‘Sundesmos and Arthron’: Aristotle on the Connective Parts of Speech (Papers In Poetics 11)

Bart A. Mazzetti

(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti

N.B. The reader will note that Scribd does not support my Greek font (SGreek), with unfortunate consequences for the readability of the text.

Also note that I have not incorporated anything from the Editio Maior of the text of the Poetics by Taran and Gutas, as this paper was completed before that work’s publication. It may be pointed out here that, though I find their historical survey of the text to be master-ful, I cannot say the same for their proposed reading of the text in many places. I expect to make greater use of the work as reviews and comments on it come into my hands.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE TEXT

I. ARISTOTLE’S DEFINITIONS OF SUNDESMOS AND ARTHRON ACCORDING TO THE RECEIVED TEXT.

II. TWO LATIN VERSIONS OF POETICS CH. 20 (1456B 38 FF.) MADE DIRECTLY FROM THE ARABIC VERSION OF ABU BISHR MATTA.

III. THE GREEK TRADITION OF THE TEXT.

IV. THE FIRST DEFINITION: AN EMENDED READING.

V. ON CONJUNCTIONS IN GENERAL.

VI. ON PARTICLES IN GENERAL.

VII. ON CONJUNCTIVE ADVERBS AND EXPLETIVE PARTICLES.

VIII. ON THE CONNECTIVES MEN AND DE.

IX. THE CONSIDERATION OF GREEK PROSE STYLE AS REVEALING THE ROLE OF CONNECTIVES IN SPEECH.

X. ON THE NEED FOR A PART OF SPEECH TO MAKE CLEAR THE BEGINNING, THE END, OR THE DIVIDING-POINT OF SPEECH.

XI. ON THE SPECIES OF CONNECTIVE CALLED ‘EXPLETIVES’.

XII. ON THE EXPLETIVES CALLED ‘TRANSITIONS’ AND ‘INTERRUPTERS’.

XIII. ON THE SPECIES OF PARAPLEROMATIC SUNDESMOI.

XIV. A FURTHER EMENDATION OF THE TEXT.

XV. APOLLONIUS DYSCOLUS ON MEN ETOI DE.

XVI. ON THE ROLE OF THE ARTICLE IN SPEECH.

XVII. THAT ANAPHORA OR ‘REFERENCE’ IS THE DEFINING CHARACTERISTIC OF THE ARTICLE.

XVIII. THE PRINCIPAL SPECIES OF ‘ARTICLE’.

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XIX. SUPPLEMENT: THE COMMON AND PROPER NOTIONS OF SUNDESMOS AND ARTHRON.

XX. THE EMENDED TEXT.

XXI. THE DEFINITION OF THE PREPOSITION.

APPENDIX I: ON TROPOS AS MEANING ‘THE WAY IN WHICH THE PREDICATE BELONGS TO THE SUBJECT’ IN AMMONIUS HERMEIAS.

APPENDIX II: ON THE INTERJECTION AND ITS ROLE IN HUMAN SPEECH.

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Introduction

Among the most difficult challenges facing the interpreter of Aristotle’s Poetics is the proper understanding of the definitions of the sundesmos and arthron1 found in the treatment of lexis or ‘language’ in Chapter 20 of that work. In the words of one com-mentator, the version of the text which has reached us in the Greek manuscript tradition is “confessedly corrupt”.2 In the opinion of another, it is “hopelessly corrupt”,3 having been the despair of interpreters for generations. The version in Arabic we possess is even more difficult to make out, sending the reader back to the Greek text as to a familiar friend. This rendering, generally considered to be the work of Abu Bishr Matta (10 th c. A.D.),4 though accessible in translation to those who do not read Arabic, has, with rare exceptions, either been overlooked or deliberately disregarded by the commentary tradition. As we shall see, however, even this witness, poor cousin to the Greek though it is, garbled and confused, will prove to contain precious fragments hinting at what Aristotle may have actually written.

Closely related to Matta’s translation, and another important witness that has been unduly neglected, is the commentary on this portion of the Poetics by the Arab philosopher Ibn Rushd, or, as he is better known in the West, “Averroes”,5 a passage preserving a text-ual witness which otherwise has been lost from the text.6

In the investigation to follow, we shall begin by presenting to the reader several widely-used and authoritative versions of the text, as well as various renderings in Latin and English, accompanied by our own literal translations and notes, followed by some few carefully-chosen glosses by recent commentators; it being our view that these glosses, inasmuch as they lay out the principal difficulties presented by the text, furnish a suitable starting-point for our investigation. We shall then proceed to treat the questions which will have arisen as a result of the beginning we have made, going on to introduce into the text such changes as seem necessary to arrive at a reading conforming, as much as possible, to a doctrine and method recognizable as Aristotle’s own.

1 I leave the words untranslated for now, as even the very the parts of speech which Aristotle has in mind here are a matter for argument and debate.2 Ingram Bywater.3 Jan Pinborg. For Bywater and Pinborg, see further below. See also Gallavotti, C., ‘Il syndesmos in Aristotele’, Parola del Passato Número 9/4 (1954), 241-55; and Bennekom, R. van, ‘The definitions of sun-desmos and arthron in Aristotle, Poetics ch. 20’, Mnemosyne 28 1975), 399-411. While I have not seen Gallavotti’s paper, he is cited several times by other commentators below. Excerpts from van Bennekom, however, will be found in the discussion to follow. And cf. also Swiggers P., Wouters A., “Grammatical Theory in Aristotle’s Poetics, Chapter XX”. In: Swiggers P., Wouters A. (edd.), Grammatical Theory and Philosophy of Language in Antiquity (Orbis Supplementa 19) (Peters, Leuven, 2002), pp. 101-120.4 “The Abu Bishr in question is the Nestorian Christian Abu Bishr Matta Ibn Yunus, who died in 940.”(Michael Chase) (N.B. The reader will find Chase’s informative notice, as well as several others of equal worth, immediately following this introduction.)5 Cf. Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics. Translated and introduced by Charles Butterworth (Princeton University Press, 1986). Cf. also “The Middle Commentary of Averroes of Cordova on the Poetics of Aristotle” (In: Preminger, Alex, O. B. Hardison, Jr., and Kevin Kerrane, eds. Classical and Medi-eval Literary Criticism: Translations and Interpretations. Frederick Ungar: New York, 1974); the first of these having been translated from the Arabic, the second, from the Latin of Hermannus Alemannus.6 Also bearing witness to the reading preserved in Averroes, as well as containing unique material, is the commentary on this portion of the text by his predecessor ibn Sīnā (“Avicenna”), for which see Dahiyat, I. M., Avicenna’s Commentary on the ‘Poetics’ of Aristotle (Leiden: Brill, 1974). I excerpt and discuss the rele-vant parts of both commentaries in the paper following this one.

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A fundamental presupposition of this investigation is that Aristotle was as lucid a writer as he was thinker, for which reason we maintain that his ‘school works’, or akro-atika,1 while quite often challenging in their treatment of a subject, must always, when pro-perly understood, be defensible at the bar of reason. Consequently, any report of his doctrine that is unintelligible or inane we must suppose to have been misrepresented in its generations-long transmission down to the present day.2 It must be understood at the outset, however, that the disordered state of the text, as well as the relative paucity of related material in Aristotle’s surviving works, make any attempt at improving it by emendation or reconstruction inescapably hypothetical, and hence subject to continual revision; the nature of this project demanding a tireless sifting of the relevant logical, grammatical, and philosophical doctrine as this is found both in Aristotle and his successors, as well as in writers learned in language. As a consequence, in the investigation to follow we shall make extensive use not only of the work of previous commentators, but also of linguists, grammarians, and any other inquirers who facilitate our understanding of the text; a use which will often take the unusual form of extended citations from their works. I have proceeded in this way because I believe that many of the obscurities confounding the would-be interpreter of Aristotle’s dicta, poorly-preserved as they are, suddenly become clear when explicit statements of certain language-related facta are laid before the eyes.3

As for the importance of this undertaking, I will merely point out that, quite apart from the interest it commands in itself, a philosophically-sound grasp of the consideration of language proper to poetic doctrine4 has a great bearing on the correct understanding of the logician’s consideration of speech, as well as the grammarian’s, inasmuch as the handling of language by the former is often confused with its treatment in the latter.

Note.

As the reader will observe, the following paper makes frequent reference to, and so presupposes a familiarity with, certain conclusions I have reached in my preceding papers treating Chapter 20 in an introductory fashion and the Arab commentators on the part of the text dealing with the connective parts of speech.

1 Cf. F. E. Peters, The Harvest of Hellenism: A History of the Near East from Alexander the Great to the Triumph of Christianity (Simon and Schuster, New York: 1970), p. 364: “Scholars at the time of Cicero divided the works of Aristotle into the technical school treatises that began as lectures (akroatika) to the students in the Lyceum and then were worked up into treatises (hupomemnata), and the “public discourses” (exoterikoi logoi) addressed to a wider audience and hence more polished and rhetorical but less philosophically sophisticated than the school treatises. Modern scholarship recognizes the distinction but is more inclined to see Aristotle’s passage from dialogues to school treatises as a function of his evolution from an early stylistic and substantial Platonism”.2 Cf. D. S. Margoliouth, The Poetics of Aristotle (Hodder and Stoughton, London, New York, Toronto, 1911), The Esoteric Style, p. 76: “The canons of interpretation at which we have arrived are, then, the following—No interpretation is certain for which chapter and verse cannot be cited from Aristotle’s works. No interpretation is satisfactory which fails to account for every syllable of the text. No interpretation is tolerable which ascribes to Aristotle propositions which are unmeaning or which conflict with common sense”. To the foregoing I would add that no interpretation is complete which fails to take into account those witnesses which manifestly preserve otherwise lost parts of the Philosopher’s teaching, especially when this relationship can be established with a high degree of probability.3 I am thinking here of the experience described so well in Plato’s Seventh Letter.4 Understanding poetic, like rhetoric, to come under logic broadly considered, and hence as opposed to logic, properly speaking, as St. Thomas Aquinas explains in a proem to his commentary on the Posterior Analytics.

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The Constitution of the Text

[As noted above, before proceeding to our investigation I preface the overview of the earliest translations of the Poetics provided by Michael Chase, with similar commentaries to follow.]

[2002: May] Aristotle in English.

“A brief addendum, offering no specific help on English versions: Gerald F. Else (tr.), Aristotle: Poetics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1967), p. 11 mentions a Latin translation by Giorgio Valla and published in 1498, but otherwise confirms Shepherd’s indications that serious and widespread interest therein, especially in the vernacular, began only some time into the following century.

In 1278, William of Moerbeke (13th C.) had produced a Latin version, extant in MSS identified only in 1930, from an otherwise unknown Greek original, and there was a paraphrase by Averroes (Abu i-Walid Muhammad bin Ahmad bin Rushd, 12th C.), which seems to have existed in both Arabic original and Latin, but these evidently did not circulate widely prior to the broader rediscovery of the Poetics around the end of the 15th C. (I take the details from D. W. Lucas, Aristotle: Poetics [Oxford: Clarendon Press 1968], pp. xxii-v, and Brian P. Copenhaver and Charles C. Schmitt, A History of Western Philosophy, 3: Renaissance Philosophy [Oxford and New York: OUP 1992], pp. 8-9, 66-8, who offer several references to secondary literature). There exists (so Else, p. 12, Lucas, p. xxiii) also a 10th C. Arabic version by one Abu Bisr (two Latin versions of which were produced in the 20th C.), translated from a Syriac version, of which there is a fragment extant.”

— Terrence Lockyer Johannesburg, South Africa

M.C.: The Abu Bishr in question is the Nestorian Christian Abu Bishr Matta Ibn Yunus, who died in 940. In the “Baghdad controversy” of 937/938, Matta argues for the claims of Greek logic against al-Sirafi, who argues for Arabic grammar. Matta loses, but this may be due to the prejudice of al-Tawhidi (ob. 1023), who reports the controversy.

There is evidence of other Arabic translations besides that of Matta, which has the reputation of not being very good. Ibn al-Nadim reports in his Fihrist that there was another, “better” translation by another Nestorian Christian, Yahya Ibn 'Adi; and Avicenna mentions yet another “better” translation of the Poetics in his Kitab al-shi'r, or section on poetics of his Shifa’. On all this see the superb work by Deborah Black, Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy, Leiden, Brill, 1990.

Averroes usually wrote three commentaries on each Aristotelian work: a short paraphrase, a brief commentary, and a longer commentary. In the case of the Poetics, only the middle commentary is extant. It was edited by Charles Butterworth, Averrois Cordubensis Com-mentarium medium in Aristotelis De arte poetica liber, Cairo 1986; English translation idem, Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics, Princeton 1986. A Latin version of this commentary “Iacob Mantino Hispano Hebraeo medico interprete” was published after the 1562 Venice edition by Fr. Heidenhain in the Jahrbuecher fuer classische Philologie, Supplementband XVII, 5, pp. 351-382, Leipzig: Teubner, 1889.

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For an imaginative account of Averroes’ struggle with the Poetics, see Borges’ story “La busca de Averroes”, in his collection El Aleph.

Best, Mike.

Michael Chase(goya@vjf.cnrs.fr)CNRS UPR 76/L'Annee PhilologiqueViellejuif-Paris, France.1

(goya_at_racine.vjf.cnrs.fr Date: 05/26/02)

[On the history, MSS, and editions of the text, I excerpt the following from Else, G. F., Poetics, Translated with an Introduction and Notes. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967).]

The Text of the Poetics

Whatever the reason, the text of the Poetics is abrupt, elliptical, sometimes incoherent, to a degree unexampled among Aristotle’s other acroamatic works. The two groups of works underwent a number of vicissitudes after his death. According to a well-known story which has been unduly doubted, the acroamatic treatises were lost for two centuries or more after Aristotle’s death, during which time he was known only by the published works, and did not come to light again until the first century B.C. Subsequently, owing apparently at least in part to the false idea that the acroamatic works contained the “real,” secret doctrine, they were copied and intensively studied while the published works, including the one On Poets, were neglected and ultimately lost; so that the older situation was exactly reversed.

During this period of renewed activity upon the acroamatic works, the Poetics obviously survived. But only half of it survived; for it was most likely then that its second book was lost (we know from evidence both internal and external that the Poetics originally had two books). Moreover, the work seems to have been little known to the Aristotelian commentators of the third to fifth centuries A.D., some of whom were admirably learned men—unless indeed they deliberately ignored it; in any case they hardly ever quote from it. What is more, no commentary was ever written on the Poetics (which means incidentally that it never had the benefit, which most of the other acroamatic works enjoyed, of having its text checked and reviewed by competent scholars); and when the torso ultimately survived [10-11] into the Middle Ages2 it seems to have done so not as a part of the Aristotelian corpus but as one of a mixed bag of rhetorical treatises by various authors: so in manuscript A (see below).

The next firm item in the history of the Poetics text is that it arrived in Italy, as part of A, sometime not long after the middle of the fifteenth century, as is attested by the fact that copies began to be made then; more than thirty are known in all. Its influence, however, was slow in spreading. A Latin translation by Giorgio Valla was published in 1498, the Greek text in 1508 (from a copy of A and, characteristically enough, as part of the Aldine Rhetores Graeci).

1 The Department of Greek and Latin at The Ohio State University. Posting: [2002: May] Aristotle in English. (http://omega.cohums.ohio-state.edu/mailing_lists/CLA-L/2002/05/0412.php [12/7/05]).2 Though unmentioned here, Else notices William of Moerbeke’s Latin version further below. (B.A.M.)

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The commentaries by Robortello, Vettori (Victorius), Castelvetro, and the rest, which established Aristotle as the dictator of criticism, did not begin until well into the sixteenth century, and of course French classicism reached its apogee only in the seventeenth. In Paris around 1660, when Racine studied the Poetics with respectful care, the story had come more than full circle: the little work which had lain unknown or neglected for the first two or three centuries of its existence and then had almost been lost again, in later antiquity, now rose to such despotic power that great poets—for example, Corneille—lived in awe and dread of its supposedly infallible “rules.” The total sequence of events, including this final peripity eis eutuchian, might have drawn an ironical smile from Aristotle if he had lived to witness it.

Manuscripts, Editions, Commentaries

We now know—subject to new discoveries—that we have four independent witnesses to the Poetics text: [11-12]

A, Parisinus graecus 1741, tenth or eleventh century;B, Riccardianus 46, twelfth century;Lat., represented by Etonsiensis 129 and Toletanus 47.10: A.D. 1278, Latin translation

by Wm. of Moerbeke from a lost original;Ar., Paris. gr. arab. 2346, tenth century:

Arabic translation by Abu bišr Matta from a lost Syriac translation of a lost Greek original.1

The New Oxford Classical Text edition of the Poetics by Rudolf Kassel (1965) makes all previous editions obsolete, being the only one that provides anything like full and accurate reports from all four text witnesses. The best previous editions, qua editions. were those of Butcher, Sykutris, and Rostagni; the best commentaries, besides the ones just mentioned (Butcher’s essays practically constitute a commentary), those of Bywater and Valgimigli. A warning must be sounded against both the text and commentary of Gudeman, as being uncritical and unreliable.

[I give next an excerpt from Lucas, D. W., ed. Aristotle: Poetics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968).]

INTRODUCTION

I. ARISTOTLE’S WORKS

CICERO was acquainted with two types of Aristotelian writing: ‘De summo autem bono quia duo genera librorum sunt, unam populariter scriptum quod e)cwteriko/n appellabant, alterum limatius quod in commentariis reliquerunt...’ (De Finibus 5. 12). ‘Commentarii’, which translates u(pomnh/mata, can stand for anything from rough notes to such sophis-ticated works as Caesar’s records of his campaign.

1 As many commentators note, Averroes’ commentary manifestly was not made from Matta’s version of the text, and so witnesses to another, or other, Arabic versions; the same being true of Avicenna’s briefer remarks which, at one or two points, also has unique material. (B.A.M.)

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The exoteric works, presumably the same as those referred to as e)kdedome/noi lo/goi in the Poetics 54b18, must be the class whose fluent style is elsewhere praised by Cicero.1

These ‘published’ works are lost.... Probably they were for the most part early works, many of them dialogues, though less dramatic than those of Plato.2 Our Corpus Aristotelicum con-sists of works of the type called by the early commentators, though not by Aristotle him-self,3 a)kroamatika/ ‘works for listening to’. It is not known for certain how these often jerky and discontinuous discourses were actually used. They have been thought of as lect-ure notes, either used by the lecturer or taken down by the pupil, as sketches for proposed works, or as summaries of works already completed, but it is pretty generally agreed that they formed part of a course of oral instruction and were not intended for wide circulation outside the school.4 [ix-x]

1 ‘Flumen orationis aureum fundens’ (Acad. 2, 119); ‘dicendi incredibili quadam cum copia tum etiam suavitate’ (Top. I. 3).2 Ad Att. 13. 19.3 The Letter to Alexander in which the word occurs (fr. 662) is not authentic.4 See de Montmollin, p. 343; W. D. Ross, Aristotle5 (London, 1949), pp. 16 and 316; H. Jackson, JPhil. 35 (1920), 191-200; Bonitz 104b44.

They vary much in degree of finish, and the Poetics is among the least finished, being in parts little more than a series of jottings....

The characteristics of the surviving works have an important consequence. The Poetics, more than most, is disjointed, full of interruptions, of digressions, and of failures in connexion. It is in the nature of notes to be disjointed. It is also in their nature that they should be revised, supplemented, and supplied with alternatives, and if they are the pro-perty of a school, they may be worked over by different hands.2 Accordingly the interpreter of the Poetics [x-xi]

2 The extreme position is taken by F. Grayeff (Phronesis i. 105 ff.), who says that all we have is h( biblioqh/kh )Aristotelou=j kai\ Qeofra/stou kai\ tw=n met ) au)tou/j ‘in which as it stands there may not be a single chapter of purely Aristotelian origin’.

is perpetually confronted with an awkward choice. He can explain an apparent failure of cohesion by saying that the writer put down enough to indicate for his own use a certain sequence of ideas, and that the connexion would be made clear in a spoken version embodying the necessary transitional passages. On the other hand, by removing a phrase or a sentence it is often possible to make a confused passage logical and coherent, and the assumption that a marginal addition has got into the text, or that alternative versions have been combined is not, given the apparent nature of the work, implausible. Again, Aristotle appears at times blatantly to contradict what he has said elsewhere. Should we go to all lengths to resolve such inconsistencies, or allow that two views may appear in notes which, not being intended for posterity, were never finally adjusted? There is no lack of sentences which can be made to appear intrusive, and editors have made the discovery that, if much of the book is left out, the rest becomes much easier to explain. But attempts to recover an original Poetics by stripping off later additions rest on the assumption, which may not be true, that the original Poetics is still there. If what we have was assembled from a larger collections of notes, parts of the original can have been lost when alternative drafts were combined.

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The right course would seem to be to warn the reader of the suspicions which may reasonably be entertained as to the continuity of the existing text, and then to make every endeavour to find a meaning for it, resorting only a final expedient to excisions or to the assumption that there is a lacuna. <...>

IV. THE TEXT AND ITS TRANSMISSION

Neither before nor after the alleged loss of Aristotle’s esoteric writings does the Poetics seem to have been widely read. Throughout the last three centuries B.C. there was a con-siderable output of critical literature from the Peripatetic [xxii-xxiii] school based on the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus. Quotations which we meet as examples first in Poetics or Rhetoric frequently recur in later literature,1 but there is no passage earlier than the fourth century A.D. of which it can be asserted with confidence that it is derived directly from the Poetics.2

The Poetics seems never to have been the subject of a Commentary. But it was certainly known in Byzantium, and it was translated into Syriac probably at the end of the ninth century A.D. The Syriac version is lost except for part of Ch. 6, but a few years later the Syriac was done into Arabic by Abu Bišr (d. 940), and this translation, which has survived almost entire, is the earliest witness to the Greek text, though a halting one. For not only is it at two removes from the Greek, but it is accessible to most of us only in a Latin translation. Further, both Syriac and Arabic translators were at the disadvantage of scarcely knowing what a tragedy was.3 The first complete Latin rendering of the Arabic was given by D. S. Margoliouth, Professor of Arabic at Oxford, in his edition of the Poetics (Oxford, 1911); but this has been superseded by the version of J. Tkatsch published posthumously at Vienna, vol. i, 1928, vol. ii, 1932; the translation is accompanied by a rambling commentary usable only with the aid of the index.

Probably within a generation or two of the translation [xxiii-xiv]

1 See G. Else, The Origin and Early Form of Gr. Trag. (Harvard and London, 1966), p. 113, n. 52; F. Solmsen in Hermes, 66 (1931), 241-67. A striking example is the passage from the Rainer Papyrus given on p. 159.2 The earliest are: Themistius Or. 27, 337 B from 49b6, which is in part a later insertion; the story of Mitys (52a8) appears in De Mirab. Auscultat. 846a; sentences from ch. 20 on grammar are quoted in the Commentaries of Ammonius and of Boethius on the De Interpretatione (see Bywater on 56b20).3 Else gives as an example of the errors to which such a work is prone the Latin version of 51 b21 qui ponit, where the Syriac translator read )Aga/qwnoj )Anqei= as )Aga/qwn o(\j )an q$=, which the Arabic necessarily followed.

into Arabic was copied the best and oldest surviving Greek manuscript, Parisinus 1741, called A or Ac by editors. This manuscript was still in Constantinople in 1427, but reached Florence before the end of the century and found a final home in Paris. Its outstanding valued was not recognized till the nineteenth century. J. Vahlen, who gave a full account of its readings in his editions (1867, 1874, 1885), regarded it as the sole authority from which the text of the Poetics is derived.

It was from a closely related manuscript that William de Moerbeke, who translated much of Aristotle, made his Latin version in 1278; this survives in two manuscripts, but they lay unrecognized until 1930. The Latin is occasionally of service in establishing the reading of A.1

1 See Aristotelis Latinus xxxiii, ed. Minio-Paluello (Bruges/Paris, 1953).

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Since Vahlen’s day it has been recognized that there is one manuscript which preserves a tradition independent of A; this is Riccardianus 46 (B or R to editors), which, though of the fourteenth century, is the second oldest manuscript. Attention was first called to it by F. Susemihl in 1878, and some of its readings were published by G. Vitelli in Stud. ital. di fil. in 1894 and by C. Landi in the following year. They were given more fully in the apparatus to the edition of Margoliouth, who used the evidence of CH. 16, where Ric-cardianus alone has the words that fill a previously unrecognized lacuna, to prove that it is independent of A, (see commentary on 55a14). Though Riccardianus has no descendents, a few of its readings found their way into Renaissance manuscripts (see apparatus, p. 3).

[Our last excerpt dealing with these preliminary matters is the final section of “Aristotle’sPoetics: A Reader’s Commentary on the Greek Text” (c) John T. Kirby 2005.]

5. The Mediæval Text-Tradition

Once the text of the Poetics resurfaced in Rome, it was doubtless copied and recopied many times.21 Our oldest Greek MS of the text dates from the tenth or eleventh century CE, and is known as the codex Parisinus 1741 (and symbolized in Kassel’s critical appar-atus as A). Other than this the most important Greek MS is codex Riccardianus 46 (sym-bolized as B), which dates from the fourteenth century.

Eventually the treatise was translated into other languages as well, including Latin and Syriac. The latter was in turn translated (in the tenth century) into Arabic,22 and this branch of the tradition occasionally preserves readings differing markedly from those of A and B. Kassel refers to two Latin MSS of the Poetics, dating from about 1280 and 1300; he assigns these to a branch of the tradition closer to A than to B or to the Syriac/Arabic translations.23 While the testimony of a translation (in any language) is less direct than that of a Greek MS, one can still make a cautious attempt to reconstruct from them the texts of the Greek MSS from which they were translated; and when they offer variant readings, these will provide a broader base upon which to establish a critical edition. The hope is, of course, is that such a text will bear the closest possible resemblance to what Aristotle originally wrote.

21 For an understanding of the mediæval transmission of the text of the Poetics, one must read not only the introduction to Bywater 1909 but also those to Rostagni 1927 and Kassel 1965. Kassel’s rehabilitation of the Riccardianus was anticipated by Rostagni. Kassel 1965:xii provides a stemma of the MSS (adopted by Dupont-Roc 1980:24).22 On the Arabic translation of the Poetics see Margoliouth 1887, Immisch 1896, and Tkatsch 1928. (Only a fragment of the Syriac version survives.) On the Arab tradition generally see Walzer 1962, Peters 1968a, 1968b. The Arabs took the Poetics very seriously; see Dahiyat 1974, Butterworth 1986, Black 1990, and Kemal 1991. In addition to Arabic translations, Persian (scil. Pahlavi) translations of various Platonic and Aristotelian works may have been made in the third to sixth centuries CE; see Lorimer 1932:161, Peters 1968b:46-47.23 For the Latin tradition see Jourdain 1819, Lobel 1931, and Valgimigli 1953.

(http://cc.purdue.edu/~corax/kirbypoeticsintro.html [2/13/07])

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I. ARISTOTLE’S DEFINITIONS OF SUNDESMOS AND ARTHRON ACCORDING TO THE RECEIVED TEXT.

Cf. Aristotle, Poetics ch. 20 (1456b 38—1457a 10) (ed. R. Kassel1 unchanged; tr. B.A.M.):2

su/ndesmoj de/ e)stin fwnh\ a)/shmoj [1457a] h(\ ou)/te kwlu/ei ou)/te poiei= fwnh\n mi/an shmantikh\n e)k pleio/nwn fwnw=n pefukui=a sunti/qesqai kai\ e)pi\ tw=n a)/krwn kai\ e)pi\ tou= me/sou

h(\n mh\ a(rmo/ttei e)n a)rxh=? lo/gou tiqe/nai kaq' au(th/n,

oi(=on me/n h)/toi de/.

h)\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ e)k pleio/nwn me\n [5] fwnw=n mia=j shmantikw=n de\ poiei=n pe/fuken mi/an shmantikh\n fwnh/n.

a)/rqron d' e)sti\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ lo/gou a)rxh\n h)\ te/loj h)\ diorismo\n dhloi=.

oi(=on to\ a)mfi/ kai\ to\ peri/ kai\ ta\ a)/lla.

But a conjunction is a non-significative [1457a] vocal sound which neither impedes nor produces one significative vocal sound out of many vocal sounds naturally apt to be composed at the extremes as well as in the middle,

which it does not suit to place at the beginning of speech by itself,

such as me/n [‘indeed’] or de/ [‘and’, ‘but’].

Or else a non-significative vocal sound which [5] out of more than one significative vocal sound is naturally apt to produce one significant vocal sound.

But an article is a non-significative vocal sound which makes clear the beginning or end or dividing-point of speech,

such as a)mfi/ [‘about’] and peri/ [‘concerning’] and the rest.

h)\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ ou)/te kwlu/ei ou)/te poiei= fwnh\n mi/an shmantikh\n e)k pleio/nwn fwnw=n pefukui=a ti/qesqai kai\ [10] e)pi\ tw=n a)/krwn kai\ e)pi\ tou= me/sou.

Or else a non-significative vocal sound which neither impedes nor produces one significative vocal sound out of many vocal sounds naturally apt to be placed at the extremes as well as [10] in the middle.

The text and translation according to Ingram Bywater:

Cf. Aristotle, Poetics ch. 20 (1456b 38—1457a 10) (ed. & tr. Ingram Bywater):3

su/ndesmoj de/ e)stin fwnh\ a)/shmoj [1457a] h(\ ou)/te kwlu/ei ou)/te poiei= fwnh\n mi/an shmantikh\n e)k pleio/nwn fwnw=n pefukui=an sunti/qesqai [kai\ e)pi\ tw=n a)/krwn kai\ e)pi\ tou= me/sou], h(\n mh\ a(rmo/ttei e)n a)rxh=? lo/gou tiqe/nai kaq' au(th/n, oi(=on me/n dh /toi/ de/:

(3) A Conjunction is (a) a non-significant sound which, when one significant sound is formable out of several, neither hinders nor aids the union, and which, if the Speech thus formed stands by itself (apart from other Speeches) must not be inserted at the beginning of it; e.g. men, de, toi, de.

Or (b) a non-significant sound capable of

1 Aristotelis. De Arte Poetica Liber (Oxford Classical Texts). Rudolph Kassel (Editor) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965).2 For variant readings, see further below.3 Ingram Bywater, Aristotle on the Art of Poetry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), pp. xiii-xiv.

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h)\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ e)k pleio/nwn me\n [5] fwnw=n mia=j shmantikw=n de\ poiei=n pe/fuken mi/an shmantikh\n fwnh/n, * *

a)/rqron d' e)sti\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ lo/gou a)rxh\n h)\ te/loj h)\ diorismo\n dhloi=. [oi(=on to\ a)mfi/ kai\ to\ peri/ kai\ ta\ a)/lla.

combining two or more significant sounds into one; e.g. amphi, peri, etc.

(4) An Article is a non-significant sound marking the beginning, end, or dividing-point of a Speech,

h)\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ ou)/te kwlu/ei ou)/te poiei= fwnh\n mi/an shmantikh\n e)k pleio/nwn fwnw=n]

pefukui=a ti/qesqai kai\ [10] e)pi\ tw=n a)/krwn kai\ e)pi\ tou= me/sou. its natural place being either at the extremities

or in the middle.

Eds. Kassel and Bywater compared:

(ed. R. Kassel [1965])

su/ndesmoj de/ e)stin fwnh\ a)/shmoj [1457a] h(\ ou)/te kwlu/ei ou)/te poiei= fwnh\n mi/an shmantikh\n e)k pleio/nwn fwnw=n pefukui=a sunti/qesqai kai\ e)pi\ tw=n a)/krwn kai\ e)pi\ tou= me/sou

h(\n mh\ a(rmo/ttei e)n a)rxh=? lo/gou tiqe/nai kaq' au(th/n, oi(=on me/n h)/toi de/.

h)\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ e)k pleio/nwn me\n [5] fwnw=n mia=j shmantikw=n de\ poiei=n pe/fuken mi/an shmantikh\n fwnh/n.

a)/rqron d' e)sti\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ lo/gou a)rxh\n h)\ te/loj h)\ diorismo\n dhloi=. oi(=on to\ a)mfi/ kai\ to\ peri/ kai\ ta\ a)/lla.

h)\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ ou)/te kwlu/ei ou)/te poiei= fwnh\n mi/an shmantikh\n e)k pleio/nwn fwnw=n pefukui=a ti/qesqai kai\ [10] e)pi\ tw=n a)/krwn kai\ e)pi\ tou= me/sou.

(ed. I. Bywater [1909])

su/ndesmoj de/ e)stin fwnh\ a)/shmoj [1457a] h(\ ou)/te kwlu/ei ou)/te poiei= fwnh\n mi/an shmantikh\n e)k pleio/nwn fwnw=n pefukui=an sunti/qesqai [kai\ e)pi\ tw=n a)/krwn kai\ e)pi\ tou= me/sou],

h(\n mh\ a(rmo/ttei e)n a)rxh=? lo/gou tiqe/nai kaq' au(th/n, oi(=on me/n dh /toi/ de/:

h)\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ e)k pleio/nwn me\n [5] fwnw=n mia=j shmantikw=n de\ poiei=n pe/fuken mi/an shmantikh\n fwnh/n, * *

a)/rqron d' e)sti\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ lo/gou a)rxh\n h)\ te/loj h)\ diorismo\n dhloi=. [oi(=on to\ a)mfi/ kai\ to\ peri/ kai\ ta\ a)/lla.

h)\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ ou)/te kwlu/ei ou)/te poiei= fwnh\n mi/an shmantikh\n e)k pleio/nwn fwnw=n] pefukui=a ti/qesqai kai\ [10] e)pi\ tw=n a)/krwn kai\ e)pi\ tou= me/sou.

Cf. Ingram Bywater, Aristotle on the Art of Poetry, Commentary. 20. 1456b 38, p. 269:

su/ndesmoj. The traditional text of this and the following section (that on the a)/rqron) is confessedly corrupt. Twining finds a good deal of it unintelligible (comp. Steinthal, Gesch. der Sprachwissenschaft2 I p. 263); and Vahlen, besides bracketing h)\ fwnh\—me/sou in 1457a8-10, has to assume two lacuna, one after sunti/qesqai in 1457a2, and another after dhloi= in 1457a7.

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At this point Aristotle passes from the constituents of words (letters and syllables) to actual words; and he begins by noting this distinction: some words are fwnh\ a)/shmoj, and others fwnai\ shmantikai/; these latter being nouns and verbs in language, which have a meaning of their own and stand for something even when uttered by themselves. The su/ndesmoi and a)/rqra, however, are said to be fwnai\ a)/shmoi; i.e. they convey no meaning when [269-270] uttered by themselves. If we may provisionally take them to represent in some way the little connexive words in language, the question arises as to the nature of the two kinds of connexives and the distinction Aristotle wished to draw between them. It will be observed that he describes them by reference to their position and function in the complex fwnh\ shmantikh/, called a lo/goj further on in the chapter (1457a23).

Cf. Ingram Bywater, Aristotle on the Art of Poetry, Commentary. 20. 1456b 38, p. 271:

...I suggest that it [i.e. the role of coordinating and subordinating conjunctions in connected speech] may have been actually present in Aristotle’s mind at the time of framing his defi-nitions of su/ndesmoj and a)/rqron, and that it is to be found in the text, if it be permissible to restore it in some such way as this:—

su/ndesmoj de/ e)stin fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ ou)/te kwlu/ei ou)/te poiei= fwnh\n mi/an shmantikh\n e)k pleio/nwn fwnw=n pefukui=an sunti/qesqai [kai\ e)pi\ tw=n a)/krwn kai\ e)pi\ tou= me/sou], h(\n mh\ a(rmo/ttei e)n a)rxh=? lo/gou tiqe/nai kaq' au(th/n, oi(=on me/n dh /toi/ de/. h)\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ e)k [5] pleio/nwn me\n fwnw=n mia=j shmantikw=n de\ poiei=n pe/fuken mi/an shmantikh\n fwnh/n, <oi(=on to\ a)mfi/ kai\ to\ peri/ kai\ ta\ a)/lla>. a)/rqron d' e)sti\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ lo/gou a)rxh\n h)\ te/loj h)\ diorismo\n dhloi=. [oi(=on to\ a)mfi/ kai\ to\ peri/ kai\ ta\ a)/lla. h)\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ ou)/te kwlu/ei ou)/te poiei= fwnh\n mi/an shmantikh\n e)k pleio/nwn fwnw=n] pefukui=a ti/qesqai kai\ [10] e)pi\ tw=n a)/krwn kai\ e)pi\ tou= me/sou.

The words bracketed after sunti/qesqai in l. 2 I suppose to be a repetition in the wrong place of those after ti/qesqai in l. 9; and the clause h)\ fwnh\—fwnw=n in ll. 8-9 to have come in through a repetition of the beginning of the definition of su/ndesmoj in l. 1. (comp. Duntzer, Rettung d. aristotelischen Poetik p. 194). It will be seen that the illustration oi(=on to\ a)mfi/ ta\ a)/lla is assumed to be out of place where it stands, and is transferred to l. 6, so as to form part of the second definition of su/ndesmoj —a view which has been antici-pated by Hartung. Two kinds of su/ndesmoj, then, are recognized in the text as amended.1 The first is said to consist of the connexive words whose presence in lo/goj does not affect [271-272] the coherence of the terms. There is no difficulty in illustrating this point; if Kle/wn and baduze/i are combinable terms, the combination of them in the proposition Kle/wn baduze/i2 is neither hindered nor helped by the insertion after the first word of a me/n, a de/, a dh/, or a toi/. Little words of this description are what the grammarians call ‘expletives’. Though they stand at the beginning of the lo/goj, they are not an integral part of it; they belong to it not per se (kaq a)uto/n), but per accidens, and only serve to indicate a relation to some other lo/goj before or after it. In contradistinction to these Aristotle recognizes a second species of S (l. 4), one that is a real and constitutive part of the lo/goj into which it enters. This function, as I have endeavoured to show above, in the general survey of the possible forms of lo/goi, is fulfilled by the prepositions and the copulative conjunctions. Aristotle’s su/ndesmoj, therefore, whatever

1 As the reader will observe hereafter, I am in substantial agreement with his conclusion regarding the sundesmoi. The same, however, cannot be said about his interpretation of the arthra.2 = “Kleon walks.” The example on the next page adds, “and Socrates sits”.

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else it may signify, may be taken to include the preposition, the copulative conjunction, and also certain particles. The sense of the word a)/rqron is more difficult to determine owing to the absence of examples to illustrate its meaning. The term must clearly denote a particular kind of con-nexive required for a particular kind of lo/goj. The kind of lo/goj Aristotle had in mind may perhaps be inferred from the fact that the a)/rqron in it is said to indicate the beginning, or end, or dividing-point in its structure. Such a lo/goj may be assumed to be a composite pro-position, and moreover one of a more complex form than Kle/wn baduze/i kai\ Swkra/thj ka/qhtai and the like. [With respect to the definition of the article, B. goes on to state:] …As a conjectural inter-pretation of this statement1 it may be suggested (1) that the a)/rqra which mark the beginning of the proposition represent the conditional and causal conjunctions, together with the relative pronouns and adverbs; (2) that those marking the end are the final and illative conjunctions; and (3) those marking the separation or division in the proposition, the disjunctives.

Bywater’s emended version (assembled by B.A.M.):

su/ndesmoj de/ e)stin fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ ou)/te kwlu/ei ou)/te poiei= fwnh\n mi/an shmantikh\n e)k pleio/nwn fwnw=n pefukui=an sunti/qesqai

[kai\ e)pi\ tw=n a)/krwn kai\ e)pi\ tou= me/sou],

h(\n mh\ a(rmo/ttei e)n a)rxh=? lo/gou tiqe/nai kaq' au(th/n, oi(=on me/n dh /toi/ de/.

(3) A Conjunction is (a) a non-significant sound which, when one significant sound is formable out of several, neither hinders nor aids the union,

[both at the beginning and in the middle],*

and which, if the Speech thus formed stands by itself (apart from other Speeches) must not be inserted at the beginning of it; e.g. men, de, toi, de.

h)\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ e)k [5] pleio/nwn me\n fwnw=n mia=j shmantikw=n de\ poiei=n pe/fuken mi/an shmantikh\n fwnh/n, <oi(=on to\ a)mfi/ kai\ to\ peri/ kai\ ta\ a)/lla>.

a)/rqron d' e)sti\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ lo/gou a)rxh\n h)\ te/loj h)\ diorismo\n dhloi=. [oi(=on to\ a)mfi/ kai\ to\ peri/ kai\ ta\ a)/lla.

h)\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ ou)/te kwlu/ei ou)/te poiei= fwnh\n mi/an shmantikh\n e)k pleio/nwn fwnw=n]

pefukui=a ti/qesqai kai\ [10] e)pi\ tw=n a)/krwn kai\ e)pi\ tou= me/sou.

Or (b) a non-significant sound capable of combining two or more significant sounds into one; e.g. amphi, peri, etc.

(4) An Article is a non-significant sound marking the beginning, end, or dividing-point of a Speech, [e.g. amphi, peri, etc.

Or else a non-significant sound which, when one significant sound is formable out of several, neither hinders nor aids the union]

its natural place being either at the extremities or in the middle.

* I have supplied the translation of this phrase. (B.A.M.)

Cf. R. van Bennekom, “The Definitions of Sundesmoj and Arqron in Aristotle, Poetics ch. 20”. Mnemosyne 28 (1975) 399-411, pp. 399-401:

1 sc. Aristotle’s definition of periodon at Rhet. III, 9, 1409a 35.

15

1456 b 381457 a 1

5

10

su/ndesmoj de/ e)stin fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ ou)/te kwlu/ei ou)/te poiei= fwnh\n mi/an shmantikh\n e)k pleio/nwnfwnw=n pefukui=a sunti/qesqai kai\ e)pi\ tw=n a)/krwn kai\ e)pi\ tou= me/sou h(\n mh\ a(rmo/ttei e)n a)rxh=? lo/gou tiqe/nai kaq' au(th/n, oi(=on me/n h)/toi de/. h)\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ e)k pleio/nwn me\n fw-nw=n mia=j shmantikw=n de\ poiei=n pe/fuken mi/an shman-tikh\n fwnh/n. a)/rqron d' e)sti\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ lo/gou a)rxh\n h)\ te/loj h)\ diorismo\n dhloi=. oi(=on to\ a)mfi/ kai\ to\ peri/ kai\ ta\ a)/lla. h)\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ ou)/te kwlu/ei ou)/te poiei= fwnh\n mi/an shmantikh\n e)k pleio/nwn fwnw=n pefukui=a ti/qesqai kai\ e)pi\ tw=n a)/krwn kai\ e)pi\ tou= me/sou.

<introductory remarks omitted>

It is essential, to my mind, to recognize from the start that the text as given above, which in the main is that of the ms. A, is the result of a conflation of two versions: a short and faulty one, due to haplography, and a full one. The short and faulty one is the version of the ms. B. It runs from b 38 to a 3 (e)pi\ tou= me/sou)and results from a copyist’s eye having leapt from fwnh\ a)/shmoj (b 38) to fwnh\ a)/shmoj (a 8). Accordingly the full version is that of A, minus the words h(\ ou)/te (b 38) . . . e)pi\ tou= me/sou (a 3). One can explain the conflation in A in various ways, the easiest of which is perhaps to assume that C, the proximate ancestor of A and B (see Kassel’s stemma on p. xii), had the short version of B, but the correct version in the margin or otherwise added to it, which P noticed.2

The seclusion of b 38 – a 3 has been proposed first by Margoliouth in his edition of 1911. It is not only paleographically relatively simple, but it yields a clearly articulated text with parallel definitions of su/ndesmoj and a)/rqron. Moreover, it obviates the awful collocation of pefukui=a sunti/qesqai kai\ e)pi\ tw=n a)/krwn kai\ e)pi\ tou= me/sou and h(\n mh\ a(rmo/ttei e)n a)rxh=? lo/gou tiqe/nai kaq' au(th/n, which no one has been able to explain away3).

2 For completeness’s sake, I add Tkatsch’s translation of the Arabic version: coniunctio autem est vox composita non indicata velut ‘quidem’ et ‘nonne’. Etenim quod auditur ex iis est non indicatum, compositum e vocibus multis, quae quidem sunt indicantes vocem verbi unam compositam non indicatam. Articulus autem ext vox composita non indicata aut initium orationis aut finem eius aut discrimen indicans, velut ‘fe <mi>’ aut ‘propter’ aut ‘sed’. Et dicitur vox composita non indicata, quae non prohibit neque facit vocem unam indicatum, cuius negotium (est) ut componatur e vocibus multis et in principiis et in medio. Gallavotti has a full discussion of it. It will be seen that the first definition of su/ndesmoj is left out altogether; for the rest it does not seem very helpful. [N.B. I give Margoliouth’s version of this passage, accompanied by a translation based on both, below. (B.A.M.)]3 Bywater brackets fwnh\n mi/an shmantikh\n e)k pleio/nwn fwnw=n pefukui=a sunti/qesqai, but the resulting phrase...does not make sense. B’s pefukui=a must be right. [400-401] [N.B. As we have seen, B.’s version reads as follows: “(4) An Article is a non-significant sound marking the beginning, end, or dividing-point of a Speech, [bracketed words omitted] its natural place being either at the extremities or in the middle”, a definition which “makes sense” if one agree with B that Aristotle understands by arthra the several species mentioned above. As the reader shall see, I believe B is correct to see the parts of speech he mentions as being at issue in Aristotle’s understanding of the connectives here, yet the conjunctive species he names, being indeclinable, could not possibly be considered arthra, the very name of which includes the note of having case, for which see further below. (B.A.M.)]

The restored text, then, runs as follows (I anticipate my subsequent argument by printing smaller conjectural emendations at the same time):

S 1 su/ndesmoj de/ e)stin fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\n mh\ a(rmo/ttei e)n a)rxh=?

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S 2

A 1

A 2

lo/gou tiqe/nai kaq' au(th/n, oi(=on me/n h)/toi de/. h)\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ e)k pleio/nwn me\n fwnw=n mia=j shmantikw=n de\ poiei=n pe/fuken mi/an shmantikh\n fwnh/n. a)/rqron d' e)sti\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ lo/gou a)rxh\n h)\ te/loj h)\ diorismo\n dhloi=. oi(=on to\ <o(> [f.m.i.] kai\ to\ peri/ kai\ ta\ a)/lla. h)\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ ou)/te kwlu/ei ou)/te poiei= fwnh\n mi/an shmantikh\n e)k pleio/nwn fwnw=n pefukui=a <sun>ti/qesqai kai\ e)pi\ tw=n a)/krwn kai\ e)pi\ tou= me/sou.

Translation:

A conjunction is a non-signifying expression which it is not fitting to place by itself at the beginning of a phrase-or-sentence, such as me/n, h)/toi, de/. Or: a non-signifying expression whose nature it is to make out of more than one, already signifying, expressions one single signifying expression.

A joint is a non-signifying expression which marks the beginning, end or break in a phrase-or-sentence, such as o(, peri/ and the rest. Or: a non-signifying expression which neither hinders nor effects the formation of one single signifying expression out of more ex-pressions, whose nature it is to be put at either end as well as in the middle.

Cf. Jan Pinborg, Classical Antiquity: Greece, 1.3.2 Aristotle on the Parts of Speech. [In T. Sebeok (ed.) Current Trends in Linguistics, vol. 13 Historiography of Linguistics, 69-126. Mouton, 1975, pp. 72-73]:

1.3.2 The non-significative segments.

...The definitions of the two following segments of speech are hopelessly corrupt. The generally printed text is the following (the segmentation is that of Gallavotti 1954):

a) the syndesmos is a non-significative expressionb) which neither prevents nor effects (the formation of) one significative expression out of several expressionsc) apt to be placed along with other signs1 at the ends or in the middle (of a sentence?) [72-73]d) which cannot stand absolutely first in the sentencee) as men, ētoi, def) or a non-significative expressiong) which is apt to effect one significative expression out of at least two significative expressionsh) the arthron is a non-significative expressioni) which shows the beginning, end, or division (diorismōs) of a sentence2

l) as e.g. to phēmi (or to amphi) and to peri etc.m) or a non-significative expressionn) which neither prevents nor effects (the formation of ) one significative expression out of several expressionso) apt to be placed at the ends or in the middle

As rightly emphasized by Gallavotti (1954) the main difficulties are: 1. Aristotle here gives alternative and even contradictory definitions of the same segments of speech or gives the same definition to different segments; and 2. that later rhetorical and grammatical traditions

1 I can find nothing corresponding to the words “along with other signs” in the Greek.2 Note that the leap in letters from ‘i to ‘l’ (thereby skipping over ‘j’ and ‘k’) is in the original.

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(cf. notes 12-13 below)1 tell us that Aristotle nowhere else uses arthron as a technical term. (1) is by far the stronger argument for corruption, as (2) is counterbalanced by the fact that Aristotle’s contemporary, Anaximenes of Lampsakos (Rhet. ad Alex. 1435 a 35) and later Stoics knew arthron as a technical term for a separate part of speech, exemplified by the deictic word houtos.2

Cf. Jan Pinborg, idem, nn. 12-13, p. 77:

12 A slightly different version is to be found in the rhetorical tradition: Dionysios of Halikarnassos (contemporary of Tryphon), De compositione verborum c.2 (p.6) and Quintilian (end of 1st century AD), Institutio oratoria I, 4, 18-21.13 Grammatici Graeci I, 3, 214, 18f,; 356, 7f.; 517, 33f. Grammatici Graeci II, 1,5, 13f. Grammatici Graeci II, 2,43, 14f.; Grammatici Latini II (Priscian), 54, 5f.; 548, 1f. I do not include other instances from Grammatici Latini, as they offer nothing new.

Cf. Lane Cooper, Aristotle on the Art of Poetry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1947 [1st ed. 1913]), pp. 65-66 (= Poet. 20, 1456b 38—1457a 10 with his suppl.):

A Connective Particle is (a) a non-significant sound—such as men, dē, toi, dĕ—which neither hinders nor causes the formation of one significant sound (expression) out of two or more others [e.g., a single clause, or the like, out of a noun and a verb], and which, if the expression stand by itself, must not be inserted as the first word. [When we form the expression Gnothi seauton—‘Know thyself’—the process is neither helped nor hindered by the insertion of dĕ; but if the particle be inserted, it must not stand first.] Or it is a non-significant sound—like amphi, peri, etc.—with (b) the function of combining two or more significant sounds into one expression [as a preposition serves to unite its noun with a verb].

A Separative Particle (i.e., sentence-connective and disjunctive particle) is a non-significant sound which marks the beginning, end, or division of an expression, and whose natural place is at either end of the expression or in the middle.

Cf. Aristotle, Poetics ch. 20 (1456b 38-1457a 10) (The Poetic of Aristotle, literally trans-lated, with a selection of notes, an analysis, and questions. By Theodore Buckley (London and New York: Bohn, 1906; rpt. Prometheus Books, 1992):

But a conjunction is a sound void of signification, which neither impedes nor produces one significant sound adapted to be composed from many sounds, and which may be placed either at the beginning or at the end of the period, unless something requires that it should be placed by itself at the beginning; such as me\n, h)\toi, de/. Or it is a sound without signi-fication, composed from more sounds than one, but naturally adapted to produce one signi-ficant sound. An article is a sound without signification, which shows the beginning, or end, or distinction of a word;7 as to\ a)mfi/ and to\ peri/, and others of the like kind. Or it is a sound without signification, which neither impedes nor produces one significant sound naturally adapted to be composed from many sounds, both at the extremes and in the middle.

7 This description is most obscure; but the sense seems to be, that an article is a sound which of itself does not signify any thing definite, but merely serves to indicate a significant sound, before or after which it is placed, or which it distinguishes from other words. Taylor. [= Thomas Taylor, the Platonist, in his edition (B.A.M.)] Ritter denies that there is any sense at all, an opinion in which the reader will probably acquiesce.

1 I give excerpts from these texts below. (B,A,M.)2 Significant excerpts on these subjects will be found below. (B.A.M.)

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N.B. The following commentary, by a Renaissance Aristotelian, is the best explanation of the received version of the text I have seen.

Cf. Sylvester Maurus, S.J., In Poeticam cap. XX, nn. 6-7 (tr. B.A.M.) [In: Aristotelis Opera Quæ Extant Omnia, Brevi Paraphrasi, Ac Litteræ Perpetuo Inhærente Explanatione Illustrata]:

6. Tertia pars locutionis est conjunctio.

Conjunctio est vox non significativa, quae neque impedit neque facit vocem unam significativam ex pluribus vocibus aptam componi.

Descriptio est obscurissima. Sensus videtur esse, quod conjunction est vox ex se nihil significans determinatum, sed quae ordinatur pure ad faciendam ex pluribus vocibus unam vocem seu unam orationem, ita ut illis vocibus neque addat significationem neque demat.

Addit Aristoteles. quod conjunctio potest poni vel in extremo vel in medio, nisi aliqua postulet poni in principio, et per hoc innuit dari tria genera conjunctionem, quarum quaedam praeponuntur, quaedam postponuntur, quaedam ponuntur in medio.

Subdit aliam descriptionem breviorem dicens, quod conjunctio est vox non significativa, quae ex pluribus quidem vocibus unam, et ex significativa apta est facere unam vocem significativam.

Haec descriptio debet intelligi sicut praecedens.

6. The third part of language is the conjunct-tion.

But a conjunction is a non-significative vocal sound which neither impedes nor produces one significative vocal sound naturally apt to be composed from many vocal sounds.

The description is most obscure. The meaning seems to be that the conjunction is a vocal sound by itself signifying nothing determinate, but which is ordered purely to producing from many vocal sounds one vocal sound or one speech, so that those vocal sounds neither add signification nor take it away.

Aristotle adds that the conjunction can either be placed at the end or in the middle, unless some-thing requires it to be placed at the beginning, and by this he gives us to understand three kinds of conjunction, of which some are preposed, some postposed, some placed in the middle.

He adds another briefer description saying, that the conjunction is a non-significative vocal sound which from many significative vocal sounds is naturally apt to make one significative vocal sound.

This description ought to be understood just like the preceding one.

n. 7. Quarta pars locutionis est articulus.

Articulus est vox non significativa, quae orationis principium, aut finem, aut distinctionem indicat.

Haec etiam descriptio est obscurissima.

Sensus videtur, quod articulus est vox, quae per se non significat aliquid determinatum, sed pure deservit ad hoc, ut indicet ac quodammodo demonstret vocem significativam, cui

7. The fourth part of language is the article.

An article is a non-significative vocal sound, which shows the beginning, or the end, or the distinction of speech.

This description is also most obscure.

The meaning seems to be that the article is a vocal sound which by itself does not signify something determinate but is purely reserved for this, that it indicate or in someway point out a

19

praeponitur, vel postponitur, vel quam distinguit a caeteris vocibus;

ex. gr., cum dicimus to\ fhmi/, designamus hanc vocem fhmi/, cui articulus praeponitur, et illam distinguimus ab aliis vocibus.

Addit Aristoteles aliam descriptionem articuli dicens:

articulus est vox non significativa, quae neque prohibet neque efficit unam vocem significativam, ex pluribus naturaliter aptam componi, et in extremo et in medio.

Sensus est, quod articulus est vox non significans aliquid determinatum, quae pure ordinatur ad hoc, ut indicet ac demonstret voces significativas, quibus significationem neque addit neque demit, ita ut vocibus designatis aliquando praeponitur, aliquando postponatur, aliquando ponatur in medio.

significative vocal sound, to which it is pre-posed, or postposed, or which it distinguishes from the rest of the vocal sounds;

for example, when we say to\ fhmi/, we designate this vocal sound fhmi/, to which the article is preposed, and we distinguish it from other vocal sounds.

Aristotle adds another description of the article saying:

an article is a non-significative vocal sound which neither prevents nor effects one significative vocal sound naturally apt to be composed from many vocal sounds, both at the extreme and in the middle.

The meaning is that the article is a vocal sound not signifying something determinate, which is purely ordered to this, that it indicate or point out significative vocal sounds, which signification it neither adds nor takes away, so that the designated vocal sounds sometimes are postposed, but sometimes placed in the middle.

Parallel translations:

(tr. S. H. Butcher [1894])

A connecting word is a nonsignificant sound, which neither [57a] causes nor hinders the union of many sounds into one significant sound;

it may be placed at either end or in the middle of a sentence.

Or, a nonsignificant sound, which out of several sounds, each of them significant, is capable of forming one significant sound - as a)mfi/, peri\, and the like.

Or, a nonsignificant sound, which marks the beginning, end, or division of a sentence; such, however, that it cannot correctly stand by itself at the beginning of a sentence - as me/n, h)/toi, de/.

(tr. W. H. Fyfe [1940])

A conjunction is a sound without meaning, [1457a] which neither hinders nor causes the formation of a single significant sound or phrase out of several sounds,

and which, if the phrase stands by itself, cannot properly stand at the beginning of it, e.g. men, dê, toi, de;

or else it is a sound without meaning capable of forming one significant sound or phrase out of several sounds having each a meaning of their own, e.g. amphi, peri.

A joint is a sound without meaning which marks the beginning or end of a phrase or a division in it, and naturally stands at either end or in the middle.

(tr. van Bennekom)

A conjunction is a non-signifying expression

(tr. Pinborg)

the syndesmos is a non-significative expression

20

which it is not fitting to place by itself at the beginning of a phrase-or-sentence, such as me/n, h)/toi, de/.*

Or: a non-signifying expression whose nature it is to make out of more than one, already signifying, expressions one single signifying expression.

A joint is a non-signifying expression which marks the beginning, end or break in a phrase-or-sentence, such as o(, peri/ and the rest.

Or: a non-signifying expression which neither hinders nor effects the formation of one single signifying expression out of more expressions, whose nature it is to be put at either end as well as in the middle.

which neither prevents nor effects (the form-ation of) one significative expression out of several expressions apt to be placed along with other signs at the ends or in the middle (of a sentence?)

which cannot stand absolutely first in the sentence as men, ētoi, de*

or a non-significative expression which is apt to effect one significative expression out of at least two significative expressions

the arthron is a non-significative expression which shows the beginning, end, or division (diorismōs) of a sentence as e.g. to phēmi (or to amphi) and to peri etc.

or a non-significative expression which neither prevents nor effects (the formation of) one significative expression out of several expressions apt to be placed at the ends or in the middle

* Notice that both van B and P take ētoi materially here, as the second member of A’s list of examples, when, in fact, it functions formally as “or”: i.e. “such as X or [= ētoi] Y”, as will be made clear by the apropos examples excerpted from Aristotle below.

(tr. William of Moerbeke [1278])

Coniunctio autem est vox non significativa que neque prohibet neque facit vocem unam significativam ex pluribus vocibus, natam componi et in extremis et in medio, quam non congruit principio sermonis poni secundum se ipsam, velut ‘quidem’, ‘vel’, ‘autem’;

vox non significativa, aut ex pluribus quidem vocibus una significativam facere nata est unam significativam vocem.

Articulus autem est vox non significativa aut orationis principium aut finem aut Expositionem palificat, puta ‘f . m . i’ et ‘p . e . r . i’ et alia.

Vox non significativa aut neque prohibet neque

(tr. Thomas Tyrwhitt [1794])

Conjunctio autem est vox significationis expers, quae neque impedit, nec facit vocem unam significativam, quae ex pluribus vocibus componi apta est, et in extremitatibus et in medio, etiamsi non conveniat eam in principio orationis ponere per se: velut me\n, h)/toi, de\:

vel est vox significationis expers, quae ex vocibus quidem pluribus quam una, verum signaficativis, apta est facere vocem unam signficativam.

Articulus autem est vox significationis expers, quae orationis initium, aut finem, aut distinctionem a ceteris indicat: * velut o(, dico, et h), et cetera: *

vel est vox significationis expers, quae neque impedit, nec facit vocem unam significativam,

21

facit vocem unam significativam ex pluribus vocibus, natam poni et in extremis et in medio.

quae ex pluribus vocibus componi apta est, et in extremitatibus et in medio.

* Notice how Tyrwhitt replaces the text’s examples of prepositions with the two genders of the Greek definite article, meaning ‘the’. (B.A.M.)

(tr. Petrus Victorius [1560])

Coniunctio autem est vox nihil signficans: quae neque vetat, neque facit vocam unam significativam, ex pluribus vocibus aptam componi, et in extremis et in medio,

nisi congruerit in principio orationis ponere per se. Seu me\n, h)/toi dh\,

vel: vox nihil significans: quae ex pluribus quidem vocibus una, significiativis autem, facere apta est unam vocem.

Articulus autem est vox nihil significans, quae orationis principium aut finem, aut distinctionem indicat, ut to\ fhmi\, et to \w(/ei, et reliqua:

vel vox nihil signficans: quae neque prohibet, neque efficit vocem unam significativam, ex pluribus vocibus natura aptam componi, et in extremis et in medio.

(tr. Antonius Riccobonus [1579])

6. Conjunctio est vox significationis expers, quae neque impedit neque facit vocem unam significativam, quae ex pluribus vocibus componatur, tam in extremis quam in medio,

nisi congruerit in principio orationis ponere per se, ut me\n, h)/toi dh\.

Vel vox non significativa ex pluribus quidem vocibus una, sed significativis, idonea quae facit unam vocem.

7. Articulus est vox significationis expers, orationis initium aut finem aut distinctionem indicans, ut to\ fhmi\, et to\ peri\, et alia.

Vel vox significationis expers, quae neque impedit neque facit vocem unam significativam ex pluribus vocibus, idoneam que componatur et in extremis quam in medio.

* Notice how both translations read nisi congruerit, ‘unless it will not have suited…”, etc. On the tense of the verb here, cf. Frederick Wheelock, Latin. An Introductory Course Based On Ancient Authors, n. 2, p. 156: “The Romans were fond of using the future perfect in the conditional clause…. The psychology of the future perfect is this: the action of the conditional clause is viewed as having been completed ( = a past tense) before that of the conclusion; and since the whole conclusion is projected into the future, the past future, or future perfect, tense is used”.

tr. Buckley:

unless something requires that it should be placed by itself at the beginning; such as me\n, h)\toi, de/.

tr. B.A.M.:

unless it does not suit its nature

unless it is not suitable [for it] to be placed

unless:eplen

22

‘(to) place’ (ponere) = ?

‘is placed’ (ponitur?) = tiqh=nai?

‘to be placed’: = ?

Moerbeke: poni

Minio-Paluello’s Textual Note, p. 24: 30 poni (teqh=nai ?) tiqh=nai

LSJ = aor inf pass

Note that the reading ‘unless’ goes with ‘to be placed’.

unless it ought not to be placedunless it should not be placed

§

23

II. TWO LATIN VERSIONS OF POETICS CH. 20 (1456b 38 ff.) MADE DIRECTLY FROM THE ARABIC VERSION OF ABU BISHR MATTA.

Aristotle, Poetics ch. 20 (1456b 38—1457a 10).

(tr. ed. J. Tkatsch, Die arabische Übersetzung der Poetik und die Grundlage der Kritik

des griechischen Textes)

coniunctio autem est vox composita non indicata velut ‘quidem’ et ‘nonne’.

Etenim quod auditur ex iis est non indicatum, compositum e vocibus multis, quae quidem sunt indicantes vocem verbi unam compositam non indicatam.

Articulus autem ext vox composita non indicata aut initium orationis aut finem eius aut discrimen indicans, velut ‘fe <mi>’ aut ‘propter’ aut ‘sed’.

Et dicitur vox composita non indicata, quae non prohibit neque facit vocem unam indicatum, cuius negotium (est) ut componatur e vocibus multis et in principiis et in medio.

(tr. D. S. Margoliouth, The Poetics of Aristotle, p. 287)

Coniunctio vero est sonus compositus non signficans v.c. quidem et nonne,

nam quod auditum est ab iis non significans compositum est e sonis multis, indicantque sonum [vocem] unum compositum non significantem.

Et separativa quidem sonus est compositus non significans, sive [1457a 5] initium sermonis sive finem vel terminum significans, v.c. et, atque, propter vel autem,

et dicitur sonus compositus non significans qui non prohibit neque facit sonum unum indicantem cuius est componi ex sonis pluribus, et ad capita et ad medium.

N.B. I address certain divergences between Tkatsch and Margoliouth below.

Aristotle, Poetics ch. 20 (1456b 38—1457a 10) (ed. Tkatsch, tr. B.A.M.): A translation based on both Tkatsch & Margoliouth, with a segmentation of the text.

1. But a conjunction is composite1 non-significant vocal sound, (a) such as ‘now’ [or ‘indeed’] [= dh/ ? (cf. Weir Smyth §1094)] and ‘is it not the case?’ [= h)=?].

(b) For what is heard from them is not significative [or ‘signifying’], composed from many vocal sounds,2 which indeed are indicating [i.e. “which indicate” or “make clear”] one composite non-significant vocal sound of the word [?].

2. But an article is a composite non-significant vocal sound (c) indicating the beginning or middle or dividing-point of speech, (d) such as ‘fe<mi>’ [= ??] or ‘because’ [= dia/?] or ‘but’ [= a/lla?],3

(e) and by ‘composite vocal sound non-significative <separately>’ is meant4 (f) what neither impedes nor produces one significant vocal sound, whose business it is [i.e. “to which it pertains”, etc.,

(g) or which is naturally apt (?)] to be composed from many vocal sounds at the beginning and in the middle.5

Notes to the text.

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1 ‘Composite’, being said of ‘speech’, is inappropriate here. Perhaps the underlying Greek was sunete, meaning ‘intelligible’, as in the definition of the syllable, which would suggest the Greek underlying the Syriac, from which the Arabic version comes, had the wrong word, just as some of our MSS do in the definition of the syllable, as is clear from Bywater’s gloss, quoted elsewhere. But even this word is unnecessary to the definition.2 When one compares this phrase to the corresponding part of the second definition, one wonders whether it should also read “and by composite non-significative vocal sound is meant”, etc., or better, “[what is] understood”, rather than “…[what] is heard from them”…etc. In any case, the sentence has the appearance of being cut and pasted from bits and pieces of legible text.3 The examples point to connectives, and not to the article, properly so called.4 Note that the form of expression, “but by X, I mean Y”, ubiquitous in the Poetics, does not occur elsewhere in this chapter in any version of the text that I have seen.5 To which we may add, “and at the end”, if one presumes this phrase to have fallen out of the text.

Translations of the Greek and Arabic versions in parallel:

But a conjunction is a non-significative [1457a] vocal sound which neither impedes nor produces one significative vocal sound out of many vocal sounds naturally apt to be composed at the extremes as well as in the middle,

which it does not suit to place at the beginning of speech by itself, such as me/n [‘indeed’] or de/ [‘and’, ‘but’].

Or else a non-significative vocal sound which [5] out of more than one significative vocal sound is naturally apt to produce one significant vocal sound.

But an article is a non-significative vocal sound which makes clear the beginning or end or dividing-point of speech,

such as a)mfi/ [‘about’] and peri/ [‘concerning’] and the rest.

Or else a non-significative vocal sound

which neither impedes nor produces one significative vocal sound out of many vocal sounds naturally apt to be placed at the extremes as well as [10] in the middle.

1. But a conjunction is composite non-significant vocal sound,

(a) such as ‘now’ [or ‘indeed’] [=dh/ ?] and ‘is it not the case?’ [= h)=?].

(b) For what is heard from them is not significative [or ‘signifying’], composed from many vocal sounds, which indeed are indicating [i.e. “which indicate” or “make clear”] one composite non-significant vocal sound of the word [?].

2. But an article is a composite non-significant vocal sound (c) indicating the beginning or middle or dividing-point of speech,

(d) such as ‘f<e>mi’ [= ??] or ‘because’ [= dia/?] or ‘but’ [= a/lla?],

(e) and by ‘composite non-significant vocal sound’ is meant

(f) what neither impedes nor produces one significant vocal sound, whose business it is [i.e. “to which it pertains”, etc. ,

(g) or which is naturally apt (?)] to be composed from many vocal sounds at the beginning and in the middle.

Aristotle, Poetics ch. 20 (1456b 38—1457a 10) (ed. Tkatsch, tr. B.A.M.).

25

But a conjunction is composite non-significative vocal sound,

such as ‘now’ [or ‘indeed’] [=dh/?] and ‘is it not the case?’ [= h)=?].

For what is heard from them is not significative, composed from many vocal sounds,

which indeed are indicating [i.e. “which indicate” or “make clear”]

one composite non-significative vocal sound of the word [?].

But an article is a composite non-significative vocal sound

|such as ‘fe<mi>’ [= ??] or ‘because’ [= dia/?] or ‘but’ [= a)lla/?],|

|and by ‘composite non-significative vocal sound’ is meant |

indicating the beginning or middle or dividing-point of speech, <...>

what neither impedes nor produces one significative vocal sound,

whose business it is [i.e. “to which it belongs”, etc.]

to be composed from many vocal sounds

in the beginning and in the middle.

Aristotle, Poetics ch. 20 (1456b 38—1457a 10) (ed. Tkatsch, tr. B.A.M.).

But an article is a composite non-significative vocal sound

indicating

the beginning or middle or dividing-point of speech,

such as ‘fe<mi>’ [= ??] or ‘because’ [= dio/per?] or ‘but’ [= a/lla?],

and by ‘composite non-significative vocal sound’ is meant

what neither impedes nor produces one significative vocal sound,

whose business it is [i.e. “to which it belongs”, etc.] to be

composed from many vocal sounds

in the beginning and in the middle.

But a conjunction is composite non-significative vocal sound,

|which indeed are indicating [i.e. “which indicate” or “make clear”]

one composite non-significative vocal sound of the word [?]|.

| such as ‘now [or ‘indeed’] [=dh/ ?] and ‘is it not the case?’ [= h)=?].|

For what is heard from them is not significative,

composed from many vocal sounds, <...>

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Aristotle, Poetics ch. 20 (1456b 38—1457a 10) (ed. & tr. D. S. Margoliouth).

su/ndesmoj de/ e)sti [1457a] fwnh\ a)/shmoj

[h(\ ou)/te kwlu/ei ou)/te poiei= fwnh\n mi/an shmantikh\n e)k pleio/nwn fwnw=n pefukui=a sunti/qesqai kai\ e)pi\ tw=n a)/krwn kai\ e)pi\ tou= me/sou]

h(\n mh\ a(rmo/ttei e)n a)rxh=? lo/gou tiqe/nai kaq' au(th/n, oi(=on me/n h)/toi de/,

h)\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ e)k pleio/nwn me\n [5] fwnw=n mia=j shmantikw=n de\ poiei=n pe/fuken mi/an shmantikh\n fwnh/n.

a)/rqron d' e)sti\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ lo/gou a)rxh\n h)\ te/loj h)\ diorismo\n dhloi=. oi(=on to\ fmi kai\ to\ peri/ kai\ ta\ a)/lla.

h)\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ ou)/te kwlu/ei ou)/te poiei= fwnh\n mi/an shmantikh\n e)k pleio/nwn fwnw=n pefukui=a ti/qesqai kai\ [10] e)pi\ tw=n a)/krwn kai\ e)pi\ tou= me/sou.

A Conjunction is a meaningless utterance,

which ought not to be put at the beginning of a statement by itself, e.g. “indeed,” “either,” “but,”

or “a meaningless utterance, intended to make one intelligible utterance out of a number of intelligible utterances.”

A Separative is a meaningless utterance, which indicates the beginning, end or limitation of a statement, e.g.—;

or “a meaningless utterance neither preventing nor constituting a single significant utterance out of several, capable of being placed at the beginning, middle or end.”

Note on Margoliouth’s commentary.

Correctly observing that “[t]he illustrations are written in the MSS. as abbreviations” (cf. the witnesses cited above), in a note to his translation (appearing on p. 201), Margoliouth goes on to state that “the definition bears some resemblance to those of the ‘prooem’ and ‘period’ in the Rhetoric, bk. iii”. Returning to this question in annotation of the Greek text (cf. p. 286), he adds: “read mh\ and peri/: from Rhetoric 1414b 19 and 1409 a 35, it would seem that these were abbreviations of proi/mion and peri/odoj”. Now if by this remark he wishes us to believe that, inasmuch as a proem “begins a speech”, and a period has in itself a “beginning” (as the texts referenced assert), that they are, in some unexplained manner, “illustrations” of “separatives” (and not ‘articles’?), and that Aristotle actually wrote “such as (a) ‘prooem’ and (a) ‘period’”, this is a strange notion indeed. Whatever the case may be, note further that Margoliouth disregards the evidence of his own rendering of the Arabic tradition, which, according to his Latin translation, “et, atque, propter, and sed”, points to a Greek original reading (presumably) kai\, te, dia/ and a)lla/. But his “solution” also ignores the fact that, in the Rhetoric Bk. III, ch. 6 (1407b 34-35), Aristotle “illustrates” the arthron by the possessive pronoun th=j, and not by ‘proem’, or ‘period’, or any such rhetorical term. As it happens, however, Aristotle’s understanding of both rhetorical terms does, in fact, have a bearing on the interpretation of the text; for the relevance of which definitions, see further below.

* * *

27

Summary of examples:

1. The Arabic Witness:

(A) The first example:

(1) tr. Tkatsch: velut quidem et nonne(2) tr. Margoliouth: v.c. quidem et nonne

= “such as dh/ [= ‘now’, ‘indeed’] and h)= [=‘yes?’]”

N.B. Note that, unlike the readings furnished for the second example, those of the first are entirely unproblematic. Moreover, the particles to which they witness helpfully supplement the witness of the Greek tradition, as we shall see further below.

(B) The second example:

(1) tr. Tkatsch: velut ‘fe<mi>’ aut ‘propter’ aut ‘sed’(2) tr. Margoliouth: v.c. et, atque, propter, autem1

(1) = “such as ‘ph<mi>’ [= ??], or ‘because’ [= dia?, dio?, dio/per?], or ‘but’ [= a)/lla]”(2) = “such as ‘and’ [= kai\], ‘as well’ [= te ?], ‘because’ [= dia?, dio?, dio/per?], ‘but’ [= me/n]” [but why not sed = a)/lla?]

2. The Greek implied by the foregoing: oi(=on to\ f<h>mi h)\ to\ dio/per h)\ to\ a)/lla.

3. The example, as emended by editors, from Aristotle, Poet. ch. 20 (1457a 6): oi(=on to\ a)mfi/ kai\ to\ peri/ kai\ ta\ a)/lla.

4. Comparison of versions:

(1) oi(=on to\ f<mi> h)\ to\ dio/per h)\ to\ a)/lla.(2) oi(=on to\ a)mfi/ kai\ to\ peri/ kai\ ta\ a)/lla.

5. The Witness of the Greek Tradition [= MS Ac]:

(A) The unemended example from MS Ac from Aristotle, Poet. ch. 20 (1457a 6) as given by Vahlen: oi(=on to\ f. m. i. j \ to\ p. e. r. i kai\ ta\ a)/lla.

(B) The unemended example from MS Ac from Aristotle, Poet. ch. 20 (1457a 6) as given by Bywater: oi(=on to\ f. m. i. kai \to\ p. e. r. i. kai\ ta\ a)/lla.

N.B. In the sources cited each letter of the abbreviations has a macron over it; but I am unable to reproduce it here.6. The Witness of William of Moerbeke: puta ‘f . m . i’ et ‘p . e . r . i’ et alia.

1 N.B. Margoliouth’s reading et, atque, etc. is similar to that found in (Hermannus Alemannus’ Latin translation of) Averroes’ Expositio, quoted below: ut est ‘et’, ‘deinde’, ‘atque’, ‘and’, ‘then’, ‘and also’.

28

N.B. Notice that Moerbeke’s rendering [to which we must supply a macron over each letter] removes any doubt about the reading of the Greek, whatever it may mean.

The principal conclusions to be drawn.

With respect to the first example, it is clear that it differs markedly from that surviving in the Greek manuscript tradition. It does, however, somewhat resemble the first examples occurring in the (Arabic) commentaries of Avicenna and Averroes, a point which I discussed in my handling of those witnesses in the paper preceding this one.

With respect to the second example, it is obvious that, looking at both Greek and Arabic traditions, the first words occurring in each,1 to a certain extent, correspond; whereas the reading propter suggests an underlying Greek dio/per, which would account for our reading peri/; but the third members are nearly identical, differing solely by a single letter: ta\ a)/lla (= ‘the rest’) as opposed to (the implied) to\ a)/lla (= ‘the but’).2

Now looking at the various (restored) examples, I believe one should read oi(=on to\ a)mfi/ h)\ to\ dio/per kai\ ta\ a)/lla, the reason being that the preposition amphi taken with the genitive has the meaning I have assigned to it, and so is closely akin to dioper, understood as meaning ‘on account of’, while alla understood as ‘but’ would not be eiusdem generis.

The reading I adopt:

|such as| |a)mfi/ (‘for the sake of’), or dio/per (‘on account of’), and the rest|.

Of course, as I shall argue below, such examples, being of an inflected part of speech, could never have served as examples of the always-inflected articles, the very name of which presumes a mutual adaptation of parts. Hence, if these or like instances of prothetikoi sundesmoi3 ever occurred in the Poetics, their definition must have been lost from the text.

* * *

N.B. Having dealt with the Arabic witness to the definitions in question, I now turn to a close consideration of the main tradition of the text, as this is given by Kassel principally out of MSS Ac and B.

1 Excepting Margoliouth’s et and atque, which I have noticed above.2 Margoliouth’s autem is equally puzzling.3 That is to say, “preposed connectives”.

29

III. THE GREEK TRADITION OF THE TEXT.

Poetics ch. 20 (1456b 38—1457a 10): A segmentation of the received version (by B.A.M.).

def. 1. |But a conjunction is| a. |a non-significative [1457a] vocal sound which

b. (i.) neither impedes nor produces (ii.) one significative vocal sound (iii.) out of many vocal sounds (iv.) naturally apt to be composed (v.) at the extremes as well as in the middle,|

c. | (i) which it does not suit (ii.) to be placed at the beginning of speech by itself|,

(1) |such as me/n [‘indeed’] or de/ [‘and’, ‘but’].|

def. 2. |Or else| d. |a non-significative vocal sound which [5]

e. (i.) out of more than one significative vocal sound (ii.) is naturally apt to produce (iii.) one significative vocal sound.|

def. 3. |But an article is| f. |a non-significative vocal sound which

g. |(i.) makes clear the beginning or end or dividing-point of speech|,

(2) |such as a)mfi/ [‘for the sake of’] and dio/per [‘on account of’] and the rest.|1

def. 4. |Or else| h. |a non-significative vocal sound which

i. (i.) neither impedes nor produces (ii.) one significative vocal sound (iii.) out of many vocal sounds (iv.) naturally apt (v.) to be placed at the extremes as well as [10] in the middle.|

Important Variants.

(1) def. 1 c. (i):

|unless [= plh/n (implied by Buckley as well as Victorius and Riccobonus)] it should not (ii.) to be placed at the beginning of speech by itself|

(2) def. 3 (2):

|Or “such as to\ femi [or to\ a)mfi/] or to\ peri\ and to\ a)/lla”.|

[On the difficulties presented by the textual witnesses for these examples, see further below.]

Elements of the text.

1 oi(=on to\ a)mfi/ h)\ to\ dio/per kai\ ta\ a)/lla.

30

1. Names.

(1) sundesmos (‘connective’; ‘conjunction’)(2) arthron (‘article’; ‘joint’ [‘separative’])

2. Definitions.

(1) (first part): “But a conjunction is a non-significative vocal sound which neither impedes nor produces one significative vocal sound out of many vocal sounds naturally apt to be composed,” etc.

(2) (second part): “...which it does not suit to place at the beginning of speech by itself,” etc. [or, “unless it should not be placed,” etc.]

(3) “Or else a non-significative vocal sound which out of more than one significative vocal sound is naturally apt to produce one significant vocal sound,” etc.

(4) “But an article is a non-significative vocal sound which makes clear the beginning, or end, or dividing-point of speech,” etc.

(5) “Or else a non-significative vocal sound which neither impedes nor produces one significative vocal sound out of many vocal sounds naturally apt to be placed at the extremes as well as in the middle,” etc.

N.B. Notice that the last definition is virtually identical to the first, differing as follows:

1. e)k pleio/nwn fwnw=n pefukui=a sunti/qesqai kai\ e)pi\ tw=n a)/krwn kai\ e)pi\ tou= me/sou, “out of many vocal sounds naturally apt to be composed [= to be placed with] at the extremes as well as in the middle”

2. e)k pleio/nwn fwnw=n pefukui=a ti/qesqai kai\ [10] e)pi\ tw=n a)/krwn kai\ e)pi\ tou= me/sou, “out of many vocal sounds naturally apt to be placed at the extremes as well as in the middle”

3. Examples [with the definite article restored].

(1) “such as o(/ me/n [‘indeed’] or o(/ de/ [‘and’, ‘but’]” (appended to def. 1)1

(2) “such as to\ a)mfi/ [‘for the sake of’] and to\ dio/per [‘on account of’] and the rest.|” (or “such as to\ femi or to\ peri\ and to\ a)lla/”) (appended to def. 3)2

N.B. Notice that the second and fourth definitions lack examples.

4. Genus.

“non-significative vocal sound”

1 On this reading, see further below.2 On the difficulties presented by the text here, see further below.

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5. Differences.

(1) “which neither impedes nor produces one significative vocal sound,” etc.(2) “which...is naturally apt to produce one significative vocal sound,” etc.(3) “which makes clear the beginning, or end, or dividing-point of speech,” etc.(4) “which neither impedes nor produces one significative vocal sound out of many

vocal sounds naturally apt to be placed,” etc.

6. Functions.

(1) what neither impedes nor produces (the formation of) one significative vocal sound out of more than one significative vocal sound (given)

(2) what is naturally apt to produce such a formation (given)(3) what impedes such a formation (implied by the text; see further below)(4) what makes clear the beginning, or end, or dividing-point of speech (given)1

7. The general form of a definition:

An X is a non-significative vocal sound (genus) which does Y (difference) with respect to (another) vocal sound, which is (or which must be) placed here (or there) (= Z) (further differences), such as a or b (examples).

8. The position of particles:

1. “at the extremes as well as in the middle”2. “which it does not suit to place at the beginning of speech by itself”3. “(to be placed) at the extremes as well as in the middle”

9. The three positions in sum:

1. “at the beginning of speech”2. “in the middle”3. “at the extremes”

10. The examples.

(A) The first instance of examples:

R. Kassel: oi(=on me/n h)/toi de/

William of Moerbeke: velut ‘quidem’, ‘vel’, ‘autem’

1 Note that logically 2 should come before 1, and that 3 must be restored to the text, as I will argue below.

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Theodore Buckley: such as me/n, h)/toi, de/

S. H. Butcher: as me/n, h)/toi, de/

Ingram Bywater: oi(=on me/n dh/ toi/ de/; e.g. men, de, toi, de

W. H. Fyfe: e.g. men, dê, toi, de

Richard Janko: e.g. men, etoi, de

H. G. Apostle: e.g. me/n, h)/, toi, de

My version: oi(=on o( me/n kai\ o( de/

(B) The second instance of examples:

R. Kassel: oi(=on to\ a)mfi/ kai\ to\ peri/ kai\ ta\ a)/lla

Butcher: as a)mfi/, peri/ and the like

Buckley: as to\ a)mfi/ and to\ peri/, and others of the like kind

van Bennekom: such as o(, peri/ and the rest

Pinborg: as e.g. to phēmi (or to amphi) and to peri etc.

Moerbeke: puta ‘f . m . i’ et ‘p . e . r . i’ et alia

Victorius: ut to\ fhmi\, et to \w(/ei, et reliqua

Riccobonus: ut to\ fhmi\, et to\ peri\, et alia

My version: oi(=on to\ a)mfi/ h)\ to\ dio/per kai\ ta\ a)/lla

Texts showing Aristotle’s manner of exhibiting examples:

Aristotle, Rhet., III. 5 (1407a 21-22) (tr. W. Rhys Roberts).

For instance, the connective me/n [o( me/n] requires the correlative de/ [o( de/].1

[Aristotle], Prob., XIX. 20 (643b 21-22) (tr. W. S. Hett; rev. B.A.M.)

The same is true in speech; if certain connectives are omitted, such as te and kai/ [oi(=on to\ te kai\ to\ kai/], the language ceases to be Greek….Other examples:

1 hôsper ho men kai ho egô men apaitei ton de kai ton ho de.

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‘Demetrius’, De Eloc. ch. 1. 55 (= Demetrius On Style: The Greek text of Demetrius De Elocutione edited after the Paris manuscript with introd., translation, facsimiles, etc. by W. Rhys Roberts [Cambridge, at the University Press: 1902]). [N.B. Greek taken from ed. Doreen C. Innes]

55. Expletive particles [parapleromatikois sundesmois] must not be employed as pointless appendages and excrescences so to say or expansions, as dê and nu and proteron [t%= “dh\” . . . t%= “nu” kai\ t%= “pro/teron” = “indeed”, “now”, “earlier”] are sometimes aimlessly used. They must be introduced only if they contribute to elevation of expression….

(1) The example of parapleromatic conjunctions from ‘Demetrius’, De Eloc. ch. 1. 55: t%= “dh\” . . . t%= “nu” kai\ t%= “pro/teron”

(2) The example of copulative conjunctions from [Arist.] Probl., XIX. 20 (643b 21-22): oi(=on to\ te kai\ to\ kai.

N.B. One observes here that in the foregoing texts the definite article is employed to set off the examples, as in the second, which reads, oi(=on to\ te kai\ to\ kai/, “such as the te and the kai/”.

The way in which the examples are to be read in an emended version of the text:

It is my view, then, the text of the Poetics should be emended so as to render the examples with the definite article, as follows:

first example: oi(=on o( me/n kai\ [or h)\] o( de/ [= “such as ‘on the one hand’ and [or ‘or’] ‘on the other’”]

second example: oi(=on to\ a)mfi/ h)\ to\ dio/per kai\ ta\ a)/lla [= “such as ‘for the sake of’, and ‘on account of’, and the rest”]

This reading of the second example, of course, points to a definition embracing the preposition, rather than any form of the article, as we understand it. See further below.

An example where no definite article is given in the Greek:

Dionysius Thrax, Techne Grammatike sec. 25 (tr. Alan Kemp, in The History of Linguistics in the Classical Period, ed. Daniel J. Taylor, John Benjamins, 1987, pp. 172-185, p. 185).

8. Expletive conjunctions are those introduced for the sake of the metre or as an embellishment; they comprise dē, rha, nu, pou, toi, thēn, ar, dēta, per, pō, mēn, an, au, nun, oun, ken, ge.38 [N.B. In the Greek text no articles appear.]

38 These expletive conjunctions are mostly untranslatable, except in some case by such words as ‘indeed’, ‘certainly’, ‘of course’.

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IV. THE FIRST DEFINITION: AN EMENDED READING.

In order to see how the text of the first and second definitions might be improved, there are two doctrinal points to consider: first, that the second definition occurring in the text, being a general definition applicable to every species of sundesmos, should, in line with Aristotle’s usual practice,1 come first; and second, that its missing examples, which assuredly included te and kai\, should be restored to the text. In support of these claims, consider the following observations from an elementary Greek grammar:

In English, a conjunction (‘and’, ‘but’) is used to connect two main clauses within a sentence.2 In Greek there are many conjunctions which perform this function. Also, in a Greek paragraph, every sentence is connected to the previous one by means of a conjunction, to show how the new matter is related to what went before.

The commonest conjunctions are:

1) coming first in the clause or sentence: kai/, ‘and’, ‘also’; alla/, ‘but’2) coming second (postpositive) in the clause or sentence: de/, ‘and’, ‘but’, ga\r, ‘for’, ‘because’; ou)=n, ‘therefore’.

Another common connective particle is the enclitic te. It is used in combination with kai\ to mean “both...and”. Because it has no accent, it cannot be the first word in a phrase. Usually it stands second; oi)/ te stratiw)=tai kai\ oi) nau=tai, ‘both the soldiers and the sailors’. It can also come at the end of a phrase, right before kai\: oi)/ te stratiw)=tai te kai\ oi) strathgo/j, ‘both the soldiers and the general’.3

Accordingly, while it is quite natural to find te at the beginning of speech (although not “coming first in the clause or sentence”),4 when it is used with kai/ to mean “both...and”, it should not be placed at the beginning of speech by itself. But such being the case, I propose emending the text as follows:

def. 1 (part 1). |But a conjunction is| from def. 2 a. |a non-significative [1457a] vocal sound which| e. (ii.) is naturally apt to produce (iii.) one significative vocal sound e. (i.) out of more than one significative vocal sound|,

<and which may be placed at the beginning of speech by itself,

(1) |such as| te [enclitic ‘and’] or kai/ [‘and],

1 For one example out of many, cf. De Anima, II. 1 (412a 3 ff.), where Aristotle first defines the soul in common, saying, “We have now stated universally what the soul is....” (= 412b 10; tr. H. G. Apostle). Likewise, in the Metaphysics (cf. V. 26, 1023b 25-26) (tr. W. D. Ross), he defines a ‘whole’ as “that from which is absent none of the parts of which it is said to be naturally a whole....”, with respect to which definition St. Thomas Aquinas states, “First, he gives the common notion of a whole....” (primo ponit rationem communem totius....; In V Meta:, lect. 21, n. 14, tr. B.A.M.).2 More accurately, as well as clauses and sentences,“[c]onjunctions are indeclinable parts of speech which unite two or more other parts of speech....” (Robert Lee Foster, “Glossary of Greek Grammatical Terms”).3 L. A. Wilding’s Greek for Beginners. Revised and expanded by C. W. Shelmerdine (Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing, 2001), § 5. Connections, p. 32.4 Cf. Bywater, op. cit., p, 272, on the postpositives that “grammarians call ‘expletives’”: “Though they stand at the beginning of the lo/goj, they are not an integral part of it.” Likewise with an enclitic particle like te.

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or> (1) |such as me/n or de/ [‘but’, ‘however’]|;5

def. 1 (part 2) c. |(i) unless it should not (ii.) be placed at the beginning of speech by itself,

|such as| <te when it is to be followed by kai/ [meaning ‘both...and’];>2

or (1) bis |such as me/n [‘on the one hand’] <when it is to be followed by> de/ [‘on the other hand’].|3 [end]

When they are placed side by side, notice how much of the received text finds a place in my emended version:

(the received text)

def. 1. |But a conjunction is| from def. 2 a. |a non-significative [1457a] vocal sound which e. (i.) out of more than one significative vocal sound (ii.) is naturally apt to produce (iii.) one significative vocal sound|

def. 1 (iv) naturally apt to be composed (v.) at the extremes as well as in the middle,|4

[examples missing from the original:]

(1) |such as me/n [‘indeed’] or de/ [‘and’, ‘but’];

c. | (i) which it does not suit (ii.) be placed at the beginning of speech by itself|,

[examples missing from the original:]

[examples adapted from the original:]

(the revised version)

def. 1 (part 1). |But a conjunction is a. |a non-significative [1457a] vocal sound which| (from def. 2) e. (ii.) |is naturally apt to produce (iii.) one significative vocal sound (i.) out of more than one significative vocal sound |,

<and which may be placed at the beginning of speech by itself,|

(1) |such as| te [enclitic ‘and’] or kai/ [‘and],

or> (1) |such as me/n or de/ [adversative ‘but’, ‘however’]|,

def. 1 (part 2) c. |(i) unless it should not (ii.) be placed at the beginning of speech by itself,

|such as| <te when it is to be followed by kai/ [meaning ‘both...and’];>

or (1) bis |such as me/n [‘on the one hand’] <when it is to be followed by> de/ [‘on the other hand’].|

In support of the foregoing emendations, as well as of subsequent changes I propose, it will be helpful to lay before the reader the following authoritative accounts of connective particles.

5 On the copulative as opposed to the expletive use of me/n and de/, cf. Herbert Weir Smyth, A Greek Grammar for Colleges, §2163 B: “de/ (postpositive, often with me/n in the preceding clause) but”. The reader will find the passage from which this observation has been taken cited more fully in the next section.2 Cf. the observation from [Aristotle], Probl. XIX. 20 (643b 13-28) on the importance of te and kai\; such particles being necessary if there is to be sense at all.3 The example manifesting the exigency that “one make them correspond in their natural order of priority and posteriority, the way some of them require”, as Aristotle explains (cf. Rhet. II. 5, 1457a 17 ff., tr. Ineke Sluiter), my version presuming him to have expressed himself in a similar way here. Note, too, the parallel with te and kai\, their corresponsive use also requiring such a placement.4 Note that this member of the text will find a place in my reconstruction of the next definition.

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V. ON CONJUNCTIONS IN GENERAL.

Herbert Weir Smyth, A Greek Grammar for Colleges.

Part IV: Syntax: SYNTAX OF THE COMPOUND SENTENCE

§2162. A compound sentence consists of two or more simple sentences, grammatically independent of one another and generally united by a coördinating conjunction. Thus, th=? de\ u(sterai/a? e)poreu/onto dia\ tou= pedi/ou ? kai\ ? Tissafe/rnhj ei(/peto but on the next day they proceeded through the plain and Tissaphernes kept following them X. A. 3.4.18 . a. Abbreviated compound sentences, i.e. sentences containing a compound subject with a single verbal predicate or a single subject with a compound verbal predicate, are treated in this book as expanded simple sentences (923, 924).

§2163. Greek has, among others, the following coördinating conjunctions, the uses of which in connecting sentences, clauses, phrases, and single words are described under Particles.

A. Copulative conjunctions: te/ (enclitic), kai/ and, te\. te/, te\ . . [p. 484] kai/, kai\ . . . kai/ both . . . and, ou)de/ (mhde/ ) and not, nor, ou)/te . . . ou)/te (mh/te . . . mh/te ) neither . . . nor. B. Adversative conjunctions: a)lla/ but, de/ (postpositive, often with me/n in the preceding clause) but, and, a)ta/r but, yet, however, me/ntoi (postpositive) however, yet, kai/toi and yet. C. Disjunctive conjunctions: h)/ or, h)\ . . . h)/ either . . . or, ei)/te . . . ei)/te (without a verb) either . . . or. D. Inferential conjunctions: a)/ra then, accordingly, ou)=n therefore, then, nu=n (in the poetic and enclitic forms nun and nuVn ) then, therefore, toi/nun now, then, toiga/r (poetic), toiga/rtoi, toigarou=n so then, therefore. E. Causal conjunction: ga/r for.

§2164. Compound sentences are divided into Copulative, Adversative, Disjunctive, Inferential, and Causal sentences.

§2769. Under the head of particles are included sentence adverbs (1094) and conjunctions. Many sentence adverbs remained such, some sank to mere enclitics, others became pure conjunctions, while still others fluctuated in function, being now adverbial, now conjunctional, as kai/ even and and, ou)de/ not even and nor, ga/r in fact and for, pri/n sooner and until or before.

§2770. Conjunctions are either coördinating or subordinating. The coördinating conjunctions with their several varieties are given in 2163. The subordinating conjunctions are Causal: o(/ti, dio/ti, dio/per, e)pei/, e)peidh/, o(/te, o(po/te, w(j (2240). Comparative: w(j, w(/sper, kaqa/per, o(/pwj, h(=?, o(/ph?, h(=?per (2463; cp. 2481). Concessive: kai\ ei) (kei' ), kai\ e)o/Vn (ka)/Vn ), ei) kai/, e)a\Vn kai/ (2369). Conditional: ei), e)a/Vn, h)/n, a)/Vn (2283). Consecutive: w(/ste, w(j (2250).

37

Declarative: o(/ti, dio/ti, ou(/neka, o(qou/neka, w(j (2578). Final: i(/na, o(/pwj, w(j, mh/ , etc. (2193; cp. 2209, 2221). Local: ou(=, o(/pou, oi(=, o(/poi, e)/nqa, o(/qen, o(po/qen, h(=?, o(/ph? , etc (2498). Temporal: o(/te, o(po/te, h(ni/ka, e)pei/, e)peidh/, w(j, me/xri, e)/ste, e(/wj, pri/n, etc (2383)....

§2801. a)ta/r (prepositive; Hom. also au)ta/r from au)=te + a)/r) usually poetical, but found in Xenophon and Plato, is an adversative conjunction commonly used to introduce a strong or surprising contrast (but, but yet, however); sometimes to introduce a slight contrast (and, and then), but one stronger than that marked by de/. a)ta/r is common as a correlative to me/n. It is often found in lively questions to introduce an objection; in rapid transitions; and sometimes it serves to introduce the apodosis of a conditional sentence. a)ta/r was largely displaced by the stronger a)lla/....

§2285. The apodosis may be introduced by de/ or a)lla/, less often by au)ta/r. See under Particles. nu=n de/ as it is, as it was corrects a supposition contrary to fact. The apodosis sometimes has to/te, to/te dh/, ou(/twj (Hom. tw=? ) comparable to Eng. then, in that case in the conclusion of conditional sentences.

J. D. Denniston, The Greek Particles (2nd ed., Oxford 1954). Introduction, The Origins and Functions of Particles, pp. xlvii-xlviii.

(6) The different methods of connexion. These are, broadly speaking, four: (a) Additional, (b) Adversative, (c) Confirmatory, (d) Inferential. But the divisions are everywhere fluid. (a) is represented at its purest by kai\ and te (though de/ is often hardly tinged with adversative colour); one idea is simply added to another without any indication of a logical relation between the two.1 A variant of (a) is what I shall term the ‘progressive’2 use of particles, or combinations of particles, conveying not merely the static piling-up of ideas, but movement of thought: ‘now’, ‘again’, ‘further’, ‘to proceed’: e.g. mh/n, a)lla\ mh/n, ge [xlvii-xlviii]

1 The logical relation may be inherent in the context, though not expressed by the particle. kai\, like ‘and’, sometimes stands where ‘and yet’ is implied (pp. 292-3). So, occasionally, te (p. 514 ad fin.). Again, de/, meaning ‘and’, is sometimes used where the logical relation would properly be expressed by ga/r, ou)=n, h)/ (pp. 169-71). 2 I prefer this term to ‘continuative’, which some writers have employed. A man going round in circles in the desert ‘continues’, but does not ‘progress’. [N.B. The ‘progressive’ or ‘continuative’ particles are also called ‘conjunctive’ adverbs by several of our authorities. (B.A.M.)]

mh/n, kai\ mh/n, me/ntoi.1 The same significance may be reached from the direction of (d), where ou)=n and ou)kou=n degenerated from propter hoc to post hoc.2

1 Even within the limits of this class a certain distinction may be drawn, in the uses of such combinations as kai\ mh/n, and toi/nwn, between the mere transition to a new item in an enumerative series, or to a fresh argument, and at the arrival of a new stage in the logical process. The former may usually best be rendered ‘again’, ‘further’, the latter, ‘now’, ‘well’.2 The post hoc sense is clearly the later in ou)=n, and also, I think, in ou)kou=n....

38

VI. ON PARTICLES IN GENERAL.

J. D. Denniston, The Greek Particles (2nd ed., Oxford 1954). Introduction, The Origins and Functions of Particles, pp. xxxvii-xxxix.

(1) Difficult as it is to arrive at a satisfactory definition of particle, an attempt must be made at the outset. I will define it as a word expressing a mode of thought, considered either in isolation or in relation to another thought,1 or a mood of emotion.

<...>

(2) The particles which, in origin, express a mode of thought in isolation are ge, dh/, h)=, qhn, mh/n, per, toi, pou. Of these, toi presses an idea upon the attention of the person addressed; ‘I would have you know (or remember)’; pou conveys doubt, ‘I [xxxvii-xxxviii]

1 This distinction cannot, however, be rigidly maintained everywhere. While in the case of adjectives and adverbs, and verbs derived from adjectives, emphasis may be added without any external reference (kalo/n ge, ‘Fine!’, Eu)= ge, ‘Excellent!’, Eu)tuxw= ge, ‘I am lucky’), emphasis on substantives and most verbs necessarily implies a contrast with some other thing or action, however dimly the contrasted idea may be envisaged. [remainder of note omitted]

suppose’. The remainder primarily carry emphasis.[1]

Further, emphasis may take different forms: (i) Affirmative, denoting that something really and truly is so: (ii) Intensive, denoting that something is very much so; (iii) Determinative, concentrating the attention on one idea to the exclusion of all else: (iv) Limitative, implying that beyond the prescribed limits the reverse may be true. Thus (i) ‘I am really sorry’ implies, almost of necessity, (ii) ‘I am very sorry’. (i) ‘It is really James’ suggests (iii) ‘It’s James and no other’. In certain contexts (iii) suggests (iv). We should not therefore expect to find, and we do not in fact find, precise delimitation of the usages of emphatic particles.

Affirmation is expressed par excellence by h)=, which (as its regular position, first word in the sentence, indicates) affects the thought as a whole: while dh/ and ge tend to cohere with the preceding word. h)= polloi\ tou=to poiou=si, ‘in truth many do this’: in polloi\ dh\ tou=to poiou=si, dh/ is almost an adverb, and polloi\ dh\, ‘really many’, is not quite the same as ma/la polloi\, ‘very many’.

Of the other emphatic particles, mh/n perhaps comes nearest in force to h)=, though less subjective in tone: and in Homer ou) mh/n in negation appears to be the counterpart of h)= in affirmation. The intensive and determinative functions are shared by ge, dh/, and per. Taking Greek as a whole, ge is the particle most commonly used for expressing determination. Interrogation is expressed by h)= (from which, combined with a)/ra, interrogative a)/ra is probably derived): though strictly speaking, the interrogation is not expressed by the particle, but understood: Poiei=j tou=to; ‘Do you do this? ’ )=H poiei=j tou=to; ‘Do you really do this?’

1 Note that these particles are called ‘sentence’ adverbs by Weir Smyth and other grammarians cited below.

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Herbert Weir Smyth, A Greek Grammar for Colleges, Part IV: Syntax. Adverbs.

§1094. Adverbs are of two kinds

a. Ordinary adverbs, denoting manner, degree, time, place, etc. Ordinary adverbs qualify verbs, adjectives, other adverbs, and (rarely) substantives: o)/pisqen geno/menoj getting behind X. A. 1.8.24 , eu)qu\j e)bo/aV straightway he shouted 1. 8. 1, fanero\n h)/dh already clear L. 4.6 , polu\ qa=tton much more quickly X. A. 1.5.2 , eu)= ma/la very easily 6. 1. 1, ei)ko/twj tro/pon tina/ in a way reasonably D. 8.41 , ma/la sumfora/V a great misfortune X. C. 4.2.5 , ma/la strathgo/j an excellent general X. H. 6.2.39 .

b. Sentence adverbs (or particles) are adverbs that affect the sentence as a whole or give emphasis to particular words of any kind.

Greek has many sentence adverbs, some of which are treated more fully under Particles. Such are words of interrogation (h)=, a)=ra, mw=n); of affirmation and confidence (dh/ now, indeed, dh=ta surely, ge/ at least, even, h)= really, mh/n in truth, nh/ surely, [p. 284] toi/ surely); of uncertainty (i)/swj, pou/, ta/xa perhaps); of negation (ou), mh/, ou)/toi, mh/toi, etc.); of limitation (a)/n 1761 ff.).

Herbert Weir Smyth, A Greek Grammar for Colleges.

§2769. Under the head of particles are included sentence adverbs (1094) and conjunctions. Many sentence adverbs remained such, some sank to mere enclitics,1 others became pure conjunctions, while still others fluctuated in function, being now adverbial, now conjunctional, as kai/ even and and, ou)de/ not even and nor, ga/r in fact and for, pri/n sooner and until or before. <...>

§2771. Greek has an extraordinary number of sentence adverbs (or particles in the narrow sense) having a logical or emotional (rhetorical) value. Either alone or in combination these sentence adverbs give a distinctness to the relations between ideas which is foreign to other languages, and often resist translation by separate words, which in English are frequently over emphatic and cumbersome in comparison to the light and delicate nature of the Greek originals (e.g. a)/ra, ge/, toi/). The force of such words is frequently best rendered by pause, stress, or alterations of pitch. To catch the subtle and elusive meaning of these often apparently insignificant elements of speech challenges the utmost vigilance and skill of the student.

§2772. The particles show different degrees of independence as regards their position. Many are completely independent and may occupy any place in the sentence; some may occur only at the beginning (prepositive particles, as a)ta/r); others find their place only after one or more words at the beginning (postpositive particles, as ga/r, de/); and some are attached closely to a preceding word or even form compounds with that word wherever it may occur (ge/, te/).

1 Cf. Plutarch, Quaest. Plat. X on “Athensward”.

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§2773. Some verbal forms have virtually become particles, e.g. a)/ge used with the second person plural, o(ra=?j used of several persons, parenthetic oi)=mai, dh=loi o(/ti, eu)= oi)=d' o(/ti, eu)= i)/sq' o(/ti (2585).

§2774. As regards their meaning, particles may be arranged in classes, e.g. adversative, affirmative, asseverative, concessive, confirmative, conjunctive, inferential, intensive, interrogative, limitative, negative, etc. These classes cannot always be sharply distinguished: some particles fall under two or more classes.

Many particles, which serve to set forth the logical relation between clauses, have originally only an intensive or confirmatory force that was confined to their own clause. The following sections deal only with the commoner uses of the most noteworthy particles.

Herbert Weir Smyth, A Greek Grammar for Colleges.

§3005. Anacoluthon is, in general, caused either (a) by the choice of some form of expression more convenient or more effective than that for which the sentence was grammatically planned; at times, too, the disturbing influence is the insertion of a brief expression of an additional thought not foreseen at the start. Or (b) by the intrusion of some explanation requiring a parenthesis of such an extent that the connection is obscured or the continuation of the original structure made difficult.

In this case the beginning may be repeated, or what has already been said be summed up in a different grammatical form and sometimes with the addition of a resumptive particle, such as dê, oun well then, then, as I was saying (X. A. 1.8.13 , 3. 1. 20, X. C. 3.3.9 ). So with de (T. 8.29. 2).

The Mayfield Handbook of Technical and Scientific Writing. Sentence Adverbs.1

Sentence adverbs express the certainty or uncertainty of the state or action described in the sentence. Sentence adverbs typically are placed between the subject and the first verb of the sentence, or after the first auxiliary verb, if one is present. Some common sentence adverbs are certainly, possibly, and probably.

Computers probably would have been developed even without government funding. Computers would probably have been developed even without government funding.

The Internet Grammar of English, Sentence Adverbs.2

We conclude by looking at a set of adverbs which qualify a whole sentence, and not just a part of it. Consider the following:   Honestly, it doesn't matter.

1 (https://mit.imoat.net/handbook/adv-s.htm [1/9/06])2 (http://www.ucl.ac.uk/internet-grammar/adverbs/xadvb4.htm [1/9/06])

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Here the sentence adverb honestly modifies the whole sentence, and it expresses the speaker’s opinion about what is being said (When I say it doesn't matter, I am speaking honestly). Here are some more examples:

Clearly, he has no excuse for such behaviour.Frankly, I don't care about your problems.Unfortunately, no refunds can be given.

Some sentence adverbs link a sentence with a preceding one:   England played well in the first half. However, in the second half their weaknesses were revealed. 

Other sentence adverbs of this type are accordingly, consequently, hence, moreover, similarly, and therefore.

[N.B. See also on the parapleromatic conjunctions below, as well as Appendix II on tropos.]

Conjunctions and particles sum:

To begin with, there is a distinction to be drawn among conjunctions between those that are coordinating and those that are subordinating. Likewise, among particles there is a conjunctive use which some of them have, with respect to which Denniston calls them ‘progressive’; but also an emphatic use distinct from the foregoing, with respect to which Weir Smyth names them ‘sentence’ adverbs; this sort being the type which Denniston describes as “expressing a mode of thought in isolation”. And note how Denniston groups the conjunctive adverbs he calls ‘progressive’ particles with the coordinating conjunctions, a reasonable procedure inasmuch as they agree in function. Further distinctions to be drawn among the particles will be met with below.

* * *

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VII. ON CONJUNCTIVE ADVERBS AND EXPLETIVE PARTICLES.

On the several species of conjunction:

Robert Harris, Virtual Salt.com. Conjunctions. Version Date: December 10, 1997.1

As their name implies, conjunctions join together elements of thought: words, phrases, sentences, and paragraphs.

Coordinating conjunctions are the simplest kind, and they denote equality of relationship between the ideas they join. Their relatives, correlative conjunctions, not only denote equality, but they also make the joining tighter and more emphatic.

Coordinating Conjunctions Correlative Conjunctions

and but or nor for so yet

both . . . and not only . . . but also

either . . . or neither . . . nor whether . . . or

just as . . . so too

Examples:

John and Sally built a fish pond. The train was late, and Tom was tired. Just as the smell of baking brought back memories, so too did the taste of the cider.

Coordinating and correlative conjunctions are great when two ideas are of the same importance, but many times one idea is more important than another. Subordinating conjunctions allow a writer to show which idea is more and which is less important. The idea in the main clause is the more important, while the idea in the subordinate clause (made subordinate by the subordinating conjunction) is less important. The subordinate clause supplies a time, reason, condition, and so on for the main clause.  

Subordinating Conjunctions

Time Reason Concession Place Condition Manner

after before since when

because since

so that in order that

although though

even though while

where wherever

if unless until

in case

as if as though

how

1 (http://www.virtualsalt.com/conjunct.htm [12/8/05])

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whenever while until as

as . . . as once

why provided that assuming that

even if

Examples:

Sally steamed the corn while Fred fried the steaks. After the rain stopped, the dog ran into the mud to play. The snowman melted because the sun came out. Even though John fell asleep, the telephone salesman kept talking.

Conjunctive adverbs make up an even stronger category of conjunctions. They show logical relationships between two independent sentences, between sections of paragraphs, or between entire paragraphs.1 Conjunctive adverbs are so emphatic that they should be used sparingly; however, when used appropriately, they can be quite effective. 

Conjunctive Adverbs

also hence

however still

likewise otherwise therefore

conversely rather

consequently furthermore nevertheless

instead moreover

then thus

meanwhile accordingly

Examples:

If the salmon is grilled, I will have that; otherwise, I might have the chicken. James has a garage full of woodworking tools. He might, however, have some

metric wrenches, too. I do not recommend that you play with a stick of dynamite lit at both ends. Rather,

a ham sandwich would be better for you.

Relative pronouns and relative adjectives [read adverbs] are also used to join ideas together by creating adjective or noun clauses, which allow a writer to create smoother, more flowing and effective sentences by combining ideas.

1 Note that these particles are the same as those called progressive by Denniston.

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Relative Pronouns and Relative Adjectives [read Adverbs]

who whom whose

whoever whomever

which that what

whichever whatever

Examples:

This is the man who sells peanuts. Tell me what you want. Hers is an idea that I would like to think through. The shirts, which are in the laundry, will need ironing.

Adverbs of time, place, and sequence are actually transitions of logic, but as such they also have conjunctive force, because they connect ideas by showing a time relationship.  

Adverbs of Time, Place, and Sequence

earlier next lastly later

before after

then now soon here there today

first second third

fourth eventually tomorrow

Examples:

The twilight glides away. Soon night will awake. First, get a pad and pencil. Next, find a quiet place to think.

Expletives are closely related to conjunctive adverbs. The “official” line on expletives is that they convey no meaning of their own but instead serve only to emphasize the statement to which they are attached. As such, then, they technically do not show a logical relationship like time or cause between ideas, and that fact prevents them from being true-blue conjunctive adverbs. But it could be argued that expletives create a relationship of emphasis between ideas: this new idea is important in light of what preceded it. Indeed, that is why they are included here.

Expletives

of course indeed

naturally

in fact I think

it seems

to be sure without doubt

for all that

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after all in short I hope at least

remarkably

in brief clearly

I suppose assuredly definitely

on the whole in any event importantly

certainly naturally

Examples:

The flashlight hit the floor and broke into a hundred pieces. At least there was a candle in the room.

They all began to use appropriate expletives in their writing. They were convinced, I suppose, by the excellent examples.

The conjunction list has left the building. On the whole, I hope you enjoyed it. [end]

The division of the connective parts of speech according to Robert Harris:

The conjunction, which is divided in one way into coordinating, correlative, and subordinating

Conjunctive adverbs (the same as sentence adverbs, although Harris doesn’t name them thus)

Relative pronouns and relative adverbs Adverbs of time Expletives

Bruce E. Clark, Use of Rhetorical Devices.1

1. Expletive is a single word or short phrase, usually interrupting normal syntax, used to lend emphasis to the words immediately proximate to the expletive. (We emphasize the words on each side of a pause or interruption in order to maintain continuity of the thought.) Compare:

But the lake was not drained before April. But the lake was not, in fact, drained before April.

Expletives are most frequently placed near the beginning of a sentence, where important material has been placed:

All truth is not, indeed, of equal importance; but if little violations are allowed, every violation will in time be thought little. --Samuel Johnson

But sometimes they are placed at the very beginning of a sentence, thereby serving as signals that the whole sentence is especially important. In such cases the sentence should be kept as short as possible:

1 (http://www.megabrands.com/carroll/faq3.html [1/2/06]) I return to this excerpt in my discussion of the parapleromatic connectives below.

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In short, the cobbler had neglected his soul. Indeed, the water I give him will become in him a spring of water welling up to

eternal life. --John 4:14 (NIV)

Or the author may show that he does not intend to underemphasize an objection or argument he rejects:

To be sure, no one desires to live in a foul and disgusting environment. But neither do we want to desert our cities.

In a few instances, especially with short sentences, the expletive can be placed last:

It was a hot day indeed. Harold won, of course.

A common practice is setting off the expletive by commas, which increases the emphasis on the surrounding words, though in many cases the commas are necessary for clarity as well and cannot be omitted. Note how the expletive itself is also emphasized:

He without doubt can be trusted with a cookie. He, without doubt, can be trusted with a cookie.

An expletive can emphasize a phrase:

The Bradys, clearly a happy family, live in an old house with squeaky floors.

Transitional phrases, accostives, some adverbs, and other interrupters can be used for emphasizing portions of sentences, and therefore function as kinds of quasi-expletives in those circumstances.

We find a few people, however, unwilling to come. “Your last remark,” he said, “is impertinent.” There is nothing, Sir, too little for so little a creature as man. --Samuel Johnson

Some useful expletives include the following: in fact, of course, indeed, I think, without doubt, to be sure, naturally, it seems, after all, for all that, in brief, on the whole, in short, to tell the truth, in any event, clearly, I suppose, I hope, at least, assuredly, certainly, remarkably, importantly, definitely. In formal writing, avoid these and similar expletives: you know, you see, huh, get this. And it goes without saying that you should avoid the unprintable ones.

* * *

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VIII. ON THE CONNECTIVES MEN AND DE.

The particles me/n and de/ as being ‘corresponsive’:

L. A. Wilding’s Greek for Beginners. Revised and expanded by C. W. Shelmerdine (Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing, 2001), p. 33.

6. me/n and de/

me/n and de/ signal words or clauses which correspond to or contrast with each other. me/n signals the first part of the contrast, de/ the second part (and subsequent parts, if they exist). These two words are both postpositive; each comes second in the phrase or clause which is the point of the contrast. me/n shows that a correspondence or contrast is being set up; there is no need to translate it. As usual de/ can mean ‘and’ or ‘but’.

Donald J. Mastronarde, Introduction to Attic Greek. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 86.

d. X me/n . . . Y de/. A very important use of de/, and one which is especially characteristic of Greek thought and idiom, is its use in combination with the postpositive particle me/n to create a contrast between antithetic elements (or sometimes simply an emphatic link between enumerated elements). The force of me/n is to anticipate an antithesis by marking its beginning;1 the second element is most often joined by de/. The contrasted elements may be single words, parallel phrases, or entire clauses.

J. D. Denniston, The Greek Particles (2nd ed., Oxford 1954). Introduction, The Origins and Functions of Particles, pp. xli-xlii.

(e) The corresponsive particles. Coherence of thought is adequately secured by the presence of a backward-pointing particle. The reader or listener, when he has reached a certain [xli-xlii] point, meets a particle which looks back to the road he has traversed, and beckons him on in a certain direction. But greater coherence is attained if in addition a forward-pointing particle warns him in advance what path he will soon have to travel, the connexion being expressed reciprocally, from rear to van and from van to rear. It is characteristic of the Greek love of orderliness and lucidity that this double method of connexion is already present in Homer. The forward-pointing particles, which we may describe as ‘preparatory’,1 are me/n, te, and kai\. me/n is most frequently answered by de\, but often, too, by other particles: te by te or kai by kai. The mutual relationship between the earlier and the later particle may be expressed by the term ‘corresponsive’. In particular, the commonness of me/n. . . de/ in all periods of classical Greek has often been noticed. The tendency to view one idea in the light of another idea more or less sharply contrasted with it was indeed innate in the Greek mentality (and occasionally led to the employment of merely formal antithesis for its own sake).

1 This observation should be borne in mind when we come to deal with the definition of the article.

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The result is a great gain in clearness and precision. Often, when a writer embarks upon a disquisition which appears to invalidate his own point of view, me/n indicates that the aberration is only temporary, and that he will return after a time to the straight path.3

1 A forward-looking particle demands a backward-pointing one to answer it….2 Demetrius, De Elocutione 24, in discussing this matter, quotes Epicharmus’ parody: to/ka me\n e)n th/noij e)gw)n h)=, to/ka de\ para\ th/noij e)gw/n. Pearson, Fragments of Sophocles, vol.. ii, p. 298, observes: ‘The Greeks saw a contrast everywhere, and sometimes overdid it’.3 Writers of Greek prose versions sometimes fall short of the Greek standard of lucidity in this respect.

‘Demetrius’, De Eloc., ch. II, n. 24 (= Demetrius On Style: The Greek text of Demetrius De Elocutione edited after the Paris manuscript with introd., translation, facsimiles, etc. by W. Rhys Roberts. Cambridge, at the University Press: 1902).

24. There are some members which, although not really opposed to one another, are apparently antithetical owing to the antithetic form in which they are written. Such is the pleasantry of the poet Epicharmus: ‘One time in their midst was I, another time beside them I’ (Epich. Fragm. 147, G. Kaibel C. G. F.) A single thought is here expressed, and there is no real opposition. But the turn of the phrase, which apes an antithesis, suggests a desire to mislead. Probably the poet employed the antithesis by way of jest, and also in mockery of the rhetoricians.

‘Demetrius’, De Eloc., ch. II, n. 53 (= Demetrius On Style: The Greek text of Demetrius De Elocutione edited after the Paris manuscript with introd., translation, facsimiles, etc. by W. Rhys Roberts. Cambridge, at the University Press: 1902).

53. Connectives, again, such as men and de, should not correspond too nicely. There is something trivial in excessive nicety. A certain negligence in the use of particles is desirable, just as Antiphon somewhere says: ‘for the island we inhabit can be seen from a distance to be lofty and rugged. Those parts of it which are tilled and useful are insignificant, while the uncultivated portions are many, small though the island is’ (Antiphon, Fragm. 30; Blass). There is here only one de to answer to the repeated men.

Aristotle, Rhet., III. 5 (1407a 17-30) (tr. W. Rhys Roberts).

Such, then, are the ingredients of which speech is composed. The foundation of good style is correctness of language, which falls under five heads. (1) First, the proper [20] use of connecting words [sundesmoi], and the arrangement of them in the natural sequence which some of them require. For instance, the connective me/n (e.g. e)gw\ me/n) requires the correlative de/ (e.g. o( de/) [ho men kai ho egô men apaitei ton de kai ton ho de]. The answering word must be brought in before the first has been forgotten, and not be widely separated from it; nor, except in the few cases where this is appropriate, is another connective to be [25] introduced before the one required. Consider the sentence, ‘But I, as soon as he told me (for [gar] Cleon had come begging and [kai] praying), took them along and set out.’1 In this sentence many connecting words are inserted in front of the one  required to complete the sense; and if there is a long interval before ‘set out’, the

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result is obscurity. One merit, then, of good style lies in the right use of connecting [30] words.1 [The text of the two preceding sentences is subject to considerable doubt.] (Roberts’ note)

N.B. The “many connecting words” inserted in front of the one required to complete the sense are the copulative conjunctions gar, ‘for’, and kai, ‘and’.

[Anaximenes of Lampsacus], Rhetoric to Alexander, XXV (1435a 34—1435b 5) (tr. H. Rackham).1

First, call everything you speak of by its proper name, avoiding ambiguity. Beware of putting vowels in juxtaposition.a Study the construction [35] of the sentence, so as to avoid both confusion and transposition of words, since these cause them to be difficult to catch. After employing introductory particles put in following particles.2 An example of putting in a following particle to correspond [40] is: ‘I one the one hand [e)gw\ me\n] turned up where I said I [1435b] would, but you on the other hand [de\], though you declared that you were going to be there, did not come.’ Again, when the same particle follows, as: ‘For you both [ka)kei/nwn] were the cause of that and [kai\] are the cause of this.’ That is an account of connecting particles [tw=n sunde/smwn]; from the instances mentioned you must infer about the others [5] also.

a Perhaps the reference is to elisions that cause ambiguity, e.g. Theognis 112 mnh=ma de\ xou=si or d’ e)/xousi (Rhys Roberts quoted by Forster).... (Rackham’s note.)

Ineke Sluiter, Parapleromatic Lucubrations, pp. 236. 3

Their correct use will lead to clarity and Hellenismos. In Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the first factor contributing to Hellenismos is said to consist in the right use of σύνδεσμοι (Rhet. III 5, 1407al9ff.)

έστι δ' αρχή της λέξεως το ελληνίζειν τοΰτο δ' εστίν έν πέντε, πρώτον μεν έν τοις συνδέσμοις, αν αποδίδω τις ώς πεφύκασι πρότεροι και ύστεροι γίγνεσθαι αλλήλων, οίον ένιοι άπαιτοΰσιν, ώσπερ ό μέν και ό έγώ μέν απαιτεί τον δέ και τον ό δε δει δε έως μεμνηται άνταποδιδόναι άλλήλοις, και μήτε μακράν άπαρταν μήτε σύνδεσμον προ συνδέσμου άποδιδόναιτου αναγκαίου κτλ. ‘The beginning of good style is Hellenismos, pure Greek. This consists in five elements, first in the use of “conjunctions”, if one makes them correspond in their natural order of priority and posteriority, the way some of them require, e.g. men and ego men require de and ho de. They should be made to correspond to one another as long as they are still fresh in memory, and should not be made to connect at a long distance, nor should one make a different “conjunction” correspond instead of the necessary one’.

1 Note that, since the work from which the following citation is taken occurs in the Corpus Aristotelicum, and was for a long time thought to be by Aristotle himself, it was printed by Bekker in his Berlin edition. Hence it has “Bekker numbers”. (B.A.M.)2 meta\ de\ sunde/smouj ou(\j a)\n proei/p$j, a)podi/dou tou\j a)kolouqou=ntaj.3 (https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/retrieve/4156/347_017.pdf+parapleromatic&hl=en [11/11/05])

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The desirable quick resolution of the expectancy created by a syndesmos corresponds to the way good composers quickly revert to the mese in the Problemata.[Aristotle], Probl., XIX. 20 (643b 13-28) (tr. W. S. Hett; rev. B.A.M.)

Why is it that, if one shifts the mese after tuning the other strings, and then plays the instrument, it is not only when the tune touches the sound of the mese that it is unpleasant and seems out of tune, but also all the rest of the melody? If, on the other hand, one shifts the lichanos or any other note, then the difference is only apparent when one employs this particular note. This is only natural, for all the best tunes make frequent use of the [20] mese, and all good musicians employ it frequently, and quickly revert to it, if they leave it, but not to any other note to the same extent. The same is true in speech; if certain connectives [sundesmoi] are omitted, such as te and kai/ [oi(=on to\ te kai\ to\ kai/], the language ceases to be Greek; but the omission of others gives no such offence, because there are some conjunctions which one [25] must use often if there is to be sense, but with others it is not so. In the same way with sounds, the mese is a kind of conjunction, especially in good music, because its note most often underlies the tune.

Plutarch, Quaest. Plat. X. 2 [In: The Complete Works Volume 3, Essays and Miscellanies. By Plutarch. pp. 1009-1010. (tr. William Watson Goodwin)].

Besides, we must not neglect to observe, that Plato says that speech is composed of these, not by these; nor must we blame Plato for leaving out conjunctions, prepositions, and the like, any more than we should cavil at a man who should say such a medicine is composed of wax and galbanum, besides fire and utensils omitted, without which it cannot be made. For speech is not composed of these; yet by their means, and not without them, speech must be composed. As, if a man pronounces beats or is beaten, and put Socrates and Pythagoreans to the same, he offers us something to conceive and understand. But if a man pronounce indeed or for or about, and no more, none can conceive any notion of a body or matter; and unless such words as these be uttered with verbs and nouns, they are but empty noise and chattering.1 For neither alone nor joined one with another do they signify any thing. And join and confound together conjunctions, articles, and prepositions, supposing you would make something of them; yet you will be taken to babble, and not to speak sense. But when there is a verb in construction with a noun, the result is speech and sense. Therefore some do with good reason make only these two parts of speech….

In sum:

“[I]f certain connectives [sundesmoi] are omitted, such as te and kai/, the language ceases to be Greek….” ([Aristotle], Probl.).2

1 Note how this statement recalls certain remarks of the Peripatetic Praxiphanes, cited by Demetrius in a passage we have quoted above, observations which should be compared with Aristotle’s remarks on the practice of the actor Philemon (cf. Rhet. III.12, 1413b 24-25), excerpted next.2 “…but the omission of others gives no such offence, because there are some conjunctions which one must use often if there is to be sense, but with others it is not so. In the same way with sounds, the mese is a kind of conjunction, especially in good music, because its note most often underlies the tune…”, the reason being “[t]he desirable quick resolution of the expectancy created by a syndesmos corresponds to the way good composers quickly revert to the mese in the Problemata”, as Sluiter remarks.

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“But if a man pronounce indeed or for or about,1 and no more, none can conceive any notion of a body or matter; and unless such words as these be uttered with verbs and nouns, they are but empty noise and chattering.” (Plutarch, Platonic Questions)[N.B. On the claims made for the mese here, cf. my paper ON SOUND AND VOICE. sec. The Overtone Series.]

Aristotle, Rhet., III. 12 (1413b 19—1414a 6) (tr. W. Rhys Roberts).

Thus strings of unconnected words, and constant repetitions of words and phrases, are very properly condemned in written speeches: but [20] not in spoken speeches—speakers use them freely, for they have a dramatic effect. In this repetition there must be variety of tone, paving the way, as it were, to dramatic effect; e.g. “This is the villain among you, who cheated you, who meant to betray you completely’. This is the sort of thing that Philemon the actor used to do in the Old Men’s Madness of Anaxandrides, whenever he spoke the words ‘Rhadamanthus and [25] Palamedes’, and also in the prologue to the Saints2 whenever he pronounced the pronoun ‘I’.2 If one does not deliver such things cleverly, it becomes a case of ‘the man who swallowed the poker’.3

So too with strings of unconnected words, e.g. ‘I came to him, I met him; I besought him’. Such passages must be acted, not delivered with the same [30] quality and pitch of voice, as though they had only one idea in them. They have the further peculiarity of suggesting that a number of separate statements have been made in the time usually occupied by one.

Just as the use of conjunctions [sundesmoi] makes many statements into a single one, so the omission of conjunctions [= asyndeton] acts in the reverse way and makes a single one into many. It thus makes everything

1 [Perhaps] ‘are carried about as pocket-companions.’2 [Comedies of Anaxandrides now lost.]3 Lit. ‘the man who carries the beam.’more important: e.g. “I came to him; I talked to him; I entreated him” [1414a] – what a lot of facts! the hearer thinks – “he paid no attention to anything I said.”1 This is the effect which Homer seeks when he writes,

Nireus likewise from Syme <three well-fashioned ships did bring>,Nireus, the son of Aglaia <and Charopus, bright-faced king>,Nireus, the comeliest man <of all that to Ilium’s strand>.2

If many things are said about a man, his name must be mentioned many times; and therefore people think that, if his name is mentioned many times, many things have been said about him. So that Homer, by means of this [5] illusion, has made a great deal of though he has mentioned him only in this one passage, and has preserved his memory, though he nowhere says a word about him afterwards.

1…‘The hearer seems to survey quite a number of things that the speaker has said.’ [The text is uncertain.]

1 Which are also “certain connectives”.2 One should recall the foregoing examples when we come to the so-called parapleromatikoi sundesmoi in a passage from ‘Demetrius’, to be given further below.

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2 Iliad, ii. 671-3.

Aristotle, Rhet., III. 12 (1413b 32—1414a 6) (tr. Theodore Buckley).

There is, moreover, a certain peculiarity which omissions of connectives possess; for it strikes one that in an equal length of time, many things have been stated; for the connective makes many, one; so that if it be taken away, it is evident that on the contrary one will be many.1

It possesses, then, amplification; “I came, I conversed with, I besought,” being many, [1414a] —“he seems to overlook all I have said, all I now say.” Homer is desirous of producing this effect in the lines:

“Three ships with Nereus sought the Trojan shore,Nireus, whom Aglae to Charopous bore,Nireus, in faultless shape1,” etc. Pope

1 Iliad, ii. 671.

For of whom a great deal is said, that man must needs be spoken of frequently; and therefore if one be spoken of frequently, it appears that a great deal has been said of him. So that the poet mentioning him only once, by help of this [5] sophism amplifies the character, and has excited a recollection of him, though he no where subsequently mentions him.

Aristotle, Rhet., III. 6 (1407b 38—1408a 1) (tr. W. Rhys Roberts).

(5) Use plenty of connecting words; conversely, to secure conciseness, dispense with connectives, while still preserving connexion; e.g. ‘having [1408a] gone and spoken’, and ‘having gone, I spoke’, respectively.

Aristotle’s use of connectives illustrated:

(1) The example of asyndeton at 1413b 35:

tr. Roberts: “I came to him; I talked to him; I entreated him”tr. Buckley: “I came, I conversed with, I besought”

(2) The example with the connectives added (by B.A.M.):

“I came to him and I talked to him and I entreated him”“I came, and I conversed with, and I besought”

(3) Aristotle’s examples at 1408b 1:

“having gone and spoken”1 o( ga\r su/ndesmoj e(\n poiei= ta\ polla/, w(/ste e)a\n e)caireqh=?, dh=lon o(/ti tou)nanti/on e)/stai to\ e(\n polla/. e)/xei ou)=n au)/chsin.

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“having gone, I spoke”

N.B. Note how the sundesmos is kai, meaning ‘and’, and how it is placed in the middle of speech. Note also how Aristotle’s remark, “the connective makes many, one,” is a general definition of the sundesmos, indicating that it should come first in any treatment or them, as I have argued above.

* * *

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IX. THE CONSIDERATION OF GREEK PROSE STYLE AS REVEALING THE ROLE OF CONNECTIVES IN SPEECH.

Hardy Hansen, “Greek Sentence Structure: Loose and Periodic Style.” The Architecture of Greek Sentences.1

This essay...will focus on the structure or “architecture” of a Greek sentence. A formidable phrase, perhaps, but less so if one bears in mind two fundamental points:

1. Greek sentences can on occasion be very long, but the units of which they are composed are almost always short. “The edifice, lofty though it may be, is built of bricks, not of huge blocks of Cyclopean masonry.” [J. D. Denniston, Greek Prose Style, p. 61]

2. Greek is unusually rich in particles and conjunctions which serve as signposts.

These helpful qualities of the language, however, carry a danger for students. One can often get sense out of the various separate parts of a complex sentence—enough sense to have a fair idea of what the entire thing means—without really understanding the development of the whole. And the reason for this is often the very profusion of “marker-words” or “signposts” in Greek: because they are omnipresent, students tend to ignore them or at least to forget earlier signposts when later ones, in corresponsion with them, appear. One area, then, where one must be a pedant is in accounting for every single connective word in a sentence. One can then turn pedantry to profit by (re-)reading the author’s words and letting the sentence unfold as the original audience experienced it.

Before we turn to the analysis of sample passages from Greek authors, let us consider the two main types of sentence structure which ancient critics recognized: the loose style ( lexis eiromene) and the periodic style (lexis katestrammene). The first phrase means literally “speech strung together” (from eiro, “to string or thread together”, like beads in a necklace); the second, “speech turned or guided toward an end”; the word “period” (periodos, “way around”) refers metaphorically to a race-course, where the starting and finish lines were the same: contestants went out and around the turning-post, then retraced their path. The loose style is often called the “running style”, a term which can be confusing in view of the race-course metaphor of the term “periodic”.

J. D. Denniston, The Greek Particles (2nd ed., Oxford 1954). Introduction, The Origins and Functions of Particles, pp. xxxix-xl.

(5) Hitherto we have considered the function of particles as expressing a mode of thought or mood of feeling in isolation. We have now to discuss their function as establishing a relationship between separate ideas. Relationships may be established in different ways.

(a) The second idea is linked to the first by a connecting particle,3 which may do no more than connect, but may also give

1 (web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/class/rhetfig.htm [12/12/05])

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1 This is not a very happy terms, but it is a convenient and customary one. Dr. R. W. Chapman, in some of his notes on the Greek particles, styles this group ‘self-contained’, ‘independent’. We must include among the ‘independent’ particles the Epic te of habitual action, which, from its purely objective nature, stands apart from the other members of the group.2 German is richer than English in particles, and offers more equivalents. German writers on the subject start at some advantage in this respect.3 Naturally the units connected are normally eiusdem generis. But this is by no means a hard and fast rule. [remainder of note omitted]

[xxxix-xl]

a logical turn (adversative, causal, or inferential) to the connexion.(b) As expression develops, subordination largely replaces coordination, the le/cij

katestramme/nh the le/cij ei)rome/nh, and to that extent hypotactic conjunctions replace connectives. These conjunctions, e)pei/, ei), and so forth, must themselves be regarded as particles.1 The only reason that I do not discuss them, as some other writers on the particles have done, is that their importance is grammatical rather than stylistic.

1 The line between parataxis and hypotaxis is a very thin one where e.g. e)pei/ or w(j introduces an independent sentence, and thus virtually = ga/r. [remainder of note omitted]

Aristotle, Rhet., III. 9 (1409a 23—1409b 25) (tr. W. Rhys Roberts; suppl. from George A. Kennedy, Aristotle on Rhetoric. A Theory of Civic Discourse).

The language of prose [lexis] must be either free-running [eiromenē, ‘strung-on’], with its parts united by nothing except the connecting words, [25] like the preludes in dithyrambs; or compact and antithetical [katestrammenē, ‘turned-down’], like the strophes of the old poets. The free-running style is the ancient one, e.g. ‘Herein is set forth the inquiry of Herodotus the Thurian.’1 Every one used this method formerly; not many do so now.

By ‘free-running’ style I mean the kind that has no natural stopping-places, [30] and comes to a stop only because there is no more to say of that subject. This style is unsatisfying just because it goes on indefinitely—one always likes to sight a stopping-place in front of one: it is only at the goal that men in a race faint and collapse; while they see the end of the course before them, they can keep on going. Such, then, is the free-running kind of style; the compact is [35] that which is in periods. By a period [periodos] I mean a portion of speech that has in itself a beginning and an end, being at the same time not too big to be taken in at a glance.

[1409b] Language of this kind is satisfying and easy to follow. It is satisfying, because it is just the reverse of indefinite; and moreover, the hearer always feels that he is grasping something and has reached some definite conclusion; whereas it is unsatisfactory to see nothing in front of you and get nowhere. It is easy to follow, because it can easily be remembered; and this because language when in [5] periodic form can be numbered,2 and number is the easiest of all things to remember. That is why verse, which is measured, is always more easily remembered than prose, which is not: the measures of verse can be numbered.

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The period must, further, not be completed until the sense is complete:1 it must not be capable of breaking off abruptly, as may happen with the following iambic lines of Sophocles—

[10] Calydon’s soil is this; of Pelops’ land (The smiling plains face us across the strait.)3

1 Herodotus i. 1, init. Aristotle intends to indicate the first complete sentence, or more than that. [Our Mss. of Herodotus read ‘Herodotus the Halicarnassian’.]2 i.e. is recognized as consisting of a countable number of parts or divisions.3 [According to the scholiast the line is a fragm. from the Meleager of Euripides.]

By a wrong division of the words the hearer may take the meaning to be the reverse of what it is: for instance, in the passage quoted, one might imagine that Calydon is in the Peloponnesus. A Period may be either divided into several members2 [cola] or simple. The period of several members is a portion of speech (1) complete in itself, (2) divided into parts, and (3) easily delivered at a single breath—as a whole, that is; not by fresh breath being taken at the division.3 A [15] member is one of the two parts of such a period. By a ‘simple’ period, I mean that which has only one member. The members, and the whole periods, should be neither curt nor long. A member which is too short often makes the listener stumble; he is still expecting the rhythm to go on to the limit his mind has fixed for it; and if [20] meanwhile he is pulled back by the speaker’s stopping, the shock is bound to make him, so to speak, stumble. If, on the other hand, you go on too long, you make him feel left behind, just as people who when walking pass beyond the boundary before turning back leave their companions behind. So too if a period is too long you turn it into [25] a speech, or something like a dithyrambic prelude. The result is much like the preludes that Democritus of Chios4 jeered at Melanippides for writing instead of antistrophic stanzas—

He that sets traps for another man’s feet Is like to fall into them first; And long-winded preludes do harm to us all, But the preluder catches it worst.5

Which applies likewise to long-membered6 orators. Periods [30]

1 i.e. by coming to an abrupt stop at the end of the first line and making no pause in its middle.2 [The Greek means ‘limbs.’]3 [The text is quite uncertain. Aristotle’s meaning seems to be that the ‘colic’ period must not merely consist of parts that are easily delivered at a single breath.]4 [Democritus of Chios, a musician of late 5 th cent.; Melanippides of Melos, a poet of dithyrambs of late 5th cent.]5 [A parody of Hesiod, Works and Days 263.]6 i.e. long-winded framers of long-membered periods. . . .

whose members are altogether too short are not periods at all; and the result is to bring the hearer down with a crash.‘Demetrius’, De Eloc. ch. 1. 12-15 (= Demetrius On Style: The Greek text of Demetrius De Elocutione edited after the Paris manuscript with introd., translation, facsimiles, etc. by W. Rhys Roberts [Cambridge, at the University Press: 1902]).

1 Cf. the definition of the sentence as perfect speech which completes a thought and makes perfect sense in the soul or mind of the hearer.

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12. The origin of the period is as follows. There are two kinds of style. The first is termed the ‘compacted’ style, as for example that which consists of periods. It is found in the discourses of Isocrates, Gorgias and Alcidamas, in which the periods succeed one another with no less regularity than the hexameters in the poetry of Homer.

The second style bears the name of ‘disconnected,’ inasmuch as the members into which it is divided are not closely united. Hecataeus is an example; and so for the most part is Herodotus, and the older writers in general. Here is an instance: ‘Hecataeus of Miletus thus relates. I write these things as they seem to me to be true. For the tales told by the Greeks are, as it appears to me, many and absurd’ (Fragm. 332; cp. § 2 supra). Here the members seem thrown upon one another in a heap without the union or propping, and without the mutual support, which we find in periods.

13. The members in a periodic style may, in fact, be compared to the stones which support and hold together a vaulted roof. The members of the disconnected style resemble stones which are simply flung carelessly together and not built into a structure.

14. Consequently there is something polished and clean-cut in the older method of writing. It resembles ancient statues, the art of which was held to consist in their severe simplicity. The style of later writers is like the sculpture of Pheidias, since it already exhibits in some degree the union of elevation and finish.

15. My own view is that composition should neither, like that of Gorgias, consist wholly of a string of periods, nor be wholly disconnected like the ancient writings, but should rather combine the two methods. It will then be elaborate and simple at the same time, and possess the charm of both manners, being neither too untutored nor too artificial. Public speakers who employ accumulated periods are as giddy-pated as tipsy men, and their hearers are sickened by the idle trick; sometimes, indeed, they audibly anticipate the conclusions of the orator’s periods and declaim them in advance.

‘Demetrius’, De Eloc. ch. 1. 1-3 (= Demetrius On Style: The Greek text of Demetrius De Elocutione edited after the Paris manuscript with introd., translation, facsimiles, etc. by W. Rhys Roberts [Cambridge, at the University Press: 1902]).

1. As verse is articulated by measures (such as the hemistich, the hexameter, and the like), so also is prose articulated and differentiated by what are called ‘members’ [kôla]. These members give rest, one might say, to the speaker and his discourse; they set bounds to its various parts, since it would otherwise extend itself without limit and would simply run the speaker out of breath.

2. But the proper function of such members is to mark the conclusion of a thought or sentence. Sometimes a member forms a complete sentence in itself, as for example Hecataeus opens his ‘History’ with the words ‘Hecataeus of Miletus thus relates’ (Hecat. Fragm. 332, C. F. Müller F. H. G. I. p. 25), where a complete member coincides with a complete sentence and both end together. Sometimes, however, the member constitutes not a complete sentence, but a part of it, yet a complete part. For just as the arm, which is a whole of a certain kind, has parts such as fingers and forearm which themselves again are wholes, inasmuch as each of them has its

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proper limits, and itself is made up of parts; so also a complete sentence, when it is extensive, may very well comprise within itself parts which themselves are integral.

3. At the beginning of the ‘Anabasis’ of Xenophon an example will be found, in the words ‘Darius and Parysatis’ down to ‘the younger Cyrus’ (Anabasis. 1.1.1.). This is a fully completed sentence, of which the two members contained in it are parts; but each of these, within its own limits, conveys a meaning which is in a measure complete. Take the first words: ‘Darius and Parysatis had sons.’ The thought that sons were born to Darius and Parysatis has its own completeness. The second member, in the same way, conveys the complete thought that ‘the elder was Artaxerxes, the younger Cyrus.’

The styles of composition in sum:

eiromenē: ‘

free-running’, ‘discontinuous’, ‘disjointed’ (like the preludes of dithyrambs) (eiromenē = ‘strung-on’)

katestrammenē:

‘compact’, ‘compacted’, ‘periodic’: compact and antithetical (like the strophes of the old poets) (katestrammenē = ‘turned-down’)

On the unity of speech arising from the use of connectives.1

Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals, I. 3 (643b 16-19) (ed. Loeb; tr. B.A.M.).

e)a\n de\ mh\ diafora=j lamba/n$ tij diafora/n, a)nagkai=on, w(/sper sunde/sm% to\n lo/gon e(/na poiou=ntaj, ou(/tw kai\ th\n diai/resin sunexh= poie=n.

But if they do take the differentia of the differentia, they must, like those persons who, making their discourse one by means of connectives, make their division without continuity.

Continuity in division and in conjunction.

For purposes of comparison, then, consider the following proportion: As the partition of a genus by the method of dichotomy is to a per se division of the genus, so the free-running style is to the compact and antithetical style; a composition disposed in the former way necessarily lacking continuity, whereas the latter would be continuous. And notice here that continuity belongs on the one side to the per se division, but on the other, to the speech using connectives.

* * *

1 For an extended discussion of what makes speech to be one, see my preceding paper on Poetics ch. 20.

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ON THE NEED FOR A PART OF SPEECH TO MAKE CLEAR THE BEGINNING, THE END, OR THE DIVIDING-POINT OF SPEECH.

Aristotle, Rhet., III. 5 (1407b 12-25) (tr. W. Rhys Roberts).

It is a general rule that a written composition should be easy to read and therefore easy to deliver.1 This cannot be so where there are many connecting words or clauses, or where punctuation [diaresis, ‘division’] is hard, as in the writings of Heracleitus.2 To punctuate [or ‘divide’] Heracleitus is no easy task, because we often cannot tell whether a particular word [15] belongs to what precedes or what follows it. Thus, at the outset of his treatise he says, ‘Though this truth is always men understand it not’, where it is not clear with which of the two clauses the word ‘always’ should be joined by the punctuation.

1 Or, ‘easy to understand.’ . . .2 [Heracleitus of Ephesus, pre-Socratic philosopher. His obscurity is frequently mentioned and criticized in antiquity.] [N.B. Note how Aristotle is here considering sins of excess, sc. the overuse of connectives, and of defect, sc. their absence. (B.A.M.)]

Further, the following fact leads to solecism, viz. that the sentence does not work out properly if you annex to two terms a third which does not suit them both. Thus either ‘sound’ or ‘colour’ will fail to work out properly with some verbs: ‘perceive’ will apply to both, ‘see’ will not. Obscurity is also caused if, when you intend to insert a number of details, you do not first make your meaning clear; for instance, if you say, ‘I meant, after telling him this, that and the other thing, to set out’, rather than something of this kind ‘I meant to set out after [25] telling him; then this, that, and the other thing occurred.’

A text from the Poetics on this matter.

On the obscurity in language arising form the absence of something making its division clear, cf. Poetics ch. 25 (1461a 24-25 (Hippocrates G. Apostle et. al., Aristotle’s Poetics, p. 34 (=):

(10) Some problems can be solved by division [i.e., grouping the words differently], as in Empedocles’ line

[25] ai)=ya de\ qnh/t' e)fu/onto ta\ pri\n ma/qon a)qa/nat' ei)=nai zwra/ te pri\n ke/krhto

[where the final clause may be punctuated in two ways: (a) ‘things unmixed, before mixed’ or (b) ‘things unmixed before, mixed’].16”

16 In (a), the things were first mixed, but later became unmixed; in (b), the things were first unmixed, but later became mixed. The problem is caused by the absence of punctuation in the ancient Greek texts….. (ibid., p. 92)

N.B. It is to be noted that, besides lacking punctuation (as well as accents and breathing-marks), the words in such texts were not separated by spaces. But for our present purposes, it must be understood that, were corresponsive and coordinating sundesmoi to have been used, the problem would not have arisen, at least not in so acute a form.

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‘Demetrius’, De Eloc. ch. 4. 190-195 (= Demetrius On Style: The Greek text of Demetrius De Elocutione edited after the Paris manuscript with introd., translation, facsimiles, etc. by W. Rhys Roberts [Cambridge, at the University Press: 1902]).

190. In the case of the plain style, we can no doubt point to subject-matter which is homely and appropriate to the style itself, e.g. the passage in Lysias, ‘I have a cottage with two storeys, the one above corresponding exactly to that below’ (Murder of Eratosthenes 9). The diction throughout should be current and familiar. An expression is homelier the more familiar it is, while the unusual and metaphorical is elevated.

191. Compound words should not be admitted (since they are appropriate to the opposite variety of style), nor yet newly-coined words, nor any other words which contribute to elevation. Above all, the style should be lucid. Now lucidity involves a number of things.

192. First of all it1 involves the employment of current words, and next of words bound together. Writing which is wholly disjointed and unconnected is entirely lacking in clearness. It is impossible to discern the beginning of each member owing to the looseness of the structure. This is illustrated by the writings of Heracleitus, the obscurity of which is due mainly to their loose structure.

193. No doubt the disjointed style lends itself better to debate. It likewise bears the name of ‘histrionic,’ since a broken structure stimulates acting. On the other hand, the best ‘literary’ style is that which is pleasant to read; and this is the style which is compacted and (as it were) consolidated by the conjunctions. This is the reason why, while Menander (whose style is for the most part broken) is popular with the actor, Philemon is the reader’s favourite.

194. To show that the broken style suits the stage, take the following line as an instance:

Thee I received, I bare, I nurse, O dear one.(Menander, Fragm. 230: Meineke iv. pp. 284, 285.)

Thus disjointed, the words will of themselves force a man to be dramatic even in his own despite. But if you employ conjunctions [sundesmoi] and say ‘I received and bare and nurse,’ you will at the same time make the line quite lifeless. And what is unemotional is essentially undramatic.

* * *

1 “It” refers to the first thing pertaining to “lucidity” as this is proper to “the plain style”.

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The differences among the various dispositions of speech.

To sum up the foregoing considerations, it must be understood that, just as there is a primary opposition in compositional styles between the free-running and the compact (the former employing nothing more than connectives to secure unity, while the latter is disposed in periods); so, too, there is just such an opposition in styles between those which are, either virtually or in their entirety, free of connectives, and those which employ them,1

a distinction that is customarily expressed as an opposition between parataxis, which eschews conjunctions, and syntaxis, which employs them.2 In this regard, consider the following, historical, account:

In most primitive stages of language there are no formal subordinate clauses. Subordinate relations, however, exist, being indicated by the juxtaposition of independent sentences, as in English ‘I believe, he is ill;’ ‘I fear, he will die.’ In course of time every language develops certain types of independent sentences into subordinate clauses. When fully developed, such subordinate sentences have introductory conjunctions. But these conjunctions, like the subordinate clauses themselves, are not original. They are for the most part adverbs, which grew into conjunctional force as the sentences they introduce grew into subordinate clauses.3

As the reader will have observed, the foregoing accounts of the several styles of composition have brought to light the following oppositions:

parataxis versus hypotaxis parataxis versus syntaxis4

As we have seen, the first of these has to do with the difference in the disposition of expression that accrues to it when coordinating conjunctions are used, as opposed to that which belongs to it when it additionally employs the subordinating kinds to produce periodic sentences, the former involving ‘coordination’, the latter, ‘subordination’; whereas the second involves an opposition between a style making no use of connectives—the ‘coordination’ here being mere juxtaposition—and one that does.

In sum, if one’s discourse makes no use of connectives whatsoever, there is parataxis, whereas when they are employed, syntaxis results. But parataxis also names the kind of style that employs coordinating conjunctions; being opposed, in this meaning, to hypotaxis, which makes use of the subordinating kind.

1 Cf. the observation from [Aristotle], Probl. XIX. 20 (643b 13-28) on the importance of te and kai\.2 Cf. the following definitions, taken from Wikipedia: “Parataxis in grammar refers to placing together sentences, clauses or phrases without conjunctions”. “Syntaxis (contrasted to parataxis) is a writing or rhetorical style that favors complex syntax, as against simple sentence structures.”3 The Syntax of Early Latin. Vol. 1—The Verb. By Charles Edward Bennet (Leipsic: Theodore Stauffer, Allyn & Bacon, 1910), Chapter V. The Subjunctive in Subordinate Clauses. Parataxis and Syntaxis, p. 208. On the adverbial underpinnings of the connective, see further below on the preposition.4 Para = ‘alongside of’; hypo =’underneath’; syn = ‘with’; taxis = ‘order’.

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The primary division of connectives with respect to their syntactic function, the coordinating (or parataktike) and the subordinating (or hupotaktike):

parataktike: ‘placing siding by side’, the task of the coordinating conjunctions, especially the copulative conjunction

hupotaktike: ‘placing under’, the task of the subordinating conjunctions

Robert Lee Foster, Glossary of Greek Grammatical Terms.

Hypotactic Clause– Also Dependent, Subordinate Clause. Relative, causal, comparative, local, temporal, purpose, result, conditional, and discourse clauses are all considered hypotactic. See Hypotactic.

Hypotactic– From u(po/tacin. The placement of a word, phrase, or clause into syntactical subordination to another by the use of subordinating conjunctions or relative pronouns. See Paratactic.

Paratactic– From para/tacin. The coordination of two parallel words, phrases, or clauses, sometimes without connecting conjunctions or particles. See Hypotactic.

On the styles of composition in relation to the role of connectives in speech.

As the foregoing passages make unmistakably clear, with the absence of the division of words in written texts at a time before the introduction of punctuation marks, as well as the ubiquity of a compositional style making no use of coordination beyond mere juxtaposition, the difficulty felt by readers when it came to ‘dividing’ or ‘separating’ speech was acute. But in the development of language such a role came to be played by sundesmoi, the connective words of speech, as is most evident in the case of the corresponsive particles, as the texts cited on me/n and de/, as well as te and kai\, manifestly demonstrate; but which function also extends to the article, as the observation of Anaximenes to be excerpted next reveals. Now it is my view that the proximate foundation for Aristotle’s treatment of sundesmoi in Poetics Chapter 20 lies in his remark concerning Heraclitus, as well as the closely-related passage from ‘Demetrius’, especially insofar as the latter reads like a continuation of the preceding passage of Aristotle.

The account of the connectives found in the Poetics, then, being understood in the light of the foregoing observations, the corruption of the text to the contrary notwithstanding, becomes perfectly clear, as the considerations to follow undertake to confirm.

* * *

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XI. ON THE SPECIES OF CONNECTIVE CALLED ‘EXPLETIVES’.

‘Demetrius’, De Eloc., ch. II, nn. 55-58 (= Demetrius On Style: The Greek Text of Demetrius De Elocutione edited after the Paris manuscript with introd., translation, facsimiles, etc. by W. Rhys Roberts. Cambridge, at the University Press: 1902).

55. Expletive particles [parapleromatikois sundesmois] must not be employed as pointless appendages and excrescences so to say or expansions, as dê and nu and proteron1 are sometimes aimlessly used. They must be introduced only if they contribute to elevation of expression….

56. as in Plato ‘lo mighty Zeus in his heaven’ (Phaedrus 246e); and in Homer

But lo when they came to the ford of the fair-flowing river.(Iliad 14.433 and 21. 1)

The particle placed thus at the beginning of the sentence and separating what follows from what precedes, creates the impression of elevation.

Amplified beginnings have an imposing effect. If the poet had said ‘but when they arrived at the ford of the river,’ he would have seemed to be using trivial language and to be describing a single occurrence.

57. The particle dê is also often used with a touch of feeling, as in the words which Calypso addresses to Odysseus:

O Zeus’ seed, son of Laertes, Odysseus of many an art,Is it so, that home to thine own dear land thou art fain to depart?(Homer, Odyssey 5. 203)

Remove the particle, and you will at the same time remove the feeling conveyed by the line. In general, as Praxiphanes says, such particles used to be employed in place of moanings and laments. Instances are ‘ah me!’ and ‘alas!’ and ‘oh, what is it?’ 1 As he himself says, the words kai nu ke were fittingly applied to men who are ‘lamenting,’ since they suggest in some degree a word of mourning' (Homer Iliad 23.154, also Odyssey 16.220 and 21.226).2

58. But those who use expletive particles aimlessly resemble, he says, actors who employ this exclamation and that casually, as though one were to say

Calydonian soil is this, whose fertile plains(Alas!)Look o'er the narrow seas to Pelops' land(Ah me!).(Euripides, Meleag.; Eurip. Fragm. 515 Nauck2)

For as in this passage the ‘ah me!’ and the ‘alas!’ are merely dragged in, so is the connective when it is inserted causelessly and indiscriminately.1 t%= “dh\” . . . t%= “nu” kai\ t%= “pro/teron” [‘in fact’, ‘now’, ‘earlier’] Cp. to Dion. Thrax. (B.A.M.) To the foregoing compare the list of parapleromatikoi sundesmoi excerpted from Dionysius Thrax above.2 w(/sper to\ “ai)\ ai)/” kai\ to\ “feu=,” kai\ “!poi=o/n ti/ e)stin! (B.A.M)

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The examples of parapleromatikoi sundesmoi from ‘Demetrius’.

1. such as dh\ [‘in fact’], or nu [‘now’], or pro/teron [‘earlier’]2. such as dh\ [as meaning ‘lo!’]3. Instances are ai)\ ai)/ [‘ah me!’] and feu= [‘alas!’] and poi=o/n ti/ e)stin [‘oh,

what is it?’]

Note that Demetrius’ examples instance the kind of emphatic particle modern grammarians call ‘transitions’, a type to which we shall return below, with his second and third cases manifestly being what have been called, since classical times, interjections. While Demetrius makes no such distinction here, it will prove to be of great importance to us when trying to make sense of what the Poetics has to say on these sorts of sundesmoi.

Ineke Sluiter, Parapleromatic Lucubrations, pp. 239-240.1

The avoidance of hiatus takes us straight back to stylistics. This fits right in with the fact that some of our earliest testimonies for the παραπληρωματικοί (as opposed, this time, to the group of syndesmoi as a whole) also take the form of stylistic recommendations. Protesting against their idle use, pseudo-Demetrius prescribes them only if one wants to produce an effect of grandeur (Eloc. 55ff.):

Τοις δε παραπληρωματικούςσυνδέσμοις χρηστέον ούχ ώς προσθήκαις κεναις και οίον προσφύμασιν ή παραξύσμασιν, ώσπερ τίνες τω δή χρώνται προς ουδέν και τω νυ και τω πρότερον, άλλ' αν συμβάλλωνταί τι τω μεγέθει τοΰ λόγου ...‘One should use the parapleromatic “conjunctions” not as empty additions, and as it were as abnormal growths or superfluous polishing, the way de and nu and proteron are sometimes used without a purpose, but only if they contribute something to the grandeur of the language’.

One way of doing this is to use δη to amplify the beginning of a statement—this emphasizes the divide between two statements and makes for a dignified impression (Eloc. 56). Another function of the particle δή is to invest discourse with pathos (Eloc. 57). Pseudo-Demetrius refers to Praxiphanes, a student of Theophrastus’, who is scornful of those who προς ουδέν άναπληροΰντες ... τον σύνδεσμον (‘use the “conjunction” as an idle filler’) (Eloc. 58). This is another indication of the stylistic interest taken in ‘conjunctions’ in general in the Peripatos, but although the context is suggestive, it cannot be proven that Praxiphanes was thinking of the parapleromatic ‘conjunctions’, identified as a separate group. Praxiphanes is not pseudo-Demetrius. He compares the idle use of words like νυ, but also like πρότερον, with actors’ interpolations of interjections like φευ and αϊ all used extra metrum. (In fact, such a bad use of these syndesmoi would probably make them fall outside the scope of Dionysius Thrax’ definition, since they do not fill out the metre at all, but ruin it in a way.) In general, the whole context—as far as it can be made out from the poor transmission—emphasizes not the mere fact of άναπληροΰν, or of being a προσθήκη, but the use of προσθηκαι κενού (Eloc. 55), προς ουδέν (58) or μάτην (58). Such a usage violates the rhetorical requirement of το πρέπον, and this is confirmed by the use of έπρεψεν in 57 for an acceptable use of the same particle.

1 (https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/retrieve/4156/347_017.pdf+parapleromatic&hl=en [11/11/05])

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The text in pseudo-Demetrius rewards further analysis. The terms πρόσφυμα and παράξυσμα have no parallels in a stylistic context. Both are used metaphorically, much like στοιβή ‘padding’ was in Trypho, a πρόσφυμα being any kind of growth, [240]_____________________14 Cf. e.g. Sch. D. Th.. 146.3lff.: καιεκθλιψις μεν έστιν, ήνίκα ευρέθη λέξις εις φωνήεν ή φωνήεντα καταλήγουσα, της έπιφερομένης λέξεως άπό φωνήεντος ή άπό φωνηέντων αρχομένης· τότε γάρ <διά> το χασμώδες και κεχηνωδες εκθλίβεται το τέλος της προηγουμένης λέξεως. Clearly, we are dealing with well-established technical terminology here.

that is ‘in addition to (the natural constitution?)’ (προς),15 while παράξυσμα may either mean ‘extra scratches, extra letters’,16 or maybe ‘a result of excessive polishing’.17 Παρά- in παράξυσμα points at the undue, excessive or redundant nature of the polishing. All three terms, προσθήκη, πρόσφυμα and παράξυσμα underline by their pseudo-etymologizing the essential redundancy of the παραπληρωματικός. Whereas compounds of πληρόω are routinely used to denote syntactic or semantic completion, i.e. the necessary completion of a semantic and syntactic structure, a παραπληρωματικός does its ‘filling out’ over and above what is strictly speaking required or necessary in those respects.

15 One is strongly reminded of Sch. D. Th. 356.15Π., explaining why the Stoics had not recognized the adverb as a separate part of speech: τά γάρ επιρρήματα ούτε λόγου οΰτε άριθμοΰ ήξίωσαν, παραφυάδι και έπιφυλλίδι αυτά παρεικάσαντες. Έπιφυλλίς refers to the small grapes left for gleaners; it was used metaphorically for bad poets in Ar. Ran.92 (cf. n. 17), quoted in D.H. Ars Rhet. X 18 to describe epilogues in a deprecating way after first having called them a sort of dessert after the main meal. The compound with έπι- may again have been found attractive for a description of επιρρήματα, even though he precisely denied that the Stoics recognized those words as a separate part of speech. Παραφυάς ‘side-growth’ is an interesting parallel for πρόσφυμα, the more so since at least one of the examples cited by Demetrius decidedly looks like an adverb (πρότερον), see below.16 Ξύσματα = γράμματα, Hsch.17 Rather than the ‘fillings’ or ‘shavings’. Cf. for the metaphor Cic. Brut.93; Hor. Ars 291; Ov. Tr. 1.7.30 (ultima lima); Quint. 10.4.4. An interesting verbal parallel is Ar. Ran. 881 (cf. n 15) παραπρίσματά τ' επών (‘sawdust, sawn-off bits’, Dover a l), where the παρά- ...seems less emphatic than in παράξυσμα.

Ibid., p. 243.

Now, if we compare the texts adduced so far, it becomes clear that the παραπληρωματικοί σύνδεσμοι were associated particularly closely with a stylistic function that could also be fulfilled by other parts of speech or even whole phrases: if applied well, if fills out the sentence, not by the necessary completion of the thought, but by making it smoother, remedying hiatus, and providing supple transitions.

Ibid., pp. 243-244.

Of the ‘literary critics’, only pseudo-Demetrius uses the terminus technicus παραπληρωματικός σύνδεσμος. And in fact, corrupt transmission of pseudo-Demetrius was promptly assumed to get rid of the example πρότερον.

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But again, a comparison with the other stylistic criticisms seems to suggest differently: when Longinus points out that it is hard to convey πάθος when the style is being made smoother by συνδέσμων και των άλλων προσθηκών, the sentence he quotes as an example contains words like και μήν, and γε μήν, but also πρώτον μέν, είτα δε, and another εΐτα (21.1). In Lucian’s harangue against Atticism, Lexiphanes, the main character is given an emetic to get rid of his redundant Atticistic phrases, which include μεν, κατα, δήπουθεν and άττα.32 While later theory does not call these words σύνδεσμοι παραπληρωματικοί, it will point out that they are redundant. Common terms are παρέλκειν, πλεονάζειν, αργός, έκ περιττού, περιττός, περιττεύειν, κενός, κενώς προσκέΐσθαι,33 έκ πλήθους.34

_____________________31 In Sch. D. Th. 461.15ff. παραπλήρωμα is one in a series of stylistic/rhetorical phenomena, and it is described as: φράσις ή λέξις έκ περισσού λαμβανομένη, ώς τό <Β 493> άρχους αΰ νηών έρέω νηάς τε προπάσας· ή γαρπρόπαρέλκει. Note that preposition and prepositional prefixes were considered σύνδεσμοι προθετικοί by the Stoics. Traces of this usage can be seen in D. H., cf. previous note.32 Μών, κατα: both are σύνδεσμοι άπορρηματικοί in D.Th.(94.2Γ.); Ap. Dysc. coni. 229.19ff. (μών = διαπορητικός and contains οΰν παραπληρωματικός; κaτα= used instead of και or it is διαπορητικός, although there is some discussion about its status. It could also be an adverb, since it contains είτα (so Trypho).33 Hipp.InAratum156.4; 8f. (ed.Manitius, BT)-προσαναπλήρωμα.34 Cf. Ruijgh (1971: § 60); Ruijgh points out that παραπληρωματικός is not synonymous with these terms, which always denote redundancy in a certain context, i.e. as an accidental feature, while παραπληρωματικός is used as a classificatory term (1971: § 65). The two exceptions where τε is called παραπληρωματικός, are Ap. Dysc. adv. 148.5; Sch. Hom. Ο 124 (Ruijgh 1971:§68f.). Note that Elink Sterk is confused about the use of έκ πλήρους, which does not mean that the word used is redundant, but that it is spelled in scriptio plena, i.e. without apocope (e.g.II48 γε, notγ';66 τε, not τ').

Ibid, p. 245.

Apollonius strengthens this argument by putting their redundant use on a par with that of any other part of speech, and pointing out that incidental redundancy is never a reason to assign a word to a different part of speech (coni. 249.22ff.). He then proves that every σύνδεσμος παραπληρωματικός is also used in a meaningful way (coni. 249.3 lff.), thus putting this sub-group firmly in the realm of the normal and regular.

Dionysius Thrax, Techne Grammatike sec. 25 (tr. Alan Kemp, in The History of Linguistics in the Classical Period, ed. Daniel J. Taylor, John Benjamins, 1987, pp. 172-185, p. 185).

8. Expletive conjunctions are those introduced for the sake of the metre or as an embellishment;1 they comprise dē, rha, nu, pou, toi, thēn, ar, dēta, per, pō, mēn, an, au, nun, oun, ken, ge.38

38 These expletive conjunctions are mostly untranslatable, except in some case by such words as ‘indeed’, ‘certainly’, ‘of course’. [end]

1 Cf. the definition with which Thrax begins his treatment: “A conjunction is a word which acts as a link for the meaning, giving it order, and fills up gaps in the expression”.

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Note on the relation of ‘Demetrius’ to Aristotle.

Given the manifest correspondences between the various passages cited from ‘Demetrius’ and Aristotle, especially those on the ‘period’ and the forms of style excerpted above, one is led to ask, ‘In the present passage, could this author (whose identity and date are unknown) be transmitting the teaching of Aristotle here?’ On this point, compare Demetrius’ citation of ‘Euripides’ at the end of his remarks on the expletives, with an excerpt from Aristotle’s Rhetoric we have met with above:

(‘Demetrius’, De Eloc., ch. II, n. 58, tr. W. Rhys Roberts)

But those who use expletive particles aimlessly resemble, he says, actors who employ this exclamation and that casually, as though one were to say

Calydonian soil is this, whose fertile plains(Alas!)Look o'er the narrow seas to Pelops’ land(Ah me!).(Euripides, Meleag.; Eurip. Fragm. 515 Nauck2)

For as in this passage the ‘ah me!’ and the ‘alas!’ are merely dragged in, so is the connective when it is inserted causelessly and indiscriminately.

(Aristotle, Rhet., III. 9, 1409b 9-12, tr. W. Rhys Roberts)

The period must, further, not be completed until the sense is complete: it must not be capable of breaking off abruptly, as may happen with the following iambic lines of Sophocles—

[10] Calydon’s soil is this; of Pelops’ land

(The smiling plains face us across the strait.) [not given in the Greek]

By a wrong division of the words the hearer may take the meaning to be the reverse of what it is: for instance, in the passage quoted, one might imagine that Calydon is in the Pelo-ponnesus.

It is quite apparent that ‘Demetrius’ is indebted to Aristotle here. But if the last part of his argument comes from the Philosopher,1 so may the earlier parts.

* * *

1 And note that it would be just like Aristotle to have seen the appropriateness of the same passage (whether from the pen of Sophocles or Euripides) as illustrating two different but related ‘linguistic’ facts, as we ob-serve in the present case, the former consideration being ‘stylistic’ or ‘rhetorical’, the other, ‘lexical’ or ‘logi-cal’. In any case, Demetrius’ citing of Praxiphanes, a student of Theophrastus’, for the doctrine concerning this species of connective, already establishes for us a clear line of descent from the Philosopher.

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XII. ON THE EXPLETIVES CALLED ‘TRANSITIONS’ AND ‘INTERRUPTERS’.

The Armchair Grammarian.1

2.2   EXPLETIVES

An expletive (also called a function word) is a word or phrase inserted into a sentence to fill a vacancy without adding anything to the sense of the sentence. Expletives are frequently used to begin a sentence. The words here, there, and it are often used in this way. Emotionally charged words, such as oh! darn! and hey!, perform a similar function. (See Interjections) [N.B. One sees why profanities are called ‘expletives’. B.A.M.]

Because expletives frequently occupy the traditional position of the subject, i.e., at or near the beginning of a sentence, these words can be mistaken for the subject. However, expletives are not nominatives, but other parts of speech, and therefore cannot function as subjects. (See Syntactic Inversion) Below, the words in accentuated text are expletives.

There is a black cat near the barn door.(Whenever you see one of these words at or near the beginning of a sentence, appearing to be the subject, suspect an expletive. In which case, try recasting the sentence without the questionable word: A black cat is near the barn door. Note that there adds nothing to sentence meaning. The expletive is an empty word whose only function is to begin the sentence.)

It is ridiculous to eat that much.

(Recast the sentence: To eat that much is ridiculous. The expletive, the pronoun it, lacks grammatical function within the sentence.)

It’s interesting to find you two here.(Recast the sentence to reveal the expletive: To find you two here is interesting.)

Here are the keys you lost.

(The verb is are; the subject, keys. The word here, seemingly an expletive, is actually an adverb. This becomes evident when we recast the sentence: The keys you lost are here. An adverb, here answers the question where? regarding the verb are. Thus the words here or there are not necessarily expletives; they may be adverbs.)

The Armchair Grammarian.

5.1   CONJUNCTIVE ADVERBS

Independent clauses are commonly joined by one of the coordinating conjunctions: and, or, nor, for, but, so, or yet.

1 (community-2.webtv.net/solis-boo/Grammar1/ - 30k [11/30/05]) Online, this article is attributed to one “Sandy Eggo”, a name demonstrating the importance of a correct division of words in juxtaposition.

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Independent clauses may also be joined by adverbs called conjunctive adverbs. A conjunctive adverb is an adverbial word or phrase that joins, like a coordinating conjunction, independent clauses. Although their name suggests otherwise, conjunctive adverbs are not considered true conjunctions; instead, they function as connectors or bridges between independent clauses, between sentences, or even between paragraphs. Moreover, unlike adverbs functioning as subordinators, i.e., as subordinating conjunctions, which always introduce a subordinate adverbial clause, conjunctive adverbs join independent clauses. Be aware that many adverbs have a shared function. For example, the word however functions as a subordinating conjunction when it introduces a subordinate adverbial clause; and yet, when used between independent clauses, however functions as a conjunctive adverb. However can also function as a transitional element that connects not only complete sentences, but also entire paragraphs; and it can also function as an adverbial expletive. (See usage note.) Also see punctuation of conjunctive adverbs.

COMMON CONJUNCTIVE ADVERBS

also besides Consequently Finally

furthermore however Moreover Nevertheless

otherwise similarly Still Supposedly

then therefore Thus

These words can also function as other parts of speech.

CONJUNCTIVE ADVERBS JOIN INDEPENDENT CLAUSES

Conjunctive adverbs can function between independent clauses something like a coordinating conjunction, joining the two clauses and expressing a relationship between them. But unlike coordinators, conjunctive adverbs are not considered true conjunctions. Examples follow.

Dennis went to the symphony; consequently, he was suspended from the band.

Barry seems very friendly; incidentally, he's the same sign as I am.

Our horse is a great jumper; on the other hand, he isn't very good in the races.

Max appears to be a level-headed guy; still, there's something about him that's just not right.

The test scheduled for today has been canceled; furthermore, there will be no class until next Friday.

Kindergarten begins at 7:40am; however, there is no supervision provided prior to 7:30am.

Claire is a wonderful public speaker; besides, folks say she's a great diplomat.

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5.2   TRANSITIONS & ADVERBIAL EXPLETIVES

Included within the class of words defined as conjunctive adverbs are adverbs that function as transitions and as expletives. Transitions are also known as transitional elements or simply connectives.

As previously noted in this section, subordinating conjunctions, conjunctive adverbs, transitions, and adverbial expletives are words or phrases identified by function alone. For instance, an adverb introducing a subordinate adverbial clause is a subordinating conjunction; an adverb joining independent clauses is a conjunctive adverb. Additionally, an adverb can function as a transition or an expletive. The role played by any given adverb is determined by its function within a sentence.

Just as a subordinate adverbial clause (introduced by an adverb called a subordinating conjunction) modifies a main clause with the concept of time, cause or reason (cause & effect), purpose or result, condition, addition, example, contrast, manner, emphasis, or concession, a conjunctive adverb (which joins independent clauses) performs the same function between clauses, where an entire independent clause modifies another. (See adverbs & associated semantic meaning.) In addition to their bridging function between grammatical constructions, conjunctive adverbs can also function as expletives, or interrupters, appearing essentially as parenthetical material. Like other conjunctive adverbs, adverbial expletives are identified by their function within a sentence.1

<intervening section omitted>

ADVERBIAL EXPLETIVES (CONJUNCTIVE ADVERBS) ARE PARENTHET-ICAL

A conjunctive adverb can function within a sentence as an expletive, or interrupter—a word or phrase that is essentially parenthetical content. Adverbial expletives can appear nearly anywhere within a sentence. Being clearly parenthetical, adverbial expletives have no grammatical function within a sentence. Examples below. (See punctuating expletives.)Her face, however, was spared the ravages of the fire.

Toni found that old sofa, by the way, lying in a vacant lot.

The new students, incidentally, don't have enough pencils.

Pamela will certainly win the match.

By the way, are you going to the dance?

† Usage Note

Be aware that the function of many adverbial words and phrases—subordinating conjunctions and conjunctive adverbs (including transitions and expletives) is determined by placement within any given grammatical construct.

1 All of the foregoing should be compared with the excerpt from J. D. Denniston, given above.

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For example, the word admittedly can function as a subordinating conjunction in one sentence while functioning as a conjunctive adverb in another. The only reliable test is to determine the grammatical function of the word in question. [end]

Note on transitions and interrupters.

Notice how expletives such as ‘therefore’, ‘however’, and ‘certainly’ clearly pause speech, and so are reasonably named ‘transitions’, whereas the species comprising interjections, by bringing speech to a full stop, are more properly called ‘interrupters’; as noted above, the former resembling the punctuation mark the comma, the latter, the period. Accordingly, as I use the word, ‘interrupter’ means the interjection, and not, as with other grammarians, the other species of expletive which merely pause speech. Notice also how the foregoing account brings out the commonality between conjunctions and certain species of adverb, as well as manifesting the fact that differences in meaning arise from their placement in speech (cp. Apollonius on men, etoi, de, excerpted below); such concerns clearly underlying Aristotle’s conception of the connective parts of speech, as we have seen.

* * *

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XIII. ON THE SPECIES OF PARAPLEROMATIC SUNDESMOI.

Having already dealt with conjunctions that are copulative, whether taken singly, such as te and kai, or as correlative and hence corresponsive, such as te when it is to be followed by kai, we are brought back to the ‘expletive’ particles, but now in the form of parapleromatikoi sundesmoi, whose lexical role in “filling up the gaps” in speech may also have a rhetorical effect, inasmuch as “[t]he particle placed thus at the beginning of the sentence and separating what follows from what precedes, creates the impression of elevation.” But we must observe that, while the first three examples of expletive Demetrius instances at times function as ‘progressive’ particles, in the present case they are clearly the type called ‘sentence adverbs’ or ‘transitions’, whereas dê as meaning ‘lo!’, as well as ai ai and pheu and poion ti estin (meaning ‘ah me!’ and ‘alas!’ and ‘oh, what is it?’ respectively), come under the part of speech afterwards called the ‘interjection’. Now it must be observed that the former species have the effect of pausing speech, whereas the latter would more accurately be described as interrupting it, and hence as impeding the formation of one significative vocal sound out of more than one such sound . Nevertheless, unlike their conjunctive use as ‘progressive’ particles, their ‘expletive’ use, whether as ‘sentence’ adverbs or transitions, or as parapleromatikoi, constitutes a sort of ‘stop’ in the course of speech, albeit a ‘weak’ one;1 whereas the stop produced by the interjection is ‘strong’, the former resembling the punctuation mark the comma, the latter, the period. In this regard, consider again the relevant observations of a grammarian we have cited above:

Expletive is a single word or short phrase, usually interrupting normal syntax, used to lend emphasis to the words immediately proximate to the expletive. (We emphasize the words on each side of a pause or interruption in order to maintain continuity of the thought.) [Cf. Weir Smyth on ‘sentence’ adverbs. (B.A.M.)] Compare:

But the lake was not drained before April. But the lake was not, in fact, drained before April.2

...A common practice is setting off the expletive by commas, which increases the emphasis on the surrounding words, though in many cases the commas are necessary for clarity as well and cannot be omitted.

...Transitional phrases, accostives, some adverbs, and other interrupters can be used for emphasizing portions of sentences, and therefore function as kinds of quasi-expletives in those circumstances.

We find a few people, however, unwilling to come. “Your last remark,” he said, “is impertinent.” There is nothing, Sir, too little for so little a creature as man. –Samuel Johnson

Some useful expletives include the following: in fact, of course, indeed, I think, without doubt, to be sure, naturally, it seems, after all, for all that, in brief, on the whole, in short, to tell the truth, in any event, clearly, I suppose, I hope, at least, assuredly, certainly, remark-ably, importantly, definitely.... And it goes without saying that you should avoid the un-printable ones.

1 And note here that it is when they are used purposively that such particles are ‘sentence’ adverbs; but when they are used aimlessly to fill up the gaps in discourse, they are ‘parapleromatic’ connective particles.2 Bruce E. Clark, Use of Rhetorical Devices. (http://www.megabrands.com/carroll/faq3.html [1/2/06])

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Hence, we must recognize the following four roles that particles may play: When used to conjoin parts of speech, they are (1) ‘conjunctive’ adverbs; but employed “as a word expressing a mode of thought, considered…in isolation” (cf. Denniston, Introduction, sec. 1), as when they are used to add emphasis to a sentence, they are (2) ‘sentence’ adverbs (cf. Weir Smyth, §1094); but when used ‘aimlessly’ to fill up the gaps in speech, they are (3) parapleromatikoi sundesmoi—that is to say, ‘expletive’ particles, properly so called. But expletives may also be used to express a strong emotion or passio animi, and then they are (4) the species the Latin grammarians called ‘interjections’.1 Now in their first use, they ‘produce’ one significative vocal sound out of more than one such sound; but in their second and third uses they neither ‘impede nor produce’ such a formation, as one may see from Bywater’s example “Kleon, however, walks”, or from Lane Cooper’s “Know, however, thyself”. But in their fourth use they manifestly impede the formation of such a conjoined vocal sound, as is shown by Demetrius’ example of lo! But if such a distinction is to be observed among them, one might very well wonder how they can have the same definition. Along the same lines, one might be at a loss to understand how a species of connective, the function of which is to conjoin segments of speech, can carry out its task by dividing or separating them, as the definition states, when these outcomes, being mutually exclusive, are opposed as contradictories. To see how these interrelated knots are to be untied, one must bring to bear Aristotle’s teaching on what at first glance will appear to be an entirely unrelated subject, that of the relation of the ‘now’ of time to a point on a line:

[5] And time, then, is continuous by the now, and divided according to the now. For this also follows locomotion and what is borne; because it is one (and not [just] as to subject, for it might pause, but in account). For this [mobile] determines the prior and the posterior motion.

[10] The now also corresponds, in a way, to the point. For the point too both continues and determines the length, for it is the beginning of the one [part] and the end of the other. But whenever someone takes the point so that he uses the one point as two, it is necessary that the mobile come to a stand, if the same point will be beginning and end. However, because what is borne is moving, the now is always different; whence, time is number, not as of the same point, because it [15] is beginning and end, but rather as the extremes of the line; and not as [determining] the parts [of the line], because of what was said. For one will use the middle point as two: whence, it will happen that it rests. (emphasis added, but footnotes omitted)2

A little further on, he elaborates on this matter as follows:

[222a10] The now is the connection of time, as was said. For it connects the time passed and the time which will be, and is the limit of time. For it is the beginning of the one and the end of the other. But this is not apparent as in the case of the point, which remains. Yet the now divides in potency. But insofar as it is like this, the now is always different, [15] but as it ties together, it is always the same, just as in the case of mathematical lines. For the point is not always the same in the understanding. For, [the line] being divided, the point is always other, but insofar as [the line is] one, the point is wholly the same. So too the now is the division of time according to potency, and as the limit and unity of both parts. The division and union are the [20] same and according to the same, but to be these is not the same.

1 See Appendix I, below.2 Phys. IV. 11, 220a 5-18, (cf. Aristotle: Physics, or Natural Hearing. Translated and Introduced by Glen Coughlin [South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2005], pp. 86-87).

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Hence, as with the ‘now’1 of time, a point taken on a line can be thought of either as dividing it (what comes before being set off from what comes after), or as continuing it; in either case being both the end of what comes before and the beginning of what comes after; so, too, the species of ‘expletive’ particles both divides and continues speech: the ‘transitional’ expletives being understood to continue the parts they separate (cf. Weir Smyth, §1094), the interjections, as dividing them (cf. ‘Demetrius’, ch. II, nn. 55-58); for which reason it is true to say of either one that “the particle placed thus at the beginning of the sentence and separating what follows from what precedes” produces its characteristic effect, whether rhetorical (as by elevating it), or lexical (as by pausing or halting it), as the case may be.

Even more closely related to these considerations is the following text on the role in anatomy played by the namesakes of the sundesmos and arthron:

De partibus animalium II. 9: Parallel translations:

Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals, II. 9 (654a 33-655b 36) (tr. William Ogle)

There is a resemblance between the osseous and the vascular systems; for each has a central part in which it begins, and each forms a continuous whole. For no bone in the body exists as a separate thing in itself, but each is either a portion of [35] what may be considered a continuous whole, or at any rate is linked with the rest by contact and by attachments; so that nature may use adjoining bones either as though they were actually continuous and formed a single bone, or, for purposes of [654b1] flexure, as though they were two and distinct.2

And similarly no blood-vessel has in itself a separate individuality; but they all form parts of one whole.

For an isolated bone, if such there were, would in the first place be unable to perform the office for the sake of which bones exist; for, were it discontinuous and separated from the rest [5] by a gap, it would be perfectly unable to produce either flexure or extension; nor only so, but it would actually be injurious, acting like a thorn or an arrow lodged in the flesh.

Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals, II. 9 (654b 14-34) (ed. Loeb; tr. A. L. Peck), pp. 163-164

1 Of course, the ‘now’ of time, whether taken to mean the indivisible instant of time, or as ‘the present’ commonly speaking, and hence a part of time including the immediate past and future, is not to be confused with the expletive particle of the same name, although they are clearly related, as one may see by considering their dictionary definitions.2 Note how this statement agrees with what Aristotle says about the now of time and a point taken on a line. The reader will observe the analogy here between the bodily systems discussed and speech disposed in segments by means of connectives and joints; one’s language being one and hence able to ‘bend’ through the former, but many or divided, though still ‘linked’, through the latter.

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Similarly if a vessel were isolated, and not continuous with the vascular centre, it would be unable to retain the blood within it in a proper state. For it is the warmth derived from this centre that hinders the blood from coagulating; indeed the [10] blood, when withdrawn from its influence, becomes manifestly putrid. Now the centre or origin of the blood-vessels is the heart, and the centre or origin of the bones, in all animals that have bones, is what is called the chine.

With this all the other bones of the body are in continuity; for it is the chine that holds together the whole length of an animal and preserves its straightness.

But since it is necessary that the body of an [15] animal shall bend during locomotion, this chine, while it is one in virtue of the continuity of its parts, yet by its division into vertebrae is made to consist of many segments.

It is from this chine that the bones of the limbs, in such animals as have these parts, proceed, and with it they are continuous, being fastened together by the sinews where the limbs admit of flexure, and having their extremities adapted to each [20] other, either by the one being hollowed and the other rounded, or by both being hollowed and including between them a hucklebone, as a connecting bolt, so as to allow of flexure and extension. For without some such arrangement these movements would be utterly impossible, or at any rate would be performed with great difficulty.

There are some joints, again, in which the lower end of the one bone and the upper end of the [25] other are alike in shape. In these cases the bones are bound together by sinews, and cartilaginous pieces are interposed in the joint, to serve as a kind of padding, and prevent the two extremities from grating against each other.

Round about the bones, and attached to them by thin fibrous bands, grow the fleshy parts, for the sake of which the bones themselves exist.

For just as an artist, [30] when he is moulding

The system of the bones is a connected whole, starting from the backbone, since the backbone connects together the length of the animal’s body and [15] holds it straight.

Now although this backbone is a unity because it is connected together, it [163-164] is also a thing of many parts because of its division into vertebrae, since the body must be able to bend while the animal is in motion.

And the bones of the various limbs (in those animals which have them) are connected with this backbone, from which they originate. Some of them have extremities which [20] fit onto each other:

[E]ither (a) one is hollow and the other rounded, or (b) both are hollow and hold a huckle-bone between then (as it might be a bolt), to admit of bending and extension, since these movements would be quite impossible or at any rate unsatisfactory without such an arrangement.

(c) There are some joints [= arthra] in [25] which the adjacent ends of the two bones are similar in shape; [these are bound together by sinews (sundedetai neuros),] and there are pieces of cartilage inserted between them, like a pad, to prevent them from rubbing against each other.a

Now the whole system of the bones exists to subserve the fleshy parts of the body, which have their place around the bones and are attached to them by thin fibrous threads [desmois].

Modellers who set out [30] to mould an animal out of clay or some other plastic substance

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an animal out of clay or other soft substance, takes first some solid body as a basis, and round this moulds the clay, so also has nature acted in fashioning the animal body out of flesh.

Thus we find all the fleshy parts, with one exception, supported by bones, which serve, when the parts are organs of motion, to facilitate flexure, and, when the parts are motionless, act as a protection.

begin first of all with a hard and solid core and mould their figure around it. Nature’s method has been the same in fashioning animals out of flesh.

With one exception, all the fleshy parts have a core of bone: for the parts that move and bend, this is present as a means for enabling the limb to bend....

a The text of this paragraph has been confused by a number of interpolations, most of which I have omitted in translating. (Peck’s note)

Hence, just as “it is necessary that the body of an animal shall bend during locomotion, this chine [or ‘backbone’], while it is one in virtue of the continuity of its parts, yet by its division into vertebrae [being] made to consist of many segments,” so, too, it is necessary for the body of speech to ‘bend’1 in virtue of its ‘connectives’ and ‘articles’; it being one in virtue of the continuity of its parts, yet by its division being made to consist of many “segments”; speech being continuous through its sundesmoi, but divided through its interjections and arthra; roles making them analogous to the expletives in speech as described above.

* * *

1 Cf. Aristotle’s comparison to the turn in a race-course in his discussion of the period.

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XIV. A FURTHER EMENDATION OF THE TEXT.

In light of the Aristotelian descent of Demetrius’ account of the parapleromatic connectives as including the interjection as well as ‘transitions’, I propose the following, additional, emendation of the text, incorporating both his general definition of them, as well as three of his examples of interjections:

[I. (B.) The expletive particles]

[(a.) The species of expletive called ‘interrupters’; i.e. ‘interjections’]

def. 2. |Or else| |a non-significative vocal sound which|, <being placed at the beginning of speech, and separating what follows from what precedes>,1

e. (bis; rev.) (ii.) |is naturally apt to <impede (the formation of)> (iii.) one significative vocal sound| i. (iii) bis |out of many vocal sounds|,

<|such as| dh\ [‘lo!’] and ai)\ ai)/ [‘ah me!’] and feu= [‘alas!’], and the like>. [(b.) The species of expletive called ‘transitions’; i.e. ‘sentence’ adverbs or (depending on their use as ‘filler’) ‘parapleromatic’ conjunctions]2

|Or else| (from def. 1) a. |a non-significative [1457a] vocal sound which|, <being placed> (v.)| at the extremes as well as in the middle <of speech>|,

b. (i.) |neither impedes nor produces (ii.) one significative vocal sound (iv.) naturally apt to be composed (iii.) out of many vocal sounds <...> |,

<such as dh/ [= ‘now’ or ‘indeed’] [or] h)= [=‘yes?]; or>3 (1) (bis) |such as me/n [‘indeed’] or de/ [‘however’]|.4

* * *

1 ‘Demetrius’, op. cit., par. 56 (tr. Doreen Innis, slightly modified to fit the context).2 Cf. Denniston, op. cit., Introduction, sec. 6, on the particles which “express a mode of thought in isolation”; e.g. ge and mh/n, and the like. Cf. also Weir Smyth, op. cit., §1094: “b. Sentence adverbs (or particles) are adverbs that affect the sentence as a whole or give emphasis to particular words of any kind”. Cf. also The Armchair Grammarian, op. cit., sec. 5.2: “For instance, an adverb introducing a subordinate adverbial clause is a subordinating conjunction; an adverb joining independent clauses is a conjunctive adverb. Additionally, an adverb can function as a transition or an expletive”. (emphasis added)3 Examples taken from Abu Bishr Matta.4 As noted above, their expletive use must be distinguished from their copulative use. Cf. the grammarians cited in extenso above.

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XV. APOLLONIUS DYSCOLUS ON MEN ETOI DE.

Apollonius Dyscolus, On Syntax i. 12 (In: The Syntax or Peri Suntaxeōs (De Constructione) of Apollonius Dyscolus, translated, and with commentary by Fred W. Householder, pp. 22-23).

12. (III) ....Conjunctions, too, may vary in force according to their position in the sentence or the context, since ētoi is understood conjunctively (sumplektikos)2 in Iliad 1.68:

1.11 ētoi ho g’hōs eipōn kat’ar’hezeto (“He said this and sat down.”)

1 [[i.e. the preposition dia by itself doesn’t mean anything, but dia + gen. means one thing and dia + acc. means another.]]2 [[i.e. “on the one hand”, not “either”, which it could also mean]]

Here ētoi is taken as equivalent to men, as is shown by the immediately following context, where de appears:

toisi d’anestē(“Then Kalchas stood up.”)

Elsewhere ētoi is disjunctive (diazeuktikos):

1.12 ētoi neos estin ē palaios (“He is either young or old.”)

N.B. Apollonius notes that etoi can be taken conjunctively or disjunctively depending on its position within speech—that is, where it is ‘placed’. On the one hand, it can mean ‘and’ and so correspond to a following de just as if it were men, and hence is to be taken conjunctively. But it can also occur so as to mean ‘either’, and hence is to be taken disjunctively. Now Aristotle could have used such an example somewhere, and hence may have said something like, “such as men and de or etoi and de”.

Aristotle’s example: hôsper ho men kai ho egô men apaitei ton de kai ton ho de An example based on Apollonius: hôsper ho men kai ho etoi . . . ton de kai ton de

“such as (the) men and (the) etoi . . . (the) de and (the) de”

The meaning of ‘either/or’ in Aristotle:

D. S. Margoliouth, The Poetics of Aristotle. Translated from the Greek into English and from Arabic into Latin, with a revised text, introduction, commentary, glossary and onomasticon (Hodder and Stoughton: London, New York, Toronto, 1911), pp. 30-33.

In another class of cases the need of the teacher’s help is no less real, but only the careful reader will feel it. These are cases in which we have a series of propositions that are apparently untrue or unmeaning. What sense—to take a paragraph near the commencement of the Poetics (§ 2)—will the following convey to the ordinary reader of Greek?—

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e)pei\ de\ mimou=ntai oi( mimou/menoi pra/ttontaj,a)na/gce de\ tou/touj h)\ spoudai/ouj h)\ fau/louj ei)=nai,ta\ ga\r h)\qh sxedo\n a)ei\ tou/toij a)xolouthei= mo/noijxaxi/a ga\r xai\ a)ret$= ta\ h)\qh diafe/rousi pa/ntej,h)/toi belti/onaj, x.t.l.

We begin with a plain and honest amateur translation.

“ (1) Now since the imitators imitate men in action,and these must be either virtuous or vicious men,for character almost always follows these only,for all men differ in character by vice and virtue.”

If the translator choose to think as well as translate, he will comment as follows:—

Clause 1. Clearly untrue. The imitator can imitate a dead man or a woman in a faint, or a landscape or a scene.Clause 2. Grossly untrue. Of men in action 99 per cent. at least are neither virtuous or vicious exclusively, but both virtuous and vicious.Clause 3. Unmeaning.Clause 4. Obscure, because we are not told from whom [30-31] they differ. If it means that they differ from each other, its truth cannot be assumed. For we often say of people that they are as like as two pins or that there is nothing to choose between them.

Three courses are now open to us. We may, like the tutor of Saladin’s son, condemn the book as decidedly silly and of no practical use.1 A far less intelligent course would be to attempt to persuade ourselves that these propositions were defensible, e.g. that a dead man was really a man in action, and that landscapes were not really painted. A third course—which we propose to attempt—is to see whether Aristotle has not left us both a vocabulary and a grammar to his books, the use of which may show us that his statements are both clear and true.

Clause 2. a)na/gxh de\ tou/touj h)\ spoudai/ouj h)\ fau/louj ei)=nai has to be compared with the statement in the Categories2 which seems to contradict it: “good and bad are predicated of men and many other subjects, but it is not necessary that one of the two should belong to those of which they are predicated”, ou) ga\r pa/nta h)/toi fau=la h)\ spoudai=a e)stin “for not all are either good or bad; there is an intermediate, the neither good nor bad”. This sound doctrine is taught elsewhere3, and we are reminded in the Metaphysics that the intermediate has in this case no name. Evidently the difference of the Greek formulae (h)/toi—h)/; h)/—h)/), which we many call those of the exhausted and balanced alternatives, must constitute a radical difference in the sense. What [33-34]

1 [footnote omitted]2 12a 13-15.3 Topics 123b 17; Metaphys. 1055 b 23.

is the meaning of the formula of balanced alternatives? This is carefully explained in the Meteorology.1

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“That which is composed of dry and moist must be h)\ sxlero\n h)\ malaxo\n. Hard is that which does not sink into itself along the surface, soft that which sinks, without compensatory elevation; for water is not soft, since the surface does not sink downwards by pressure, but has compensatory elevation. Absolutely hard or soft is that which is absolutely such, relatively, what is so in relation to a particular thing. In relation to each other there is between things infinite difference of degree; but since we refer all sensible things to sense, it is clear when we speak of absolutely hard or absolutely soft that we do so with reference to the touch, the touch being used as a standard. That which is above it is hard, that which is below it is soft in our nomenclature.”

The formula of balanced alternatives then means the one or the other relatively to some standard or other, that of the exhausted alternatives the one or the other relatively to a particular standard. Hence in the de Generatione2 the author can say “the water must be or white or black”, meaning relatively light or dark in color, whereas he frequently points out3

that between white and black there are numerous varieties of colour; which, however, (e.g. scarlet4 and grey5), are white or black relatively to darker or lighter colours. Similarly we get the assertion that everything “must of necessity be or light or heavy”6 in a paragraph [32-33]

1 382 a 102 332b 22b.3 Metaphysics 1056a 30; Topics 106b 11.4 Meteorology 375a 14.5 Physics 224b 34.6 De Caelo 301b 30. In Metaphysics 1056a 22 pefuko\\j h)\ me/ga h)\ mikro/n ei)=nai is identified with what has mei=zon xai\ e)/latton.

which demonstrates that things are both. And that this is the true explanation in the passage with which we are dealing is evident from the fact that the standard “ourselves” is immediately introduced. The differentia “virtue” attaching to all character by law of nature, every character must in relation to some other possible character to be good or bad; in relation to ourselves be equal, better or worse. Hence it is quite true to say with the Categories that it is not necessary for them to be either good or bad,1 and with the Poetics that it is necessary for them to be “or good or bad”. For just as adjectives can be used for both dunamis and energeia, so they can be used to signify the possession of any of the quality or much of the quality. “Gravity and velocity have each two significations, meaning any motion and a high degree of motion”2. The Poles are not really to be found apart;3; things being called one or the other according to predominance.

The English for the formula of balanced alternatives must then not be “either virtuous or vicious”, but “relatively virtuous or vicious”. For it is quite clear that this formula of exhausted alternatives excludes it.4 It is not true to say that an article must be cheap or dear; it is true to say that it must be relatively cheap or dear.

1 For h)/toi—h) after a)na/gkh see Politics 1260b 38; de Caelo 274a 30; de Generatione 332a 5, etc.2 Metaphysics 1052b 28.3 Meteorology 359b 32.4 It is not asserted that h)/—h is never used for h)/toi—h; but that h)/—h has a sense which h)/toi—h has not.

N.B. The reader will note how the foregoing account not only demonstrates the use of disjunctive conjunctions in Aristotle, but also the need for them in making one’s speech clear.

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XVI. ON THE ROLE OF THE ARTICLE IN SPEECH.

[Anaximenes of Lampsacus], Rhetoric to Alexander, XXV (1435b 11-15) (tr. H. Rackham; slightly rev. B.A.M.).

The following examples illustrate attention to the insertion of the articles in the necessary places. ‘The man there [ou(=toj] wrongs the man there’ [tou=ton]:1 in this case the presence of the articles makes the language clear; to remove them will obscure it].b2 But in [15] some cases the result is the contrary. This is how things stand in respect of the articles.

b The point of this is not clear. (Rackham’s note) [N.B. For ‘language’ R. has ‘meaning’. (B.A.M.)]

[N.B. Perhaps Rackham thinks that “the point of this is not clear” because toutos occurs as correlative to houtos, whereas one would have expected ekeinos in its stead. In accordance with this observation, the sentence could be made to read “This man here wrongs that man there”. In any case, it is this power of the corresponsive articles to “make clear” that helps to reveal the import of the received definition of the article, especially in the light of the foregoing ‘compositional’ excerpts.]

Aristotle, Rhet., III. 6 (1407b 34-35) (tr. W. Rhys Roberts).

4) Do not bracket two words under one article, but put [35] one article with each; e.g. th=j gunaiko\j th=j h(mete/raj.3 The reverse to secure conciseness; e.g. th=j h(mete/raj gunaiko/j.3

3 [These are two ways of expressing ‘our wife.’] (Roberts’ note)

Aristotle, Rhet., III. 6 (1407b 34-35) (tr. George Kennedy).

5. And do not join [words with a single definite article] but use one with each: tēs gynaikos tēs hēmeteras; but for conciseness the opposite: tēs hēmerteras gynaikos.76

76 Cope captures the difference in English by that wife of ours as contrasted with our wife. (Kennedy’s note)

Aristotle, Prior An., I. 40 (49b 10-13) (tr. A. J. Jenkinson).

Since the expressions ‘pleasure is good [a)gaqo\n]’ and ‘pleasure is the good [to\ a)gaqo/n]’ are not identical, we must not set out the terms in the same way; but if the syllogism is to prove that pleasure is the good, the term must be ‘the good’, but if the object is to prove that pleasure is good, the term will be ‘good’. Similarly in all other cases.Aristotle’s examples of an arthron:

1 ou(=toj o( a)/nqrwpoj tou=ton to\n a)/nqrwpon a)dikei=. One expects ekeinos here. See below.2 nu=n me\n ou)=n e)ggino/mena ta\ a)/rqra safh= poiei= th\n le/cin, e)caireqe/nta de\ a)safh= poih/sei.

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tes, ‘our’ (= a possessive pronoun) to [agathon], ‘the [good]’ (= the definite article)

Anaximenes on the connective particles.

In the texts we have excerpted, we have seen how this contemporary of Aristotle, after mentioning “the so-called arthra”, turns to sundesmoi, giving, in the latter case, the following examples: first, the corresponsive particles men and de, remarking that after using the introductory connecting particle, one should put in the following, an observation similar to that made by the Philosopher in the Rhetoric;1 and then an example of cor-relative coordinating conjunctions meaning “both...and”. Third comes the decisive ex-ample illustrating the proper use of articles, an observation similar to what we find in the Rhetoric concerning these connective parts of speech: when put in their proper places they “make (something) clear,” namely, one’s language [lexis], by which we may understand one’s meaning, as Rackham translates it. Hence, taken together with the observations of Aristotle and Demetrius on the need for the proper placement of connective particles in order for the language to be understandable, we are now in a position to recognize exactly what this part of the definition of the arthron means: such words are said to “make clear” the lexis to which they belong inasmuch as it is in virtue of their use that speech which would otherwise be disjointed and unintelligible becomes transparent to the under-standing; the article playing a role similar to the connectives in ordering speech by marking the divisions that are necessary for there to be sense.

On the right way to understand the definitions of connectives in the Poetics.

It is worth noting here that, in my view, aside from the disordered state of the text, the greatest difficulty one encounters from the definitions we are concerned with arises from certain presuppositions, inasmuch as the intellectual custom of later ages predisposes many readers to come to the text with a grammarian’s understanding of the so-called “parts of speech”, and therefore expecting to find a grammarian’s definitions of the ‘conjunction’ and the ‘article’, rather than the logician’s consideration of ‘poetic’ lexis. Consequently, never suspecting that what is at issue here is speech considered insofar as it may be ‘bound’ or ‘articulated’ by the presence of certain connectives, they are at a loss. Now in-asmuch as the work we have before us pertains to logic rather than grammar, the element in which it moves is not language considered insofar as its composing parts are adapted to construction—that is to say, fitted to enter into a sentence—but rather such expression insofar as it is composed of vocal sounds that are either significative and intelligible or not, and hence able to inform the understanding or not. Now in my view the single most important fact that must be understood here is this: presupposing the logician’s concern with signification and understanding, the Philosopher’s entire treatment appears to be or-dered to investigating the problem, ‘What makes language one, and what makes it many?’; for which reason it is necessarily ordered to answering the question, ‘In virtue of what is language continuous and in virtue of what divided?’. As we have seen, both here and in the Rhetoric, Aristotle devoted considerable effort to answering these questions.

1 Cf. Rhet., III. 5 (1407a 17-30).

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But to return to the text, we must also recognize that another reason for its difficulty lies in the fact that several of its examples have been lost. As the reader will understand from the argument I have just presented, it is my view that the definition of arthron must be understood in light of the unique example furnished by the text of Anaximenes, which example manifestly agrees with the related observations the Philo-sopher and his disciple Demetrius make on certain sundesmoi; a use necessitated by the absence (so far as I know) of any similar observation involving arthra in Aristotle’s surviving works. Failure to do so has led Bywater seriously astray here.

In sum, my understanding of the entire question amounts to this: as works such as those of Heracleitus unmistakably show, the absence of ‘marker-words’ or ‘sign-posts’ such as are the connectives and articles, whether taken singly, or as corresponsive, the office of which is to make clear the before and after of speech, renders it virtually unin-telligible, for which reason there is a need in language for a kind of word which makes clear the beginning, end, or dividing-point of speech; for without such words it is often impossible to understand correctly what is being said.

Another essential point to grasp: the treatment of the article as performing an essential role with respect to rendering discourse intelligible necessarily disregards its character as a distinct part of speech—distinct, that is, in the consideration of the gram-marian. But, as we have repeatedly stated, the work we are investigating pertains to logic, whose concern is with significative vocal sound, and not with the parts of speech as such.1

Now the realization of the character of Aristotle’s treatment helps us to understand the re-ports that have come down to us from antiquity calling into question the Philosopher’s separation of the arthron from the sundesmos.2 In the first of these reports, its author, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, informs us that

Theodectes, Aristotle, and the philosophers of those days took the number of these parts of speech to be three: nouns, verbs, and conjunctions. Their successors, especially the leaders of the Stoic sect, made it up to four, separating ‘articles’ from ‘conjunctions’.3

Likewise, the author of the second, the Roman Quintilian, states that

the ancients, among whom were Aristotle and Theodectes, treated only of verbs, nouns, and conjunctions: as the verb is what we say, and the noun, that of which we say it, they judged the power of discourse to be in verbs, and the matter in nouns, but the connexion in conjunctions. Little by little, the philosophers, and especially the Stoics, increased the number: first, to the conjunctions were added articles; afterwards, prepositions....4

In perfect agreement with these reports, Aristotle could have proffered a definition of the arthron while not yet separating it—namely, as a distinct part of speech—from the sun-desmos, which is precisely the disposition of the text to which our investigation has led.

1 Of course, the phrase “parts of speech” is equivocal: in the acceptation of the logician, it refers to the name and the verb as entering into a logos, understood as significative vocal sound some of parts of which are significative separately; whereas, in the perspective of the grammarian, the phrase names these, as well as the conjunction, the article, and the other species of word; but it comprehends them insofar as they enter into a construction of the sort that completes a thought, and makes perfect sense in the soul of the hearer.2 Cf. the remark of Pinborg above, with the additional references to Priscian.3 De Comp. verborum 2 (In: Donald Andrew Russell and M. Winterbottom, editors. Ancient Literary Criticism: The Principal Texts in Translation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, tr. D. A. Russell, p. 323).4 Inst. Or. I 4, 17-19 (tr. Goold Brown).

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XVII. THAT ANAPHORA OR ‘REFERENCE’ IS THE DEFINING CHARACTER-ISTIC OF THE ARTICLE.

Apollonius Dyscolus, On Syntax, (= The Syntax or Peri Suntaxeōs (De Constructione) of Apollonius Dyscolus, translated, and with commentary by Fred W. Householder), Bk. I, n. 43, p. 33-4.

43. (VI) The special function of the article, as we have explained elsewhere, is anaphora (reference), that is, the presentation of a person [i.e. the referent of an NP] previously identified [i.e. known to speaker and hearer]. Anaphora of nouns may be (1) par excellence, …(“This is the grammarian.”)…. Or else (2) it marks unique possession …(“Your slave did this.”)…. Or else (3) it may be mere anaphora, …(“The man came looking for you.”)….

Ammonius, Commentary on the Peri Hermeneias (= Ammonius: On Aristotle’s On Interpretation 1-8, tr. David L. Blank’ slightly rev. B.A.M.), pp. 23-24.

The truth of what we have said is also clear from the fact that the very names of the other parts of speech relate to the name and the verb. For they name the pronoun as they do [antinumia, literally, ‘instead-of-name’] as being a ‘name’, not of certain natures [phuseis], but simply of persons; and the participle [metokhe, literally, ‘sharing’, ‘partaking’] as partaking of both, i.e. of the name and the verb, even if it inclines more to the particular nature of the verb by indicating certain times, and the [23-24] article [arthron, literally, ‘joint’] as ‘joined’ to names and having reference to them.1 And why should we even speak of prepositions [prothesis], adverbs [epirrhema], or conjunctions [sundesmos]? The first of them has its name since it ‘precedes’ both names and the verbs equally; the second, since it is combined in such-and-such a way with ‘verbs’; and the third, since it ‘conjoins’ detached [apertemenoi] speeches. And you will find that, in certain passages, Aristotle seems to relent and call all [of them] more generally ‘parts of speech’. This is why in what follows he will say that some of the parts of speech are significant, as though there were also some which were non-significant,—unless some more appropriate explanation of this manner of speaking, which does not in any way contradict what we have now said, occurs to us.

Ammonias Hermeias on the arthron in sum:

That the article [arthron, literally, ‘joint’] (is so named) as (being) ‘joined’ to names and having reference to them. [N.B. For ‘joint’ here Blank has ‘link’.]

1 Cf. Michael Harvey, “The Nuts and Bolts of College Writing”, Pronouns and Relative Adjectives: “Another linking strategy is to make use of words that help us keep our sense of direction—pointers and transitions. Some of the most useful pointers and transitions are also some of the least appreciated by students: pronouns and adjectives to show possession and relation, like he, his, this, which, they, and it. The definition of a pronoun is a word that can stand in for a noun. It always points to some noun or thing called the antecedent (ante is a Latin word meaning before: the antecedent goes before the pronoun). Relative adjectives are similar: they show relation or ownership (my book, his argument, its strengths). Pronouns and relative adjectives perform the invaluable function of calling your reader’s attention to some noun you have already used without requiring you to use it again. This is an economical way of reminding your reader of your argument”. (http://www.nutsandboltsguide.com/process. [11/15/05]) Cf. also the excerpt from St. Thomas Aquinas cited next.

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St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 1, obj. 3, & ad 3 (tr. B.A.M.).

Further, names [or ‘nouns’] signify a substance with a quality; but verbs and participles signify with time; but pronouns with demonstration or relation, nothing of which belongs to God, since He is without quality and without every accident, and without time; and He cannot be sensed in order to be demonstrated [i.e. ‘pointed out’]; nor signified relatively, since relatives are able to recall to mind things said before, whether names, or participles, or demonstrative pronouns. In no way, then, can God be named by us.1

* * *

1 praeterea, nomina significant substantiam cum qualitate; verba autem et participia significant cum tempore; pronomina autem cum demonstratione vel relatione. quorum nihil competit deo, quia sine qualitate est et sine omni accidente, et sine tempore; et sentiri non potest, ut demonstrari possit; nec relative significari, cum relativa sint aliquorum antedictorum recordativa, vel nominum, vel participiorum, vel pronominum demonstrativorum. ergo deus nullo modo potest nominari a nobis. For a detailed treatment of St. Thomas on the article, see the discussion following.

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XVIII. THE PRINCIPAL SPECIES OF ‘ARTICLE’.

I next give excerpts from certain contemporary authors outlining the doctrine concerning the principal species of the article as this is found in those grammatical authors most closely related to Aristotle, namely, the Stoics (3 rd cent. B.C.), the Alexandrians (2nd

cent. B.C.), Apollonius Dyscolus (2nd cent. A.D.), as well as the surviving text of Dionysius Thrax (floruit 1st cent. B.C.):1

The Stoics:

1. Francesca Schironi, “Articles in Homer: A Puzzling Problem in Ancient Grammar” (In: Grammatical Theory and Philosophy of Language in Antiquity. Orbis, Louvain, Belgium: 2002. Supplementa, T. 19, p. 147):

In Stoic linguistics, a)/rqron is one of the parts of speech, next to o)/noma,5 r(h=ma and su/ndesmoj, and it comprises both articles and pronouns. There are a)/rqra w(risme/na, demonstrative and personal pronouns, and a)/rqra a)orista (or a)oristw/dh), articles and relative, indefinite, correlative, interrogative pronouns.6

5 Within the noun class, Diogenes of Babylonia and Chysippos (SVF III, 213, frr. 21. 22) distinguished o)/noma, “proper noun”, and the proshgori/a, “common noun”.6 Ap. Dysc. Pron. G.G. II, 1. 5. 13: Oi( a)po\ Stoa=j a)/rqra kalou=si kai\ ta\j a)ntwnumi/aj, diafe/ronta de\ tw=n par’ h(mi=n a)/rqrwn, $(= tau=ta me\n w(risme/na, e)kei=na de\ a)oristw/dh. [The Stoics call “articles” also the pronouns, but they differ from what we call “articles” as these ones (pronouns) are definite, the others (articles) indefinite]. Cf. also Ap. Dysc. fragm., G.G. II 3, 34, 44 (= Sch. Dion. Thr. [= G.G. I 3] 518, 34): To de\ a)/qron kai\ th\n a)ntwnumi/an suna/ptiousi, th\n a)ntwnumi/an w(risme/non a)/rqron kalou=nte\j, to\ de\ a)/rqron a)o/riston [...]. [(The Stoics) put together the article and the pronoun, calling the pronoun “definite article”, and the article “indefinite article”]. But Diogenes of Babylonia (SVF III, 214, fr. 22) gave the name a)/rqron only to the article....

2. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, Zeno. VII. 58; tr. R. D. Hicks, p. 167:

There are, as stated by [the Stoics] Diogenes [of Babylon] in his treatise on Language and by Chrysippus, five parts of speech: proper name, common noun, verb, conjunction, article…. A conjunction [sundesmos] is an indeclinable part of speech, binding the various parts of a statement together; and an article [arthron] is a declinable part of speech, distinguishing the genders and numbers of nouns, e.g. o(, h(, to/, oi(, ai(, ta/.d

d = “the,” masc., fem. and neut., singular and plural. (Hick’s note)

3. Catherine Atherton, The Stoics on Ambiguity (Cambridge, 1993), p. 306:

(iv) Diogenes Laertius’ definition of the article is also flawed. His list of me/rh tou= lo/gou omits pronouns altogether, the article there defined being what the Stoics called the “indefinite article”, and what moderns and ancient professional grammarians call the “definite article”. But (what we call) pronouns are Stoic articles too, what they called definite articles. The Stoics defended this unorthodoxy with a number of phonological considerations (A.D. pron. 6.7-14), while also observing that articles (i.e. standard definite articles) are substitutable for pronouns, and like them signify anaphora.

1 Many commentators think the ‘grammatical’ portion of Thrax’s text to be a later interpolation. My own view is that even if this is so the doctrine itself may be contemporary with, or even earlier than, Thrax. (B.A.M.)

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4. Jan Pinborg, Classical Antiquity: Greece, 2.7 Formal Grammar, in T. Sebeok (ed.) Current Trends in Linguistics, vol. 13 Historiography of Linguistics, 69-126. Mouton, 1975, p. 99:

The definition of arthron given by Diogenes Laertius is not expressly ascribed to Diogenes from Babylon, and I find it extremely improbable that the definition should derive from him. It defines arthron as if it only meant ‘article’ in the narrow sense, as a part of speech which shows the gender of the noun.1 This is quite out of character with the previous, purely semantic definitions. So it is probably a late definition influenced by the Alexandrian grammarians. The original Stoic definition of arthron must be the one reflected in Apollonios Dyskolos (Grammatici Graeci II, 1, 9,9), according to which the arthron signifies existence (ousia) without quality, i.e. the mere existence of a denotatum.2 This agrees perfectly with the Stoic theory of the deictic and infinite pronoun (cf. 2.3.1) and with the fact that arthron was originally used of the deictic houtos (cf. 1.3.2). According to the Stoics there were two principal classes of arthra; definite and indefinite. This corresponds with their division of simple propositions according to their subject (2.5). The prototype of definite arthra was houtos (‘that!’); the personal pronouns were probably associated with demonstratives. The prototype of indefinite arthra was tis (‘some’). To this category belonged also the anaphoric arthra which were not strictly deictic but referred to an already mentioned object, e.g., the article and ekeinos (cf. Diogenes Laertius VII, 70). The interrogative and relative pronouns were probably also classified here (for sources cf. note 13 and Varro, De lingua latina VIII, 51, which Fehling [1958:165] does not understand perfectly). The distinction between pronouns and articles was not known to the Stoics, but was an accomplishment of later grammarians. If we trust Apollonios Dyskolos (Grammatici Graeci II, 1, 5,18-19) even Dionysius Thrax did not distinguish pronouns and articles as two parts of speech (cf. 3.1).

N.B. As the foundation of their doctrine is due to Aristotle and the Peripatetic school, the Stoics’ divisions of the article might be owed to these precursors as well.5. Francesca Schironi, “Articles in Homer: A Puzzling Problem in Ancient Grammar” (In: Grammatical Theory and Philosophy of Language in Antiquity. Orbis, Louvain, Belgium: 2002. Supplementa, T. 19, p. 147):

The Alexandrians distinguish a new group, the a)ntwnumi/ai, which consists of demonstrative, personal, possessive and reflexive pronouns. For these grammarians a)/rqron indicates only the article properly speaking (protaktiko\n a)/rqron, i.e. put “before” [pro-] the noun it refers to), and the relative pronoun (u(potaktiko\n a)/rqron, i.e. put “after” [u(po-] the noun it refers to)7.

7 [Footnote omitted; but Schironi goes on to give the definitions found in Diogenes Laertius, which I have quoted above. (B.A.M.)]

6. Dionysius Thrax, Techne Grammatike n. 20 (= “The Grammar of Dionysios Thrax”. St. Louis: R. P. Studley. Translated by Thomas Davidson. The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. VIII (1874), p. 336.

20. ON THE ARTICLE (a)/rqron)

1 As we have seen, the definition reads, “distinguishing the genders and numbers of nouns”. (B.A.M.)2 Actually ousia means ‘substance’ not ‘existence’. Hence, according to the Stoics, the article signifies a substance without (a) quality, in which case it is immediately opposed to the noun, which signifies a substance with (a) quality, as St. Thomas Aquinas, following Priscian, states in a text cited above. (B.A.M.)

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An article is a declinable part of speech prefixed or subjoined to the various cases of nouns,1 taking, when prefixed, the form o(, and, when subjoined, the form o(/j.* It has three accidents: Gender, Number, and Case. The Genders are three, as o(/ poihth/j, h( poi/hsij, to\ poi/hma. The Numbers are three: Singular, Dual, and Plural—Singular, as o(, h(, to/; Dual, as tw/, ta/; Plural, as oi(, a(i, ta/. The Cases are— o(, tou=, t%=, to/n, w)=, h(, th=j, t$=, th/n, w)=, to/, tou=, t%=, to/, w)=.

* The ancient a)/rqron included both the article and the relative pronoun…. (Davidson’s note)

7. R. van Bennekom, “The Definitions of Sundesmoj and Arqron in Aristotle, Poetics ch. 20”. Mnemosyne 28 (1975) 399-411, p. 406.

It will be best to look into the history of the term a)/rqron to see if A 1 and A 22 fit in somewhere. At the beginning of our era, in the classical work of Apollonius Dyscolus, the term a)/rqron had come to designate the article o( h( to/ (a)/qron protaktiko/n) and the relative pronoun o(/j h(/ o(/ (a)/qron u(potaktiko/n). [N.B. I return to this excerpt, adding its continuation, below. (B.A.M.)]

N.B. The following excerpts from contemporary sources offer further clarification on the understanding of the article in classical Greek:

1. “Definite Article” [excerpt from a summary appearing on the Internet]:3

A. Function of the Definite Article

1. The article was originally derived from the demonstrative pronoun ho, he, to, and is clearly akin to the relative pronoun hos, he, ho. 2. It always retained some of the demonstrative force. 3. This fact is evidenced by its frequent use in the papyri purely as a demonstrative pronoun. 4. The function of the article is to point out an object or to draw attention to it. 5. It was used by the Greeks to make a word stand out distinctly. 6. Whenever the article occurs the object is certainly definite. 7. The basal function of the Greek article is to point out individual identity.

2. Herbert Weir Smyth, A Greek Grammar for Colleges:

§1099. The article o(, h(, to/, was originally a demonstrative pronoun, and as such supplied the place of the personal pronoun of the third person. By gradual weakening it became the definite article. It also served as a relative pronoun (1105). (Cp. Germ. der, demonstrative article and relative; French le from ille.) o( as a demonstrative is still retained in part in Attic prose (1106), while the beginnings of its use as the article are seen even in Homer (1102).

Cf. also the following from Weir Smyth:

1 a)/qron e)sti me/roj lo/gou ptwtiko/n protasso/menon kai\ u(potasso/menon th=j kli/sewj tw=n o)nona/twn.2 Cf. van B’s segmentation of the text given above.3 (www.prairieviewchristian.org/Greek%20Word%20study/Definite%20Article.pdf- Supplemental Result [3/7/06])

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§1118. The article o(, h(\, to/ marks objects as definite and known, whether individuals (the particular article) or classes (the generic [p. 287] article). The context must determine the presence of the generic article. a. There is no indefinite article in Greek, but a, an is often represented by ti\j (1267). [end]

N.B. Note that Aristotle’s treatment of the article in the Poetics follows after the part of lexis including men and de. But there is a characteristic use of the definite article with respect to these corresponsive particles, as Weir Smyth states (§1107):

o( is a demonstrative commonly before me/n, de/, and especially in contrasted expressions: o( me/n . . . o( de/ the one, this . . . the other, that, as in oi( me\n e)poreu/onto, oi( d' ei(/ponto the one party proceeded, the other followed X. A. 3.4.16.1

Cf. also the following:

§1111. Note the adverbial expressions: to\ (ta\ ) me/n . . . to\ (ta\ ) de/ on the one hand . . . on the other hand, partly . . . partly (so also tou=to me/n . . . tou=to de/ 1256); to\ de/ ti partly, th=? me/n . . . th=? de/ in this way . . . in that way, to\ de/ whereas (1112), tw=? toi therefore.

Cf. also the following:

§1102. o(, h(, to/ often approaches to its later use as the definite article or is actually so used: to\n me/n . . . to\n d' e(/teron E 145 (cp. 1107). a. The substantive often stands in apposition, and is added, as an afterthought, to the demonstrative (especially o( de/) which is still an independent pronoun: au)ta\r o( toi=si ge/rwn o(do\n h(gemo/neuen but he, the old man, was leading the way for them w 225.

And again, cf. Weir Smyth on Homer’s use of o(, h(, to/:§338 D. 1. Hom. uses the demonstrative forms o(, h(, to/ (332) as relatives (1105). In this case the nom. pl. has toi/, tai/ (332 D.). [end]

I suspect that Aristotle was well aware of these interrelated usages, Weir Smyth’s account in §1107 reading almost like a continuation of what Aristotle says about men and de in the Rhetoric.

3. Encyclopedia of English Grammar and Word Grammar, “The classification of words in Word Grammar”, s.v. ‘definiteness’; s.v. ‘determiner’:2

definiteness

Traditional grammar classified ‘articles’ (the determiners THE and A) as definite or indefinite, but this distinction applies to all the other pronouns as well (see the lists in pronoun). Furthermore, proper nouns are all inherently definite, while common nouns are indefinite unless combined with a definite determiner (so books is indefinite in Books were lying all over the place). Although definiteness is clearly predictable (in English) from the syntactic structure, it is not a syntactic category (there being no syntactic rules that mention it) so in WG [Word Grammar] it is not treated as a syntactic distinction. It is represented in

1 The reader will note that I incorporate this example into my reconstruction below.2 (http://www.phon.ucl.ac.uk/home/dick/enc/words.htm [3/7/06])

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the semantic structure, however, in terms of whether or not the noun’s referent is already known to the addressee. The referent is known if the noun is definite, but not if it is indefinite; for example, if I say the book to you, I am inviting you to find the book concerned in your memory, among all the books you know; but if I say a book I am advising you not to bother to look for it, as you may not already know it. <...>

determiner

‘Determiner’ is a word-class which is not part of traditional grammar but was invented earlier this century. Typical examples are SOME, ANY, MY and THIS, which were traditionally classified as adjectives because they combine with common nouns. However, the most common determiners are A(N) and THE, which were traditionally called ‘articles’ (from the Latin for ‘joint’, as in articulated). The modern word-class ‘determiner’ therefore combines the traditional articles with some of the traditional adjectives – a major reorganisation of the word-class system. Other modern theories take ‘determiner’ as an additional basic word-class, distinct from all the others. After all the upheaval, however, the WG position is that determiners do not in fact constitute a separate word-class, but are all pronouns (NB certainly not adjectives as in traditional grammar). [end]

The importance of these observations for our investigation is clear: If it is true that “[t]he ancient a)/rqron included both the article and the relative pronoun”, as Davidson points out—an opinion, be it noted, shared by many of the other witnesses cited above— and is derived from the demonstrative pronoun, as Weir Smyth among others maintains, while embracing other principal forms of pronoun, we are then well-placed to understand just what arthron meant for the ancients, among whom Aristotle was preeminent. Further, while the foregoing passages reveal important differences among ancient authors and schools with regard to their respective understandings of the arthron or article, they nevertheless agree in taking the demonstrative pronoun, the definite article and the relative pronoun as principal species of the form, an agreement suggesting they all derive from a common source. But the principal forerunner of all these schools was Aristotle.

Note also that, of the texts cited, which represent the principal grammatical ‘schools’ of antiquity, none gives us any reason to suppose that the ancients ever considered an indeclinable part of speech like the preposition to be an arthron.1 Moreover, when we consider the etymology of the name—a derivation which the passage from the De Partibus cited above shows that Aristotle certainly knew—we are again forced to deny the name ‘article’ to the preposition. In further support of this claim, let us consider the following, additional texts:

1. R. van Bennekom, “The Definitions of Sundesmoj and Arqron in Aristotle, Poetics ch. 20”. Mnemosyne 28 (1975) 399-411, pp. 406-407:

It will be best to look into the history of the term a)/rqron to see if A 1 and A 2 fit in somewhere11. At the beginning of our era, in the classical work of Apollonius Dyscolus, the term a)/rqron had come to designate the article o( h( to/ (a)/qron protaktiko/n) and the relative pronoun o(/j h(/ o(/ (a)/qron u(potaktiko/n). The origin of the term had become a matter of dispute. There were three current explanations, assembled by Schneider (Gramm Graeci II 3, p. 130): 1. ek tou= sunarta=sqai ptwtikoi=j kai\ mhde/pote di/ka au)tw=n eu(ri/skesqai; 2. para\ to\ a)rqron ta\ o)no/mata kat” a)riqmo\n kai\

1 Cf. Apollonius Dyscolus, Syntax, n. 85, p. 53 (tr. Householder): “The words which are combined [unchanged] with [nouns of] different number and gender are never articles, but indeclinable words (morion)—namely conjunctions, adverbs and prepositions”.

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ge/noj kai\ ptw=sin; 3. a)po\ tou= a)/rw, o(/ dhloi+ to\ a(rmo/zw. a(rmo/zetai ga\r toi=j ptwtikoi=j o)no/masi, metokai=j te kai\ a)ntwunumi/aij. The first etymology is followed by Apollonius (e.g. De constru. 118, 5, cf. Uhlig ad 24, 12), but he seems to accept the third one as well: De pron. 9, 5 kaqo/ti pa/ntote e)narmo/nion ptwtik%=. The second, which is rather different and is combated by Apollonius (De constr. 35, 5 ff.), apparently underlies the definition by Diogenes of Babylon, a Stoic grammarian of the second cent. B.C. and the teacher of Apollodorus of Athens and Dionysius Thrax: a)/rqron de/ e)sti [406-407] stoixei=on lo/gou ptwtiko/n, diori/zon ta\ ge/nh tw=n o)noma/twn tou\j a)riqmou/j, oi(=on o( h( to/, oi( ai( ta / (Diog. L, Vii 58, SVF III, p. 214).

Dionysius’ own definition does not give out much in the form we have it: a)/qron e)sti me/roj lo/gou ptwtiko/n protasso/menon kai\ u(potasso/menon th=j kli/sewj tw=n o)nona/twn. kai’ e)/sti protaktiko\n me\n o(, u(potaktiko\n de\ o(/j. (p. 61 Uhlig).

11 [footnote omitted]

2. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 1, art. 6, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

I reply that it must be said that the name ‘article’ appears to be derived from the Greek. For arthron in Greek, which is called ‘articulus’ in Latin, means a certain mutual adaptation of certain distinct parts. And thus the small parts of the body adapted to each other are called the ‘articles’ [i.e. ‘articulations’ or ‘joints’] of the limbs. And likewise in grammar among the Greeks certain parts of speech adapted to other words in order to express their gender, number or case are called ‘articles’. And likewise in rhetoric certain mutual adaptations of parts are called ‘articles’; for Cicero says in the Rhetorica ad Herennium IV (xix) that “it is called an ‘article’ when single words are distinguished by intervals in interrupted speech, thus: Your passion, your voice, your look, have struck terror into your foes”.1

3. Aristotle, De Anima, III. 10 (433b 19-27) (tr. H. G. Apostle):

The instrument with which desire causes motion is at this point [20] corporeal; and, for this reason, its study comes under the treatise which investigates the functions common to body and soul. At present, we may briefly say that the mover which causes motion instrumentally lies where a beginning and an end coincide, as in a ball and socket joint; for here the convex and the concave sides [coincide], the one being an end and the other a beginning. For this reason, one of them is at rest but the other is in motion; [25] and they are different in definition but not separate in magnitude, for all things are moved by being pushed or pulled. Thus something should remain fixed, as in a [rotating] wheel, and it is from this thing that motion should begin.2

On the definition of the arthron in light of its etymology.

In sum, according to St. Thomas Aquinas, an ‘article’, in the sense of an articulation or joint, means “a certain mutual adaptation of certain distinct parts” in virtue of which one thing is distinguished from another; as, to take Aristotle’s example, in a ball

1 respondeo dicendum quod nomen articuli ex graeco videtur esse derivatum. arthron enim in graeco, quod in latino articulus dicitur, significat quandam coaptationem aliquarum partium distinctarum. et ideo particulae corporis sibi invicem coaptatae dicuntur membrorum articuli. et similiter in grammatica apud graecos dicuntur articuli quaedam partes orationis coaptatae aliis dictionibus ad exprimendum earum genus, numerum vel casum. et similiter in rhetorica articuli dicuntur quaedam partium coaptationes, dicit enim tullius, in iv rhet., quod articulus dicitur cum singula verba intervallis distinguuntur caesa oratione, hoc modo, acrimonia, voce, vultu adversarios perterruisti.2 On this subject, cf. also the excerpt from the De Partibus, above, as well as St. Thomas’ little work, De Motu Cordis.

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and socket joint the convex and the concave sides coincide and are therefore distinguished from one another, the one being a beginning and the other an end (which is to say, they are extremes), an arrangement of parts making movement possible. Hence every ‘joint’ is seen to involve the coming together of “certain distinct parts” the mutual adaptation of which allows a kind of movement to occur. Note, however, the divergence between the grammatical article as St. Thomas defines it, and the bodily one: In the latter case, an article itself consists of two parts mutually adapted to one another, as with the ball and socket joint in Aristotle’s text; but in the former, an article consists in “a certain part of speech adapted to other words”.

With respect to language, then, an article would be such a word adapted to other words in the same way as the extreme of one of two bones is adapted in a ball and socket joint; that is, in such a way as to be itself an extreme that may be considered to ‘move’—that is (in the case of the relative pronoun), to ‘turn’—upon another word as on a pivot, as in the phrase, “and then the man, who spoke to you at dinner, went home”, as occurring in a periodic sentence, by virtue of which one’s speech is ‘articulated’;1 or (in the case of the ‘definite’ article) being so adapted in order to show its gender, number or case, the anaphora of which determiner is a kind of ‘turning back’.

If, then, an article involves in its very notion “a certain mutual adaptation of certain distinct parts”; and if the grammatical article is such insofar as it is (in one prominent species) “adapted to other words in order to express their gender, number or case”; and if Aristotle was aware of both of these facts (as the texts from both his logical and physical works cited above plainly show), then, bearing in mind his strict adherence to logical procedure, he necessarily would have taken into account the difference of being ‘declinable’—that is, of ‘having case’, as he puts it—in categorizing the article; for which reason he would not have given the name ‘article’ to the preposition.

The principal species of article:

an article may be ‘definite’ [e.g. houtos] or ‘indefinite’ [e.g. tis]2

again, an ‘indefinite’ article may be preposed (as with our ‘definite’ article, e.g. ‘the’) or postposed (as also with our ‘relative’ pronoun, e.g. ‘who’); the (definite) article = arthron protaktikon; the relative pronoun = arthron hupotaktikon

N.B. As the reader will see, in my reconstruction of the definition of the arthron to follow, I have incorporated instances of each of these species, as I believe all of them to have been known to Aristotle, as well as being compatible with his definition.

1 Cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, De Comp. verborum 2, op.cit., tr. D. A. Russell, p. 323): “Now it is the combination and juxtaposition of these primary parts of speech—three or four, or however many there are—which produces what are called cola [clauses]; the connection of these in turn completes the period; and periods make up the entire discourse. The function of arrangement is thus to place words properly in relation to each other, to give cola their appropriate connection, and to articulate the discourse properly in periods”. (emphasis added) Note that I do not say that the articulation proper to the period is due solely to the presence of such arthra as the relative pronouns; rather I merely note the important role they play in such articulation (cf. the texts on Greek prose style cited above). The reader will also note that, like the passages excerpted from ‘Demetrius’ above, Dionysius’ work on the sunthesis onomaton also arguably preserves significant elements of Aristotle’s teaching on the questions which concern us.2 Cf. the remark from the ‘Word Grammar’ text excerpted above: “’Determiner’ is a word-class which is not part of traditional grammar but was invented earlier this century. Typical examples are SOME, ANY, MY and THIS, which were traditionally classified as adjectives because they combine with common nouns”.

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* * *

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XIX. SUPPLEMENT: THE COMMON AND PROPER NOTIONS OF SUNDES-MOS AND ARTHRON.

As we have seen, it is proper to the sundesmos to be that in virtue of which two or more things are made one; but it is proper to the arthron to be that in virtue of which one thing is distinguished from another. In the former case the extremes become one, whereas in the latter they remain two but are together in place, as in a ball and socket joint. As Aristotle explains in his physical works, in the case of the body, by virtue of its connectives a continuous whole made up of more than one bone may be used by nature as though its parts were one; but by virtue of the joint (article) a continuous whole made up of more than one bone may be used by nature as though its parts were two and distinct—that is to say, adjoining bones considered in one respect as a continuous whole may be used by nature as though they were two and distinct. Likewise in speech, adjoining vocal sounds which are significative by themselves going to make up a continuous whole of speech may be used by the speaker as though they were distinct. But just as in the body, sometimes something comes between the extremities of the joints such that they do not touch (i.e. synoidial fluid1, without which the bones would meet, making movement difficult if not impossible), so too in speech, another word like a pronoun may come between the article and its noun, albeit not necessarily for an analogous purpose.

On the foregoing parts in the case of an animal’s structure, cf. the following, contemporary, account (= Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th ed., s.v. ‘joint’):

Joint in anatomy, a structure connecting two or more adjacent elements of the skeleton. Structurally, there are two types of joints: diarthrosis, containing fluid, and synarthrosis, which function without fluid. Synarthroses are classified as fibrous, cartilaginous, or fibrocartilaginous. The elements of a fibrous joint are connected with collagen fibres. Cartilaginous joints, or synchondroses, are transient, linking bones which become fused after birth; they usually disappear before the age of 25. Fibrocartilaginous joints, or symphyses, are the connections between the body of one bone and the body of another. With two exceptions, all symphyses are located in the spinal column and are termed intervertebral disks. These disks have a hard, elastic outer ring, and a soft, mucoid core. Disks permit the vertebrae of the spine to move and insulate against the jolts of severe movements, such as jumping. A diarthrosis, or synovial joint, consists of a sac (bursa) containing fluid which both nourishes and lubricates the joint, making motion possible. All synovial joints are either ovoid (which is either convex or concave in all directions) or sellar, with concave and convex sides at right angles to each other. The ovoid bone surface is termed male if it is convex, and female if it is concave. The collagen fibres which connect the bones of a joint are ligaments. It was accepted until recently that ligaments held the bones of a joint in place, but it is now believed that it is in fact muscles which keep bones in their joint. Joints are nourished by blood supplied through capillaries, with the exceptions of the moving cartilage parts of a joint, disks, and menisci, which are nourished by synovial fluid.

N.B. Note that diarthrosis is found in speech as well as in the body; in speech dearticulation being seen with respect to its composition out of syllables, as well as out of connectives; cf. the following definitions: diarthrosis (= dearticulata), “articulate utterance of the voice”; in animals, “movable articulation” (LSJ); dearticulate, “distinct articulation (of the voice)”; in animals, “articulation admitting of motion in several directions” (OED).In sum:

1 ‘Synoidial’ being said from sunaphe, ‘connection’.

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A sundesmos is that in virtue of which a continuous whole made up of (at least) two parts may be acted on as one.

An arthron is that in virtue of which such a whole, while considered one, may be acted upon as if it were two—that is, as if it were composed of two distinct parts.

Where there is a sundesmos you have two adjoining parts which nature may use as though they were one; but where there is an arthron you have the adjoining parts used as though they were two and distinct. Hence, something may become one simply or in a certain respect.

Where there is a joint the extremities do not become one; for if they did, there would be no joint; it belonging to the definition of such a thing that its extremes be together in place such that they coincide, yet remain distinct in order to allow for movement.

Where there is a conjunction, the extremes become one by being held together in some way. Yet in the case of binding, the extremities become one only in a certain respect, as one can see by considering the familiar example of a bundle of sticks held together by a cord, as opposed, for instance, as being held together by glue.

The primary division of conjunctions.

As we have explained above, a conjunction is that which produces one thing out of more than one thing by uniting them. But this happens in five ways; in one way as signifying simultaneous existence, and in four ways as signifying an order. That which signifies simultaneous existence is the copulative conjunction such as ‘and’. That which signifies an order is either conditional (if/then), or causal (because, which comes first), or inferential (since; therefore, which comes second), or concessive (although, though, etc.). Hence, if we take to conjoin to mean “to produce one thing out of more than one thing”, then the copulative conjunction may be defined as a non-significative vocal sound which conjoins two or more things insofar as they are considered merely as being capable of existing at the same time; the others, insofar as they express a condition, a cause, an inference, or an concession, respectively. The task of a disjunctive, however, is to produce one thing out of more than one thing by dividing it, a function which takes the following forms: being either that which signifies an alternative (or), or an exception (except; except for), or an opposition (the adversatives: but; however; but indeed). Such disjunctives are single, but as noted above, they also occur as correlatives, as either/or, neither/nor, and the like.

In sum.

When one considers the function of the several species of connective, the following divisions become manifest: On the one hand, with respect to their syntactic role, connectives are divided into coordinating and subordinating. On the other hand, with respect to their signification, they are divided into the conjunctive and the disjunctive; while the conjunctive are, as noted by certain grammarians, divided into the copulative and the continuative. Cf. the following divisions:

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The ‘syntactic’ division:

coordinating conjunctions (FANBOYS)

for (causal) and (copulative) nor (negative alternative) but (adversative) or (disjunctive or alternative) yet (exceptive) so (inferential or conclusive)

subordinating conjunctions

if (or if/then) (conditional) because (causal) since (inferential) either/or (disjunctive) although, though, etc. (concessive)

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XX. THE EMENDED TEXT.

Having, then, to the best of my ability carefully considered the relevant evidence, I shall now proceed to incorporate my suggested revisions and supplements into a form resembling the received version of the text. As I have stated above, I do not suppose my reconstructions to recover what Aristotle actually wrote, but, at best, to approximate to it more closely than our current versions do.1

Poetics ch. 20, 1456b 38–1457a 10: A Conjectural Reconstruction

[I. (A.) The species of conjunction called ‘copulatives’]

def. 1 (part 1). |But a conjunction is| from def. 2 a. |a non-significative [1457a] vocal sound which| e. (ii.) is naturally apt to produce (iii.) one significative vocal sound e. (i.) out of more than one significative vocal sound|,

<and which may be placed at the beginning of speech by itself,

(1) |such as| te [enclitic ‘and’] or kai/ [‘and]>, or (1) |such as me/n or de/ [‘but’, ‘however’]|;2 [= solitarius]

def. 1 (part 2) c. |(i) unless it should not (ii.) be placed at the beginning of speech by itself,

|such as| <te when it is to be followed by kai/ [meaning ‘both...and’], or> (1) bis |such as me/n [‘on the one hand’] <when it is to be followed by> de/ [‘on the other hand’].| [= correlativus or ‘corresponsive’]

[I. (B.) The expletive particles]

[(a.) The species of expletive called ‘interrupters’; i.e. ‘interjections’]

def. 2. |Or else| |a non-significative vocal sound which|, <being placed at the beginning of speech, and separating what follows from what precedes>,3

e. (bis; rev.) (ii.) |is naturally apt to <impede (the formation of)> (iii.) one significative vocal sound| i. (iii) bis |out of many vocal sounds|,

<|such as| dh\ [‘lo!’] and ai)\ ai)/ [‘ah me!’] and feu= [‘alas!’], and the like>.4

1 It will be helpful here to recall that, since some other cause might be operative, the sort of reasoning I employ, namely, hypothetical, can never produce certainty; probability alone being approached when, from many pieces of converging evidence, one is led to suppose that such-and-such an explanation is more likely than another; as, for instance, when one reasons that, if it rained last night, the ground would be wet; then finding it wet, and ruling out other possible causes, one concludes that rain is the likeliest culprit.2 Cf. Weir Smyth, op. cit., §2163 B: “de/ (postpositive, often with me/n in the preceding clause) but”.3 ‘Demetrius’, op. cit., par. 56 (tr. Doreen Innis, slightly modified to fit the context).4 The reader will notice that I have combined examples taken from ‘Demetrius’. But it must also be noted that, inasmuch as these last two species are naturally-significative vocal sounds, taking them as examples of non-significative vocal sounds is problematic. One could, of course, supply other instances of those which are, like ‘lo!’, adverbs of attention, and hence, words. See the Appendix on interjections.

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[(b.) The species of expletive called ‘transitions’; i.e. ‘sentence’ adverbs or (depending on their use as ‘filler’) ‘parapleromatic’ conjunctions]1

|Or else| (from def. 1) a. |a non-significative [1457a] vocal sound which|, <being placed> (v.)| at the extremes as well as in the middle <of speech>|,

b. (i.) |neither impedes nor produces (ii.) one significative vocal sound (iv.) naturally apt to be composed (iii.) out of many vocal sounds <...> |,

<such as dh/ [= ‘now’ or ‘indeed’] [or] h)= [=‘yes?]; or>2 (1) (bis) |such as me/n [‘indeed’] or de/ [‘however’]|.3 [= ‘sentence’ adverbs or ‘transitions’]

[II. The several species of ‘article’]

def. 3. |But an article is| f. |a non-significative vocal sound which|, <being ‘joined’ to names and having reference [anaphora] to them>,4

g. (i.) |makes clear the beginning, or end, or dividing-point of speech|,

(1) |such as| <o( me/n or o( de/ [the one, this . . . the other, that] >;5

(2) or |such as| <ou(=toj and e)kei=noj, as when it is said, ‘This man here [ou(=toj] wrongs that man there [e)kei=noj]’, and the like],6 [= corresponsive demonstratives]

(3) or |such as| to\ a)gaqo/n in ‘pleasure is the good’>,7 [= the ‘definite’ article] (4) or |such as| o\(n o(i qeoi\ in ‘whom the gods love die young’ [o\(n o(i qeoi\ filou=sin, apoqn$/skei ne/oj];8 [= the ‘relative’ pronoun]

the former being placed before, the latter, placed after, the name to which it is joined.>9

1 Cf. Denniston, op. cit., Introduction, sec. 6, on the particles which “express a mode of thought in isolation”; e.g. ge and mh/n, and the like. Cf. also Weir Smyth, op. cit., §1094: “b. Sentence adverbs (or particles) are adverbs that affect the sentence as a whole or give emphasis to particular words of any kind”. Cf. also The Armchair Grammarian, op. cit., sec. 5.2: “For instance, an adverb introducing a subordinate adverbial clause is a subordinating conjunction; an adverb joining independent clauses is a conjunctive adverb. Additionally, an adverb can function as a transition or an expletive”. (emphasis added)2 Examples taken from Abu Bishr Matta.3 As noted above, their expletive use must be distinguished from their copulative use.4 Ammonius Hermeias, op.cit., pp. 23-24.5 Cf. Weir Smyth, op. cit., §1107: o( me/n . . . o( de/ the one, this . . . the other, that, as in oi( me\n e)poreu/onto, oi( d' ei(/ponto the one party proceeded, the other followed X. A. 3.4.16. [= Xenophon, Anabasis] (B.A.M.) The reader will note that this is the third occurrence of ho men and ho de in the present reconstruction.6 Cf. Anaximenes of Lampsakos, op. cit., 1435 a 35 (tr. H. Rackham, modified by B.A.M.).7 Prior An., I. 40 (49b 10).8 Menander (c. 342–c. 291 B.C.), Greek playwright. The Double Deceiver, fragment 25, Menandri Reliquiae Selectae, ed. F.H. Sandbach (1990). As I have not found a suitable example in Aristotle or related authors, I have supplied this well-known saying from his younger contemporary and friend.9 Note here that I have not found it expedient to incorporate any version of the examples (imperfectly) preserved in either the Greek or Oriental manuscript traditions. See further below.

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Commentary

The respective derivations of each member of this version having been discussed above, let us take a look at the structure the definitions themselves assume. To begin with, it will be helpful to consider the functions that are present in the text:

1. what neither impedes nor produces (the formation of) one significative vocal sound out of more than one significative vocal sound (given)

2. what is naturally apt to produce such a formation (given)3. what impedes such a formation (implied by the text)4. what makes clear the beginning, or end, or dividing-point of speech (given)

Now, on the assumption that the first two members of this division represent what Aristotle actually wrote, one must perforce conclude that some form of this third member originally belonged to the text, as otherwise the wording of the first member would be otiose; it making no sense to speak of “neither an A nor a B” when there is no ‘A’ in the case. But inasmuch as it interrupts the course of speech, the interjection, so I maintain, has the ability to carry out this task, the definition ‘Demetrius’ gives for the parapleromatic connectives in general furnishing us with the wording necessary to restore what may have been lost from the text here.1 But such being the case, this species would be immediately opposed to the copulative conjunction and so would, in accordance with Aristotle’s customary practice, come next. That is to say, assuming there is some species whose function is immediately opposed to that of the conjunction as such (which function, as we have seen, is making many one),2 Aristotle would have given this next, followed by the kind “which neither impedes nor produces” such a formation, as this would naturally come third and last; the order in which I have given them, then, being quite natural.

But with respect to the wording of the first definition, if one look at the corresponding part of the second (emended) definition, as well as the definitory phrase I have taken from ‘Demetrius’, both of which speak without qualification of a “placing” of the particle involved, the wording I have inserted suggests itself: “<which may be> placed at the beginning of speech by itself”.

But with respect to the third definition, inasmuch as it embraces particles such as the interrogative e, which may come first, as well as ge, which may come last, to the third definition I have added the phrase, “<being> placed at the extremes as well as in the middle <of speech>”, thereby making use of that otherwise superfluous member of the text.3

1 If, of course, as suggested above the ultimate source from which Demetrius’ observations derive is Aristotle himself, we have an even more compelling reason for incorporating its relevant parts into the text.2 Cf. Rhet., III. 12 (1413b 32—1414a 6): “[F]or the connective makes many, one”. But, as we have argued above, in a way, the interjection makes one many.3 On their placement, cf. Weir Smyth, op. cit., §2772: “The particles show different degrees of independence as regards their position. Many are completely independent and may occupy any place in the sentence; some may occur only at the beginning (prepositive particles, as a)ta/r); others find their place only after one or more words at the beginning (postpositive particles, as ga/r, de/); and some are attached closely to a preceding word or even form compounds with that word wherever it may occur (ge/, te/)”. But that ge (as also ara and others) may come last is well known. Cf. also Bruce E. Clark, Use of Rhetorical Devices, op. cit.:

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But with respect to what is “naturally apt” to result from the composition of things, it is helpful to consider here the following passage from the Physics:

This being determined, it is apparent that the continuous is among those things from which something one is naturally apt to come to be according to contact. And in the way in which the continuous comes to be one at some time, so too the whole will be one, e.g., either by a nail or by glue or by touch or by growing together. (V. 3, 227a 14-17, tr. R. Glen Coughlin)

Now just as the continuous is among those things from which something one is naturally apt to come to be according to contact, so its species connected speech is among those things from which one significative vocal sound is naturally apt to come to be—that is, to be composed—out of many vocal sounds; the resultant whole being one “by conjunction(s)”. Hence, in addition to what is “naturally apt to be placed” in some way, it is quite natural to speak of what is “naturally apt to be composed” in the way stated.

As for the reading “unless it should not,” etc., notice how this description implies the case where such a placement is suitable. But a placing of this sort in the before and after of speech applies to corresponsive particles such as te and kai\,1 as well as to me/n and de/ [= ‘on the one hand’; ‘on the other hand’], as explained above. Note, too, that in both instances Aristotle may have given the same reason for placing them one after another that he gives in the Rhetoric,2 in which case the wording which I have adapted from the surviving portion of the text may be insufficient for expressing his thought on the matter.3

As for the part of the definition referring to what “neither impedes nor produces (such a formation),” etc., I have supposed it to apply to the expletive particles called ‘transitions’ which, being understood as ‘sentence’ adverbs, “affect the sentence as a whole or give emphasis to particular words of any kind” (Weir Smyth); but, understood as parapleromatic connectives, fill up the gaps in speech; the way the text is to be understood here having been correctly explained by Ingram Bywater, and beautifully illustrated by Lane Cooper’s illuminating example of “Know, however, thyself”. As a consequence, I have once again been able to construct an intelligible sentence in conformity with the other parts of the surviving text. And note, too, that my emendation makes use of the unique part of the fifth definition occurring in the received text,4 thereby vindicating its presence in our manuscripts.

As for the definition of the article, while not being absolutely necessary to it, the phrase I have taken out of Ammonius Hermeias furnishes a much-needed differentia5

helping to explicate this most challenging member of the text; it being my view that the statement it qualifies becomes much more intelligible as a definition of the article.

“In a few instances, especially with short sentences, the expletive can be placed last: ‘It was a hot day indeed.’ ‘Harold won, of course.’”1 And recall that I have taken the example word for word from [Aristotle], Probl. XIX. 20 (643b 21-22), the conformity of its doctrine with that of the Philosopher arguing in favor of this ‘problem’ being his own work.2 Cf. also the similar passage in Anaximenes, as he, too, instances the proper placing of corresponsive particles.3 As this is the simpler course, I have adopted it as requiring less extensive emendation.4 Sc. “out of many vocal sounds naturally apt to be composed [= to be placed with] at the extremes as well as in the middle”.5 A qualification that may, in fact, be Aristotle’s own, inasmuch as he preserves lost parts of the Poetics.

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But the examples of ho men and ho de, as well as houtos and ekeinos, being themselves corresponsive particles, are as suitable to it as te and kai or men and de preceding them. As for the three separate occurrences of ho men and ho de, I believe this is a plus, as it seems likely to me that Aristotle would have made use of this most evident polysemy; it being an aid to understanding to see how the same particles—arguably the most ubiquitous and important in the Greek tongue—while materially the same, are formally distinct by playing different roles in speech.

But with respect to the rest of the species I have added to the definition, the first of these, our ‘definite’ article, the most known of all the species, being taken out of Aristotle himself, needs no further justification; whereas the division into the species ‘(definite) article’ and ‘relative pronoun’ invites its inclusion as, perhaps, going back to the Philosopher himself, a view I hold for the following reasons: First, it is too obvious for him to have missed;1 second, like every other species belonging to the text, the respective definitions of these kinds include in their very notion an elementary opposition with respect to placement; and third, they all involve the role of “making (something) clear”, which role, as we have seen, virtually defines the connectives as Aristotle understands them.

Finally, a word must be said about the connective species we call the preposition. If one interpret the examples appended to the end of the third definition as witnessing to their existence in the text, one must then suppose their definition to have been lost from it. But this would have occurred at an earlier point in the text, as this otherwise unaccounted-for type of connective would not have been treated after the (several species of) article, but rather before it, as the former have case, but the latter do not, agreeing in this with the preposition. Accordingly, in the next section the reader will find a definition composed in conformity with Aristotle’s own, followed by the sources from which it has been drawn.2

* * *

1 The presence of these elementary divisions in the schools of antiquity immediately following after him also arguing in favor of this view.2 Closely connected to this concern is the nature and role of the adverb, a subject which we shall also consider below. And note that prepositions and adverbs are mentioned by Ammonius Hermeias in his discussion of the conjunction; the passage in question explicitly citing the Poetics as its source. See my preceding paper.

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XXI. THE DEFINITION OF THE PREPOSITION.

[The species of connective called ‘the preposition’]1

|or else| |a non-significative vocal sound which|, being placed before another |significative vocal sound|, |makes clear| the relationship [skhesis] the thing signified by |one significative vocal sound| has to another |vocal sound|>, |such as amphi [‘for the sake of’] and dioper [‘on account of’], and the rest.|2

The sources of the foregoing definition:

Frederick M. Wheelock, Latin: An Introductory Course Based on Ancient Authors, p. 7, n. 4.

A preposition (prae-positivus, having been placed before) is a word placed before a noun or a pronoun to make a phrase which modifies another word in the capacity of an adverb or an adjective. In Latin most prepositional phrases are adverbial.

Allen & Greenough, New Latin Grammar for Schools and Colleges. p. 12.

A Preposition is a word which shows the relation between a noun or pronoun and some other word or words in the same sentence: as, per agrōs it, he goes over the fields; ē plūribus ūnum, one out of many.

NOTE.--Most prepositions are specialized adverbs (cf. § 219). The relations expressed by prepositions were earlier expressed by case-endings.

Herbert Weir Smyth, A Greek Grammar for Colleges, Part IV: Syntax: Prepositions.

§1636. Prepositions define the relations of a substantival notion to the predicate. a. All prepositions seem to have been adverbs originally and mostly adverbs of place; as adverbs they are case-forms. Several are locatives, as peri/.

St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 1, n. 3 (tr. B.A.M.).

Or it may be said that only the name and the verb are principal parts of speech. For under names [or nouns] are comprehended pronouns, which, although they do not name a nature, nevertheless, determine a person, and therefore are put in place of names. But under the verb, the participle, because it consignifies time, although it have an agreement with the noun. But the others are more bonds of the parts of speech, signifying the relationship [habitudo] of one thing to another [significantes habitudinem unius ad aliam], rather than parts of speech [themselves], just as spikes [nails] and other things of this kind are not parts of a ship, but conjunctions of the parts of a ship.

1 As being uninflected, the preposition goes with the conjunctions’ but insofar as it resembles the last two species of article as involving a determinate placement within language or speech, it may have come after that species of word.2 Notice how much of this definition consists of words and phrases already occurring in the text.

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St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 6, n. 3 (tr. B.A.M.).

But second, he puts down that in which speech differs from the name and the verb, when he says, some parts of which are significative separately. For he said above that a part of a name does not signify something separate by itself [per se], but only that it is conjoined from two parts. But he significantly does not say: whose part is significative of something separated [cuius pars est significativa aliquid separata], but of which some part is significative [cuius aliquid partium est significativum], on account of negations and other syncategorematic terms, which in and of themselves do not signify something absolute [quae secundum se non significant aliquid absolutum], but only the relationship [habitudo] of one thing to another [sed solum habitudinem unius ad alterum].1

Ammonius Hermeias, Commentary on the Peri Hermeneias (tr. David L. Blank), p. 20.

It is worthwhile knowing that of the infamous ‘eight parts of the sentence’, some are significant of certain natures or simply of persons or activities or passions or some combination of these –i.e. name, pronoun [antonumia], verb, and participle [metokhe]—and these are the only ones that can suffice to generate an enunciative speech, as when we say ‘Socrates walks’ or ‘I walk’ or ‘The running [man] walks’ or ‘Socrates is [a] running [man], one [part] being taken as subject and the other as predicate. But the other [parts of speech] do not signify these [things], but make clear some relation [skhesis] of the predicate to the subject, as do most adverbs [epirrhemata]”.

Ibid., p. 21:

And the [other] so-called parts of speech besides these are absolutely without significance [asema] by themselves, such as the article [arthron], preposition [prothesis], and conjunction [sundesmos].

Ibid., p. 21:

So Aristotle divides into names and verbs all the things significative of natures, persons, activities, passions, or some combination of a person with an action or passion. He calls those which are said with time or predicated in propositions ‘verbs’, while those which are said without time or which have the function of subjects he calls ‘names’. But those which are found in neither place, even if they are added in another way to the propositions and signify that the predicate belongs or does not belong, or when, or how, or how often it belongs to the subject, or that they have any other relation to one another, he does not want to call ‘parts of speech (logos)’, properly speaking. For just as the planks of a ship are properly speaking its parts, while bolts, flax, and pitch are also added to hold them together and for the unity of the whole, in the same way in speech conjunctions, articles, prepositions, and adverbs themselves do the work of bolts, but they would not correctly be called parts inasmuch as they cannot be put together and on their own produce a complete ‘speech’. So these are not parts of speech, but they are parts of lexis, of which speech itself also is a part, as has been said in On Poetry.

1 Although he does not mention him by name, as the excerpts following make clear, St. Thomas is manifestly following Ammonius, as he often does at other points in his commentary, the latter’s work having been translated for him by William of Moerbeke.

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A grammatical definition of the preposition.

As is clear from the foregoing accounts, grammatically speaking, the preposition may be defined as a part of speech which, being placed before a noun or a pronoun, shows the relationship a thing signified by one part of speech (such as the subject) has to the thing signified by another part (or parts) of speech (such as the predicate), doing so by modifying it in the capacity of an adverb or an adjective. E.g. in the sentence “Socrates loved Xanthippe with all his heart”, the preposition ‘with’ relates the subject of the sentence (‘Socrates’), to the predicate (‘Xanthippe’), demonstrating the way in which he loved her, which is a skhesis or habitudo (a ‘relation’ or ‘relationship’), thereby doing the work of an adverb.

Two definitions of the adverb from classical sources.1

Priscian, Inst. gramm., ii. 4. 15ff. (6.1-12), tr. B.A.M.).

It is proper to the adverb to be placed with the verb, nor can it have complete signification without it, as ‘I do well’, ‘I read expertly’.

Anonymous, = P. Yale I.25 (tr. Vivien Law; slightly rev. B.A.M.).

The adverb is an uninflected word which is placed before or after the verb and not compounded with it, signifying quantity, quality, time, place, negation, agreement, pro-hibition, exhortation, interrogation, exclamation, comparison or doubt. Indicating quantity: ‘frequently’, ‘rarely’. Quality: ‘well’, ‘nicely’. Time: ‘now’, ‘yesterday’, ‘tomorrow’. Place: ‘here’, ‘there’, ‘outside’. Negation: ‘not’. Agreement: ‘yes’. Prohibition: mē [the negative particle used in negative commands]. Exhortation: ‘what’, ‘encore!’ Interrogation: ‘where?’ Exclamation: ‘If only!’. Comparison: ‘like’. Doubt” ‘pretty much’, ‘perhaps’.

A definition of the adverb.

The reader will note that the passage cited from Ammonius above allows us to educe the following Aristotelic definition of the epirrhema:

An adverb is a non-significative vocal sound which, being placed next to a vocal sound significant with time [i.e. the verb], or to one significant without time [i.e. an adjective, which is a kind of noun], “makes clear the relation of the predicate to the subject”—that is to say, adverbs indicate “how the predicate belongs to the subject, or when, or where, or how many times – whether finitely or infinitely many – or also according to what kind of order relative to something else,”2 such as eu [or kalos, ‘well’] and kakos [‘badly’] and the like.

[N.B. On this subject, see also the texts on modus in Appendix II following.]

1 For the parts of speech in their entirety as defined by these authors, see Appendix I, below.2 Cf. Ammonius Hermeias, op. cit, p. 21.

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The division of the connectives with respect to their having case or not.

One should note that, inasmuch as the conjunction stands to the article as what does not have case (and hence is indeclinable) to what does (and hence may be declined), in the text as it left his hands Aristotle almost certainly would have stated that, whereas the several species of arthra agree with the sundesmoi1 in being non-significative vocal sounds, they differ inasmuch as the former has case, whereas the latter lacks it. In this regard, one should consider the passage from Apollonius’ Syntax, n. 85, p. 53 (tr. Householder), cited above: “The words which are combined [unchanged] with [nouns of] different number and gender are never articles,2 but indeclinable words (morion)—namely conjunctions, adverbs and prepositions,” an observation that closely tracks with the substance of my suggestion, as well as with my supplementary treatments of the adverb and the preposition.

* * *

N.B. Having dealt with the preposition and, however briefly, the adverb, I shall end this paper with a consideration of the adverb as embodying a tropos or mode, and then the interjection in particular, as the doctrine concerning them is related essentially to our investigation.3

1 The connective parts of speech being understood to include the preposition, as well the expletives, the latter of which are types of the adverb, as we have seen.2 Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 1, art. 6, c., as well as the text of the De partibus, both of which are cited above.3 As noted several times above, I treat the Arabic tradition of the text in the paper following this one.

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APPENDIX I: ON TROPOS AS MEANING ‘THE WAY IN WHICH THE PREDICATE BELONGS TO THE SUBJECT’ IN AMMONIUS HERMEIAS

Avi Sion, Future Logic, Ch. 65. Developments in Tropology (TheLogician.net).

Incidentally, he1 points out that the word ‘tropos’ (Greek for ‘modality’) first occurs in the Commentary of Ammonius, where it is taken as ‘signifying how the predicate belongs to the subject’. This might be interpreted as widely applying to any adverb; but logic is more concerned with adverbs which ‘determine the connexion’ (according to Michael Psellus), or more precisely which ‘attach to the copula, and not to the subject or predicate’ (according to Buridanus).

H.W.B. Joseph, An Introduction to Logic (1st ed. 1916; 2nd ed. revised 1925). Excerpt from footnote 1, pp. 206-207.

...The distinctions of modality descend from Aristotle, de Interp. xii. 1, 21a 34-37, and Anal. Pri. a. ii. 1, 25a sq., but the word tro/poj (= modus) is said to occur first in the Commentary of Ammonius; v. Ammonius in Ar. de Interp. 172r, (quoted in part Prantl, vol. i. p. 654) = Berlin ed. p. 214 Tro/poj me\n ou)=n e)sti fwnh\ shmai/nousa o(/pwj u(pa/rxei to\ kathgorou/menon t%= u(pokeime/n%, oi(=on to\ taxe/wj, o(/tan le/gwmen “h( selh/nh taxe/wj a)pokaqi/statai”, h)\ to\ kalw=j e)n t%= “Sokra/thj kalw=j diale/getai”, h)\ to\ pa/nu e)n t%= “Pla/twn Di/wna pa/nu filei=”, h)\ to\ a)ei\ t%= “o( h(/lioj a)ei\ kinei=tai”. a)riqmo\j de\ au)tw=n fu/sei me\n ou)/k e)stin a)/peiroj, ou) mh\n de\ perilhpto/j ge h(mi=n, w(/sper o( tw=n kaqo/lou u(pokeime/nwn h)\ kathgoroume/nwn, a)nariqmh/twn de\ au)tw=n o)/ntwn. te/ttaraj de\ mo/nouj o( )Aristote/lhj paralamba/nei pro\j th\n qewri/an tw=n meta\ tro/pwn prota/sewn, to\n a)nagkai=on to\n dunato\n to\n e)ndexo/menon kai\ e)pi\ tou/toij to\n a)du/naton...: ‘Mode is a word signifying how the predicate belongs to the subject, e.g. “quickly”, when we say that “The moon waxes quickly”, or “well” in “Socrates argues well”, or “much” in “Plato loves Dion much”, or “always” in “The sun always moves”. The number of them is not infinite in the nature of things, but is beyond our computation, like the number of universals that can be subjects or predicates, though they cannot be numbered. Aristotle, however, brings into his consideration of modal propositions four modes only, the necessary, the possible, the contingent, and further the impossible....’ This statement about Aristotle is based on de Interp. xii, and the modalities were often enumerated as these four, sometimes with the addition of the true and the false. The same wide definition of tro/poj is given by Michael Psellus (v. Prantl, ii. 269), but he singles out for discussion only those which ‘determine the connexion’ of subject and predicate, i.e. the modalities proper. Cf. Buridanus (Prantl, iv. 22), who explains that the qualification which is to make the proposition modal must attach to the [206-207] copula, and not to the subject or predicate. The word modus is of course a term of wide signification, but Logic is concerned with certain modi propositionis; and it is obviously wrong to suppose that any adverb will make the proposition in which it occurs modal; nor can differences of tense do so, though they express a modification of the predicate.

1 Sion is speaking of the Oxford logician H.W.B. Joseph, in his work An Introduction to Logic (1st

ed. 1916; 2nd ed. revised 1925). The passage is found in footnote 1, on pp. 206-207 of the latter edition, for which, see the next excerpt.

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John Longeway on Simon of Faversham (from a ListServ.)

(9) “Omnis isti sunt modales, ‘Socrates bene currit vel cito,’ quia modus non est nisi determinatio inhaerentiae praedicati ad subiectum; ideo omnis illa determinatio quae potest determinare inhaerentiam praedicati ad subiectum potest facere propositionem modalem. Huismodi autem sunt infiniti et hoc vult Armonius (Ammonius, I assume) et Simplicius super librum Perihermeneias.” The Ammonius I found in Verbeke’s edition of the William of Moerbeke translation of Ammonius’s De Int commentary, pp. 14-15, ll. 27-32. But what is this about Simplicius? Could the commentary on the Categories be meant? There is a reference to that commentary in Siger of Courtrai’s commentary on De Int (ed. Verhaak, p. 40), so I suppose I can assume Simon might have used it, but I don’t know of any commentary of Simplicius on De int. I will be most grateful for any help or suggestions on this. I hate typing in “non inventus.” I will, of course, acknowledge any help in the edition.

[Submitted by: John Longeway Mon, 15 Aug 1994 09:46:54 -0500]

Simon of Faversham (tr. B.A.M.):

All of the following are modal: ‘Socrates runs well, or swiftly’, since a mode is nothing other than a determination of the inherence of the predicate in a subject, and so every such determination which can determine the inherence of the predicate in the subject can make the proposition modal. But things of this sort are infinite, as Ammonius and Simplicius have it (in their remarks) on the book Peri Hermeneias.1

1. St. Thomas Aquinas on the adverb.

St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 21, q. 2, art. 1. c. (tr. B.A.M.).

I reply that it must be said that these exclusionary words solus [‘solely’] and tantum [‘alone’] differ in this, that tantum, since it is an adverb, and likewise solus, determine the act of the verb, since an adverb is the adjective of the verb.2 And so since the verb by reason of composition conjoins the predicate to the subject, and relates to both, fittingly these adverbs can be joined to the subject as well as to the predicate.3

that the adverb is called the ‘adjective’ of the verb because it determines the act of the verb

that the adverb does this by being joined either to the subject or to the predicate

St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm. (= Book I, Lesson 4) (tr. Jean T. Oesterle).

1 Omnis isti sunt modales, ‘Socrates bene currit vel cito,’ quia modus non est nisi determinatio inhaerentiae praedicati ad subiectum; ideo omnis illa determinatio quae potest determinare inhaerentiam praedicati ad subiectum potest facere propositionem modalem. Huismodi autem sunt infiniti et hoc vult Armonius et Simplicius super librum Perihermeneias. Cf. the text cited from Ammonius Hermeias above.2 Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm. II 16, p. 5411: adverbium est ut verbi adiectivum.3 respondeo dicendum, quod istae dictiones exclusivae solus, et tantum in hoc differunt, quod tantum, cum sit adverbium, et similiter solum determinat actum verbi, quia adverbium est adjectivum verbi; unde cum verbum ratione compositionis conjungat praedicatum subjecto, et ad utrumque se habeat, congrue possunt ista adverbia tam ad subjectum quam ad praedicatum adjungi.

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7. The fourth part is the third difference, i.e., without time, which differentiates the name from the verb. This, however, seems to be false, for the name “day” or “year” signifies time. But there are three things that can be considered with respect to time; first, time itself, as it is a certain kind of thing or reality, and then it can be signified by a name just like any other thing; secondly, that which is measured by time, insofar as it is measured by time. Motion, which consists of action and passion, is what is measured first and principally by time, and therefore the verb, which signifies action and passion, signifies with time. Substance considered in itself, which a name or a pronoun signify, is not as such measured by time, but only insofar as it is subjected to motion, and this the participle signifies. The verb and the participle, therefore, signify with time, but not the name and pronoun. The third thing that can be considered is the very relationship of time as it measures. This is signified by adverbs of time such as “tomorrow,” “yesterday,” and others of this kind.1

2. St. Thomas Aquinas on modus.

St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 49, art. 2, c., ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.).

...[P]roperly, quality implies a certain mode of a substance. However, as St. Augustine says (Super gen. ad litteram), a mode is what a measure predetermines [praefigit], and so it implies a certain determination according to some measure.2

[St. Thomas Aquinas],3 De Propositionibus Modalibus (init.) (tr. B.A.M.).

Because a proposition is called ‘modal’ from ‘mode’, in order to know what a modal proposition is, one must first know what a mode is. Now a mode is a determination lying next to a thing, which, in fact, results from the ‘placing next to’ of an adjectival name, which determines a substantive, as when it is said ‘A man is white’, or by an adverb, which determines a verb, as ‘A man runs well’.4

1 quarto, ponit tertiam differentiam, scilicet sine tempore, per quod differt nomen a verbo. sed videtur hoc esse falsum: quia hoc nomen dies vel annus significat tempus. sed dicendum quod circa tempus tria possunt considerari. primo quidem, ipsum tempus, secundum quod est res quaedam, et sic potest significari a nomine, sicut quaelibet alia res. alio modo, potest considerari id, quod tempore mensuratur, in quantum huiusmodi: et quia id quod primo et principaliter tempore mensuratur est motus, in quo consistit actio et passio, ideo verbum quod significat actionem vel passionem, significat cum tempore. substantia autem secundum se considerata, prout significatur per nomen et pronomen, non habet in quantum huiusmodi ut tempore mensuretur, sed solum secundum quod subiicitur motui, prout per participium significatur. et ideo verbum et participium significant cum tempore, non autem nomen et pronomen. tertio modo, potest considerari ipsa habitudo temporis mensurantis; quod significatur per adverbia temporis, ut cras, heri et huiusmodi.2 …proprie enim qualitas importat quendam modum substantiae. modus autem est, ut dicit augustinus, super gen. ad litteram, quem mensura praefigit, unde importat quandam determinationem secundum aliquam mensuram.3 Note that some editors doubt St. Thomas wrote this little work; but the agreement of its doctrine with what the Angelic Doctor holds on modus and adverbum in the other texts cited argues in favor of his authorship.4 quia propositio modalis a modo dicitur, ad sciendum quid sit propositio modalis oportet prius scire quid sit modus. est autem modus determinatio adiacens rei, quae quidem fit per adiectionem nominis adiectivi, quod determinat substantivum, ut cum dicitur homo est albus, vel per adverbium, quod determinat verbum, ut homo currit bene.

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But it must be understood that mode is threefold. One determines the subject of a proposition, as ‘(A) white man runs’. One determines the predicate, as ‘Socrates is a white man’, or ‘Socrates runs swiftly’. One determines the very composition of the predicate with the subject, as when one says ‘It is possible for Socrates to run’. And only by this mode is a proposition called ‘modal’.1

3. Note.

As St. Thomas Aquinas, following St. Augustine, teaches, a mode is what a measure ‘predetermines’—that is, establishes beforehand. But, as St. Thomas elsewhere explains (cf. Summa Theol., Ia, q. 5, art. 5, c.), a mode consists in a determination or commensuration of a thing’s principles, whether material or efficient; for which reason it is reasonable to attribute to him the view that a modus is also a determination lying next to a thing: in speech, a ‘mode’ resulting when an adjectival name, or adjective, is ‘placed next to’ a substantive, or when an adverb determines a verb, an example of the first being when it is said Homo est albus, ‘A man is white’; of the second, when it is said Homo currit bene, ‘A man runs well’. Hence, we observe that an adjective is a word determining a substantive, but an adverb a word determining a verb, the latter being called “the ‘adjective’ of the verb”, as St. Thomas (after Priscian) says in the text cited above.

According to St. Thomas Aquinas, then, an adverb “determines a verb” by “being placed next to it” (De Propositionibus Modalibus). More particularly, the adverb “determines the act of the verb, for which reason it is called the adjective of the verb. And so since the verb by reason of composition conjoins [conjugat] the predicate to the subject, and relates to both, fittingly these adverbs can be joined [possunt…adjungi] to the subject as well as to the predicate” (In I Sent., dist. 21, q. 2, art. 1. c.).

With respect to the meaning of tropos, as we have seen, Joseph refers us to “...Buridanus (Prantl, iv. 22), who explains that the qualification which is to make the proposition modal must attach to the copula, and not to the subject or predicate.” From these remarks, the following division of ‘adverbial’ determinations is evident:

adverbs which attach to the subject or predicate and so which “’determine the connexion’ of subject and predicate”: every, no, some, etc. (cf. Aristotle, De Int., ch. 7-8, e.g. “Every man is white”; “No man is white”.)

adverbs which attach to the copula and so ‘determine the act of the verb’: “the necessary, the possible, the contingent, and further the impossible” (cf. Aristotle, De Int., ch. 12)

A good overview of the historical underpinnings of this doctrine is offered by the following passage:

1 sciendum etiam quod triplex est modus. quidam determinat subiectum propositionis, ut homo albus currit. quidam determinat praedicatum, ut socrates est homo albus, vel socrates currit velociter. quidam determinat compositionem ipsam praedicati ad subiectum, ut cum dicitur socrates currere est impossibile: et ab hoc solo modo dicitur propositio modalis.

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Gino Roncaglia, “Modal Logic in Germany at the Beginning of the Seventeenth Century”, pp. 26-27.2

3. MODAL PROPOSITIONS

This is a classic problem: it appears that even adjectives, adverbs, and some syncategore-matic terms such as quantifiers have the capacity to “modify” a proposition: is this suffice-ent to render that proposition modal? Let us consider the medieval tradition for a moment. With respect to adverbs and adjectives, the question was examined in the following way by Peter of Spain, when he gave his definition of modus:

Modus est adiacens rei determinatio. Et habet fieri per adiectivum. Sed quia adiectivum est duplex: est enim quoddam adiectivum nominis, ut albus et niger et consimilia, aliud autem verbi, ut adverbium; secundum enim Priscianum adverbium est ut verbi adiectivum – et ideo

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duplex est modus: unus nominalis, qui fit per adiectiva nominis, alius adverbialis, qui fit per adiectiva adverbia, ut homo albus currit velociter. Item, adverbiorum quedam determinant verbum gratia compositionis, ut hec sex: necessario, contingenter, possibiliter, impos-sibiliter, vero et falso, alia determinant verbum ratione temporis, ut adverbia temporalia, alia ratione modi, ut adverbia optandi et hortandi, et ita de aliis. Et secundum hoc sumitur modus multiplex per adverbia.82

Let us examine the distinctions introduced by Peter of Spain more closely. The first, present in embryo in Boethius,83 concerns the difference between nominal modes, brought about by an adjective being added to the noun, and adverbial modes, brought about by adding an adverb to the verb. This is a distinction that we will encounter often and that sometimes plays an extremely significant role in subsequent authors. A parallel between these two cases – which Scheibler, as we shall see, deals with together by resorting to the category of material modes – is introduced by Peter of Spain with reference to Priscianus’ Institutiones grammaticae, according to which the adverb functions as the “adjective” of the verb.84

Peter of Spain further distinguishes several different adverbial modes. Some regard temporal or qualitative or exhortative or optative modifications of the verb. Others – note the presence in this category of truth and falsity, in addition to the four traditional modes – determine the verb gratia compositionis. The explanation of what is meant by this determinatio compositionis is given in the following paragraph:

Sed omissis omnibus aliis de illo modo qui compositionem determinat, dicendum est, ut sunt isti sex: necessario, contingenter, etc. Cum enim dicitur homo necessario currit, significatur quod ista compositio sit necessaria. Cum autem dicitur homo currit bene vel velociter, significatur quod cursus hominis sit bonus vel velox. Et ita in ista determinatur res verbi, in prima vero compositio. Et sic intelligendum est de aliis predictis adverbiis. Unde solum ille modus qui determinat compositionem, facit propositionem modalem, et solum de tali hic intendimus.85

2 (www.merzweb.com/testi/saggi/scheibler.pdf [2/1/08])

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The differentiation between the different kinds of adverbial modes put forward in the previous paragraph thus shows a dichotomous structure: on the one hand, there are the modes through which determinatur res verbi, in other words, we might say, those that specifically affect the semantic content of the verb; on the other hand, there are those through which determinatur compositio. Only the latter constitute modal propositions, and therefore have specific logical relevance here. They are those that various authors describe as modes specialiter or stricte. Through this type of adverbial mode it is not the semantic content of the verb that is modified, but the way in which the

82 Petrus Hispanus 1972, 11-12. On the history of the definition of modus cf. also Maierù 1972, 323-91 and Jacobi 1980, 66-132.83 Cf. Boethius 1880, 377, on whom cf. Maierù 1972, 328-32 (particularly 331).84 Priscianus 1885-1889, II 16, 54.85 Petrus Hispanus 1972, 12.

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verb performs its function as predicate. It is not surprising therefore that even in the Middle Ages most authors preferred the idea that what is modified in the modal proposition is the way the subject and predicate are connected, rather than the predicate itself. In this case the determinatio compositionis introduced by the strictly modal terms is seen not as an adverbial modification of the verb, but as a modification of the subject-predicate relation. Thus, while in Peter of Spain the modes stricte seem to belong to the class of adverbs, many other authors tend to differentiate them from both adjectives and adverbs, on the basis that they neither modify the subject as subject, nor the predicate as predicate, but the relation between the two, the propositional compositio.

An example of this conception can be found in the De modalibus traditionally attributed to Thomas Aquinas:

Est autem modus determinatio rei, que quidem fit per adiectivum nomen quod determinat substantivum, ut cum dicitur homo albus; vel per adverbium quod determinat verbum, ut cum dicitur Sortes currit bene. Sciendum est igitur quod triplex est modus: quidam qui determinat subiectum propositionis, ut cum dicitur homo albus currit; quidam qui determinat predicatum, ut cum dicitur Sortes est homo albus vel Sortes currit velociter; quidam qui determinat compositionem ipsam predicati ad subiectum, ut cum dicitur Sortem currere est possibile; et ab hoc solo modo dicitur propositio modalis.86

At first the De modalibus seems to propose here the classic twofold division between adverbial modes and nominal modes, but then it clearly opts for a threefold division, in which the determinatio compositionis has a place all to itself. This was the path chosen by various logical writers in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, for example the author of the Ars Meliduna (“Modalis est illa propositio qua modificatur coherentia predicati ad subiectum”).87

In the centuries that followed a general distinction between a broad or improper meaning of modality, which normally included at least adverbs and adjectives, and a narrow or proper meaning that included only the four traditional modal terms, remained widespread,88

despite the fact that the “improper” modal terms taken into consideration might vary considerably from author to author.

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86 Thoma de Aquino 1976, 421.87 de Rijk 1962-1967, II-1, 332.88 To give a few examples, we find it in the period that concerns us here in the Enchiridion logicum by Caspar Bartholinus (1628), 283-84; in the Palaestra rationis by Johannes Paulus Felwinger (1664), 36-38; and in the Quadriga disputationum logicarum by Johannes Weiss (1653), 6-7.

Definitions.

MODUS (‘MODE’). (1) “A mode is what a measure predetermines” (St. Augus-tine, Super gen. ad litteram); “and so” (2) “it implies a certain determination according to some measure” (St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 49, art. 2, c., ad 1); or again, (3) “a mode is a determination lying next to a thing” ([St. Thomas Aquinas], De propositionibus modalibus), as with an adjectival name or an adverb.

Methods of definition:

by causal predication: what a measure predetermines (a measure being a cause of a mode)

by genus and difference: a certain determination according to some measure by form and matter: a determination lying next to a thing

* * *

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APPENDIX II: ON THE INTERJECTION AND ITS ROLE IN HUMAN SPEECH

Boethius, On Division (In: The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts: Volume 1, Logic and the Philosophy of Language. Edited by Norman Kretzmann, Eleonore Stump, pp. 29-31) (tr. slightly rev. B.A.M.).

Suppose it is our job to define name. The word ‘name’ is predicated of many names, and in some sense [they are] species containing individuals under themselves. And so I define name in this way: {886C} I take up its genus, which is vocal sound, and I divide it. ‘Of vocal sounds some are significative, but others are not.’ A non-significative vocal sound has nothing to do with a name because, of course, a name signifies. And so I take up the differentia significative, and I join it to the genus vocal sound, and I say ‘significative vocal sound’; then I look to see whether this genus and differentia are equal to name. But they are not equal yet, because a vocal sound can be significative without being a name; for there are certain vocal sounds that indicate pain and others that indicate passions of the soul naturally that are not names – as are interjections.1

I again divide significant vocal sound into other differentiae: ‘Of significant vocal sounds [29-30] some are significant in accordance with men’s imposition of them, others are naturally significant.’ And a naturally significant vocal sound certainly has nothing to do with a name, but a vocal sound that is significant {886D} in accordance with men’s imposition of it does fit a name. And so I join the two differentiae significant and in accordance with imposition to vocal sound – i.e., to the genus – and I say ‘A name is a vocal sound significant by convention.’

But in my view this is still not equated to name; for of course verbs too are vocal sounds significant in accordance with imposition, and so that is not a definition of name alone. I again distribute the differentiae in accordance with imposition, and I say ‘Of vocal sounds significant in accordance with imposition some are significant with a tense, others without a tense.’ And of course the differentiae with a tense is not conjoined to name, because it belongs to verbs but not to names to consignify times. The result is that the differentiae without a tense is appropriate. Therefore, I join {887A} those three differentiae to the genus, and I say ‘A name is a vocal sound consignificant by convention without a tense.’2

1 Sit nobis propositum quod definire uelimus “nomen”. Vocabulum ergo nominis de pluribus nominibus praedicatur et est quodammodo species sub se continens indiuidua. Definio ergo nomen sic. Sumo eius genus quod est uox et diuido: “Vocum aliae sunt significatiuae, aliae uero minime”. Vox autem non significatiua nihil ad nomen, etenim nomen significat; sumo ergo differentiam quae est significatiua et iungo cum genere, id est cum uoce, et facio “uox significatiua” et tunc respicio utrum genus hoc et differentia nomini sint aequalia. Sed nondum aequalia sunt, potest enim et uox significatiua esse et nomen non esse, sunt enim quaedam uoces quae dolorem designant, aliae quae animi passiones naturaliter quae nomina non sunt, ut interiectiones.2 Rursus ipsam uocum significantiam in alias differentias diuido: “Vocum significatiuarum aliae sunt secundum positionem, aliae /36/ sunt naturaliter”, et uox quidem significans naturaliter nihil ad nomen, uox uero significans positione hominum nomini congruit. Quocirca duas has differentias significatiuam et secundum positionem, iungo cum uoce, id est cum genere, et dico: “Nomen est uox significatiua secundum placitum”. Sed rursus mihi non aequatur ad nomen, sunt namque et uerba uoces significatiuae et secundum positionem; non igitur solius nominis definitio est. Distribuo iterum differentiam quae est secundum positionem et dico “Secundum positionem uocum significatiuarum aliae sunt cum tempore, aliae sine tempore”, et differentia quidem cum tempore nomini non iungitur idcirco quod uerborum est consignificare tempora, nominum uero minime; restat ergo ut congruat illa differentia quae est sine tempore. Iungo igitur has tres differentias generi et dico: “Nomen est uox significatiua ad placitum sine tempore”.

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But in my view the definition is still not completely finished; for a vocal sound can be significant, in accordance with imposition, and without a tense, and yet not be a single name but names joined together – i.e., an expression (oratio/ratio). For example, ‘Socrates together with Plato and his disciples’ is an expression, even though it is of course incomplete. For that reason the last differentiae, without a tense, must again be divided into other differentiae. And we will say ‘Of vocal sounds significant in accordance with imposition without a tense there are some having a part that signifies something independently (this pertains to an expression), others having no part that signifies anything independently.’ This pertains to a name, for a part of a name signifies nothing independently. And so the definition is made in this way: {887B} A name is a vocal sound significant by convention, without a tense, having no part that signifies anything independently when separated.1

Do you see, then, how a correct definition is constructed? For by saying ‘vocal sound’ I disjoined a name from other sounds; by adding ‘significant’ I separated a name from nonsignificant vocal sounds; with ‘by convention’ and ‘without a tense’ the distinctive character of a name was disjoined from naturally significant vocal sounds and from verbs; by proposing that its parts signify nothing independently I [30-31] disjoined it from an expression, the separated parts of which do signify independently. That is why anything that is a name is included in its definition, and wherever the expression of that definition fits, you will be in no doubt whether the thing is question is a name.2

St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Pol., lect. 1, n. 28 (tr. B.A.M.).

n. 28 Then when he says, But (man is by nature) a political animal etc., he proves from the proper activity of man that he is a political animal, more so even than the bee or any other gregarious animal, by a reason of this sort. For we say that nature does nothing in vain because it always works toward a determinate end. And so if nature gives to anything something that of itself is ordered to an end, it follows that that end is given to the thing by nature. For we see that, whereas certain other animals have voice, man alone above the other animals has locution. For even if certain animals bring forth human locution, still, they do not properly speak, since they do not understand what they say, but bring forth such vocal sounds by a certain habituation.3

1 Sed rursus mihi non plena conclusio definitionis occurrit, potest enim uox et significatiua et secundum positionem et sine tempore esse et nomen non esse unum sed nomina iuncta, quae est oratio, ut: Socrates cum Platone et discipulis sed quamquam imperfecta quidem haec sit oratio, tamen est oratio. Quocirca ultima differentia quae est sine tempore aliis item differentiis diuidenda est, et dicemus: “Vocum significatiuarum secundum positionem sine tempore aliae sunt quarum pars extra aliquid significat”, hoc pertinet ad orationem, “aliae quarum pars extra nihil significat”, hoc pertinet ad nomen, nominis enim pars nihil extra designat. Fit ergo definitio sic: “Nomen est uox significatiua secundum placitum sine tempore, cuius nulla pars extra significatiua est separata”.2 Videsne igitur quam recta definitio constituta sit? Nam quod dixi “uocem” a caeteris sonis nomen disiunxi, quod “significatiuam” apposui nomen a non significatiuis uocibus separaui, quod "”secundum placitum” et “sine tempore” a naturaliter significantibus uocibus et a uerbis proprietas nominis distributa est, quod eius partes extra nihil significare proposui ab oratione distinxi, cuius partes aliquid separatae extra significant. Unde fit ut quodcumque nomen fuerit illa definitione claudatur et ubicumque haec ratio definitionis aptabitur illud nomen esse non dubitem.3 deinde cum dicit quod autem civile animal etc., probat ex propria operatione hominis quod sit animal civile, magis etiam quam apis, et quam quodcumque gregale animal, tali ratione. dicimus enim quod natura nihil facit frustra, quia semper operatur ad finem determinatum. unde, si natura attribuit alicui rei aliquid quod de se est ordinatum ad aliquem finem, sequitur quod ille finis detur illi rei a natura. videmus enim quod

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But there is this difference between speech and simple voice. For the voice is a sign of pain and pleasure, and consequently of the other passions like anger and fear, all of which are ordained to pleasure and pain, as is said in the second book of the Ethics.1 And so a voice is given to other animals whose nature attains to this, that they sense their own pleasures and pains, and they signify these to each other by certain natural vocal sounds, just as the lion by a roar and a dog by a bark, in place of which we have interjections.2

[Aristotle], Probl. X. 39 (tr. B.A.M.)

Now speech3 consists in conveying a meaning not by the voice [= phone], but by certain affections of it [= pathesin],4 and not only shows pain and pleasure. But the letters5

are certain affections of the voice.

Ammonius Hermeias, Commentary on the Peri Hermeneias (= Ammonius: On Aristotle’s On Interpretation 1-8, tr. David Blank, p. 20).

[Speaking of the adverb, which indicates “how the predicate belongs to the subject, or when, or where, or how many times – whether finitely or infinitely many – or also according to what kind of order relative to something else”, Ammonius goes on to state:] ...[it also indicates] how we are disposed toward the thing about which we are making an assertion (i.e. whether we are complaining or admiring or even ratifying the assertion by <calling on> the testimony of the stronger [25] <power>)....59

59 This last mode refers to interjections, such as ‘By Zeus!’. (Blank’s note)

Ammonius Hermeias, Commentary on the Peri Hermeneias (= Ammonius: On Aristotle’s On Interpretation 1-8, tr. David Blank, pp. 39-40).

<The specifications ‘significant’ and ‘by convention>

...’By convention’ (kata sunthêkên) distinguishes <the name> from the vocal sounds significant by nature. Such are the vocal sounds of the irrational animals. For, when a stranger suddenly appears, a dog by his bark signifies the presence of the stranger; but dogs do not produce this sort of vocal sound according to any conven- [25] tion or agreement among themselves.

cum quaedam alia animalia habeant vocem, solus homo supra alia animalia habeat loquutionem. nam etsi quaedam animalia loquutionem humanam proferant, non tamen proprie loquuntur, quia non intelligunt quid dicunt, sed ex usu quodam tales voces proferunt.1 Cf. Nic. Eth., II, 5, 1105b 23.2 est autem differentia inter sermonem et simplicem vocem. nam vox est signum tristitiae et delectationis, et per consequens aliarum passionum, ut irae et timoris, quae omnes ordinantur ad delectationem et tristitiam, ut in secundo ethicorum dicitur. et ideo vox datur aliis animalibus, quorum natura usque ad hoc pervenit, quod sentiant suas delectationes et tristitias, et haec sibiinvicem significent per aliquas naturales voces, sicut leo per rugitum, et canis per latratum, loco quorum nos habemus interiectiones.3 = logos, a species of which is dialektos, = phone enarthros, ‘articulate vocal sound’.4 Cf. Poet. 25 on the ‘passions’ of the voice.5 = grammata, = stoicheia, ‘elementary speech sounds’, = ‘phonemes’.

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One could note such vocal sounds also among men, which we utter when strongly affected – I mean, for example, groaning, guffawing, and what we said (23,3) regarding those who are deaf from birth or regarding children who [39-40] utter inarticulate sounds before they are able to follow <speech>. The vocal sounds of irrational animals resemble these in being uttered by [30] them now excitedly, now gently and with a certain peaceful disposition. So it is from such vocal sounds that the name is distinguished by the addition of ‘by convention’, which means the same thing as ‘by imposition’ (thesei). For the Greeks agreed with one another to call things by these names, Indians by other names and Egyptians by others, and the same people called the same things sometimes by other [35] names and sometimes still by others. These names are significant of [31,1] our thoughts. However, groans and guffawing and the vocal sounds of small children or irrational animals signify no thought, but passions and dispositions of the soul.

N.B. When one compares the foregoing texts to those of Boethius and Aquinas quoted above, one sees that Ammonius is speaking here of the interjection, although he does not use that name, or any other.

Aristotle, De Int., I. 2 (16a 19-25) (tr. Jean T. Oesterle).

A name, then, is a vocal sound significant by convention, without time, no part of which is significant separately; for in the name “Campbell” the part “bell,” as such signifies nothing, although in the expression “camp bell” it does. However the case is not exactly the same in simple names and composite names; for in the former the part is in no way significant, but in the latter the part has meaning but of nothing apart from the word, as “fast” in “breakfast.” “By convention” is added because nothing is by nature a name, but it is a name when it is made a sign; for unlettered sounds, such as those of the brutes, designate but none of them is a name.1

St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 4, nn. 6, 11-12 (tr. Jean T. Oesterle).

6. The third part is the second difference, i.e., by convention, namely, according to human institution deriving from the will of man. This differentiates names from vocal sounds signifying naturally, such as the groans of the sick and the vocal sounds of brute animals.

11. Then he says, “By convention” is added because nothing is by nature a name, etc. Here Aristotle explains the third part of the definition.

1 Cf. Ingram Bywater, Aristotle on the Art of Poetry, Commentary, pp. 262-263: “b23 suneth\ ...Aristotle’s argument here seems to be something like this: In the utterances of the brutes there are indivisible sounds, but these ‘noises’ of theirs are directly significant in themselves (De interpr. 2, 16 a 29) [cf. also Pol. I. 2, 1253a 7-19 (B.A.M.)]; they are not stoixei=a fwnh=j, because they do not combine as elements to form a fwnh/ suneth\. The indivisible sounds, on the other hand, in human speech exist as elements of speech, and they have no meaning in themselves; the meaning in human speech is in the words and propositions—not in the ‘elements’ which analysis reveals in them (comp. Vahlen, Beitr. 3 p. 220). fwnh/ suneth\ is perhaps the nearest Aristotelian equivalent for our term ‘word’. It may be taken as including not only the fwnh/ a)/shmoj—words like a)mfi, peri/ me/n, de/, etc. (Aristotle’s a(/qra and su/ndesmoi), which stand for nothing by themselves, though they have a certain significance in their place in intelligible human speech”.

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The reason it is said that the name signifies by convention, he says, is that no name exists naturally. For it is a name because it signifies; it does not signify naturally however, but by institution. This he adds when he says, but it is a name when it is made a sign, i.e., when it is imposed to signify. For that which signifies naturally is not made a sign, but is a sign naturally. He explains this when he says: for unlettered sounds, such as those of the brutes designate, etc., i.e., since they cannot be signified by letters. He says sounds rather than vocal sounds because some animals—those without lungs—do not have vocal sounds. Such animals signify proper passions by some kind of non-vocal sound which signifies naturally. But none of these sounds of the brutes is a name.

We are given to understand from this that a name does not signify naturally.

12. However, there were diverse opinions about this. Some men said that names in no way signify naturally and that it makes no difference which things are signified by which names. Others said that names signify naturally in every way, as if names were natural likenesses of things. Still others said names do not signify naturally, i.e., insofar as their signification is not from nature, as Aristotle maintains here, but that names do signify naturally in the sense that their signification corresponds to the natures of things, as Plato held.

The fact that one thing is signified by many names is not in opposition to Aristotle’s position here, for there can be many likenesses of one thing; and similarly, from diverse properties many diverse names can be imposed on one thing. When Aristotle says, but none of them is a name, he does not mean that the sounds of animals are not named, for we do have names for them; “roaring,” for example, is said of the sound made by a lion, and “lowing” of that of a cow. What he means is that no such sound is a name.

Ammonius Hermeias, Commentary on the Peri Hermeneias (= Ammonius: On Aristotle’s On Interpretation 1-8, tr. David Blank, pp. 27-28).

<On things, thoughts, vocal sounds, and letters>

...Vocal sounds are enunciative [30] of thoughts and therefore are given to us by nature so as to indicate through them the concepts of our soul, so that we can share with one another and be part of the same society, man being a social animal. Hence, those who do not use the same vocal sounds also do not share [27-28] [35] a state with one another, as they do not know one another’s thoughts.

Report on Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man (excerpt from a Website).

There has been much debate whether language is instinctive to humans or “merely” a result of societal influence. The complexity of human language and the fact that infants cannot acquire language without human contact has led many scientists to assume that language is not instinctive in the same way that bird calls might be said to be instinctive. Darwin hypothesized that language could not be an instinct: “Language is an art, like brewing or baking.... It certainly is not a true instinct, for every language has to be learnt.” (Darwin, Descent of Man, I, 3).

Other notes by Darwin include the following:

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The habitual use of articulate language is . . . particular to man; but he uses, in common with lower animals, inarticulate cries to express his meaning, aided by gestures and the movements of the muscles of the face. This especially holds good with the more simple and vivid feelings, which are but little connected with our higher intelligence. Our cries of pain, fear, surprise, anger, together with their appropriate actions, and the murmur of a mother to her beloved child are more expressive than any words.

That which distinguishes man from the lower animals is not the understanding of articulate sounds, for, as every one knows, dogs understand many words and sentences. In this respect they are at the same stage of development as infants, between the ages of ten and twelve months, who understand many words and short sentences, but cannot yet utter a single word. It is not the mere articulation which is our distinguishing character, for parrot and other birds possess this power. Nor is it the mere capacity of connecting definite sounds with definite ideas; for it is certain that some parrots, which have been taught to speak, connect unerringly words with things, and persons with events. The lower animals differ from man solely in his almost infinitely larger power of associating together the most diversified sounds and ideas; and this obviously depends on the high development of his mental powers. (Darwin, Descent of Man, I, 3)

Note on Darwin.

As the reader will have observed, several of Darwin’s observations agree with those of Boethius, St. Thomas, and Ammonius cited above; yet he differs from them in his claim that dogs “understand many words and sentences”, the truth being that they can be habituated to recognize and respond to them, as St. Thomas points out, whereas understanding is proper to animals with reason, such as are men alone.1

Encyclopedia Britannica, First edition, 1771, s.v. “Universal Grammar”.

Besides the above parts of speech, there is another, which cannot be comprehended under any of the foregoing classes, called INTERJECTIONS: of this kind are the words, “AH!” “ALAS!” “FIE!” &C. This species of words coincide with no part of speech, but are either uttered alone, or else thrown into a sentence, without altering its form either in syntax or signification. It may be therefore objected, that as we say, that all language is divided into the several parts above enumerated, and this class cannot be comprehended in any of these divisions; of course, the analysis that we have made cannot be just, because it does not comprehend the whole. To this objection it may be answered, that the language of which we have been treating, is that which has been formed by mutual compact, for the purposes of reasoning and speculation; that besides this artificial language, man, like every other sensitive animal, is endowed with a natural language, by which he can express any strong sensation.

1 On this subject, one may usefully consult Mortimer J. Adler, The Difference of Man and the Difference It Makes. Introduction by Deal W. Hudson (New York: Fordham University Press, 1967, 1993), as well as the recent article by Marie I. George, “Thomas Aquinas Meets Nim Chimpsky: On the Debate about Human Nature and the Nature of Other Animals.” The Aquinas Review, 10, 2003, 1-50. In her paper, Dr. George explains the difference between sense knowledge and thought as this applies to claims of animal intelligence, as well as debunking claims for human-like language ability in the so called ‘great’ apes.

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This language does not owe its characteristical expression to the arbitrary form of articulation; but derives its whole force from the tone of voice, and modification of countenance and gesture: and of consequence these tones and gestures express the same meaning without any relation to the articulation which they may assume, and are therefore universally understood by all mankind. Now, “interjection” is the name by which we distinguish these natural expressions: these cannot be properly called words, or parts of speech; but certain adventitious sounds, or voices of nature, expressing those passions and natural emotions which spontaneously arise in the mind upon the view or narrative of interesting events.

Ineke Sluiter, Ancient Grammar in Context. Contributions to the Study of Ancient Linguistic Thought (Amsterdam, 1990), p. 173.

They [sc. certain Latin grammarians] combined the grammatical (and philosophical) idea that interjections serve to express an emotion, with the rhetorical (and philological) conception of “interjection” as any kind of addition to a sentence which interrupts the line of thought. This brought them to the insight that other parts of speech could also fill the (rhetorical) function of an interjection.

Ineke Sluiter, Ancient Grammar in Context. Contributions to the Study of Ancient Linguistic Thought (Amsterdam, 1990), pp. 176-177.

The rhetorical use is documented in Quintilian, who also knows of a separate grammatical meaning (1,4,19; 1,5,50). Rhetorically speaking we are according to him dealing with interiectio “... cum continuationi sermonis medius aliqui sensus intervenit”7

(9,3,23; cf. 8,2,15).8

7 “... when some meaningful element interrupts the course of speech.” [Cf. the entire sentence, as translated by H. E. Butler: “The first is called interpositio or interclusio by us, and parenthesis or paremptosis by the Greeks, and consists in the interruption of the continuous flow (= dum continuationi) of our language by the insertion of some remark”. (B.A.M.)]8 In a more philological context, Quint. 11,3,37 (on Verg. A. 1ff.): interiecto est fato profugus et continuum sermonem, qui faciebat Italiam Lavinaque, dividit..... [As translated by Butler: “After Italiam {37} comes a third pause, since fato profugus is parenthetic and breaks up the continuity of the phrase Italiam Lavinaque”. (B.A.M.)]

Ineke Sluiter, Ancient Grammar in Context. Contributions to the Study of Ancient Linguistic Thought (Amsterdam, 1990), pp. 179- 180.

The gradual transition from the grammatical to the rhetorical concept of “interjection” is best shown by Pompeius, who with his usual verbosity rises to the occasion (V 281,10ff.): plane illud scire debes quod plerumque non solum integra pars orationis, sed elocutio [179-180] omnis pro interiectione est.20

20 “You should know clearly that not only a pure and correct part of speech, but also a complete uttering may regularly be used as an interjection.”

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Note on Sluiter’s excerpts.

As the Latin texts of the foregoing passages show, Quintilian is here dealing with examples of parenthesis or pause occurring in the midst of speech,1 a consideration which helpfully shows how the notion of ‘interjection’, considered as a kind of word ‘thrown into’ a sentence in order to express a passio animi, or ‘emotion’, arises; the accompanying description of this particle as interrupting speech supporting my treatment of it in ‘Demetrius’.

The definition of the interjection.

According to St. Thomas Aquinas, “a voice is given to other animals whose nature attains to this, that they sense their own pleasures and pains, and they signify these to each other by certain natural vocal sounds, just as the lion by a roar and a dog by a bark, in place of which we have interjections” (In I Pol., lect. 1, n. 28); that is to say, with Boethius, that interjections are “significative vocal sounds” which “indicate passions of the soul naturally”. Hence the interjection may be defined as a certain naturally-significative vocal sound2 by means of which we signify to others our pleasures and pains, just as the animals other than man do by employing sounds of this sort.

But, with the Latin grammarians cited by Ineke Sluiter, we may add that the interjection may also be understood as “any kind of addition to a sentence which interrupts the line of thought”.

The Armchair Grammarian.3

2.3   INTERJECTIONS

Interjections also function as expletives. An interjection is a word or phrase that expresses emotion. Like other expletives, interjections serve no grammatical function within a sentence. We should also note that words or phrases of vulgarity are classified as expletives. Several examples of the mild variety follow.

Ah! Alas! Hurry! My goodness!

Oh! Ouch!

Although the expletives above end with an exclamation mark, indicating strong emotion, we should note that these and other expletives may be followed instead by other punctuation marks—or sometimes by no punctuation. The choice is up to the writer.

1 And recall here St. Thomas’ citation from Cicero, quoted above: “[F]or Cicero says in the Rhetorica ad Herennium IV (xix) that “it is called an ‘article’ when single words are distinguished by intervals in interrupted speech, thus: Your passion, your voice, your look, have struck terror into your foes” (Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 1, art. 6, c., tr. B.A.M.).2 As opposed to significative by convention, for which, see the second excerpt from Ammonius, above.3 community-2.webtv.net/solis-boo/Grammar1/ - 30k [11/30/05]

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Allen and Greenough’s New Latin Grammar for Schools and Colleges (eds. J. B. Greenough, G. L. Kittredge, A. A. Howard, Benj. L. D'Ooge) 1.225, p. 140.

PART FIRST — WORDS AND FORMS: CONJUNCTIONS

INTERJECTIONS

Some Interjections are mere natural exclamations of feeling; others are derived from inflected parts of speech, e.g. the imperatives em, lo (probably for eme, take); age, come, etc. Names of deities occur in herclē, pol (from Pollux), etc. Many Latin interjections are borrowed from the Greek, as euge, euhoe, etc.

The following list comprises most of the Interjections in common use:--

ō, ēn, ecce, ehem, papae, vāh (of astonishment).iō, ēvae, ēvoe, euhoe (of joy).heu, ē˘heu, vae, alas (of sorrow).heus, eho, ehodum, ho (of calling); st, hist.êia, euge (of praise).prō (of attestation): as, prō pudor, shame!

A Greek example of interjections:

1. Irenaeus, Against Heresies I. 15.4.

(a) (tr. unknown): Such ravings, we may now well say, go beyond Iu, Iu, Pheu, Pheu, and every kind of tragic exclamation or utterance of misery.

(b) (tr. ed. Ante-Nicene Fathers): Iu, Iu! Pheu, Pheu! –for well may we utter these tragic exclamations at such a pitch of audacity in the coining of names as he has displayed without a blush, in devising a nomenclature for his system of falsehood.

N.B. It must be understood, then, that, in the first place, those are called interjections which signify naturally, such as Iu, Iu! or Pheu, Pheu!, and so would not be defined as “non-significative vocal sounds”. Yet others are clearly words, such as hark! and lo! in English. Hence, if examples of interjections were ever included in the Poetics, the distinction between those which signify naturally and those which do not would have had to have been addressed.

A division of interjections:

naturally significative: “Iu, Iu!”, “Pheu, Pheu!” significative by agreement (thesis): “hark!”, “lo!”

[Note that the second kind, being syncategorematic, are non-significative in a certain respect.]

§

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‘Sundesmos and Arthron’: Aristotle on the Connective Parts of Speech (Papers In Poetics 11)

(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti. All Rights Reserved.

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