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June 29, 1988

Docket Nos. 50-325, 50-324License Nos. DPR-71, DFR-62

Carolina Power and Light CompanyATTH: Mr. E. E. Utley

Senior Executive Vice PresidentPower Supply and Engineering

and CorstructionP. O. Box 1551Raleigh, NC 27602

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: MANAGEMENT MEETING SUMMARY

This letter refers to the Management Meeting held at your request on June 14,1988. This meeting concerned activities authori;ed for your Brunswick fat.ility.The issues discussed at the meeting related to the January 1988 AIT findingsand recent ESF equipment failures. A list of attendees, a sunnary, and a copyof your handout are enclosed.

It is our opinion that this meeting was beneficial and has provided a betterunderstan(ing of your efforts to prevent such failures in the future.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2,Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, copy of this letter and its enclosureswill be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.

Sincerely,

Original Signed byLuis A. Reyes /for

J. Nelson GraceRegional Administrator

Enclosares:1. List of Attendees2. Management Meeting Sunmary3. Licenseo Handout

cc w/en( 1s:P. W. Howe, Vice President

Brunswick Nuclear ProjectC. R. Diei;z, Plant General Mcnager

bcc w/encls: (Seepage 2)

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Carolina Power and Light Company 2 June 29, 1988

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June 29, 1988

ENCLOSURE 1

LIST OF ATTENDEES

Carolina Power and Light

P. L. Howe, Vice President, Brunswick Nuclear ProjectC. R. Dietz, Plant General ManagerK. E. Enzor, Director, Regulatory Complianc3J. O'Sullivan, Manager, MaintenanceR. E. Helme, Manager, Technical SupportD. Sullivan, Principal Engineer, MetallurgyW. M. Bracey, Jr., Senior Specialist, Technical Support

Nuclear Regulatory Comission, RII

M. L. Ernst, Deputy Regico. AdministratorL. A. Reyes, Director, Div;v.^n of Reactor Projects (DRP)A. F. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)E. W. Merschoff, Deputy Director, DRSP. E. Fredrickson, Chief, Projects Section 1A, DRPM. B. Shymlock, Chief, Operational Programs Section (0PS), DRSF. Jape, Chief, Test Programs Section (TPS), DRSG. A. Belisle, Chief, Quality Assurance Programs Section (QAPS), DRSW. H Ruland, Senior Resident inspector, DRPR. E. Carroll, Project Engineer, DRPW. Levis, Resident Inspector, DRPL. J. Watson, Reactor Engineer, OPS, DRSS. G. Tingen, Reactor Engineer, TPS, DRSP. B. Moore, Reactor Engineer, OPS, DRSB. A. Breslau, Reactor Engineer, OPS, DRSR. D. Starkey, Reactor Engineer, OPS, DRS

iA. J. Szczepaniec, Reactor Engineer, TPS, DRSP. J. Kellogg, Reactor Engineer, OPS, DRSR. D. Gibbs, Reactor Engineer, QAPS, DRSM. C. Shannon, Reactor Engineer, QAPS, DR!

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Headquarters

E. G. Adensam, Directer, Directorate 11-1, Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

H. L. Ornstein, Senior Reactor Systems Engineer, Office ofAnalysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AE0D)

J. J. Petrosino, Vendor Inspection Branch, NRR

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June 29, 1988

ENCLOSURE 2

MANAGEMENT MEETING SUMMARY

Carolina Power and Light (CP&L) began their presentation by stating that theyhad requested this meeting to: (1) review their findings and conclusionsrelated to the failure of the four Group 2 Primary Containment Isolation System(PCIS) valves on January 2,1988;(2) acknowledge deficiencies identified as aresult of the analysis of the event; (3) share conclusions and correctiveactions resulting from the analysis of the event; and (4) review the scope andresults of their valve improvement initiatives. The. licensee proceeded todescribe the sequence of events leading up to the failure of the four drywellfloor and equipment drain PCIS valves to close; the valve failure analysis,including the maintenance investigation; the technical support investigations;and the Harris Energy and Environmental Center (HEEC) metallurgical lab analysis.The maintenance and technical support investigations revealed no root cause ofthe valve failures. However, the HEEC lab analysis indicated that the "failureto vent" mechanism included adherence of EPDM to metal, the degradation ofEPDM, the degradation of valve lubricants, the interaction of the EPDM andlubricants, and possible mechanical interference of valve parts. As a resultof-these investigations, the licensee. stated that new solenoid valves had beenprocured and installed in both Unit 1 and Unit 2, Additionally, new air filtershad been installed and the air regulator setpoints had been verified to becorrect. As a matter of practice, CP&L indicated that rebuild kits which hadbeen used in the past, will no longer be utilized on solenoid valves withoutmanagement approval.

The licensee then outlined the scope of the valve improvement program includingoperator training, valve testing, and the results of this program. As part oftheir program, the licensee indicated that reliance on vendors is being phasedout as their people receive specialized valve training. Accordingly, fundshave been budgeted (approximately $1.000,000/yr) to support the training oftheir establisned valve repair teams; purchasing of state-of-the-art test

| equipment, new valves and spare parts; and for the establishment of a computer-based component tracking and trending program. In closing, CP&L stressed thata valve failure is now being treated as a crisis; one in which greato ianage-ment overview has been established and daily discussions / followup is occurringduring morning meetings.

The Director for the Division of Reactor Projects closed the meeting by thankingCP&L for their presentation and frank discussion, lle indicated that this typeof communication was important to our relationship and our understanding oftheir problem-solving efforts.

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ENCLOSURE 3

MANAGEMENT MEETING

CAROLINA PCWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT

JUNE 14, 1988

OBJECTIVES

O REVIEW FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS RELATED TO THE FAILURE

OF THE FOUR GROUP 2 PCIS VALVES ON JANUARY 2, 1988

.

O

O ACKNOWLEDGE DEFICIENCIES' IDENTIFIED AS A RESULT OF THE,

ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT.

O SHARE CONCLUSIONS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS RESULTING~

FROM THE ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT.

O REVIEW SCOPE AND RESULTS OF VALVE IMPROVEMENT

INITIATIVES.

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MANAGEMENT MEETING

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT

CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

JUNE 14, 1988

AGENDA

O OPENING REMARKS C. R. DIETZ

- PRESENTATION ONECTIVEG

O EVENT DESCRIPTION K. E. ENZOR

- SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

- EVENT INVESTIGATION BY SIIT

O PCIS VALVE FAILURE ANALYSIS

- MAINTENANCE INVESTIGATION /RESULTS J. O'SULLIVAN

- TECHNICAL SUPPORT INVESTIGATION /RESULTS R. E. HELME

- HEEC METALLURGICAL LAB ANALYSIS D. M. SULLIVAN

O REPETITIVE FAILURE PROGRAM

- MAINTENANCE J. O'SULLIVAN

O REPORTING DEFICIENCIES K. E. ENZOR

- CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

O VALVE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM J. O'SULLIVAN

O CLOSING REMARKS C. R. DIETZ/"

P. W. HOWE

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MANAGEMENT MEETING

CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT

JUNE 14, 1988

UNIT 2 MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM AND PCIS VALVE FAILURES

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

DAIE .Tlt2E

01/01/88 2015 POWER REDUCTION COMMENCED FROM 69% IN

PREPARATION FOR SCHEDULED

REFUELING / MAINTENANCE OUTAGE.

2115 RX POWER = 55%

OFFGAS FLOW = 149 CFM

:2125 A0G SYSTEM BYPASS VALVE AUTOMATICALLY

OPENED ON OFF-GAS HIGH FLOW SIGNAL.

(SETPOINT 150 SCFM). -

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2145 RFPT A SECURED.l

2210 2A HEATER DRAIN PUMP SECURED. |

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2215 RX POWER = 48%

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2220 2B SJAE SECURED WITH 2A SJAE REMAINING IN

HALF LOAD PER THE PLANT SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE.

CONDENSER VACUUM BEGAN TO DECREASE.

2230 NOTICED HIGH SJAE DISCHARGE PRESSURE..

2245 2A SJAE PLACED IN FULL LOAD DUE TO VACUUM

DECREASE.

2246 INCREASED REACTOR POWER TO 53% TO AID IN

MAINTAINING CONDENSER VACUUM. CONDENSER.

VACUUM BEGAN TREND INCREASE.

~ 2330 HISSING SOUND HEARD AT WMSR DRAIN TANK.

2345 CONDENSER VACUUM BEGINS RAPID DECREASE.~

- F0 EVOLUTION HAD TAKEN PLACE WHICH WOULD

ACCOUNT FOR DECREASING TREND.

- ATTEMPTS TO PLACE 2B SJAE IN SERVICE WERE

UNSUCCESSFUL DUE TO LOW OUTPUT FROM

3TARTUP PERMISSIVE TEMPERATURE

INSTRUMENT.

- FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO INCREASE POWER RAD NO

EFFECT ON TERMINATING THE DECREASING

VACUUM TREND...

01/02/88 C015 CONDENSER VACUUM = 22" HG,

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0017 RECEIVED "EXHAUST HOOD 'A' VAC LOW" ALARM.

- MANUALLY DECREASED 2A AND 2B REACTOR

RECIRC PUMPS TO MINIMUM SPEED.

- INSERTED MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM - REACTOR.

POWER 56%.

- PLACED REACTCR MODE SWITCH TO SHUTDOWN.

- RECEIVED REACTOR LOW WATER LEVEL (LL#1).

- TRIP ON RPS CHANNELS A1,A2,B1, AND B2.

- RECEIVED GROUP 2,6, AND 8 ISOLATION

SIGNAL.

0018 MANUALLY TRIPPED MAIN TURBINE -GENERATOR.

REACTOR WATER LEVEL INCREASING WITH LOWEST

INDICATED LEVEL 153 INCHES.

0021 NOTED DURING VERIFICATION OF GROUP 2,6, AND-

8 ISOLATIONS THAT 2-G16-F003, F004, F019,

AND F020 DID NOT ISOLATE.t

- CONTROL OPERATOR ATTEMPTED TO MANUALLY|

| CLOSE VALVES. 2-G16-F003 AND F004 (DW

FLOOR DRAINS) CLOSED.

- 2-G16-F019 AND F020 (DW EQUIPMENT DRAINS)

| DID NOT CLOSE.|||

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0024 UNIT 1 SHIFT FOREMAN NOTED 2-G16-F020 WAS

CLOSED. ATTEMPT TO CLOSE 2-G16-F019

MANUALLY UNSUCCESSFUL .

0025 REACTOR SCRAM RESET - REACTOR WATER LEVEL.

192".

0026 UNIT 1 SHIFT FOREMAN AND CO NOTED 2-G16-

F019 CLOSED.

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0026 PROCESS COMPUTER VERIFICATION OF CONTROL

RODS INDICATED 22-35, 30-39, 30-23, 26-27

AND 18-23 AT POSITION 02.

0028 MODE SWITCH PLACED IN REFUEL POSITION TO

INSERT ABOVE RODS PER LEP-02.

| 0030 ALL CONTROL RODS VERIFIED INSERTED.

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MANAGEMENT MEETING

CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT

JUNE 14, 1988

SCRAM-INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM (SIIT)

O DEFINED BY ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION (AI)-84

0 GUIDED BY OI-22, POSTTRIP INVESTIGATION

O PROVIDE CENTRAL POINT FOR CONTROLLING INVESTIGATION

O COMPOSED OF:

o CHAIRMAN-DIRECTOR-REGULATORY COMPLIANCE

o OPERATIONS ENGINEER (OPPOSITE UNIT)

o MAINTENANCE

- MECHANICAL

- ELECTRICAL

o TECHNICAL SUPPORT..

- MECHANICAL

- ELECTRICAL

- COMPUTER SUPPORT /ERFIS~

o GE OPERATIONS ENGINEER

o ONSITE NUCLEAR SAFETY

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-MANAGEMENT-MEETING'

CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT,

JUNE 14, 1988

UNIT 2 MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM AND PCIS VALVE FAILURES

EVENT INVESTIGATION BY SIIT

DATE TlME

01/02/88 0230 SIIT ACTIVATION INITIATED BY SOS AT REQUEST~

OF GENERAL MANAGER.

0315 SIIT DIRECTOR DISCUSSED FAILURE OF DRYWELL~

"

FLOOR AND EQUIPMENT DRAIN ISOLATION VALVES*

(GROUP 2) WITH SOS AND OTHER CONTROL ROOM

PERSONNEL.

0345 - I&C AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT REPRESENTATIVES~

REQUESTED TO RESEARCH PRINTS FROM GROUP 2

LOGIC AND VALVE CIRCUITS.

- OPERATIONS ENGINEER ASKED TO COMPLETE

COMPUTER PRINTOUT AND CHART RETRIEVAL.

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0430 I&C AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT REPRESENTATIVES~

PROVIDED SIMPLIFIED SCHEMATICS OF VALVE AND

GROUP 2 LOGIC.

- REVIEW BY SIIT (DIRECTOR AND ONS.

TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND lo.C

REPRESENTATIVES) COULD NOT FIND COMMON

LINKS BETWEEN LOGIC DESIGN AND OPERATION

AS WITNESSED BY THE OPERATORS.

0500 REVIEWED SEQUENCE OF EVENTS WRITE-UP FROM~

CONTROL ROOM, COMPUTER ALARM TYPER AND

EVENT LOG PRINTOUTS TO DETERMINE IF OTHER

CONCERNS EXISTED AND TO GAIN INSIGHT INTO

CAUSE OF GROUP 2 VALVE OPERATION AS NOTED

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BY THE OPERATORS.

CONCLUDED NO OTHER SAFETY SYSTEM CONCERNS0600~-

EXISTED FROM REVIEW OF ABOVE INFORMATION.

DISCUSSION CONTINUED TO FOCUS ON GROUP 2-

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VALVE FAILURES.

REQUESTED SOS AND INVOLVED OPERATORS TO-

HOLD FINAL DEBRIEF PRIOR TO DEPARTING SITE

AFTER SHIFT TURNOVER.'

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0730 SOS AND INVOLVED OPERATORS REVIEWED IN~

DETAIL THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS INVOLVING THE

GROUP 2 ISOLATION VALVES.

0815 -DEVELOPNDPRELIMINARYTESTPLANFORLOGIC~

AND VALVE TIMING TESTS TO ATTEMPT TO REPEAT

FAILURES AND DETERMINE CAUSE.

- MAINTENANCE MANAGER CALLED IN U/2 I&C/E

SUPERVISOR.

0900 SIIT DIRECTOR AND OPERATIONS ENGINEER~

REVIEWED RESULTS OF SIIT INVESTIGATION WITH

GENERAL MANAGER AND MAINTENANCE MANAGER.

0930 REVIEW OF RED PHONE REPORT INDICATED A NEED~

FOR REVISION TO INDICATE SIGNIFICANCE OF

LOSS 3F PRIMARY CONTAINMENT DUE TO GROUP 2

PCIS VALVE FAILURES.

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~ 1000 FINALIZED TEST PLAN.

- MAINTENANCE ASSIGNED TO PE7ELOP AND

EXECUTE DETAILED TEST PLAN UNDER

DIRECTION OF U/2 I&C/E SUPERVISOR.

- TECHNICAL SUPPORT ASSIGNED REVIEW OF

PLANT MODIFICATIONS WHICH INSTALLED THE

SULENOID VALVES FOR TIIE GROUP 2 PCIS

VALVES TO DETERMINE SCOPE OF

INVESTIGATION REQUIRED.

- OPERATIONS ASSIGNED TO STROKE TEST U/1

G16 PCIS VALVES AND MAKE FOLLOWUP RED

PHONE REPORT.

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NRC PRESENTATION

RESPONSE TO AIT REPORT NOS. 50-325/88-03 AND 50-324/88 03.JUNE 14, 1988

AS MR. ENZOR DI D, I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SUMMARIZE THE

MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE PCIS VALVES WHICH

FAILED TO '. LOSE UPON RECEIPT OF AN AUTOMATIC AND NUMEROUS MANUAL

COMMANDS AFTER THE MANUAL SCRAM WAS INITIATED ON JANUARY 2,

1988.

FIRST, I WILL SHOW SKE'CHES OF SOME OF THE HARDWARE THAT

WILL BE PART OF OUR DISCUSSION TODAY. THE SYSTEMS, IN WHICH

THE VALVES FUNCTION, ARE THE DRYWELL FLOOR DRAIN AND THE DRYWELL

EQUIPMENT DRAIN SYSTEMS. AS CAN BE SEEN IN THE SKETCH, THE

VALVES ARE REDUNDANT. THE CLOSURE OF EITHER ONE EFFECTIVELt

i:0LATES THE SYSTEMS THEY SERVE. THE VALVES ARE ANCHOR VALVECOMPANY, 150-POUND, CAST CARBON STEEL AND ARE SIMILAR TO MANY

OTHERS WIDELY USED IN THE PLANT. THESE VALVES ARE OPENED BY

ADMITTING INSTRUMENT AIR VIA AN ASCO SOLENOID VALVE TO THE

UNDERSIDE OF A PISTON OF A MILLER MODEL A 61-B ACTUATOR. THE

VALVE IS MAINTAINED OPEN AGAINST SPRING PRESSURE AS LONG AS

SUFFICIENT AIR PRESSURE IS EXERTED ON THE PISTON. CLOSURE OCCURS

WHEN THE ASCO SOLEN 0ID IS DEENERGlZED AND INLET AIR IS INTERRUPTED

WHILE THE AIR YOLUME IN THE MILLER ACTUATOR IS VENTED TO

ATMOSPHERE.

PAGE ONE OF ELEVEN

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THE VALVES ARE NORMALLY OPEN DURING OPERATING AND SHUTDOWNCONDITIONS. THEIR OPERATION IS CONTROLLED BY A SWITCH ON THERTGB. THEY RECEIVE AN AUTOMATIC CLOSURE SIGNAL WHEN A 6ROUP

IWO ISOLATION SIGNAL IS PRESENT.

IHE VALVES AND THEIR ASSOCIATED CONTROLS, EXCEPT FOR THESOLEN 0 IDS, ARE UNCHANGED FROM ORIGINAL INSTALLATION. THE

SOLEN 0 IDS WERE CHANGED TO CONFORM TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL

QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS BY PLANT MODIFICATIONS NUMBERS

PM-82-065, UNIT ONE AND PM-82-066, UNIT TWO. THE MODIFICATIONS

WERE MADE OPERABLE IN 1985 AND 1986, UNITS ONE AND TWO,

RESPECTIVELY. SINCE OPERABILITY, NO SOLENOID FAILURES HAVE

BEEN DOCUMENTED FOR UNIT ONE, WHILE UNIT IWO HAS EXPEAIENCEDSEVERAL.

BEFORE PROCEEDING TO DISCUSS THE UNIT TWO FAILURE HISTORY,

IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT DURING THE MODIFICATION OF UNITONE'S VALVES, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE SOLEN 0ID VALVES WERE

MISCONFIGURED FOR THEIR SERVICE APPLICATION, I. E., AN ASCO

VALVE MODEL 206-832, TYPE "G" WAS INSTALLED INSTEAD OF MODEL206-832, TYPE "F". THROUGH CONVERSATIONS WITH THE VENDOR, IT

WAS LEARNED THAT THE TYEP "G" SOLEh0!DS COULD BE CONVERTED TO

THE IYPE "F" BY CHANGING THE UPPER AND LOWER DISC SPRINGS WITH

SPRINGS FROM A IYPE "F" REBUILD KIT. THE SPRING CHANGES WERE.

MADE BY THE MODIFICATION GROUP. THE VALVES WERE TESTED AND

OPERATED SATISFACTORILY. UNFORTUNATELY, AS WE WILL LEARN LATER,

THAT INFORMATION WAS NOT EFFECTIVELY CONVEYED TO THE PLANT

MAINTENANCE GROUP. ADDITIONALLY, THE SPARE SOLENOIDS, WHICH

PAGE TWO 0F ELEVEN.

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HERE PLACED IN THE STORER0OM, WERE THE UNCONVERTED TYPE "G"

VARIETY. THE NEWLY INSTALLED CONVERTED TYPE "F" SOLEN 0 IDS WERE

IDENTIFIED BY THE PLANT MODIFICATION AS BEING TYPE "G", SINCE

INSTALLATION OF THE UNIT ONE SOLEN 0 IDS IN APRIL, 1985, NO

INSERVICE FAILURES HAVE BEEN DOCUMENTED. UNIT IWO SOLEN 0 IDS,

INSTALLED IN APRIL, 1986, HAVE EXPERIENCED SEVERAL FAILURES.

THOSE FAILURES ARE DISCUSSED AS FOLLOWS.

VALVE NO. 2G16-F003

JULY IL 1986: WR8A ISSUED WITH AN INDICATED "NATURE OF

TROUBLE" AS FAILURE OF THE VALVE TO RESPOND TO AN AUTOMATIC

OR MANUAL CLOSE COMMAND. TROUBLESHOOTING INCLUDED MANUAL

OPERATION OF THE VALVE FROM THE CONTROL DOM AND A MOMENTAR'.

WIRE LIFT TO SIMULATE AN AUTOMATIC CLOSE SIGNAL. ALL FUNCTIONS

APPEARED TO BE NORMAL. IHE VALVE WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE.

JULY 12, 1986: ON THIS DATE, AFTER FURTHER SUPERVISORY

RE'!! EW 0F THE PPEVIOUS DAY'S REPAIR ACTIVITIES, CONCERN WAS

RAISED DUE TO THE LACK OF RESOLUTION WITH RESPECT TO PROPER

IDENTIFICATION OF THE FAILURE MODE. IT WAS DECIDED AT THIS

POINT TO INSTALL A NEW SOLEN 0ID GIVEN THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE

"AUSE OF FAILURE. A SPARE SOLENOID WAS DRAWN FROM STOCK AND,

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INSTALLED IN THE CONTROLS OF THE VALVE. POST MAINTENANCE TESTING

REVEALED AN OPERATIONAL MALFUNCTION IN THAT AIR WAS ISSUING

FROM THE VALVES EXHAUST PORT WHEN THE VALVE WAS ENERGlZED TO

PAGE THREE OF ELEVEN

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OPEN. BEING UNAWARE OF THE PREVIOUS CONVERSION ACTIVITIES ONTHIS VALVE AND UNDER THE PRESSURE OF A RAPIDLY EXPIRING LCO,

IT WAS DECIDED TO REINSTALL THE ORIGINAL SOLEN 0ID WHICH NOW

APPEARED TO BE FUNCTIONING PROPERLY. WITH THE HINDSIGHT GAINEDFROM SUBSEQUENT EVENTS, IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT DECISION WAS

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NOT CORRECT.

JULY 30, 1986: AT 2320, ON THIS DATE, A WORK REQUEST WAS

AGAIN INITIATED ON THIS VALVE DUE TO ITS FAILURE TO CLOSE.

STICKING OF THE SOLENOID WAS SUSPECTED AND THE WORK DOCUMENT

WAS ANNOTATED TO DIRECT THE TECHNICIAN TO "TAP" THE SOLENOIDTO DETERMINE IF THAT WAS THE CASE. THE TECHNICI.e TAPPED ON

THE VALVE BODY AND THE VALVE COMMENCED OPERATING. A WORK REQUEST

WAS WRITTEN IMMEDIATELY TO REBUILD THE SOLEN 0ID AND THAT

MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY WAS SUCCESSFUL IN RETURNING THE VALVE TOSERVICE. A FAILURE CAUSE OF POSSIDLE "DEBRIS IN THE SOLENOID"WAS RECORDCD.

WHILE FOUR SEPARATE WORK ORDERS WERE WRITTEN, IT APPEARS

CLEAR THAT FOUR SEPARATE FAILURES DID NOT OCCUR. IT CAN BE

CONCLUDED THAT THE FAILURE WHICH OCCURRED ON JULY 11,1986 WAS

NOT PROPERLY DIAGNOSED UNTIL THE PROBLEM RECURRED ON JULY 30,

1986.

APRIL 27, 1987: ON THIS DATE, THE TECHNICIANS RtiSPONDED

TO A WORK ORDER WHICH DESCRIBED THE VALVE'S FAILURE TO CLOSE.

TWO PEOPLE RESPONDED TO THIS AND FOUND NO PROBLEM WHEN THEY

PAGE FOUR OF ELEVEN

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ARRIVED IN THE CONTROL ROOM AT APPROXIMATELY MID-NIGHT ON THE

DAY OF THE FAILURE. THE NEXT DAY, ANOTHER TECHNICIAN MORE

FAMILIAR WITH THE PROBLEM HISTORY, REVISITED THE ISSUE. IT

WAS DURING THE SECOND EVALUATION THAT IT WAS SUPPOSED THAT THE

OPERATORS MAY NOT BE HOLDING THE SWITCH LONG ENOUGH IN THE CLOSE

POSITION TO CLEAR THE OPEN LIMIT SWITCH.

THE WORK ORDER WAS INCORRECTLY ANNOTATED TO STATE THAT

THE SWITCH MUST BE HELD IN THE CLOSE POSITION UNTIL THE GREEN

LIGHT CAME ON.

JULY 17, 1987: PROBLEM IDENTIFIED AS VALVE FAILED TO RESPOND

TO A CLOSE SIGNAL FROM THE RTGB. DURING THE REPAIR EFFORT,

THE ERROR OF THE PREVIOUS JULY WAS RE.PE ATED. A SPARE SOLENOID

OBTAINED FROM THE STORER0OM WAS BENCH-TESTED AND INSTALLED.

THIS SOLEN 0ID WAS THE TYPE "G" AND THE RESULT WAS SIMILAR TO

THE PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE. THIS WORK WAS BEING ACCOMPLISHED BY

THE WEEKEND DUTY SECTION WHO WERE UNFAMILIAR WITH THE HISTORY

OF THE CONVERSION. SUSPECTING THAT THE REPLACEMENT SOLEN 0ID

WAS FAULTED, A SECOND SOLEN 0ID WAS DRAWN FROM STORES AND

INSTALLED, AGAIN, POST MAINTENANCE TESTING INDICATED A FAULT.

OTHERS, WHO NORMALLY WORK ON REACTOR BUILDING EQUIPMENT, WERE

CONTACTED AND ISSUES RELATED TO THE CONVERSION WERE UNCOVERED.

A REBUILD KIT WAS THEN OBTAINED AND REPAIRS WERE CONDUCTED

PROPERLY.

AT THIS TIME., THE ENGINEER WHO WAS SUPERVISING THE REPAIR

EFFORT, CONCLUDED THAT THE CONVERSION WAS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT

PAGE FIVE OF ELEVEN

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AND SUSCEPTIBLE TO ERROR GIVEN THE VERY EXACTING TOLERANCES

(12 MILS) WHICH HAD TO BE OBTAINED USING HAND TOOLS. HE INITIATED

PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES TO PROVIDE FOR THE CORRECTLY CONFIGURED

SCLEN0lDS TO BE LOADED INTO STOCK.

TO SUMMARIZE THE MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES ON THIS VALVE OVER

THE PERIOD DISCUSSED, IT COULD BE CONCLUDED THAT SIX SEPARATE

FAILURES OCCURRED OR IT COULD BE CONCLUDED THAT TWO FAILURES

OCCURRED. IN ATTEMPTING TO ASSESS RETROACTIVELY THE EVENTS

ASSOCIATED WITH THIS VALVE, I BELIEVE THAT GIVEN THE TIGHT

TOLERANCES WE WERE DEALING WITH LED US TO CONCLUDE THAT WE WERE

INTRODUCING THE FAULTED CONDITION DURING THE CONVERSION PROCESS.

CLEARLY, NOT TAKING EFFECTIVE ACTION TO HAVE THE CORRECTLY

CONFIGURED SOLEN 0 IDS LOADED INTO STOCK AFTER THE JULY, 1986

ACTIVITIES IS A WEAKNESS.

VALVE NO 2-G16-F004

0CTOBER 27, 1987: ON THIS DATE, THE FIRST IN-SERVICE FAILURE

OF THIS VALVE WAS RECORDED. IROUBLESH00 TING INDICATED THAT

THE FAILURE CAUSE WAS A STICKING SOLEN 0ID. CORRECTIVE ACTION

INCLUDED THE INSTALLATION OF A REBUILD KIT AND POST MAINTENANCE

TESTING.

VALVE NOS. 2-G16-F020 AND 2-G16-F019

IHERE WERE NO SOLEN 0ID FAILURES RECORDED FOR THESE VALVES

FROM THE TIME OF MODIFICATION THROUGH JANUARY, 1988.

PAGE SIX OF ELEVEN

__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

,

'

PROBLEM INVESTIGATION

AS TROUBLESHOOTING ACTIVITIES WERE BEING PLANNED ON THE

MORNING OF JANUARY 2, 1988, THE FAULTED CONDITIONS HAD

DISAPPEARED. DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS, THE FOUR VALVES

WERE CYCLED TO PUMP DOWN THE DRYWELL PUMPS ON TWO OCCASIONS.

THIS MEANT THAT THE MANUAL PORTION OF THE CONTROL LOGIC, AS

WELL AS THE SOLEN 0 IDS, THE OPERATOR, AND THE VALVES WERE NOWFUNCTIONAL. AN INITI AL CONCERN WAS TO PREPARE A TEST PLAN 7 HATWOULD CAPTURE THE FAILURE MODE QUICKLY, UNIT ONE OPERABILITY

WAS AS YET NOT FULLY RESOLVED, WITHOUT DESTROYING EVIDENCE VITAL

TO FAILURE DETERMINATION.

THE INVESTIGATION INCLUDED A SEARCH OF MAINTENANCE HISTORYFILES TO DETERMINE TYPE AND FREQUENCY OF PREVIOUS FAILURES.

A PHYSICAL INSPECTION OF EVERY ACCESSABLE COMPONENT / DEVICE WAS

CONDUCTED. ACTIVITIES WHICH MAY HAVE ALTERED THE VALVE LOGIC

(ERFIS INSTALLATION) WERE EXAMINED IN DETAIL AND RULED OUT ASCONTRIBUTING FACTORS. OTHER MODIFICATIONS WHICH WERE COMPLETED

DURING THE PRE-0UTAGE WERE REVIEWED AND SIMILARLY FOUND NOT

TO IMPACT.

PAGE SEVEN OF ELEVEN.

_ _ . _ . - . _ - -

. . ..

-

INVESTIGATION PROCESS /RESULTS

1/2/88 SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED A GROUP IWO ISOLATION

LOGIC FUNCTIONAL TEST. THIS TEST VERIFIED THATCIRCUITRY AND EQUIPMENT COMPONENTS WERE CAPABLE

OF PERFORMING THEIR DESIGN ISOLATION FUNCTIONS.

COMMENCED PREPARATION OF A SPECIAL PROCEDURE

TO TEST UNIT ONE LOGIC ASSOCIATED WITH THE

AUTOMATIC ISOLATION OF THE DRYWELL FLOOR AND

EQUIPMENT DRAIN PCIS VALVES.

1/3/88 REMOVED FOR DISASSEMBLY THE ASCO SOLEN 0ID FROM

G16-F019 (THIS VALVE WAS OBSERVED TO REMAIN OPEN

LONGER THAN OTHERS).

PRIOR TO DISASSEMBLY, THE VALVE WAS OPERATIONALLY

TESTED OVER A WIDE RANGE OF AIR PRESSURES.

DISASSEMBLY AND INSPECTION OF THE VALVE INTERNALS

DID NOT REVEAL A CAUSE OF MALFUNCTION. THE VALVE

WAS REASSEMBLED AND REINSTALLED TO SUPPORT FURTHER

TES'ING.

1/4/88 COMPLETED AND ISSUED A SPECIAL TEST PROCEDURE

TO TEST UNIT ONE LOGIC. IESTING SHOWED THAT

THE LOGIC AND ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS WERE

FUNCTIONING AS DESIGNED.

1/6/88 PERFORMED A SPECIAL TEST ON UNIT IWO CIRCUITRY

PAGE EIGHT OF ELEVEN

i

'.

|.

. -

TO MORE COMPLETELY DEMONSTRATE LOGIC OVERLAP.

RESULTS WERE SATISFACTORY. !

!

1/7/88 REMOVED, DISASSEMBLED, AND INSPECTED THE SOLENOID

VALVE FROM G16-F003. MALFUNCTION CAUSE COULD

NOT BE DETERMINEDJ VERIFIED THAT AIR PRESSURE

AND AIR CONTAINMENT LEVELS WERE ACCEPTABLE.

1/8/88 REMOVED THE SOLENOID VALVE FROM G16-F020 IN

PREPARATION FOR VENDOR EXAMINATION. VERIFIED

THAT THE OPERATION OF THE REGULATOR ON THE AIR

INLET LINE TO BE CORRECT.

1/9/88 CONDUCTED AN INSPECTION OF RELAY NOS. A71-K17

AND A71-K18. DISCOVERED AN ARC STRIKE ON THE

CONTACT AT IERMINAL 12 0F RELAY K18. SOME METAL

TRANSFER HAD OCCURRED INDICATING POSSIBLE WELDIf;G

OF CONTACT FACES. HAD THIS OCCURRED, THE C0ll

0F SOLEN 0ID VALVE, G16-F004 WOULD HAVE REMAINED

ENERGIZED AND WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE VALVE

FROM CLOSING ON A GROUP IWO ISOLATION SIGNALi

SOLEN 0ID VALVE, G16-F020 DISASSEMBLED BY ASCO

FIELD SERVICE REPRESENTATIVES) CAUSE OF FAILURE

REMAINED UNDETERMINATE.

1/13/88 REMOVED AND INSPECTED AIR FILTER ON G16-F003.

PAGE NINE OF ELEVEN

.- .- _ _ -

= ..

.

INSPECTION DID NOT REVEAL ANY CLUE TO THE'

OPERATIONAL FAILURES EXPERIENCED. NEW FILTER

INSTALLED.

1/14/88 REPLACED RELAYS, A7'-K17 AND A71-K18 WITH NEW

REPLACEMENT RELAYS.

1/18/88 REMOVED SOLF.NOIDS FROM VALVE NOS. G16-F004 AND

G16-F019 FOR DELIVERY TO VENDOR FOR FURTHER FAILUREANALYSIS. CONTINUED AIR SAMPLING. NO ADVERSE

FINDINGS.

1/20/88 REMOVED, DISASSEMBLED, AND INSPECTED THE ACTUATOR

FROM VALVE NO. G16-F020. NO SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS.

2/7/88 REMOVED l-G16-F019 SOLENOID AND ACTUATOR FOR

DISASSEMBLY AND INSPECTION. SINCE UNIT ONE HAD

NOT EXPERIENCED IN-SERVICE FAILURES, IT WAS HOPEDTHAT A COMPARISON MAY YlELD SOME CLUE TO THE

CAUSE OF FAILURE IN UNIT IWO COMPONENTS.

! 2/11/88 DISASSEMBLED THE SOLENOID FROM 1-G16-F020 AND|

THE ACTUATORS FROM VALVES, 1-G16-F019 AND

2-G16-F003. CP8L METAL LAB PERSONNEL ASSISTED

IN THE EXAMINATION. NO SIGNIFICANT DISCERNABLE

DIFFERENCES WERE IN EVIDENCE.

PAGE TEN OF ELEVEN

- ..

.

THE RESULTS OF CONTINUING VENDOR ACTIVITIES AND CONTINUING

ANALYSIS WILL BE DISCUSSED BY OTHERS AFTER THIS PRESENTATION.

TODAY AT BRUNSWICK, ALL OF UNIT IWO SOLEN 0ID VALVES HAVE

BEEN CHANGED OUT WITH FACTORY ASSEMBLED SOLEN 0 IDS. NEW AIR

FILTERS HAVE BEEN INSTALLED. AIR REGULATOR SETPOINTS HAVE BEEN

VERIFIED AS CORRECT.

AS A MATTER OF WORK PRACTICE, REBUILD KITS WILL NOT BE

UTILIZED ON SOLENOID VALVES WITHOUT MANAGEMENT CONCURRENCE.

,

PAGE ELEVEN OF ELEVEN

'. . . .,

*.

.

. .

TECHNICAL SUPPORT INVESTIGATION /RESULTS ;

|

0 TECHNICAL SUPPORT IS PART OF SIIT.

O WORK WITH HAINTENANCE ON LOGIC REVIEWS.

O WORK WITH MAINTENANCE ON INSPECTION.

O WORK WITH MAINTENANCE ON TESTING

0 BENCH TESTS AND LOGIC

0 DETERMINE EXTENT OF APPLICATION

O UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2

0 HODEL WL206-832-3RF

0 COLLECT INDUSTRY INFORMATION

O NPRDS

0 NO INDICATION OF PROBLEMS.

O GE SITE REPRESENTATIVE

O GENERIC QUESTIONS ON ASCO

O SPECIFIC TO 206-832s

'

.

.

..

.

.

A

TECHNICAL SUPPORT INVESTIGATION /RESULTS

0 ESTABLISH INTERFACE WITH ASCO

O CONTACTED 01-04-88 ABOUT 208-832s

O RESPONSE WAS NO PROBLEM

0 REQUESTED SITE ASSISTANCE 1-7-88

0 ARRIVED 1-9-88

0 OBSERVED ASCO TESTING ON 1-20-88

0 SOLENOIDS BENCH TESTED SATISFACTORILY

0 ON F004 (PREVIOUS OCTOBER 1987 FAILURE)

O BLACKISH MATERIAL ON DISK ANICORRESPONDING RING

0 OIL FILM PRESENT

0 CP&L REQUESTS ASCO TO SEND TO AHOTHER LAB

0 ASCO SENDS SOLENOIDS TO INDEPENDENT LAB

0 OILS CP&L SENT DID NOT MATCH OIL IN SOLENOID

0 LAB BELIEVES OIL DOW CORNING 550 LUBRICANT

0 USED BY ASCO ON SOLENOID 0-RINGS

0 CONCLUSION: OIL DOE TO FABRICATION PROCESSHQI PLANT CONDITIONS

,

--

- - _ - _ _ _

..

.

.

a-

TECHNICAL SUPPORT INVESTIGATION /RESULTS

1

0 CONTACTED HARRIS ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CENTER

0 EXPERIENCE IN THIS TYPE OF ASSESSMENT

0 CURRENT STATUS

0 SAME MODEL SOLENOID PRESENT (EPDM)

0 ORDERED SOLEN 0 IDS USING VITON VERSUS EPDH

0 FOCUS IS ON NORMALLY ENERGIZED SOLENOIDS WITH EPDM

0 JUSTIFICATION WRITTEN TO OPEN VALVES

0 STROKE EQ-LIST VALVES ON WEEKLY BASIS

0 RESEARCH ON-GOING WITH HE&EC

0 INTERFACING WITH GE

.

;

f .

- _ - _ - - _ _

.

.

.

..

4. -

CARO _.s A 30WER & _ G'

C0k 3AsY

V E"A__J RGY s! T

e

ASCO VA_VE

.

3_. _

\.. .. n

V_s _.

!

|

.. ... . , - . - . . _ . , . . - . - . . . . - . . - . - - . - . . - , . . - - - - - - - . . . . - - - . - - - - - . - - . . . - - , - ..

.

.

.

F

,

i

Ca rolin a Power & Light Company

:

M etallu rgy U nit;

I

i Fail u re Analysis of ASCO Solenoid Valves

.

. .

.

'

.

PLANTS WITH REPORTED FAILU R ES.

''

1. CP&L Plants

f A. BSEP (GE/BWR)

8. Ha rris (W/PWR)

2. Other Systems

A. Gra nd Gulf (GE/BWR)

8. LaSalle (GE/BWR)

C. Perry (GE/BWR)

D. WPPSS (GE/BWR)

_ _ - - - - -

--

.

>

i

TYPES OF SOLENOID VALVES WHICH HAVE FAILED

1. ASCO Model NP 8323

2. ASCO Model NP 8320,

1

3. ASCO Model NP 2O6-832|

_ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ - .-

_ . - _ _ . ._ -.

.

.

.

VA_VE 0 3 E R A~~ O N COM M ENTS--

.

1. Affected Valves a re ''Th re e-Wa y''1

.

j O p e ra tio n.

I

|

! 2. Af f ected Valves a re Solenoid

Actuated O p e ratio n

,

||

.. . _ - - , _. - - _ _ . _ . - . .

.

.

.

a

4- AC "A" Solenoid

*: Solenoid Core / Seat Assy.:

1 1-, i,AC Core Spring - la m

B* P $; AC Solenoid O-Ring

- V

I

SUPPLY

AIR 2 1

'b- I- Disk Assy.Vent '

= " ' * " ' ~ '" 8-- e-[Lower (DC Seat) Spring ;

___ --

,

6 DC "B" Solenoid! _.

i

|

ASCO Model 8323 Valve|

| Energized Mode

!

_- . _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _

.__ - ._ _ __.

I-

i'

!

!-

)!

I

|1

! :. .

! HOW THESE SOLENO!D VALVES FAILED t

;'

,

,

1. Solenoid Valves Fail to Vent and Close ,

';

! the Primary Valvei

A. Exhaust Ports are Blocked{

'

I '

B. Internal P orts of the Valve Stickj.

{ C. Other Problems ???

;

*

,

T

i

w- --s ---4 - -T- w- _m t-- - ___-_a- - -- --- -

. _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ .

:

. .

a

BSEP MSIV Solenoid Valve Fail u res.

.

B ru n swic k Pla nt, Unit 2

3 of 8 M S IV's Affected- 2-FO22C .

2-FO28C-

- 2-FO28A<

.

All Th ree Valves Failed Fast

Clos u re P e rf o rm a n ce Test After !

.

Plant Cold S h utd ow n !;

_ _ _

_ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ __ _ . _ - - _. _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ .-

,

..

i .

i'

.

11

:

ii

<

!'

i

1'

:

) .,

'J

WHY THESE VALVES FAILED|1

i

| O BS ERVATIO NS:

!

| 1. Deg radation of the EPDM Elastomer Components

]

| 2. Ad herence of EPDM Elastomer Components to Brass

! Valve Components :

|1

j 3. Deg radation of the Valve Lubricants ProduoIngj a "Sticky" Material (WPPSS A: LaSalle)I

1

-|

!

s .,

.

..

OO N

N

OG h-

-

O-ni

-

@C

._

L _oO

I r|

.cACo0 w

( ) 3v M C _C .yD 2'

QvO'N C

O8 E5ke - Q w

2 -v>v CC --

o ~

@UbU

' dCF, r

c. ic.

buaW ,,

~M~

CO

~

Q ~

,~-f

i

!

-,

l i i i i { C~

h" O q) N N - -

.

SXoJ- x oudio-x ;arJdoD *sluno?

._

-- .

.

.

O

i

4

BSEP PCIS Solenoid Valves .

.

Valves Which Failed J a n u a ry 2, 1988 '

'

2-G16-FOO3

2-G16-FOO4'

2-G 16- F019

2-G16-FO2O1

; Valve Which Failed October 28, 1987

| 2-G16-FOO4 '

,

,

;

;

- . _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ - _ - . - ___ ___ ___-_--__ _ -

.

.

.

.

. ,

- -y ys ss s

g A A gn

m mt ntict icir a aCsPrsa e ePi e et

ssSe*DSt i

SD sSserr rr rr rreeMee eeMee

p pD p p wwDww vp pP p p ooPoo lUUEUU tLELL a-

Ov- -

_i

'

_V' -

- - - -- , L q - - '. '

i

_f'c#[, b 2- f7 3

- ~J 8,_ \ |

,

6 y,0,2,

l

e}

do

, MA

O# I

CS

V A.

y rs rs AA

re er vo eC L

.

1i | i\

_ - ._ _- __ _ . _- - _ - . . . . .- -..

-:

,

-

,

; -

i.

!l

-

,,

!

| FAILU R E MECHANISMS (THEORIES)iii

| 1. CATALYTIC OXIDATIONi;

i! 2. CREEPi

i

!

! 3. "STIC KI N G" of Valve Seal M aterials4

m a: ,- - A

.

O

.

C ATA LYTIC OXIDATIONf

EPDM Reacts in the P resen ce of Copper

Alloys and Air to Produce:

a. Deg ra d a tion of the EPDM,.

b. Ad heren ce of the EPDM to Copper Alloys -

. - _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ - _ _ ._ _ _ _ . .- . . ._

.

O

-

,

1

i

SUMMARY OF THERMAL ANALYSIS RESU LTS !

9

i1985!,

!

'

No glass tra nsition tem peratu re for degraded--

materials (BSEP MSIV O-ring) by DSC onalysis i

indicative of absence of elastomerI

TGA analyses indicate that Viton materials--

'

a re more sta ble at higher temperatures than

a re EPDM materials

!

Literatu re survey indicates that copper--

alloys catalyze the d eg rad a' zion of polyethylene |

type materials (e.g., EP D M'r ;

l

l

:. _ _ _ . . , . _ - -

_- - - - _ - - _ _ - . - - . . .. . . - - - . _ ._ ._ . -_. -.

.

.

,

SUMMARY OF THERMAL ANALYSIS RESU LTS?.

1985 !

Continued

-- DSC of EPDM in contact with copper in air

Indicated a low tem peratu re exothermic reaction.

indicative of oxidation or residual cure

(rate maximum occu rred at 14O F)which did not occur with EPDM in contact

I with an aluminum su bstrate in air||

'

1 .

; '

'- - _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ . - -_. __ ._ __. _

_ ._ _ . _ _ - . __-- . . . _. . . ..

.

-

'

.

|

NEW EPDM IN FO RM ATION ,

MODEL 8323 Valve (MSIV)

EPDM Disc Peak Oxidation Temperature 120*F

Onset of Oxidation 32*F

EPDM O-Ring Peak Oxidation Temperature 392*F,

;,

IMODEL 206-832 Volve (PCIS)

EPDM Seat Peak Oxidation Temperature N/A

NOTE: Oxidation Does NOT Necessarily imply Failure

:

m ___ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._ _-_ , ._ _ ._ _ . - . .

.

.

.

.

.

BSEP MSIV F028C 0-ringCopper Concentration Versus Depth

400i

.

g , ;

\s.'

.

350 aI

I,

ep 300 t

\,

s. II t

' *X :i i

a

a , -

E | \l 6

200-| \*'

!:

* \a j ga . .

O 150 -! \ .

'

$ W \g

Ns ,o 100 -i so t s

; .

. s.

50 s

!. ''s.,' N

O -i - i-- i i - I i 7 U

O 10 20 30 40 50 90 130 170 220

Depth from Surface. Microns

_ _ _ ,

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - _ - - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . _ _ _.. -

-,- - - .

.

+

.

.

e

f

9

CREEPi!1

|-

| Deformation and Permanent Set to the EPDM.

1l:

) -3

i,

|

!

<

i

i

!

1

, . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , - - - - , , - - - - - - - , . . - - ,w--,,, - , - - - - - . , - , , - -- ,- -,-----;,- --- - - - - - -..

_

.

.

O

.

.

a -

STIC K , N G

Valve Did Not Vent on Initial Attempt (s)

Subsequent Operations Caused Valve to " U n s tic k"

- - , , ,-- -

0

~ e. _

9

6

2-

<-s,

p

i

!i

- . _ _ _ . _. - _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - - - . _. . , _ . . . . - . . - . - . .-. __ - . . . - - . . _ , . .

.%

.

' l

.

yssA g

_ nmtat cire ast e eipSS S DS

err rreeMeewwDww vooPoo lLLELL a@ - -

-

V-

~

_ ' -_. L.

e'g : 2.

23

_ -_ \ / - 8

-

6ts

0Te

2 dao

l Le|

do_

_ M_

_

_.

__

OCSA

_

.

__

_

-i!||:||||,

.. -- ..

.

..

9

.

, .,

!:

:

i

!~ ASCO Model 206-832 Valve .

i| (PCIS):

| Lower Seat Loads Prior to Tcat'

!

i

i Minimum Calculated Differential Spring Load 4 lbs

] (When Deenergized);

I

| Lower Seat Loads After 190*F Exposure for 7 Daysi

I

Maximum Load increase to Overcome "sticking" 3.5 lbs

i

Loads to Tear Adhered EPDM (Assuming 5000 psi UTS)

|

| Bonded to Entire Contact Area of Seat (.0279 sq. in.) 139 lbs|| Bonded to 3 % of Seat Contact Area 4 lbs;I

|

|

. . . _ . . .

,

,

...

e-

,

ii

!: Solenoid Valve Fail u res ;!

*

! Conclusions!

:,

! 1. CP&L Fail u res Have involved EPDM Ela sto m e rs.'

!

I 4

'

2. CP&L Fail u re s Have involved a " Fail u re to

Ve n t'' M ec h a nis m.;

i

i 3. Possible Causes of " Fail u re to Vent" Mechanism:i

! A. Ad h e re n ce of EPDM to Metal

B. Deg ra d atio n of EPDM: C. Deg ra d a tio n of Valve Lu b rica nts

i D. I nte ra ctio n of B. & C.

f E. Mechanical i n te rf e re n ces of Valve Pa rts

,

!

,

.

,

.

.

3

.

Elastomer Testing Being Co n sid e red *

1. Deg ra d atio n Mechanism of EPDM

A. Th e rm og ravim etric Analyses (TGA) '

B. Dif f e re n tia l Scanning Ca lo rim etry (DSC)

2. SNeking Mechanism for EPDM & Dow CorningA. Tests Similar to ASTM D 429/F 607

3. Analysis of Failed Ela sto m e rs

A. Development of Baseline Data for Virgin M a te rials

Using TGA & DSC Analysis Methods

B. Development of Data for Artificially Aged Elastomer

M ate rials Using TGA & DSC Analysis Methodsi C. Co m pa riso n s Between New, Aged, and Failed Ma te rials;

!

|

|

|

[

-

..-

_5_.

_

_

e

s m set ei

r ru s u ~__

s u s) a s a _C e r e e __

S me mms D vi(e t

h e hs y cl ) c sp ). Ai .y r i u)t h e Ghmt s el

ea w T wr t

n m a a ( e a .s r rA r e e vi

so u uia g

q s s gql

f ai n yi s no C nf i i

t n atl

o ah a h man g c e n c ey Ap (hn e e (heo t ti l c l

n a pi

t s e r s ei

nih mra r ti

a st sn c y n u e y a u

e ml st tl

a S a a a ar ri

nl v nn e n ep l

a ai a aip r px i

s m gl s mt

E n a e o a el

e ee mgt mmgtre r n r r nf e ad e e adf h h n h h h ni

D T c a T T c a

. .

21

. . .

*VRLVE RElRTED SHJTD%HS

.

~

21

.

15 -

,

12 N.

10 - - -

x~

5 '- - - - -

0 -

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987|

| LLRT VRLVE TEST FRILLRES75

.

.

'T.

!~

, - _.

!-

~

:-

25 - -_

| 15"

*|

; EZ22LHIT 2.|

0- C lMIT 1

1994 1985 1986 1987 1988

!