Summer 2013

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vol. xiii no

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cprInternational: Senkaku, I Choose You!

By Sam Aarons

Domestic: An Impoverished DebateBy Kunal Mehta

columbia political review By The Numbers: Designing for Disasterby David Silberthau and Sofi Sinozich

when the sky was redby Narayan Subramanian

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Editor’s NoteSummer 2013 marks my eighth issue at the Columbia Political Review, and in that time, my fellow editors and I have read dozens of pitches from Columbia students. It is my experi-ence that the most successful authors are those who take on the day’s issues from a unique, and sometimes surprising, perspective.

In our cover story, “When the Sky Was Red,” the Review’s editor emeritus, Narayan Sub-ramanian takes us to the South Pacific, where we look at what has been left behind by US nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands (19).

The Senkaku Islands have been at the center of a conflict between China, Japan, and Tai-wan for hundreds of years. In this issue, Sam Aarons re-examines the conflict through the lens of nationalism in the aptly named, “Senkaku, I Choose You!” (16). He argues that the situation reveals more about Asia’s political climate than previously thought.

Kunal Mehta explores poverty in the United States, labeling the problem a growing epi-demic in “An Impoverished Debate,” (29). By looking back at initiatives during the nineties and the early twenty-first century, Mehta answers why poverty was not a “hot topic” issue during the 2008 elections.

And it is in this spirit of new perspectives that I am so proud to introduce two new bi-annu-al features for our magazine. The first, called “By the Numbers,” will illustrate topical issues and ideas in perhaps the most concise medium possible: statistics. Coupled with beautiful graphics and design, I hope that “By the Numbers” will make accessible some of the more complicated and, at times, confusing issues of the day. And in the spirit of looking forward with an eye to the past, I introduce “CPRetrospective,” an opportunity to look back at the annals of CPR history and learn what was once being said about today’s most pressing is-sues. We can learn a lot from past ideas. But we can learn more by realizing that past ideas are always present in today’s conversation.

I hope you enjoy this issue of the Columbia Political Review as much as we have enjoyed working on it. Enjoy your summer, and we’ll see you again in the fall!

Geetika Rudra Editor-in-Chief

Editor-in-Chief

Publisher

Managing Editors

Web Editor

Senior Editors

Associate Web Editor

Arts Editor

Copy Chief

Assistant Copy Editors

Head Design Editor

Design Editor

Geetika Rudra

Malini Nambiar

Gregory J. BarberTaylor Thompson

Jordan Kalms

Jamie BootheMonica CartyJoshua FattalGeorge JosephJulian NoiseCatLucas RehautDavid SilberthauTommaso Verderame

Eliot Sackler

Sida Chen

Tommaso Verderame

Anushua BhattacharyaNicolas SamborSofi Sinozich

Alejandra Oliva

David Blackman

Volume XIII, no. 2cpr

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this magazine belong to their authors and do not necessarily reflectthoseoftheColumbiaPoliticalReview,ColumbiaPoliticalUnion,orColumbiaUniversity.

Anushua Bhattacharya (pages 29, 30)Sida Chen (cover, pages 20, 22, 27, 28) Alexis Huseby (pages 7, 8)Tiffany Kim (pages 10, 12)Lena Ji (pages 5, 6)Xin Xu (pages 17, 18)

Artists:

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CPRetrospective23 Giving Up the Gun TwoSupremeCourtCases BringGunControlBack IntotheCrosshairs By Sam Roth (CC ‘12)

Features | International4 The Great Leap North Greenlandic Independence Amidst ChangingArcticGeopolitics

By Mikå Mered

7 With Arms Wide Open TheGrowingThreatofIranian ArmsTrafficking

By Greg Graff

29 Refugee Aid, Syrians Betrayed Humanitarian Aid’s Failure in the War Against Assad

By Brina Seidel

16 Senkaku, I Choose You! Examining Sino-Japanese Territorial Disputes

By Sam Aarons

Cover Story19 When the Sky Was Red America’s Nuclear Legacy in the Marshall Islands

By Narayan Subramanian

By The Numbers14 Designing for Disaster IsNewYorkCityPreparedforthe Next Sandy? By David Silberthau and Sofi Sinozich

Features | Domestic 26 Rain Check on Reform FixingFederalHurricaneRelief

By Constance Boozer

10 An Impoverished Debate Ending America’s Apathy Toward Poverty

By Kunal Mehta

table of contents

SUMMER.2013

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features :: international columbia political review :: summer 2013

The Great Leap NorthGreenlandic Independence Amidst Changing Arctic Geopolitics

By Mikå Mered

June21,2021.Sunnyblueskies,40degrees Fahrenheit onshore, 35degrees inthewater.Celebration

is in the air as thousands of touristsandforeignersofInuitdescentjointhelocalsinthestreetsofGreenland’scap-ital city,Nuuk.Theworld’s elite haveflowninduringthepastfewdaystopaytributetothe18,000inhabitantsofthenortherncapital.Her Majesty Queen Margrethe II

of Denmark is here, accompanied byCrown Prince Frederik, and Danishmembers of Parliament. Also invitedare numerous representatives fromNATO,Norden,theICC,Nordefco,theEuropeanUnion, theUnitedNations,and special emissaries for northernissues from a plethora ofmultilateralorganizations. European, American,and East Asian heads of state haveeachbroughtalongtheirowncohortofmultinational CEOs: ExxonMobil, Al-coa,Chevron,RioTinto,DONG,Cairn,Statoil,Areva,andmanymore.They’reall standing up today to pay tribute to historyinthemaking.OnJune21,2021,Greenland,ifac-

tivistshavetheirway,maybecomeanindependentnationafter300yearsofDanish colonization, and in this con-text of promises and widespread en-thusiasm, critical questions remain:Whichforeignpowerhasbeenabletoearn the newborn state’s trust in the past decade and through what means? Whataretheimplicationsofthesecel-ebrations for the Arctic regional andworld order? In September 2009, the twentieth

anniversaryoftheArcticCentreattheUniversity of Lapland in Rovaniemi,Alexander Stubb, then foreignminis-terofFinland,remarked:“theArcticisevolving from a regional frozen back-waterintoaglobalhotissue.”Indeed,withtheArctic’smelting,re-

gional states have had to adapt to the changingterrain–howtoforesee,pre-

vent and channel the new uncertainties andthreatsresultingfromtheocean’smelting.Inordertoavoidbeingcaughtoff-guard,theyquicklypouredmillionsofdollarsintostate-of-the-artresearchprogramsaimedatrethinkingeconom-ics,diplomaticstrategies,andsecurityeffectsatthenationalandregionallev-els–Rovaniemi’sArcticCentreisoneof those strategic programs. In thiscontextofchange,thecriticalissuewastofigureoutwhattheglobalgeostrate-gic dynamics of the post-polar worldwouldbe.

This is precisely the idea that Alex-anderStubbaddressed inhiskeynotespeech in Rovaniemi: “We are facinganewArcticera,”heconcluded.Withmaps centered on the North Pole in-steadofEuropebecomingmorecom-monplace, Foreign Minister Stubbshowed from a practical perspectivehow the geopolitical order will be completelyreworkedinthepost-polarworld.

The Arctic has long been deemed impractical and unnavigable render-ing it insignificant in grand strategy.However, because of climate change,thatlandscapeisabouttobealtered.Infact,by2035,whenmuchoftheArcticwill be ice-free seasonally, traditionaltwentieth century grand strategies will

be challenged or even irrelevant. In-deed,sincetheArcticOceanisexpect-ed to be “militarily practicable” year-round by 2035 (as a recent US Navystudyshows),theareawouldnotonlybeanareaofcommercialactivity,butalso a power projection theater withstakeslikenoother.If global domination in the twen-

ty-first century world is more thanever about applying pressure at crit-ical points, the Arctic will be crucial.The Arctic ties the whole Northern Hemisphere, where all superpowersare located, together.America’s polit-ical credibility and, consequently, itsregionalleadershiparenotunrivaled.Greenlandisabouttomatter.Three

timesbiggerthanTexas,Greenlandisa nearly autonomous province of theKingdom of Denmark that sits at thenorthern tip of the planet, making ittheArctic’scontroltower.

Greenland and the surrounding area isthoughttositonanywherefrom90to200billionbarrelsofoil,50to150billion metric cubes of natural gas,andlargeamountsofgold,diamonds,copper,ironore,andmanyotherstra-tegicresources.Bycomparison,SaudiArabia and Venezuela’s oil reserves are measured at around 250 billion bar-rels.ButGreenlandisatrickycase.Indeed, if the country wants to be

fully independent, it has to generateenough revenue to give up on the annu-al subsidyof3.2billionkroners (over$500 million) supplied by Copenha-gen. Given that Greenland’s economyactuallyhasnoindustrybesidefishingandscanttourism,thisfigurecurrentlyaccounts formore than90percentofGreenland’s GDP. Therefore, Green-landers have no choice but to tap into their underground wealth in order to finance their independence. And sotheGreenlanderswilldoso,nomatterwhat the most convincing environmen-taliststellthem.

“Greenland is about to matter. Three times bigger than Texas, Greenland is an nearly autonomous province of the Kingdom of Denmark that sits at the northern tip of the planet, making it the Arc-tic’s control tower.”

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columbia political review :: summer 2013 features :: international

However, even if Greenland is anautonomousprovincewithfullcontrolover themanagement of onshore andoffshorenaturalresources,itstillcan-notexploititstwomainandmostprof-itable resources: rare earth elements(REE)anduranium.Under the last administration led

by far-left Greenlandic Prime Minis-terKuupikKleist,Greenlandawarded20 offshore oil exploration and pro-duction permits and more than 100 onshoreminingconcessions.Yet,pro-ductionhasnotstarted inKvanefjeld,the world’s second-largest rare earth elements and sixth-largest uranium field.LocatedatGreenland’ssoutherntip,theKvanefjeldfieldwasawardedtoGME,anAustralianminingcompany,whichhasnowbeenwaiting foryearstostartdiggingupbothmetals.Here’s the catch: Greenland needs

REE money to finance its indepen-dence. But REE extraction impliesextracting uranium at the same time,since both metals are inextricably mixedunderground—foreverygramofREEextracted,one-tenthofagramof uranium is extracted too. GiventhatDanishCommonwealth law bansuranium extraction on Greenlandic soil,productioncannotstartatall.So,shouldGreenlandoptoutoftheCom-monwealth?Perhaps,buthowcanitfi-nance such a move without the annual Danish subsidy?That iswhere foreignpowerscome

intoplay:inanattempttobenefitfromthe Greenlanders’ eagerness to be-comeindependent,manyhavelobbiedKuupikKleist’sadministrationhardinthe past years. Indeed, China has sogreatlyintensifieditspresencethroughindustrial and diplomatic means in GreenlandthatSwedishanalystsfromtheStockholmInternationalPeaceRe-search Institute have started branding Chinain2012asa“Near-Arcticstate.”Though lacking any formal territo-

rialclaimtotheArcticandanysortofpublic Arctic strategy, China has hadan aggressive policy in the Arctic over the last decade. From its investmentsinicebreakingnavalcapabilities,totheexponential increase in Arctic research funding,andthroughdiplomaticmeasdeveloped in Greenland and Iceland,Chinahasmanagedtobecomeanun-avoidable interlocutor at the Arctic ta-

ble.AsChinaroseintheregion,Europe-

ans became lost in their environmental sentimentalism,andRussiawasproneto grandiloquent announcements andspectacularjingoisticmoves–liketheplantingofatitaniumRussianflagun-der the North Pole’s seabed just out-sideGreenland’swatersin2007.And as for America, right after

World War II, the United States of-fered $100 million to buy Greenlandfrom Denmark. Since then, it has,despite operating the Thule airbase,restedonitslaurels(atbest)inGreen-land.Atworst,ithasactuallyneglectedGreenland’s evolution. Quite signifi-cantlyintheschemeofAmericanpol-icyplanners’failuretounderstandtheaforementioned philosophical shift ingrand strategy thinking, Capitol HillpolicymakersfailedtofullyaccountforGreenland’sevolutionintheirriskmit-igation recommendations. In the pastdecade,blindedbysomekindofliberalnaïveté, a large majority of risk ana-lysts thought that China’s energy anddevelopment-related moves towards Greenland, Iceland, and even the Ca-nadianArcticwerejustregularexpres-sionsofadevelopingcountrywithbigenergyneeds.What they failed to understand is

that Beijing policy planners did notseek dominance in the Arctic just to

quench their country’s energy needs.Rather, China sees economic preemi-nenceasanearlysteptowardsmakingtangible diplomatic and security in-roads frommilitary power projectionin the regionbymid-century. Indeed,by achieving strategic partnerships with countries geographically situat-edattheheartoftheArctic,Chinare-ceives a critical long-term geostrategic advantagevis-à-vistheUnitedStates.Even worse: because uranium

extraction in Greenland by Chi-nese-backed companies have scaredoffsometerrorismanalystswhothinkAl-Qaeda,Iran,orNorthKoreamightgeturaniumasaresult,itisonlynowthatsomepolicymakersareconcernedthataChina-friendlyGreenlandmightpose a great threat toUS interests atlarge.Therefore,providedwithdiplomat-

ic and economic space in Greenland,Beijing has reinforced its Arctic ca-pability by closing scientific researchand privatemineral deals. Betting onsoft cooperation on indirect interests,Chinese lobbyists have managed toconvinceformerPrimeMinisterKleistthatBeijingcouldbeGreenland’sangelinthenearfuture.TheChinesequestionwasundoubt-

edly a core issue in Greenland’s 2013 general election. Leading the opposi-tion to PM Kleist’s Chinese-backed,

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pro-independencepolicy,AleqaHam-mond, head of the social-democraticpartySiumut(“Forward!”),arguedthatChina’s soft power domination overGreenland would be good neither forDenmark’sinterestsinGreenland,norforGreenlanditself.Particularly, she accused Kleist of

replacing the historic Danish domi-nationwith aChinese economic colo-nialism.Yet,overits30yearsofdom-inanceupto2007,Siumuthadalwayspreferred partial autonomy to full in-dependence. It is the historic elector-al setback in 2009 that changed thegame.Thenseenasanepotisticpartythat only protected Danish interests to secure its own, Siumut had been de-featedbyamotleycoalitionsupportedbyInuitAtaqatigiit(“MenandSolidar-ity”), Prime Minister Kleist’s radicalleft-wingpro-independenceparty.

According to Hammond and her al-lies,theKleistadministration,farfrompromoting the intransigent policy it promisedin2009,soldoffnaturalre-sources and social stability to ensure the interest of foreign investors. Bysatisfying their every demand, Kleistthought he would be able to financeGreenland’s independence in a fastermanner. For instance, the Kleist ad-ministration awarded operating licens-es to foreign multinationals without

subjecting them to outstanding taxes.Moreover,foreignmultinationalswerenearlyallowedtoimportthousandsofworkers fromabroadandapply thoseworkers’ native labor laws, despiteworkingonGreenlandicsoil.Thegov-ernment had already imported some Mandarin-language teachers for kidsand adults to be able to eventually in-teract and integrate foreign ChineseworkersamongsttheInuitpopulation.The key to Greenland’s future lies

in its ability to ensure its political in-dependence.Thatis,findingalliesthatcould support it at the regional and worldtables,particularlywhenGreen-landic uranium andREE exploitationare poised to destabilize the Chinesemonopoly on those markets. Chinanowsuppliesmorethan90percentofthe globalmarket for thesematerials,butwiththedevelopmentofKvanefjeldalone,China’sREEglobalmarketsharecould fall below 50 percent by 2020.Indeed,oneof thereasonswhyChinawas so proactive in Greenland was to protectitsmonopolyinREE.In2013,AleqaHammond,ininter-

view after interview, explained howa virtuously financed independencewould be possible through a sort ofeconomic affirmative action towardsDanish and Nordic energy and mining companies.

Yet on the other hand,she showed the public how the influx of at least 5,000Chinese or Polish workersto man the country’s mines would put the Greenlandic culture, social structure,language (Kalaallisut, with50,000speakers),andevendirectsecurityinjeopardy.Aleqa Hammond even-

tually gathered on March 12 almost as many votes on her name alone than all ofPMKleist’sInuitAtaqatigiitcandidates together — a peculiarity of Greenland’ssingle-round, uninominal,yet proportional elector-al system. Associated withthe notorious pro-uranium party,Atassut,andwiththenationalisticKalaallisut(theGreenlandic language) de-fenders,PartiiInuit,shewasinaugurated onApril 5, be-

comingGreenland’sfirstfemaleprimeminister.

Now that there has been a change in power and the Arctic is entering the spotlight,maybetheUnitedStateswillsucceed where the Europeans have failed: flexing its muscles and curb-ingChina’sincreasinginfluenceinthefarnorthwiththehelpofanindepen-dentandNATO-backedGreenland. “Ireally want to see Greenland become independent inmy lifetime,and rightnow, I think I will,” recently-electedPM Aleqa Hammaond said in an in-terview with Greenland’s main televi-sionchannelKNR.Perhaps, then, theworld’selitewillgatherinNuuktoseethe red-and-white Erfalasorput waveindependentlyintheGreenlandicskiesonJune21,2021,afterall. cpr

Mikå Mered, GS’13, is CEO at POLA-RIIS, a Paris-based consulting firm specializing in Arctic & Antarctic po-litical risk. Contributor to several think tanks and columnist on Arctic & Antarctic affairs for periodicals in France and abroad, he is currently writing his first book on the impact of the Arctic’s melting on global geo-strategy and grand strategy thinking (expected 2014). Follow him on twitter @mika_polariis.


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With Arms Wide OpenThe Growing Threat of Iranian Arms Trafficking

By Greg Graff

InFebruary,theUnitedStatesNavyand Yemeni security forces seizeda shipment of shoulder-fired an-

ti-aircraftmissiles, allegedlymade byIran, heading to Houthi insurgentsin Yemen. Far from a one-time inci-dent,itissymptomaticofalargerandmore disturbing trend in the region.ThroughtheQudsforce—amixofanintelligence agency and special forces—Iranhasbegunprovidingsignificantsupport to various groups across the MiddleEast.The immediateoriginofIran’s renewed attempts to export its revolution lie in its rather awkwardandprecariousstrategicposition.

During the American occupation in Iraq, Tehran faced the reality that

“the Great Satan” hadmilitary forceson its western and eastern borders.Across theGulf liesSaudiArabia,an-other ideological and geopolitical ri-val. In Afghanistan, the Taliban areenemies of theUnited States yet alsoenemies of Iran. Indeed, Afghanistanis one of three countries— includingIraqandPakistan—thatcouldpoten-tiallydestabilize,inundatingIranwithrefugeesandthreateningitsoverallse-curity.Arguably, Iran’sciviliannucle-arprogram,and theirallegednuclearweapons program, is one strategy ofensuringtheirownsecurity.Neverthe-less,sincethestartofthenewmillen-nium, Iran has also provided varyinglevelsoffinancialandmilitarysupport

to both state and non-state actors in the region in an effort to create anetworkofalliancesthatwill secure its national security and preserve Tehran’sregime.Historically, Iran’s

biggest threat has been Iraq, and that contin-ues to be the case to-day. Saddam Hussein’sregime undoubtedly caused more damage and inflicted more lossoflifeintheIslamicRe-public during the Iran-IraqWarthananythingdone by the UnitedStates. The loss of lifewas in the hundreds ofthousandsonbothsides,and the psychological scar this war inflictedon Iran has important policy considerations.Iraqhasademonstratedability to cause signifi-cant harm to its eastern neighbor.Thus, Iraniannational security policy will do all it can to pre-vent a powerful Iraqi

government. In the 1990s, this waseasy:SaddamHussein suffereda tre-mendousblowfromthe1991GulfWarand throughout the period, the Unit-edStatesanditsallieswereenforcingano-flyzoneandsanctions.Iraqwas,fromIran’sperspective,neutered.WhentheUSmilitarytoppledHus-

sein’s regime in 2003, all bets wereoff.OperationIraqiFreedomchangedeverything, and assuming Iraqwouldno longer be a threat was no longer an acceptablepolicy.Atworst,theUnitedStates could have completely succeed-ed:itcouldhavecreatedafunctioningdemocratic government with a strong US-equippedIraqimilitaryforce.Thiswouldbeanincrediblypowerful,likelypro-Westernstate,rightonIran’sbor-der.Thepotential for a second,moredestructive Iran-Iraq war existed, atleastinthelong-term.Atbest,theUnit-ed States would completely fail: theIraqigovernmentwouldeithersimplycollapseorbesocorruptandinefficientastonotmatteranyway.Theresultingchaos would threaten Iran’s security.Nostatelikesitwhentheirneighborisinthethroesofadeadlycivilwar;refu-gees and armed rebel groups both have their own unique security challenges.Not to mention Iran had already been dealing with this exact issue on their easternborderwiththeTaliban.Evenbefore theUSmilitary invad-

ed,Iranhadstartedpreparingtocon-frontAmericanforces.Uptothatpoint,the Iranian Quds force had alreadybeenshelteringvariousIraqiShiitere-sistancegroups in Iran, the largestofwhich was the Badr Corps. Iran alsohedged their bets by backing anothernewShiitemilitia,theMahdiArmy,ledbyMoqtada al-Sadr.One of thewaysIran militarily supported these groups wasbyprovidingtraininginIran,ofteninconjunctionwithHezbollah.Groupsofnewrecruits,broughttogether intoacohesiveunitcalledaSpecialGroup,would learn how to use explosives and conduct intelligence, sniper, and kid-


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napping operations. According toDr.Michael Knights at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, thesegroupsfocusedonanti-USoperations,directing mortar and rocket attacksagainstUSbases andusing advancedimprovised explosive devices (IEDs)with explosively formed penetrators(EFPs) to blow up coalition vehicles.Special Groups were also involved in planning and executing assassinations against key Iraqi leaders. In today’sIraq, these Special Groups continueto exist and operate. As asserted inKnights’ report, “If Iraqi governmentpolicy crosses any ‘red lines’ (such aslong-term US military presence inIraq, rapid rearmamentoranti-Irani-anoilpolicy),theSpecialGroupscouldbeturnedagainsttheIraqistateinser-viceofIranianinterests,showeringthegovernmentcenterwithrocketsoras-sassinatingkeyindividuals.”

These Special Groups have allowed Iran to accomplish its security goals bypreventingnationalistforceswithinthe Iraqi state from fully developing,thus preventing the Iraqi state’s totalresurgence. However, Iran is also at-

temptingtogaininfluencethroughthelegitimate Iraqi political process. TheShiite militiamen that participated in theMahdiArmyandBadrCorpsnowmakeupalargepartoftheIraqisecu-rity forces,and leadersof thoseorga-nizations, such as Moqtada Al-Sadr,have turned their resistance against USforcesandprotectionofShiitecom-munitiesintopoliticalcapital.Further,Iran has repeatedly attempted to unite Shiite Iraqis (roughly 60 percent ofthe population) into one cohesive po-liticalparty,andwhile thismightdif-ficult to achieve, successwouldmeanIran would have added influence intheIraqipoliticalprocess.Essentially,itwouldturnIraqintoanally,ifnotavassal,ofIran.

This dual strategy is also appearing in, of all places, Afghanistan, whereIranian weapons have been discovered and,in2010,NATOforcescapturedaQudsforceoperative.Further, theUSmilitary has attributed the influx ofEFPs,money, and advancedweaponssystems inAfghanistan toTehran,al-though they point out that the support has beenmeasured. That Iran would

even provide support to the Taliban is puzzling, given their less-than-amica-ble history. Themost obvious reasonfortheirsupportwouldbetobogdownNATO forces, with the natural resultbeingafalteringandineffectiveAfghanstate.TheUSpolicyofregimechangeis certainly a threat to Tehran, andlimitingNATO influence in the coun-try would help assure the survival oftheregime.Ontheotherhand,afailedAfghanstatemeans theresurgenceoftheTaliban,adangeroussituationforIran. The key to understanding thisparadox, according Dr. Sajjan Gohel,Director for International Security attheAsia-PacificFoundation,islookingat Iranian investment inAfghanistan.Tehran has put significant sums ofmoneyinoneparticularAfghanprov-ince,Herat.Today,itisoneofthemorestable and economically booming re-gionsofthecountry,preciselybecauseofIranianinvestmentininfrastructureprojectssuchasroads,bridges,powergeneration, and telecommunications.ItisbecominganintegralpartofIran’seconomy, and Stephen Carter at theGreggCenterfortheStudyofWarand


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Society posits it may even be necessary for a future natural gas pipeline con-necting Iran to countries such as Pa-kistanandIndia.BecauseAfghanistandoesnothaveamajorityShiitepopu-lation,theriskstoIranofitbecominga collapsed state are far greater. ThereturnofSunnimilitantsmaybecomeasmuchathreatforTehranasfortheUnited States, but this considerationhas only resulted in limiting Iranian support for the Taliban, rather thaneliminating it. Carter points out thatIran’s measured support is intended asawarning:Iranperceivesthepossi-bilityofstrikesonitsnuclearfacilitiestobeaveryrealthreat.Theirnetwork-ing with the Taliban might be intend-edtocultivateanabilitytostrikebackattheUnitedStatesincaseofsuchanattack,thusmakingthecoststheUnit-ed States stands to receive too high to warrantastrike.

This may also be the reason why Iran has cultivated an ambiguous re-lationshipwithAl-Qaeda.SethJones,a senior political scientist at RAND,points out that following the US in-vasionofAfghanistan, theQuds forcetransported several hundred Al-Qae-da-linked individuals intoIran.Theseoperatives set up a “management”council with clear ties to Bin Laden,but in 2003, Tehran detained all oftheseindividuals.In2009and2010,iteaseditscontroloverthem,butithasadheredtostrictredlines,forcingtheoperativestokeepalowprofile.Iranisplaying a very dangerous game in sup-portingboth theTalibanandAl-Qae-da,butBruceRiedelatBrookingssug-gests that, despite this, “Tehran mayconsider the price worth paying in the faceofWesternaggressionagainst itsnuclearprogram.”Ofcourse, the ideaistomakethecostsofafirststrikesohighthatitneverhappens.USstrate-gic planners would have to weigh the potential blowback from the TalibanandAl-Qaedathatsuchastrikewouldbring.TheUnited States is not, however,

the only “Satan” that Iranmust face.On the other side of theMiddle Eastlies the ayatollahs’ other arch-neme-sis: Israel. Since Iran has no borderwith Israel, to keep itself relevant intheArab-Israeli conflict and continuetostoketheflames,ithastorelyonitsproxies, namely Hezbollah, Hamas,andPalestinianIslamicJihad.Hezbol-lah isperhapsa textbookcaseofhow

Iran operates with various nonstate actorstoextenditsinfluence.Formedthree years after the revolution thatoustedtheShah,itcontinuestoreceivesignificant financial, organizational,and military support from Iran. Thishas made Hezbollah a potent military threat to Israel, which bloodied theirnose in the 2006war. The AmericanEnterprise Institute reports that Iran has supplied Hezbollah with over ten thousand ground-attack rockets andmissiles,aswellasadvancedanti-air-craft, anti-ship, and anti-armor mis-siles, and the training to use them.These weapons are all designed to counter the military power of Israeland neutralize its ability to operate in Lebanon. Further, in the Gaza Strip,

Iran has recently begun providing thesesameweapons,albeitinsmallernumbers, to Hamas and to Palestin-ianIslamicJihadintheWestBank.Bydiversifying thenumberofanti-Israelmilitant groups it is funding, Iran isincreasing its capability to continually strikeatordistractIsrael,andtangen-tiallytheUnitedStates,“withouthav-ingtosacrificethesameproxycontin-uously.”Towards that end, Iran also cur-

rently supports the embattled Assad regime. Syria is not only a longtimeallyofIran;itiscurrentlyitsonlystateallyintheregion.LosingAssadmeanslosing a key friend, but it alsomeanslosingtheabilitytofunnelweaponstoLebanonandPalestine.TheIraqigov-ernment has refused to stop Iraniancargoflights,likelycarryingsignificantquantities of weapons, to Syria. ThekillingofaQuds forcecommander inSyria also shows their direct presence ontheground,towhichIranfullyad-

mits on the basis that they are there in anadvisoryrole.Inadditiontoadvis-ingandequippingSyrianmilitaryforc-es, it is likely that they are doing thesametopro-Assadparamilitaryforces,specifically the Shabiha militias. AshasbecomeQudsforcedoctrine, theyseem to be spreading their resources ratherthanputtingalloftheireggsinonebasket.LosinginfluenceinSyriaistoodevastatingalossforIran.

When considering the broader is-sue of Iran’s rise to power in the re-gion,andWesternresponsestoit,theactivitiesof theQuds forcemaybeassignificant,ifnotmoreso,asIran’snu-clearprogram.The listof groupsandcountries with ties to Iran is signifi-cant and diverse: Palestinian IslamicJihad,Hamas,Hezbollah,Assad’sgov-ernment,variousIraqiinsurgents,theTaliban,andevenAl-Qaeda.TheyformthecoreofashadowwarTehranwagesagainst theWest, and it is awar thathasonlybeenescalating,withdanger-ousimplicationsfortheUnitedStatesand Israel. Iranian EFPs have killedAmericantroopsinIraqandAfghani-stan,andIranianrocketsandmissilescontinue to pose a deadly threat forIsrael. Should Washington considera policy of containment toward Iran,it is important to consider the ability of Iran to strike back via these proxygroups.AslongasIranexistswithse-riousnationalsecurityconcerns,itwillcontinuetofundthesegroups,andaslong as that continues these groups will pose a significant threat to theUnited States. Iran’s operations stemfromtheirsenseofinsecurity,andthisleaves open the diplomatic option ofamore conciliatory foreign policy to-wardIran.Yet,themostplacatingandappeasing foreignpolicyonWashing-ton’s part will not resolve the very real security challenges Tehran faceswithregard to Iraq and Afghanistan, norwill it ameliorate relations between Iran and Israel and Iran and Saudi Arabia. While US actions may havestartedthisshadowwar,itisdoubtfulanydiplomaticpolicywillbringaquickresolution.

Greg Graff, CC ‘15, plans to study polit-ical science and history. His interests include international relations and military history, science, and strat-egy. He can be reached at [email protected].

cpr


“The US policy of regime change is certainly a threat to Tehran, and limiting NATO influence in the country would help assure the sur-vival of the regime. On the other hand, a failed Afghan state means the resurgence of the Taliban, a dangerous situation for Iran.”

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features :: domestic columbia political review :: summer 2013

An Impovrished DebateEnding America’s Apathy Toward Poverty

By Kunal Mehta

The protracted economic crisis that has entangled America since 2007 has produced an uproar of politi-

calreaction,galvanizingthepubliccon-sciousness to demand answers to the biggerquestionsofourtime:theroleofgovernment,thechallengesofglobaliza-tion,andtherapidriseofinequalityhaveallbeenfuriouslydebated.Furthermore,thepitchof political discussion andac-tion has remained particularly feverousandferocious,whethermanifestedinthepolarization of Congress or the anti-es-tablishmentoutrageintheTeaPartyandOccupymovements. Yet in themidst of this political ca-

cophony,therehasbeenadeafeningsi-lence concerning something that should be identified as a keynational concern:the growing epidemic of poverty inAmerica.Povertyhasalwaysbeenacom-plicated,challengingissue,butchangingsocial and political attitudes towards poverty in thewakeof the1996welfarereform compromise, coupled with thedisruptions posed by the Great Reces-sion,haveconvergedtoshutout talkofpovertyfromthenationaldiscourse.Figures released by the US Census

Bureau in late 2012 have shown the as-tounding extent to which this epidemic has gained ground in America over the pastfewyears.TheproportionofAmeri-canslivinginpovertyhasrisenfromthe11 percent pre-recession low to 15 per-cent, a peak notwitnessed in 20 years.Thefigureissettoincreasefurtherto15.8percentby2014,accordingtoprojectionsmadebytheBrookingsInstituteandThe Economist,resultinginanadditional10million Americans joining the ranks ofthepooroverthecourseof thisdecade.Toaddtothisdepressingsetofstatistics,the poverty count increases dramatically fromanalreadyrecordhighof46millionto 66million if the federal poverty line(drawnat$24,500 fora familyof four)isredefinedatonly25percentaboveitscurrentvalue.

GiventheseverityofAmerica’spover-tycrisis,itwouldbereasonabletoexpectthatpoliticians, themedia,orevenciti-zen groups would raise the issue in the public forum. Yet, a puzzling and per-vasive lackofdebateon thesubjecthascome to pass. The presidential race of2012isaperfectillustrationofjusthowlittle attention the issue has been receiv-ingfromthepublicatlarge.Whilecandi-dateMittRomneypassedoffpovertyasproblemadequatelysolvedbythesafetynet, famously admittinghe is “not con-cerned about the very poor,” PresidentObama proved even more reticent on the topic;hespokeeuphemisticallyofvagueaspirations to join themiddle classandneglected the topic entirely in his inau-guraladdress.

Such a reluctance to bring up the is-sue during recent general elections is an anomaly in post-war America, andspeaks to the broader apathy of mostAmericanstowardsthesubject.Afterall,campaignpitchesaremerelyareflectionoftheissuesthatthemajorityofAmeri-cansandmediaoutfitsdeem importantfordiscussion.Severalstudiesonpublic

opinion and media studies support this hypothesis of widespread indifference.ThePewResearchCenterfoundaseveredownward trend in the percentage ofAmericans who consider poverty allevi-ationapublicpriority.Figuresfellfrom63percentin2001to59percentin2005,andfinally52percentin2012.Inasep-arate poll that Pew conducted in 2011,51percentofAmericansagreedwiththeclaim, “The government can’t afford todomuchmoretohelptheneedy,”mark-ingthefirsttimethatamajorityendorsedthestatementsincethesurveybegan15yearsago.Themediaseemsequallycul-pableineschewingthefightagainstpov-erty.Areportbythenon-profitorganiza-tionFairnessandAccuracyinReportingfound that across major media outletsincludingCBS,ABC,NPR,andThe New York Times,only17outof10,489cam-paignstoriesdirectlyaddressedpoverty.Recent trends and statistics make

two things clear: poverty is a troublingandgrowingphenomenonintheUnitedStates,andnooneiswillingtotalkaboutit.Butitiscrucialtounderstandthewebofsocial,economic,andcultural factors

11

columbia political review :: summer 2013 features :: domestic

thatdrive this reticence.Modernpoliti-cal perspectives on how society should deal with the poor can best be measured bythelastdecisiveactionsocietytooktoaddresspoverty–tellingly,thisoccurred17yearsagointheformofthe1996Per-sonalResponsibilityandWorkOpportu-nity Act (PRWOA), also known as wel-farereform.AlthoughPRWOAmaynotnecessarilybeafailedpovertyalleviationtactic initself,abriefhistoricalanalysisreveals that it was both the effect andconsequenceofaperiodinhistorywherethe debate on poverty was considered decisively closed, sowing the seeds forfutureapathyonthetopic.Welfare reform, signed into law by

President Bill Clin-ton,wastheresultofa half-decade-longexperiment with pov-erty alleviation pro-grams in the UnitedStates. After Presi-dentLyndonB.John-son’s declaration of“War on Poverty” in1964, accompaniedby a raft of anti-pov-erty measures, theissue immediately became a center offocus inWashington.The Johnson pres-idency saw the es-tablishment of wide-spread employment support,welfare,andeducation initiatives,kick-startedwithahistoricandveritablypublicizedtourofpoor,ruralKentucky.Although these programs were widely credited with slashing poverty in halffromahighof22percent,theysoonfacedcriticismfromthepublicandanimosityfrom Congress on account of multiplereports ofmisallocated funds, scandals,and rising expenditures. The politicalscales eventually tipped in favor of an-ti-welfare thinkers, and by the time ofNixon’s administration, which receivedmuch advice from the noted free-mar-ketproponentMiltonFriedman,severalwelfare initiativeswere either closed orreformedinanefforttoavoidinefficientgovernmentintervention.President Reagan’s term in office,

which coincided with a large conserva-tive backlash against the remnants of

thewelfaremovement, set thestage forthefuturedebateonpoverty.InfluentialthinkerslikeFriedmanandthelibertari-anpoliticalscientistCharlesMurrayad-vancedtheviewthattheWaronPovertyhad actually retarded poverty-alleviation efforts by making recipients depen-dent on assistance and de-incentivizing work. Though poverty levels remainedstubbornly high at 15 percent, the con-servative attack on welfare intensified.Declaring that theWar on Poverty hadbeenwon – by poverty – Reagan radi-cally restructured welfare, cutting cashassistancetodependentfamiliesinfavorofofferingincometaxcreditstolow-in-come earners. The conservative count-

er-visionhadbeenstatedandboldlyso;governmentwelfarecreatedacycleofde-pendency, trapping generations withinpoverty.Thegovernment’s role in com-bating poverty was best served by creat-ing jobsandassisting theworkingpoorinlimitedmeasure.

Now accorded the due responsibil-ity of working towards bettering theirownfuture,thepoorwouldnolongerbecharacterized as ”welfare queens” and”lazy drunks.” Such a message caughtonquicklyinAmerica,asthepublicbe-came increasingly disillusioned with the failures of thewelfare system of earlieryears.Bythe1990s,evenDemocratsgrudg-

inglysurrenderedtheiradvocacyoflargewelfaresystems,reachingacompromisepositionof“workfare.”Thisconcept,pi-

oneered to a large extent in theUnitedStates by Tommy Thompson, the Re-publican governor ofWisconsin duringthelate1980s,waspredicatedupontheidea that government aid should operate with an aim to move as many recipients intotheworkforceaspossible,andhencereduce relianceonstateassistance.Thesuccessofthiseffort,alongwiththepo-liticalmainstream’s dissatisfactionwithexisting programs, meant that welfarehad turned into a political liability. Aneconomic boom that brought poverty rates down by the mid-1990s only sharp-ened this view. And in 1996, PresidentBill Clinton reached across the aisle to“endwelfareasweknowit,”signinginto

lawthegroundbreak-ingPersonalRespon-sibilityandWorkOp-portunity Act (afterhaving vetoed two Republican bills onwelfare reform) thatcompletely restruc-tured federal aid tolow-incomegroups.Welfare expendi-

tureintheformoftheAid to Families with Dependent Childrenprogram was greatly reduced through sev-eral different mea-sures and renamed Temporary Aid to NeedyFamilies.Cashassistance was lim-ited tofiveyearsand

was tied to a willingness to search forwork. Discretion over federal funds onpoverty alleviationpassed to the states,andfederalfundswerenolongeradjust-able,butwereinsteadhandedoutinfixedgrants.Byandlarge,welfarewasnolon-gerconsideredanentitlementprogram,buthadbecomeasystemofworkfare.Conditions at the time bolstered the

view that the correct formula to tacklepoverty had been found.Around 2000,the poverty rate in the United Statesreached a low of 11.3 percent – with-in a hair’s breadth of the historical lowreached in 1973. Welfare caseloadsshrankthroughoutthedecadeby2mil-lion; therewasa30percent increase inemploymentoflow-incomesinglemoth-ers, incomeof low incomefamiliesroseby 25 percent, and welfare payments

12


constituted a dramatically smaller share ofincomereceivedbythepoor.Summingup the sentiment of the times, a 2002New York Times editorial began with theline“Welfarereformhasbeenanob-vious success,”while a 2006BrookingsInstitute report on the topic was titled “ItWorked.”The1996reformhadbeenetchedinstone–tofightagainstitwouldbepoliticalsuicide,andevenmentioningwelfarehadbecome taboo, forwhat re-mainedtobesaid?Anuneasytrucekeptbothpartiessilentonwelfareeversince,describedasan“offthetablepoliticalis-sue”bya2008New York Times article that ran “DoAmericansStillHateWel-fare?”Theleftandtherightagreed;dis-cussiononpovertywasclosed.Or so it would seem. The benefit of

hindsight shows us that all was not as rosy as it appeared. The unusually lowpoverty rates experienced over the past 20 years have had less to do with foresightedpolicy and more to do with an un-precedented eco-nomic boom that could not have been continually sustained. TheGreat Recession has ex-posedtheinabilityofthewelfaresystemto protect the poor when they most need it.America’spovertyreformneedstoberedrawntobettersuittheuniquecircum-stances that thepoor faceandwill con-tinuetofaceoverthisdecade.Policyandpublic response to the issue, however,seemsstuckinthepast.ThelowlevelsofconcernforthepoorevidencedearlierinthisarticleseemtostemfromthebeliefthatAmerica’smethodsofpovertyfight-ingneednoadjustment.Thesocialandpolitical conceptions frozen in time bythewelfaredealhave impededanynewinsighton the topic.All opposingview-points have been bullied out by prevail-ingviewssetinplacein1996,andanyef-forttospeakofchangingdirectionsincethen has been met with a harsh political andsocialbacklash.On the political front, the left seems

inhibited from bringing up changes inthefightagainstpoverty,whiletherightis content with the gains it was able to secure in1996.Scarred fromitsexperi-enceoffallingonthewrongsideofpublicopinion on poverty after the 1994mid-

terms,theDemocraticPartyconsidersitspro-welfarepastamajorliability.Itsvul-nerability on the topic prevents the leftfromspeakingoutonapro-povertyplat-form,focusinginsteadonrhetoricaimedexclusivelyatthemiddleclass.Thissen-sitivity tobeing caught speakingon theissue can easily be seen both in how con-servatives have tried to label the Dem-ocratic Party a welfare party, and howDemocrats have tried to distance them-selvesfromthisnotion.WhenPresidentObama announced that states could ap-plytoreplacecertainworkrequirementsunderTANFinfavorofnewpilotprojectslastJuly,aconservativefirestormerupt-ed,accusingDemocratsof“guttingwel-fare”(inthewordsofaWashingtonPosteditorial).GovernorRomney’scampaignwas quick to run a series of attack adsclaiming that the president had silently endedthe1996welfarereformandthat

hispolicieswerefavoringareturntothecycle of welfare dependency. Althoughnumerous news organizations including CNNandABCNewscalledtheseclaimsfalse,thedamagehadalreadybeendone.President Obama was forced to makeclear that he championed the causes behindwelfare reform, even employingex-President Clinton’s backing to attestthathisviewswereperfectlyinsyncwith1996thinking.Theconservativetacticofcalling outDemocrats as proponents ofwelfarehasbeenakeyfactorinkeepingtheleftreluctanttotalkaboutpoverty.The politics of poverty and welfare,

however,canonlyreflectpopularsocialviews on the issues. The workfare con-ceptthatgrewoutofthe1990swassym-bolic of a view that low-income groupswere just like ordinary employees whohadtoworktheirwayoutofpoverty.Ac-cording to a report by the Salvation Army conductedin2012,halfofallAmericansbelieved that poverty could be entirely overcome with a good work ethic. Pewpolling also found that an incredible 71percent ofAmericans believed the poorwere too dependent on government wel-

fare, implyingthat theyneededtoworkmore.Thepopularityofthisnotionmayexplainwhythepublicdiscourserefusestoadmitthegrowingproblemofpover-tyinandofitself.Despitethestructuralchallenges and systematic discrimina-tiontheyface,thepoorareviewedasnodifferentfromwealthierworkinggroupsand,consequently,donotrequireapolit-icalspaceoftheirownoutsidethecurrentdiscussionson inequalityandeconomicgrowth.Withlittlesocialinterestindis-cussingtheplightofthepoor,it’sunsur-prising that no noise has been raised on thepoliticalstageabouttheircondition.Ultimately, poverty is an incredibly

complex and often intractable prob-lemthatsocietiesacrosstheworldface.Whether conservatives, liberals, or cen-trists have the best formula to carrythe war on poverty forward is hard togauge. What remains certain, however,

is that the anti-pov-erty mechanisms we have in place are woefully inad-equate to meet to-day’s needs as well asthoseofthenearfuture. The publicconscience needs

toberousedfromthestuporithasfall-en into since welfare reform and facethe reality of today. Society’s efforts tofight poverty should be under constantscrutinyandrenewedassessment.Evenif substantive change can’t immediatelybe applied to today’s policies, Americastands togainmuch fromavibrantde-bateonthetopic.Theresponsibility forrekindling discussion on one of Amer-ica’s most fundamental problems restsfirmly with our journalists, communityleaders,andpoliticians.Butitisprimari-lythedutyoftheaveragevotertoendtheapathy thatquietlydestroys the livesofmillionsoftheirfellowcitizenseachandeveryday.

Kunal Mehta, CC ’15, is a student from Mumbai, India currently majoring in Economics-Mathematics. His interests include politics, history, and amateur cycling. Kunal hopes to one day work with a foreign affairs/economic policy-making institution. He can be reached at [email protected].

“Declaring that the War on Poverty had been won – by poverty – Reagan radically restructured welfare, cut-ting cash assistance to dependent families in favor of

offering income tax credits to low-income earners.”

cpr

13

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14

by the numbers: Designing for DisasterIs New York City ready for the next Sandy?

OnOctober29,2012,HurricaneSandymadelandfallonthe southern tipofManhattan.WhileColumbia studentsmayremembertheresultingextendedweekend,thestormwasnotpleasant formost.HurricaneSandywasthesec-ond-costlieststorminUShistory,destroyinganestimated$75billionworthofproperty,takingalmost300lives,andleavingNewYorkCitydevastated.Hundredsof thousandsofNewYorkers lostpower for

days,ifnotweeks,manyinStatenIsland,andQueenslosttheirhomestofire,water,andwinddamage,and48NewYorkers lost their lives.Mayor Bloomberg suspended allmodesofpublictransportation,andclosedthetunnelsandbridges intoNew York during the storm. TheNew YorkStockExchangesuspended trading.Quite literally, life inNewYorkCitydrewdangerouslyclosetoacompletestopbefore,during,andintheimmediateaftermathofHurri-caneSandy.Theeconomicdamagewasconsiderable.Andyetthepsychologicaldamageisjustassignificant.

HurricaneSandywasunprecedented.NewYorkCityhadneverseenahurricaneascostlyinthemodernera.ImagesofoiltankersbeachedontheStatenIslandshore,orcra-tered pathways in Brooklyn parks are inconsistent withNewYorkers’dailyexperiences.ThelargestmetropolisintheUnitedStates– thecenterof theUSfinancial sector,andalynchpinofAmericancultureandart–washumbledinaseverelydestructiveway.Moreover, Sandy’s physical impact still lingers. Sandy

obliterated an estimated $18 billion of New York City’sGDPthatcannotberetrieved.Aprogramtorapidlyrepairhomes damaged during the Hurricane only wrapped up its workonMarch26.EvenManhattan,hometomorethanonemiracle story,maintainsdamage.OnlyonApril 4th,almostsixmonthsafterSandy,didtheSouthFerrysubwaystationre-open.Without doubt, the recovery effort in New York City

and the surrounding area was the high point in an oth-erwise abysmal situation.NewYorkers rememberMayorBloomberg’sswiftactionandcompetency.PicturesofDem-ocraticPresidentBarackObamaandRepublicanGovernorChrisChristieembracingandtouringtheravagedNewJer-sey landscape still resonate with Americans all across the country.Concretely,theFederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA)pledgedalmost$6billiontoNewYorkCityforcostsassociatedwithSandyreparation.Morebroadly,the federal governmentpasseda$50billionaidpackageforSandyrelatedrepairs.Butthequestionpersists,canandwillastormlikeSan-

dystrikeagain?ManyscientistsclaimclimatechangewillonlymakestormslikeSandymorecommoninthefuture.IsNewYorkCityprepared foranotherHurricaneSandy,andcanitaffordanother$6billionrecovery?

NYC Federal Block Grant Allocations for Disaster Relief

by David Silberthau and Sofi Sinozich

graphs by Alejandra Oliva

15

The eye-opening aftermath of Hurricane Sandy ex-posedtheinadequacyofNewYorkCity’s infrastructureintheeventofnaturaldisasters.InastudycommissionedbyGovernorAndrewCuomo,weseealackofredundan-cyinourenergysystems,anoverdependenceonanagingpipeline system, and the ineffectiveness of our currentpumpingsystem.Thecity’slocationonthecoastputsitataninherentriskforfloodswhich,giventherisingsealevel due to climate change, are becoming increasinglymoreintense.Thecityisalsoatamoderateriskforearth-quakes,withtheweaksoilfoundationsandunreinforcedmasonryconstructionofmanyolderstructuresinlowerManhattanmakingthemparticularlysusceptibletoseis-micforces.Traditionalfixessuchasseawallsandfloodbarriers

may,ontheirown,proveinsufficientgiventheseverityofstorms likeSandy,whicharebecomingmorecommon.One alternative is to implement more widely structures thatarealreadyextant(andhavebeenshowntowork),suchasman-madedunesalongtheshorelineandflood-gatestocloseofftunnelsbeforesurgesoccur.Therehasalso been a rising trend to design structures that can adapttochangingconditionsandare“safetofail,”asop-posedtofail-safe.Examplesincludefloatingwatertreat-mentplantsanddikes thatareengineeredto failwhenconditions become too severe and instead direct the floodharmlesslyawaytoadesignatedarea.Inalllikeli-hood,therewillbenosingleresponseandamoreholisticsolutionwillbenecessary,onethatcanincludetheuseofnaturalbuffers,betterevacuationschemes,andplansforremovinggeneratorsfrombasements.Indeed,theknowledgeexiststomitigateorevenpre-

vent the effects of natural disasters. The politics, how-ever,ofeven thesesolutionsarea formidableobstacle;beforewecanfixthechallengesposedbythesenaturaldisasters,itseemswemustfirstovercomeadeep-seatedcultureofinstitutionalfragmentation.Attheendoftheday,wecanonlycountonsomecon-

stants–ourpopulationwillcontinuetomultiply,ourin-frastructurewillcontinuetodeteriorateifleftunchecked,andmoneywill always be an issue.With each passingday, the risk of a catastrophic natural disaster growslarger,asdoesthepotentiallocalimpactand,giventhenatureofNYC,long-termglobalinfluence.Fortunately,thefederalgovernmenthasfinallyrecognizedthistrend,withPresidentObamaincludingtheimprovementofin-frastructureinhisStateoftheUnionspeechinFebruary.Ifwearetofunctionasanationandremaincompetitiveglobally,wemustmaketheinvestmentsnow.Inpoliticalterms,thatmeanssignificantsavingsindollarsandthecreationofjobsinthefuture;totherestofus,itmeanslivessavedandarisingstandardofliving.

American Society of Civil Engineers

billion

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FlamesbillowupintotheskyfromthecharredshellofablackHon-da.Theownerwalksaway,guilty

of having just set fire to his own car.Behind the man is a sign written in Chinesewhichreads“DefeattheJapa-neseDemons.”Thisisjustoneofmanyscenes capturing the zeitgeist of theriots last September inChina that oc-curredafter theJapanesegovernmentnationalized three uninhabited islands that lie off the coasts of Japan, Chi-na, andTaiwan.Paying a little over 2billionyen($26million) for theprivi-lege, the government assumed finan-cial ownershiponSeptember 11, 2012over the desolate rocks that, togetherwithfiveotherisles,comprisetheSen-kaku Islands. The archipelago sits amere ninety-three miles from Japan,onehundred andfivemiles fromTai-wan, and two hundred and ten milesfromChina.DespitebeingthefarthestawayfromChina,thefervoritinvokedamongChinesecitizenscouldnothavehit closer tohome.Carswereburned,factoriesdestroyed—anythingbearingaJapanesenamebecameafairtarget.Eventhoughtheriotsgenuinelyreflect-ed the strong anti-Japanese sentiment ofparticipants,theintensityandtimingcameataninterestingtime.IntheheatofnationalelectionsinbothChinaandJapan, the riotsdiverted attention away from import-ant domestic issues in both countries,capturing their re-spective national dialogues. The ter-ritorial dispute had quickly become avaluable political toolfortheregionChina,Japan,andTaiwanhavefeud-

ed intermittently since 1972 over which country maintains the proper territo-rialclaimtotheSenkakuIslands.His-

torically, the islands lacked any con-crete territorial claimantsand in1895wereformallyannexedbyJapan.AfterWorldWarII,thestill-uninhabitedis-lands came under the control of theUnitedStatesduringtheoccupationofJapan. Under US control, the islandswere administratively lumped together withtheRyukyuIslands,anotherarchi-pelago stretching south from Japan’smainland.Throughouttheoccupation,theUSmilitaryusedoneoftheislandsformissiletestswhilealsopayingrenttotheisland’sproperowner.Fromtheperspective of the United States, thiscemented the idea that at least some of the islands were private propertythat fell under the territorial rights ofJapan. Control over the Ryukyu andSenkakuislandswasformallyreturnedto the Japanese government in 1972,though China and Taiwan took issuewith this transferof sovereignty.BothChina and Taiwan had accepted theUnitedStates’controloverthe islandsduringoccupation,anditwasonlyaftersovereignty was transferred to Japanthat both countries expressed grievanc-es.Whilethehandoverwasmadesuc-cessfullyandwithoutmodification,theexchangemarkedthebeginningofthedispute and China’s entrance into theconflict.

The Chinese tell the story of theSenkaku Islandsdifferently than theirJapanese counterparts. Deep-rooteddifferences are even demonstrated in

theirnamesfortheislands. InChina,the islands are known as the DiaoyuIslandsandarereferredtoexclusivelybythatname.TheChinesegovernmentclaims that the islands were associated withtheirterritoryasfarbackas1372,a historical and territorial claim that is referenced in numerousChinese trav-eloguesandbooks.TheChineseclaimrelies on the Treaty of Shimonoseki,which ended the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895. According to the text ofthetreaty,“theislandofFormosa[Tai-wan], together with all islands apper-taining or belonging to the said island ofFormosashouldbecededtoJapan.”However,thislanguageleavesambigu-ouswhich islands“belong” toTaiwan,as such important details were left totheconsensusofthesignatorynations.Thus, the Chinese claim that the Di-aoyu Islands do not belong to the his-torical area of Formosa and thereforehavealwaysbelongedtoChina.

While these countries’ claims to the islands differ, their political and eco-nomic interests do not. In 1969, theUnitedNationsEconomicCommissionforAsia and theFarEast published areport suggesting an abundance of oiland gas reserves near the islands. In1971,oneyearaheadof the scheduledhandoffoftheislandsfromtheUnited

States to Japan,China protestedthe impending transfer, defend-ing their claim through the Treaty of Shi-monoseki andattempting to demonstrate that open loopholes — however narrow

or ridiculous — represent economic op-portunities.However, despite Chineseprotests, the transfer went ahead asplanned. Since then, Japanhasmain-


Senkaku, I Choose You!Examining Sino-Japanese Territorial Disputes

By Sam Aarons

“By focusing internal dissent outwards to-wards a common enemy, domestic dissent in these countries is essentially nullified and in its places comes solidarity centered around

a common entity—real or imagined.”

17


tainedaneffectiveadministrativecon-trolovertheislandsand,untilrecently,hasavoidedterritorialconflicts.At first blush it would seem China

entered into the dispute with an eye on the island’s supposed oil and natural gasreserves,yetduetothedispute,noadditional scientific researchhasbeenperformed to ver-ify the claims inthe original report published over fortyyearsago. Infact most of theislands’ current commercial appeal is related to their value as an abun-dantfishingarea.

Although the islands are gener-ally considered to fallwithinJapan’sexclusive econom-iczone,adealwasstruck to allowChinese and Tai-wanese fishermenrights to fish inthe zone as long as they agreed not to bring the islands into their own ex-clusive economic zones. This agree-ment, however, ispurely focused ontrade and does not address issues re-lated to sovereign-ty. It has been re-portedthatfishingtrips originating in Chinaareunfeasiblebecauseofthedis-tancefromtheislandstothemainland.ThesameisnottrueforTaiwaneseandJapanese fishermen who frequent thearea. Given the islands’ isolation anddisputed status not much else besides fishingiseconomicallyfeasible;theis-landsareahavenforraremolespeciesandalbatross,butnothumanactivity.The islands’ political value thus stands apartfromtheireconomicvalueUndeterredbythelackofeconomic

incentives,bothJapanandChinacon-tinue todevotepart of their busy for-eign policy agendas to these islands.For both countries, the dispute over

the islands has increasingly become a way of providing political cover forimportant domestic issues. In orderto achieve this, both countries open-lyadmonish theother,hoping togainpopular support. By focusing inter-nal dissent outwards towards a com-monenemy,domesticdissentinthese

countries is essentially nullified andin its places comes solidarity centered around a common entity — real or imagined.This, in essence, is a “fake”nationalism, or rather nationalism asa response toaperceived injustice. Infact,major incidents regarding the is-lands are a relatively recent phenome-non and have become an increasingly frequentmediamainstayonbothsidesof thedisputesince2006.Thisrise inmedia coverage can be correlated with anumberofimportantdomesticissuesinbothcountriesinrecentyears.Not coincidentally, last year’s an-

ti-Japanese riots coincided with Chi-

nese national elections. Members ofthe National People’s Congress, Chi-na’s only national legislative body,were elected over a five-month cyclebylocalcongressesforfive-yearterms.Duringthetimeoftheriotsitwasun-clear who would become the new leader of theCommunistParty causinggreat

concern amongst citizens. The Chi-nese government began focusing itsmedia coverage more heavily on the islands and began using in-creasingly strong rhetoric when talking about theislands. In 2006,afirstgroupofac-tivists set sail to the islands frommainland Chinabut were ultimate-ly turned away.The local media exalted the crew upon their return.Four years later,a Chinese fishingboat collided with a boat from theJapanese coast guard,causing thecrew to be takeninto Japanese cus-tody. The Chinesegovernment met this action against itscitizenssternly,with government officials deriding

Japan’s actions publicly. Over time,repeated and emotional Chinese re-sponses to an insignificant Japanesethreats on these remote islands created a powder keg of anti-Japanese senti-ment; dissentwas thus focused exter-nallytowardsJapanwhilealsoframingthe government in a positive light as “defenders” of the islands. When theislands were eventually nationalized,thedisputewaspackagedinawaythatintentionallycreatedpublicoutrage.

Japan is also prone to the dangers of fake nationalism, albeit in a slight-lydifferentway.InthecaseofJapan,fake nationalism can be seen asmore

18


ofapolitickingtoolratherthanpublicmisdirection.LastSeptember,thegov-ernment’s sudden nationalization ofthreeoftheislandscreatedanupswellofsupportforthedisputeamongJapa-nesenationals.DuringJapan’sgeneralelectionthreemonthslater,theLiberalDemocraticPartywona landslidevic-tory over the incumbent government,the Democratic Party of Japan. Thisvictory also secured the Liberal Dem-ocratic Party’s pick for Prime Minis-terShinzoAbe.PartofAbe’sallure toJapanese voters was his stance on the SenkakuIslands,which, intherun-upto the election, he called Japan’s “in-herent territory.” After being elected,AbewentevenfurthertoclaimthattheSenkakuIslands“clearlybelongtoJa-pan.”WhileavarietyoffactorsplayedintoAbe’stake-allvictory,hisstanceonthedisputeallowedhimto takeonanevenbiggerpoliticalbattle.Electedoncebeforein2006,Abeis

knownforhisparticularlyconservativeviews on national defense.During hisfirst term, Abe upgraded theMinistryof Defense to “full ministry status,”bringing it in linewithotherpowerfulministries. Particularly noteworthy isAbe’s stance onArticle 9 of the Japa-nese constitution, which forbids thecountry from maintaining a standingarmy–alegislativevestigeofpost-waroccupation.Throughouthiscareer,Abehasarguedforaconstitutionalamend-

ment to eliminate this particular re-striction. Such an amendment wouldallow Japan to resolve any disputes it hasbymeansofforce.Anyamendmentto the constitution, however, requiresatwo-thirdsmajorityofthelegislaturebefore it can be ratified. By taking apopularstanceontheSenkakuIslands,Abe is attempting to build up the sup-portneededbeforehecanproposesuchanamendment.Coincidentally, Abe’scallfora“boldreview”ofArticle9co-incided with the first major incidentconcerningtheislandsin2006.Itisnoaccidentthatforhiscurrentterm,Abemade his hardline stance on the islands a major focal point of the campaign.By focusing on the threat of Chineseaggression,Abewasabletobothbuildupsupportforhiscampaignaswellasshape the national dialogue around the Article9issueinhisfavor.

While Taiwan does play a role in the disputeovertheislands,recentactionshave signaled the government may be willing to partially concede the issue.InrecentnegotiationswithJapan, theTaiwanese government stated it will not claim the islands in an upcoming fisheryagreement.Taiwanclaims thatits stance on the islands remains un-changed, but in order todisencumberdialogue, Taiwan has forgone placingthat claim in this specific agreement.Theaction isaradicaldeparture fromTaiwan’s previous rhetoric over the

islandsandisevenmorestrikingcon-sideringthehostileconfrontationsbe-tween both countries’ coast guards in recent years. It is reported that theserecent concessions were made with the hopeof receivingfishingrights inwa-tersclosetotheSenkakuIslands,whichthe Japanese government has said it is willingtodo.Apart from the domestic implica-

tionsoftheconflictforJapanandChi-na,inmanywaystheSenkakudisputeisjustanotherwrinkletobeironedoutinSino-Japanese relations. It isnocoin-cidencethatChina’sincreasinglyharshrhetoric regarding the islands comes on the heels of its emergence as a globalsuperpower,whileatthesametimeJa-pan struggles to maintain its economic footing. In 2010, China surpassed Ja-pan to become the second-largest econ-omy in the world. Based solely on itshandlingofthe islands, itwouldseemChina isusing its foreignpolicyagen-da to position itself as the dominantplayer in the region, flexing its mus-clesinfrontofoldadversaries.Thisisjustoneconflictofmany.Infact,Chinahas numerous ongoing conflicts withother countries in the region over ter-ritory ranging from underwater rocksto small tropical reefs. Japan is alsono stranger to territorial disputes and maintains longstanding conflicts withSouth Korea and Russia over islandsthatareactuallypopulated.

By understanding these issues and how these countries use them to achieve certaingoals,wecanpredicthowfutureconflicts in the regionmightplayout.Such understanding also allows us to study the social ramifications of thesedisputesandhowtheyfunctionnotjustasways for countries to exhibit inter-national strength, but also to achieveimportantdomesticandforeignpolicygoals.Whether it’s to win an electionor control public opinion, how muchmightanationpayforthatprivilege?

Sam Aarons, SEAS ‘14, is currently studying Computer Science at Colum-bia University but wishes he could just be traveling in the Far East. In addi-tion to being mediocre at Starcraft, Sam also runs and maintains a major-ity of Columbia’s popular websites. He is not using these for nefarious purpos-es.

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columbia political review :: summer 2013 cover story

When the Sky Was RedAmerica’s Nuclear Legacy in the Marshall Islands

By Narayan Subramanian

“The sky turned red and itrainedforfourdaysstraight.Iftherewaseveratimeyou

thoughttheworldwasgoingtoend,itwas thatday.”Thesesound like linesstraight out of a sci-fi thriller but, infact,theyareMinisterTonydeBrum’spersonalaccountoftheeffectsofCas-tleBravo,thelargestnucleartestinUShistory.Thiswasjustonenucleartestout of the 68 that the United Statesconductedovera12-yearspan(1946-1958)intheRepublicoftheMarshallIslands. Measured by their power,these nuclear tests amounted to 1.6Hiroshimas per day over that pe-riod – a fact lit-tle known to theworldcommunity.

The Marshall Islands is part ofthe Micronesian island chain in the Pacific Oceanextending fromHawaii to thePhilip-pines, and consists of 34 volcanic is-landsthatarehometoaround70,000people. The country, strategically lo-cated just south of Japan, played animportant role inWorldWar II, andthe United States officially wrest-edcontrolof it fromtheJapanese in1944.Intheaftermathoftheconflict,the Marshall Islands was admitted to the UnitedNations as a Trust Terri-toryofthePacificIslands,alongwithmostofMicronesia.ButthefateoftheMarshall Islandswouldsoonchange.In 1946, the United States decidedthat the islandswouldbecomeitsof-ficialnucleartestsite.Theobjectiveofthistestingwastwofold:first,togainabettersenseofthenatureofnuclearbombs;andsecond, toserveasade-terrenttotheSovietUnion.From the beginning, the Marshall

Islands had little say in determin-ing the policies that were carried out by the United States in its territory.

Thisisreflectedinthefactthat,priorto even speaking to the Marshalleseabouttheproposednucleartests, theUS Senate had already passed JointResolution 307 authorizing the test-ingofatomicweaponsintheMarshallIslands. When Commodore Ben H.Wyatt finally approached the Mar-shallese on behalf of the US Navy,they were entirely misled. Knowingthe Marshallese were extremely reli-gious people, the first request madeto the people was couched in Biblical terms. The Marshallese were com-

pared to the “childrenof Israel”whowere saved by the Lord and led to the “Promised Land.” The Marshallesepeople would be helping to create peace for the “betterment of human-ity,”insofarasthenucleartestswouldserveto“silencetheevilforces”intheworld.Having endured suffering un-der the Japanese and disoriented by their newfound “freedom” under theUnitedStates,theislandersendedupacceptingtheproposal.AleaderoftheBikiniAtollpeopleevenwentsofarastoproclaimthat“iftheUnitedStates…want[s]touseour…atoll…whichwithGod’sblessingwill result inkindnessandbenefittoallmankind,mypeoplewillbepleasedtogoelsewhere.”Despite their illusions of freedom,

however, theMarshallesewereneverinformedfullyofthepotentialdangersthatwouldarisefromnucleartesting.TheUSgovernmentanditsscientists,on the other hand, were fully awareof the effects andpossibledoomsday

scenarios associated with the tests,andthisinformationwasintentionallywithheldoutoffearthatitwoulddeterthe islanders from going along withthe plan. The United States swiftlybeganthepreparations for its testingprogram,removingthelocalislandersfromthevarioustestingsites.Allkindsofnucleartestswerecon-

ductedbetween1946-1958,fromstan-dard aerial tests to underwater tests.In the process, entire atollswere va-porized or rendered completely unin-habitable,suchasBikiniAtoll.Oneof

themostfamousmushroom cloud pictures was taken during anaerial test over Bikini Atoll in1946. The mostwell known test,Castle Bravo,was carried out onMarch1,1954– the largest nu-

cleartesttodateinUShistory,withablast 1000 times greater in power than theHiroshimabomb.WhatmadetheBravo test especially significant wasthefactthatthedetonationwascarriedout despite repeated warnings that the windswereblowinginthedirectionofinhabited islands. Furthermore, theeffects of the lithium isotopepresentinthefuelwasseverelyunderestimat-ed,resultinginanexplosionthatwasthree times greater in magnitude than whatwaspredictedbyscientists.Theexplosion itself could be seen up to250milesawayandleftacrateramileindiameterontheatoll.The impacts of Castle Bravo were

immediate and devastating. The fall-out drifted hundreds of miles, af-fecting populated islands. RongelapAtoll experienced a snowfall of ash,whichatfirstwasa“wondroussight”tomanyoftheinhabitants,butquick-ly became alarming as the islanders began to experience radiation burns

“The most well-known test, Castle Bravo, was carried out on March 1, 1954 – the larg-est nuclear test to date in US history, with a blast 1000 times greater in power than the

Hiroshima bomb.”

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from it. Within 72hours,hundredsofMar-shallese were evacuat-ed and began to receive emergency treatment for hair loss and severeskinburns.Shortlyafterthetests,theUSAtomicEnergy Commission is-sued a public statement claimingthatCastleBra-vowasa“routineatomictest” with some Amer-icans and Marshallese “unexpectedly” exposedtosomeslightradiation.No mention was made publicly about the seri-ous injuries that wereendured. Even worse,other residents were leftlargelyunawarethateverything they were drinkingandeatingwascontaminated. The dayof the Bravo testwouldlaterbecomeknownas“thedayoftwosuns.”Perhapsthemostchillingresponse

tothetestbytheUSgovernmentwasProject4.1,astudyofthehumansex-posed to significantbeta andgammaradiation due to nuclear fallout. TheMarshallese were divided into two groups (“exposed” and “control”) toobserve the short- and long-term ef-fects of the nuclear contamination.The 1954 study was highly secretiveand only declassified in 1994, in or-dertoavoidnegativepublicbacklash.TheUS response to thenuclear testsintheMarshallIslandsfitwithagen-eralpatternofdenialthatwasseeninthe aftermath of the Hiroshima andNagasaki nuclear events. When Ja-pan released reports describing the radiation injuries experienced by thesurvivorsoftheblasts,theUSgovern-ment quickly labeled the reports as“anti-Americanpropaganda.”TheUSscientists even went on to insist that there could be no conceivable deaths other than the ones that occurred duringtheinitialexplosion.Despitetheclearnegativeeffectsof

thenucleartesting,thetestingcontin-ueduntil1958.JusttwomonthsaftertheCastleBravotest,theMarshallesefiledapetitionstatingthatthepeoplewere “fearful” of the dangers of theweaponstestingand“concerned”withthe human displacement that was oc-

curring.Theywentontodemandthatall lethal weapons testing in the area be “immediately ceased.”TheUnitedStates continued the nuclear tests,paying no heed to the first petition.Asecondpetitionwasfiledtwoyearslater in 1956. AUS government rep-resentative responded stating that as longasathreatofaggressionexisted,“elementary prudence require[d] theUnitedStates to continue its testing”andfuturetestingwouldbe“absolute-ly necessary for the well-being of allthepeopleofthisworld.”

This unilateral control over poli-cy in the Marshall Islands precluded the possibility of fair and equitablenegotiationsabouthowtoadequatelycompensatetheMarshallese fortheirsuffering.Estimatessuggestthatonly$350millioninthe50yearsafterthenuclear testing has been provided as compensationforthenucleartesting.Thisamountsto$15perpersonannu-ally.Thislevelofcompensationhard-ly accounts for the many secondaryeffectsof thenuclear testing,suchasthecontaminationoffishreservesandharborareas,whicharecentraltotheislandeconomy.Throughout the testing years, the

MarshallIslandswasstillaUNTrust-eeship,meaning itneverhad the fullrights of a sovereign country. Underthe trusteeship agreement, the Unit-ed States was expected to help the

Marshall Islands attain self-govern-mentorindependence.This,however,wasnevertheobjectiveoftheUnitedStates,asrevealedbythedeclassifiedNational Security Action Memoran-dumNo.145(NSAMNo.145),signedbyPresidentJohnF.KennedyonApril18,1962.KennedywritesinNSAMNo.145 that it is “unlikely that theTrustTerritorycouldeverbecomeaviable,independentnation”andtherefore,“itis inthe interestof theUnitedStatesthat the Trust Territory be given a real option at the appropriate time to move into a new and lasting relationship to theUnitedStateswithinourpoliticalframework.”InNSAMNo.243,signedin1963,Kennedyapprovedamissionto“gatherinformationandmakerec-ommendations”onUSpolicymovingforward in the region to achieve theobjectivesstatedabove.Themission’sreportisquitedamn-

ing.Fromtheoutset,thereportstatesthat it aims to lay out recommenda-tions which would “secure the ob-jective of winning the plebiscite andmaking Micronesia a United Statesterritory.”Aplebisciteisavoteheldina country in which the people express an opinion on their choice of gov-ernment. The report goes on to urgethe President and Congress to cometo agreement on the guidelines forUS action in the next few years, andspecifically cautions that, “the Unit-

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ed States will be moving counter to the anti-colonial movement that has just…completedsweepingtheworld.”Unequivocally,American’sgoalwastodevelop a policy that would leave the Marshall Islands with no choice but to submititselftothecontroloftheUnit-edStates.

This is precisely what occurred in 1983withthesigningoftheCompactof Free Associ-ation (COFA).COFA gave theMarshall Islands access to many USdomesticpro-grams, the abil-ity for the Mar-shallese to freelyimmigrate to the United States,and general fi-nancial assistance. For the UnitedStates,COFAmeant that itwouldbeable to conduct military operations freely within the Marshall Islandsterritory and, specifically, KwajaleinAtoll would become a missile-testing base.WhenCOFAwent into force in1986, the Marshall Islands officiallyattained independence, contrary toPresidentKennedy’sprediction,butinadefactosensetheislandnationwasstillfarfromindependent.ThepeopleofBikiniAtoll,displaced

by the nuclear testing for almost 35years,filedasuitagainsttheUSgov-ernmentinJudav.UnitedStates.Thecase was at first suspended in 1983becauseCOFAnegotiationswere on-going;thehopewasthatCOFAwouldadequately address the reparationsissue.Later,whenCOFAenteredintoforce in 1986, the court dismissedthecaseonthegroundsthatitlackedjurisdiction, because section 177 ofCOFAwastogovernallclaimsrelatedtothepast,present,andfutureofthenuclear testingprogram. COFApro-videdafixed$150millionsettlementand a Nuclear Claims Tribunal wascreatedto“adjudicateclaimsforper-sonal injury and property damage.”Marshallese citizens thus no longer had access to theUS judicial systemforanyfutureclaimsduetotheprec-edentestablishedby theJudaruling.To make matters worse, the Nucle-arClaimsTribunalhasbeenseverelyunderfundedandtheUSgovernmenthaslargelyignoredmostofitsrulings.Todate,thereisa$17millionshort-

fallforpersonalinjuryclaimsand$1.1billion shortfall for property claimsthat have been awarded by the tribu-nal.Moreover, theUnited States hasconsistentlyrefusedtoreleaseallclas-sifieddocumentsrelatedtothenucle-artestingsuchasProject4.1(notethatProject 4.1 was only declassified in1994,11yearsafterCOFAwassigned).Even in the declassified documents

providedbytheUSgovernment,thou-sandsofpageshavebeenblackedoutor deleted. Among these documentsis the radiation exposure data for allsixty-seven tests the United Statescarriedout.How,then,wastheMar-shall Islands ever supposed to fairlynegotiatewith theUnited States if itwasnevergiventhevitalinformationitneededtoholdtheUnitedStatesac-countableforitsactions?Acloserlookatsection177ofCOFA

leads to complex legalquestions.Ar-ticle IX of the agreement addresses“changed circumstances,” allowingadditional funding to be requestedfromtheUSCongressifnewinjuryis“discovered after the effective date”of the agreement, and if the “inju-ry could not reasonably have been identified” prior.However, in ArticleX, theMarshall Islands agreed to an“espousal provision,” which termi-nates all legal proceedings against the UnitedStates related tonuclear test-ing.COFA,accordingtoArticleX,wassupposedtoprovideafullsettlementofallpast,present,andfutureclaimsviatheNuclearClaimsTribunal.HowwasArticleIXsupposedtobeinvokedifArticleXsettledallnuclear-relatedclaims? And why would the Marshall Islands government agree to a provi-sion that legally shut the door on all future claims?Minister de Brum ex-plains that “espousal was ultimatelythepriceoffreedom…withoutespous-al theUSgovernmentthreatenedthevetooftrusteeshipterminationandtoperpetuatecolonialstatus.”

TheMarshallIslandsinfactfiledfora“changedcircumstances”petitionin2000 to the US Congress, claimingthat declassified information by theUSDepartmentofEnergyandtheUSDepartmentofDefense revealednewinformationindicatingthemagnitudeof the testing had been greater thanwhat was previously known. The USgovernment filed a counter-petition

asserting that the Marshall Islands petition did not “meet the set cri-teria for changedcircumstances.”Moreover,theUSgovernment con-tinues to assert that section 177 legally exempts it from owing any

furtherreparations.ContrarytotheUnitedStates’previ-

ous statements regarding the nuclear matter,PresidentBillClintonin1994appointedtheAdvisoryCommitteeonHumanRadiationExperimentstoin-vestigate any unethical human exper-iments that were undertaken by theUnited States and make recommen-dations to prevent such an occurrence fromhappeningagain.Thecommitteeconcluded that therewas insufficientevidence to prove intentional human testing in the Marshall Islands. Thecommittee did conclude, however,that there was demonstrated cultur-al insensitivity and an unwarranted conflationofpatientcareandresearchonthepartoftheUnitedStatesintheMarshall Islands. For this, the com-mitteerecommendedthattheUSgov-ernment issue individual apologies along with financial compensation,something that has, tellingly, yet tobedone.Perhapsthemostinterestingaspect of the committee’s reportwasits concession that that the greatest harmfromtheUSnucleartestingwasthe“legacyofdistrust”thatitcreatedduetotheUSgovernment’sintention-aldenialofaccesstopreviouslyclassi-fieddocumentationonthematter.AsrecentlyasSeptember2012,the

Marshall Islands has continued to presstheUnitedNationstohelprec-tifythehumanrightsviolationsiten-duredduetothenucleartesting.CalinGeorgescu, the UN Special Rappor-teurontheeffectsoftoxicanddanger-ouswasteontheenjoymentofhuman

columbia political review :: summer 2013 cover story

“How, then, was the Marshall Islands ever supposed to fairly negotiate with the United States if it was never given the vital infor-mation it needed to hold the United States

accountable for its actions?”

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rights, releaseda reportdetailinghisfindingson the effects of thenuclearcontamination in the islands and their human rights ramifications. His re-portconfirmsthattheMarshallesearestillaffectedbythenearlyirreversibleenvironmental damage caused by the radiation.The report also goes on toendorsetheclaimthattheUSgovern-ment hampered the Marshall Islands’ ability to adequately negotiate thetermsofitsindependencebywithhold-ingkeyinformation.TheUSresponsetothereportwasnotsurprising.AUSrepresentative stated that theUnitedStates “acknowledged and acted re-sponsiblyuponthenegativeeffectsofthenuclear testing” through “the fullandfinalsettlementofallclaimsrelat-ed to the testing contained in the 1986 CompactofFreeAssociation.”Byrely-ingonsuchalegalisticformality,thisresponse allows the United States toget away with ignoring the continuing appealsbytheMarshalleseforjustice.

So what legal recourse does the Marshall Islands have moving for-ward?AccordingtoColumbiaUniver-sity law professor Michael Gerrard,a frequent advisor to the MarshallIslandsgovernment, theMarshall Is-lands has little to no legal recourse.Hestates,“Thecourtshaveheldthatit’smostlyapoliticalquestionwheth-er theUnitedStatespaysmore com-pensation.TheMarshallIslandshavelost at every turn in court.” GerrardarguesthattherecentreportfromtheUNSpecialRapporteurcreates“ifnotawedge,atleastasliver,whichcould

allow someone to argue that it was a human rights violation for the Unit-ed States not to have carried through on the recommendations of the Nu-clear Claims Tribunal.” Even in thiscircumstance, however, the UnitedStates wields much more power in the UnitedNationssystemthantheMar-shall Islands,not tomentionthe factthat the Marshall Islands still depends on theUnited States formuch of itsfunding.TheonlyhopefortheMarshallIs-

lands is to garner support from oth-er countries to put pressure on the UnitedStatestotakestepstoaddressits nuclear legacy. Thus far, Algeria,Australia, Cuba, Malaysia, Maldives,and New Zealand have all expressed support for the Marshall Islands’cause based on the Special Rappor-teur’sReport.WhiletheUnitedStatespossesses considerable power in the United Nations, the collective pres-surefromthesecountriescouldattheleastpushtheUSgovernmenttofur-therdeclassifysomeofthevitalinfor-mationrelatedtothenucleartesting.Thedeclassificationof information isnecessarynotonlyfortheMarshallIs-landstoreceivejusticeonthenuclearissuebutalsoforitscurrentresidentsto seekpreemptivemedicalattentiontoaddress theharmsof lingering ra-diation.The woes of the Marshall Islands

unfortunately do not end at the nu-clear issue. Today, the country ex-ists barely meters above sea level,making it one of the most vulnera-

blecountries to theeffectsofclimatechange-induced sea level rise. Withitsveryphysical territory threatened,theMarshallIslandsisnowfacedwithquestionsthateventhemostpowerfulcountries such as the United Stateswould not be able to answer.Wherewill the Marshallese people go? What wouldtheirlegalstatusbeiftheywereto relocate? Will the country be able to retain its statehood or the distinct culture to which its citizens are accus-tomed?Manyofthesamethemesthatplay out around the nuclear issue play outhereaswell.TheUnitedStatesre-fuses to takeaccountability forbeingthelargestemitterofcarbonand,onceagain, the victims are countries likethe Marshall Islands that have played little to no role in contributing to the problem.

It is possible that the nuclear leg-acymay, in fact, end up helping theMarshall Islands navigate the devel-opingclimatecrisis.AspartofCOFA,the United States agreed to letMar-shallese people freely and indefinite-ly immigrate into the United Stateswithoutavisa.Asaresult,Springdale,Arkansas today happens to be hometo over 4,000 Marshallese. This un-fortunatelyputs theMarshall Islandsgovernment in a political catch-22:should the government continue to press for justice on thenuclear issueand thereby risk the current bene-fits the US government provides, orshould the government pivot to fo-cusing exclusively on dealing with the climate issue? Ineither case, thenu-clear legacy is one that will never be forgotten by the Marshallese peoplefor generations to come even if theirland is lost.Thephysicalandmentalwounds–andtheculturalmemoryofadeephistorical injustice–willper-sist farbeyond thesmall islands thatwere repeatedly battered by nuclear bombs.

Narayan Subramanian, SEAS ‘13 is a former editor-in-chief of CPR. He has long been passionate about cli-mate change and small island issues. This past summer, Narayan worked for the Marshall Islands Government at the UN Mission in New York and served as an official delegate to the Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable Development. He can be reached at [email protected].

columbia political review :: summer 2013cover story

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On the morning of March 30,1981, President Ronald Reaganwaved to the crowd as he de-

partsaspeakingeventataWashingtonD.C. hotel.Grinning characteristically,heholdsouthishandstogreetcriesof“President Reagan!” with his benedic-tion.JohnHinckley, then, attempts toimpresshis idol JodieFosterbyfiringsix bullets at Reagan at point-blankrange,andthestatuesquefigureofthePresident disappeared instantly fromthe scene. Watching the press foot-age of the incident, one barely gets aglimpse of his barreling limousine.Hinckley, a twenty-five-year-old fromArdmore, Oklahoma, who had stalkedFoster for over a year, is hidden fromview beneath a huddle of Secret Ser-viceagents.Themostprominentfigureon the scene is a squat-looking manin a three-piece grey suit and brown leather shoes,whobellows commandsat the crowd. Press Secretary JamesBrady,Washington,D.C. police officerThomasDelaharty, and Secret ServiceagentTimothyMcCarthyalllielimponthe sidewalk and need an ambulance.There’snocartodepositHinckleyinto,andthepresskeeptryingtogetagoodlookat thegunman’s face. Inhisrighthand,thegrey-suitedmanhoistsalofta

largesubmachinegun.Several polls sponsored by Time

Magazine in the run-up to the 1984 electionaskedAmericanstoidentifyis-suesthatwould influencetheirvote inNovember. Not surprisingly, between42and52percentof registeredvoterssaidthequestionofguncontrolwouldinfluencetheirdecision“alot,”andbe-tween 82 and 86 percent said it would havesomeeffectontheirballot.But when asked the same question

in1996,only4percentofvotersidenti-fiedguncontrolasanimportantissue.In2000, thatnumberreachedonly17percent,despitetheinfamousshootingatColumbineHighSchoolthepreviousyear.AnMSNBCexitpollof the2004election didn’t even include gun control as anoption.Neitherdid the “TalkingtoAmerica”surveyoftheelectoratepri-ortothe2008election.Why not? Incidents at Columbine

and Virginia Tech, after all, were fargrislier than John Hinkley’s failedassassination attempt, and lacked asmilingPresidentialvictimjokingwithsurgeons inpre-op. InFebruary2010,Amy Bishop’s murder of three of hercolleagues in the biology department oftheUniversityofAlabamainHunts-ville bore sad witness to the continuing

power of gun crimes to captivate na-tionalattention,asdidJiverlyVoong’sApril2009,shootingspreeatanimmi-grantcenterinBinghamton,NewYork,andUSArmyMajorNidalM.Hasan’sarmed assault on Fort Hood in Texas lastNovember.Can itbe that, inspiteof these iso-

latedtragedies,theissueofguncontrolhasbeen largely resolved?Since1984,the number of US households withguns has declined from 47.5 percentto36percent,perhapsbecauseviolentcrimes,too,haveslowlydeclinedsincetheir1990peak.And2,262NewYork-ersweremurdered in 1990, comparedto471lastyear.Perhapsit’snotjustthepoliticalweightoftheguncontrolissuethat’s in decline, but the actual socialgravity.“Fewer Americans see a … benefit

ingettingagunfortheirpersonalpro-tection,”remarksRobertSpitzer,chairof the political science department atSUNY-CortlandandauthorofThePoli-ticsofGunControl.“Mostgunpurchas-es are made by people who already own guns,”Spitzersaid,withthecaveatthatapaucityofgoodstatisticsmakesdefin-itivecharacterizationsdifficult.Meanwhile, high-profile political

candidates have moderated their views

This article was originally published in the March 2010 issue of the Columbia Political Review. In this, our inaugural CPRetrospective feature, we hope to highlight the longstanding and continuing relevance of the gun control debate in American politics.

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accordingly.WhileDemocratshadputstronger gun control at the center oftheir platform for decades, PresidentBillClintoninhis1992campaignmod-erated that talkwith references to thepopularityofhuntinginhishomestateofArkansas.Intherun-uptothe2008election, Democratic Vice Presiden-tial nominee JoeBiden spoke proudlyof his guns and promised fellow own-ers of firearms that they had little tofear fromthen-SenatorBarackObama(D—Illinois). Even Senator John Ker-ry (D—Massachusetts) found it neces-sarytoawkwardlytrotouthishuntinggear shortly before the 2004 contest,

although he got someone else to car-ry thedeadgoose.Placatorymessagesfromleft-wingfigures,meanwhile,havegiven the right little to campaign on.“Democrats have been stepping awayfromthe issue, so it fades frompublicview,”saidSpitzer.Thus,overtime,thepoliticaldebate

became resilient to even the most pub-lictragedies.InlateJuly1998,RussellEugene “Rusty” Weston, Jr. jumpedinto his father’s Chevy pickup anddrovefromValmyer,Illinois,toWash-ington,D.C., inasingleday.Hedidn’tstop until he reached the Capitol. In-side, he tried to skirt themetal detec-

tor,andwhenCapitolPoliceofficerJ.J.Chestnutconfrontedhim,Westonpro-duceda.38revolverandshotChestnutin the eye.As civiliansdove for cover,Weston marched on to the offices ofRep. TomDeLay (R—Texas), then theHouse Majority Whip, where stafferswere celebrating a recent legislative vic-tory.Inside,SpecialAgentJohnGibsonwaswaitingforhim.Bothfired.Gibsondied,whileWestonwas incapacitated.Walking outside the Capitol after theshooting,Rep.Randy“Duke”Cunning-ham (R—California) was asked whateffect the shootingmighthaveonguncontrol laws. “After an incident like

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this,I’msurethere’sgoingtobesomereflection,” he remarked, but by nomeanscouldCongress“takegunsoutofthehandsoflaw-abidingcitizens.”Twoyearsago,however,themoder-

ateconsensuswasdealtamajorblow.At the time, the District of ColumbiaOfficialCodeprohibitedresidentsofthecityfromkeepingfunctionalfirearmsathome.DickAnthonyHeller,aD.C.po-liceofficerwhowantedtokeepaguninhisresidence,suedtooverturnthelawonthebasisoftheSecondAmendmentto the Constitution, which states, “Awell regulatedmilitia, beingnecessarytothesecurityofafreestate,therightofthepeopletokeepandbeararms,shallnotbeinfringed.”TheSupremeCourt,voting5-4,concurredwithHeller,void-ing theban.While the court endorsedabroadrangeofacceptablelimitationson the right tobear arms, suchas thepower of the government to ban gunsfromfelonsorthementallyill,itruleda that general prohibition violates the Constitution.WithD.C.v.Heller,thecourtbrokea

70-year silence on the Second Amend-mentwithastrongendorsementoftherighttobeararms.Thedecision,inandofitself,hadlittleeffect:becauseDC.v.HellerstruckdownalawoftheDistrictofColumbia,itappliedonlytothefed-eralgovernment.ButtheCourthassetthestageforamuchgreaterchange.Contrary to public belief, the Bill

ofRights initially didnot apply to thestates, limiting only federal powers.Startingin1925,theSupremeCourtbe-gan applying individualConstitutionalamendments to strike down state andlocal laws. This selective “incorpora-tion”ofConstitutionalfreedoms,whichrelies on the Fourteenth Amendment’s guaranteeof “dueprocessof law,”hasrequired state governments to abidebymany of the guarantees of the Billof Rights. The Second Amendment,however, has never been incorporatedagainstthestates.Now, apair of cases,NationalRifle

Association v. Chicago andMcDonaldv.Chicago,seemspoisedtoaccomplishjustthat.Ahostoflegalexperts,includ-ing Spitzer, concur that theCourtwillincorporate the Second Amendment against the states after McDonald v.Chicago’soralargumentsinMarch.TheNationalRifleAssociation,whichhesi-tated tobackHeller’s caseout of con-cernthat theCourtwouldruleagainsttheir interests, has since worked tire-

lessly to share in the spotlight ofMc-Donald,signalingtheirnewfoundcon-fidence.They,andalliedorganizations,havepromisedahostoflegalchallengesinMcDonald’swake.The consequences are potentially

wide-reaching.“TheNRAandthe[lib-ertarian]CatoInstitutehavemadeclearthrough their actions that they oppose

essentially all gun laws,” said Spitzer.To be sure, the District of Columbia’shandgun ban and similar state laws addressed by McDonald mark someof the nation’s toughest regulations.Nevertheless, many jurisdictions, in-cluding New York, could see changesinfirearmspolicy.Forexample,arep-resentative of the New York State Ri-fleandPistolAssociationsaid thathisorganization could use McDonald to challenge a law that gives the NYPDbroad discretion in granting handgun licenses. D.C. v. Heller makes allow-ancesfor“reasonable”restrictions,butmuch will rest on lower courts’ applica-tionof that vague standard.For thosewhocampaignforstricterlimitsonhowandwhere gunsmay be acquired andused, including New York CityMayorMichaelBloomberg,thenewlegalchal-lengeswillcreatetroublesomedelays,ifnotoutrightroadblocks.D.C.v.Hellermarksavictoryforall

advocatesofloosergunlaws,includingmany civil libertarians, recreationalhunters,andotherlaw-abidingcitizens.“Most[gun-owners]owngunsforhunt-ing and sporting reasons,” comment-ed Spitzer. For one more worrisomegroupofcitizens,however, thechangecouldnotcomeatabettertime.Inthe1990s,militiasandconspiracytheoristsdirected a grim campaign of violencewith government institutions and of-

ficeholdersastheprimarytargets.The“Patriot”movement,whichhadlargelyvanishedduringGeorgeW.Bush’sten-ure inoffice,nowseems tobemakingan aggressive return to the American landscape. According to a report bytheSouthernPovertyLawCenter,over50 new militia training groups haveformed in recent years. Their rhetoriccentersaroundadeepdistrustofPres-identObamaandofAfrican-Americansmore broadly, but the 2008 electionalone does not explain the new rise in paramilitary activity. Controversially,in 2009 the FBI launched a new inves-tigation of the links between Iraq andAfghanistanveteransand thenewmi-litias. Meanwhile, swirling theories ofimmigrantconspiraciesfurtherradical-izethemilitiamovement,theSouthernPovertyLawCenterreports.Theriseofmore mainstream right-wing populist movementshavealsohadtheirimpact.“Someofthepeoplewhoaregravitatingto the Tea Party movement belong tothisradicalfringe,”saidSpitzer.Certainly, the new militias are to

some extent temporary and a product of changing conditions. Spikes in gunpurchases after Sept. 11 and Obama’selectiondidnotmarksustainedtrends,suggesting that paramilitary activity is driven more by short-term fears thanlong-termplanning.Moretothepoint,fears surrounding 2009’s economicdepths likelydrovesomeof theuptickin militia membership. A recent pro-nounced decline in illegal immigration should also serve to belie some of theanti-immigrant movement’s claims ofa building crisis. But at a time wheneven non-violent conservative move-mentsplayexplicitlyonideasofrevolu-tionanduprising,recentdevelopmentsin America’s gun culture demand the public’s attention. As Ronald Reagan,James Brady, Thomas Delaharty, andTimothy McCarthy discovered, peacecanbeshatteredinaninstant.

With thanks to Professor Richard Pious of Barnard College and Profes-sor Robert Spitzer of SUNY-Cortland for their assistance.

Samuel Roth, CC ‘12, is a triple-ma-jor in economics, history, and political science. He first wrote about gun con-trol in pre-school, for which he was taken to the principal’s office. He can be reached at [email protected].

“For those who cam-paign for stricter lim-its on how and where guns may be acquired and used, the new legal challenges will create troublesome delays, if not outright roadblocks.”

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Rain Check on ReformFixing Federal Hurricane Relief

By Constance Boozer

With his feet planted firm onthe sand, Hank Iori squint-ed as he scanned the beach

shoreline – spotting ramshacklehomes,transplantedutilitypipes,andscattereddebrisineveryglimpseofhishometownRockaway,Queens.“FEMAandthefederalgovernmenthavedoneamarvelousjobcleaninguptheblocksand getting sand off the streets, butthatmoneydriesup,”hetoldreportersat Newsweek.Out-of-pocketcostsquicklybecame

a daily reality for Iori post-Sandy. “Iprobablyspentaminimumof$2,000in Home Depot and each day I’m still findingmorethingsIneedtoreplace:new lawn mower, power washers,tools, table saw, snow blower.” Iori,nevertheless, considers himself lucky,ashewasabletoaffordrepairsforhishomehimself.Mostaren’t.“Every family I know has burned

through whatever money has been provided,” said Matt Doherty, Mayorof Belmar, New Jersey. “People arestaying with family and friends. It iswreckinglives.”Seven years ago, Gulf Coast resi-

dents were also reaching their hands deep into empty pockets after Hurri-caneKatrina.NotonlywasKatrinathethird-deadliest hurricane of the pasthundredyears,butitwasalsothelarg-estnaturaldisasterintermsofperson-al insurance claims in American histo-ry.TheInsuranceServicesOffice(ISO)definesacatastropheasaneventthatcauses$25millionormoreininsuredproperty losses. In 2005, HurricaneKatrina generated privately insured propertylossesof$41.1billion.Toputthis inperspective,HurricaneKatrinacaused$22.3billionmoreininsurancelosses than the 2001 attacks on theWorldTradeCenterandthePentagoncombined,whichgenerated$18.8bil-lion in insureddamage.Estimatesaf-ter Superstorm Sandy pegged the costs

covered by insurance companies at no lessthan$10billion.Whiledemonstra-tiveof thegeneral sizeof thedamageand recovery efforts that super-hurri-canes leave, thesenumbers cannevertrulyreflectthefinancialpunchinthegut that Sandy and Katrina have dealt countless Americans within the past decade.Within the delicate dance of the

local, state, and federal governmentsplanning for and responding to natu-ralemergencies,thedilemmaof“whopaysforwhat”isoftenthecentraldragthat slows recovery efforts. Themostrecentsagaofdispersingfederalfundstohurricanevictims started tounfolddaysafterSandystruck–withelectedofficialsofallshapesandsizesherald-ingacollectivecallforCongresstopassa bill of aid for the stricken tri-statearea.Congresspassed$62.3billioninaid10daysafterHurricaneKatrinahit,and that’s not including the additional

$20 billion that was appropriated in 2006. In contrast, it took 91 days forCongresstopasstwoSandyreliefbills.Albeitnotsuggestedby the longwait,theeffort topassaidwasnotwithoutmultitudinouspublicthreatsfromgov-ernorsandcongressionalmembers.Part GOP ideological resistance to

what conservatives called “pork” andpart congressional preoccupation with the unpleasant dilemma that the whole nation’s economy could possibly col-

lapsebeneathus, theSandyreliefbillbecame a political football of blamethispastDecemberandJanuary.Afterthe Senate passed the bill in mid-De-cember,RepublicanHouse leadershiphad “promised” that they would voteontheSandyreliefpackagebeforethe112th Congress ended its session thefirstweekofJanuary.This,ofcourse,didnothappen.OnJanuary1,oncetheHousepassedthebilltoavoidthefis-cal cliff,Boehner,despite thepleasoftri-stateareaHousemembers,didnotallow a vote on the Sandy bill that same night.Newlegislationwouldhavetobeintroduced and voted on in the next session of Congress. The reasons forBoehner’s decision could be hashed outforhours(Boehnerhadjustvotedonalotofspendingwiththefiscalcliff;Boehner was worried about Repub-licans publically splitting on another pieceoflegislation;Cantorisreallytheone responsible for the decision andtheonetoblame).Whatever the reason, “Boehner’s

betrayal”—puntingSandyrelieftothe113thCongress—resultedinnewspa-perheadlinesevokingtheclassic“FordToCity:DropDead”and in localoffi-cials telling the House of Represen-tatives that they should be ashamed,with Representative Peter King (R-NY) even calling the legislative move “acruelknife in theback.”DaysafterNew Jersey’s and New York’s publicscolding,theHouseandSenatefinallypassed$9.7billioninaidtotemporar-ily cover the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). At the end of Jan-uary, Congress passed an addition-al $50.5 billion of aidmoney,whichis being used today to repair public transportationsystems,rebuildpublichousing,andtoevenfixuptheStatueofLiberty—nowslatedtoopenontheFourth of July.While Congress even-tually passed greatly needed recovery funds,thecaseofSandydemonstrates


“In short, the federally-sub-sidized flood program is incapable of fulfilling its central role — paying flood insurance claims — without going into severe debt and without hiking premiums after major hurricanes.”

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that federal disaster relief funding isfartoosusceptibleofbecomingalegis-lative hostage in partisan and ideolog-icaldeficitbattlesorofsimplygettinggummed up in congressional proce-dures — to the considerable detriment ofcommunitieswhocan’taffordtositandwaittorebuild.Another option to fund natural di-

saster recovery is for states to pitchinaidas theydidintheaftermathofHurricane Katrina. While not an is-sueduringSandybecausemostofthedamaged structures were still remain-ing onshore, a key question block-ing Katrina recovery was whether the damage was caused by wind-driven storm surges or flooding. The mediaquicklycoinedthisasthe“windv.wa-ter”debacle.In addition to the ambiguity of

whetherastormsurgecountsasfloodorwinddamage,mosthurricanecon-tractshad“Anti-ConcurrentCausation”(ACC) clauses. If wind and floodingboth caused damage to a home, in-surers could interpret theACC clauseinawaytoassertthatthepresenceofflooding nullified payment of damagecovered in an all-risk hurricane poli-cy. Instead, insurers would only paywinddamage,accompaniedwithwaterdamage, under flood coverage, if it isavailable.Sincemostdamagetohomesincludedbothwindandwaterdamage,ahomeownerwouldhavetohavefloodcoverage to receive money that could beusedtorepairwinddamage.Whileoverall,all-riskspolicyappeartoofferbroadcoverage,theexceptions–suchasfloods–takeawaysomemore,andthen the anti-concurrent clause takesmostofwhatwasleft,unlesstheclaim-anthasfloodinsurance.Atthetime,however,nearly75per-

cent of Mississippi homeowners didnothavefloodinsurance.Thesehome-owners may have not been aware ofthis programor, asdisputed inmanyScruggs-Katrina Group lawsuits, mayhave been assured by the insurance agent that purchasing separate floodinsurance outside a designated floodzonewasnotnecessary.Forexample,James Lucas, a resident of Gautier,Mississippihasassertedthatafterask-ing if he should buy additional floodinsurance when purchasing his hurri-canepolicy,anAllstateagentallegedly

informedhim“thathewascoveredforany damage incurred during a hurri-cane,includingstormsurge.”As a result of these insurance dis-

putes, many homeowners broughttheir denied claims to the state govern-ment tomediate. In total, theMissis-sippi Insurance Department reported that over 380,000 insurance claimswerefiled inresponsetoKatrina,andthe Insurance Institute estimates 1.75millionclaimswerefiledacrossthere-gion. In order to rectify disputes thatdidnothavejurisprudencetobeheardin court and were denied by insurance companies, the state’s “wind-pool”wasused.Mississippi’swind-poolwascreated in 1969 due to the problems that arose in Hurricane Camille. Awind-pool, sometimes referred to as“beachplans,”isaprogramcreatedbystate statute and regulation to provide wind insurance coverage in high-riskareas when insurance companies can nolongerprovideorrefusetoprovidecoverage.Asaresult,awind-poolcanbeconsideredaresidualmarketplan,where home and business owners buy intothepoolthroughtheirpremiums.When damage exceeds the money col-lectedinpremiums,thecompaniesthatdo business in the state have to pay the difference.AsinsurersstoppedissuingwindcoverageafterKatrina,thewind-poolhada150percentincreaseinpoli-cies–16,000to40,000—andsuffereda $745 million loss, which was fourtimesgreater than the$175million it

hadasassets.Evennow,thisrapidex-pansionhas left the state’swind-poolunderfunded,whichhas resulted in arapidjumpinratesforwind-poolpre-miums.

Another glaring problem in govern-ment-fundedhurricane relief today istheNationalFloodInsuranceProgram(NFIP),whichismanagedbytheFed-eral Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Until the Mississippi Riverflooded in1927,most insurancecom-panies nationwide regularly offeredflood coverage in a basic homeown-er’s insurance policy. As a result ofthisnaturaldisaster,privateinsurancecompanies increasingly dropped their floodpolicies,whichthenledCongresstocreatetheNFIPin1968.Undercur-rent legislation, residents who live indesignated flood areas are requiredto buy federal flood insurance, whilevoluntary coverage is available to all homeowners.AccordingtoFEMA,theNFIPhasat

least$45billioninfloodpoliciesinthetri-state area recovering from Sandy.Although the exact number of flood-ed homes and flood insurance claimsare not yet available, in mid-Novem-ber, Edward Connor, FEMA’s deputyassociateadministrator for federal in-surance,toldameetingoftheFederalAdvisoryCommitteeonInsurancethatFEMA estimated the number of San-dy-related losses under the program would be somewhere between $6 bil-lionand$12billion.

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columbia political review :: summer 2013features :: domestic

Asaresult,withonly$900millionin cash and$2.9billion remaining inNFIP’sborrowingauthority,Sandyvic-tims were not be able to settle claims andthusrecoveruntilthefederalgov-ernment bailed out NFIP once againinJanuary.Further,FEMAhasyet tofullyrepaythe$18billionTreasury-fi-nanced loan that bailed out the pro-gram in 2005. While nothing can bedonetopreventthisbailout,reforminghow homeowners are insured against flood damage while the issue of hur-ricane home insurance is still on the public’s agenda is a step the govern-mentcanandshould take in thenextyearinordertomakethelatestbailoutof theNFIP the Treasury’s last.Withtheevidencethatisavailabletousnow,NFIPmostlikelywillgointodebtagainduring or after paying Sandy-relatedclaims.Furthermore, this past summer,

Congress passed the Biggert-WatersFloodInsuranceReformandModern-ization Act of 2012 that reauthorizedtheNFIPuntil2017,createdanadviso-ry council to modernize 100-year-old floodzonesthatwentintoaffectatthebeginningof2013,andgrantedFEMAthe authority to raise premiums up to 25percentperyearuntiltheprogramis set to expire again five years fromnow.One result of the updatedmapsis that itwill forcemorehomeownersto buymandatory NFIP policies nextyear,whichcouldbeconsideredagoodthing since so few Gulf Coast homeswereflood-insuredbeforeKatrina.

In requiring more mandatory cov-erageinflood-proneareas,thegovern-mentwouldbe able to spread its riskamong a larger pool of homeowners.A problem of this, however, is thatthe increased premium hikes underthe2012reformsmay leadmanyres-identstomoveawayfromcoastalandflood-proneareastoavoidthecostsofstorm-proofingnewhomesalongwithhigher premiums — ultimately leaving fewerhomesintheNFIPpool.Anotherapproachistoencouragemostoftheseresidents to leave thearea,as seen inNewYorkGovernorAndrewCuomo’sbuy-back program. Nevertheless, asevidenced in the post-Katrina GulfCoastregion,largedeparturesofmid-dle-classfamiliesfromareaslikeLongIsland,Queens,StatenIsland,andtheJersey Shore would deal a devastating blow to the region’s local economy.While large-scale coastal departure wouldfixNFIP’s solvencyproblem, itwould greatly hinder the tri-state as wellasthenationaleconomy.In short, the federally-subsidized

flood program is incapable of fulfill-ing its central role – paying flood in-surance claims – without going into severedebtandwithouthikingpremi-ums aftermajor hurricanes. In ordertobreakthiscycleoffrequentbailoutsattheexpenseoftaxpayersacrossthecountry,thefederalgovernmentneedsto reformNFIP.One alternative is tomodify NFIP so that it provides – inaddition to flood – wind and otherhurricane-related damage coverage

through voluntary policies so that it expandsitspoolofcoveredhomeown-ers and increases competition in the privateinsurancemarket.Whilesomewoulddecry the federal government’soffering of optional comprehensivehurricane insurance as Obamacare’s inbredspawnofSatan,thecurrentsys-tem isn’t lookinganybetter.Aswe’veseenintheaftermathofSandy,havingcongressional members pass feder-al aidona case-by-casebasis to fundNFIPhasnotonlybeenpennywiseandpoundfoolish,butalsohasonlybeenadropinthebucket.“Never let a crisis go to waste,” as

formerWhiteHouseChiefofStaffandcurrentChicagoMayorRahmEmanuelhas said.Whenhurricane relief fund-ing comes up on the national agenda onceagain,mostlikelythroughanoth-er large-scale hurricane, these prob-lems need to be considered in order tohaveabetterchanceatformulatingnew policies that could permanent-ly improve coastal insurancemarketsand save families fromfinancial ruin.We cannot rule out governmental reg-ulation on grounds that the private market will return to recover on itsown. It is true that a comprehensivefederal rainy day fund could addressthese problems in an ideal world. Inthe realworld,however,findingreve-nuetopayforit–alongwithnumerousotherproblems–makesitarainydaydreamaway.Nevertheless, discussionand debate are always the first stepstofindingpracticalandcommonsensi-calsolutionstotheexistingproblems,including natural disaster recovery funding.Thatbeingthesaid,let’skeepthe conversation going — we shouldn’t takearaincheckonreform.

Constance Boozer, CC ’13, is an edi-tor emeritus of the Columbia Political Review and IvyGate – or as she has failingly tried to coin it “editor emir-iti.” Like Winklevii. Graduating this May with a degree in American stud-ies and political science, Constance unwittingly has been confronted with the stark reality that numbers exist and are useful – leading her to enroll in a masters of public policy program that ends in 2015. You can reach her at [email protected].

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Refugee Aid, Syrians BetrayedHumanitarian Aid’s Failure in the War Against Assad

By Brina Seidel

AsthenumberofSyrianrefugeesclimbsrapidlybeyond1million,the need for increased funding

to address the crisis is obvious, butthe motivation for nations to actuallyprovidethosefundsisnot.TheUnitedNation’s relief plan requests just overabilliondollars to fund its operationsfromJanuary2013toJune2013,andavarietyofdonorspledgedtomeetthoseneeds. Yet somehow, the latest reporton the inter-agency regional response citesan$800millionshortfallinthepromisedfundsthusfar,render-ingtheUnitedNationsanditspartner organizations inca-pable ofmeeting the basicneedsoftherefugees,whoare dispersed across Leba-non,Turkey,Jordan,Iraq,andEgypt.From afar, this lack of

fundingseemslikeachoiceonthepartofthepotentialdonornations.Buttheworldis still in a global recession,and losing valuable taxpay-er dollars to foreign aid is sim-ply impractical. Spending moneyabroad during an economic slump athomeisneverapopulardecision.Yettheinternationalpoliticalramificationsofhumanitarianaidareimpos-sible to deny, and theymustcometotheforefrontoftheworld’s consciousness when addressing the issue of the Syrianrefugees. By provid-ing aid to refugeeswho have fled be-yond the borders of Syria, donornations can ac-tually promote the cause of theopposition and hasten the fallof theAssad re-

gime.This is because the refugees are, in

essence,apartoftheoppositionmove-ment. From the onset, the Syrian op-position has made little distinction be-tween its soldiersand the civilians forwhom they are fighting. Although theorganization of the Free Syrian Armyisbecomingmoreformalized,theforceremains focused on guerilla tacticsthatrelyheavilyonthesupportoflocal

communities. Thestrength of

this contin-ued link

between t h e armed r e -

sistance and the Syrian civilians ampli-fiesthepoliticalimpactofhumanitari-anaid.

Those who remain in Syria are clos-ertothefrontlinesoftheconflictandmore directly involved in the opposition efforts,buthumanitarianaidcanbede-liveredmoreefficientlyandmoreeffec-tively in Syria’s neighboring countries than insidethenation itself. Suchex-ternalaidwillbefeltinsideSyria,serv-ing to delegitimize the Assad regime in a way that the international community currently can-n o t

features :: internationalcolumbia political review :: summer 2013

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achieve through aid to internally dis-placedrefugeesalone.ThisisdueinlargeparttotheUnit-

ed Nations’ continued recognition ofthe Assad regime, maintained almostentirely by Russia’s obstinate supportforthedictator.BecausetheUnitedNa-tionsstillofficiallyrecognizestheAssadregime,theUnitedNationsandallofitsdozens of partnerorganizations are essentially immobi-lized within Syria.They are requiredby international law to administer all in-ternal aid through official channels.The money fromforeign donorsmust pass through Damascus before reaching those forwhomitisintended.Accordingly,mosthumanitarian aid inside Syria goes to regions still controlled byAssad, leav-ing theopposition-heldareasbereftofsupport.

It is no coincidence that these op-position-held areas are the regions in which the most violence has occurred and the most aid is needed. ThoughAssad-controlled regions are still expe-riencing critical food supply challeng-es and medical issues, the practice ofproviding humanitarian aid provided to those areas alone deemphasizes the regime’s failure to provide basic ser-vicestoSyriancitizens.Inaddition,anyperceptionthatsuchaidstemsfromthecapital legitimizes the regime and even-tuallyservestoprolongtheconflict.Syrian refugees outside Syria also

have a huge impact on the opposition’s ongoing effort to formalize and defineits organization and ideology. Thougha vast array of groups oppose Assad,history has proven that a strong anti-es-tablishment sentiment is nowhere near enough to guarantee that a stable gov-ernmentemergesfromtheconflict.Therefugeecampshavebecomeafertilere-cruitinggroundforsplintersoftheop-positionmovementlookingtoincreasetheir clout. As humanitarian studiesscholar Hugo Slim notes, “insurgents,counter-insurgentsandliberal[human-itarian] agencies” all similarly “claimtoknowwhatisbestforthepeopleandseektoimprovetheirlivesaccordingly.”

Because worse conditions increase dis-satisfactionwith the current tilt of theopposition,increasedhumanitarianaidwould undermine such splinter groups andfacilitatetheopposition’ssolidifica-tion.For theUnitedStates and its allies,

any whispers of Islamic extremism inthe refugee camps brings the Syrian

conflict into the scope of the war onterrorism,makingSyrialessofanationstruggling for freedom and democracyandmoreofabreedinggroundforter-rorists.Thecounter-insurgencymental-ityofthecoalitionnationsthatenteredIraqin2003isnotsodifferentfromtheliberalvaluesheldbytheUNorganiza-tions and NGOs conducting humanitar-ianaid.Hauntedbythelongandcostlyyears in Iraq, theUnited States is un-likely to take anydirect groundactionin Syria, and it has instead deliveredmore funds for humanitarian aid thananyothernationtodate.Thoughrecentmilitary training and supply initiatives haveindicatedthattheUnitedStatesisdepartingfromitsinitialhumanitarianfocus,itisstillexpectedthattheinter-national community will refrain fromsendingtroopstoSyria.Thisisastarkcontrasttotherecent

revolution in Libya, which was endedby a NATO-led military intervention in support of the opposition movement.The Arab Spring uprising against the Qaddafi regime and the ensuing tur-moil caused a refugee crisis that canservetoclarifytheneedforexternalaidto Syria. According to the United Na-tions,theLibyanrevolutionspurredthemovement of over 550,000 internallydisplacedrefugeesandaround750,000externally displaced refugees over thecourseof2011.AsinSyria,theexistingregimewascarefultoallowhumanitari-an groups access to only the areas under itscontrol, leadingtheself-assessment

oftheUNHighCommissionerforRef-ugees(UNHCR)ofUNactionsinLibyatospecifythatthe“lackofaccesstocon-flict-affectedareas,aswellas theneedto manage operations remotely fromTunisia, led to somedelays in the hu-manitarianresponse.”BecausetheSyr-iancivilwarhasalreadydraggedonforyearslongerthantheLibyanrevolution,

the roots of such“delays” in thehumanitarian re-sponse in Syrian opposition-held areaarefarmoredifficult to over-come.

The assump-tion that a full-scale military in-tervention is off

the table has fundamentally changedthenatureoftheinternationalresponseto Syria. If the situation is interpretedthrough the United Nations’ doctrineabout the “responsibility to protect”theworldagainstmassatrocitycrimes,such military intervention should be an option for the international communi-ty,ifstillalastresort.YetinSyria,theweapons and allies available to the As-sad regime mean that military interven-tion is not under consideration. Withthe international community acknowl-edging that there are binding limits on the extent to which it will aid the Syrian populace, there is lessurgency topro-vide even humanitarian aid. This dis-regardofthe“responsibilitytoprotect”policy once again proves the limits on the United Nations’ power to actuallyguidetheactionsofsovereignstates.Ifpotentialdonornationsdirecttheir

effortstoSyria’sneighbors,theirfundswill have a political impactnot just inSyriabutalsointherestoftheregion.Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey standoutasparticularlycrucialrecipientsofinternational aid. With over a millionregistered refugees flooding refugeecampsandurbanareasalike,thesehostnations have long called for the inter-national community to support them.Inaregionperpetually labeled“unsta-ble”and“volatile,”therestoftheworldmustrecognizethattheburdenofhost-ingrefugeesisespeciallyworrisome.Jordan feels the strain of hosting

aboutone-thirdoftheSyrianrefugees.

“For the United States and its allies, any whispers of Islamic extremism in the refugee camps brings the Syrian conflict into the scope of the war on ter-rorism, making Syria less of a nation struggling for freedom and democracy and more of a breeding

ground for terrorists.”

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Brina Seidel is a sophomore in Co-lumbia College majoring in Econom-ics and Political Science. She can be reached at [email protected].

ArecentanalysisfromChathamHouseemphasizesthatas“apoorcountryrely-ingheavilyonmoneyfromthe[UnitedStates]andtheGulf[states]tobalanceitsbudget,Jordanisworriedabouttheeconomicimpactoftherefugeecrisis.”Itsinfrastructureisbarelyabletokeepupwiththeincreaseddemandforevery-thingfromclassroomstowastemanage-ment.ThoughJordanoftenplayshosttorefugeesfromitsconflict-riddenneigh-bors, theplight of theSyrians ismoreserious and more contentious than that ofthePalestinians.ConditionsinplacessuchastheZa’atrirefugeecampinJor-dan are at times so bad that riots have brokenoutandaidworkershavebeenattacked. Though King Abdullah II ofJordan has remained popular through-outtheArabSpringandlookslikelytoremainso,Jordan’sstatusasoneofthemost steadily developing oil-free Arabnationsisatstake.

Lebanon is perhaps struggling the mostundertheburdenofhostingrefu-gees.AsofMarch2013,Lebanon’spop-ulation had increased by ten percent duetoSyrianrefugeesalone.Thescaleofthecrisishasleadtoramificationsbe-yondtherestrainoninfrastructurefeltinJordan.Withthe influxofaidmon-ey, however insufficient, the economyhasexperiencedaspikeininflationanda fall inwages.Lebanese citizenshavelong since begun to resent the Syrian refugees,noting thatall aidpreviouslydevoted to helping Lebanese citizens is now directed sole-lytowardsSyrians.Are-

cent study by De-

velopment Management International foundthatthemajorconcernsfor“Leb-anese households burdened by Syrian refugeesarerelatedtodecreasedspaceavailabletoLebanese,increasedhouse-holdexpenditureonfoodandnon-fooditems and the minimal space left toallow for segregation between sexes.”Last year, this frustration turned intoviolence in several clashes between groups divided by in large part by their supportofAssad,conflictsthatwereof-tendeclareda“spillover”oftheSyrianconflict.With such clashes continuingsporadically, thesectariantensionthatisalwayspresentinLebanonislikelytoworsenastherefugeecrisescontinues.Turkey, a far wealthier nation than

either Jordan or Lebanon, is facingverydifferentstakesthanitsneighbors.InitiallyabletofundmuchofitsaidtoSyrian refugees without internationalsupport,Turkey’shumanitarianeffortswereleadbyTurkishorganizationsinadisplay of national competency. How-ever,anationthathasworkedsinceitsinception to shove religion and ethnic-ityoutsidetherealmofpoliticscannotlongremainaloofoftheimpactoftensofthousandsofhighlypoliticizedrefu-gees.Forexample,theinfluxofSyrianshasmeantaninfluxofmembersofthemilitantSyrianbranchoftheKurdistanWorker’sParty (PKK), threatening theTurkish government’s recent at-t e m p t at peace t a l k sw i t h t h e

TurkishPKKtoenddecadesofviolence.As Turkish citizens become more andmore frustratedwith therefugeecrisisandbegintotaketheiropinionsonSyr-iatothevotingbooths,Turkey’sproudseculartraditionwillcomeintoconflictwithitscitizens’viewsonSyria.Because the political impact of hu-

manitarian aid is much less obvious thantheimpactofarmedsoldiers,gar-neringdomesticsupportforhumanitar-ianaid is adifferent gameentirely forthe leadersofpotentialdonornations.The paths by which humanitarian aid will both promote the opposition and stabilizetheregioncanbeclarifiedandemphasized in order to spur greater in-ternational support for externally dis-placedrefugees.

Humanitarian aid is never merely humanitarian. Potential donor nationsmust recognize that the long-term re-turns to their investment in the fallof the Assad regime far outweigh thedollar value of providing foreign aid.Though there exists a moral imperative toprovideaidforallrefugees,aidmustcurrently be directed towards the crisis ofthemassesofrefugeesoutsideSyriaforgreatestimpact. cpr

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Documents

Summer 2013