-locat e failed, though at r510 thisaircraft sighted and communicated with theother Catalina- " ~l " of No. 240 Squadron­which by this time had also lost touch. "Z "then left the scene for base, plugging the holesin the hull, and landed safely at Loch Erne.Meanwhile " 1\1" regained contact with anenemy ship at r600 and continued to reportpositions and courses until 1800, when contactwas lost and the aircraft had to return to basehaving reached prudent limit of endurance.

A relief Catalina-" 0" of No. aroSquadron-had been flown off at 1215 to con­tinue . the shadowing. At 2340 this aircraftsighted and reported an enemy ship and con­tinued to signal positions at intervals until0240 hours on 27th May .

May 27thAt 0404 this aircraft reported having lost

touch with the enemy ship, thou gh at 07r2 itsignalled the presence of " R.lohm and Voss float

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LeJNDON GAZETTE , 16 OCTOBER, 1947 4867

plane. after which limit of endurance forced areturn to base after a flight of 26 hours reminutes.

As the Hipper class cru iser-PRINZEUGEN-last seen in company with theBISMARCK early on 25th May was un­accounted forJ Coastal Command maintainedtwo patrols by Sunderlands of No. IQ Squadronacross the mouth of the Bay of Biscay fromdawn during the day, and Hud sons of No.

206 Squadron carried out searches in this areafrom 0<)00 till r830, while Wellingtons of No.22r Squadron completed the patrols across themouth of the Bay up till r900 hours.

Over the whole period from the locating ofthe two enemy ships near Bergen on 21st Mayuntil dusk on 27th May, aircraft of CoastalCommand flew 69 sorties, totalling 580 hoursflying, while searching for or shadowing thesetwo ships.

LONDONPRINTE D AND PUBLISHED BY IllS MAJESTY 'S STAT IONERY OFFI CETo be purchased direct ly from H.M. Statio nery Office at the following addresses:

York House, Kingsway, London, W.C.2 : 13a Castle Street, Edinburgh, 2;39-4 1 King Stree t, Manchester, 2 : 1 SI. Andrew's Crescent , CarditI ;

Tower Lane, Bristol, 1 : 80 Chichester Street , BelfastOR THROUGH ANY BOOKSELLER

1947Price One Shilling and Sixpence

S.O. Code No. 6j - 3809 8

PLAN 245' 30' 15'

23

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APPROACH AND ACTIONAGAINST

BISMARCK27 T.H MAY 1941

H.M.S.King George VRodneyNorfolkDoreetehire

BismarckBismarck (accor~in9 00 Rodney)

Scale of Sea Miles5I

oI I

45' 3 r . 15' longitude 16°Westfrom Greenwich

C,B,HI4 101