Summaries of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders of ...legal.un.org/icjsummaries/documents/english/st_leg_serf1_add3.pdf · v page 160 . armed activities on the territory of the

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Contents

Page

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

140 . APPLICATIONFORREVISIONOFTHEJUDGMENTOF11JULY1996INTHECASECONCERNINGAPPLICATIONOFTHECONVENTIONONTHEPREVENTIONANDPUNISHMENTOFTHECRIMEOFGENOCIDE(BOSNIAANDHERZEGOVINA v. YUGOSLAVIA),PRELIMINARYOBJECTIONS(YUGOSLAVIA v. BOSNIAANDHERZEGOVINA)

Judgmentof3February2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

141 . CASECONCERNINGAVENAANDOTHERMExICANNATIONALS(MExICO v. UNITEDSTATESOFAMERICA)(PROVISIONALMEASURES)

Orderof5February2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

142 . CASECONCERNINGCERTAINCRIMINALPROCEEDINGSINFRANCE(REPUBLICOFTHECONGO v. FRANCE)(PROVISIONALMEASURES)

Orderof17June2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

143 . CASECONCERNINGQUESTIONSOFINTERPRETATIONANDAPPLICATIONOFTHE1971MONTREALCONVENTIONARISINGFROMTHEAERIALINCIDENTATLOCKERBIE(LIBYANARABJAMAHIRIYA v. UNITEDKINGDOMOFGREATBRITAINANDNORTHERNIRELAND)(DISCONTINUANCE)

Orderof10September2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

144 . CASECONCERNINGQUESTIONSOFINTERPRETATIONANDAPPLICATIONOFTHE1971MONTREALCONVENTIONARISINGFROMTHEAERIALINCIDENTATLOCKERBIE(LIBYANARABJAMAHIRIYA v. UNITEDSTATESOFAMERICA)(DISCONTINUANCE)

Orderof10September2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

145 . CASECONCERNINGOILPLATFORMS(ISLAMICREPUBLICOFIRAN v. UNITEDSTATESOFAMERICA)

Judgmentof6November2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

146 . APPLICATIONFORREVISIONOFTHEJUDGMENTOF11SEPTEMBER1992INTHECASECONCERNINGTHELAND,ISLANDANDMARITIMEFRONTIERDISPUTE(ELSALVADOR/HONDURAS:NICARAGUAINTERVENING)(ELSALVADOR v. HONDURAS)

Judgmentof18December2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

iv

Page

147 . CASECONCERNINGAVENAANDOTHERMExICANNATIONALS(MExICO v. UNITEDSTATESOFAMERICA)

Judgmentof31March2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

148 . LEGALCONSEQUENCESOFTHECONSTRUCTIONOFAWALLINTHEOCCUPIEDPALESTINIANTERRITORY

AdvisoryOpinionof9July2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

149 . CASECONCERNINGLEGALITYOFUSEOFFORCE(SERBIAANDMONTENEGRO v. BELGIUM)(PRELIMINARYOBJECTIONS)


150 . CASECONCERNINGLEGALITYOFUSEOFFORCE(SERBIAANDMONTENEGRO v. CANADA)(PRELIMINARYOBJECTIONS)


151 . CASECONCERNINGLEGALITYOFUSEOFFORCE(SERBIAANDMONTENEGROv.FRANCE)(PRELIMINARYOBJECTIONS)


152 . CASECONCERNINGLEGALITYOFUSEOFFORCE(SERBIAANDMONTENEGROv.GERMANY)(PRELIMINARYOBJECTIONS)


153 . CASECONCERNINGLEGALITYOFUSEOFFORCE(SERBIAANDMONTENEGROv.ITALY)(PRELIMINARYOBJECTIONS)


154 . CASECONCERNINGLEGALITYOFUSEOFFORCE(SERBIAANDMONTENEGROv.NETHERLANDS)(PRELIMINARYOBJECTIONS)


155 . CASECONCERNINGLEGALITYOFUSEOFFORCE(SERBIAANDMONTENEGROv.PORTUGAL)(PRELIMINARYOBJECTIONS)


156 . CASECONCERNINGLEGALITYOFUSEOFFORCE(SERBIAANDMONTENEGROv.UNITEDKINGDOM)(PRELIMINARYOBJECTIONS)


157 . CASECONCERNINGCERTAINPROPERTY(LIECHTENSTEINv.GERMANY)(PRELIMINARYOBJECTIONS)

Judgmentof10February2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

158 . FRONTIERDISPUTE(BENIN/NIGER) Judgmentof12July2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

159 . ARMEDACTIVITIESONTHETERRITORYOFTHECONGO(DEMOCRATICREPUBLICOFTHECONGOv.UGANDA)


v

Page

160 . ARMEDACTIVITIESONTHETERRITORYOFTHECONGO(NEWAPPLICATION:2002)(DEMOCRATICREPUBLICOFTHECONGOv.RWANDA)(JURISDICTIONOFTHECOURTANDADMISSIBILITYOFTHEAPPLICATION)

Judgmentof3February2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150

161 . CASECONCERNINGTHESTATUSVIS-À-VISTHEHOSTSTATEOFADIPLOMATICENVOYTOTHEUNITEDNATIONS(COMMONWEALTHOFDOMINICA v. SWITZERLAND)(DISCONTINUANCE)

Orderof9June2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

162 . PULPMILLSONTHERIVERURUGUAY(ARGENTINA v. URUGUAY)(PROVISIONALMEASURES)

Orderof13July2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

163 . PULPMILLSONTHERIVERURUGUAY(ARGENTINA v. URUGUAY)(PROVISIONALMEASURES)

Orderof23January2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

164 . APPLICATIONOFTHECONVENTIONONTHEPREVENTIONANDPUNISHMENTOFTHECRIMEOFGENOCIDE(BOSNIAANDHERZEGOVINAv.SERBIAANDMONTENEGRO)

Judgmentof26February2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

165 . AHMADOUSADIODIALLO(REPUBLICOFGUINEA v. DEMOCRATICREPUBLICOFTHECONGO)(PRELIMINARYOBJECTIONS)

Judgmentof24May2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190

166 . TERRITORIALANDMARITIMEDISPUTEBETWEENNICARAGUAANDHONDURASINTHECARIBBEANSEA(NICARAGUAv .HONDURAS)

Judgmentof8October2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

167 . TERRITORIALANDMARITIMEDISPUTE(NICARAGUA v. COLOMBIA)(PRELIMINARYOBJECTIONS)


vii

FoReWoRD

Thispublicationcontainssummariesofjudgments,advisoryopinionsandordersofasubstantivenatureissuedbytheInternationalCourtofJustice,theprincipaljudicialorganoftheUnitedNations,from1January2003to31December2007 .Itisthecontinuationofthreeearliervolumesonthesamesubject(ST/LEG/SER .F/1andAddenda1and2),whichcoveredtheperiods1948-1991,1992-1996and1997-2002,respectively .

During the period covered by this publication, the Court issued 28 judgments,advisoryopinionsandordersofasubstantivenature .Itshouldbenotedthatthematerialscontained herein are summaries prepared by the Registry of the Court, which do notinvolve the responsibilities of the Court itself . These summaries are for informationpurposesandshouldnotbequotedastheactualtextsofthesame .Nordotheyconstituteaninterpretationoftheoriginal .

The Codification Division of the Office of Legal Affairs wishes to acknowledge theinvaluableassistancereceivedfromtheRegistryoftheCourtinmakingavailablethesesummariesforpublication .

1

140. APPLICAtIonFoRReVIsIonoFtHeJUDGMentoF11JULY1996IntHeCAseConCeRnInGAPPLICAtIonoFtHeConVentIonontHePReVentIonAnDPUnIsHMentoFtHeCRIMeoFGenoCIDe(BosnIAAnDHeRZeGoVInA v. YUGosLAVIA),PReLIMInARYoBJeCtIons(YUGosLAVIA v. BosnIAAnDHeRZeGoVInA)

Judgmentof3February2003

InitsJudgmentontheadmissibilityoftheApplicationfiledbyYugoslaviafortherevisionoftheJudgmentof11July1996in thecaseconcerningApplication of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide(Bosnia and Herzegovina v . Yugoslavia), the Court found that theApplicationwasinadmissible .

TheCourtwascomposedasfollows:PresidentGuillaume;Vice-President Shi; Judges Ranjeva, Herczegh, Koroma,Vereshchetin,Parra-Aranguren,Rezek,Al-Khasawneh,Buer-genthal,Elaraby;Judgesad hocDimitrijević,Mahiou;Regis-trarCouvreur .

** *

Thetextoftheoperativeparagraph(para .75)oftheJudg-mentreadsasfollows:

“ . . .TheCourt,Bytenvotestothree,FindsthattheApplicationsubmittedbytheFederalRepub-licofYugoslaviaforrevision,underArticle61oftheStatuteoftheCourt,oftheJudgmentgivenbytheCourton11July1996,isinadmissible .infavour:PresidentGuillaume;Vice-PresidentShi;JudgesRanjeva, Herczegh, Koroma, Parra-Aranguren, Al-Kha-sawneh,Buergenthal,Elaraby;Judgead hocMahiou;against: Judges Vereshchetin, Rezek; Judge ad hoc Dimitrijević .”

** *

Judge Koroma appended a separate opinion to the Judg-mentoftheCourt;JudgeVereshchetinappendedadissentingopiniontotheJudgmentoftheCourt;JudgeRezekappendeda declaration to the Judgment of the Court; Judge ad hocDimitrijevićappendedadissentingopiniontotheJudgmentoftheCourt;Judgead hocMahiouappendedaseparateopin-iontotheJudgmentoftheCourt .

** *

On 24 April 2001, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia(hereinafterreferredtoasthe“FRY”)institutedproceedings,whereby, referring to Article 61 of the Statute of the Court,it requested the Court to revise the Judgment delivered on11 July 1996 in the case concerning Application of the Con-vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v . Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections (I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II),p .595) .

Since the Court included upon the Bench no judgeof the nationality of either of the Parties, the FRY choseMr . Vojin Dimitrijević and Bosnia and HerzegovinaMr .SeadHodžićtositasjudgesad hoc.AfterMr .Hodžićhadsubsequently resigned from his duties, Bosnia and Herze-govinadesignatedMr .AhmedMahioutositinhisstead .

BosniaandHerzegovinafiled itswrittenobservationsonthe admissibility of the FRY’s Application within the time-limit fixed by the Court . The Court decided that a secondroundofwrittenpleadingswasnotnecessary .Publichearingswereheldon4,5,6and7November2002 .

At the oral proceedings, the following final submissionswerepresentedbytheParties:

OnbehalfoftheGovernmentoftheFRY,atthehearingof6November2002:“For the reasons advanced in its Application of 23 April2001 and in its pleadings during the oral proceedingsheldfrom4to7November2002,theFederalRepublicofYugoslaviarespectfullyrequeststheCourttoadjudgeanddeclare:—thattherearenewlydiscoveredfactsofsuchacharac-

terastolaythe11July1996JudgmentopentorevisionunderArticle61oftheStatuteoftheCourt;and

—thattheApplicationforRevisionoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslaviaisthereforeadmissible .”

OnbehalfoftheGovernmentofBosniaandHerzegovina,atthehearingof7November2002:“Inconsiderationofallthathasbeensubmittedbytherep-resentativesofBosniaandHerzegovinainthewrittenandoralstagesoftheseproceedings,BosniaandHerzegovinarequeststheCourttoadjudgeanddeclarethattheApplica-tionforRevisionoftheJudgmentof11July1996,submit-tedbytheFederalRepublicofYugoslaviaon23April2001,isnotadmissible .”

*

2

TheCourtnotesthatinitsApplicationforrevisionofthe1996 Judgment, the FRY relies on Article 61 of the Statute,whichprovidesforrevisionproceedingstoopenwithajudg-mentoftheCourtdeclaringtheapplicationadmissibleonthegroundscontemplatedbytheStatute;Article99oftheRulesmakesexpressprovisionforproceedingsonthemeritsif,initsfirstjudgment,theCourthasdeclaredtheapplicationadmis-sible .

Thus, the Court points out, the Statute and the Rules ofCourt foreseea“two-stageprocedure” .Thefirststageof theprocedureforarequestforrevisionoftheCourt’s judgmentshould be “limited to the question of admissibility of thatrequest” .Therefore,atthecurrentstageoftheproceedingstheCourt’sdecisionislimitedtothequestionwhethertherequestsatisfies the conditions contemplated by the Statute . UnderArticle61oftheStatute,theseconditionsareasfollows:

(a) theapplication shouldbebasedupon the “discovery”ofa“fact”;

(b)thefact,thediscoveryofwhichisreliedon,mustbe“ofsuchanatureastobeadecisivefactor”;

(c)thefactshouldhavebeen“unknown”totheCourtandtothepartyclaimingrevisionwhenthejudgmentwasgiven;

(d)ignoranceofthisfactmustnotbe“duetonegligence”;and

(e) the application for revision must be “made at latestwithinsixmonthsofthediscoveryofthenewfact”andbeforetenyearshaveelapsedfromthedateofthejudgment .

The Court observes that an application for revision isadmissibleonly if eachof theconditions laiddown inArti-cle61issatisfied .Ifanyoneofthemisnotmet,theapplicationmustbedismissed .

*The Court then begins by ascertaining whether there is

here a “fact” which, although in existence at the date of itsJudgmentof11July1996,wasatthattimeunknownbothtotheFRYandtotheCourt .

Inthisregard,itnotesthatinitsApplicationforrevisionoftheCourt’sJudgmentof11July1996,theFRYcontendedthefollowing:

“TheadmissionoftheFRYtotheUnitedNationsasanewMemberon1November2000iscertainlyanewfact .Itcanalsobedemonstrated,andtheApplicantsubmits,thatthisnewfactisofsuchanatureastobeadecisivefactorregard-ing thequestionof jurisdictionratione personaeover theFRY .AftertheFRYwasadmittedasanewMemberon1Novem-ber 2000, dilemmas concerning its standing have beenresolved, and it has become an unequivocal fact that theFRY did not continue the personality of the SFRY [theSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia],wasnotaMem-beroftheUnitedNationsbefore1November2000,wasnotaStatepartytotheStatute,andwasnotaStatepartytotheGenocideConvention . . .TheadmissionoftheFRYtotheUnitedNationsasanewMember clears ambiguities and sheds a different light

ontheissueofthemembershipoftheFRYintheUnitedNations,intheStatuteandintheGenocideConvention .”TheCourtpointsoutthatinitsoralpleadings,theFRYdid

notinvokeitsadmissiontotheUnitedNationsinNovember2000asadecisive“newfact”,withinthemeaningofArticle61oftheStatute,capableoffoundingitsrequestforrevisionofthe1996Judgment .TheFRYclaimedthatthisadmission“asanewMember”aswellastheLegalCounsel’sletterof8Decem-ber 2000 inviting it, according to the FRY, “to take treatyactionsifitwishedtobecomeapartytotreatiestowhichtheformerYugoslaviawasaparty”were

“eventswhich . . .revealedthefollowingtwodecisivefacts:(1)theFRYwasnotapartytotheStatuteatthetimeoftheJudgment;and(2) the FRY did not remain bound by Article Ix of theGenocide Convention continuing the personality of theformerYugoslavia” .The Court observes that it is on the basis of these two

“facts”that,initsoralargument,theFRYultimatelyfoundeditsrequestforrevision .TheFRYfurtherstressedatthehear-ings that these “newly discovered facts” had not occurredsubsequently to the Judgment of 1996 . In this regard, theFRYstatedthat“theFRYneverarguedorcontemplatedthatthe newly discovered fact would or could have a retroactiveeffect” .

For itspart,BosniaandHerzegovinamaintainedthe fol-lowing:

“thereisno‘newfact’capableof‘layingthecaseopen’torevisionpursuanttoArticle61,paragraph2,oftheCourt’sStatute:neithertheadmissionofYugoslaviatotheUnitedNationswhichtheapplicantStatepresentsasafactofthiskind,orinanyeventasbeingthesourceofsuchafact,noritsallegedlynewsituationvis-à-vistheGenocideConven-tion . . .constitutefactsofthatkind” .In short, Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted that what

theFRYreferredtoas“facts”were“theconsequences . . .ofafact,whichisandcanonlybetheadmissionofYugoslaviato the United Nations in 2000” . It stated that “Article 61 oftheStatuteoftheCourt . . .requiresthatthefactwas‘whenthe judgment was given, unknown to the Court and alsoto the party claiming revision’” and that “this implies that . . . the fact in question actually did exist ‘when the judg-ment was given’” . According to Bosnia and Herzegovina,the FRY “is regarding its own change of position [as toits continuation of the personality of the SFRY] (and theensuing consequences) as a new fact” . Bosnia and Herze-govinaconcludedthatthe“newfact”invokedbytheFRY“issubsequenttotheJudgmentwhoserevisionissought” .Itnotedthattheallegednewfactcouldhave“noretroactiveorretro-spectiveeffect” .

*Withaviewtoprovidingthecontextforthecontentionsof

theFRY,theCourtthenrecountsthebackgroundtothecase .Intheearly1990stheSFRY,madeupofBosniaandHerze-

govina,Croatia,Macedonia,Montenegro,SerbiaandSlovenia,begantobreakup .On25June1991CroatiaandSloveniaboth

3

declaredindependence,followedbyMacedoniaon17Septem-ber1991andBosniaandHerzegovinaon6March1992 .On22May1992,BosniaandHerzegovina,CroatiaandSloveniawereadmittedasMemberstotheUnitedNations;aswastheformerYugoslavRepublicofMacedoniaon8April1993 .

On27April1992the“participantsof the jointsessionofthe SFRY Assembly, the National Assembly of the RepublicofSerbiaand theAssemblyof theRepublicofMontenegro”adopted a declaration . Expressing the will of the citizens oftheir respective Republics to stay in the common state ofYugoslavia,theystatedthat:

“1 .TheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia,continuingthestate,international legalandpoliticalpersonalityof theSocial-ist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, shall strictly abide byall thecommitmentsthattheSFRofYugoslaviaassumedinternationally, . . .Remainingboundbyallobligationstointernationalorgan-izationsandinstitutionswhosememberitis . . .”AnofficialNoteofthesamedatefromthePermanentMis-

sionofYugoslaviatotheUnitedNationsstatedinter alia“Strictly respecting the continuity of the internationalpersonalityofYugoslavia,theFederalRepublicofYugosla-viashallcontinuetofulfilalltherightsconferredto,andobligations assumed by, the Socialist Federal Republic ofYugoslavia in international relations, including its mem-bershipinallinternationalorganizationsandparticipationininternationaltreatiesratifiedoraccededtobyYugosla-via .”(UnitedNationsdoc .A/46/915 .Ann .I .)On22September1992theGeneralAssemblyadoptedreso-

lution 47/1, whereby, upon the recommendation containedin Security Council resolution 777 of 19 September 1992, itconsidered “that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbiaand Montenegro) cannot continue automatically the mem-bershipoftheformerSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslaviaintheUnitedNations;andthereforedecidesthattheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(SerbiaandMontenegro)shouldapplyfor membership in the United Nations and that it shall notparticipateintheworkoftheGeneralAssembly” .

On29September1992,inresponsetoaletterfromthePer-manent Representatives of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatiarequestingcertainclarifications,theUnder-Secretary-GeneralandLegalCounseloftheUnitedNationsaddressedalettertothem,inwhichhestatedthatthe“consideredviewoftheUnit-edNationsSecretariatregardingthepracticalconsequencesoftheadoptionbytheGeneralAssemblyofresolution47/1”wasasfollows:

“While the General Assembly has stated unequivocallythattheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(SerbiaandMon-tenegro)cannotautomaticallycontinuethemembershipoftheformerSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslaviaintheUnitedNationsandthattheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(SerbiaandMontenegro)shouldapplyformembershipintheUnitedNations,theonlypracticalconsequencethattheresolutiondrawsisthattheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(SerbiaandMontenegro)shallnotparticipateintheworkof theGeneralAssembly . It isclear, therefore, thatrepre-

sentativesoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(SerbiaandMontenegro)cannolongerparticipate intheworkoftheGeneral Assembly, its subsidiary organs, nor conferencesandmeetingsconvenedbyit .Ontheotherhand, theresolutionneither terminatesnorsuspends Yugoslavia’s membership in the Organization .Consequently,theseatandnameplateremainasbefore,butinAssemblybodiesrepresentativesoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia (SerbiaandMontenegro)cannotsitbehindthesign‘Yugoslavia’ .YugoslavmissionsatUnitedNationsHeadquarters and offices may continue to function andmayreceiveandcirculatedocuments .AtHeadquarters,theSecretariatwillcontinuetoflytheflagoftheoldYugoslaviaas it is the lastflagofYugoslaviausedby theSecretariat .TheresolutiondoesnottakeawaytherightofYugoslaviatoparticipate intheworkoforgansotherthanAssemblybodies . The admission to the United Nations of a newYugoslavia under Article 4 of the Charter will terminatethesituationcreatedbyresolution47/1 .” (UnitedNationsdoc .A/47/485;emphasisintheoriginal .)On29April1993,theGeneralAssembly,upontherecom-

mendationcontainedinSecurityCouncilresolution821(1993)(couchedintermssimilartothoseofSecurityCouncilresolu-tion777(1992)),adoptedresolution47/229inwhichitdecidedthat “the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Mon-tenegro)shallnotparticipateintheworkoftheEconomicandSocialCouncil” .

*

The Court recalls that between the adoption of GeneralAssemblyresolution47/1of22September1992andtheadmis-sionoftheFRYtotheUnitedNationson1November2000,thelegalpositionoftheFRYremainedcomplex .Asexamplesthereof,theCourtcitesseveralchangestotheEnglishtextofcertain relevant paragraphs of the “Summary of Practice oftheSecretary-GeneralasDepositaryofMultilateralTreaties”,preparedbytheTreatySectionoftheOfficeofLegalAffairs,whichwaspublishedatthebeginningof1996(thosechangesweredirectly incorporated into theFrench textof theSum-marypublishedin1997);italsoreferredtotheletterssentbythe Permanent Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina,Croatia,SloveniaandtheformerYugoslavRepublicofMac-edonia which questioned the validity of the deposit of thedeclaration recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of theInternationalCourtofJusticebytheFRYdated25April1999,andwhichsetouttheir“permanentobjectiontotheground-less assertion of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbiaand Montenegro), which has also been repudiated by theinternationalcommunity,thatitrepresentsthecontinuityofourcommonpredecessor,andtherebycontinuestoenjoyitsstatusininternationalorganizationsandtreaties” .

TheCourtaddstotheaboveaccountoftheFRY’sspecialsituation that existed between September 1992 and Novem-ber2000,certaindetailsconcerningtheUnitedNationsmem-bershipduesandratesofassessmentset for theFRYduringthatsameperiod .

The Court then recalls that on 27 October 2000,Mr . Koštunica, the newly elected President of the FRY, sent

4

a letter to the Secretary-General requesting admission oftheFRYtomembershipintheUnitedNations;andthat,on1 November 2000, the General Assembly, upon the recom-mendationoftheSecurityCouncil,adoptedresolution55/12,bywhichitdecidedtoadmittheFederalRepublicofYugosla-viatomembershipintheUnitedNations .

TheCourtobservesthattheadmissionoftheFRYtomem-bershipoftheUnitedNationson1November2000putanendtoYugoslavia’ssui generispositionwithintheUnitedNations .Itnotesthat,on8December2000,theUnder-Secretary-Gen-eral,theLegalCounsel,sentalettertotheMinisterforFor-eignAffairsoftheFRY,readinginpertinentparts:

“Following[theadmissionoftheFederalRepublicofYugo-slaviatotheUnitedNationson1November2000],areviewwasundertakenofthemultilateraltreatiesdepositedwiththe Secretary-General, in relation to many of which theformerSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(theSFRY)andtheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(FRY)hadunder-takenarangeoftreatyactions . . .ItistheLegalCounsel’sviewthattheFederalRepublicofYugoslaviashouldnowundertaketreatyactions,asappro-priate,inrelationtothetreatiesconcerned,ifitsintentionis toassumetherelevant legalrightsandobligationsasasuccessorState .”(LetterbytheLegalCounseloftheUnitedNations,ApplicationofYugoslavia,Ann .27 .)The Court further notes that at the beginning of

March2001,anotificationofaccessiontotheGenocideCon-ventionbytheFRYwasdepositedwiththeSecretary-GeneraloftheUnitedNations;andthat,on15March2001,theSec-retary-General,actinginhiscapacityasdepositary, issuedaDepositary Notification (C .N .164 .2001 .TREATIES-1), indi-catingthattheaccessionoftheFRYtothe1948ConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocide“was effected on 12 March 2001” and that the Conventionwould“enterintoforcefortheFRYon10June2001” .

*

TheCourt,inordertocompletethecontextualbackground,alsorecallstheproceedingsleadinguptothedeliveryoftheJudgmentof11July1996,aswellasthepassagesinthatJudg-mentrelevanttothepresentproceedings .

ItreferstoitsOrderdated8April1993,bywhichitindi-catedcertainprovisionalmeasureswithaviewtotheprotec-tionofrightsundertheGenocideConvention .Itrecallsthatin thisOrder theCourt, referring toSecurityCouncil reso-lution777(1992),GeneralAssemblyresolution47/1andtheLegalCounsel’sletterof29September1992,statedinter aliathat,“whilethesolutionadoptedisnot freefromlegaldiffi-culties,thequestionwhetherornotYugoslaviaisaMemberof the United Nations and as such a party to the Statute oftheCourtisonewhichtheCourtdoesnotneedtodeterminedefinitivelyatthepresentstageoftheproceedings”;andthatit concluded that “Article Ix of the Genocide Convention,to which both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia are par-ties,thusappearstotheCourttoaffordabasisonwhichthejurisdictionoftheCourtmightbefoundedtotheextentthatthe subject-matter of the dispute relates to ‘the interpreta-tion,applicationor fulfilment’of theConvention, including

disputes‘relatingtotheresponsibilityofaStateforgenocideor foranyof theotheractsenumerated inarticle III’of theConvention .” The Court further refers to its second Orderon provisional measures, of 13 September 1993, by which itconfirmedthatithadprima facie jurisdictioninthecaseonthebasisofArticleIxoftheGenocideConvention .

Itfinallyobservesthat,initsJudgmentof11July1996,onthepreliminaryobjectionsraisedbytheFRY,itcametotheconclusion thatbothPartieswereboundby theConventionwhen the Application was filed . In the operative part of itsJudgment theCourt,having rejected thepreliminaryobjec-tionsraisedbytheFRY,foundthat“onthebasisofArticleIxoftheConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocide,ithasjurisdictiontoadjudicateuponthedispute” and that “the Application filed by the Republic ofBosniaandHerzegovinaon20March1993isadmissible” .

*

InordertoexaminewhethertheFRYreliesonfactswhichfall within the terms of Article 61 of the Statute, the Courtobserves first that, under the terms of paragraph 1 of thatArticle,anapplicationforrevisionofajudgmentmaybemadeonlywhenitis“baseduponthediscovery”ofsomefactwhich,“whenthejudgmentwasgiven”,wasunknown .Thesearethecharacteristicswhichthe“new”factreferredtoinparagraph2ofthatArticlemustpossess .Thusbothparagraphsrefertoafactexistingatthetimewhenthejudgmentwasgivenanddis-coveredsubsequently .Afactwhichoccursseveralyearsafterajudgmenthasbeengivenisnota“new”factwithinthemean-ingofArticle61;thisremainsthecaseirrespectiveofthelegalconsequencesthatsuchafactmayhave .

TheCourtpointsoutthat,inthepresentcase,theadmis-sionoftheFRYtotheUnitedNationsoccurredon1Novem-ber2000,wellafterthe1996Judgment .Itconcludesaccord-ingly that that admission cannot be regarded as a new fact,within the meaning of Article 61, capable of founding arequestforrevisionofthatJudgment .

TheCourtgoesontonotethat, inthefinalversionof itsargument, the FRY claims that its admission to the UnitedNations and the Legal Counsel’s letter of 8 December 2000simply“revealed”twofactswhichhadexistedin1996buthadbeenunknownatthetime:thatitwasnotthenapartytotheStatuteoftheCourtandthatitwasnotboundbytheGenocideConvention .TheCourtfindsthat,inadvancingthisargument,theFRYdoesnotrelyonfactsthatexistedin1996 .Inreality,itbasesitsApplicationforrevisiononthelegalconsequenceswhichitseekstodrawfromfactssubsequenttotheJudgmentwhichitisaskingtohaverevised .Thoseconsequences,evensupposingthemtobeestablished,cannotberegardedasfactswithin the meaning of Article 61 . The Court finds that theFRY’sargumentcannotaccordinglybeupheld .

The Court furthermore notes that the admission of theFRY to membership of the United Nations took place morethanfouryearsaftertheJudgmentwhichitisseekingtohaverevised .AtthetimewhenthatJudgmentwasgiven,thesitu-ationobtainingwasthatcreatedbyGeneralAssemblyresolu-tion47/1 .InthisregardtheCourtobservesthatthedifficultieswhicharoseregardingtheFRY’sstatusbetweentheadoption

5

ofthatresolutionanditsadmissiontotheUnitedNationson1 November 2000 resulted from the fact that, although theFRY’s claim to continue the international legal personalityof the Former Yugoslavia was not “generally accepted” (seeSecurity Council resolution 777 of 19 September 1992), thepreciseconsequencesof thissituationweredeterminedonacase-by-casebasis(forexample,non-participationintheworkoftheGeneralAssemblyandECOSOC) .Resolution47/1didnotinter aliaaffecttheFRY’srighttoappearbeforetheCourtortobeapartytoadisputebeforetheCourtunderthecondi-tionslaiddownbytheStatute .NordiditaffectthepositionoftheFRYinrelationtotheGenocideConvention .To“termi-natethesituationcreatedbyresolution47/1”,theFRYhadtosubmitarequestforadmissiontotheUnitedNationsashadbeendoneby theotherRepublicscomposing theSFRY .TheCourt points out that all these elements were known to theCourtandtotheFRYatthetimewhentheJudgmentwasgiv-en .Nevertheless,whatremainedunknowninJuly1996wasifandwhentheFRYwouldapplyformembershipintheUnitedNationsandifandwhenthatapplicationwouldbeaccepted,thus terminating the situationcreatedbyGeneralAssemblyresolution47/1 .

The Court emphasizes that General Assembly resolu-tion 55/12 of 1 November 2000 cannot have changed retro-activelythesui generispositionwhichtheFRYfounditselfinvis-à-vistheUnitedNationsovertheperiod1992to2000,oritspositioninrelationtotheStatuteoftheCourtandtheGen-ocideConvention .Furthermore,theletteroftheLegalCoun-seloftheUnitedNationsdated8December2000cannothaveaffectedtheFRY’sposition inrelationtotreaties .TheCourtalsoobservesthat,inanyevent,thesaidletterdidnotcontainaninvitationtotheFRYtoaccedetotherelevantconventions,butratherto“undertaketreatyactions,asappropriate, . . .asasuccessorState” .

The Court concludes from the foregoing that it has notbeenestablishedthattherequestoftheFRYisbaseduponthediscoveryof“somefact”whichwas“whenthejudgmentwasgiven,unknowntotheCourtandalsotothepartyclaimingrevision” .Itfindsthatoneoftheconditionsfortheadmissibil-ity of an application for revision prescribed by paragraph 1of Article 61 of the Statute has therefore not been satisfied .TheCourtfinallyindicatesthatitthereforedoesnotneedtoaddresstheissueofwhethertheotherrequirementsofArti-cle61oftheStatutefortheadmissibilityoftheFRY’sApplica-tionhavebeensatisfied .

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Separate opinion of Judge Koroma

JudgeKoroma,referringtotheneedtoelucidateArticle61andtheratherscantjurisprudenceonrevision,pointsoutthatthe revisionprocedure is essentiallyaboutnewlydiscoveredfactsorargumentsandnota legalchallenge,assuch, totheconclusionreachedearlierbytheCourtbasedonthefactsasthenknown,althoughtheoutcomeofthechallengemayhaveaneffectontheJudgment .

According to the jurisprudence, the discovery of newfactsisastrictconditionontheavailabilityofrevision .ThisconditionisalsofundamentaltothedecisionontheApplica-tion,whethertheadmissionoftheFRYtomembershipoftheUnitedNations,whichtookplaceon1November2000, isanewlydiscoveredfactwithinthemeaningofArticle61oftheStatute,whichfactmusthaveexisted,butbeenunknown,atthetimeoftheJudgment .

It is against this background that Judge Koroma has dif-ficultywithsomeconclusions reached in the Judgment .TheCourt,heobserves,withoutdefiningwhatinitsopinionwillbeconsidereda“new”factwithinthemeaningofArticle61,statedthatifthefactoccurredseveralyearsafterajudgment,thisisnotanewfactwithinthemeaningofArticle61,irre-spectiveofitslegalconsequences .InJudgeKoroma’sview,thisis,asapositionoflaw,correctasfarasitgoes;buttheissuetheCourt has to determine involves the questionas to whetherornotYugoslaviawasaMemberoftheUnitedNationsbefore1November2000 .

He recalls that the Court relied for the basis of its Judg-mentin1996ontheFRY’sdeclarationof22April1992thatitremainedboundbythosetreatiestowhichtheformerSocial-istFederalRepublicofYugoslaviahadbeenaparty,andtheCourtassumedforthispurposethattheFRYwasaMemberoftheUnitedNations .Unlesssuchassumptionwasmade,theFRY’sdeclarationaloneshouldnotandcouldnotlegallyhavebeensufficienttoserveasabasisforrecognitionoftheFRYasapartytotheGenocideConvention—thesolebasisonwhichthe Court founded its jurisdiction . Accordingly, the FRY’sadmissiontomembershipoftheUnitedNationson1Novem-ber 2000 suggests that it was not a Member of the UnitedNations in 1996 and thus was not a party to the GenocideConvention;therefore,thebasisoftheCourt’sjurisdictionnolongerexists .Unfortunately, theCourtchosenot toaddressthesecriticalissues,whichwereraisedintheApplicationandinthehearings,butratherstatedthattheconsequenceswhichtheFRYsoughttodrawfromthefactswhichoccurredin2000even if established, “cannot be regarded as facts within themeaningofArticle61” (paragraph69of the Judgment) .Farfromtheconsequencesnotbeingestablished,itwasbecauseoftheFRY’sadmissiontomembershipoftheUnitedNationsthat it acceded to the Genocide Convention in March 2001,after having received a letter from the Legal Counsel of theUnited Nations asking it to undertake any necessary treatyformalitiesinitscapacityassuccessorState .InJudgeKoroma’sopinion,itisincontestablethat,astheFRYstatedinitsAppli-cation,“[t]headmissionoftheFRYtotheUnitedNationsasanewMemberclearsambiguitiesandshedsadifferentlightontheissueofthemembershipoftheFRYintheUnitedNations,intheStatuteandintheGenocideConvention .”

JudgeKoromagrantsthattheissuesraisedbythiscasearenoteasyofsolution,butfearsthattheanswersprovidedbegthequestionandcannotwithstandscrutiny .Inhisview,whenanapplicationforrevisionissubmittedunderArticle61andwhere fresh facts have emerged and are of such importanceastowarrantrevisingtheearlierdecisionorconclusion,theCourtshouldbewillingtocarryoutsuchaprocedure .SuchanapplicationisnottoberegardedasimpugningtheCourt’searlierlegaldecisionassuch,asthatdecisionwasbasedonthe

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factsasthenknown .HeisoftheviewthattheadmissionoftheFRYtomembershipoftheUnitedNationsinNovember2000doeshavelegalimplicationsfortheJudgmentreachedbytheCourtonthismatterinJuly1996 .

InJudgeKoroma’sopinion,theCourt’sjurisdictioncouldhavebeenfoundedonmorelegallysecuregrounds .

Dissenting opinion of Judge Vereshchetin

Judge Vereshchetin is of the view that the starting pointoftheCourt’sreasoninginthepresentJudgmentshouldhavebeen the question, lying at the core of the dispute betweentheParties,as towhetherornot theassumption thatYugo-slaviawasaMemberoftheUnitedNationsatthetimeofthe1996Judgmentwasnecessary,andtherefore“ofsuchanatureas to be a decisive factor” (within the meaning of Art . 61,para .1,oftheStatute),fortheCourt’sfindingonitsjurisdic-tion .

Havingarrivedattheconclusionthatsuchanassumptionwas necessary since, “otherwise, it is inconceivable how theCourtcouldhaverecognizedthecontinuingparticipationofYugoslavia in the Genocide Convention while the essentialpre-condition of such participation [the membership of theUnitedNations]hadceasedtoexist”,JudgeVereshchetinpro-ceedstoexaminewhetherUnitedNationsmembershipstatusmayfallwithinthelegalnotionof“fact”andifso,whetheranassumptionofsuchafactlaterprovedtobewrongcanserveasagroundforrevisingajudgment,providedallotherrequire-mentsofArticle61oftheStatutearesatisfied .

Givingaffirmativeanswerstobothquestions,JudgeVeresh-chetinfurtheropinesthatYugoslaviahasshownthatitsnon-membershipoftheUnitedNationswasunknowntoYugosla-viaandtheCourtwhentheJudgmentwasdeliveredandthatsuchignorancewasnotduetoYugoslavia’snegligence .

“From the legal point of view”, continues Judge Veresh-chetin, “it cannot be denied that the fact of Yugoslavia’snon-membership in the United Nations at the time of the1996 Judgment could not have been established before thedecision of the General Assembly on 1 November 2000, bywhichdecisionYugoslaviawasadmittedasanewMemberoftheUnitedNations .ThisdecisionwastakenpursuanttotherecommendationoftheCommitteeontheAdmissionofNewMembersand the recommendationof theSecurityCouncil .LikeallotherStateswhichhadformedthepastSocialistFed-eralRepublicofYugoslavia,thenewYugoslaviaisnowlistedintheofficialdocumentsoftheUnitedNationsasaMemberfromthetimeofitsadmission,andnotfromthetimewhentheformerYugoslaviabecameaMemberoftheUnitedNations .

Ontheotherhand,theassumptionofYugoslavia’smem-bershipintheUnitedNationsatthetimeoftheCourt’sJudg-mentonits jurisdictioncannotbesustainedafter1Novem-ber2000 .ResidualelementsofthemembershipoftheformerYugoslavia,notdeniedtothenewYugoslaviaafter1992,can-notfrustratethisconclusion .Otherwise,wehavetopresumethattherulesofelementarylogicandcommonsensearenotapplicabletothiscase,andaStatethatalreadywasaMemberofanorganizationandwhosemembershiphadneitherceasednorwassuspendedatacertaintime,canagainbeadmittedtothesameorganizationasanewMember,butwithadifferent

initialdateofitsmembership .However”,intheviewofJudgeVereshchetin,“thisisexactlywhatflowsfromtheJudgment’sholding that ‘it has not been established that the request oftheFRYisbaseduponthediscoveryof‘somefact’whichwas‘whenthejudgmentwasgiven,unknowntotheCourtandalsotothepartyclaimingrevision’(para .72oftheJudgment) .”

Intheconcludingpartofhisopinion,JudgeVereshchetinsays that, inhisview, therequest forrevisionof theCourt’sJudgment on its jurisdiction satisfies all the conditionscontemplated by Article 61 of the Statute and therefore theApplicationofYugoslaviaisadmissibleandtheJudgmentoftheCourtof11July1996shouldhavebeenlaidopenforrevi-sion .“Suchaproceduraldecisionwouldnothaveprejudgedtheultimateresultoftherevision .A fortiori,itcouldnothavebeenseenasacondoningofthebehaviourofeithersideinthebloodyconflictontheterritoryoftheformerYugoslavia .”

Declaration by Judge Rezek

Judge Rezek considers the Application for revision to beadmissible .Inhisview,theCourt’sassertionintheJudgmentof11July1996ofjurisdictionovertheRespondent,resultingfromamisreadingofthefactualsituation,shouldnowbere-examined . Otherwise, he would have proposed denying in liminetheApplicationforrevisionbutforareasondiametri-callyopposedtothoserelieduponbythemajority:theFed-eralRepublicofYugoslavia,oneofthenewestMembersoftheUnitedNations,isnottheentityconsideredbytheCourttobetheRespondentintheJudgmentof11July1996 .Accordingly,thenewYugoslaviadoesnothavestanding toseekrevision .ItisnotapartytothedisputesubmittedtotheCourtbyBos-niaandHerzegovina .ItwillbefortheCourttodecideattheappropriatetimewhetherthatdisputeisextantintheabsenceoftheRespondent .

Dissenting opinion of Judge Dimitrijević

JudgeDimitrijevićbelievesthatthetwoprincipal linesofreasoningofthemajorityareflawed,namely,(a)theattempttodisposeofthecasebyrestrictivelyinterpretingthemean-ingoftheterm“fact”asusedinArticle61oftheStatute,and(b)thechoiceofonlyoneinterpretationofthelegalsituationwhichobtainedon11July1996whentheJudgmentinthecaseconcerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herze-govina v . Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections was delivered .ThepropositionthattheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(FRY)wasacontinuatoroftheformerSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(SFRY)wastreatedbytheCourtin1996asafact(as is done by the majority in the present case); the admis-sionof theFRYasanewMember to theUnitedNationson1November2000revealedthatthisfacthadnotexistedatanytime .

In the opinion of Judge Dimitrijević, the meaning of theterm“fact”cannotbereducedtoaneventoranobjectexist-ing in physical reality: a fact in law is part of legal reality .Beingornotbeingamemberofaninternationalorganizationor a party to an international treaty is a legal fact . In Arti-cle61,paragraph1,oftheStatute,referenceismadetoafactwhichexistedatthetimewhentheJudgmentwasgiven,but

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wasunknowntotheCourtandtothepartyclaimingrevision,whilstparagraph2requirestheCourtexpresslytorecordtheexistenceofthe“newfact”inordertodeclareanapplicationforrevisionadmissible .Thisimpliesanewunderstanding,asa resultof the realization,after the judgmentwasdelivered,that the “old” fact, which had been taken as existing at thetimeofthejudgment,hadneveractuallyexisted .Contrarytowhatthemajorityholds,theFRYdoesnotrely“onthelegalconsequenceswhichitseekstodrawfromfactssubsequenttothe[1996]Judgment”(Judgment,para .69),butclaimsthatthefactonwhichtheCourtrelied in its1996Judgmentdidnotexist .Thenon-existenceofafactisasmuchafactualquestionasitsexistence .

InitsOrderof8April1993ontherequestfortheindicationofprovisionalmeasuresinthecaseofBosnia and Herzegovina v . Yugoslavia,theCourtfoundthatithadprima faciejurisdic-tiononthebasisofArticleIxoftheGenocideConventioninconjunctionwithArticle35,paragraph2,oftheStatuteandobserved that the solution adopted was “not free from legaldifficulties”(I.C.J. Reports 1993,p .14,para .18)andthat“thequestionwhetherornotYugoslaviaisaMemberoftheUnitedNationsandassuchapartytotheStatuteoftheCourtisonewhichtheCourtdoesnotneedtodeterminedefinitivelyatthepresentstageoftheproceedings”(ibid.;emphasisadded) .Inits1996Judgmentonthepreliminaryobjections,theCourtagaindidnotfinditnecessarytodeterminedefinitivelywhetherornottheFRYwasaMemberoftheUnitedNationsandapartytotheStatuteoftheCourt .

For Judge Dimitrijević it remains unclear to which“Yugoslavia” the Court referred as being party to theGenocide Convention . In failing to indicate that theFRY was bound by the obligations of the SFRY as a suc-cessor State, the Court must have assumed that therewas continuity between the SFRY and the FRY and thatthe latter was a Member of the United Nations . Thesedeterminations were findings on facts . They were made bytheCourtinspiteofadmitted“legaldifficulties”,whichwereknownto theCourt in the formofpossibleoptionsonhowto decide on the presence of certain facts, as disclosed in aseries of ambiguous or controversial decisions of States andvariousorgansoftheUnitedNationsandotherinternationalorganizations,suchasSecurityCouncilresolution757(1992),whichnotedthattheclaimbytheFRY“tocontinueautomati-callythemembershipoftheformerSocialistFederalRepublicof Yugoslavia in the United Nations has not been generallyaccepted” (United Nations doc . S/RES/757 (1992)), its reso-lution 777 (1992) finding that the SFRY had ceased to existand recommending to the General Assembly to decide thattheFRY“shouldapplyformembershipintheUnitedNationsand that it shall not participate in the work of the GeneralAssembly”(UnitedNationsdoc .S/RES/777(1992)),followedby the General Assembly resolution 47/1, which stated thatthe FRY “cannot continue automatically the membership ofthe former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in theUnited Nations” (United Nations doc . A/RES/47/1 (1992)),anddecidedthattheFRY“shouldapplyformembershipintheUnitedNationsandthatitshallnotparticipateintheworkoftheGeneralAssembly”(ibid.).Afterdeciding,sevenmonthslater, that theFRYshouldnotparticipate intheworkof the

Economic and Social Council either, the General Assemblyadopted resolution 48/88, urging “Member States and theSecretariatinfulfillingthespiritofthatresolution,toendthede facto working status of Serbia and Montenegro” (UnitedNations doc . A/RES/48/88, para . 19; emphasis added) . HowtheaddresseesofthisresolutionactedmusthavebeenknowntotheCourt .

TheexamplesquotedinthisregardbyJudgeDimitrijevićbeginwiththeopinionsoftheArbitrationCommissionestab-lishedasanadvisorybodybythePeaceConferenceonYugo-slavia(the“BadinterCommission”) .ItfoundinJuly1992thatthe SFRY no longer existed and that “none of the successorStatesmay thereuponclaim for itself alone themembershiprights previously enjoyed by the former SFRY” (Opinion 9,reproduced inInternational Legal Materials,1992),andthattheFRYwas“anewStatewhichcannotbeconsideredthesolesuccessor to theSFRY”(Opinion10, reproduced inInterna-tional Legal Materials,1992) .TheEuropeanCommunityandits Member States, or the majority of other Members of theUnitedNations,haveneveracceptedtheautomaticcontinuityoftheFRY .Ontheotherhand,therewerestatementsbyrepre-sentativesofsomeotherStates,whichsupportedtheclaimtocontinuityofthethengovernmentoftheFRY .AthirdgroupofStatesstatedthattheyfailedtodiscernthebasisinlawofthe resolutions of the United Nations principal organs onYugoslavia,andinparticularanyreferencetotheprovisionsoftheUnitedNationsChartergoverningmembership .

ThefindingoftheCourtin1996“thatithasnotbeencon-tested thatYugoslaviawasaparty to theGenocideConven-tion” must, in the view of Judge Dimitrijević, now be seeninadifferentlight .BosniaandHerzegovinahasbeenoneofthoseStateswhichhavemostvigorouslycontestedtheidentitybetween theSFRYand theFRY,exceptonly in relation toaspecificcasebeforetheCourt .

Judge Dimitrijević does not believe that the opinions ofthelegalservicesoftheUnitedNationsSecretariatovercamethe inconsistencies and ambiguities of the decisions of theUnitedNationsorgans,especiallyofGeneralAssemblyresolu-tion47/1 .Alltheactorsatthetimemusthavebeenawarethat“Yugoslavia” in thisparticularand importantcontextcouldhave been taken as a short reference both to the SFRY andtheFRY .Whatthen,asksJudgeDimitrijević,isthedifferencebetween “old Yugoslavia” and “new Yugoslavia”, referred tointheopinions?WhatwasbelievedwouldhappentotheoldStateoncethenewStatewasadmittedtotheUnitedNations?Itcanevenbeconcludedthatsomeactorskeptalivethefic-tionthataphantomStateexisted,whichwasneithertheSFRYnortheFRY,orthatitwaspresumedthattheSFRYhadgoneonexisting .Paradoxically, thefancifultheoryofthefurtherexistenceof“Yugoslavia”seemstocorrespondbesttothesitu-ationdescribedbyonewriteras“limitedsurvivalafterdeath . . .oftheformerYugoslaviaattheUnitedNations”(T .Treves,“TheExpansionof theWorldCommunityandMembershipoftheUnitedNations”,The Finnish Yearbook of International Law,Vol .VI(1995),p .278) .

The United Nations Under-Secretary-General opined in1992thatresolution47/1didnot“takeawaytherightofYugo-slaviatoparticipateintheworkoforgansotherthanAssembly

8

bodies”(UnitedNationsdoc .A/47/485) .Theimplied“right”oftheFRYtoparticipateinotherUnitedNationsorgansandtousetheInternationalCourtofJustice,whichisoneofthemainargumentsofthemajorityinsupportofthejurisdictionof the Court in 1996, was in the eyes of Judge Dimitrijevićveryweak,because, sevenmonths later,participation in theworkofECOSOCwasdeniedbytheGeneralAssemblywith-outadducinganyfurtherlegalreasons .HowcouldtheCourtthen have concluded that the “right” of the FRY to appearbeforetheCourtwasanystronger?IfthemeasuresagainsttheFRYwereveryrestrictedandnotdecisivefortheveryimpor-tantmatterofthestatusofaStateintheUnitedNations,wasnottheprescribed“admissiontotheUnitedNationsofanewYugoslavia under Article 4” too potent a remedy? MeasuresdirectedagainsttheFRYcouldsimplyhavebeenrescinded .IfthemembershipoftheFRYwasnotterminated,whydidthatStatehavetoapplytobeadmittedasanewMember?

JudgeDimitrijevićbelievesthattheanswerlayinthepuni-tivenatureof thosemeasures .TheFRYwasat that timethetargetofgradually increasingrestrictionsaimedatreducingthe limitedscopeinwhichitwasallowedtoplaytheroleof“Yugoslavia”intheUnitedNations .TheFRYwasofferedtheprospectthatitwouldreceivebettertreatmentifthecompe-tent United Nations organs become satisfied that the objec-tions to the political conduct of the FRY no longer existed .OnewayoftestingthiswastheprocedureofadmissionunderArticle 4 of the United Nations Charter, which offered theopportunitytoexaminewhethertheFRYwas“peace-loving”and“ableandwilling”tocarryouttheobligationscontainedinthatArticle .Intheprocess,therepeatedassertionsthattheSFRYhadceasedtoexistwereconvenientlyforgottenandthefictionofitsvirtualexistenceprolonged .IftheSFRYstillsur-vivedunder thenameof “Yugoslavia”, theconclusioncouldbedrawnthattheJudgmentof11July1996didnotconcerntheFRYbutthestillexistingSFRY .WhentheFRYwasfinallyadmittedtotheUnitedNationsitbecameclearthattheprag-matic temporary solution could not resolve the confusionin regard to the suggested admission to membership of theUnitedNationsofanewStatewhilepretendingthatitwasatthesametimeanoldState,thereadmissionofaStatethathadnotpreviouslybeenexcludedfrommembership,thereconfir-mationofaState’sexistingmembership,etc .

JudgeDimitrijevićconcedesthattherewasaclaimof theFRYtocontinuity .However,thedecisiveelementwaswhetherotherStatesrecognizedthisclaim .ThedecisiononcontinuityofStatesisoneofthedecentralizedactsoftheinternationalcommunity, similar to that on the recognition of States . Inall cases of disintegration of a State, the general responsehas depended primarily on the attitude of the other Stateswhichemergedon the territoryof the formerState . If therewas agreement, other members of the international com-munitywouldgenerally followsuit . In thecaseof theSFRYtherewasnoagreement .ThecontinuationoftheSFRYbytheFRYwasnotamattertobedecidedonlybytheFRY,orexclu-sivelybytheFRYandothersuccessorStatesoftheSFRY,butitremainedinthehandsofotheractors .ByadmittingtheFRYtotheUnitedNations,theSecurityCouncilandtheGeneralAssemblyfinallydeterminedtheoutcomeofthedebatewhichhadshownthatSFRY-FRYcontinuityhadbeenanassumption

or perception shared by some other international actors butnot widely supported . If the FRY’s claim was not “generallyaccepted” in 1992, it could have been accepted later, say in1996,buttheCourtfailedthentoproveuniversalacceptance .It could not have proven it in 1996 or for the whole periodbetween11 July1996and1November2000,when itfinallybecameclearthatgeneralacceptancehadnotmaterialized .

ThattheFRYwasnotthesolecontinuator,butoneofthesuccessorsoftheSFRY,becameestablishedasafactexistingsincetheverycreationoftheFRY;the“fact”thattheFRYwasacontinuatoroftheSFRYhasnotexistedatanytime .Inits1996JudgmenttheCourtespousedoneoftheexistingviews,rejectedbythemajorityofStates,includingBosniaandHerze-govina .ThemajorityintheCourtinthepresentcasetreatsthisviewastheonlyknownfactatthetime .JudgeDimitrijevićisconvincedthatlatereventsdemonstratedthatrealitydifferedfromthe“facts”whichwerereliedontoestablishtheCourt’sjurisdictionin1996 .

Even if none of the interpretations advanced above areaccepted,JudgeDimitrijevićissurethatthefollow-uptotherelevantSecurityCouncilandGeneralAssemblyresolutionswasknowntotheCourtin1996,andthatitmusthavereal-izedthatthiswasinconclusive .Thesituationin1996hadnotdevelopedtothedegreethatitallowedafinaldeterminationthattheCourthadjurisdictiononthebasisofcontinuity .InviewoftheconsistentoppositionofBosniaandHerzegovinatotheclaimoftheFRYtocontinuity,theCourtshouldhaveexamineditsjurisdictionproprio motuandnothavebeensat-isfiedbythefactthatBosniaandHerzegovinadidnotdisputethatjurisdictionin this particular case.ThejurisdictionoftheCourtcannotbeimposedonaStatewithoutitsconsent,whichcannot be presumed and should be carefully examined andnarrowlyinterpreted .The“sui generispositionwhichtheFRYfound itself in vis-à-vis the United Nations over the period1992to2000”(Judgment,para .71),asthemajoritydescribesthestatusoftheFRY,was,intheeyesofJudgeDimitrijević,insufficient to establish jurisdiction . The majority concedesthatitwasnotknownin1996whethertheFRYwouldapplyformembershipintheUnitedNationsandwhetheritwouldbeadmitted,butitstillbasesthewholeargumentonthecuri-ousassumptionthattheadmissionofaStateasaMemberoftheUnitedNationsdoesnotnecessarilyresult in the logicalconclusionthatithadnotbeenaMemberpriortoadmission .Ifforsomereasonsthereisanexceptiontotherule,itmustbestrictly construed and unequivocally proven, which has notbeendoneinthiscase .

According to Article 61, paragraph 2, of the Statute, thepurposeofa judgmentopeningtheproceedingsforrevisionislimitedtotheinitialdeterminationoftheexistenceofanewfact and of its nature . In the view of Judge Dimitrijević theJudgment in this case should have enabled the Court to gomoredeeplyintothematterofitsjurisdictiononthebasisoffactsthatexistedinJuly1996,butacquiredtheirrealmean-ingonlyon1November2000 .Openingtheproceedingsforrevisionwouldnothaveprecludedapossiblefindingthatthefactswere suchas toenable theCourt toentertain jurisdic-tion .DeclaringtheApplicationforrevisioninadmissibleonlybyreferencetotheliteralmeaningoftheword“fact”missesa serious opportunity to decide on important matters relat-

9

ingtothejurisdictionoftheCourt .Admittedly,therecouldhavebeenotherbasesforthejurisdictionoftheCourt,buttheCourtdismissedtheminthe1996Judgment .Theycouldhavebeenexaminedhadthecasebeenopenedforrevision .

Separate opinion of Judge Mahiou

Judge Mahiou observes that, to found its Application forthe revision of the 11 July 1996 Judgment, Yugoslavia reliesonthefactthatatthetimeoftheJudgmentitwasnotaMem-berof theUnitedNations,wasnotaparty to theStatuteoftheCourtandwasnotboundby theGenocideConvention,contending that this was a new fact and that it was discov-eredon1November2000whenYugoslaviawasadmittedtomembership in the United Nations, thereby revealing thatit had not previously been a Member . However, this claimcannot be established in terms of Article 61 of the Court’s

Statute because, while the admission of Yugoslavia in 2000iscertainlyanewfact,thisfactoccurredaftertheJudgmentandcannotthereforeaffecttheprevioussituation .Further,theissue of Yugoslavia’s legal status was being discussed beforethevariousorgansoftheUnitedNationsandwasthusafactknown to everyone, in particular to Yugoslavia and to theCourt,whichthusrendereditsJudgmentwithfullknowledgeofthefacts .Lastly,theundertakings,statementsandconductofYugoslaviashowthatitdidnothingtoclarifythesituation,andthiscontinuestobethecase,asshownbythefactthatitremainstheApplicantineightcasesbeforetheCourtagainstmembersofNATO,concerningthelegalityoftheuseofforce,preciselyfoundingitsclaimsonitsdeclarationofacceptanceofthecompulsoryjurisdictionoftheCourtandontheGeno-cideConvention .

141. CAseConCeRnInGAVenAAnDotHeRMexICAnnAtIonALs(MexICo v. UnIteDstAtesoFAMeRICA)(PRoVIsIonALMeAsURes)

orderof5February2003

___________

InthecaseconcerningAvena and Other Mexican Nation-als(Mexico v . United States of America),theCourt,exercisingitspowerunderArticle41of itsStatute, issuedanOrderon5February2003,indicatingprovisionalmeasures .

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TheCourtwascomposedas follows: PresidentGuillaume;Vice-PresidentShi;JudgesOda,Ranjeva,Herczegh,Fleischhauer,Koroma,Vereshchetin,Higgins,Parra-Aranguren,Kooijmans,Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, Elaraby; Registrar Cou-vreur .

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Paragraph59oftheOrderreadsasfollows:“ . . .TheCourtUnanimously,I. Indicatesthefollowingprovisionalmeasures:(a) The United States of America shall take all measuresnecessarytoensurethatMr .CésarRobertoFierroReyna,Mr . Roberto Moreno Ramos and Mr . Osvaldo TorresAguileraarenotexecutedpendingfinaljudgmentintheseproceedings;(b)TheGovernmentoftheUnitedStatesofAmericashallinformtheCourtofallmeasurestakeninimplementationofthisOrder .Decides that, until the Court has rendered its final judg- that, until the Court has rendered its final judg-that,until theCourthas rendered itsfinal judg-ment,itshallremainseisedofthematterswhichformthesubjectofthisOrder .”

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JudgeOdaappendedadeclarationtotheOrder .

** *

The Court begins by recalling that, on 9 January 2003,the United Mexican States (hereinafter “Mexico”) institutedproceedingsagainsttheUnitedStatesofAmerica(hereinafterthe“UnitedStates”)for“violationsoftheViennaConventiononConsularRelations(doneon24April1963)”(hereinafterthe“ViennaConvention”)allegedlycommittedbytheUnitedStates .TheCourtnotesthat,initsApplication,MexicobasesthejurisdictionoftheCourtonArticle36,paragraph1,oftheStatuteoftheCourtandonArticleIoftheOptionalProtocolconcerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, whichaccompanies the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations(hereinafterthe“OptionalProtocol”) .

TheCourtnotesfurtherthatinitsApplicationMexicoaskstheCourttoadjudgeanddeclare:

“(1) that the United States, in arresting, detaining, try-ing,convicting,andsentencingthe54Mexicannationalson death row described in this Application, violated itsinternational legalobligationstoMexico, initsownrightandintheexerciseofitsrightofconsularprotectionofitsnationals,asprovidedbyArticles5and36,respectivelyoftheViennaConvention;(2) that Mexico is therefore entitled to restitutio in inte-grum;

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(3) that the United States is under an international legalobligationnottoapplythedoctrineofproceduraldefault,oranyotherdoctrineofitsmunicipallaw,toprecludetheexerciseoftherightsaffordedbyArticle36oftheViennaConvention;(4) that the United States is under an international legalobligation to carry out in conformity with the foregoinginternational legal obligations any future detention of orcriminalproceedingsagainstthe54Mexicannationalsondeath row or any other Mexican national in its territory,whetherbyaconstituent,legislative,executive,judicialorotherpower,whetherthatpowerholdsasuperiororasub-ordinatepositionintheorganizationoftheUnitedStates,and whether that power’s functions are international orinternalincharacter;(5)thattherighttoconsularnotificationundertheViennaConventionisahumanright;andthat,pursuanttotheforegoinginternationallegalobli-gations,(1)theUnitedStatesmustrestorethestatus quo ante,thatis,re-establishthesituationthatexistedbeforethedeten-tionof,proceedingsagainst,andconvictionsandsentencesof, Mexico’s nationals in violation of the United Statesinternationallegalobligations;(2) the United States must take the steps necessary andsufficienttoensurethattheprovisionsofitsmunicipallawenablefulleffecttobegiventothepurposesforwhichtherightsaffordedbyArticle36areintended;(3) the United States must take the steps necessary andsufficienttoestablishameaningfulremedyatlawforvio-lations of the rights afforded to Mexico and its nationalsbyArticle36oftheViennaConvention,includingbybar-ring the imposition, asamatterofmunicipal law,of anyproceduralpenaltyforthefailuretimelytoraiseaclaimordefencebasedontheViennaConventionwherecompetentauthoritiesoftheUnitedStateshavebreachedtheirobliga-tion to advise the national of his or her rights under theConvention;and(4) the United States, in light of the pattern and practiceof violations set forth in this Application, must provideMexicoafullguaranteeofthenon-repetitionoftheillegalacts .”TheCourtfurtherrecallsthat,on9January2003,Mexico

also submitted a request for the indication of provisionalmeasures inorder toprotect its rights,asking that,pendingfinaljudgmentinthiscase,theCourtindicate:

“(a) That the Government of the United States take allmeasuresnecessarytoensurethatnoMexicannationalbeexecuted;(b)ThattheGovernmentoftheUnitedStatestakeallmeas-uresnecessarytoensurethatnoexecutiondatesbesetforanyMexicannational;(c)ThattheGovernmentoftheUnitedStatesreporttotheCourt the actions it has taken in pursuance of subpara-graphs(a)and(b);and

(d)ThattheGovernmentoftheUnitedStatesensurethatno action is taken that might prejudice the rights of theUnitedMexicanStatesoritsnationalswithrespecttoanydecisionthisCourtmayrenderonthemeritsofthecase .”TheCourtfinallynotesthat,byaletterof20January2003,

Mexico informed the Court that, further to the decision ofthe Governor of the State of Illinois to commute the deathsentences of all convicted individuals awaiting execution inthatState,itwaswithdrawingitsrequestforprovisionalmeas-uresonbehalfofthreeofthe54Mexicannationalsreferredto in the Application: Messrs . Juan Caballero Hernández,Mario Flores Urbán and Gabriel Solache Romero . In thatletter, Mexico further stated that its request for provisionalmeasures would stand for the other 51 Mexican nationalsimprisoned in the United States and that “[t]he applicationstands,onitsmerits,forthefifty-fourcases” .

The Court then summarizes the arguments put forwardby the Parties during the public hearings held on 21 Janu-ary2003 .

*The Court begins its reasoning by observing that, on a

requestfortheindicationofprovisionalmeasures,itneednotfinally satisfy itself, before deciding whether or not to indi-cate suchmeasures, that ithas jurisdictionon themeritsofthe case, yet it may not indicate them unless the provisionsinvokedbytheApplicantappear,prima facie,toaffordabasisonwhichthejurisdictionoftheCourtmightbefounded .

TheCourtgoesontonotethatMexicohasarguedthattheissuesindisputebetweenitselfandtheUnitedStatesconcernArticles5and36of theViennaConventionand fallwithinthe compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under Article I oftheOptionalProtocol,andthatMexicohasaccordinglycon-cludedthattheCourthasthejurisdictionnecessarytoindi-catetheprovisionalmeasuresrequested .TheCourtnotesthattheUnitedStateshassaidthatit“doesnotproposetomakeanissuenowofwhethertheCourtpossessesprima faciejurisdic-tion,althoughthisiswithoutprejudicetoitsrighttocontestthe Court’s jurisdiction at the appropriate stage later in thecase” .Inviewoftheforegoing,theCourtaccordinglyconsid-ersthat,prima facie,ithasjurisdictionunderArticleIoftheaforesaidOptionalProtocoltohearthecase .

The Court then recalls that, in its Application, MexicoaskedtheCourttoadjudgeanddeclarethattheUnitedStates“violated its international legal obligations to Mexico, in itsownrightandintheexerciseofitsrightofconsularprotectionofitsnationals,asprovidedbyArticles5and36,respectivelyof the Vienna Convention”; that Mexico is seeking variousmeasures aimed at remedying these breaches and avoidingany repetition thereof; and that Mexico contends that theCourt shouldpreserve theright to suchremediesbycallingupon theUnitedStates to takeallnecessary steps toensurethatnoMexicannationalbeexecutedandthatnoexecutiondatebesetinrespectofanysuchnational .

The Court further recalls that the United States hasacknowledgedthat,incertaincases,Mexicannationalshavebeen prosecuted and sentenced without being informedof their rights pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of

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the Vienna Convention, but that it argues, however, that insuch cases, in accordance with the Court’s Judgment in theLaGrand case, it has the obligation “by means of its ownchoosing,[to]allowthereviewandreconsiderationofthecon-victionandsentencebytakingaccountoftheviolationoftherightssetforthinthatConvention”,andthatitsubmitsthat,inthespecificcasesidentifiedbyMexico,theevidenceindi-catesthecommitmentoftheUnitedStatestoprovidingsuchreviewand reconsideration .According to theUnitedStates,suchreviewandreconsiderationcanoccurthroughtheproc-ess of executive clemency—an institution “deeply rooted intheAnglo-Americansystemofjustice”—whichmaybeiniti-atedbytheindividualsconcernedafterthejudicialprocesshasbeencompleted .Itcontendsthatsuchreviewandreconsidera-tionhasalreadyoccurredinseveralcasesduringthelasttwoyears; that none of the Mexicans “currently under sentenceofdeathwillbeexecutedunlesstherehasbeenareviewandreconsiderationoftheconvictionandsentencethattakesintoaccountanyfailuretocarryouttheobligationsofArticle36oftheViennaConvention”;that,underthetermsoftheCourt’sdecision in theLaGrand case, this is a sufficient remedy foritsbreaches,andthatthereisaccordinglynoneedtoindicateprovisionalmeasuresintendedtopreservetherightstosuchremedies .

TheCourtalsonotesthat,accordingtoMexico,theposi-tion of the United States amounts to maintaining that “theViennaConventionentitlesMexicoonlytoreviewandrecon-sideration, and that review and reconsideration equals onlytheability to request clemency”; and that, inMexico’s view,“thestandardless,secretiveandunreviewableprocessthatiscalledclemencycannotanddoesnotsatisfythisCourt’sman-date[intheLaGrandcase]” .

TheCourtconcludes that there is thusadisputebetweenthePartiesconcerningtherightsofMexicoandofitsnation-alsregardingtheremediesthatmustbeprovidedintheeventofafailurebytheUnitedStatestocomplywithitsobligationsunderArticle36,paragraph1,oftheViennaConvention;thatthisdisputebelongstothemeritsandcannotbesettledatthisstageoftheproceedings;andthattheCourtmustaccordinglyaddress the issue of whether it should indicate provisionalmeasures to preserve any rights that may subsequently beadjudgedonthemeritstobethoseoftheApplicant .

The Court notes, however, that the United States arguesthatitisincumbentupontheCourt,pursuanttoArticle41ofitsStatute, to indicateprovisionalmeasures“nottopreserveonly rights claimed by the Applicant, but ‘to preserve therespectiverightsofeitherparty’”;that,“[a]fterbalancingtherightsofbothParties,thescalestipdecidedlyagainstMexico’srequestinthiscase”;thatthemeasuressoughtbyMexicotobe implemented immediately amount to “a sweeping prohi-bition on capital punishment for Mexican nationals in theUnitedStates,regardlessofUnitedStateslaw”,which“woulddrastically interfere with United States sovereign rights andimplicate important federalism interests”; that this would,moreover,transformtheCourtintoa“generalcriminalcourtofappeal”,whichtheCourthasalreadyindicatedinthepastisnotitsfunction;andthatthemeasuresrequestedbyMexicoshouldaccordinglyberefused .

The Court points out that, when considering a requestfor the indication of provisional measures, it “must be con-cernedtopreserve . . .therightswhichmaysubsequentlybeadjudgedbytheCourttobelongeithertotheApplicantortothe Respondent”, without being obliged at that stage of theproceedings to rule on those rights; that the issues broughtbeforetheCourtinthiscase“donotconcerntheentitlementofthefederalstateswithintheUnitedStatestoresorttothedeathpenaltyforthemostheinouscrimes”;that“thefunctionofthisCourtistoresolveinternationallegaldisputesbetweenStates,inter alia,whentheyariseoutoftheinterpretationorapplicationof internationalconventions,andnot toactasacourt of criminal appeal”; that the Court may indicate pro-visional measures without infringing these principles; andthattheargumentputforwardonthesespecificpointsbytheUnitedStatesaccordinglycannotbeaccepted .

TheCourtgoesontostatethat“provisionalmeasuresareindicated ‘pending the final decision’ of the Court on themeritsofthecase,andarethereforeonly justifiedif thereisurgency in the sense that action prejudicial to the rights ofeitherpartyislikelytobetakenbeforesuchfinaldecisionisgiven” .ItfurtherpointsoutthatthejurisdictionoftheCourtislimitedinthepresentcasetothedisputebetweenthePar-tiesconcerningtheinterpretationandapplicationoftheVien-naConventionwithregardtotheindividualswhichMexicoidentifiedasbeingvictimsofaviolationof theConvention .Accordingly,theCourtobserves,itcannotruleontherightsofMexicannationalswhoarenotallegedtohavebeenvictimsofaviolationofthatConvention .

The Court further states that “the sound administrationof justicerequires thatarequest for the indicationofprovi-sionalmeasuresfoundedonArticle73oftheRulesofCourtbesubmittedingoodtime”;itrecallsinthisrespectthattheSupreme Court of the United States, when considering apetitionseeking theenforcementofanOrderof thisCourt,observedthat:“Itisunfortunatethatthismattercamebeforeus while proceedings arepending before the ICJ that mighthave been brought to that court earlier” . The Court furtherobservesthat,inviewoftherulesandtime-limitsgoverningthegrantingofclemencyandthefixingofexecutiondatesinanumberofthestatesoftheUnitedStates,thefactthatnosuchdateshavebeenfixedinanyofthecasesbeforetheCourtisnotperseacircumstancethatshouldprecludetheCourtfromindicatingprovisionalmeasures .

The Court finds that it is apparent from the informa-tion before it in this case that three Mexican nationals,Messrs .CésarRobertoFierroReyna,RobertoMorenoRamosandOsvaldoTorresAguilera,areatriskofexecution in thecomingmonths,orpossiblyevenweeks;thattheirexecutionwouldcauseirreparableprejudicetoanyrightsthatmaysub-sequentlybeadjudgedbytheCourttobelongtoMexico .TheCourtaccordinglyconcludes that thecircumstances requirethatitindicateprovisionalmeasurestopreservethoserights,asArticle41ofitsStatuteprovides .

The Court points out that the other individuals listed inMexico’s Application, although currently on death row, arenotinthesamepositionasthethreepersonsidentifiedintheprecedingparagraphandthattheCourtmay,ifappropriate,

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indicateprovisionalmeasuresunderArticle41oftheStatuteinrespectofthoseindividualsbeforeitrendersfinaljudgmentinthiscase .

TheCourtfinallyobservesthatitisclearlyintheinterestof both Parties that their respective rights and obligationsbedetermineddefinitivelyasearlyaspossible;andthat it isthereforeappropriatethattheCourt,withtheco-operationoftheParties,ensurethatafinal judgmentbereachedwithallpossibleexpedition .

TheCourtconcludesbypointingoutthatthedecisiongiveninthepresentproceedingsinnowayprejudgesthequestionofthejurisdictionoftheCourttodealwiththemeritsofthecaseoranyquestionsrelatingtotheadmissibilityoftheApplica-tion, or relating to the merits themselves; and that it leavesunaffected the right of the Governments of Mexico and theUnitedStates tosubmitarguments inrespectof thoseques-tions .

** *

Declaration of Judge Oda

WhileJudgeOdavotedinfavourofthepresentOrder,inhis declaration he states his doubts concerning the Court’sdefinition of “disputes arising out of the interpretation orapplication” of the Vienna Convention, doubts previouslyexpressedinconnectionwiththeBreardandLaGrandcases .

In Judge Oda’s view, the present case is essentially anattemptbyMexicotosavethelivesofitsnationalssentencedtodeathbydomesticcourtsintheUnitedStates .AstheUnitedStateshasadmitteditsfailuretoprovideconsularnotification,thereisnodisputeabouttheinterpretationorapplicationof

theViennaConvention .JudgeOdabelievesthatMexicohasseizedupontheViennaConventionandtheadmittedviola-tionasameanstosubjecttheUnitedStatestothecompulsoryjurisdictionoftheCourt .

JudgeOdanotesthattheMexicannationalswereinmostcasesgivenconsularassistanceinthejudicialprocessesthatfollowed their initial sentencing . He stresses that this casecannotbeaboutdomesticlegalprocedureintheUnitedStatesbecausethatlieswithinthesovereigndiscretionofthatcoun-try . Nor can it be about the interpretation or application oftheViennaConventionbecausetheUnitedStatesadmits itsviolation .NorcanthecasebeabouttheappropriateremedyfortheviolationoftheConventionbecausethatisamatterofgeneralinternationallaw,nottheinterpretationorapplicationoftheConvention .JudgeOdaconcludesthatthiscaseisreallyaboutabhorrenceofcapitalpunishment .

JudgeOdastatesthatiftheInternationalCourtofJusticeinterferes in a State’s criminal law system, it fails to respectthesovereigntyoftheStateandplacesitselfonaparwiththesupremecourtoftheState .HerecallshisobservationfromtheLaGrand case that theInternationalCourtof Justicecannotactasacourtofcriminalappealandcannotbepetitionedforwritsofhabeascorpus. Further,thepresentcase,havingbeenbrought under the Vienna Convention, is not the appropri-atecontext todeterminewhetherornotcapitalpunishmentwouldbecontrarytoArticle6oftheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights .

Appreciatingthesignificantissuesraisedbythedeathpen-altyfromtheperspectiveoftheindividualscondemnedtodie,JudgeOdareiterateshispreviousstatementthatiftherightsofthoseaccusedofviolentcrimesaretoberespected,thentherightsofthevictimsshouldalsobetakenintoconsideration .

___________

In the case concerning Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of the Congo v . France),theCourtfoundbyfourteen votes to one that the circumstances, as they nowpresentthemselvestotheCourt,arenotsuchastorequiretheexerciseofitspowerunderArticle41oftheStatutetoindicateprovisionalmeasures .

** *

TheCourtwascomposedas follows:PresidentShi;Vice-PresidentRanjeva;JudgesGuillaume,Koroma,Vereshchetin,Higgins,Parra-Aranguren,Kooijmans,Al-Khasawneh,Buer-genthal, Elaraby, Owada, Simma, Tomka; Judge ad hoc deCara;RegistrarCouvreur .

** *

Paragraph41oftheOrderreadsasfollows:

“ . . .

TheCourt,

Byfourteenvotestoone,

Finds that the circumstances, as they now present them-selvestotheCourt,arenotsuchastorequiretheexerciseofitspowerunderArticle41oftheStatutetoindicatepro-visionalmeasures;

infavour:PresidentShi;Vice-PresidentRanjeva; JudgesGuillaume, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal,Elaraby,Owada,Simma,Tomka;

against:Judgead hocdeCara .”

142. CAseConCeRnInGCeRtAInCRIMInALPRoCeeDInGsInFRAnCe(RePUBLICoFtHeConGo v. FRAnCe)(PRoVIsIonALMeAsURes)

orderof17June2003

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** *

JudgesKoromaandVereshchetinappendedajointseparateopiniontotheOrder;Judgead hocdeCaraappendedadis-sentingopiniontotheOrder .

** *

Application and request for a provisional measure(paras .1–4,22–24)

By Application filed in the Registry of the Court on9December2002,theRepublicoftheCongo(hereinafter“theCongo”) sought to institute proceedings against the FrenchRepublic (hereinafter “France”) on the grounds, first, ofalleged

“violationoftheprinciplethataStatemaynot,inbreachoftheprincipleofsovereignequalityamongallMembersoftheUnitedNations,aslaiddowninArticle2,paragraph1,oftheCharteroftheUnitedNations,exerciseitsauthorityontheterritoryofanotherState,byunilaterallyattributingtoitselfuniversaljurisdictionincriminalmattersandbyarrogatingtoitselfthepowertoprosecuteandtrythe Minister of the Interior of a foreign State for crimesallegedlycommittedinconnectionwiththeexerciseofhispowers for the maintenance of public order in his coun-try”,

andsecond,alleged“violationofthecriminalimmunityofaforeignHeadofState—aninternationalcustomaryrulerecog-nizedbythejurisprudenceoftheCourt” .

BytheApplicationtheCongorequestedtheCourt“to declare that the French Republic shall cause to beannulled the measures of investigation and prosecutiontakenbytheProcureur de la RépubliqueoftheParisTribu-nal de grande instance, theProcureur de la RépubliqueoftheMeauxTribunal de grande instanceandtheinvestigat-ingjudgesofthosecourts” .TheApplicationfurthercontaineda“requestfortheindica-

tionofaprovisionalmeasure”,directedtothepreservationoftherightsoftheCongounderbothofthecategoriesmentionedabove,andseeking“anorderfortheimmediatesuspensionoftheproceedingsbeingconductedbytheinvestigatingjudgeoftheMeauxTribunal de grande instance”;uponreceiptoftheconsentofFrancetothejurisdiction,theCourtwasconvenedforthepurposeofproceedingtoadecisionontherequestfortheindicationofaprovisionalmeasureasamatterofurgency;andthatpublichearingsontherequestwereheldon28and29April2003 .

Factual background(paras .10–19)

The Order outlines as follows the factual background ofthecase,asstatedintheApplicationorbythePartiesatthehearings:

A complaint was filed on 5 December 2001, on behalf of certain human rights organizations, with the Procureur de la République of the Paris Tribunal de grande instance “forcrimesagainsthumanityandtortureallegedlycommittedintheCongoagainst individualshavingCongolesenationality,expresslynamingH .E .Mr .DenisSassouNguesso,PresidentoftheRepublicoftheCongo,H .E .GeneralPierreOba,MinisteroftheInterior,PublicSecurityandTerritorialAdministration,GeneralNorbertDabira,Inspector-GeneraloftheCongoleseArmedForces,andGeneralBlaiseAdoua,CommanderofthePresidentialGuard” .

The Procureur de la République of the Paris Tribunal de grande instancetransmittedthatcomplainttotheProcureur de la RépubliqueoftheMeauxTribunal de grande instance,whoorderedapreliminaryenquiryandthenon23January2002issued a réquisitoire (application for a judicial investigationoftheallegedoffences),andtheinvestigatingjudgeofMeauxinitiatedaninvestigation .

ItwasarguedbythecomplainantsthattheFrenchcourtshadjurisdiction,asregardscrimesagainsthumanity,byvir-tue of a principle of international customary law providingforuniversaljurisdictionoversuchcrimes,andasregardsthecrimeoftorture,onthebasisofArticles689–1and689–2oftheFrenchCodeofCriminalProcedure .

TheProcureur de la RépubliqueoftheTribunal de grande instance of Meaux, in his réquisitoire of 23 January 2002,requestedinvestigationbothofcrimesagainsthumanityandoftorture,withoutmentioninganyjurisdictionalbasisotherthanArticle689–1ofthatCode .

Thecomplaint wasreferredtotheparquet oftheTribunal de grande instance of Meaux taking into account that Gen-eralNorbertDabirapossessedaresidenceintheareaofthatcourt’s jurisdiction; however, the investigation was initiatedagainstanon-identifiedperson,notagainstanyoftheCongo-lesepersonalitiesnamedinthecomplaint .

The testimony of General Dabira was first taken on23May2002byjudicialpoliceofficerswhohadtakenhimintocustody,andthenon8July2002bythe investigating judge,asatémoin assisté(legallyrepresentedwitness) .(IthasbeenexplainedbyFrancethatatémoin assistéinFrenchcriminalprocedureisapersonwhoisnotmerelyawitness,buttosomeextentasuspect,andwhothereforeenjoyscertainproceduralrights(assistanceofcounsel,accesstothecasefile)notcon-ferred on ordinary witnesses) . On 16 September 2002 theinvestigatingjudgeissuedagainstGeneralDabira,whohadbythenreturnedtotheCongo,amandat d’amener(warrantforimmediateappearance),which,itwasexplainedbyFranceatthehearing,couldbeenforcedagainsthimshouldhereturntoFrance,butisnotcapableofbeingexecutedoutsideFrenchterritory .

The Application states that when the President of theRepublicoftheCongo,H .E .Mr .DenisSassouNguesso“wason a State visit to France, the investigating judge issued acommission rogatoire (warrant) to judicial police officersinstructing them to take testimony from him” . However nosuchcommission rogatoirehasbeenproduced,andFrancehasinformedtheCourtthatnocommission rogatoirewasissuedagainstPresidentSassouNguesso,but that the investigating

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judgesoughttoobtainevidencefromhimunderArticle656oftheCodeofCriminalProcedure,applicablewhereevidenceissoughtthroughthediplomaticchannelfroma“representativeofaforeignpower”;theCongoacknowledgedinitsApplica-tionthatPresidentSassouNguessowasnever“mis en examen,norcalledasatémoin assisté”.

It iscommongroundbetween theParties thatnoactsofinvestigation(instruction)havebeentakenintheFrenchcrim-inal proceedings against the other Congolese personalitiesnamedintheApplication(H .E .GeneralPierreOba,MinisteroftheInterior,andGeneralBlaiseAdoua),norinparticularhasanyapplicationbeenmadetoquestionthemaswitnesses .

Jurisdiction(paras .20–21)

Afterrecallingtheneedforaprima faciebasisofjurisdic-tion in order for provisional measures to be indicated, theCourt notes that in the Application the Congo proposed tofoundthejurisdictionoftheCourtuponaconsenttheretoyetto be given by France, as contemplated by Article 38, para-graph5,oftheRulesoftheCourt;andthatbyaletterdated8April2003fromtheMinisterforForeignAffairsofFrance,FranceconsentedexplicitlytothejurisdictionoftheCourttoentertaintheApplicationonthebasisofthattext .

Reasoning of the Court(paras .22–40)

TheCourttakesnotethatthecircumstancesreliedonbytheCongo,whichinitsviewrequiretheindicationofmeas-uresrequiringsuspensionoftheFrenchproceedings,aresetoutasfollowsintherequest:

“Theproceedings inquestionareperturbing the interna-tional relations of the Republic of the Congo as a resultof the publicity accorded, in flagrant breach of Frenchlaw governing the secrecy of criminal investigations, tothe actions of the investigating judge, which impugn thehonourandreputationoftheHeadofState,oftheMinisteroftheInteriorandoftheInspector-GeneraloftheArmedForcesand,inconsequence,theinternationalstandingoftheCongo .Furthermore,thoseproceedingsaredamagingtothetraditionallinksofFranco-Congolesefriendship .Iftheseinjuriousproceedingsweretocontinue,thatdamagewouldbecomeirreparable .”ItobservesthatatthehearingstheCongore-emphasized

theirreparableprejudicewhichinitscontentionwouldresultfrom the continuation of the French criminal proceedingsbeforetheTribunal de grande instanceofMeaux,inthesametermsasintherequest;andthattheCongofurtherstatedthattheprejudicewhichwouldresult ifnoprovisionalmeasuresareindicatedwouldbethecontinuationandexacerbationoftheprejudicealreadycausedtothe honourandreputationofthehighestauthoritiesoftheCongo,andtointernalpeaceintheCongo,totheinternationalstandingoftheCongoandtoFranco-Congolesefriendship .

The Court observes that the rights which, according totheCongo’sApplication,aresubsequently tobeadjudgedtobelongtotheCongointhepresentcaseare,first,therighttorequireaState,inthiscaseFrance,toabstainfromexercising

universal jurisdiction incriminalmatters inamannercon-trarytointernationallaw,andsecond,therighttorespectbyFrancefortheimmunitiesconferredbyinternationallawon,inparticular,theCongoleseHeadofState .

The Court further observes that the purpose of any pro-visionalmeasuresthattheCourtmight indicate inthiscaseshouldbetopreservethoseclaimedrights;thattheirrepara-ble prejudice claimed by the Congo and summarized abovewould not be caused to those rights as such; that howeverthis prejudice might, in the circumstances of the case, beregardedassuchastoaffectirreparablytherightsassertedintheApplication .TheCourtnotesthatinanyeventithasnotbeen informed in what practical respect there has been anydeteriorationinternallyorintheinternationalstandingoftheCongo, or in Franco-Congolese relations, since the institu-tionoftheFrenchcriminalproceedings,norhasanyevidencebeenplacedbeforetheCourtofanyseriousprejudiceorthreatofprejudiceofthisnature .

TheCourtobserves that thefirst questionbefore itat thepresentstageofthecaseisthuswhetherthecriminalproceed-ingscurrentlypending inFranceentaila riskof irreparableprejudice to the rightof theCongo to respectbyFrance fortheimmunitiesofPresident SassouNguessoasHeadofState,such as to require, as a matter of urgency, the indication ofprovisionalmeasures .

TheCourt takesnoteof thestatementsmadeby thePar-tiesas to therelevanceofArticle656of theFrenchCodeofCriminal Procedure (see above), and of a number of state-mentsmadebyFranceastotherespectinFrenchcriminallawfortheimmunitiesofHeadsofState .ItthenobservesthatitisnotnowcalledupontodeterminethecompatibilitywiththerightsclaimedbytheCongooftheproceduresofarfollowedinFrance,butonlytheriskorotherwiseoftheFrenchcrimi-nalproceedingscausingirreparableprejudicetosuchclaimedrights .TheCourtfinds,ontheinformationbeforeit,that,asregardsPresident SassouNguesso,thereisatthepresenttimenoriskofirreparableprejudice,soastojustifytheindicationofprovisionalmeasuresasamatterofurgency;andneitherisitestablishedthatanysuchriskexistsasregardsGeneralOba,Minister of the Interior of the Republic of the Congo, forwhomtheCongoalsoclaimsimmunityinitsApplication .

TheCourtthenconsiders,asasecond question, theexist-enceofariskofirreparableprejudiceinrelationtotheclaimoftheCongothattheunilateralassumptionbyaStateofuni-versaljurisdictionincriminalmattersconstitutesaviolationofaprincipleofinternationallaw;theCourtobservesthatinthisrespectthequestionbeforeitisthuswhethertheproceed-ingsbeforetheTribunal de grande instanceofMeauxinvolveathreatofirreparableprejudicetotherightsinvokedbytheCongo justifying, as a matter of urgency, the indication ofprovisionalmeasures .

TheCourtnotesthat,asregardsPresident SassouNguesso,the request for a written deposition made by the investigat-ing judge on the basis of Article 656 of the French Code ofCriminalProcedurehasnotbeen transmitted to thepersonconcernedbytheFrenchMinistryofForeignAffairs;that,asregardsGeneralObaandGeneralAdoua,theyhavenotbeenthe subject of any procedural measures by the investigating

15

judge; and that no measures of this nature are threatenedagainstthesethreepersons .TheCourtconcludesthatthere-forethereisnourgentneedforprovisionalmeasurestopre-servetherightsoftheCongointhatrespect .

As regards General Dabira, the Court notes that it isacknowledgedbyFrancethatthecriminalproceedingsinsti-tutedbefore theTribunal de grande instance ofMeauxhavehadan impactuponhisown legalposition, inasmuchashepossessesaresidenceinFrance,andwaspresentinFranceandheard as a témoin assisté, and in particular because, havingreturnedtotheCongo,hedeclinedtorespondtoasummonsfromtheinvestigatingjudge,whothereuponissuedamandat d’ameneragainsthim .Itpointsout,however,thatthepracti-caleffectofaprovisionalmeasureofthekindrequestedwouldbe toenableGeneralDabira toenterFrancewithout fearofanylegalconsequences .TheCongo, intheCourt’sview,hasnotdemonstratedthelikelihoodoreventhepossibilityofanyirreparableprejudicetotherightsitclaimsresultingfromtheproceduralmeasurestakeninrelationtoGeneralDabira .

The Court finally sees no need for the indication of anymeasuresofthekinddirectedtopreventingtheaggravationorextensionofthedispute .

** *

Joint separate opinion of Judges Koroma and Vereshchetin

Judges Koroma and Vereshchetin, in their joint separateopinion, expound the view that when considering a requestforinterimmeasuresofprotection,theCourtshouldweighallrelevantaspectsof thematterbefore it, including theextentof thepossibleharmfulconsequencesof theviolationof theclaimed right . Therefore, they entertain some reservationsinrespectoftheCourt’shaving,inthecircumstancesofthepresent case, drawn a distinction between the harm to therightswhichmightsubsequentlybeadjudgedtobelongtotheCongoandtheharmconsequentupontheviolationofthoserights(Order,para .29) .

Theharmattributabletotheviolationoftheclaimedrightsmay have much wider negative consequences and repercus-sionsforlegalandpoliticalinterestsoftheStateconcerned,fartranscendingitsadverseeffectontheclaimedrightsassuch .Inthesecircumstances,theindicationofprovisionalmeasuresmaybecomenecessarynotsomuchinviewoftheimminenceofirreparableharmtotheclaimedrights,butratherbecauseoftheriskofgraveconsequencesoftheirviolation .

In the view of Judges Koroma and Vereshchetin, theCourtappearsnottohavegivensufficientweighttotheriskof“irreparableharm”,whichcouldoccur in theCongoasaresultofthecontinuationofthecriminalproceedings .

Dissenting opinion of Judge de Cara

Inhisdissentingopinion,Judgead hocdeCaraemphasizesthedistinctivefeaturesofthecasebeforetheCourt .First,itisacaseconcerninganAfricanStatewhichimplicates,inpar-ticular,theHeadofState,whoistheembodimentofthenationitselfon thatcontinent .Secondly, thecurrentFrench law in

suchmatterscontrastswiththeuntimelymeasurestakenorcapableofbeingtakenbytheFrenchprosecutorsandjudges .Lastly, itwouldseemthat in thiscase,more than inothers,thereisaparticularlycloserelationshipbetweentheproceed-ingsonprovisionalmeasuresandtheproceedingsonthemer-its;inmakingadistinctionbetweentherightsclaimedtohavebeenviolatedandthe indirectprejudice thatmaybecausedthereby,theCourtappearstohaveadoptedaformalapproachwhich prevents the case from being considered as a whole .Article41oftheStatuteandArticle75oftheRulesofCourtleavetheCourtconsiderablelatitudetodecideonprovisionalmeasuresaccordingtothecircumstances ofeachcase .Inthepresentcase,theCourtdidnotseefittogranttherequestforprovisionalmeasuresandthejudgead hocregretsthathewasunabletovoteinfavourofthedecisionbecauseheconsidersthattheessentialelementofthecasehasbeendisregarded .Atthis stage it is not a matter of deciding whether, in abstractterms,FrenchlawguaranteestheimmunityofaforeignHeadof State or whether it adopts a strict concept of universaljurisdiction, but of determining to what extent the réquisi-toire (prosecutor’s application for a judicial investigation) of23January2002derogatesfromsuchprinciplesandviolatestherighttoimmunity,theattributionofcriminaljurisdictionand thedignityof theCongolesePresident, therebycausingharmtotheStateitself .Theréquisitoireandtheannexedcom-plaints,onthebasisofwhichitwasissued,governtheentireFrench criminal proceedings . As an act of prosecution, thisréquisitoirealreadyviolatestheimmunityoftheforeignHeadof State and unduly seeks to substitute the jurisdiction ofFrenchcourtsforthatoftheCongolesecourtsalreadyseisedandhavingterritorialjurisdictionbyreasonofthefactsofthecase and the individuals implicated . Prejudice has certainlybeencausedandthereisariskofadditionalprejudice,becauseatanytimetheFrenchinvestigatingjudgemaydecideonanyactsofjudicialinvestigation,includingtheformalplacingofsuspectsunderexamination(mise en examen),oronmeasuresofdetention,againstanyoftheseniorfiguresnamedbutalsoagainstanyCongolesecitizen .Thethreatofcoercionmaywellconstituteirreparableprejudice,especiallywhenitaffectstheinviolabilityofaHeadofState .Furthermore,withthepublic-ity that inevitably surrounds prosecution for crimes againsthumanity, thecriminalproceedings initiated inviolationoftheCongo’srightsarecapableofcausingharmnotonlytothehonourofthatcountrybuttothestabilityofthegovernmentin a country marked by division after a long period of civilwar . This is even more serious in Africa, a continent whoseHeads of State occupy a special position in societies whereethnicsolidarityprevailsover inadequatenationalcohesion .Theriskofthecountrybeingdestabilizedcannotbedismissedasadistinctprejudicefromthosedirectlyrelatedtotheviola-tionoftherightsforwhichtheCongoseeksprotection .TheApplicanthasalegalinterestwhichisworthyofpreservationandwhichstemsfromarighttorespectforitssovereignty .

Under these circumstances, the urgency remains for aslong as the prosecutor’s application is maintained, becausetherearenoguaranteesfortheindividualsnamedinthecom-plaints, regardless of their status, and they have no right ofappealagainstthatapplicationunlesstheyareformallyplacedunder judicialexamination .For theconditionofurgency to

16

bemet,isitreallynecessaryforthePresidentoftheRepublicoftheCongotobeformallyplacedunderexamination,heldin police custody, imprisoned or brought before the AssizeCourt?Butinanyevent,urgentprotectioncanbejustifiedbythefactofhavingtowaituntiltheCourtrulesonthemerits,sinceany subsequent reparation forprejudicecausedby thecontinuationofthejudicialproceedingsagainstthepersonali-tiesconcernedwouldbequiteillusory .

The Court is entitled to indicate provisional measures inordertopreventanyaggravationofthedisputewhenthecir-cumstancessorequire;itcanthusmaintainthestatusquo .TherepresentativesoftheFrenchRepublicrejectedtheCongo’spro-posaltoasktheCourt“formallytoplaceonrecordthescopewhichtheyascribetothe[prosecutor’s]originatingapplication” .TheAgentofFrancesimplygaveastatementofcurrentFrenchlawandrefusedtomakeanypromiseswithrespecttothesitu-ationortotheindividualsconcerned .TheCourttooknoteofhisdeclarationswithoutcommentingontheirscopeandtheyfailtoprovideanyguaranteecapableofcounterbalancingthedecision todismiss the request forprovisionalmeasures .TheCourt’s solution is thus somewhat ambiguous . Either thosedeclarationsby theAgentofFranceconstitutea statementoflaw,thusentitlingtheCourtnotonlytotakenoteofthembutalso to hold that the indication of provisional measures waspointlessbecauseithadnodoubtthattheFrenchGovernmentwouldcomplywithitsownlaw:suchdeclarationscanthushavethe effect of “creating legal obligations” as recognized in theNuclearTestscase(1974) .Orotherwisethosedeclarationsweresimply tantamount to question-begging for dramatic effect,

withoutanypracticalconsequences,thusobligingtheCourttotaketheviewthatFrancehadnointentionofcommittingitselfandtodrawappropriateconclusionsfromFrance’sreluctancetomakeanypromises .TherefusalbytheFrenchGovernment’sAgenttomakeanycommitmentthusleavesariskofaggrava-tion of the dispute whilst the réquisitoire at issue remains inforce .Thatrefusalcannotbeexplainedbyconsiderationsrelat-ingtotheseparationofpowers,forunderinternationallawthegovernmentrepresentstheStateinallitsaspects .Franceshouldthushavebeenremindedofitsdutytoensurecompliancewithits own laws, in so far as they enshrine the rules and normsofinternationallaw .DomesticstatutesarenotimmunetotheeffectsofajudgmentoftheCourt .Afortiori,theexecutionofadecisionoftheCourtmayrequirethegovernmentofaStatetotakeanadministrativemeasure .IntheAdvisoryOpinioncon-cerningtheimmunityfromlegalprocessofaSpecialRappor-teuroftheCommissiononHumanRights,theCourtheldthatgovernmentalauthoritieshadtheobligationtoinformdomesticcourtsofthestatusoftheofficialconcernedandinparticularofhisentitlementtoimmunityfromlegalprocess .Similarly,inthepresentcase,itwasincumbentupontheFrenchGovernmenttogiveinstructionstotheProcureur Général(PrincipalStatePros-ecutor)toannultheréquisitoirewhichthreatenstheimmunityoftheHeadofStateandwhichencroachesuponthejurisdic-tion of Congolese courts . Accordingly, in the absence of anyspecificcommitmentbyFrancewithrespecttothescopeofthatact of procedure, the suspension of the criminal proceedingscurrentlypendingwouldhaveprecludedanyaggravationofthedispute by maintaining the status quo, and without affectingthebalancebetweentheParties’respectiverights .

In the case concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v . United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland),thePresidentoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeissuedanOrderon10Sep-tember2003,recordingthediscontinuanceoftheproceedingsanddirectingtheremovalofthecasefromtheCourt’slist .

** *

TheOrderofthePresidentoftheCourtreadsasfollows:“ThePresidentoftheInternationalCourtofJustice,HavingregardtoArticle48oftheStatuteoftheCourtandtoArticle88oftheRulesofCourt,

Having regard to the Application filed in the Registry oftheCourton3March1992,bywhichtheGreatSocialistPeople’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya instituted proceedingsagainst theUnitedKingdomofGreatBritainandNorth-ernIrelandinrespectofa“disputebetweenLibyaandtheUnitedKingdomconcerningtheinterpretationorapplica-tion of the Montreal Convention” of 23 September 1971fortheSuppressionofUnlawfulActsagainsttheSafetyofCivilAviation,HavingregardtotheOrderof19June1992,bywhichtheCourt fixed 20 December 1993 and 20 June 1995 as thetime-limitsforthefiling,respectively,oftheMemorialofLibyaandtheCounter-MemorialoftheUnitedKingdom,HavingregardtotheMemorialfiledbyLibyaandthepre-liminary objections submitted by the United Kingdom,withinthetime-limitsthusfixed,

143. CAseConCeRnInGQUestIonsoFInteRPRetAtIonAnDAPPLICAtIonoFtHe1971MontReALConVentIonARIsInGFRoMtHeAeRIALInCIDentAtLoCKeRBIe(LIBYAnARABJAMAHIRIYA v. UnIteDKInGDoMoFGReAtBRItAInAnDnoRtHeRnIReLAnD)(DIsContInUAnCe)

orderof10september2003

___________

17

Having regard to the Judgment of 27 February 1998, bywhichtheCourtgaveitsdecisiononthepreliminaryobjec-tions,Having regard to the Order of 30 March 1998, by whichtheCourtfixed30December1998asthetime-limitforthefiling of the Counter-Memorial of the United Kingdom,andtotheOrderof17December1998,bywhichtheSeniorJudgeextendedthattime-limitto31March1999,HavingregardtotheCounter-MemorialfiledbytheUnitedKingdomwithinthetime-limitthusextended,HavingregardtotheOrderof29June1999,bywhichtheCourt,takingaccountoftheagreementofthePartiesandthespecialcircumstancesofthecase,authorizedthesub-missionofaReplybyLibyaandaRejoinderbytheUnitedKingdomandfixed29June2000asthetime-limitforthefilingoftheReplyofLibya,HavingregardtotheReplyfiledbyLibyawithinthetime-limitthusfixed,

HavingregardtotheOrderof6September2000,bywhichthePresidentoftheCourtfixed3August2001asthetime-limitforthefilingoftheRejoinderoftheUnitedKingdom,HavingregardtotheRejoinderfiledbytheUnitedKing-domwithinthetime-limitthusfixed;Whereas by a letter dated 9 September 2003, filed in theRegistry on the same day, the Agents of the two PartiesjointlynotifiedtheCourtthat‘theLibyanArabJamahiriyaandtheUnitedKingdomhaveagreedtodiscontinuewithprejudicetheproceedingsinitiatedbytheLibyanApplica-tionfiledon3March1992’,Places on record the discontinuance with prejudice, byagreementoftheParties,oftheproceedingsinstitutedon3March1992bytheGreatSocialistPeople’sLibyanArabJamahiriya against the United Kingdom of Great BritainandNorthernIreland;andDirects thatthecaseberemovedfromtheList .”

___________

144. CAseConCeRnInGQUestIonsoFInteRPRetAtIonAnDAPPLICAtIonoFtHe1971MontReALConVentIonARIsInGFRoMtHeAeRIALInCIDentAtLoCKeRBIe(LIBYAnARABJAMAHIRIYA v. UnIteDstAtesoFAMeRICA)(DIsContInUAnCe)

orderof10september2003

In the case concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v . United States of America),thePresidentoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeissuedanOrderon10September2003,recordingthediscontinuanceoftheproceedingsanddirectingtheremovalofthecasefromtheCourt’slist .

** *

TheOrderofthePresidentoftheCourtreadsasfollows:“ThePresidentoftheInternationalCourtofJustice,HavingregardtoArticle48oftheStatuteoftheCourtandtoArticle88oftheRulesofCourt,Having regard to the Application filed in the Registry oftheCourton3March1992,bywhichtheGreatSocialistPeople’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya instituted proceedingsagainsttheUnitedStatesofAmericainrespectofa“dis-putebetweenLibyaandtheUnitedStatesconcerningtheinterpretationorapplicationoftheMontrealConvention”of23September1971fortheSuppressionofUnlawfulActsagainsttheSafetyofCivilAviation,HavingregardtotheOrderof19June1992,bywhichtheCourt fixed 20 December 1993 and 20 June 1995 as thetime-limitsforthefiling,respectively,oftheMemorialofLibyaandtheCounter-MemorialoftheUnitedStates,

HavingregardtotheMemorialfiledbyLibyaandthepre-liminaryobjectionssubmittedbytheUnitedStates,withinthetime-limitsthusfixed,Having regard to the Judgment of 27 February 1998, bywhichtheCourtgaveitsdecisiononthepreliminaryobjec-tions,Having regard to the Order of 30 March 1998, by whichtheCourtfixed30December1998asthetime-limitforthefilingoftheCounter-MemorialoftheUnitedStates,andtotheOrderof17December1998,bywhichtheSeniorJudgeextendedthattime-limitto31March1999,HavingregardtotheCounter-MemorialfiledbytheUnitedStateswithinthetime-limitthusextended,HavingregardtotheOrderof29June1999,bywhichtheCourt,takingaccountoftheagreementofthePartiesandthespecialcircumstancesofthecase,authorizedthesub-missionofaReplybyLibyaandaRejoinderbytheUnitedStatesandfixed29June2000asthetime-limitforthefilingoftheReplyofLibya,HavingregardtotheReplyfiledbyLibyawithinthetime-limitthusfixed,HavingregardtotheOrderof6September2000,bywhichthePresidentoftheCourtfixed3August2001asthetime-limitforthefilingoftheRejoinderoftheUnitedStates,HavingregardtotheRejoinderfiledbytheUnitedStateswithinthetime-limitthusfixed;

18

145. CAseConCeRnInGoILPLAtFoRMs(IsLAMICRePUBLICoFIRAn v. UnIteDstAtesoFAMeRICA)

Judgmentof6november2003

On6November2003, the InternationalCourtof Justice,delivered its Judgment in thecase concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v . United States of America) .

** *

TheCourtwascomposedas follows:PresidentShi;Vice-PresidentRanjeva;JudgesGuillaume,Koroma,Vereshchetin,Higgins,Parra-Aranguren,Kooijmans,Rezek,Al-Khasawneh,Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada, Simma, Tomka; Judge ad hocRigaux;RegistrarCouvreur .

** *

Theoperativeparagraph125oftheJudgmentreadsasfol-lows:

“ . . .TheCourt,(1)Byfourteenvotestotwo,FindsthattheactionsoftheUnitedStatesofAmericaagainstIranianoilplatformson19October1987and18April1988cannot be justified as measures necessary to protect theessentialsecurity interestsof theUnitedStatesofAmericaunder Article xx, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty ofAmity,EconomicRelationsandConsularRightsbetweentheUnitedStatesofAmericaandIran,asinterpretedinthelightofinternationallawontheuseofforce;findsfurtherthattheCourtcannothoweverupholdthesubmissionoftheIslamicRepublicofIranthatthoseactionsconstituteabreachoftheobligationsoftheUnitedStatesofAmericaunderArticlex,paragraph1,ofthatTreaty,regardingfreedomofcommercebetweentheterritoriesoftheparties,andthat,accordingly,theclaimoftheIslamicRepublicofIranforreparationalsocannotbeupheld;infavour:PresidentShi;Vice-PresidentRanjeva; JudgesGuillaume, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Buergenthal, Owada,Simma,Tomka;Judgead hocRigaux;against:JudgesAl-Khasawneh,Elaraby;

(2)Byfifteenvotestoone,Findsthatthecounter-claimoftheUnitedStatesofAmer-icaconcerningthebreachoftheobligationsoftheIslamicRepublic of Iran under Article x, paragraph 1, of theabove-mentioned1955Treaty,regardingfreedomofcom-merceandnavigationbetweentheterritoriesoftheparties,cannotbeupheld;andaccordingly,thatthecounter-claimoftheUnitedStatesofAmericaforreparationalsocannotbeupheld .infavour:PresidentShi;Vice-PresidentRanjeva; JudgesGuillaume, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buer-genthal,Elaraby,Owada,Tomka;Judgead hocRigaux;against:JudgeSimma .”

** *

Vice-President Ranjeva and Judge Koroma appendeddeclarations to the Judgment of the Court; Judges Higgins,Parra-ArangurenandKooijmansappendedseparateopinionstotheJudgmentoftheCourt;JudgeAl-Khasawnehappendeda dissenting opinion to the Judgment of the Court; JudgeBuergenthal appended a separate opinion to the Judgmentof the Court; Judge Elaraby appended a dissenting opiniontotheJudgmentoftheCourt;JudgesOwadaandSimmaandJudgead hocRigauxappendedseparateopinionstotheJudg-mentoftheCourt .

** *

History of the proceedings and submissions of the Parties(paras .1–20)

On2November1992,theIslamicRepublicofIran(herein-aftercalled“Iran”)institutedproceedingsagainsttheUnitedStates of America (hereinafter called “the United States”)in respect of a dispute “aris[ing] out of the attack [on] anddestructionofthreeoffshoreoilproductioncomplexes,ownedand operated for commercial purposes by the National Ira-

___________

Whereas by a letter dated 9 September 2003, filed in theRegistryonthesameday,theAgentofLibyaandtheCo-Agentof theUnitedStates jointlynotifiedtheCourt that‘the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the United States ofAmerica have agreed to discontinue with prejudice theproceedingsinitiatedbytheLibyanApplicationfiledon3March1992’,

Places on record the discontinuance with prejudice, byagreementoftheParties,oftheproceedingsinstitutedon3March1992bytheGreatSocialistPeople’sLibyanArabJamahiriyaagainsttheUnitedStatesofAmerica;andDirects thatthecaseberemovedfromtheList .”

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nianOilCompany,by severalwarshipsof theUnitedStatesNavyon19October1987and18April1988,respectively” .

InitsApplication,Irancontendedthattheseactsconstitut-eda“fundamentalbreach”ofvariousprovisionsoftheTreatyofAmity,EconomicRelationsandConsularRightsbetweenthe United States and Iran, which was signed in Tehran on15August1955andenteredintoforceon16June1957(here-inafter called “the 1955 Treaty”), as well as of internationallaw .TheApplicationinvoked,asabasisfortheCourt’sjuris-diction,ArticlexxI,paragraph2,ofthe1955Treaty .

Within the time-limit fixed for the filing of the Coun-ter-Memorial, the United States raised a preliminary objec-tion to the jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to Article 79,paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court of 14 April 1978 . By aJudgment dated 12 December 1996 the Court rejected thepreliminaryobjectionoftheUnitedStatesaccordingtowhichthe1955TreatydidnotprovideanybasisforthejurisdictionoftheCourtandfoundthat ithadjurisdiction,onthebasisofArticlexxI,paragraph2,ofthe1955Treaty,toentertaintheclaimsmadebyIranunderArticlex,paragraph1,ofthatTreaty .

TheUnitedStatesCounter-Memorial includedacounter-claimconcerning“Iran’sactionsintheGulfduring1987–88which, among other things, involved mining and otherattacks on U .S .-flag or U .S .-owned vessels” . By an Order of10 March 1998 the Court held that this counter-claim wasadmissibleassuchandformedpartoftheproceedings .

Public sittings were held between 17 February and7March2003,atwhichtheCourtheardtheoralargumentsandrepliesontheclaimofIranandonthecounter-claimofthe United States . At those oral proceedings, the followingfinalsubmissionswerepresentedbytheParties:

OnbehalfoftheGovernmentofIran,atthehearingof3March2003,ontheclaimofIran:“The Islamic Republic of Iran respectfully requests theCourt, rejecting all contrary claims and submissions, toadjudgeanddeclare:

1 .Thatinattackinganddestroyingon19October1987and18April1988theoilplatformsreferredtoinIran’sApplication, theUnitedStatesbreached itsobligationsto Iran under Article x, paragraph 1, of the Treaty ofAmity, and that the United States bears responsibilityfortheattacks;and2 .ThattheUnitedStatesisaccordinglyunderanobli-gationtomakefullreparationtoIranfortheviolationofitsinternationallegalobligationsandtheinjurythuscausedinaformandamounttobedeterminedbytheCourtatasubsequentstageoftheproceedings,therightbeingreservedtoIranto introduceandpresent to theCourtinduecourseapreciseevaluationoftherepara-tionowedbytheUnitedStates;and3 .AnyotherremedytheCourtmaydeemappropriate”;

atthehearingof7March2003,onthecounter-claimoftheUnitedStates:

“The Islamic Republic of Iran respectfully requests theCourt, rejecting all contrary claims and submissions, toadjudgeanddeclare:ThattheUnitedStatescounter-claimbedismissed .”OnbehalfoftheGovernmentoftheUnitedStates,atthehearingof5March2003,ontheclaimofIranand

thecounter-claimoftheUnitedStates:“The United States respectfully requests that the Courtadjudgeanddeclare:

(1)thattheUnitedStatesdidnotbreachitsobligationsto the IslamicRepublicof IranunderArticlex,para-graph 1, of the 1955 Treaty between the United StatesandIran;and(2) that the claims of the Islamic Republic of Iran areaccordinglydismissed .

With respect to its counter-claim, the United StatesrequeststhattheCourtadjudgeanddeclare:

(1) Rejecting all submissions to the contrary, that, inattacking vessels in the Gulf with mines and missilesand otherwise engaging in military actions that weredangerous and detrimental to commerce and naviga-tionbetweentheterritoriesoftheUnitedStatesandtheIslamic Republic of Iran, the Islamic Republic of IranbreacheditsobligationstotheUnitedStatesunderArti-clex,paragraph1,ofthe1955Treaty;and(2) That the Islamic Republic of Iran is accordinglyunderanobligationtomakefullreparationtotheUnit-edStatesforitsbreachofthe1955TreatyinaformandamounttobedeterminedbytheCourtatasubsequentstageoftheproceedings .”

Basis of jurisdiction and factual background(paras .21–26)

The Court begins by pointing out that its task in thepresentproceedingsistodeterminewhetherornottherehavebeenbreachesof the1955Treaty,and if itfinds that such isthecase,todrawtheappropriateconsequencesaccordingtothesubmissionsoftheParties .TheCourtisseisedbothofaclaimbyIranallegingbreachesbytheUnitedStates,andofacounter-claimbytheUnitedStatesallegingbreachesbyIran .Its jurisdictiontoentertainboththeclaimandthecounter-claimisassertedtobebaseduponArticlexxI,paragraph2,ofthe1955Treaty .

The Court recalls that, as regards the claim of Iran, thequestionof jurisdictionhasbeenthesubjectof its judgmentof 12 December 1996 . It notes that certain questions havehoweverbeenraisedbetweenthePartiesastotheprecisesig-nificanceorscopeofthatJudgment,whichwillbeexaminedbelow .

Astothecounter-claim,theCourtalsorecallsthatitdecid-edbyitsOrderof10March1998toadmitthecounter-claim,andindicatedinthatOrderthatthefactsallegedandreliedonbytheUnitedStates“arecapableof fallingwithinthescopeofArticlex,paragraph1,ofthe1955TreatyasinterpretedbytheCourt”,andaccordinglythat“theCourthasjurisdictiontoentertaintheUnitedStatescounter-claiminso faras the

20

factsallegedmayhaveprejudicedthefreedomsguaranteedbyArticlex,paragraph1”(I.C.J. Reports 1998,p .204,para .36) .It notes that in this respect also questions have been raisedbetween the Parties as to the significance and scope of thatrulingonjurisdiction,andthesewillbeexaminedbelow .

TheCourtpointsoutthatitishoweverestablished,bythedecisionscited,thatbothIran’sclaimandthecounter-claimoftheUnitedStatescanbeupheldonlysofarasabreachorbreachesofArticlex,paragraph1,ofthe1955Treatymaybeshown, even though other provisions of the Treaty may berelevant to the interpretation of that paragraph . Article x,paragraph1,ofthe1955Treatyreadsasfollows:“BetweentheterritoriesofthetwoHighContractingPartiesthereshallbefreedomofcommerceandnavigation .”

TheCourtthensetsoutthefactualbackgroundtothecase,as it emerges from the pleadings of both Parties, observingthatthebroadlinesofthisbackgroundarenotdisputed,beingamatterofhistoricalrecord .Theactionsgivingrisetoboththeclaimandthecounter-claimoccurredinthecontextofthegeneralevents that tookplace in thePersianGulf—which isaninternationalcommercialrouteandlineofcommunicationofmajorimportance—between1980and1988,inparticularthearmedconflictthatopposedIranandIraq .In1984,IraqcommencedattacksagainstshipsinthePersianGulf,notablytankerscarryingIranianoil .Thesewerethefirstincidentsofwhatlaterbecameknownasthe“TankerWar”:intheperiodbetween1984and1988,anumberofcommercialvesselsandwarships of various nationalities, including neutral vessels,wereattackedbyaircraft,helicopters,missilesorwarships,orstruckmines in thewatersof thePersianGulf .Naval forcesofbothbelligerentpartieswereoperating in the region,butIranhasdeniedresponsibilityforanyactionsotherthaninci-dentsinvolvingvesselsrefusingaproperrequestforstopandsearch .TheUnitedStatesattributesresponsibilityforcertainincidentstoIran,whereasIransuggeststhatIraqwasrespon-sibleforthem .

TheCourttakesnotethattwospecificattacksonshippingareofparticularrelevanceinthiscase .On16October1987,theKuwaititankerSeaIsleCity,reflaggedtotheUnitedStates,washitbyamissilenearKuwaitharbour .TheUnitedStatesattributedthisattacktoIran,andthreedayslater,on19Octo-ber1987,itattackedtwoIranianoffshoreoilproductioninstal-lationsintheReshadat[“Rostam”]complex .On14April1988,thewarshipUSSSamuelB.Robertsstruckamineininterna-tional waters near Bahrain while returning from an escortmission;fourdayslatertheUnitedStatesemployeditsnavalforcestoattackanddestroysimultaneouslythe Nasr [“Sirri”]Nasr [“Sirri”][“Sirri”]andSalman[“Sassan”]complexes .

These attacks by United States forces on the Iranian oilplatforms are claimed by Iran to constitute breaches of the1955 Treaty; and the attacks on the Sea Isle City and theUSSSamuelB.RobertswereinvokedinsupportoftheUnitedStates’claimtoact inself-defence .Thecounter-claimof theUnitedStatesishowevernotlimitedtothoseattacks .

The United States request to dismiss Iran’s claim because of Iran’s allegedly unlawful conduct(paras .27–30)

TheCourtfirstconsidersacontentiontowhichtheUnitedStatesappearstohaveattributedacertainpreliminarychar-acter .TheUnitedStatesaskstheCourttodismissIran’sclaimand refuse it the relief it seeks, because of Iran’s allegedlyunlawful conduct, i .e ., its violation of the 1955 Treaty andotherrulesofinternationallawrelatingtotheuseofforce .

TheCourtnotesthatinordertomakethefindingrequest-edbytheUnitedStatesitwouldhavetoexamineIranianandUnitedStatesactionsinthePersianGulfduringtherelevantperiod—whichithasalsotodoinordertoruleontheIranianclaimandtheUnitedStatescounter-claim .Atthisstageofitsjudgment,itdoesnotthereforeneedtodealwiththisrequest .

Application of Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty(paras .31–78)

TheCourtrecallsthatthedisputeinthepresentcasehasbeen brought before it on the jurisdictional basis of Arti-clexxI,paragraph2,ofthe1955Treaty,whichprovidesthat“AnydisputebetweentheHighContractingPartiesastotheinterpretation or application of the present Treaty, not sat-isfactorily adjusted by diplomacy, shall be submitted to theInternational Court of Justice, unless the High ContractingPartiesagreetosettlementbysomeotherpacificmeans .”

TheCourtfurtherrecallsthatbyitsJudgmentof12Decem-ber1996,itfoundthatithadjurisdiction,onthebasisofthisArticle,“toentertaintheclaimsmadebytheIslamicRepublicof Iran under Article x, paragraph 1, of that Treaty” (I.C.J. Reports 1996(II),p .821,para .55(2)) .Itstaskisthustoascer-tainwhethertherehasbeenabreachbytheUnitedStatesoftheprovisionsofArticlex,paragraph1;otherprovisionsoftheTreatyareonly relevant in so faras theymayaffect theinterpretationorapplicationofthattext .

Inthatrespect,theCourtnotesthattheUnitedStateshasreliedonArticlexx,paragraph1(d),oftheTreatyasdeter-minativeofthequestionoftheexistenceofabreachofitsobli-gationsunderArticlex .Thatparagraphprovidesthat

“The present Treaty shall not preclude the application ofmeasures:…(d)necessarytofulfiltheobligationsofaHighContractingParty for themaintenanceor restorationof internationalpeace and security, or necessary to protect its essentialsecurityinterests .”InitsJudgmentontheUnitedStatespreliminaryobjection

of12December1996,theCourtruledthatArticlexx,para-graph1(d),doesnotaffordanobjectiontoadmissibility,but“isconfinedtoaffordingthePartiesapossibledefenceonthemerits” (I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II),p .811,para .20) . Inaccord-ancewithArticlexxI,paragraph2,oftheTreaty,itisnowfortheCourttointerpretandapplythatsubparagraph,inasmuchassuchadefenceisassertedbytheUnitedStates .

To uphold the claim of Iran, the Court must be satisfiedboththat theactionsof theUnitedStates,complainedofbyIran, infringed the freedom of commerce between the ter-

21

ritoriesof thePartiesguaranteedbyArticlex,paragraph1,andthatsuchactionswerenotjustifiedtoprotecttheessentialsecurityinterestsoftheUnitedStatesascontemplatedbyArti-clexx,paragraph1(d).ThequestionhoweverarisesinwhatordertheCourtshouldexaminethesequestionsofinterpreta-tionandapplicationoftheTreaty .

Inthepresentcase, itappearstotheCourtthatthereareparticularconsiderationsmilitatinginfavourofanexamina-tionoftheapplicationofArticlexx,paragraph1(d),beforeturning to Article x, paragraph 1 . It is clear that the origi-naldisputebetweenthePartiesrelated to the legalityof theactionsoftheUnitedStates, inthelightofinternationallawontheuseofforce .Atthetimeofthoseactions,neitherPartymadeanymentionofthe1955Treaty .ThecontentionoftheUnitedStatesatthetimewasthatitsattacksontheoilplat-formswerejustifiedasactsofself-defence,inresponsetowhatitregardedasarmedattacksbyIran,andonthatbasisitgavenoticeofitsactiontotheSecurityCouncilunderArticle51oftheUnitedNationsCharter .BeforetheCourt,ithascontinuedtomaintainthatitwasjustifiedinactingasitdidinexerciseoftherightofself-defence;itcontendsthat,eveniftheCourtwere to find that its actions do not fall within the scope ofArticle xx, paragraph 1 (d), those actions were not wrong-fulsincetheywerenecessaryandappropriateactionsinself-defence .Furthermore,astheUnitedStatesitselfrecognizesinits Rejoinder, “The self-defense issues presented in this caseraisemattersofthehighestimportancetoallmembersoftheinternationalcommunity”,andbothPartiesareagreedastotheimportanceoftheimplicationsofthecaseinthefieldoftheuseofforce,eventhoughtheydrawoppositeconclusionsfromthisobservation .TheCourtthereforeconsidersthat,totheextentthatitsjurisdictionunderArticlexxI,paragraph2,ofthe1955Treatyauthorizesittoexamineandruleonsuchissues,itshoulddoso .

Thequestionoftherelationshipbetweenself-defenceandArticlexx,paragraph1(d),oftheTreatyhasbeendisputedbetweentheParties,inparticularasregardsthejurisdictionof theCourt . In theviewof theCourt, thematter isoneofinterpretationoftheTreaty,andinparticularofArticlexx,paragraph 1 (d). The question is whether the parties to the1955Treaty,whenprovidingthereinthat itshould“notpre-cludetheapplicationofmeasures . . .necessarytoprotect[the]essentialsecurityinterests”ofeitherparty,intendedthatsuchshouldbetheeffectoftheTreatyevenwherethosemeasuresinvolvedauseofarmedforce;andifso,whethertheycontem-plated,orassumed,alimitationthatsuchusewouldhavetocomply with the conditions laid down by international law .TheCourtconsiders that its jurisdictionunderArticlexxI,paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty to decide any question ofinterpretationorapplicationof(inter alia)Articlexx,para-graph1(d),ofthatTreatyextends,whereappropriate,tothedetermination whether action alleged to be justified underthat paragraph was or was not an unlawful use of force, byreferencetointernationallawapplicabletothisquestion,thatistosay,theprovisionsoftheCharteroftheUnitedNationsandcustomaryinternationallaw .

The Court therefore examines first the application ofArticlexx,paragraph1(d),ofthe1955Treaty,whichinthecircumstances of this case, as explained above, involves the

principle of the prohibition in international law of the useof force, and the qualification to it constituted by the rightofself-defence .Onthebasisofthatprovision,apartytotheTreaty may be justified in taking certain measures which itconsiderstobe“necessary”fortheprotectionofitsessentialsecurity interests . In the present case, the question whetherthemeasurestakenwere“necessary”overlapswiththeques-tionoftheirvalidityasactsofself-defence .

Inthisconnection,theCourtnotesthatitisnotdisputedbetweenthePartiesthatneutralshippinginthePersianGulfwas caused considerable inconvenience and loss, and gravedamage,duringtheIran-Iraqwar .Itnotesalsothatthiswastoagreatextentduetothepresenceofminesandminefieldslaidbybothsides .TheCourthasno jurisdiction toenquireintothequestionof theextent towhichIranandIraqcom-pliedwith the international legal rulesofmaritimewarfare .It can however take note of these circumstances, regardedbytheUnitedStatesasrelevanttoitsdecisiontotakeactionagainstIranwhichitconsiderednecessarytoprotectitsessen-tialsecurityinterests .Nevertheless,thelegalityoftheactiontaken by the United States has to be judged by reference toArticlexx,paragraph1(d),ofthe1955Treaty,inthelightofinternationallawontheuseofforceinself-defence .

TheCourtobservesthattheUnitedStateshasneverdeniedthat itsactionsagainst theIranianplatformsamountedtoauseofarmedforce .TheCourtindicatesthatitwillexaminewhether each of these actions met the conditions of Arti-clexx,paragraph1(d),asinterpretedbyreferencetotherel-evantrulesofinternationallaw .

Attack of 19 October 1987 on Reshadat(paras .46–64)

The Court recalls that the first installation attacked, on19October1987,wastheReshadatcomplex,whichwasalsoconnectedbysubmarinepipelinetoanothercomplex,namedResalat .AtthetimeoftheUnitedStatesattacks,thesecom-plexeswerenotproducingoilduetodamageinflictedbypriorIraqi attacks . Iran has maintained that repair work on theplatformswasclosetocompletioninOctober1987 .TheUnit-edStateshashoweverchallengedthisassertion .Asaresultoftheattack,oneplatformwasalmostcompletelydestroyedandanotherwasseverelydamagedand,accordingtoIran,produc-tionfromtheReshadatandResalatcomplexeswasinterruptedforseveralyears .

The Court first concentrates on the facts tending to showthevalidityorotherwiseof theclaim toexercise the rightofself-defence . In itscommunication to theSecurityCouncilatthe time of the attack, the United States based this claim ontheexistenceof“aseriesofunlawfularmedattacksbyIranianforcesagainsttheUnitedStates,includinglayingminesininter-nationalwatersforthepurposeofsinkingordamagingUnitedStates flag ships, and firing on United States aircraft withoutprovocation”;itreferredinparticulartoamissileattackontheSea Isle CityasbeingthespecificincidentthatledtotheattackontheIranianplatforms .BeforetheCourt, ithasbaseditselfmorespecificallyontheattackontheSea Isle City,buthascon-tinuedtoasserttherelevanceoftheotherattacks .

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TheCourtpointsoutthattheUnitedStateshasnotclaimedtohavebeenexercisingcollectiveself-defenceonbehalfoftheneutralStatesengagedinshippinginthePersianGulf .There-fore,inordertoestablishthatitwaslegallyjustifiedinattack-ingtheIranianplatformsinexerciseoftherightofindividualself-defence, the United States has to show that attacks hadbeenmadeupon it forwhichIranwasresponsible;andthatthoseattackswereofsuchanatureastobequalifiedas“armedattacks”withinthemeaningofthatexpressioninArticle51oftheUnitedNationsCharter,andasunderstoodincustom-arylawontheuseofforce .TheUnitedStatesmustalsoshowthatitsactionswerenecessaryandproportionaltothearmedattack made on it, and that the platforms were a legitimatemilitarytargetopentoattackintheexerciseofself-defence .

Havingexaminedwithgreatcaretheevidenceandargu-ments presented on each side, the Court finds that the evi-denceindicativeofIranianresponsibilityfortheattackontheSea Isle City isnotsufficienttosupportthecontentionsoftheUnitedStates .TheconclusiontowhichtheCourthascomeonthisaspectofthecaseisthusthattheburdenofproofoftheexistenceofanarmedattackbyIranontheUnitedStates,intheformofthemissileattackontheSea Isle City,hasnotbeendischarged .

InitsnotificationtotheSecurityCouncil,andbeforetheCourt, the United States has however also asserted that theSea Isle Cityincidentwas“thelatestinaseriesofsuchmissileattacks against United States flag and other non-belligerentvesselsinKuwaitiwatersinpursuitofpeacefulcommerce” .

TheCourtfindsthateventakencumulatively,andreserv-ingthequestionofIranianresponsibility,theseincidentsdonot seemto theCourt toconstituteanarmedattackon theUnitedStates .

Attacks of 18 April 1988 on Nasr and Salman and “Operation Praying Mantis”(paras .65–72)

TheCourtrecalls that thesecondoccasiononwhichIra-nianoilinstallationswereattackedwason18April1988,withtheattacksontheSalmanandNasrcomplexes .Iranstatesthattheattackscausedseveredamagetotheproductionfacilitiesoftheplatforms;thattheactivitiesoftheSalmancomplexweretotallyinterruptedforfouryears,itsregularproductionbeingresumedonlyinSeptember1992,andreachinganormallevelin1993; and that activities in thewholeNasr complexwereinterruptedanddidnotresumeuntilnearlyfouryearslater .

The nature of the attacks on the Salman and Nasr com-plexes, and their alleged justification, was presented by theUnited States to the United Nations Security Council in aletter from the United States Permanent Representative of18April1988,which stated inter alia that theUnitedStateshad “exercised their inherent right of self-defence underinternationallawbytakingdefensiveactioninresponsetoanattackbytheIslamicRepublicofIranagainstaUnitedStatesnaval vessel in international waters of the Persian Gulf”,namelytheminingoftheUSSSamuelB.Roberts;accordingto theUnitedStates, “This [was]but the latest ina seriesofoffensiveattacksandprovocationsIraniannaval forceshave

takenagainstneutralshippingintheinternationalwatersofthePersianGulf .”

TheCourtnotesthattheattacksontheSalmanandNasrplatforms were not an isolated operation, aimed simply attheoilinstallations,ashadbeenthecasewiththeattacksof19October1987;theyformedpartofamuchmoreextensivemilitaryaction,designated“OperationPrayingMantis”,con-ductedbytheUnitedStatesagainstwhatitregardedas“legiti-mate military targets”; armed force was used, and damagedonetoanumberoftargets,includingthedestructionoftwoIranianfrigatesandotherIraniannavalvesselsandaircraft .

As in the caseof theattackon theSea Isle City, thefirstquestioniswhethertheUnitedStateshasdischargedthebur-denofproofthattheUSSSamuel B. RobertswasthevictimofaminelaidbyIran .TheCourtnotesthatmineswerebeinglaidatthetimebybothbelligerentsintheIran-Iraqwar,sothatevidenceofotherminelayingoperationsbyIranisnotconclu-siveastoresponsibilityofIranforthisparticularmine .ThemainevidencethattheminestruckbytheUSSSamuelB.Rob-ertswas laidby Iranwas thediscoveryofmooredmines inthesamearea,bearingserialnumbersmatchingotherIranianmines, inparticular those found aboard the vessel Iran Ajr.Thisevidenceishighlysuggestive,butnotconclusive .

Furthermore, no attacks on United States-flagged vessels(as distinct from United States-owned vessels), additionalto those cited as justification for the earlier attacks on theReshadatplatforms,havebeenbrought totheCourt’satten-tion, other than the mining of the USS Samuel B. Robertsitself .Thequestionisthereforewhetherthatincidentsufficedinitself to justifyactioninself-defence,asamountingtoan“armed attack” . The Court does not exclude the possibilitythattheminingofasinglemilitaryvesselmightbesufficienttobringintoplaythe“inherentrightofself-defence”;butinviewofallthecircumstances,includingtheinconclusivenessoftheevidenceofIran’sresponsibilityfortheminingoftheUSSSamuelB.Roberts, theCourt isunable toholdthat theattacksontheSalmanandNasrplatformshavebeenshowntohavebeenjustifiablymadeinresponsetoan“armedattack”ontheUnitedStatesbyIran,intheformoftheminingoftheUSSSamuelB.Roberts.

Criteria of necessity and proportionality(paras .73–77)

The Court points out that in the present case a questionofwhethercertainactionis“necessary”arisesbothasanele-mentofinternationallawrelatingtoself-defenceandonthebasis of the actual terms of Article xx, paragraph 1 (d), ofthe1955Treaty,alreadyquoted,wherebytheTreatydoes“notpreclude . . .measures . . .necessarytoprotect[the]essentialsecurityinterests”ofeitherparty .TheCourtthereforeturnstothecriteriaofnecessityandproportionalityinthecontextofinternationallawonself-defence .Oneaspectofthesecriteriaisthenatureofthetargetoftheforceusedavowedlyinself-defence .

The Court indicates that it is not sufficiently convincedthat the evidence available supports the contentions of theUnited States as to the significance of the military presenceandactivityontheReshadatoilplatforms;and itnotes that

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nosuchevidenceisofferedinrespectoftheSalmanandNasrcomplexes .However,evenacceptingthosecontentions,forthepurposesofdiscussion, theCourtfinds itselfunable toholdthattheattacksmadeontheplatformscouldhavebeenjusti-fiedasactsofself-defence .InthecasebothoftheattackontheSea Isle CityandtheminingoftheUSSSamuel B. Roberts,theCourt isnotsatisfied that theattackson theplatformswerenecessarytorespondtotheseincidents .

Astotherequirementofproportionality,theattackof19October1987might,hadtheCourtfoundthatitwasneces-sary in response to the Sea Isle City incident as an armedattackcommittedbyIran,havebeenconsideredproportion-ate .Inthecaseoftheattacksof18April1988,however,theywere conceived and executed as part of a more extensiveoperationentitled“OperationPrayingMantis” .Asaresponseto themining,byanunidentifiedagency,ofasingleUnitedStateswarship,whichwasseverelydamagedbutnotsunk,andwithoutlossoflife,neither“OperationPrayingMantis”asawhole,noreventhatpartofitthatdestroyedtheSalmanandNasrplatforms,canberegarded,inthecircumstancesofthiscase,asaproportionateuseofforceinself-defence .

Conclusion(para .78)

The Court thus concludes from the foregoing that theactionscarriedoutbyUnitedStatesforcesagainstIranianoilinstallationson19October1987and18April1988cannotbejustified,underArticlexx,paragraph1(d),ofthe1955Treaty,asbeingmeasuresnecessarytoprotecttheessentialsecurityinterestsoftheUnitedStates,sincethoseactionsconstitutedrecourse to armed force not qualifying, under internationallawonthequestion,asactsofself-defence,andthusdidnotfall within the category of measures contemplated, upon itscorrectinterpretation,bythatprovisionoftheTreaty .

Iran’s claim under Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty(paras .79–99)

HavingsatisfieditselfthattheUnitedStatesmaynotrely,inthecircumstancesofthecase,onthedefencetotheclaimofIranaffordedbyArticlexx,paragraph1(d),ofthe1955Trea-ty, the Court turns to that claim, made under Article x,paragraph1,ofthatTreaty,whichprovidesthat“BetweentheterritoriesofthetwoHighContractingPartiesthereshallbefreedomofcommerceandnavigation .”

InitsJudgmentof12December1996onthepreliminaryobjectionoftheUnitedStates,theCourthadoccasion,forthepurposesofascertaininganddefiningthescopeofitsjurisdic-tion, to interpretanumberofprovisionsof the1955Treaty,includingArticlex,paragraph1 .ItnotedthattheApplicanthadnotallegedthatanymilitaryactionhadaffecteditsfree-dom of navigation, so that the only question to be decidedwas“whethertheactionsoftheUnitedStatescomplainedofbyIranhadthepotentialtoaffect‘freedomofcommerce’”asguaranteedbythatprovision(I.C.J. Reports 1996(II),p .817,para .38) .AfterexaminingthecontentionsofthePartiesastothemeaningoftheword,theCourtconcludedthat“itwouldbe a natural interpretation of the word ‘commerce’ in Arti-clex,paragraph1,oftheTreatyof1955thatitincludescom-

mercialactivitiesingeneral—notmerelytheimmediateactofpurchaseandsale,butalsotheancillaryactivities integrallyrelatedtocommerce”(ibid.,p .819,para .49) .

Inthatdecision,theCourtalsoobservedthatitdidnotthenhavetoenterintothequestionwhetherArticlex,paragraph1,“isrestrictedtocommerce‘between’theParties”(I.C.J. Reports 1996(II),p .817,para .44) .HoweveritisnowcommongroundbetweenthePartiesthatthatprovisionisintermslimitedtotheprotectionoffreedomofcommerce“betweentheterritoriesofthetwoHighContractingParties” .TheCourtobservesthatitisoilexportsfromIrantotheUnitedStatesthatarerelevanttothecase,notsuchexportsingeneral .

Inthe1996Judgment,theCourtfurtheremphasizedthat“Articlex,paragraph1,oftheTreatyof1955doesnotstrictlyspeakingprotect‘commerce’but‘ freedomofcommerce’”,andcontinued: “Unless such freedom is to be rendered illusory,the possibility must be entertained that it could actually beimpededasaresultofactsentailingthedestructionofgoodsdestinedtobeexported,orcapableofaffectingtheirtransportandstoragewithaviewtoexport”(ibid.,p .819,para .50) .TheCourt also noted that “Iran’s oil production, a vital part ofthatcountry’seconomy,constitutesanimportantcomponentofitsforeigntrade”,andthat“OnthematerialnowbeforetheCourt,itis . . .notabletodetermineifandtowhatextentthedestructionoftheIranianoilplatformshadaneffectupontheexport trade in Iranianoil . . .” (ibid., p . 820, para . 51) . TheCourtconcludesbyobservingthat if,at thepresentstageoftheproceedings,itweretofindthatIranhadestablishedthatsuch was the case, the claim of Iran under Article x, para-graph1,couldbeupheld .

BeforeturningtothefactsandtothedetailsofIran’sclaim,theCourtmentionsthattheUnitedStateshasnotsucceeded,tothesatisfactionoftheCourt, inestablishingthatthelim-itedmilitarypresenceontheplatforms,andtheevidenceastocommunications toandfromthem,couldberegardedasjustifyingtreatingtheplatformsasmilitaryinstallations(seeabove) . For the same reason, the Court is unable to regardthem as outside the protection afforded by Article x, para-graph1,ofthe1955Treaty,asallegedbytheUnitedStates .

TheCourtinits1996Judgmentcontemplatedthepossibil-itythatfreedomofcommercecouldbeimpedednotonlyby“thedestructionofgoodsdestinedtobeexported”,butalsobyacts“capableofaffectingtheirtransportandtheirstoragewithaviewtoexport”(I.C.J. Reports 1996(II),p .819,para .50) .IntheviewoftheCourt,theactivitiesoftheplatformsaretoberegarded,ingeneral,ascommercialinnature;itdoesnot,however, necessarily follow that any interference with suchactivities involves an impact on the freedom of commercebetweentheterritoriesofIranandtheUnitedStates .

The Court considers that where a State destroys anotherState’smeansofproductionandtransportofgoodsdestinedforexport,ormeansancillaryorpertainingtosuchproduc-tion or transport, there is in principle an interference withthe freedom of international commerce . In destroying theplatforms,whosefunction,takenasawhole,waspreciselytoproduce and transport oil, the military actions made com-merce in oil, at that time and from that source, impossible,andtothatextentprejudicedfreedomofcommerce .Whilethe

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oil,whenitlefttheplatformcomplexes,wasnotyetinastatetobesafelyexported,thefactremainsthatitcouldbealreadyat that stagedestined for export, and thedestructionof theplatform prevented further treatment necessary for export .The Court therefore finds that the protection of freedom ofcommerce under Article x, paragraph 1, of the 1955 TreatyappliedtotheplatformsattackedbytheUnitedStates,andtheattacksthusimpededIran’sfreedomofcommerce .However,thequestionremainswhethertherewasinthiscaseaninter-ferencewithfreedomofcommerce“betweentheterritoriesoftheHighContractingParties” .

TheUnitedStates in factcontends further that therewasinanyeventnobreachofArticlex,paragraph1, inasmuchas,evenassumingthat theattackscausedsome interferencewithfreedomofcommerce,itdidnotinterferewithfreedomofcommerce“between the territoriesof the twoHighCon-tracting Parties” . First, as regards the attack of 19 October1987ontheReshadatplatforms,itobservesthattheplatformswereunderrepairasaresultofanearlierattackonthembyIraq;consequently,theywerenotengagedin,orcontributingto,commercebetweentheterritoriesoftheParties .Secondly,asregardstheattackof18April1988ontheSalmanandNasrplatforms,itdrawsattentiontoUnitedStatesExecutiveOrder12613,signedbyPresidentReaganon29October1987,whichprohibited,withimmediateeffect,theimportintotheUnitedStates of most goods (including oil) and services of Iranianorigin . As a consequence of the embargo imposed by thisOrder, there was, it is suggested, no commerce between theterritories of the Parties that could be affected, and conse-quentlynobreachoftheTreatyprotectingit .

Iranhasasserted,andtheUnitedStateshasnotdenied,thattherewasamarketforIraniancrudeoildirectlyimportedintotheUnitedStatesuptotheissuanceofExecutiveOrder12613of 29 October 1987 . Thus Iranian oil exports did up to thattimeconstitutethesubjectof“commercebetweentheterrito-riesoftheHighContractingParties”withinthemeaningofArticlex,paragraph1,ofthe1955Treaty .

The Court observes that at the time of the attack of 19October1987nooilwhatsoeverwasbeingproducedorproc-essedbytheReshadatandResalatplatforms,sincethesehadbeenputoutofcommissionbyearlierIraqiattacks .Whileitistruethattheattackscausedamajorsetbacktotheprocessofbringingtheplatformsbackintoproduction,therewasatthemomentof theattackson theseplatformsnoongoingcom-merceinoilproducedorprocessedbythem .

TheCourtfurtherobservesthattheembargoimposedbyExecutiveOrder12613wasalreadyinforcewhentheattacksontheSalmanandNasrplatformswerecarriedout;andthat,ithasnotbeenshownthattheReshadatandResalatplatformswould,haditnotbeenfortheattackof19October1987,haveresumed production before the embargo was imposed . TheCourtmustthereforeconsiderthesignificanceofthatExecu-tiveOrderfortheinterpretationandapplicationofArticlex,paragraph1,ofthe1955Treaty .

The Court sees no reason to question the view sustainedbyIranthat,overtheperiodduringwhichtheUnitedStatesembargowasineffect,petroleumproductswerereachingtheUnitedStates,inconsiderablequantities,thatwerederivedin

partfromIraniancrudeoil .Itpointsout,however,thatwhatthe Court has to determine is not whether something thatcouldbedesignated“Iranian”oilenteredtheUnitedStates,insomeform,duringthecurrencyoftheembargo;itiswhetherthere was “commerce” in oil between the territories of IranandtheUnitedStatesduringthat time,withinthemeaninggiventothatterminthe1955Treaty .

Inthisrespect,whatseemstotheCourttobedetermina-tive is the nature of the successive commercial transactionsrelatingtotheoil,ratherthanthesuccessivetechnicalproc-essesthatitunderwent .WhatIranregardsas“indirect”com-merce in oil between itself and the United States involveda series of commercial transactions: a sale by Iran of crudeoiltoacustomerinWesternEurope,orsomethirdcountryotherthantheUnitedStates;possiblyaseriesofintermediatetransactions; and ultimately the sale of petroleum productsto a customer in the United States . This is not “commerce”betweenIranand theUnitedStates,butcommercebetweenIranandanintermediatepurchaser;and“commerce”betweenanintermediatesellerandtheUnitedStates .

The Court thus concludes, with regard to the attack of19October1987ontheReshadatplatforms,thattherewasatthe timeof thoseattacksnocommercebetween the territo-riesofIranandtheUnitedStates inrespectofoilproducedby those platforms and the Resalat platforms, inasmuch astheplatformswereunderrepairandinoperative;andthattheattackscannotthereforebesaidtohaveinfringedthefreedomofcommerceinoilbetweentheterritoriesoftheHighCon-tracting Parties protected by Article x, paragraph 1, of the1955Treaty,particularlytakingintoaccountthedateofentryintoforceoftheembargoeffectedbyExecutiveOrder12613 .The Court notes further that, at the time of the attacks of18April1988ontheSalmanandNasrplatforms,allcommercein crude oil between the territories of Iran and the UnitedStates had been suspended by that Executive Order, so thatthoseattacksalsocannotbesaidtohaveinfringedtherightsofIranunderArticlex,paragraph1,ofthe1955Treaty .

The Court is therefore unable to uphold the submissionsof Iran, that incarryingout thoseattacks theUnitedStatesbreacheditsobligationstoIranunderArticlex,paragraph1,ofthe1955Treaty .Inviewofthisconclusion,theIranianclaimforreparationcannotbeupheld .

*

The Court furthermore concludes that, in view of thisfinding on the claim of Iran, it becomes unnecessary toexamine the argument of the United States (referred toabove)thatIranmightbedebarredfromreliefonitsclaimbyreasonofitsownconduct .

United States Counter-Claim(paras .101–124)

TheCourtrecallsthattheUnitedStateshasfiledacoun-ter-claimagainstIranandreferstothecorrespondingfinalsubmissionspresentedbytheUnitedStatesintheCounter-Memorial .

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The Court further recalls that, by an Order of10March1998itfound“thatthecounter-claimpresentedbytheUnitedStates in itsCounter-Memorial is admissibleassuchandformspartofthecurrentproceedings .”

Iran’s objections to the Court’s jurisdiction and to the admissibility of the United States counter-claim(paras .103–116)

Iran maintains that the Court’s Order of 10 March 1998did not decide all of the preliminary issues involved in thecounter-claimpresentedbytheUnitedStates;theCourtonlyruledontheadmissibilityoftheUnitedStatescounter-claimin relation to Article 80 of the Rules of Court, declaring itadmissible“assuch”,whilstreservingthesubsequentproce-dureforfurtherdecision .IrancontendsthattheCourtshouldnotdealwiththemeritsofthecounter-claim,presentingfiveobjections .

TheCourtconsidersthatitisopentoIranatthisstageoftheproceedingstoraiseobjectionstothe jurisdictionoftheCourt to entertain the counter-claim or to its admissibility,other than thoseaddressedby theOrderof10March1998 .It points out that this Order does not address any questionrelatingtojurisdictionandadmissibilitynotdirectlylinkedtoArticle80oftheRules .TheCourtindicatesthatitwillthere-foreproceedtoaddresstheobjectionsnowpresentedbyIran .

TheCourtfindsthatitcannotupholdthefirstobjectionofIrantotheeffectthattheCourtcannotentertainthecounter-claimof the United Statesbecause it waspresentedwithoutany prior negotiation, and thus does not relate to a dispute“notsatisfactorilyadjustedbydiplomacy”ascontemplatedbyArticlexxI,paragraph2,ofthe1955Treaty .TheCourtpointsoutthatitisestablishedthatadisputehasarisenbetweenIranand the United States over the issues raised in the counter-claim;andthatitissufficientfortheCourttosatisfyitselfthatthedisputewasnotsatisfactorilyadjustedbydiplomacybeforebeingsubmittedtotheCourt .

TheCourtfindsthatthesecondobjectionofIran,accord-ingtowhichtheUnitedStatesisineffectsubmittingaclaimonbehalfofthirdStatesorofforeignentitiesandhasnotitletodo so, isdevoidof anyobject andcannotbeupheld .TheCourtrecallsthatthefirstsubmissionpresentedbytheUnitedStates in regard to its counter-claim simply requests theCourttoadjudgeanddeclarethattheallegedactionsofIranbreacheditsobligationstotheUnitedStates,withoutmentionofanythirdStates .

Initsthirdobjection,IrancontendsthattheUnitedStatescounter-claimextendsbeyondArticlex,paragraph1,ofthe1955Treaty, theonly text inrespectofwhichtheCourthasjurisdiction,andthattheCourtcannotthereforeupholdanysubmissions fallingoutside the termsofparagraph1of thatArticle .TheCourtnotesthattheUnitedStates,inpresentingitsfinalsubmissionsonthecounter-claim,nolongerrelies,asitdidattheoutset,onArticlexofthe1955Treatyasawhole,but on paragraph 1 of that Article only, and, furthermore,recognizestheterritoriallimitationofArticlex,paragraph1,referring specifically to the militaryactions that were alleg-edly “dangerous and detrimental to commerce and naviga-tionbetween the territories of the United States and the Islamic

Republic of Iran” (emphasis added) rather than, generally,to“militaryactions thatweredangerousanddetrimental tomaritime commerce” . By limiting the scope of its counter-claiminitsfinalsubmissions,theUnitedStateshasdeprivedIran’sthirdobjectionofanyobject,andtheCourtfindsthatitcannotthereforeupholdit .

InitsfourthobjectionIranmaintainsthat“theCourthasjurisdiction to rule only on counter-claims alleging a viola-tion by Iran of freedom of commerce as protected underArticlex(1),andnotoncounter-claimsallegingaviolationoffreedomofnavigationasprotectedbythesameparagraph” .TheCourtnotesnevertheless,thatIranseemstohavechangedits position and recognized that the counter-claim could befoundedonaviolationof freedomofnavigation .TheCourtfurther observes that it also concluded in 1998 that it hadjurisdictiontoentertaintheUnitedStatescounter-claiminsofarasthefactsallegedmayhaveprejudicedthe freedoms(intheplural)guaranteedbyArticlex,paragraph1,ofthe1955Treaty,i .e .,freedomofcommerceandfreedomofnavigation .ThisobjectionofIranthuscannotbeupheldbytheCourt .

IranpresentsonefinalargumentagainsttheadmissibilityoftheUnitedStatescounter-claim,whichhoweveritconcedesrelatesonly topartof thecounter-claim .Irancontends thattheUnitedStateshasbroadenedthesubject-matterofitsclaimbeyondthesubmissionssetoutinitscounter-claimbyhaving,belatedly,addedcomplaintsrelatingtofreedomofnavigationto its complaints relating to freedom of commerce, and byhavingaddednewexamplesofbreachesoffreedomofmari-timecommerce in itsRejoinder inaddition to the incidentsalready referred to in the counter-claim presented with theCounter-Memorial .

TheCourtobservesthattheissueraisedbyIraniswhethertheUnitedStatesispresentinganewclaim .TheCourtisthusfacedwithidentifyingwhatis“anewclaim”andwhatismerely“additional evidence relating to the original claim” . It is wellestablished in the Court’s jurisprudence that the parties to acasecannotinthecourseofproceedings“transformthedisputebroughtbeforetheCourtintoadisputethatwouldbeofadif-ferentnature .”TheCourtrecallsthatithasnotedinitsOrderof 10 March 1998 in the present case that the counter-claimalleged“attacksonshipping,thelayingofmines,andothermil-itaryactionssaidtobe‘dangerousanddetrimentaltomaritimecommerce’”(I.C.J. Reports 1998,p .204,para .36) .SubsequentlytoitsCounter-Memorialandcounter-claimandtothatOrderoftheCourt,theUnitedStatesprovideddetailedparticularsoffurther incidentssubstantiating, in itscontention, itsoriginalclaims . In the view of the Court, the United States has not,bydoingso,transformedthesubjectofthedisputeoriginallysubmitted to the Court, nor has it modified the substance ofitscounter-claim,whichremainsthesame .TheCourtthereforecannotupholdtheobjectionofIran .

Merits of the United States Counter-Claim(paras .119–123)

HavingdisposedofallobjectionsofIrantoitsjurisdictionover thecounter-claim,andto theadmissibility thereof, theCourtconsidersthecounter-claimonitsmerits .Itpointsoutthat,tosucceedonitscounter-claim,theUnitedStatesmust

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showthat:(a)itsfreedomofcommerceorfreedomofnaviga-tionbetween the territoriesof theHighContractingPartiestothe1955Treatywasimpaired;andthat(b)theactswhichallegedlyimpairedoneorbothofthosefreedomsareattribut-abletoIran .

TheCourtrecallsthatArticlex,paragraph1,ofthe1955Treaty does not protect, as between the Parties, freedom ofcommerce or freedom of navigation in general . As alreadynoted above, the provision of that paragraph contains animportantterritoriallimitation .Inordertoenjoytheprotec-tion provided by that text, the commerce or the navigationistobebetween the territoriesoftheUnitedStatesandIran .TheUnitedStatesbears theburdenofproof that thevesselswhichwereattackedwereengagedincommerceornavigationbetweentheterritoriesoftheUnitedStatesandIran .

The Court then examines each of Iran’s alleged attacks,in chronological order, from the standpoint of this require-ment of the 1955 Treaty and concludes that none of thevessels described by the United States as being damaged byIran’sallegedattackswasengagedincommerceornavigation“betweentheterritoriesofthetwoHighContractingParties” .Therefore,theCourtconcludesthattherehasbeennobreachofArticlex,paragraph1,ofthe1955Treatyinanyofthespe-cificincidentsinvolvingtheseshipsreferredtointheUnitedStatespleadings .

TheCourt takesnotethat theUnitedStateshasalsopre-sented its claim in a generic sense . It has asserted that as aresultof thecumulationofattacksonUSandothervessels,layingminesandotherwiseengaginginmilitaryactionsinthePersianGulf,IranmadetheGulfunsafe,andthusbreacheditsobligationwithrespecttofreedomofcommerceandfreedomof navigation which the United States should have enjoyedunderArticlex,paragraph1,ofthe1955Treaty .

The Court observes that, while it is a matter of publicrecordthatasaresultoftheIran-IraqwarnavigationinthePersianGulfinvolvedmuchhigherrisks,thataloneisnotsuf-ficientfortheCourttodecidethatArticlex,paragraph1,wasbreachedbyIran .ItisfortheUnitedStatestoshowthattherewasanactual impedimenttocommerceornavigationbetweentheterritoriesofthetwoHighContractingParties .However,theUnitedStateshasnotdemonstratedthattheallegedactsofIranactuallyinfringedthefreedomofcommerceorofnavi-gationbetweenthe territoriesof theUnitedStatesandIran .TheCourtalsonotes that theexaminationaboveof specificincidentsshowsthatnoneofthemindividuallyinvolvedanyinterferencewiththecommerceandnavigationprotectedbythe1955Treaty;accordinglythegenericclaimoftheUnitedStatescannotbeupheld .

The Court has thus found that the counter-claim of theUnited States concerning breach by Iran of its obligationsto the United States under Article x, paragraph 1, of the1955Treaty,whetherbasedonthespecificincidentslisted,orasagenericclaim,mustberejected;thereisthereforenoneedforittoconsider,underthishead,thecontestedissuesofattri-butionofthoseincidentstoIran .Inviewoftheforegoing,theUnitedStatesclaimforreparationcannotbeupheld .

** *

Declaration of Judge Ranjeva

Subscribing to the conclusions set out in the Judgment,JudgeRanjevaraisesthedistinctionarisinginrespectofthesame set of facts between the violation of freedom of com-mercebetweenthetwoPartiesandthenon-violationoffree-domofcommercebetweenthoseParties’territories .

InhisdeclarationJudgeRanjevadrawsattentiontothefactthat the Judgment pierces the veil of the dispute: the Courtsoughttogiveprioritytothoroughconsiderationofthepointof law towhich theParties ascribed thegreatest importance:whethertheuseofforcewasjustifiedunderArticlexx,para-graph1,ofthe1955Treatyortheprincipleofself-defenceunderinternationallaw .Thenegativeresponsegivenintheoperativepart itself reflects the Court’s decision to adopt an approachgroundedonananalysisoftheelementsoftheclaim:itscause(cur)anditssubject(quid).ItwouldhavebeenappropriateunderthesecircumstancestolooktoArticle38,paragraph2,oftheRulesofCourtandtoreferdirectlytotheconceptofthecauseoftheclaim .Anotherapproach,maskingthecauseoftheclaim,wouldhaveaffectedthesubjectofthelitigants’trueintentandfavoured wholly artificial considerations or purely logical ones,whollyartificialconsiderationsorpurelylogicalones,giventhestrategyemployedinpresentingtheclaimsandargu-ments . In the present proceedings the Respondent’s attitudehelpedtoforestallthetheoreticaldebateconcerningthetensionbetweentheconsensualbasisoftheCourt’sjurisdictionandtheprinciplejura novit curia. novit curia.

Declaration of Judge Koroma

In the declaration he appended to the Judgment,Judge Koroma stated that it was crucial and correct, in hisview, that the Court had determined that measures involv-ingtheuseofforceandpurportedtohavebeentakenundertheArticleofthe1955Treatyrelatingtothemaintenanceorrestorationof internationalpeaceandsecurity,ornecessarytoprotectaStateparty’sessentialsecurityinterests,hadtobejudgedonthebasisoftheprincipleoftheprohibitionunderinternationallawoftheuseofforce,asqualifiedbytherightofself-defence .Inotherwords,whetheranactionallegedtobejustifiedundertheArticlewasorwasnotanunlawfulmeas-ure had to be determined by reference to the criteria of theUnitedNationsCharterandgeneralinternationallaw .

He agreed with the Court’s decision, as reflected in theJudgment,thattheactionscarriedoutagainsttheoil instal-lationswerenot lawfulasmeasuresnecessarytoprotect theessential security interests of the United States, since thoseactions constituted recourse to armed force not qualifying,undertheUnitedNationsCharterandgeneral internationallaw, as acts of self-defence, and thus did not fall within thecategory of measures contemplated by the 1955 Treaty .JudgeKoromamaintainedthatthatfindingconstitutedareplytothesubmissionsofthePartiesand,accordingly,theissueofnon ultra petitadidnotarise .

HealsosubscribedtotheCourt’sfindingthattheprotec-tionof freedomofcommerceunderthe1955Treatyapplied

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to the oil installations and that the attacks, prima facie,impededIran’sfreedomofcommercewithinthemeaningofthatexpressioninthetextoftheTreaty,butdidnotviolatethefreedomofcommerce .JudgeKoromaconsideredthisfindingnotdevoidofsignificance .

Separate opinion of Judge Higgins

JudgeHigginshasvotedinfavourofthedispositif,becauseshe agrees that the claim of Iran that the United States hasviolatedArticlex,paragraph1,oftheTreatyofAmitycannotbeupheld .

However, she believes that this determination makes itunnecessaryfortheCourtalsotoaddressinitsJudgmentthequestionofwhethertheUnitedStatescouldjustifyitsmilitaryattacksontheoilplatformsunderArticlexx,paragraph1(d),of thesameTreaty .ThisisbecausetheCourt itselfhassaid,in its Judgment on Preliminary Objections in 1996, thatArticlexx,paragraph1(d),isinthenatureofadefence .IntheabsenceofanyfindingofabreachbytheUnitedStatesofArticlex,paragraph1,theissueofapossibledefencedoesnotarise .

JudgeHigginsobserves that thereare twoparticularrea-sonswhythereshouldnothavebeenafindingonArticlexx,paragraph 1 (d), in the dispositif. The first is that the Courtusually treats a defence as part of its reasoning in decidingwhetheraRespondenthasactedcontrarytoaninternationallegal obligation . It is its conclusion which normally consti-tutes the dispositif, and not its reasoning as to any possibledefenceor justification .Thesecondreason is that,giventheconsensual basis of jurisdiction, the Court is limited in thedispositiftomakingfindingsuponmattersthattheApplicanthasrequestedfordetermination .ThefinalsubmissionsofIrandonotincludeanyrequestforadeterminationonArticlexx,paragraph1(d).

EvenifithadbeencorrectfortheCourttodealwiththatclause,JudgeHigginsbelievesthatitshouldthenhaveinter-pretedtheparticularprovisionsinthelightofgeneralinterna-tionallawastotheirspecificterms .Inherview,theCourthasnotinterpretedtheactualtermsofArticlexx,paragraph1(d),buthasessentiallyreplacedthem,assessingtheUnitedStatesmilitaryactionbyreference to the lawonarmedattackandself-defence .

Finally,inJudgeHiggins’sopinion,inthehandlingoftheevidencethatwouldfallforconsiderationinanyexaminationofArticlexx,paragraph1(d),theCourthasnotspecifiedthestandardofevidencetobemet;nordealtwiththeevidenceinsufficientdetail;nordealtwithitinaneven-handedmanner .

Separate opinion of Judge Parra-Aranguren

Judge Parra-Aranguren declared that his vote for theoperativepartof theJudgmentshouldnotbeunderstoodasanexpressionofagreementwitheachandeverypartof thereasoningfollowedbytheCourtinreachingitsconclusions .Inparticularheindicatedhisdisagreementwiththefirstsen-tenceofparagraph125(1)statingthattheCourt:“Findsthatthe actions of the United States of America against Iranianoilplatforms on19October1987and18April 1988cannot

be justified as measures necessary to protect the essentialsecurityinterestsoftheUnitedStatesofAmericaunderArti-clexx,paragraph1(d),ofthe1955TreatyofAmity,EconomicRelationsandConsularRightsbetween theUnitedStatesofAmericaandIran,asinterpretedinthelightofinternationallawontheuseofforce .”

Thereasonsforhisdisagreementarethefollowing:The Court decided in its 12 December 1996 Judgment

that: “it has jurisdiction, on the basis of Article xxI, para-graph2,oftheTreatyof1955,toentertaintheclaimsmadebytheIslamicRepublicofIranunderArticlex,paragraph1,ofthatTreaty”(Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v . United States of America), Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996(II), p .821,para .55(2)) .

InitsfirstandmainsubmissionIranrequeststheCourttorejectallcontraryclaimsandsubmissionsandtoadjudgeanddeclare“Thatinattackinganddestroyingon19October1987and18April1988theoilplatformsreferredtoinIran’sAppli-cation,theUnitedStatesbreacheditsobligationstoIranunderArticlex,paragraph1,of theTreatyofAmity,and that theUnitedStatesbearsresponsibilityfortheattacks .”

ThusJudgeParra-Arangurenconsidered that thesubject-matter of the dispute submitted by Iran to the Court waswhether the military actions of the United States breachedits obligations to Iran under Article x, paragraph 1, of the1955Treaty, in forcebetweentheparties .Therefore the taskoftheCourtwastodecidetheclaimpresentedbyIran,i .e .,toexamineanddeterminewhethertheUnitedStatesviolateditsobligationsunderArticlex,paragraph1,ofthe1955Treaty .InhisopinionitisonlyiftheCourtcametotheconclusionthattheUnitedStatesbreacheditsobligationsunderArticlex,paragraph1,ofthe1955Treatythatitwouldhavejurisdictionto enter into the consideration of the defence advanced bytheUnitedStates to justify itsmilitaryactionsagainst Iran,in particular whether they were justified under Article xx,paragraph1(d),ofthe1955Treatyasnecessarytoprotectits“essentialsecurityinterests” .

In the Court’s view there are particular considerationsmilitating in favourof anexaminationof theapplicationofArticlexx,paragraph1(d),beforeturningtoArticlex,para-graph1 .

The first particular consideration militating in favourof reversing the order of examination of the Articles of the1955Treaty,asexplainedinparagraph37oftheJudgment,isthat:“ItisclearthattheoriginaldisputebetweenthePartiesrelated to the legality of the actions of the United States, inthelightofinternationallawontheuseofforce”;“Atthetimeofthoseactions,neitherPartymadeanymentionofthe1955Treaty”,theUnitedStatescontendingthat“itsattacksontheoilplatformswerejustifiedasactsofself-defence,inresponseto what it regarded as armed attacks by Iran”; and “on thatbasisitgavenoticeofitsactiontotheSecurityCouncilunderArticle51oftheUnitedNationsCharter” .

As the second particular consideration, paragraph 38 oftheJudgmentindicatesthat,initsRejoinder,theUnitedStatesitselfrecognizesthat“Theself-defenseissuespresentedinthiscaseraisemattersofthehighestimportancetoallmembersof

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theinternationalcommunity”;andthatIranalsostressesthegreatimportanceofthoseissues .

IntheopinionofJudgeParra-Arangurentherecanbenodoubt that matters relating to the use of force and to self-defenceareofthehighest importancetoallmembersoftheinternational community . He also stated that, while beingperfectly well aware at that time of the two particular con-siderations indicated above, the Court in its 1996 JudgmentexpresslyinterpretedArticlexx,paragraph1(d),ofthe1955Treaty“asaffordingonlyadefenceonthemerits”,concludingthatit“isconfinedtoaffordingthePartiesapossibledefenceonthemeritstobeusedshouldtheoccasionarise”(Oil Plat-forms (Islamic Republic of Iran v . United States of America), Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II),p .811,para .20) .

Consequently, Judge Parra-Aranguren is convinced thatthere are no “particular considerations militating in favourof an examination of the application of Article xx, para-graph 1 (d), before turning to Article x, paragraph 1” . Onthecontrary,therearestrongconsiderationsinfavourofnotdoingso .Thesecondsentenceofparagraph125(1)oftheJudg-mentdismissestheclaimpresentedbyIranbecausetheCourtcametotheconclusionthattheUnitedStateshadnotviolatedArticlex,paragraph1,ofthe1955Treaty .IntheopinionofJudge Parra-Aranguren, that is the end of the story . There-foreheconcludedthattheCourtdidnothavejurisdictiontoexamine the defences advanced by the United States on thebasisofArticlexx,paragraph1(d),tojustifyitshypotheticalviolationofArticlex,paragraph1,ofthe1955Treaty .

Separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans

JudgeKooijmanshasvotedinfavourofthedispositifsinceheagreedwithitssubstance .Heis,however,oftheviewthattheCourt’sfindingthattheactionsoftheUnitedStatesagainsttheoilplatformscannotbejustifiedasmeasuresnecessarytoprotect itsessentialsecurity interests isnotpartofthedeci-sionontheclaimandthereforeshouldnothavefoundaplacein the dispositif. That creates the hazardous precedent of anobiter dictumintheoperativepartofajudgment .

InhisseparateopinionJudgeKooijmansfirstgivesamoredetailedoverviewofthefactualcontextthanispresentedintheJudgment .HethendealswiththesubstanceofthedisputebeforetheCourt,whichdealswiththequestionwhethertheUnited States violated its obligation under Article x, para-graph1,ofthe1955Treatyconcerningfreedomofcommerce,andnotwhetheritusedforceinbreachoftheUnitedNationsCharterandcustomarylaw .

Heisof theviewthatArticlexx,paragraph1(d),of the1955 Treaty enabling the parties to take measures neces-sary to protect their essential security interests, is not anexonerationclausebutafreestandingprovisionandthattheCourtthereforecorrectlyconcludedthatitwasfreetochoosewhetheritwouldfirstdealwithArticlex,orwithArticlexx,paragraph1(d).ButoncetheCourthadfoundthattheUnitedStatescouldnotinvokeArticlexx,ithadtodecidethecaseongroundsmaterialtoArticlex,paragraph1,itself .Itsconclu-sionwithregardtoArticlexx,paragraph1(d),becameirrel-

evant for the disposition on the claim and therefore shouldnothavefoundaplaceintheoperativepartoftheJudgment .

JudgeKooijmansalsodissociateshimselffromthewayinwhich the Court puts the measures, invoked by the UnitedStatesas“necessarytoprotectitsessentialsecurityinterests”,directly to the test of the general rules of law on the use offorceincludingtherighttoself-defence,therebymisinterpret-ingthescopeofitsjurisdiction .

Inthelastpartofhisopinion,JudgeKooijmansindicateswhatinhisopinionwouldhavebeentheproperapproachtodealwiththelegalaspectsofArticlexx,paragraph1(d).InthisrespecthefollowsthedistinctionmadebytheCourt inits1986JudgmentintheNicaraguacasebetweenatestofrea-sonablenesswithregardtotheassessmentofthethreattothesecurityrisksandalegalitytestwithregardtothenecessityofthemeasurestaken .Applyingthismethodandusingtherulesofgeneralinternationallawontheuseofforceasameanstointerpret themeaningof“necessary”, JudgeKooijmanscon-cludesthattheactionsagainsttheoilplatformsdonotconsti-tutemeasureswhichcanbedeemednecessarytoprotecttheessentialsecurityinterestsoftheUnitedStates .

Dissenting opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh

JudgeAl-Khasawneh felt that the formal structureof thedispositif amalgamating as it does two distinct findings inoneparagraphwasunorthodoxandunfortunate . It also leftJudgeAl-Khasawnehwithadifficultchoiceofacceptingtheparagraphasawholeorleavingit .HefeltcompelledtodissentbecausehedisagreedwiththefindingthattheUnitedStateswasnotinviolationofitsobligationsunderArticlex,para-graph1,ofthe1955Treatyonthefreedomofcommerce .Thatfindingwasarrivedatbyunpersuasivereasoningthatdrawsanartificialdistinctionbetweenprotectedcommerce(directcommerce)andunprotectedcommerce(indirectcommerce) .Hepointedout that international trade law thresholds wereill-suitedasayardstickfortreaty-protectedcommerce,more-over the Judgment was unduly restrictive of the definitionoffreedomofcommercewhichincludednotonlyactualbutalsopotential commerce . JudgeAl-Khasawneh felt also thattheapproachcouldnotbesupportedonthebasisof textualanalysisandwasatvariancewithearlierjurisprudence .

Regarding the United States counter-claim which wasrejected by the Court, Judge Al-Khasawneh felt this was aconsequenceoftheCourt’snarrowinterpretationofprotectedcommerceandfeltitwouldbebetteriftheCourthadupheldclaimandcounter-claim .ThemaindifficultywiththeUnitedStatesclaimwashowevertheproblemofattributiontoIran .

JudgeAl-KhasawnehfeltthattheCourtshouldhavebeenclearerinitsuseoflanguagewhenitcametorejectingUnitedStatesclaimsthattheiractionsagainsttheoilplatformswerejustifiedbyArticlexx,paragraph1(d),ofthe1955TreatyasnecessarymeasurestoprotectUnitedStatesessentialsecurityinterests .Theuseofforcemadeitinevitabletodiscussthesecriterion in the language of necessity and proportionalitywhichformpartoftheconceptofthenon-useofforce .

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Separate opinion of Judge Buergenthal

JudgeBuergenthalagreeswiththeCourt’sJudgmenttotheextentthatitholdsthattheUnitedStatesofAmericadidnotbreachArticlex,paragraph1,ofthe1955TreatybetweenitandIran .Healsoagreeswith theCourt’sdecisionrejectingthe counter-claim interposed by the United States againstIran . That decision of the Court is justified, in his view, forthe very reasons, mutatis mutandis, that led the Court tofind that the United States did not breach the obligations itowedIranunderArticlex,paragraph1,of the1955Treaty .But Judge Buergenthal dissents from the Court’s conclusionthat the actions of the United States, in attacking certainIranian oil platforms, cannot be justified under Article xx,paragraph1 (d),of theTreaty“as interpreted in the lightofinternationallawontheuseofforce” .Heconsidersthatthispronouncement has no place in the Judgment,much less intheoperativepartthereof .

JudgeBuergenthalbelievesthattheCourt’sJudgment,asitrelatestoArticlexx,paragraph1(d), isseriouslyflawedforthefollowingreasons .First,itmakesafindingwithregardtoArticlexx,paragraph1(d),of the1955Treaty thatviolatesthenon ultra petitarule,acardinalrulegoverningtheCourt’sjudicialprocess,whichdoesnotallowtheCourttodealwithasubject—hereArticlexx,paragraph1(d)—inthedispositifofitsjudgmentthatthepartiestothecasehavenot,intheirfinal submissions, asked it to adjudicate . Second, the Courtmakesafindingonasubjectwhichithadnojurisdictiontomakeunderthedisputeresolutionclause—ArticlexxI,para-graph2—ofthe1955Treaty, thatclausebeingthesolebasisoftheCourt’sjurisdictioninthiscaseonceitfoundthattheUnitedStateshadnotviolatedArticlex,paragraph1,oftheTreaty . Third, even assuming that the Court had the requi-site jurisdiction to make the finding regarding Article xx,paragraph1(d),itsinterpretationofthatArticleinlightoftheinternationallawontheuseofforceexceededitsjurisdiction .Finally,JudgeBuergenthalconsidersthatthemannerinwhichtheCourtanalysestheevidencebearingonitsapplicationofArticlexx,paragraph1(d),isseriouslyflawed .

Dissenting opinion of Judge Elaraby

JudgeElarabyvotedagainstthefirstparagraphofthedis-positif,essentiallydissentingonthreepoints .

First, theCourthadjurisdictiontoruleuponthelegalityof theuseof force .Particularly that theCourtheld that theUnitedStatesuseofforcecannotbeconsideredaslegitimateself-defenceinconformitywiththe“criteriaapplicabletothequestion”whichtheCourtidentifiedas“theprovisionsoftheCharter of the United Nations and customary internationallaw” .UnitedStatesactionamounted toarmedreprisals andtheir illegality as such should have been noted . The Courtmissedanopportunitytoreaffirmandclarifythelawontheuseofforceinallitsmanifestations .

Second, the Court’s refusal to uphold Iran’s claim of aviolation of Article x, paragraph 1, was based on unsoundpremisesinfactsandinlaw .Whatisrelevantisnotwhetherthe targetedplatformswereproducingoilat the timeof theattacks, but rather whether Iran as a whole was producingoilandexportingittotheUnitedStates .Thetestiswhether

thefreedomofcommercebetweentheterritoriesof thetwoPartieshadbeenprejudiced .Oncetheembargowasimposed,indirect commerce was allowed and in fact continued . Theordinary meaning of the Treaty in its context supports theargumentthatitspurviewcoverscommerceinabroadsense .Also,Articlex,paragraph1,doesnotexcludesuch indirectcommerce .Thetendaysbetweenthefirstattackandtheimpo-sitionoftheembargowouldhavesufficedtodeclarethatthefreedomofcommercewasprejudiced .Hence, theobligationemanatingfromArticlex,paragraph1,wasbreached .

Third,theCourtwasrightinexaminingArticlexx,para-graph1(d),beforeArticlex,paragraph1 .Ithadjurisdictiontoenhanceitscontributiontotheprogressivedevelopmentofthelawbyrulingmoreexhaustivelyontheuseofforce .

Separate opinion of Judge Owada

JudgeOwadaconcurs in thefinalconclusionof theCourtthatneithertheclaimsoftheApplicantnorthecounter-claimoftheRespondentcanbeupheld,butheisnotinapositiontoagreetoallthepointsinthedispositifnorwithallthereasonsleadingtotheconclusions .ForthisreasonJudgeOwadaattach-eshisseparateopinion,focusingonlyonsomesalientpoints .

First, on the question of the basis of the decision of theCourt, Judge Owada takes the view that the Court shouldhave examined Article x, paragraph 1, prior to Article xx,paragraph 1 (d). Article xx, paragraph 1 (d), constitutes adefenceonthemeritsoftheclaimsoftheApplicantonArti-clex,paragraph1,andshouldforthatreasonbeconsideredonlyifandwhentheCourtfindsthattherehasbeenabreachofArticlex,paragraph1 .TheCourtcannotfreelychoosethegrounduponwhichtopassjudgmentwhenitsjurisdictionislimitedtotheexaminationofArticlex,paragraph1 .

Second, on the question of the scope of Article x, para-graph1,JudgeOwadaisingeneralagreementwiththeJudg-ment, but makes the point that the term “freedom of com-merce”,asusedinthe1955Treaty,refersto“unimpededflowofmercantiletransactioningoodsandservicesbetweentheterritories of the Contracting Parties” and cannot cover theactivitiesoftheoilplatforms .Apartfromthefactualgroundon which the Judgment is based, the Court for this reasoncannotupholdtheclaimthatthe“freedomofcommerce”inArticlex,paragraph1,hasbeenbreached .

Third, on the question of the scope of Article xx, para-graph1(d),whichinhisviewtheCourtdoesnothavetotakeupinviewofitsfindingonArticlex,paragraph1,JudgeOwa-da is of the opinion that the interpretation and applicationofArticlexx,paragraph1(d),andthequestionof theself-defence under international law in general are not synony-mous and that the latter as such is not the task before theCourt . The examination of the latter problem by the CourtshouldbeconfinedtowhatisnecessaryfortheinterpretationandapplicationofArticlexx,paragraph1(d),inviewofthelimitedscopeofthejurisdictionoftheCourt .

Finally,JudgeOwadaraisesthequestionofasymmetryintheproductionofevidenceinthiscase,whichleadstoadif-ficult situation for theCourt inverifying the facts involved .While accepting the basic principle on evidence, actori incumbit onus probandi, Judge Owada would have liked to

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see the Court engage in much more in-depth probing intotheproblemofascertainingthefactsofthecase,ifnecessarypropriomotu.

Separate opinion of Judge Simma

Judge Simma starts his separate opinion by explainingwhyhevotedinfavourofthefirstpartofthedispositifoftheJudgmenteventhoughheagreeswiththeCourt’s treatmentofonlyoneofthetwoissuesdealtwiththerein,namelythatoftheallegedsecurityinterestsoftheUnitedStatesmeasuredagainsttheinternationallawonself-defence .Astotheremain-ingpartsofthedispositif,JudgeSimmacanneitheragreewiththeCourt’sdecisionthattheUnitedStatesattacksontheoilplatformsultimatelydidnotinfringeuponIran’sTreatyrighttorespectforitsfreedomofcommercewiththeUnitedStates,nor does Judge Simma consider that the way in which theCourtdisposedoftheso-called“generic”counter-claimoftheUnitedStateswascorrect .Rather,inJudgeSimma’sviewthiscounter-claimoughttohavebeenupheld .Regardingthepartof thedispositifdevotedto thiscounter-claim,JudgeSimmathushadnochoicebuttodissent .ThereasonwhyJudgeSim-madidnotalsodissentfromthefirstpartofthedispositif(andpreferstocallhisopiniona“separate”andnota“dissenting”one) even though he concurs with the Court’s decisions ononlythefirstofthetwoissuesdecidedtherein,istobeseeninaconsiderationofjudicialpolicy:JudgeSimmawelcomesthattheCourthastakentheopportunity,offeredbyUnitedStatesrelianceonArticlexxofthe1955Treaty,tostateitsviewonthelegallimitsontheuseofforceatthemomentwhentheselimits find themselves under the greatest stress . AlthoughJudgeSimmaisoftheviewthattheCourthasfulfilledwhatisnothingbutitsdutyinthisregardwithinappropriaterestraint,JudgeSimmadoesnotwanttodisassociatehimselffromwhatafteralldoesresult inaconfirmation,albeit toohesitant,ofthejus cogensoftheUnitedNationsCharter .

SincemattersrelatingtotheUnitedStatesuseofforceareat the heart of the case, Judge Simma finds the Judgment’sapproachofdealingwithArticlexxbeforeturningtoArti-cle x of the 1955 Treaty acceptable . On the other hand, theCourt should have had the courage to restate, and thus toreconfirm,thefundamentalprinciplesofthelawoftheUnitedNationsaswellascustomaryinternationallawontheuseofforceinawayconformingtothestandardofvigourandclar-itysetbytheCourtalreadyintheCorfu Channelcaseofhalfacenturyago .This,unfortunately,theCourthasnotdone .

InJudgeSimma’sviewtheCourtcouldhaveclarifiedwhatkindofdefensivecountermeasureswouldhavebeenavailabletotheUnitedStates: inJudgeSimma’sview,hostilemilitaryactionnotreachingthethresholdofanarmedattackwithinthemeaningofArticle51oftheUnitedNationsCharter,likethat by Iran in the present case, may be countered by pro-portionate and immediate defensive measures equally of amilitarycharacter .However,theUnitedStatesactionsagainsttheoilplatformsdidnotqualifyassuchproportionatecoun-termeasures .

InJudgeSimma’sview,theCourt’streatmentofArticlexonfreedomofcommercebetweentheterritoriesofthePartiesfollowsastep-by-stepapproachwhichheconsiderscorrectup

toacertainpointbutwhichthenturnsintowrongdirections:first, the platforms attacked in October 1987 could not losetheir protection under Article x through being temporarilyinoperativebecause,accordingtoJudgeSimma,thefreedomunder theTreatyembracesalso thepossibilityofcommerceinthefuture .Secondly,accordingtoJudgeSimma,theindi-rectcommerceinIranianoilgoingonduringthetimeoftheUnitedStatesembargoisalsotoberegardedasprotectedbytheTreaty .

TurningtotheUnitedStatescounter-claim,JudgeSimmafinds theway inwhich theCourthasdealtwith itblatantlyinadequate,particularlywithregardtotheso-calledgenericcounter-claim which, in Judge Simma’s view, should havebeenupheld .JudgeSimmathensetsouttodeveloptheargu-ments, put forward somewhat unpersuasively by the UnitedStates,insupportofthegenericcounter-claim .Thefactthatinthepresentinstance(unlikeintheNicaraguacase),itwastwoStateswhichcreatedthesituationadversetoneutralshippingintheGulf,isnotdeterminant .AccordingtoJudgeSimma,allthatmatterswithregardtothegenericcounter-claimisthatIran was responsible for a significant portion of the actionsimpairingthefreedomofcommerceandnavigationbetweenthe two countries; it is not necessary to determine the par-ticularextenttowhichIranwasresponsibleforthem .Neithercoulditbearguedthatalltheimpedimentstofreecommerceand navigation which neutral ships faced in the Gulf werecausedbylegitimateactsofwarcarriedoutbythetwobellig-erents,andthatthereforeneutralshippingenteredthemari-timeareasaffectedbytheGulfwarat itsownrisk .InJudgeSimma’sview,Iran’sactionsconstitutedaviolationofArticlexofthe1955Treaty;animpedimentonthefreedomofcom-merceandnavigationcausedbythoseactionsisevidencedbytheincreaseinlabour,insurance,andothercostsresultingforthe participants in commerce between the countries duringtherelevantperiod .

JudgeSimmathenturnstorefutingtheargumentthattheacts alleged to have constituted an impediment to the free-domofcommerceandnavigationundertheTreatycannotbeattributedtoIranwithcertaintyandthatthereforeitisimpos-sibletofindIranresponsibleforthoseacts .JudgeSimmadem-onstrates that a principle of joint-and-several responsibilitycan be developed from domestic legal systems as a generalprinciple of law by which the dilemma in the present casecouldhavebeenovercome .

Finally,JudgeSimmaarguesthattheso-called“indispensa-ble-third-party”doctrine,consecutivelyacceptedandrejectedbytheCourt’searlierjurisprudence,wouldnothavestoodinthewayofacceptingtheUnitedStatescounter-claimaswell-founded .

Separate opinion of Judge Rigaux

TheoperativepartoftheJudgmentcomprisestwopoints:in the second it is concluded that the counter-claim of theUnitedStatesofAmericamustberejected;thefirstisdividedinto two parts, the second of which rejects the claim of theIslamicRepublicofIranforreparationwhile inthefirst theAmerican attacks on the oil platforms are held not to havesatisfiedtherequirementsoftheapplicableprovisionsofthe

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___________

InitsJudgment,theChamberconstitutedbytheCourtinthecaseconcerningApplicationforRevisionoftheJudgmentof11September1992inthecaseconcerningtheLand, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute(El Salvador/Honduras: Nica-ragua intervening) (ElSalvador v . Honduras), foundby fourvotestoone,thattheApplicationsubmittedbytheRepublicofElSalvadorforrevision,underArticle61oftheStatuteoftheCourt,of the Judgmentgivenon11September1992,bytheChamberoftheCourtconstitutedinthecaseconcerningtheLand,IslandandMaritimeFrontierDispute(ElSalvador/Honduras:Nicaraguaintervening),wasinadmissible .

** *

TheChamberwascomposedasfollows:JudgeGuillaume,PresidentoftheChamber;JudgesRezek,Buergenthal;Judgesad hocTorresBernárdezandPaolillo;RegistrarCouvreur .

** *

ThefinalparagraphofthejudgmentoftheChamberoftheCourtreadsasfollows:

“ . . .

TheChamber,

Byfourvotestoone,

Finds that the Application submitted by the Republic ofElSalvadorforrevision,underArticle61oftheStatuteoftheCourt,of the Judgmentgivenon11September1992,bytheChamberoftheCourtformedtodealwiththecaseconcerningtheLand, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (ElSalvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening),isinadmis-sible .

in favour: Judge Guillaume, President of the Chamber;JudgesRezek,Buergenthal;Judgead hocTorresBernárdez;against:Judgead hocPaolillo .”

** *

Judgead hocPaolilloappendedadissentingopiniontotheJudgmentoftheChamber .

** *

History of the proceedings and submissions of the Parties (paras .1–14)

On10September2002theRepublicofElSalvador(herein-after“ElSalvador”)submittedarequesttotheCourtforrevi-sionoftheJudgmentdeliveredon11September1992bytheChamberoftheCourtformedtodealwiththecaseconcern-ingtheLand,IslandandMaritimeFrontierDispute(ElSal-vador/Honduras:Nicaraguaintervening)(I .C .J .Reports1992,p .351) .

In its Application, El Salvador requested the Court “Toproceed to formtheChamber thatwillhear theapplicationforrevisionoftheJudgment,bearinginmindthetermsthatElSalvadorandHondurasagreeduponintheSpecialAgree-mentof24May1986 .”

ThePartieshavingbeendulyconsultedby thePresident,theCourt,byanOrderof27November2002,decidedtogranttheir request for the formationof a special chamber todealwith the case; it declared that three Members of the Courthadbeenelectedtositalongsidetwoad hocjudgeschosenbytheParties:PresidentG .Guillaume;JudgesF .Rezek,T .Buer-genthal;Judgesad hocS .TorresBernárdez(chosenbyHondu-ras)andF .H .Paolillo(chosenbyElSalvador) .

146. APPLICAtIonFoRReVIsIonoFtHeJUDGMentoF11sePteMBeR1992IntHeCAseConCeRnInGtHeLAnD,IsLAnDAnDMARItIMeFRontIeRDIsPUte(eLsALVADoR/HonDURAs:nICARAGUAInteRVenInG)(eLsALVADoR v. HonDURAs)

Judgmentof18December2003

1955Treaty,asinterpretedinthelightofinternationallawontheuseofforce .

Judge Rigaux voted in favour of the two points in theoperativepart,withsomereservationsastothefirst .Thetwoclausesconstitutingitwouldappearinconsistent:itisacon-tradictionbothtoholdthatuseofarmedforceagainsttheoilplatformswasunlawfulandtorejecttheclaimforreparationfortheinjurycausedbytheunlawfulact .However,theCourt’saffirmationoftheprincipleprohibitingtheuseofarmedforceexceptinthosesituationswherecontemplatedbyinternational

lawappeared to JudgeRigaux sufficiently important thathefeltobligedtovoteinfavourofit,notwithstandingtherefusaltoupholdIran’srightfulclaim .

Thereasoningsupportingtherejectionsofthetwoactionscontainstwoelementscommontothem,i .e ., theinterpreta-tiongiventothenotionof“indirect”commerceandtheideathat“future”commercefallsoutsidethescopeoffreedomofcommerce .JudgeRigauxfindsthosetwoelementsdebatable .

32

On1April2003,withinthetime-limitfixedbytheCourt,HondurasfileditsWrittenObservationsontheadmissibilityofElSalvador’sApplication .Publicsittingswereheldon8,9,10and12September2003 .

*At the oral proceedings, the following final submissions

werepresentedbytheParties:OnbehalfoftheGovernmentoftheRepublicofElSalva-

dor,“The Republic of El Salvador respectfully requests theChamber,rejectingallcontraryclaimsandsubmissionstoadjudgeanddeclarethat:1 .TheapplicationoftheRepublicofElSalvadorisadmis-siblebasedontheexistenceofnewfactsofsuchanatureastoleavethecaseopentorevision,pursuanttoArticle61oftheStatuteoftheCourt,and2 .OncetherequestisadmittedthatitproceedtoarevisionoftheJudgmentof11September1992,sothatanewjudg-mentfixestheboundary line inthesixthdisputedsectorofthelandboundarybetweenElSalvadorandHondurasasfollows:‘Starting at the old mouth of the Goascorán River at theentry point known as the Estero de la Cutú, located atlatitude13degrees22minutes00secondsnorthandlon-gitude87degrees41minutes25secondswest,theborderfollowstheoldbedoftheGoascoránRiverforadistanceof17,300metresuptotheplaceknownasRompicióndeLosAmates, locatedat latitude13degrees26minutes29sec-onds north and longitude 87 degrees 43 minutes 25 sec-onds west, which is where the Goascorán River changedcourse .’”OnbehalfoftheGovernmentoftheRepublicofHonduras,“Inviewof thefactsandargumentspresentedabove, theGovernment of the Republic of Honduras requests theChambertodeclaretheinadmissibilityoftheApplicationforRevisionpresentedon10September2002byElSalva-dor .”

Basis of jurisdiction and circumstances of the case(paras .15–22)

The Chamber begins by stating that, under Article 61 oftheStatute,revisionproceedingsopenwithajudgmentoftheCourt declaring the application admissible on the groundscontemplatedbytheStatute,andthatArticle99oftheRulesofCourtmakesexpressprovisionforproceedingsonthemeritsif,initsfirstjudgment,theCourthasdeclaredtheapplicationadmissible .

TheChamberobservesthat,atthisstage,itsdecisionisthuslimitedtothequestionwhetherElSalvador’srequestsatisfiestheconditionscontemplatedbytheStatute .UnderArticle61,theseconditionsareasfollows:

(a) theapplication shouldbebasedupon the “discovery”ofa“fact”;

(b)thefactthediscoveryofwhichisreliedonmustbe“ofsuchanatureastobeadecisivefactor”;

(c)thefactshouldhavebeen“unknown”totheCourtandtothepartyclaimingrevisionwhenthejudgmentwasgiven;

(d)ignoranceofthisfactmustnotbe“duetonegligence”;and

(e) the application for revision must be “made at latestwithinsixmonthsofthediscoveryofthenewfact”andbeforetenyearshaveelapsedfromthedateofthejudgment .

TheChamberobservesthat“anapplicationforrevisionisadmissibleonly if eachof theconditions laiddown inArti-cle61issatisfied .Ifanyoneofthemisnotmet,theapplicationmustbedismissed .”

However,ElSalvadorappearstoarguein liminethatthereisnoneedfortheChambertoconsiderwhethertheconditionsof Article 61 of the Statute have been satisfied, since, by itsattitude,“HondurasimplicitlyacknowledgedtheadmissibilityofElSalvador’sApplication” .

In this respect, the Chamber observes that regardless ofthe parties’ views on the admissibility of an application forrevision,itisinanyeventfortheCourt,whenseisedofsuchanapplication,toascertainwhethertheadmissibilityrequire-ments laiddown inArticle61of theStatutehavebeenmet .Revisionisnotavailablesimplybyconsentoftheparties,butsolelywhentheconditionsofArticle61aremet .

ThenewfactsallegedbyElSalvadorconcernontheonehandtheavulsionoftheriverGoascoránandontheotherthe“CartaEsférica”andthereportofthe1794El Activoexpedition .

Avulsion of the river Goascorán(paras .23–40)

“InorderproperlytounderstandElSalvador’spresentcon-tentions”,theChamberfirstrecapitulatespartofthereason-inginthe1992Judgmentinrespectofthesixthsectorofthelandboundary .

TheChamberthenindicatesthatinthepresentcase,ElSal-vadorfirstclaimstopossessscientific,technicalandhistoricalevidenceshowing,contrary towhat itunderstands the1992decision to have been, that the Goascorán did in the pastchange itsbed,andthat thechangewasabrupt,probablyasaresultofacyclonein1762 .ElSalvadorarguesthatevidencecan constitute “new facts” for purposes of Article 61 of theStatute .

El Salvador further contends that the evidence it isnow offering establishes the existence of an old bed of theGoascorándebouchingintheEsteroLaCutú,andtheavul-sionoftheriverinthemid-eighteenthcenturyorthatattheveryleast,itjustifiesregardingsuchanavulsionasplausible .These are said to be “new facts” for purposes of Article 61 .AccordingtoElSalvador, the facts thussetoutaredecisive,becausetheconsiderationsandconclusionsofthe1992Judg-mentarefoundedontherejectionofanavulsionwhich,intheChamber’sview,hadnotbeenproved .

El Salvador finally maintains that, given all the circum-stancesofthecase,inparticularthe“bittercivilwar[which]was raging in El Salvador” “for virtually the whole periodbetween 1980 and the handing down of the Judgment on11 September 1992”, its ignorance of the various new facts

33

whichitnowadvancesconcerningthecourseoftheGoascoránwasnotduetonegligence .

TheChamberstatesthatHonduras,foritspart,arguesthatwithregardtotheapplicationofArticle61oftheStatute,itis“well-establishedcase law that there isadistinction inkindbetween the facts alleged and the evidence relied upon toprovethemandthatonlythediscoveryoftheformeropensarighttorevision” .Accordingly,intheviewofHonduras,theevidencesubmittedbyElSalvadorcannotopenarighttorevi-sion .

HondurasaddsthatElSalvadorhasnotdemonstratedtheexistence of a new fact . In reality, El Salvador is seeking “anewinterpretationofpreviouslyknownfacts”andaskingtheChamberfora“genuinereversal”ofthe1992Judgment .

Honduras further maintains that the facts relied on byEl Salvador, even if assumed to be new and established, arenotofsuchanatureastobedecisivefactorsinrespectofthe1992Judgment .

HondurasargueslastlythatElSalvadorcouldhavehadthescientificandtechnicalstudiesandhistoricalresearchwhichitisnowrelyingoncarriedoutbefore1992 .

TurningtoconsiderationofElSalvador’ssubmissionscon-cerning the avulsion of the Goascorán, the Chamber recallsthatanapplicationforrevisionisadmissibleonlyifeachoftheconditionslaiddowninArticle61issatisfied,andthatifanyoneofthemisnotmet,theapplicationmustbedismissed;inthepresentcase,theChamberbeginsbyascertainingwhethertheallegedfacts,supposingthemtobenewfacts,areofsuchanatureas tobedecisive factors inrespectof the1992Judg-ment .

Inthisregard,theChamberfirstrecallstheconsiderationsofprincipleonwhichtheChamberhearingtheoriginalcasereliedforitsrulingonthedisputesbetweenthetwoStatesinsixsectorsoftheirlandboundary .AccordingtothatCham-ber, theboundarywas tobedetermined“by theapplicationof the principle generally accepted in Spanish America ofthe uti possidetis juris, whereby the boundaries were to fol-lowthecolonialadministrativeboundaries”(para .28of the1992 Judgment) . The Chamber did however note that “theuti possidetis juris position can be qualified by adjudicationandbytreaty” .Itreasonedfromthisthat“thequestionthenariseswhetheritcanbequalifiedinotherways,forexample,by acquiescence or recognition” . It concluded that “Thereseems tobenoreason inprinciplewhy these factors shouldnotoperate,wherethereissufficientevidencetoshowthatthepartieshaveineffectclearlyacceptedavariation,oratleastaninterpretation,oftheuti possidetis jurisposition”(para .67ofthe1992Judgment) .

TheChamber thenconsidered“ThecontentionofElSal-vadorthataformerbedoftheriverGoascoránformstheuti possidetis jurisboundary” .Inthisrespect,itobservedthat:

“[this contention] depends, as a question of fact, on theassertionthattheGoascoránformerlywasrunninginthatbed,andthatatsomedateitabruptlychangeditscoursetoitspresentposition .OnthisbasisElSalvador’sargumentoflawisthatwhereaboundaryisformedbythecourseofariver,andthestreamsuddenlyleavesitsoldbedandforms

anewone,thisprocessof‘avulsion’doesnotbringaboutachangeintheboundary,whichcontinuestofollowtheoldchannel .”(Para .308ofthe1992Judgment .)TheChamberaddedthat:“No record of such an abrupt change of course havingoccurred has been brought to the Chamber’s attention,butweretheChambersatisfiedthattheriver’scoursewasearliersoradicallydifferentfromitspresentone,thenanavulsionmightreasonablybeinferred .”(Ibid.)Pursuing itsconsiderationofElSalvador’sargument, the

Chamber did however note: “There is no scientific evidencethat the previous course of the Goascorán was such that itdebouchedintheEsteroLaCutú . . .ratherthaninanyoftheotherneighbouringinletsinthecoastline,suchastheEsteroElCoyol”(para .309ofthe1992Judgment) .

Turning to consideration as a matter of law of El Salva-dor’spropositionconcerningtheavulsionof theGoascorán,theChamberobservedthatElSalvador“suggests . . .thatthechangeinfacttookplaceinthe17thcentury”(para .311ofthe1992Judgment) .Itconcludedthat“Onthisbasis,whatinter-nationallawmayhavetosay,onthequestionoftheshiftingofriverswhichformfrontiers,becomesirrelevant:theproblemismainlyoneofSpanishcoloniallaw .”(Para .311ofthe1992Judgment .)

Beginning in paragraph 312 of the 1992 Judgment, theChamber turned to a consideration of a different ground .At the outset, it tersely stated the conclusions which it hadreachedandthensetout thereasoningsupportingthem .IntheviewoftheChamber,“anyclaimbyElSalvadorthattheboundaryfollowsanoldcourseoftheriverabandonedatsometimebefore1821mustberejected .Itisanewclaimandincon-sistentwiththeprevioushistoryofthedispute .”(Para .312ofthe1992Judgment .)

Inthepresentcase, theChamberobservesthat,whilst in1992theChamberrejectedElSalvador’sclaimsthatthe1821boundarydidnotfollowthecourseoftheriveratthatdate,itdidsoonthebasisofthatState’sconductduringthenine-teenthcentury .

TheChamberconcludes that, inshort, itdoesnotmatterwhetherornottherewasanavulsionoftheGoascorán .Evenifavulsionwerenowproved,andevenifitslegalconsequenceswere those inferred by El Salvador, findings to that effectwouldprovidenobasisforcallingintoquestionthedecisiontakenby theChamber in1992onwhollydifferentgrounds .The facts asserted in this connectionbyElSalvadorarenot“decisivefactors”inrespectoftheJudgmentwhichitseekstohaverevised .

Discovery of new copies of the “Carta Esférica” and report of the 1794 ElActivo expedition(paras .41–55)

TheChamberthenexaminesthesecond“newfact”relieduponbyElSalvadorinsupportofitsApplicationforrevision,namely,thediscoveryintheAyerCollectionoftheNewberryLibrary inChicagoofa furthercopyof the“CartaEsférica”and of a further copy of the report of the expedition of theElActivo,therebysupplementingthecopiesfromtheMadrid

34

NavalMuseumtowhichthe1992Chambermadereferenceinparagraphs314and316ofitsJudgment .

The Chamber points out that Honduras denies that theproductionofthedocumentsfoundinChicagocanbechar-acterizedasanewfact .ForHonduras,thisissimply“anothercopy of one and the same document already submitted byHonduras during the written stage of the case decided in1992,andalreadyevaluatedbytheChamberinitsJudgment” .TheChamberproceedsfirst,as itdid inrespectof theavul-sion,todeterminefirstwhethertheallegedfactsconcerningthe“CartaEsférica”andthereportoftheElActivoexpeditionareofsuchanatureastobedecisivefactorsinrespectofthe1992Judgment .

TheChamberrecallsinthisregardthatitspredecessorin1992,afterhavingheldElSalvador’sclaimsconcerningtheoldcourseoftheGoascorántobeinconsistentwiththeprevioushistoryofthedispute,considered“theevidencemadeavaila-bletoitconcerningthecourseoftheriverGoascoránin1821”(para . 313 of the 1992 Judgment) . The 1992 Chamber paidparticularattentiontothechartpreparedbythecaptainandnavigatorsofthevesselElActivoaround1796,describedasa“CartaEsférica”,whichHondurashadfoundinthearchivesof the Madrid Naval Museum . That Chamber concludedfrom the foregoing “that the report of the 1794 expeditionand the ‘Carta Esférica’ leave little room for doubt that theriverGoascoránin1821wasalreadyflowinginitspresent-daycourse”(para .316ofthe1992Judgment) .

In the present case, the Chamber observes in this con-nection, that the two copies of the “Carta Esférica” held inMadridandthecopyfromChicagodifferonlyas tocertaindetails,suchasforexample,theplacingoftitles,thelegends,andthehandwriting .Thesedifferencesreflecttheconditionsunderwhichdocumentsofthistypewerepreparedinthelateeighteenth century; they afford no basis for questioning thereliabilityofthechartsthatwereproducedtotheChamberin1992 .TheChambernotesfurtherthattheEsteroLaCutúandthemouthoftheRioGoascoránareshownonthecopyfromChicago,justasonthecopiesfromMadrid,attheirpresent-daylocation .ThenewchartproducedbyElSalvadorthusdoesnot overturn the conclusions arrived at by the Chamber in1992;itbearsthemout .

AsforthenewversionofthereportoftheElActivoexpe-dition found in Chicago, it differs from the Madrid versiononlyintermsofcertaindetails,suchastheopeningandclos-ingindications,spelling,andplacingofaccents .Thebodyofthetextisthesame,inparticularintheidentificationofthemouthoftheGoascorán .Hereagain,thenewdocumentpro-ducedbyElSalvadorbearsouttheconclusionsreachedbytheChamberin1992 .

TheChamberconcludes fromthe foregoing that thenewfactsallegedbyElSalvadorinrespectofthe“CartaEsférica”and the report of the El Activo expedition are not “decisivefactors”inrespectoftheJudgmentwhoserevisionitseeks .

Final observations(paras .56–59)

TheChambertakesnoteofElSalvador’sfurthercontentionthatpropercontextualizationoftheallegednewfacts“neces-sitatesconsiderationofotherfactsthattheChamberweighedandthatarenowaffectedbythenew facts” .

TheChamberstatesthat itagreeswithElSalvador’sviewthat, in order to determine whether the alleged “new facts”concerningtheavulsionoftheGoascorán,the“CartaEsféri-ca”andthereportoftheElActivoexpeditionfallwithintheprovisionsofArticle61oftheStatute,theyshouldbeplacedincontext,whichtheChamberhasdone .However,theChamberrecallsthat,underthatArticle,revisionofajudgmentcanbeopenedonlyby“thediscoveryofsomefactofsuchanatureastobeadecisivefactor,whichfactwas,whenthejudgmentwasgiven,unknowntotheCourtandalsotothepartyclaim-ingrevision,alwaysprovidedthatsuchignorancewasnotduetonegligence” .Thus,theChambercannotfindadmissibleanapplicationforrevisiononthebasisoffactswhichElSalvadoritself does not allege to be new facts within the meaning ofArticle61 .

** *

Dissenting opinion of Judge Paolillo

Inad hocJudgePaolillo’sopinion,itisclearthattheratio decidendiofthe1992JudgmentinrespectofthesixthsectorofthelandboundarybetweenElSalvadorandHondurasliesinthefactthatElSalvadorwasunabletoproveitsallegationsconcerninganavulsionof theriverGoascorán .In1992, theChamber, after having considered El Salvador’s argumentfromthe legalperspective,statedthatnodocumentprovinga sudden change in the course of the Goascorán had beenproducedbyElSalvadorandthattherewasnoscientificevi-dence proving that the river in its earlier course debouchedintheEsteroLaCutú .IntheabsenceofproofofElSalvador’sclaim, the Chamber therefore upheld Honduras’s submis-sions . The present Chamber has indicated—incorrectly, inJudge Paolillo’s view—that the ratio decidendi of the 1992Judgmentrelatedtothe“novelty”ofElSalvador’sclaimandtoits“inconsistency”withtheprevioushistoryofthedispute .JudgePaolillonotes,however,thatitwasonlyafterconsider-ingElSalvador’sclaimandtheevidenceproducedinsupportofitthattheChamberin1992referredtotheprevioushistoryofthedispute,asanargumentaccessorytothemainground,ratherthanasadecisiveconclusionconcerningthecourseoftheboundaryinthesixthsector .

HepointsoutthatHonduras’sconductduringthepresentproceedingsshowsthat,inHonduras’sviewaswell,theratio decidendiofthe1992Judgmentrelatedtotheobjectofthedis-puteconcerningthesixthsectorandnotitsprevioushistory .In the initial phase of the proceedings, Honduras opposedElSalvador’sApplicationforrevisiononthegroundthatthenewfactsallegedbyElSalvadordidnotmeettheconditionslaiddownbyArticle61oftheStatuteoftheCourt .Itwasonlyduring the last public sitting, at which stage El Salvador nolonger had an opportunity to respond to Honduras’s argu-

35

ment, that Honduras maintained that the historical consid-erations set out in paragraph 312 of the Judgment renderedintheoriginalproceedingsconstitutedtheratio decidendi ofthatdecision .

InthepresentJudgment,theChamberhasconcludedthatthecourseoftheboundarylineinthesixthsectorwasdecidedin1992bytheChamberonthebasisofreasoninganalogoustothatwhichitadoptedinrespectofthefirstsector, i .e .,byapplication of the principle uti possidetis juris, as qualifiedby acquiescence or recognition by the parties . According toJudge Paolillo, there is however nothing in the 1992 Judg-ment to suggest that the Chamber adopted that approach;theChamberdidnotsaysoexplicitly,as itdid inrespectofthefirstsector,noristhereanyevidencethatElSalvadorhad“clearlyaccepted”,byacquiescenceorrecognition,amodifica-tionof thepositionresulting fromtheuti possidetis juris inthesixthsector .Theabsenceofanyexplicit reference to theoldcourseoftheGoascoránduringthenegotiationspriorto1972caninnowaybeinterpretedasawaiverbyElSalvadorofitsclaimthattheboundaryshouldbedrawnalongtheoldcourseoftheriver .

The new facts relied upon by El Salvador in support ofitsApplication for revisionconsistofagroupofdocumentscontaining scientific, technical and historical informationproduced or discovered after 1992 and proving the occur-rence of an avulsion and the existence of an old bed of theriver Goascorán, which, pursuant to the principle uti possi-detis juris, should thus formtheboundary linebetween thetwo Parties in the sixth sector . After considering these newfacts,JudgePaolilloarrivedattheconclusionthattheysatisfytheconditionslaiddowninArticle61oftheStatute,includ-ingtherequirementthattheymustbeofsuchanatureasto

beadecisivefactor .GiventhatamajorityoftheMembersoftheChamberwereoftheviewthatthe1992decision,asfarasthesixthsectorwasconcerned,wasbasedonconsiderationsrelatingtotheprevioushistoryofthedisputeandnottotheobject of the dispute, the Chamber concluded that the newfactsrelieduponbyElSalvadorwerenotofsuchanatureastobeadecisivefactorinrespectoftheJudgmentwhichitsoughttohaverevised .AstherequirementsofArticle61oftheStat-uteoftheCourtarecumulative,theChamberrefrainedfromconsidering whether or not the new facts alleged by El Sal-vador satisfied the other conditions laid down . Judge Pao-lillobelieves,however,thatiftheChamberhadsoconsideredthem, itwouldhaveconcluded that thenewfactsmet thoseconditions .

Heobserves that, asa resultof the inadmissibilityof theApplicationforrevision,thesecondphaseoftheproceedings,duringwhich theChamberwouldhavebeencalledupon toruleonthemeritsoftherequest,cannottakeplace .Hefindsthis unfortunate because a new consideration on the meritsofthedisputewouldhaveenabledtheChambertoupholdorrevisethe1992JudgmentinrespectofthesixthsectorandtodosoonthebasisofsignificantlymoreextensiveandreliableinformationthanthatavailabletotheChamberintheorigi-nalproceedings .Hebelievesthattheinterestsofjusticecouldhavebeenbetterservedbyanewdecisiononthemeritsthanbythe1992Judgment,sincethebetterinformedacourtis,thegreaterthelikelihoodthatitwilladoptjustdecisions .

InJudgePaolillo’sview,theChamberhasthusmissedtheopportunitytodeclareadmissible,forthefirsttimeinthehis-toryoftheCourt,anapplicationforrevisionwhichmetalltheconditionsrequiredbyArticle61oftheStatuteoftheCourt .

___________

147. CAseConCeRnInGAVenAAnDotHeRMexICAnnAtIonALs(MexICo v. UnIteDstAtesoFAMeRICA)

Judgmentof31March2004

On 31 March 2004, the International Court of JusticedeliveredaJudgmentinthecaseconcerningAvena and Other Mexican Nationals(Mexico v . United States of America) .

** *

TheCourtwascomposedas follows:PresidentShi;Vice-PresidentRanjeva;JudgesGuillaume,Koroma,Vereshchetin,Higgins,Parra-Aranguren,Kooijmans,Rezek,Al-Khasawneh,Buergenthal,Elaraby,Owada,Tomka;Judgead hocSepúlveda;RegistrarCouvreur .

** *

Subparagraphs 4 to 11 (on the merits) of operative para-graph153oftheJudgmentreadasfollows:

“ . . .TheCourt,Finds, by fourteen votes to one, that, by not informing,withoutdelayupontheirdetention,the51Mexicannation-als referred to in paragraph 106 (1) above of their rightsunderArticle36,paragraph1(b),oftheViennaConven-tion on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963, the UnitedStates of America breached the obligations incumbentuponitunderthatsubparagraph;Finds, by fourteen votes to one, that, by not notifyingthe appropriate Mexican consular post without delay ofthe detention of the 49 Mexican nationals referred to inparagraph106(2)aboveandtherebydeprivingtheUnited

36

MexicanStatesoftheright,inatimelyfashion,torenderthe assistance provided for by the Vienna Convention tothe individuals concerned, the United States of AmericabreachedtheobligationsincumbentuponitunderArticle36,paragraph1(b);Finds,byfourteenvotestoone,that,inrelationtothe49Mexicannationalsreferredtoinparagraph106(3)above,theUnitedStatesofAmericadeprivedtheUnitedMexicanStates of the right, in a timely fashion, to communicatewithandhaveaccesstothosenationalsandtovisitthemindetention,andtherebybreachedtheobligationsincumbentupon it under Article 36, paragraph 1 (a) and (c), of theConvention;Finds,byfourteenvotestoone,that,inrelationtothe34Mexicannationalsreferredtoinparagraph106(4)above,theUnitedStatesofAmericadeprivedtheUnitedMexicanStatesoftheright,inatimelyfashion,toarrangeforlegalrepresentationofthosenationals,andtherebybreachedtheobligationsincumbentuponitunderArticle36,paragraph1(c),oftheConvention;Finds,byfourteenvotestoone,that,bynotpermittingthereview and reconsideration, in the light of the rights setforth in theConvention, of the conviction and sentencesofMr .CésarRobertoFierroReyna,Mr .RobertoMorenoRamosandMr .OsvaldoTorresAguilera, after theviola-tionsreferredtoinsubparagraph(4)abovehadbeenestab-lishedinrespectofthoseindividuals,theUnitedStatesofAmericabreachedtheobligationsincumbentuponitunderArticle36,paragraph2,oftheConvention;Finds,byfourteenvotestoone,thattheappropriaterepa-rationinthiscaseconsistsintheobligationoftheUnitedStatesofAmericatoprovide,bymeansofitsownchoosing,reviewandreconsiderationoftheconvictionsandsentenc-esof theMexicannationals referred to in subparagraphs(4), (5), (6) and (7) above, by taking account both of theviolationoftherightssetforthinArticle36oftheConven-tionandofparagraphs138to141ofthisJudgment;Unanimouslytakes noteofthecommitmentundertakenbytheUnitedStatesofAmericatoensureimplementationofthespecificmeasuresadoptedinperformanceofitsobliga-tionsunderArticle36,paragraph1(b),oftheViennaCon-vention;andfindsthatthiscommitmentmustberegardedas meeting the request by the United Mexican States forguaranteesandassurancesofnon-repetition;Unanimouslyfinds that, shouldMexicannationalsnone-theless be sentenced to severe penalties, without theirrightsunderArticle36,paragraph1(b),oftheConventionhavingbeenrespected,theUnitedStatesofAmericashallprovide,bymeansofitsownchoosing,reviewandrecon-siderationoftheconvictionandsentence,soastoallowfullweighttobegiventotheviolationoftherightssetforthintheConvention,takingaccountofparagraphs138to141ofthisJudgment .”

** *

President Shi and Vice-President Ranjeva appended dec-larationstotheJudgmentoftheCourt;JudgesVereshchetin,

Parra-Aranguren and Tomka and Judge ad hoc SepúlvedaappendedseparateopinionstotheJudgmentoftheCourt .

** *


TheCourtbeginsbyrecallingthaton9January2003theUnited Mexican States (hereinafter referred to as “Mexico”)instituted proceedings against the United States of America(hereinafterreferredtoasthe“UnitedStates”)for“violationsoftheViennaConventiononConsularRelations”of24April1963 (hereinafter referred to as the “Vienna Convention”)allegedlycommittedbytheUnitedStates .

In its Application, Mexico based the jurisdiction of theCourtonArticle36,paragraph1,oftheStatuteoftheCourtand on Article I of the Optional Protocol concerning theCompulsorySettlementofDisputes,whichaccompaniestheViennaConvention(hereinafterreferredtoasthe“OptionalProtocol”) .

Onthesameday,Mexicoalsofiledarequestfortheindica-tionofprovisionalmeasures .

ByanOrderof5February2003, theCourt indicatedthefollowingprovisionalmeasures:

“(a)TheUnitedStatesofAmericashall takeallmeasuresnecessarytoensurethatMr .CésarRobertoFierroReyna,Mr . Roberto Moreno Ramos and Mr . Osvaldo TorresAguileraarenotexecutedpendingfinaljudgmentintheseproceedings;(b)TheGovernmentoftheUnitedStatesofAmericashallinformtheCourtofallmeasurestakeninimplementationofthisOrder .”It further decided that, “until the Court has rendered its

final judgment, it shall remain seised of the matters” whichformedthesubjectofthatOrder .

In a letter of 2 November 2003, the Agent of the UnitedStatesadvisedtheCourtthattheUnitedStateshad“informedthe relevant state authorities of Mexico’s application”; that,since the Order of 5 February 2003, the United States had“obtainedfromtheminformationaboutthestatusofthefifty-fourcases, including the threecases identified inparagraph59(I)(a)ofthatOrder”;andthattheUnitedStatescould“con-firmthatnoneofthenamedindividuals[had]beenexecuted” .A Memorial by Mexico and a Counter-Memorial by theUnited States were filed within the time-limits extended bytheCourt .

TheCourtfurtherrecalledthat,inordertoensurethepro-ceduralequalityoftheParties,ithaddecidednottoauthorizearequestedamendmentbyMexicoofitssubmissionssoastoincludetwoadditionalMexicannationals,whiletakingnotethattheUnitedStateshadmadenoobjectiontothewithdraw-albyMexicoofitsrequestforreliefintwoothercases .

SincetheCourtincludedupontheBenchnojudgeofMexi-cannationality,MexicochoseMr .BernardoSepúlvedatositasjudgead hocinthecase .

37

Public sittings were held between 15 and 19 December2003 .

At the oral proceedings, the following final submissionswerepresentedbytheParties:

OnbehalfoftheGovernmentofMexico,“The Government of Mexico respectfully requests theCourttoadjudgeanddeclare

(1) That the United States of America, in arresting,detaining, trying, convicting, and sentencing the 52MexicannationalsondeathrowdescribedinMexico’sMemorial,violateditsinternationallegalobligationstoMexico,initsownrightandintheexerciseofitsrightto diplomatic protection of its nationals, by failing toinform, without delay, the 52 Mexican nationals aftertheir arrest of their right to consular notification andaccessunderArticle36(1)(b)oftheViennaConventiononConsularRelations,andbydeprivingMexicoofitsrighttoprovideconsularprotectionandthe52nation-als’ right to receive such protection as Mexico wouldprovideunderArticle36(1)(a)and(c)oftheConven-tion;(2) That the obligation in Article 36 (1) of the ViennaConventionrequiresnotificationofconsularrightsandareasonableopportunityforconsularaccessbeforethecompetent authorities of the receiving State take anyactionpotentiallydetrimentaltotheforeignnational’srights;(3)ThattheUnitedStatesofAmericaviolateditsobliga-tionsunderArticle36(2)oftheViennaConventionbyfailingtoprovidemeaningfulandeffectivereviewandreconsiderationofconvictionsandsentences impairedbyaviolationofArticle36(1);bysubstitutingforsuchreviewandreconsiderationclemencyproceedings;andbyapplyingthe“proceduraldefault”doctrineandothermunicipallawdoctrinesthatfailtoattachlegalsignifi-cancetoanArticle36(1)violationonitsownterms;(4)ThatpursuanttotheinjuriessufferedbyMexicoinitsownrightand intheexerciseofdiplomaticprotec-tionofitsnationals,Mexicoisentitledtofullreparationforthoseinjuriesintheformofrestitutio in integrum;(5) That this restitution consists of the obligation torestore the status quo ante by annulling or otherwisedeprivingoffullforceoreffecttheconvictionsandsen-tencesofall52Mexicannationals;(6)That thisrestitutionalso includes theobligationtotakeallmeasuresnecessarytoensurethatapriorviola-tion of Article 36 shall not affect the subsequent pro-ceedings;(7)Thattotheextentthatanyofthe52convictionsorsentencesarenotannulled,theUnitedStatesshallpro-vide, by means of its own choosing, meaningful andeffectivereviewandreconsiderationoftheconvictionsandsentencesofthe52nationals,andthatthisobliga-tioncannotbesatisfiedbymeansofclemencyproceed-ingsorifanymunicipallawruleordoctrineinconsist-entwithparagraph(3)aboveisapplied;and

(8) That the United States of America shall cease itsviolationsofArticle36oftheViennaConventionwithregardtoMexicoandits52nationalsandshallprovideappropriateguaranteesandassurancesthatitshalltakemeasures sufficient to achieve increased compliancewithArticle36(1)andtoensurecompliancewithArti-cle36(2) .”

OnbehalfoftheGovernmentoftheUnitedStates,“OnthebasisofthefactsandargumentsmadebytheUnit-edStatesinitsCounter-Memorialandintheseproceedings,theGovernmentoftheUnitedStatesofAmericarequeststhattheCourt,takingintoaccountthattheUnitedStateshasconformeditsconducttothisCourt’sJudgmentintheLaGrand Case(Germany v . United States of America),notonlywithrespecttoGermannationalsbut,consistentwiththeDeclarationofthePresidentoftheCourtinthatcase,toalldetainedforeignnationals,adjudgeanddeclarethattheclaimsoftheUnitedMexicanStatesaredismissed .”TheCourtfinallygivesa shortdescriptionof thedispute

andof the factsunderlying thecase,and inparagraph16 itlistsbynamethe52Mexicannationalsinvolved .

Mexican objection to the United States objections to jurisdiction and admissibility(paras .22–25)

The Court notes at the outset that the United States haspresented a number of objections to the jurisdiction of theCourt,aswellastotheadmissibilityoftheclaimsadvancedbyMexico; that it ishowever thecontentionofMexico thatalltheobjectionsraisedbytheUnitedStatesareinadmissibleas having been raised after the expiration of the time-limitlaiddownbyArticle79,paragraph1,oftheRulesofCourtasamendedin2000 .

The Court notes, however, that Article 79 of the Rulesapplies only to preliminary objections . It observes that anobjectionthat isnotpresentedasapreliminaryobjectioninaccordancewithparagraph1ofArticle79doesnot therebybecomeinadmissible;thatthereareofcoursecircumstancesinwhichthepartyfailingtoputforwardanobjectiontojuris-dictionmightbeheldtohaveacquiescedinjurisdiction;that,however, apart from such circumstances, a party failing toavailitselfoftheArticle79proceduremayforfeittherighttobringaboutasuspensionoftheproceedingsonthemerits,butcanstillarguetheobjectionalongwiththemerits .TheCourtfinds that that is indeedwhat theUnitedStateshasdone inthis case; and that, for reasons to be indicated below, manyof itsobjectionsareofsuchanaturethat theywouldinanyevent probably have had to be heard along with the merits .TheCourtconcludesthatitshouldnotexcludefromconsid-erationtheobjectionsoftheUnitedStatestojurisdictionandadmissibilitybyreasonofthefactthattheywerenotpresentedwithinthreemonthsfromthedateoffilingoftheMemorial .

United States objections to jurisdiction(paras .26–35)

Byitsfirstjurisdictionalobjection,theUnitedStatessug-gestedthattheMexicanMemorialisfundamentallyaddressedtothetreatmentofMexicannationalsinthefederalandstate

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criminaljusticesystemsoftheUnitedStates,andtotheopera-tionof theUnitedStatescriminal justicesystemasawhole;for the Court to address such issues would be an abuse ofits jurisdiction .TheCourt recalls that its jurisdiction in thepresentcasehasbeeninvokedundertheViennaConventionand Optional Protocol to determine the nature and extentof the obligations undertaken by the United States towardsMexicobybecomingpartytothatConvention .Ifandsofaras the Court may find that the obligations accepted by theparties to theViennaConvention includedcommitmentsasto the conduct of their municipal courts in relation to thenationalsofotherparties,theninordertoascertainwhethertherehavebeenbreachesoftheConvention,theCourtmustbeabletoexaminetheactionsofthosecourtsinthelightofinternationallaw .Howfaritmaydosointhepresentcaseisamatterforthemerits;thefirstobjectionoftheUnitedStatestojurisdictioncannotthereforebeupheld .

ThesecondjurisdictionalobjectionpresentedbytheUnitedStateswasaddressedtoMexico’ssubmission“thattheUnitedStatesinarresting,detaining,trying,convicting,andsentenc-ing [to death] Mexican nationals, violated its internationallegalobligationstoMexico,initsownrightandintheexerciseofitsrightofdiplomaticprotectionofitsnationals,asprovid-edbyArticle36oftheViennaConvention .TheUnitedStatespointedoutthatArticle36oftheViennaConvention“createsnoobligationsconstrainingtherightsoftheUnitedStatestoarrestaforeignnational”;andthat,similarly,the“detaining,trying,convictingandsentencing”ofMexicannationalscouldnotconstitutebreachesofArticle36,whichmerelylaysdownobligations of notification . The Court observes, however,that Mexico argues that depriving a foreign national facingcriminalproceedingsoftherighttoconsularnotificationandassistance renders those proceedings fundamentally unfair .IntheCourt’sviewthatistoargueinfavourofaparticularinterpretationoftheViennaConvention .Suchaninterpreta-tionmayormaynotbeconfirmedon themerits,but isnotexcluded from the jurisdiction conferred on the Court bytheOptionalProtocoltotheViennaConvention .ThesecondobjectionoftheUnitedStatestojurisdictioncannotthereforebeupheld .

ThethirdobjectionbytheUnitedStatestothejurisdictionoftheCourtreferstothefirstsubmissionconcerningreme-diesintheMexicanMemorial,namelythatMexicoisentitledtorestitutio in integrum,andthattheUnitedStatesthereforeis under an obligation to restore the status quo ante . TheUnitedStatesobjectsthatthiswouldintrudedeeplyintotheindependenceofitscourts;andthatfortheCourttodeclarethattheUnitedStatesisunderaspecificobligationtovacateconvictions and sentences would be beyond its jurisdiction .TheCourtrecallsinthisregard,asitdidintheLaGrandcase,that,where jurisdictionexistsoveradisputeonaparticularmatter, no separate basis for jurisdiction is required by theCourtinordertoconsidertheremediesapartyhasrequestedfor the breach of the obligation (I.C.J. Reports 2001, p . 485,para .48) .WhetherorhowfartheCourtmayordertherem-edyrequestedbyMexicoarematterstobedeterminedaspartofthemeritsofthedispute;thethirdobjectionoftheUnitedStatestojurisdictioncannotthereforebeupheld .

Thefourthandlast jurisdictionalobjectionoftheUnitedStates is that, contrary to the contentions of Mexico, “theCourtlacksjurisdictiontodeterminewhetherornotconsu-larnotificationisa‘humanright’,ortodeclarefundamentalrequirementsofsubstantiveorproceduraldueprocess” .TheCourtobserves thatMexico haspresented this argumentasbeingamatterofinterpretationofArticle36,paragraph1(b),and therefore belonging to the merits . The Court considersthatthisisindeedaquestionofinterpretationoftheViennaConvention, for which it has jurisdiction; the fourth objec-tionof theUnitedStates to jurisdictioncannot thereforebeupheld .

United States objections to admissibility(paras .36–48)

TheCourtnotesthatthefirstobjectionoftheUnitedStatesunderthisheadisthat“Mexico’ssubmissionsshouldbefoundinadmissiblebecausetheyseektohavethisCourtfunctionasacourtof criminalappeal”; that there is, in theviewof theUnitedStates,“nootheraptcharacterizationofMexico’stwosubmissionsinrespectofremedies” .TheCourtobservesthatthiscontentionisaddressedsolelytothequestionofremedies .TheUnitedStatesdoesnotcontendon thisground that theCourtshoulddeclinejurisdictiontoenquireintothequestionofbreachesoftheViennaConventionatall,butsimplythat,ifsuchbreachesareshown,theCourtshoulddonomorethandecidethattheUnitedStatesmustprovide“reviewandrecon-sideration”along the lines indicated in the Judgment in theLaGrandcase(I.C.J. Reports 2001,pp .513–514,para .125) .TheCourtnotesthatthisisamatterofmerits;thefirstobjectionoftheUnitedStatestoadmissibilitycannotthereforebeupheld .

TheCourtthenturnstotheobjectionoftheUnitedStatesbasedontheruleofexhaustionoflocalremedies .TheUnitedStates contends that the Court “should find inadmissibleMexico’s claim to exercise its right of diplomatic protectiononbehalfofanyMexicannationalwhohasfailedtomeetthecustomarylegalrequirementofexhaustionofmunicipalrem-edies” .TheCourtrecallsthatinitsfinalsubmissionsMexicoaskstheCourttoadjudgeanddeclarethattheUnitedStates,infailingtocomplywithArticle36,paragraph1,oftheVien-naConvention,has“violateditsinternationallegalobligationstoMexico,initsownrightandintheexerciseofitsrightofdiplomatic protection of its nationals” . The Court observesthattheindividualrightsofMexicannationalsundersubpar-agraph1(b)ofArticle36oftheViennaConventionarerightswhicharetobeasserted,atanyrateinthefirstplace,withinthe domestic legal system of the United States . Only whenthat process is completed and local remedies are exhaustedwouldMexicobeentitledtoespousetheindividualclaimsofitsnationalsthroughtheprocedureofdiplomaticprotection .InthepresentcaseMexicodoesnot,however,claimtobeact-ingsolelyonthatbasis .Italsoassertsitsownclaims,basingthemontheinjurywhichitcontendsthatithasitselfsuffered,directlyandthroughitsnationals,asaresultoftheviolationby the United States of the obligations incumbent upon itunderArticle36,paragraph1(a),(b)and(c) .TheCourtfindsthat,inthesespecialcircumstancesofinterdependenceoftherights of the State and of individual rights, Mexico may, insubmittingaclaiminitsownname,requesttheCourttorule

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ontheviolationofrightswhichitclaimstohavesufferedbothdirectly and through the violation of individual rights con-ferredonMexicannationalsunderArticle36,paragraph1(b).Thedutytoexhaust localremediesdoesnotapply tosucharequest .TheCourtaccordinglyfindsthatthesecondobjectionbytheUnitedStatestoadmissibilitycannotbeupheld .

TheCourt then turns to the questionof the alleged dualnationalityofcertainoftheMexicannationalsthesubjectofMexico’sclaims .TheUnitedStatescontendsthatinitsMemo-rialMexicohadfailedtoestablishthatitmayexercisediplo-maticprotectionbasedonbreachesofMexico’srightsundertheViennaConventionwithrespecttothoseofitsnationalswhoarealsonationalsoftheUnitedStates .TheCourtrecalls,however,thatMexico,inadditiontoseekingtoexercisedip-lomatic protection of its nationals, is making a claim in itsownrightonthebasisoftheallegedbreachesbytheUnitedStates of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention . Seen fromthisstandpoint,thequestionofdualnationalityisnotoneofadmissibility,butofmerits .Withoutprejudicetotheoutcomeofsuchexamination,thethirdobjectionoftheUnitedStatestoadmissibilitycannotthereforebeupheld .

TheCourtthenturnstothefourthobjectionadvancedbytheUnitedStatestotheadmissibilityofMexico’sclaims:thecontentionthat“TheCourtshouldnotpermitMexicotopur-sueaclaimagainsttheUnitedStateswithrespecttoanyindi-vidualcasewhereMexicohadactualknowledgeofabreachofthe[ViennaConvention]butfailedtobringsuchbreachtotheattentionoftheUnitedStatesordidsoonlyafterconsiderabledelay .”TheCourtrecallsthatinthecaseofCertain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v . Australia), itobservedthat“delayon the part of a claimant State may render an applicationinadmissible”,butthat“international lawdoesnot laydownanyspecifictime-limitinthatregard”(I.C.J. Reports 1992,pp .253–254,para .32) .ItnotesthatinthatcaseithadrecognizedthatdelaymightprejudicetheRespondentState,butfinesthattherehasbeennosuggestionofanysuchriskofprejudiceinthepresentcase .Sofarasinadmissibilitymightbebasedonan impliedwaiverof rights, theCourtconsiders thatonlyamuchmoreprolongedandconsistentinactiononthepartofMexicothananythattheUnitedStateshasallegedmightbeinterpretedasimplyingsuchawaiver .TheCourtnotes,fur-thermore,thatMexicoindicatedanumberofwaysinwhichitbrought to theattentionof theUnitedStates thebreacheswhichitperceivedoftheViennaConvention;thefourthobjec-tionoftheUnitedStatestoadmissibilitycannotthereforebeupheld .

The Court finally examines the objection of the UnitedStatesthattheclaimofMexicoisinadmissibleinthatMexicoshould not be allowed to invoke against the United StatesstandardsthatMexicodoesnotfollowinitsownpractice .TheCourtrecallsinthisrespectthatitisessentialtohaveinmindthe nature of the Vienna Convention . That Convention laysdowncertain standards tobeobservedbyallStatesparties,withaviewtothe“unimpededconductofconsularrelations” .Even if it were shown, therefore, that Mexico’s practice asregardstheapplicationofArticle36wasnotbeyondreproach,thiswouldnotconstituteagroundofobjectiontotheadmissi-bilityofMexico’sclaim;thefifthobjectionoftheUnitedStatestoadmissibilitycannotthereforebeupheld .

TheCourtthenturnstothemeritsofMexico’sclaims .

Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention(paras .49–106)

The Court notes that in the first of its final submissions,MexicoaskstheCourttoadjudgeanddeclarethat,

“theUnitedStatesofAmerica,inarresting,detaining,try-ing,convicting,andsentencingthe52MexicannationalsondeathrowdescribedinMexico’sMemorial,violateditsinternational legalobligationstoMexico, initsownrightandintheexerciseofitsrighttodiplomaticprotectionofits nationals, by failing to inform, without delay, the 52Mexicannationalsafter theirarrestof theirright tocon-sularnotificationandaccessunderArticle36(1)(b)oftheViennaConventiononConsularRelations,andbydepriv-ingMexicoofitsrighttoprovideconsularprotectionandthe52nationals’righttoreceivesuchprotectionasMexicowouldprovideunderArticle36(1)(a)and(c)oftheCon-vention” .ItrecallsthatithasalreadyinitsJudgmentintheLaGrand

case described Article 36, paragraph 1, as “an interrelatedrégimedesignedtofacilitatetheimplementationofthesystemofconsularprotection”(I.C.J. Reports 2001,p .492,para .74) .Aftercitingthefulltextoftheparagraph,theCourtobservesthattheUnitedStatesasthereceivingStatedoesnotdenyitsdutytoperformtheobligationsindicatedtherein .However,itclaimsthatthoseobligationsapplyonlytoindividualsshowntobeofMexicannationalityalone,andnottothoseofdualMexican/UnitedStatesnationality .TheUnitedStatesfurthercontends,inter alia,thatithasnotcommittedanybreachofArticle36,paragraph1(b),upontheproperinterpretationof“withoutdelay”asusedinthatsubparagraph .

Article 36, paragraph 1 (b)(paras .52–90)

TheCourtfindsthat thustwomajor issuesunderArticle36,paragraph1(b)are indisputebetweentheParties:first,thequestionofthenationalityoftheindividualsconcerned;and second, the question of the meaning to be given to theexpression“withoutdelay” .

Nationality of the individuals concerned(paras .53–57)

TheCourtbeginsbynotingthatthePartiesdisagreeastowhateachofthemmustshowasregardsnationality incon-nectionwiththeapplicabilityofthetermsofArticle36,para-graph1,andas tohowtheprinciplesofevidencehavebeenmetonthefactsofthecases .

TheCourtfinds that it is forMexico to show that the52personslistedinparagraph16oftheJudgmentheldMexicannationalityatthetimeoftheirarrest .ItnotesthattothisendMexico has produced birth certificates and declarations ofnationality,whosecontentshavenotbeenchallengedby theUnited States . The Court observes further that the UnitedStateshasquestionedwhethersomeoftheseindividualswerenotalsoUnitedStatesnationals .TheCourttakestheviewthatit was for the United States to demonstrate that this was soandtofurnishtheCourtwithallinformationonthematterin

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itspossession .Insofarasrelevantdataonthatmatteraresaidby theUnitedStates to liewithin theknowledgeofMexico,it was for the United States to have sought hat informationfrom the Mexican authorities . The Court finds that, at nostage,however,hastheUnitedStatesshowntheCourtthatitmadespecificenquiriesofthoseauthoritiesaboutparticularcases and that responses were not forthcoming . The Courtaccordinglyconcludes that theUnitedStateshasnotmet itsburdenofproofinitsattempttoshowthatpersonsofMexicannationalitywerealsoUnitedStatesnationals .TheCourtthere-forefindsthat,asregardsthe52personslistedinparagraph16of theJudgment, theUnitedStateshadobligationsunderArticle36,paragraph1(b) .

Requirement to inform “without delay” (paras .58–90)

TheCourtcontinuesbynotingthatMexico,initssecondfinalsubmission,askstheCourttofindthat

“the obligation in Article 36, paragraph 1, of the ViennaConvention requires notification of consular rights anda reasonable opportunity for consular access before thecompetentauthoritiesofthereceivingStatetakeanyactionpotentiallydetrimentaltotheforeignnational’srights” .TheCourtnotesthatMexicocontendsthat,ineachofthe

52casesbeforetheCourt,theUnitedStatesfailedtoprovidethearrestedpersonswithinformationastotheirrightsunderArticle36,paragraph1(b),“withoutdelay” .It furthernotesthattheUnitedStatesdisputesboththefactsaspresentedbyMexicoandthelegalanalysisofArticle36,paragraph1(b),oftheViennaConventionofferedbyMexico .

The Court first turns to the interpretation of Article 36,paragraph 1 (b), having found that it is applicable to the 52personslistedinparagraph16oftheJudgment .ItbeginsbynotingthatArticle36,paragraph1(b),containsthreeseparatebutinterrelatedelements:therightoftheindividualconcernedtobe informedwithoutdelayofhisrightsunderArticle36,paragraph1(b);therightoftheconsularposttobenotifiedwithoutdelayoftheindividual’sdetention,ifhesorequests;and theobligationof thereceivingState to forwardwithoutdelayanycommunicationaddressedtotheconsularpostbythedetainedperson(thislastelementnothavingbeenraisedinthecase) .

Beginning with the right of an arrested individual toinformation,theCourtfindsthatthedutyuponthearrestingauthoritiestogivetheArticle36,paragraph1(b),informationtotheindividualarisesonceitisrealizedthatthepersonisaforeignnational,oroncetherearegroundstothinkthatthepersonisprobablyaforeignnational .Preciselywhenthismayoccurwillvarywithcircumstances .

Bearing in mind the complexities of establishing such afact as explained by the United States, the Court begins byexamining theapplicationofArticle36,paragraph1 (b),oftheViennaConventiontothe52cases .In45ofthesecases,itfindsthatithasnoevidencethatthearrestedpersonsclaimedUnited States nationality, or were reasonably thought to beUnitedStatesnationals,withspecificenquiriesbeingmadeintimelyfashiontoverifysuchdualnationality .Itnotes,how-ever, that sevenpersonsareassertedby theUnitedStates to

havestatedatthetimeofarrestthattheywereUnitedStatescitizens .

AfterexaminationofthosesevencasestheCourtconcludesthat Mexico has failed to prove the violation by the UnitedStatesofitsobligationsunderArticle36,paragraph1(b), inonly one of these . As regards the other individuals who areallegedtohaveclaimedUnitedStatesnationalityonarrest,theCourtfindsthattheargumentoftheUnitedStatescannotbeupheld .

The Court points out that the question nonethelessremainsas towhether, ineachof these51cases, theUnitedStates did provide the required information to the arrestedpersons“withoutdelay” .ItistothatquestionthattheCourtthenturns .TheCourtnotesthatin47casestheUnitedStatesnowherechallengesthefactthattheMexicannationalswereneverinformedoftheirrightsunderArticle36,paragraph1(b), but that in four cases some doubt remains whether theinformationthatwasgivenwasprovided“withoutdelay”;forthese,someexaminationofthetermisthusnecessary .

TheCourtnotesthatthePartieshaveverydifferentviewsonthis .AccordingtoMexico,thetimingofthenoticetothedetainedperson“iscritical totheexerciseoftherightspro-videdbyArticle36”andthephrase“withoutdelay”inpara-graph1(b)requires“unqualifiedimmediacy” .Mexicofurthercontends that, in view of the object and purpose of Article36,whichistoenable“meaningfulconsularassistance”andthe safeguardingof thevulnerabilityof foreignnationals incustody, “consular notification . . . must occur immediatelyupondetentionandpriortoanyinterrogationoftheforeigndetainee, so that the consul may offer useful advice aboutthe foreign legal systemandprovideassistance inobtainingcounsel before the foreign national makes any ill-informeddecisionsortheStatetakesanyactionpotentiallyprejudicialtohisrights” .

TheUnitedStatesdisputedthisinterpretationofthephrase“withoutdelay” .Initsviewitdidnotmean“immediately,andbeforeinterrogation”andsuchanunderstandingwassupport-edneitherbytheterminology,norbytheobjectandpurposeof the Vienna Convention, nor by its travaux préparatoires.AccordingtotheUnitedStates,thepurposeofArticle36wasto facilitate theexerciseofconsular functionsbyaconsularofficer:

“The significance of giving consular information to anational is thus limited . . . It isaproceduraldevice thatallowstheforeignnationaltotriggertherelatedprocessofnotification . . .[It]cannotpossiblybefundamentaltothecriminaljusticeprocess .”The Court begins by noting that the precise meaning of

“withoutdelay”,asitistobeunderstoodinArticle36,para-graph 1 (b), is not defined in the Convention . This phrasethereforerequiresinterpretationaccordingtothecustomaryrulesoftreatyinterpretationreflectedinArticles31and32oftheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties .Afterexamina-tionofthetextoftheViennaConventiononConsularRela-tions, itsobject andpurpose, aswell as its travaux prépara-toires,theCourtfindsthat“withoutdelay”isnotnecessarilytobeinterpretedas“immediately”uponarrest,norcanitbeinterpreted to signify that the provision of the information

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mustnecessarilyprecedeanyinterrogation,sothatthecom-mencement of interrogation before the information is givenwouldbeabreachofArticle36 .TheCourtobserves,however,thatthereisnonethelessadutyuponthearrestingauthoritiestogivetheinformationtoanarrestedpersonassoonasitisrealized that the person is a foreign national, or once thereare grounds to think that the person is probably a foreignnational .

Applying this interpretation of “without delay” to thefactsof the fouroutstandingcases, theCourtfinds that theUnited States was in breach of its obligations under Article36,paragraph1(b), inrespectoftheseindividualsalso .TheCourtaccordinglyconcludesthat,withrespecttoall,saveone,ofthe52individualslistedinparagraph16oftheJudgment,theUnitedStateshasviolateditsobligationunderArticle36,paragraph1(b),oftheViennaConventiontoprovideinfor-mationtothearrestedperson .

Article 36, paragraph 1 (a) and (c) (paras .91–106)

The Court begins by recalling its observation above thatArticle36,paragraph1(b),containsthreeelements .Thusfar,itobserves, ithasbeendealingwiththerightofanarrestedpersontobeinformedthathemayaskforhisconsularposttobenotified .TheCourtthenturnstoanotheraspectofArti-cle36,paragraph1(b).ItfindstheUnitedStatesiscorrectinobservingthatthefactthataMexicanconsularpostwasnotnotifiedunderArticle36,paragraph1(b),doesnotofneces-sity show that the arrested person was not informed of hisrightsunderthatprovision .Hemayhavebeeninformedanddeclined tohavehisconsularpostnotified .TheCourtfindsinoneofthetwocasesmentionedbytheUnitedStatesinthisrespect, thatthatwasthecase .IntwoofthreefurthercasesinwhichtheUnitedStatesallegesthattheconsularpostwasformallynotifiedwithoutpriorinformationtotheindividual,theCourtfinds that theUnitedStatesdidviolate itsobliga-tionsunderArticle36,paragraph1(b).

TheCourtnotes that, in thefirstof itsfinalsubmissions,Mexico also asks the Court to find that the violations itascribes to the United States in respect of Article 36, para-graph1(b),havealsodeprived“Mexicoofitsrighttoprovideconsularprotectionandthe52nationals’righttoreceivesuchprotectionasMexicowouldprovideunderArticle36(1)(a)and(c)oftheConvention” .

TheCourt recalls that therelationshipbetween the threesubparagraphsofArticle36,paragraph1,hasbeendescribedbyitinitsJudgmentintheLaGrandcase(I.C.J. Reports 2001,p . 492, para . 74) as “an interrelated régime” . The legal con-clusions tobedrawn from that interrelationshipnecessarilydependuponthefactsofeachcase .IntheLaGrandcase,theCourtfoundthatthefailurefor16yearstoinformthebrothersoftheirrighttohavetheirconsulnotifiedeffectivelypreventedtheexerciseofotherrightsthatGermanymighthavechosentoexerciseunder subparagraphs (a)and(c) .TheCourt isoftheviewthatitisnecessarytorevisittheinterrelationshipofthethreesubparagraphsofArticle36,paragraph1,inthelightoftheparticularfactsandcircumstancesofthepresentcase .

It first recalls that, in one case, when the defendant wasinformedofhisrights,hedeclinedtohavehisconsularpostnotified .Thusinthiscasetherewasnoviolationofeithersub-paragraph(a)orsubparagraph(c)ofArticle36,paragraph1 .

Intheremainingcases,becauseofthefailureoftheUnitedStates toact inconformitywithArticle36,paragraph1(b),Mexicowasineffectprecluded(insomecasestotally,andinsomecasesforprolongedperiodsoftime)fromexercisingitsrightunderparagraph1(a) tocommunicatewithitsnationalsandhaveaccesstothem .AstheCourthasalreadyhadocca-siontoexplain,itisimmaterialwhetherMexicowouldhaveoffered consular assistance, “or whether a different verdictwouldhavebeenrendered .ItissufficientthattheConventionconferredtheserights”(I.C.J. Reports 2001,p .492,para .74),whichmighthavebeenactedupon .

The Court observes that the same is true, pari passu, ofcertainrightsidentifiedinsubparagraph(c):“consularofficersshallhavetherighttovisitanationalofthesendingStatewhois inprison, custodyordetention, and toconverseandcor-respondwithhim . . .” .Mexico,itnotes,laidmuchemphasisinthislitigationupontheimportanceofconsularofficersbeingabletoarrangeforsuchrepresentationbeforeandduringtrial,andespeciallyatsentencing,incasesinwhichaseverepenaltymay be imposed . Mexico has further indicated the impor-tanceofanyfinancialorotherassistancethatconsularofficersmay provide to defence counsel, inter alia for investigationofthedefendant’sfamilybackgroundandmentalcondition,when such information is relevant to the case . The Courtobserves that the exercise of the rights of the sending StateunderArticle36,paragraph1(c),dependsuponnotificationbytheauthoritiesof thereceivingState .Itmaybe,however,thatinformationdrawntotheattentionofthesendingStatebyothermeansmaystillenableitsconsularofficerstoassistinarranginglegalrepresentationforitsnational .TheCourtfindsthathasbeensoin13cases .

The Court concludes on this aspect of the case in para-graph106oftheJudgment,whereitsummarizesitsfindingsastotheviolationofthedifferentobligationsincumbentupontheUnitedStatesunderArticle36,paragraph1,inthecasesbeforeit .

Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Vienna Convention (paras .107–114)

The Court then recalls that in its third final submissionMexicoaskstheCourttoadjudgeanddeclarethat“theUnitedStatesviolateditsobligationsunderArticle36(2)oftheVien-na Convention by failing to provide meaningful and effec-tivereviewandreconsiderationofconvictionsandsentencesimpaired by a violation of Article 36 (1)” . More specifically,Mexicocontendsthat:

“TheUnitedStatesusesseveralmunicipallegaldoctrinestopreventfindinganylegaleffectfromtheviolationsofArti-cle36 .First,despitethisCourt’sclearanalysisinLaGrand,U .S .courts,atboththestateandfederallevel,continuetoinvoke default doctrines to bar any review of Article 36violations—evenwhen thenational hadbeenunawareofhisrightstoconsularnotificationandcommunicationandthushisabilitytoraisetheirviolationasanissueattrial,

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due to the competent authorities’ failure to comply withArticle36 .”AgainstthiscontentionbyMexico,theUnitedStatesargues

that:“thecriminaljusticesystemsoftheUnitedStatesaddressall errors in process through both judicial and executiveclemencyproceedings,relyinguponthelatterwhenrulesofdefaulthaveclosedoutthepossibilityoftheformer .Thatis, the ‘lawsandregulations’of theUnitedStatesprovidefor the correction of mistakes that may be relevant to acriminal defendant to occur through a combination ofjudicial review and clemency . These processes together,workingwithothercompetentauthorities,givefulleffectto the purposes for which Article 36 (1) is intended, inconformity with Article 36 (2) . And, insofar as a breachofArticle36(1)hasoccurred,theseproceduressatisfytheremedialfunctionofArticle36(2)byallowingtheUnitedStatestoprovidereviewandreconsiderationofconvictionsandsentencesconsistentwithLaGrand.”The Court observes that it has already considered the

application of the so called “procedural default” rule in theLaGrandcase,whentheCourtaddressedtheissueofitsimpli-cationsfor theapplicationofArticle36,paragraph2,of theViennaConvention .TheCourtemphasizedthat“adistinctionmustbedrawnbetweenthatruleassuchanditsspecificappli-cationinthepresentcase”stating:

“Initself,theruledoesnotviolateArticle36oftheViennaConvention . The problem arises when the proceduraldefaultruledoesnotallowthedetainedindividualtochal-lenge a conviction and sentence by claiming, in relianceon Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Convention, that thecompetentnationalauthoritiesfailedtocomplywiththeirobligation to provide the requisite consular information‘without delay’, thus preventing the person from seekingandobtainingconsularassistancefromthesendingState .”(I.C.J. Reports 2001,p .497,para .90 .)On this basis, the Court concluded that “the procedural

default rule prevented counsel for the LaGrands to effec-tively challenge their convictions and sentences other thanonUnitedStatesconstitutionalgrounds”(ibid .,para .91) .TheCourtdeemsthisstatementtobeequallyvalidinrelationtothepresentcase,whereanumberofMexicannationalshavebeenplacedexactlyinsuchasituation .

TheCourtfurtherobservesthattheproceduraldefaultrulehasnotbeenrevised,norhasanyprovisionbeenmadetopre-ventitsapplicationincaseswhereithasbeenthefailureoftheUnitedStatesitselftoinformthatmayhaveprecludedcounselfrombeinginapositiontohaveraisedthequestionofaviola-tionoftheViennaConventionintheinitialtrial .TheCourtnotesmoreoverthat inseveralofthecasescitedinMexico’sfinalsubmissionstheproceduraldefaultrulehasalreadybeenapplied,andthat inothers itcouldbeappliedatsubsequentstagesintheproceedings .Italsopointsout,however,thatinnoneofthecases,saveforthethreementionedbelow,havethecriminalproceedingsagainsttheMexicannationalsconcernedalreadyreachedastageatwhichthereisnofurtherpossibil-ityofjudicialre-examinationofthosecases;thatistosay,allpossibilityisnotyetexcludedof“reviewandreconsideration”

ofconvictionandsentence,ascalledforintheLaGrandcase,andasexplainedinsubsequentparagraphsoftheJudgment .TheCourtfindsthatitwouldthereforebeprematurefortheCourt to conclude at this stage that, in those cases, there isalreadyaviolationoftheobligationsunderArticle36,para-graph2,oftheViennaConvention .

Bycontrast,theCourtnotesthatinthecaseofthreenamedMexican nationals, conviction and sentence have becomefinal .Moreover,inoneofthesecases,theOklahomaCourtofCriminalAppealshassetanexecutiondate .TheCourtfindsthereforethatitmustconcludethat,subjecttoitsobservationsbelowinregardtoclemencyproceedings,inrelationtothesethreeindividuals,theUnitedStatesisinbreachofitsobliga-tionsunderArticle36,paragraph2,of theViennaConven-tion .

Legal consequences of the breach(paras .115–150)

HavingconcludedthatinmostofthecasesbroughtbeforetheCourtbyMexicointhe52instances,therehasbeenafail-uretoobservetheobligationsprescribedbyArticle36,para-graph1(b),oftheViennaConvention,theCourtproceedstothe examination of the legal consequences of such a breachandofthelegalremediestherefor .

ItrecallsthatMexicoinitsfourth,fifthandsixthsubmis-sionsaskstheCourttoadjudgeanddeclare:

“(4)thatpursuanttotheinjuriessufferedbyMexicoinitsownrightand in theexerciseofdiplomaticprotectionofitsnationals,Mexicoisentitledtofullreparationfortheseinjuriesintheformofrestitutio in integrum;(5)thatthisrestitutionconsistsoftheobligationtorestorethestatus quo antebyannullingorotherwisedeprivingoffull force or effect the conviction and sentences of all 52Mexicannationals;[and](6)thatthisrestitutionalsoincludestheobligationtotakeallmeasuresnecessary toensure thatapriorviolationofArticle36shallnotaffectthesubsequentproceedings .”TheUnitedStatesontheotherhandargues:“LaGrand’sholdingcallsfortheUnitedStatestoprovide,ineachcase,‘reviewandreconsideration’that‘takesaccountof ’theviolation,not‘reviewandreversal’,notacross-the-board exclusions of evidence or nullification of convic-tions simply because a breach of Article 36 (1) occurredand without regard to its effect upon the conviction andsentenceand,not . . . ‘aprecise,concrete,statedresult:tore-establishthestatus quo ante’” .TheCourtpointsoutthatitstaskinthepresentcaseisto

determinewhatwouldbeadequate reparation for theviola-tionsofArticle36 .TheCourtfindsittobeclearfromwhathasbeen observed above that the internationally wrongful actscommittedbytheUnitedStateswerethefailureofitscompe-tentauthorities to informtheMexicannationalsconcerned,tonotifyMexicanconsularpostsandtoenableMexicotopro-videconsularassistance .It isof theviewthat it followsthattheremedytomakegoodtheseviolationsshouldconsistinanobligationontheUnitedStatestopermitreviewandreconsid-erationof thesenationals’casesbytheUnitedStatescourts,

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withaviewtoascertainingwhetherineachcasetheviolationofArticle36committedbythecompetentauthoritiescausedactualprejudicetothedefendantintheprocessofadministra-tionofcriminaljustice .

The Court considers that it is not to be presumed, asMexico asserts, that partial or total annulment of convic-tionor sentenceprovides thenecessaryandsole remedy . InthepresentcaseitisnottheconvictionsandsentencesoftheMexicannationalswhicharetoberegardedasaviolationofinternational law, but solely certain breaches of treaty obli-gations which preceded them . Mexico, the Court notes, hasfurthercontendedthattherighttoconsularnotificationandconsular communication under the Vienna Convention is ahumanrightofsuchafundamentalnaturethatits infringe-mentwill ipso factoproducetheeffectofvitiatingtheentireprocessofthecriminalproceedingsconductedinviolationofthisfundamentalright .TheCourtobservesthatthequestionofwhetherornot theViennaConventionrightsarehumanrightsisnotamatterthatitneeddecide .Itpointsout,how-ever, thatneither the textnor theobjectandpurposeof theConvention,noranyindicationinthetravaux préparatoires,supporttheconclusionthatMexicodrawsfromitscontentioninthatregard .TheCourtfindsthatforthesereasons,Mexico’sfourthandfifthsubmissionscannotbeupheld .

In elaboration of its sixth submission, Mexico contendsthat “As an aspect of restitutio in integrum, Mexico is alsoentitled to an order that in any subsequent criminal pro-ceedings against the nationals, statements and confessionsobtained prior to notification to the national of his right toconsularassistancebeexcluded” .TheCourtisoftheviewthatthisquestionisonewhichhastobeexaminedunderthecon-cretecircumstancesofeachcasebytheUnitedStatescourtsconcernedintheprocessoftheirreviewandreconsideration .For this reason, the sixth submission of Mexico cannot beupheld .

Althoughrejectingthefourth,fifthandsixthsubmissionsof Mexico relating to the remedies for the breaches by theUnitedStatesofitsinternationalobligationsunderArticle36oftheViennaConvention,theCourtpointsoutthatthefactremainsthatsuchbreacheshavebeencommitted,andthatitis thus incumbentupontheCourt tospecifywhatremediesarerequiredinordertoredresstheinjurydonetoMexicoandtoitsnationalsbytheUnitedStatesthroughnon-compliancewiththoseinternationalobligations .

Inthisregard,theCourtrecallsthatMexico’sseventhsub-missionalsoaskstheCourttoadjudgeanddeclare:

“Thattotheextentthatanyof the52convictionsorsen-tencesarenotannulled,theUnitedStatesshallprovide,bymeansofitsownchoosing,meaningfulandeffectivereviewandreconsiderationoftheconvictionsandsentencesofthe52 nationals, and that this obligation cannot be satisfiedbymeansofclemencyproceedingsorifanymunicipallawruleordoctrine[thatfailstoattachlegalsignificancetoanArticle36(1)violation]isapplied .”On this question of “review and reconsideration”, the

United States takes the position that it has conformed itsconduct to the LaGrand Judgment . In a further elaborationofthispoint, theUnitedStatesarguesthat“[t]heCourtsaid

inLaGrandthatthechoiceofmeansforallowingthereviewandreconsideration it called for ‘mustbe left’ to theUnitedStates” .

TheCourtpointsoutthat,instatinginitsJudgmentintheLaGrandcasethat“theUnitedStatesofAmerica,bymeansofitsownchoosing,shallallowthereviewandreconsiderationoftheconvictionandsentence”(I.C.J. Reports 2001,p .516,para .128;emphasisadded),theCourtacknowledgedthatthecon-cretemodalities for such reviewandreconsideration shouldbeleftprimarilytotheUnitedStates .Itshouldbeunderlined,however, that this freedom in the choice of means for suchreview and reconsideration is not without qualification: asthepassageoftheJudgmentquotedabovemakesabundantlyclear, suchreviewandreconsiderationhas tobecarriedout“bytakingaccountof theviolationof therightsset forth intheConvention”(I.C.J. Reports 2001,p .514,para .125),includ-ing,inparticular,thequestionofthelegalconsequencesoftheviolation upon the criminal proceedings that have followedtheviolation .

TheCourtobservesthatthecurrentsituationintheUnitedStates criminal procedure, as explained by the Agent at thehearings,issuchthataclaimbasedontheviolationofArticle36,paragraph1,oftheViennaConvention,howevermeritori-ousinitself,couldbebarredinthecourtsoftheUnitedStatesbytheoperationoftheproceduraldefaultrule .TheCourtisoftheviewthatthecrucialpointinthissituationisthat,bytheoperationoftheproceduraldefaultruleasitisappliedatpresent,thedefendantiseffectivelylimitedtoseekingthevin-dicationofhisrightsundertheUnitedStatesConstitution .

The Court takes note in this regard that Mexico, in thelatter part of its seventh submission, has stated that “thisobligation [ofproviding reviewand reconsideration] cannotbesatisfiedbymeansofclemencyproceedings” .Furthermore,Mexicoarguesthattheclemencyprocess is in itselfaninef-fective remedy to satisfy the internationalobligationsof theUnitedStates .Itconcludes:“clemencyreviewisstandardless,secretive,andimmunefromjudicialoversight” .

Against this contention of Mexico, the United Statesclaims that it “gives ‘full effect’ to the ‘purposes for whichthe rights accorded under [Article 36, paragraph 1,] areintended’ through executive clemency” . It argues that “[t]heclemencyprocessiswellsuitedtothetaskofprovidingreviewandreconsideration” .TheUnitedStatesexplainsthat,“Clem-ency . . .ismorethanamatterofgrace;itispartoftheoverallschemeforensuringjusticeandfairnessinthelegalprocess”and that “Clemency procedures are an integral part of theexisting ‘laws and regulations’ of the United States throughwhicherrorsareaddressed” .

The Court emphasizes that the “review and reconsidera-tion”prescribedbyitintheLaGrand caseshouldbeeffective .Thusitshould“tak[e]accountoftheviolationoftherightssetforth in [the] Convention” (I.C.J. Reports 2001, p . 516, para .128 (7)) and guarantee that the violation and the possibleprejudicecausedbythatviolationwillbefullyexaminedandtakenintoaccountinthereviewandreconsiderationprocess .Lastly,reviewandreconsiderationshouldbebothofthesen-tenceandoftheconviction .

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Accordingly,inasituationoftheviolationofrightsunderArticle36,paragraph1,oftheViennaConvention,thedefen-dantraiseshisclaiminthisrespectnotasacaseof“harmtoaparticularrightessentialtoafairtrial”—aconceptrelevanttotheenjoymentofdueprocessrightsundertheUnitedStatesConstitution—butasacaseinvolvingtheinfringementofhisrights under Article 36, paragraph 1 . The rights guaranteedunder the Vienna Convention are treaty rights which theUnitedStateshasundertakentocomplywithinrelationtotheindividual concerned, irrespective of the due process rightsunder United States constitutional law . The Court is of theviewthat, incaseswherethebreachofthe individualrightsofMexicannationalsunderArticle36,paragraph1(b),oftheConventionhasresulted,inthesequenceofjudicialproceed-ings that has followed, in the individuals concerned beingsubjectedtoprolongeddetentionorconvictedandsentencedtoseverepenalties,thelegalconsequencesofthisbreachhavetobeexaminedandtakenintoaccountinthecourseofreviewandreconsideration .TheCourtconsidersthatitisthejudicialprocessthatissuitedtothistask .

Asregardstheclemencyprocedure, theCourtpointsoutthatwhatisatissueinthepresentcaseiswhethertheclem-encyprocessaspractisedwithinthecriminaljusticesystemsof different states in the United States can, in and of itself,qualifyasanappropriatemeansforundertakingtheeffective“review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentenceby taking account of the violation of the rights set forth inthe Convention”, as the Court prescribed in the LaGrand Judgment (I.C.J. Reports 2001, p . 514, para . 125) . The Courtnotesthattheclemencyprocess,ascurrentlypractisedwithintheUnitedStatescriminaljusticesystem,doesnotappeartomeettheabove-mentionedrequirementsandthatitisthere-forenotsufficientinitselftoserveasanappropriatemeansof“reviewandreconsideration”asenvisagedbytheCourtintheLaGrandcase .

Finally,theCourtconsiderstheeighthsubmissionofMexi-co,inwhichitaskstheCourttoadjudgeanddeclare:

“Thatthe[UnitedStates]shallceaseitsviolationsofArticle36oftheViennaConventionwithregardtoMexicoandits52nationalsandshallprovideappropriateguaranteesandassurancesthatitshalltakemeasuressufficienttoachieveincreased compliance with Article 36 (1) and to ensurecompliancewithArticle36(2) .”The Court recalls that Mexico, although recognizing the

efforts by the United States to raise awareness of consularassistance rights, notes with regret that “the United Statesprogram,whateveritscomponents,hasprovenineffectivetoprevent the regular and continuing violation by its compe-tentauthoritiesofconsularnotificationandassistancerightsguaranteedbyArticle36” .ItalsorecallsthattheUnitedStatescontradicts this contention of Mexico by claiming that “itseffortstoimprovetheconveyanceofinformationaboutcon-sularnotificationarecontinuingunabatedandareachievingtangibleresults” .ItcontendsthatMexico“failstoestablisha‘regularandcontinuing’patternofbreachesofArticle36inthewakeofLaGrand” .

ReferringtothefactthattheMexicanrequestforguaran-teesofnon-repetitionisbasedonitscontentionthatbeyond52

casesthereisa“regularandcontinuing”patternofbreachesbytheUnitedStatesofArticle36,theCourtobservesthat,inthisrespect,thereisnoevidenceproperlybeforeitthatwouldestablish a general pattern . While it is a matter of concernthat,eveninthewakeoftheLaGrand Judgment,thereremainasubstantialnumberofcasesoffailuretocarryouttheobli-gationtofurnishconsularinformationtoMexicannationals .TheCourtnotesthattheUnitedStateshasbeenmakingcon-siderableeffortstoensurethatitslawenforcementauthoritiesprovide consular information to every arrested person theyknoworhavereasontobelieveisaforeignnational .TheCourtfurthernotesinthisregardthatintheLaGrandcaseGermanysought,inter alia,“astraightforwardassurancethattheUnit-edStateswillnotrepeatitsunlawfulacts”(I.C.J. Reports 2001,p .511,para .120) .Withregardtothisgeneraldemandforanassuranceofnon-repetition,theCourtstated:

“If a State, in proceedings before this Court, repeatedlyrefers to substantial activities which it is carrying out inorder to achieve compliance with certain obligationsunderatreaty,thenthisexpressesacommitmenttofollowthroughwiththeeffortsinthisregard .TheprogrammeinquestioncertainlycannotprovideanassurancethattherewillneveragainbeafailurebytheUnitedStatestoobservetheobligationsofnotificationunderArticle36oftheVien-naConvention .ButnoStatecouldgive suchaguaranteeand Germany does not seek it . The Court considers thatthecommitmentexpressedbytheUnitedStatestoensureimplementation of the specific measures adopted in per-formanceof itsobligationsunderArticle36,paragraph1(b),mustberegardedasmeetingGermany’srequestforageneralassuranceofnon-repetition .” (I.C.J. Reports 2001,pp .512–513,para .124 .)TheCourtbelievesthatasfarastherequestofMexicofor

guarantees and assurances of non-repetition is concerned,what the Court stated in this passage of the LaGrand Judg-mentremainsapplicable,andthereforemeetsthatrequest .

*The Court then re-emphasizes a point of importance . It

pointsoutthatinthepresentcaseithasbeenaddressingtheissuesofprincipleraisedinthecourseofthepresentproceed-ingsfromtheviewpointofthegeneralapplicationoftheVien-naConvention,andtherecanbenoquestionofmakinganacontrario argument inrespectofanyof theCourt’sfindingsinthepresentJudgment .Inotherwords,thefactthatinthiscasetheCourt’srulinghasconcernedonlyMexicannationalscannotbetakentoimplythattheconclusionsreachedbyitinthepresentJudgmentdonotapplytootherforeignnationalsfindingthemselvesinsimilarsituationsintheUnitedStates .

The Court finally points out that its Order of 5 Febru-ary 2003 indicating provisional measures mentioned above,according to its terms and to Article 41 of the Statute, waseffective pending final judgment, and that the obligationsof theUnitedStates inthatrespectare,witheffect fromthedateoftheJudgment,replacedbythosedeclaredinthisJudg-ment .TheCourtobservesthatithasfoundinrelationtothethreepersonsconcernedintheOrder(amongothers),thattheUnitedStateshascommittedbreachesofitsobligationsunder

45

Article36,paragraph1,oftheViennaConvention;andthatmoreover,inrespectofthosethreepersonsalone,theUnitedStateshasalsocommittedbreachesofArticle36,paragraph2 .ThereviewandreconsiderationofconvictionandsentencerequiredbyArticle36,paragraph2,whichistheappropriateremedyforbreachesofArticle36,paragraph1,hasnotbeencarriedout .TheCourtconsidersthatinthesethreecasesitisfortheUnitedStatestofindanappropriateremedyhavingthenatureofreviewandreconsiderationaccordingtothecriteriaindicatedintheJudgment .

** *

Declaration of President Shi

Invotinginfavourofoperativeparagraph153oftheJudg-ment,PresidentShimakesitclearthathestillmaintainshisviews as expressed in his separate opinion annexed to theLaGrand Judgment (I.C.J. Reports 2001, pp . 518–524) withregardbothtotheCourt’sinterpretationthatArticle36,para-graphs1and2,oftheViennaConventiononConsularRela-tions creates individual rights, and to the Court’s ruling on“reviewandreconsiderationoftheconvictionandsentence”as a form of remedy for breach by the receiving State of itsobligationsunderArticle36oftheConvention .

Declaration of Vice-President Ranjeva

Judge Raymond Ranjeva, Vice-President, has attached adeclarationprimarilyconcerningthequestionofevidenceandthe request for diplomatic protection submitted by Mexico .ThedistinctionbetweentheburdenofproofandtheburdenofevidencewasrightlyrebuttedbytheJudgmentasithasnoknown relevance in international law; in the absence of theprinciple nemo contra se edere tenetur, the Corfu ChannelcasegivestheCourtjurisdictiontodefinethefactualconse-quencesoffailuretoproducedocumentslikelytosupportanargument .

Concerning the Mexican request relating to diplomaticprotection, the author of the declaration considers that theViennaConventiononConsularRelations,inexplicitlyrecog-nizingindividualrightstoforeignnationalsindetention,doesnot provide for diplomatic protection . The interdependencebetweentherightssetoutinArticle36oftheViennaConven-tiononConsularRelationspointstothecorrelationbetweenthe initiative by the sending State to uphold the individualrightsof itsnationalsandthelackofrefusalbythenationalheldindetention .Thiscorrelationmakesitpossibleforafor-eignnationalwhohasbeenarrestedtoobjecttotheconsularpostofhisStatebeinginformed .Foritspart,thesendingStatemaydemandobservanceofitsownlawoncetheforeignoriginofthearrestedpersonhasbeenestablished .

Separate opinion of Judge Vereshchetin

Inhisseparateopinion,JudgeVereshchetinputsonrecordhisdisagreementwiththatpartoftheCourt’sreasoningwhereitdealswiththeissuesconcerningthelawofdiplomaticpro-tectionandtherelatedruleoftheexhaustionoflocalremedies(para .40oftheJudgment) .

In rejecting the United States contention that Mexico’sclaims brought under the head of diplomatic protection ofitsnationalsareinadmissible,theCourt,intheviewofJudgeVereshchetin, has resorted to reasoning which amounts toahighlyproblematicnew legalproposition inrespectof thelaw of diplomatic protection . In deviation from the generalrequirement of the exhaustion of local remedies where aninternational claim is brought by a State in espousal of therights of its nationals, the Judgment finds that the duty toexhaustlocalremediesdoesnotapplytotheMexicanrequestbecauseofthespecialcircumstancesofinterdependenceoftherightsoftheStateandofindividualrightsunderArticle36oftheViennaConvention .

Having analysed the jurisprudence of the Court dealingwiththe lawofdiplomaticprotectionandtheDraftArticlesonDiplomaticProtection,recentlyelaboratedbytheInterna-tionalLawCommission(ILC),JudgeVereshchetinconcludesthatinthepresentcasetherewerenocompellingreasonstodeviate from the “preponderance” standard applied in theformer Court’s jurisprudence and in the ILC Draft Articleswithregardto“mixed”claimsbroughtbyaState initsownrightandintheexerciseofitsrightofdiplomaticprotectionofitsnationals .

TheruleofexhaustionoflocalremediesdoesnotapplyherenotbecauseofthespecialcharacterofArticle36oftheViennaConventiononConsularRelations,whichimpliedlydiffersinkindfromothertreatyprovisionscreatingrightsofindividu-als,butratherbecauseoftheveryspecialcircumstancesofthecaseathand .AtthetimewhentheApplicationwasfiled,alltheMexicannationalsconcernedwerealreadyondeathrow .Inthosecircumstances,todemandthatallthelocalremediesshouldhavebeencompletelyexhaustedbeforeMexicocouldexerciseitsrightofdiplomaticprotectionofthosenationals,could lead to the absurd result of this Court having to rulewhenitsrulingcouldhavenopracticaleffect .


Judge Parra-Aranguren considers that the preliminaryobjectionsraisedbytheUnitedStatesshouldhavebeendis-regardedforitgaveitsconsentnottoraisepreliminaryobjec-tions when agreeing to a single round of pleadings and notsayinganythingaboutpreliminaryobjections .Forthisreasonhevotedagainstparagraph153(1)oftheJudgment .

The United States “has chosen to vehemently deny anywrongdoing”,asindicatedbyMexico .MexicoacknowledgeditsobligationtodemonstratetheMexicannationalityofeachof the 52 persons identified in its Memorial . It presented tothis end declarations of 42 of them stating their Mexicannationalityand52birthcertificatesattestingthateachoneofthemwasborninMexico,explainingthattheyautomaticallyacquirediure soliMexicannationality,asprescribedinArticle30oftheMexicanConstitution .

IntheopinionofJudgeParra-Arangurenthedeclarationspresentedareex partedocumentswhichcannotdemonstratethe nationality of the 42 persons concerned; and the birthcertificates undoubtedly prove that each of the 52 personsmentionedinMexico’sMemorialwereborninMexicobutnot

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thattheyareMexicannationals .MexicodidnotpresentthetextofArticle30ofitsconstitutionand“insofarastheInter-nationalCourtofJusticeiscalledupontoexpressanopinionastotheeffectofaruleofnationallawitwilldosobytreat-ingthematterasaquestionoffacttobeestablishedassuchratherthanasaquestionoflawtobedecidedbythecourt .”(Oppenheim’s International Law, Ninth Edition, edited by Sir Robert Jennings, Q.C., and Sir Arthur Watts, K.C.M.G., Q.C.,Vol . 1, “Peace”, Introduction and Part 1, 1996, p . 83, para .21 .) This is a generally accepted rule, as indicated by JudgeJohnE .Readwhenreferringtoalongseriesofdecisionsren-deredbythePermanentCourtofInternationalJusticewhichapplied the principle that “municipal laws are merely facts”(Nottebohm, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1955, dissenting opinion of Judge Read,p .36) .Consequently,JudgeParra-ArangurenconsidersthatMexicodidnotdischargeitsburdenofproofbyfailingtopresentthetextofArticle30ofitsconstitution .Consequently,thisomissiondoesnotenableit to be established from the evidence presented by Mexico,that the 52 persons identified in its Memorial automaticallyacquirediure soliMexicannationality .Forthisreason,unlessoneweretorelyonextralegalconsiderationsastheJudgmentdid, in his opinion there was no other way but to concludethattheclaimspresentedbyMexicoagainsttheUnitedStatescannotbeupheldsinceMexicannationalityofthe52personsconcernedwasnotdemonstratedanditis,inthepresentcase,anecessaryconditionfortheapplicationofArticle36oftheVienna Convention and for Mexico’s exercise of its right todiplomatic protection of its nationals . Therefore the failureofMexicotoprovetheMexicannationalityofthe52personsidentified in itsMemorial is the fundamental reason forhisvoteagainstparagraph153,subparagraphs(4),(5),(6),(7),(8)and(9) .

Paragraph40states that theexhaustionof the localrem-ediesruledoesnotapplytotherequestcontainedinthefirstfinal submissionofMexicoasking theCourt todeclare thatthe United States violated its international legal obligationstoMexico,initsownrightandintheexerciseofitsrighttodiplomaticprotectionofitsnationals .JudgeParra-Arangurendoes not agree with such conclusion because in his opiniontheexhaustionof the local remediesruleapplies incases inwhichtheclaimantStatehasbeeninjuredindirectly,thatis,through its national and does not apply where it has beendirectlyinjuredbythewrongfulactofanotherState .AstheInternational Law Commission has recently observed “[i]npractice it is difficult to decide whether the claim is ‘direct’or ‘indirect’where it is ‘mixed’, inthesensethat itcontainselementsofbothinjurytotheStateandinjurytothenation-alsof theState .”This is thecase inthepresentproceedings,as paragraph 40 acknowledges when indicating the “specialcircumstances of interdependence of the rights of the Stateandofindividualrights”,andforthisreasontheCourtshouldhaveexaminedthedifferentelementsoftheclaim“todecidewhetherthedirectortheindirectelementispreponderant”;italsobeingpossibletoapplythesine qua nonor“butfor”test,which asks whether the claim comprising elements of bothdirectandindirectinjurywouldhavebeenbroughtwereitnotfortheclaimonbehalfoftheinjurednational(UnitedNations,ReportoftheInternationalLawCommission,Fifty-FifthSes-

sion(5May–6Juneand7July–8August2003),Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-Eighth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/58/10), pp . 89–90) . Judge Parra-Aranguren considersthat Mexico would not have presented its claim against theUnitedStatesbutfortheinjurysufferedbyitsnationalsandthatthereforethelocalremediesruleappliestotheclaims“initsownright”submittedbyMexico in itsfirstfinalsubmis-sion . Accordingly, the Court should have examined each oftheindividualcasestodeterminewhetherthelocalremedieshadbeenexhausted;ifthatwerenotthecase,thecorrespond-ingclaimpresentedbyMexico in theexerciseofdiplomaticprotectionofitsnationalsshouldhavebeendismissed,unlessitwascoveredbyanyofthecustomarilyacceptedexceptionstothelocalremediesrule,takingintoconsiderationArticle10oftheDraftArticlesonDiplomaticProtectionpreparedbytheInternationalLawCommission .

JudgeParra-Arangurenwishestoemphasizethattimecon-straintstopresenthisseparateopinionwithintheperiodfixedbytheCourtdidnotpermithimtomakeacompleteexplana-tionofhisdisagreementwithsubparagraphs(4),(5),(6),(7),(8)and(9)ofparagraph153 .

Separate opinion of Judge Tomka

In his separate opinion, Judge Tomka expresses the viewthat the Court could only arrive at the conclusion that theindividual rights of Mexican nationals were violated if itaccepted Mexico’s submission claiming its right to exercisediplomaticprotection .

Inthatcase,itwouldnothavebeenappropriatetodisregardtheUnitedStatesobjectionthattheMexicannationalsfailedtoexhaustlocalremedies .However,inviewofthepracticeofUnitedStatescourtswhich,inthepast,havefailedforvariousreasonstoprovideeffectivereliefforviolationsofindividualrightsunderArticle36,paragraph1(b),of theViennaCon-vention,JudgeTomkaconcludesthattheexhaustionoflocalremediesdoesnotapplyinthepresentcase .

JudgeTomkaexpressessomedoubtastotheideathattheobligationtoinformanarrestedforeignnationalofhisrightsunderArticle36oftheViennaConventiononlyappliesoncethearrestingauthoritiesrealizethattheindividualisaforeignnationalorhavegroundsforsobelieving .Hetakestheviewthat theobligationtogiveconsular informationarisesuponthedetentionoftheforeignnational .

JudgeTomkaagreeswiththeCourt’sfindingthatitcannotupholdMexico’srequestseekingthecessationbytheUnitedStatesofanyviolationsof itsobligationsunderArticle36oftheViennaConvention,becauseMexicohasnotestablishedthatthoseviolationsareofacontinuingnature .Hedoesnotfinditpertinenttotakeaccountofthefactthatcriminalpro-ceedings against the 52 individuals remain pending beforedomesticcourtsortoconsiderthenatureoftheappropriateremedy,inrelationtotheobligationofcessation .

Separate opinion of Judge Sepúlveda

Judgead hocSepúlvedahasstatedthat,evenifheisbasi-callyinagreementwithmostofthefindingsoftheCourt,he

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has some misgivings and reservations about the reasoningemployedbytheCourttoreachcertainconclusions .Thefol-lowingarethemainones:

(1)TheCourthasoptedinfavourofarestrictedinterpre-tation of the law of State responsibility, providing a limitedreachtotheclaimsforreparationsoughtbyMexico .

(2) The decision of the Court is not sufficiently clear inanswering the request of Mexico asking it to adjudge thatthe United States violated its international legal obligationstoMexico,initsownrightandintheexerciseofitsrighttodiplomaticprotectionofitsnationals .

(3) The present Judgment departs substantially from thefindings in theLaGrand Judgmentonmattersrelatedto thecircumstancesinwhichlocalremediesmustbeexhausted,totheapplicationoftheproceduraldefaultrule,andtotheques-tionofdenialofjustice .

(4)Itisfactuallyandlegallyincorrecttoassumethatinfor-mationdrawntotheattentionofthesendingStatebymeans

different from those established in Article 36 of the ViennaConvention may still enable consular affairs to assist inarranging legalrepresentation .Areviewof thecasesquotedintheJudgmentshowsthatinmostifnotallcaseslegalrepre-sentationwasbadlyneededfromtheverybeginning .

(5)There isan intimate linkbetweentheMirandawarn-ing and Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, in the sensethatbothaimatcreatingaschemeofprotectionofrightsthatdirectlyimpingeonthefairnessofatrial .Consularprotectionmaybeanimportantelementfordueprocessoflaw,especiallyincapitalcases .

(6) Full reparation seems unlikely to be achieved if theambiguity of the notion of “by means of its own choosing”remains, and isnot strengthenedwith theadditionof somespecificmeasures .

(7)TheCourtshouldhavefoundtheneedforthecessationoftheviolationsofArticle36oftheViennaConventionbytheUnitedStates .

TheCourthandeddownitsadvisoryopinionontherequestbytheGeneralAssemblyoftheUnitedNationsontheques-tionconcerningtheLegalConsequencesoftheConstructionofaWallintheOccupiedPalestinianTerritory .

** *

The Court was composed as follows: President Shi,Vice-President Ranjeva; Judges Guillaume, Koroma, Veresh-chetin,Higgins,Parra-Aranguren,Kooijmans,Rezek,Al-Kha-sawneh, Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada, Simma and Tomka;RegistrarCouvreur .

** *

Thefinalparagraph(para .163)oftheAdvisoryOpinionreadsasfollows:

“ . . .

TheCourt,

(1)Unanimously,

Finds thatithasjurisdictiontogivetheadvisoryopinionrequested;

(2)Byfourteenvotestoone,

Decides tocomplywiththerequest foranadvisoryopin-ion;

___________

148. LeGALConseQUenCesoFtHeConstRUCtIonoFAWALLIntHeoCCUPIeDPALestInIAnteRRItoRY

Advisoryopinionof9July2004

infavour:PresidentShi;Vice-PresidentRanjeva; Judges Guillaume, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Elaraby,Owada,Simma,Tomka;

against:Judge Buergenthal;

(3)Replies inthefollowingmannertothequestionputbytheGeneralAssembly:

A .Byfourteenvotestoone,

The construction of the wall being built by Israel, theoccupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,includinginandaroundEastJerusalem,anditsassociatedrégime,arecontrarytointernationallaw;

infavour:PresidentShi;Vice-PresidentRanjeva; Judges Guillaume, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Elaraby,Owada,Simma,Tomka;

against:JudgeBuergenthal;B .Byfourteenvotestoone,Israel is under an obligation to terminate its breaches ofinternationallaw;itisunderanobligationtoceaseforth-withtheworksofconstructionofthewallbeingbuiltintheOccupied Palestinian Territory, including in and aroundEastJerusalem,todismantleforthwiththestructurethere-insituated,andtorepealorrenderineffectiveforthwithalllegislativeandregulatoryactsrelatingthereto, inaccord-ancewithparagraph151ofthisOpinion;

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infavour:PresidentShi;Vice-PresidentRanjeva; Judges Guillaume, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Elaraby,Owada,Simma,Tomka;against:JudgeBuergenthal;C .Byfourteenvotestoone,Israel is under an obligation to make reparation for alldamage caused by the construction of the wall in theOccupied Palestinian Territory, including in and aroundEastJerusalem;infavour:PresidentShi;Vice-PresidentRanjeva; Judges Guillaume, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Elaraby,Owada,Simma,Tomka;against:JudgeBuergenthal;D .Bythirteenvotestotwo,All States are under an obligation not to recognize theillegalsituationresultingfromtheconstructionofthewallandnottorenderaidorassistanceinmaintainingthesitu-ationcreatedbysuchconstruction;allStatespartiestotheFourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection ofCivilianPersons inTimeofWarof12August1949havein addition the obligation, while respecting the UnitedNationsCharterand international law, toensurecompli-ance by Israel with international humanitarian law asembodiedinthatConvention;infavour:PresidentShi;Vice-PresidentRanjeva; Judges Guillaume, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Elaraby, Owada, Sim-ma,Tomka;against:JudgesKooijmans,Buergenthal;E .Byfourteenvotestoone,TheUnitedNations,andespeciallytheGeneralAssemblyand the Security Council, should consider what furtheraction is required to bring to anend the illegal situationresultingfromtheconstructionofthewallandtheassoci-ated régime, taking due account of the present AdvisoryOpinion .infavour:PresidentShi;Vice-PresidentRanjeva; Judges Guillaume, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Elaraby,Owada,Simma,Tomka;against:JudgeBuergenthal .”

** *

Judges Koroma, Higgins, Kooijmans and Al-Khasawnehappended separate opinions to the Advisory Opinion .JudgeBuergenthalappendedadeclaration .JudgesElarabyandOwadaappendedseparateopinions .

** *

History of the proceedings(paras .1–12)

TheCourtfirstrecallsthaton10December2003theSecre-tary-GeneraloftheUnitedNationsofficiallycommunicatedtotheCourtthedecisiontakenbytheGeneralAssemblytosub-mitthequestionsetforthinitsresolutionES-10/14,adoptedon8December2003atitsTenthEmergencySpecialSession,foranadvisoryopinion .Thequestionisthefollowing:

“What are the legal consequences arising from the con-struction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupyingPower,intheOccupiedPalestinianTerritory,includinginandaroundEast Jerusalem,asdescribed in the reportoftheSecretary-General,consideringtherulesandprinciplesofinternationallaw,includingtheFourthGenevaConven-tion of 1949, and relevant Security Council and GeneralAssemblyresolutions?”TheCourtthengivesashortoverviewofthehistoryofthe

proceedings .

Questions of jurisdiction(paras .13–42)

AttheoutsetofitsreasoningtheCourtobservesthat,whenseisedofarequestforanadvisoryopinion,itmustfirstcon-siderwhetherithasjurisdictiontogivetheopinionrequestedandwhether,shouldtheanswerbeintheaffirmative,thereisanyreasonwhyitshoulddeclinetoexerciseanysuchjurisdic-tion .

TheCourtfirstaddressesthequestionwhetheritpossessesjurisdictiontogivetheadvisoryopinion .Itnotesfirstthatthecompetence of the Court in this regard is based on Article65,paragraph1,ofitsStatute,accordingtowhichtheCourt“may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at therequestofwhateverbodymaybeauthorizedbyorinaccord-ance with the Charter of the United Nations to make sucha request”, and secondly that the General Assembly, whichseekstheadvisoryopinion,isauthorizedtodosobyArticle96,paragraph1,oftheCharter,whichprovides:“TheGeneralAssembly or the Security Council may request the Interna-tionalCourtofJusticetogiveanadvisoryopiniononanylegalquestion .” As it has done sometimes in the past, the Courtthenturnstotherelationshipbetweenthequestionwhichisthesubjectofarequestforanadvisoryopinionandtheactivi-ties of the Assembly . It observes in this respect that Article10oftheCharterhasconferredupontheGeneralAssemblyacompetencerelatingto“anyquestionsoranymatters”withinthescopeoftheCharter,andthatArticle11,paragraph2,hasspecificallyprovideditwithcompetenceon“questionsrelat-ing to the maintenance of international peace and securitybroughtbeforeitbyanyMemberoftheUnitedNations . . .”andtomakerecommendationsundercertainconditionsfixedbythoseArticles .ItnotesthatthequestionoftheconstructionofthewallintheOccupiedPalestinianTerritorywasbroughtbeforetheGeneralAssemblybyanumberofMemberStatesinthecontextoftheTenthEmergencySpecialSessionoftheAssembly, convened to deal with what the Assembly, in itsresolutionES-10/2of25April1997,consideredtoconstituteathreattointernationalpeaceandsecurity .

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Afterrecallingthesequenceofeventsthatledtotheadop-tionofresolutionES-10/14,theCourtturnstothefirstques-tion of jurisdiction raised in the present proceedings . Israelhasallegedthat,giventheactiveengagementoftheSecurityCouncil with the situation in the Middle East, includingthe Palestinian question, the General Assembly acted ultra vires under the Charter, because its request for an advisoryopinion was not in accordance with Article 12, paragraph1, of the Charter, which provides that: “While the SecurityCouncilisexercisinginrespectofanydisputeorsituationthefunctions assigned to it in the present Charter, the GeneralAssembly shall not make any recommendation with regardto that dispute or situation unless the Security Council sorequests .” The Court first observes that a request for anadvisoryopinion isnota“recommendation”bytheGeneralAssembly“withregardto[a]disputeorsituation”,withinthemeaningofArticle12,butconsidersitappropriatetoexaminethesignificanceofthatArticle,havingregardtothepracticeof theUnitedNations . Itnotes that,underArticle24of theCharter, the Security Council has “primary responsibilityforthemaintenanceofinternationalpeaceandsecurity”andthatboththeSecurityCouncilandtheGeneralAssemblyini-tiallyinterpretedandappliedArticle12totheeffectthattheAssembly could not make a recommendation on a questionconcerningthemaintenanceofinternationalpeaceandsecu-ritywhilethematterremainedontheCouncil’sagenda,butthatthisinterpretationofArticle12hasevolvedsubsequently .The Court takes note of an interpretation of that text givenbytheUnitedNationsLegalCounselattheTwenty-thirdSes-sionoftheAssembly,andofanincreasingtendencyovertimefortheGeneralAssemblyandtheSecurityCounciltodealinparallelwiththesamematterconcerningthemaintenanceofinternationalpeaceandsecurity .TheCourtconsidersthattheacceptedpracticeoftheAssembly,asithasevolved,isconsist-entwithArticle12,paragraph1;itisaccordinglyoftheviewthat theGeneralAssembly, inadopting resolutionES-10/14,seekinganadvisoryopinionfromtheCourt,didnotcontra-venetheprovisionsofArticle12,paragraph1,oftheCharter .TheCourtconcludesthatbysubmittingthatrequesttheGen-eralAssemblydidnotexceeditscompetence .

The Court recalls that it has however been contendedbeforeitthattherequestdidnotfulfiltheessentialconditionssetbyresolution377A(V),underwhichtheTenthEmergencySpecialSessionwasconvenedandhascontinuedtoact .

Resolution377A(V)providesthat:“if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimityof the permanent members, fails to exercise its primaryresponsibility for the maintenance of international peaceandsecurityinanycasewherethereappearstobeathreattothepeace,breachofthepeace,oractofaggression,theGeneral Assembly shall consider the matter immediatelywith a view to making appropriate recommendations toMembersforcollectivemeasures . . .” .The Court proceeds to ascertain whether the conditions

laiddownbythisresolutionwerefulfilledasregardsthecon-vening of the Tenth Emergency Special Session of the Gen-eralAssembly, inparticular at the timewhen the AssemblydecidedtorequestanadvisoryopinionfromtheCourt .

In light of the sequence of events as described by it, theCourtobservesthat,atthetimewhentheTenthEmergencySpecialSessionwasconvenedin1997,theCouncilhadbeenunabletotakeadecisiononthecaseofcertainIsraelisettle-mentsintheOccupiedPalestinianTerritory,duetoanegativevoteofapermanentmember;andthat,asindicatedinresolu-tionES-10/2,thereexistedathreattointernationalpeaceandsecurity .TheCourt furthernotes that,on20October2003,theTenthEmergencySpecialSessionoftheGeneralAssemblywasreconvenedonthesamebasisasin1997,aftertherejec-tionbytheSecurityCouncil,on14October2003,againasaresultofthenegativevoteofapermanentmember,ofadraftresolution concerning the construction by Israel of the wallin the Occupied Palestinian Territory . The Court considersthattheSecurityCouncilagainfailedtoactascontemplatedinresolution377A(V) .ItdoesnotappeartotheCourtthatthesituationinthisregardchangedbetween20October2003and 8 December 2003, since the Council neither discussedthe construction of the wall nor adopted any resolution inthatconnection .Thus,theCourtisoftheviewthat,upto8December2003,theCouncilhadnotreconsideredthenega-tivevoteof14October2003 .TheCourtconcludesthat,duringthat period, the Tenth Emergency Special Session was dulyreconvened and could properly be seised of the matter nowbeforetheCourt,underresolution377A(V) .

TheCourtalsoemphasizesthat,inthecourseofthisEmer-gencySpecialSession,theGeneralAssemblycouldadoptanyresolution falling within the subject-matter for which theSessionhadbeenconvened,andotherwisewithinitspowers,includingaresolutionseekingtheCourt’sopinion .Itisirrel-evant in that regard thatnoproposalhadbeenmade to theSecurityCounciltorequestsuchanopinion .

TurningtoallegedfurtherproceduralirregularitiesoftheTenthEmergencySpecialSession,theCourtdoesnotconsiderthat the “rolling” character of that Session, namely the factofithavingbeenconvenedinApril1997andreconvened11timessincethen,hasanyrelevancewithregardtothevalid-ityoftherequestbytheGeneralAssembly .Inresponsetothecontention by Israel that it was improper to reconvene theTenthEmergencySpecialSessionatatimewhentheregularSessionof theGeneralAssemblywas inprogress, theCourtobservesthat,whileitmaynothavebeenoriginallycontem-platedthatitwouldbeappropriatefortheGeneralAssemblyto hold simultaneous emergency and regular sessions, noruleoftheOrganizationhasbeenidentifiedwhichwouldbetherebyviolated,soastorenderinvalidtheresolutionadopt-ing thepresent request foranadvisoryopinion .Finally, theTenthEmergencySpecialSessionappears tohavebeencon-venedinaccordancewithRule9(b) oftheRulesofProcedureoftheGeneralAssembly,andtherelevantmeetingshavebeenconvenedinpursuanceoftheapplicablerules .

The Court turns to a further issue related to jurisdictionnamelythecontentionthattherequestforanadvisoryopin-ionbytheGeneralAssemblydoesnotraisea“legalquestion”withinthemeaningofArticle96,paragraph1,oftheCharterandArticle65,paragraph1,oftheStatuteoftheCourt .

As regards the alleged lack of clarity of the terms of theGeneralAssembly’srequestanditseffectonthe“legalnature”

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ofthequestionreferredtotheCourt,theCourtobservesthatthisquestionisdirectedtothelegalconsequencesarisingfromagivenfactualsituationconsideringtherulesandprinciplesof international law, including the Geneva Convention rela-tivetotheProtectionofCivilianPersonsinTimeofWarof12August 1949 (hereinafter the “Fourth Geneva Convention”)andrelevantSecurityCouncilandGeneralAssemblyresolu-tions . In the view of the Court, it is indeed a question of alegalcharacter .TheCourtfurtherpointsoutthatlackofclar-ityinthedraftingofaquestiondoesnotdeprivetheCourtofjurisdiction .Rather,suchuncertaintywillrequireclarificationin interpretation, and such necessary clarifications of inter-pretationhavefrequentlybeengivenbytheCourt .Therefore,theCourtwill,asithasdoneofteninthepast,“identifytheexistingprinciplesandrules,interpretthemandapplythem . . .,thusofferingareplytothequestionposedbasedonlaw”(Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I),p . 234,para .13) .TheCourtpointsout that, in thepresentinstance,iftheGeneralAssemblyrequeststheCourttostatethe“legalconsequences”arisingfromtheconstructionofthewall,theuseofthesetermsnecessarilyencompassesanassessmentofwhetherthatconstructionisorisnotinbreachofcertainrulesandprinciplesofinternationallaw .

TheCourtdoesnotconsiderthatwhatiscontendedtobetheabstractnatureofthequestionposedtoitraisesanissueofjurisdiction .Evenwhenthematterwasraisedasanissueofproprietyratherthanoneofjurisdiction,inthecaseconcern-ingtheLegality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,theCourt took the clear position that to contend that it shouldnotdealwithaquestioncouchedinabstracttermsis“amereaffirmation devoid of any justification” and that “the Courtmaygiveanadvisoryopiniononanylegalquestion,abstractorotherwise”(I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I),p .236,para .15) .

The Court finds that it furthermore cannot accept theview,whichhasalsobeenadvanced, that ithasno jurisdic-tionbecauseofthe“political”characterofthequestionposed .Asisclearfromitslong-standingjurisprudenceonthispoint,theCourtconsidersthatthefactthatalegalquestionalsohaspoliticalaspects,“doesnotsufficetodepriveitofitscharacterasa‘legalquestion’andto‘deprivetheCourtofacompetenceexpresslyconferredonitbyitsStatute’,andtheCourtcannotrefusetoadmitthelegalcharacterofaquestionwhichinvitesit to discharge an essentially judicial task” (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I),p .234,para .13) .

TheCourtaccordinglyconcludesthatithasjurisdictiontogivetheadvisoryopinionrequestedbyresolutionES-10/14oftheGeneralAssembly .

Discretionary power of the Court to exercise its jurisdiction(paras .43–65)

TheCourtnotesthatithasbeencontended,however,thattheCourt shoulddecline toexercise its jurisdictionbecauseofthepresenceofspecificaspectsoftheGeneralAssembly’srequestthatwouldrendertheexerciseoftheCourt’sjurisdic-tionimproperandinconsistentwiththeCourt’sjudicialfunc-tion .

TheCourtfirst recalls thatArticle65,paragraph1,of itsStatute,whichprovidesthat“TheCourtmay giveanadvisoryopinion . . .”(emphasisadded),shouldbeinterpretedtomeanthattheCourtretainsadiscretionarypowertodeclinetogivean advisory opinion even if the conditions of jurisdictionaremet .Itismindfulhoweverofthefactthatitsanswertoarequestforanadvisoryopinion“representsitsparticipationintheactivitiesoftheOrganization,and,inprinciple,shouldnotberefused” .Fromthisitfollowsthat,givenitsresponsibilitiesasthe“principaljudicialorganoftheUnitedNations”(Article92oftheCharter),theCourtshouldinprinciplenotdeclineto give an advisory opinion, and only “compelling reasons”shouldleadtheCourttodoso .

ThefirstargumentpresentedtotheCourtinthisregardistotheeffectthatitshouldnotexerciseitsjurisdictioninthepresentcasebecausetherequestconcernsacontentiousmatterbetweenIsraelandPalestine,inrespectofwhichIsraelhasnotconsentedtotheexerciseofthatjurisdiction .Accordingtothisview,thesubject-matterofthequestionposedbytheGeneralAssembly“isanintegralpartofthewiderIsraeli-Palestiniandisputeconcerningquestionsofterrorism,security,borders,settlements,Jerusalemandotherrelatedmatters” .TheCourtobservesinthisrespectthatthelackofconsenttotheCourt’scontentious jurisdiction by interested States has no bearingon the Court’s jurisdiction to give an advisory opinion, butrecallsitsjurisprudencetotheeffectthatthelackofconsentofaninterestedStatemightrenderthegivingofanadvisoryopinionincompatiblewiththeCourt’sjudicialcharacter,e .g .if togiveareplywouldhavetheeffectofcircumventingtheprinciple thataState isnotobligedtosubmit itsdisputes tojudicialsettlementwithoutitsconsent .

Asregardstherequestforanadvisoryopinionnowbeforeit, the Court acknowledges that Israel and Palestine haveexpressedradicallydivergentviewsonthelegalconsequencesof Israel’s construction of the wall, on which the Court hasbeenaskedtopronounceinthecontextoftheopinionitwouldgive . However, as the Court has itself noted before, “Differ-encesofviews . . .on legal issueshaveexisted inpracticallyeveryadvisoryproceeding .”Furthermore,theCourtdoesnotconsider that the subject-matter of the General Assembly’srequest can be regarded as only a bilateral matter betweenIsraelandPalestine .GiventhepowersandresponsibilitiesoftheUnitedNationsinquestionsrelatingtointernationalpeaceandsecurity,itistheCourt’sviewthattheconstructionofthewallmustbedeemedtobedirectlyofconcerntotheUnitedNations in general and the General Assembly in particular .TheresponsibilityoftheUnitedNationsinthismatteralsohasits origin in the Mandate and the Partition Resolution con-cerning Palestine . This responsibility has been described bytheGeneralAssemblyas“apermanentresponsibilitytowardsthequestionofPalestineuntilthequestionisresolvedinallitsaspectsinasatisfactorymannerinaccordancewithinter-national legitimacy”(GeneralAssemblyresolution57/107of3December2002) .TheobjectoftherequestbeforetheCourtis to obtain from the Court an opinion which the GeneralAssemblydeemsofassistancetoitfortheproperexerciseofitsfunctions .TheopinionisrequestedonaquestionwhichisofparticularlyacuteconcerntotheUnitedNations,andonewhich is located inamuchbroader frameof reference than

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abilateraldispute .Inthecircumstances,theCourtdoesnotconsiderthattogiveanopinionwouldhavetheeffectofcir-cumventingtheprincipleofconsenttojudicialsettlement,andtheCourtaccordinglycannot,intheexerciseofitsdiscretion,declinetogiveanopiniononthatground .

TheCourtthenturnstoanotherargumentraisedinsup-portoftheviewthatitshoulddeclinetoexerciseitsjurisdic-tion:thatanadvisoryopinionfromtheCourtonthelegalityofthewallandthelegalconsequencesofitsconstructioncouldimpedeapolitical,negotiatedsolutiontotheIsraeli-Palestin-ianconflict .Moreparticularly,ithasbeencontendedthatsuchanopinioncouldundermine theschemeof the“Roadmap”,which requires Israel and Palestine to comply with certainobligations in various phases referred to therein . The Courtobservesthat it isconsciousthatthe“Roadmap”,whichwasendorsedbySecurityCouncilresolution1515(2003),consti-tutesanegotiatingframeworkfortheresolutionoftheIsraeli-Palestinianconflict,butthatitisnotclearwhatinfluenceitsopinionmighthaveonthosenegotiations:participantsinthepresent proceedings have expressed differing views in thisregard .TheCourtfindsthatitcannotregardthisfactorasacompellingreasontodeclinetoexerciseitsjurisdiction .

ItwasalsoputtotheCourtbycertainparticipantsthatthequestionoftheconstructionofthewallwasonlyoneaspectofthewiderIsraeli-Palestinianconflictwhichcouldnotbeprop-erlyaddressedinthepresentproceedings .TheCourtdoesnothoweverconsiderthisareasonforittodeclinetoreplytothequestionasked:itisaware,andwouldtakeintoaccount,thatthequestionofthewallispartofagreaterwhole .Atthesametime,thequestionwhichtheGeneralAssemblyhaschosentoaskoftheCourtisconfinedtothelegalconsequencesoftheconstructionofthewall,andthattheCourtwouldonlyexam-ineotherissuestotheextentthattheymightbenecessarytoitsconsiderationofthequestionputtoit .

ThefurtherargumenthasbeenraisedthattheCourtshoulddeclinetoexerciseitsjurisdictionbecauseitdoesnothaveatits disposal the requisite facts and evidence to enable it toreachitsconclusions .AccordingtoIsrael,iftheCourtdecidedtogivetherequestedopinion,itwouldbeforcedtospeculateaboutessentialfactsandmakeassumptionsaboutargumentsoflaw .TheCourtpointsoutthatinthepresentinstance,ithasatitsdisposalthereportoftheSecretary-General,aswellasavoluminousdossiersubmittedbyhimtotheCourt,compris-ingnotonlydetailedinformationontherouteofthewallbutalsoonitshumanitarianandsocio-economic impactonthePalestinian population . The dossier includes several reportsbasedonon-sitevisitsbyspecialrapporteursandcompetentorgans of the United Nations . Moreover, numerous otherparticipantshavesubmittedtotheCourtwrittenstatementswhichcontaininformationrelevanttoaresponsetotheques-tionputbytheGeneralAssembly .TheCourtnotesinparticu-larthatIsrael’sWrittenStatement,althoughlimitedtoissuesofjurisdictionandpropriety,containedobservationsonothermatters,includingIsrael’sconcernsintermsofsecurity,andwasaccompaniedbycorrespondingannexes;andthatmanyotherdocuments issuedbytheIsraeliGovernmentonthosemattersareinthepublicdomain .

The Court therefore finds that it has before it sufficientinformation and evidence to enable it to give the advisoryopinion requested by the General Assembly . Moreover, thecircumstance that others may evaluate and interpret thesefactsinasubjectiveorpoliticalmannercanbenoargumentforacourtoflawtoabdicateitsjudicialtask .Thereisthereforeinthepresentcasenolackofinformationsuchastoconsti-tuteacompellingreasonfortheCourttodeclinetogivetherequestedopinion .

Another argument that has been advanced is that theCourt should decline to give the requested opinion on thelegal consequences of the construction of the wall becausesuch opinion would lack any useful purpose: the GeneralAssemblywouldnotneedanopinionoftheCourtbecauseithas already declared the construction of the wall to be ille-gal and has already determined the legal consequences bydemanding that Israel stopandreverse itsconstructionandfurther,becausetheGeneralAssemblyhasnevermadeitclearhowitintendedtousetheopinion .TheCourtobservesthat,asisclearfromitsjurisprudence,advisoryopinionshavethepurposeoffurnishingtotherequestingorganstheelementsof law necessary for them in their action . It recalls what itstated in its Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons:“itisnotfortheCourtitselftopurporttodecidewhetherornotanadvisoryopinion isneededby theAssembly for theperformanceof its functions .TheGeneralAssemblyhastherighttodecideforitselfontheusefulnessofanopinioninthelightofitsownneeds .”ItthusfollowsthattheCourtcannotdeclinetoanswerthequestionposedbasedonthegroundthatitsopinionwouldlackanyusefulpurpose .TheCourtcannotsubstituteitsassessmentoftheusefulnessoftheopinionrequestedforthatoftheorganthatseekssuchopinion,namelytheGeneralAssembly .Furthermore,andinanyevent,theCourtconsidersthattheGeneralAssemblyhasnot yet determined all the possible consequences of its ownresolution .TheCourt’staskwouldbetodetermineinacom-prehensivemannerthelegalconsequencesoftheconstructionof the wall, while the General Assembly—and the SecurityCouncil—maythendrawconclusionsfromtheCourt’sfind-ings .

Lastly,anotherargumentadvancedbyIsraelwithregardtotheproprietyofitsgivinganadvisoryopinioninthepresentproceedingsisthatPalestine,givenitsresponsibilityforactsofviolenceagainstIsraelanditspopulationwhichthewallisaimed at addressing, cannot seek from the Court a remedyforasituationresultingfromitsownwrongdoing .Therefore,Israelconcludes,goodfaithandtheprincipleof“cleanhands”provide a compelling reason that should lead the Court torefuse the General Assembly’s request . The Court does notconsider this argument to be pertinent . It emphasizes, asearlier,thatitwastheGeneralAssemblywhichrequestedtheadvisoryopinion,and that theopinion is tobegiven to theGeneralAssembly,andnottoanindividualStateorentity .

Inthelightoftheforegoing,theCourtconcludesthatithasjurisdictiontogiveanopiniononthequestionputtoitbytheGeneralAssemblyandthatthereisnocompellingreasonforittouseitsdiscretionarypowernottogivethatopinion .

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Scope of the question before the Court(paras .66–69)

The Court then proceeds to address the question put toit by General Assembly resolution ES-10/14 (see above) . TheCourt explains that it has chosen to use the term “wall”employedbytheGeneralAssembly,becausetheothertermsused—“fence” or “barrier”—are no more accurate if under-stood in thephysical sense . It furthernotes that therequestoftheGeneralAssemblyconcernsthe legalconsequencesofthe wall being built “in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,includinginandaroundEastJerusalem”,andconsidersthatitisnotcalledupontoexaminethelegalconsequencesarisingfromtheconstructionofthosepartsofthewallwhichareontheterritoryofIsraelitself .

Historical background(paras .70–78)

Inordertoindicatethelegalconsequencesoftheconstruc-tion of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, theCourthasfirsttodeterminewhetherornottheconstructionof that wall breaches international law . To this end, it firstmakesabriefhistoricalanalysisofthestatusoftheterritoryconcernedsincethetimethatPalestine,havingbeenpartoftheOttomanEmpire,was,attheendoftheFirstWorldWar,thesubjectofaclass“A”mandateentrustedbytheLeagueofNations to Great Britain . In the course of this analysis, theCourtmentionsthehostilitiesof1948–1949,andthearmisticedemarcation linebetween Israeli andArab forcesfixedbyageneral armistice agreement of 3 April 1949 between IsraelandJordan,referredtoasthe“GreenLine” .Atthecloseofitsanalysis,theCourtnotesthattheterritoriessituatedbetweentheGreenLineandtheformereasternboundaryofPalestineundertheMandatewereoccupiedbyIsraelin1967duringthearmedconflictbetweenIsraelandJordan .Undercustomaryinternational law, the Court observes, these were thereforeoccupiedterritoriesinwhichIsraelhadthestatusofoccupy-ing Power . Subsequent events in these territories have donenothing to alter this situation . The Court concludes that allthese territories(includingEast Jerusalem)remainoccupiedterritoriesandthatIsraelhascontinuedtohavethestatusofoccupyingPower .

Description of the wall(paras .79–85)

TheCourtgoesontodescribe,onthebasisoftheinforma-tionavailabletoitinareportbytheUnitedNationsSecretary-GeneralandtheWrittenStatementpresentedtotheCourtbythe Secretary-General, the works already constructed or incourseofconstructioninthatterritory .

Relevant rules and principles of international law(paras .86–113)

It then turns to thedeterminationof the rulesandprin-ciples of international law which are relevant in assessingthe legalityof themeasures takenby Israel . Itobserves thatsuchrulesandprinciplescanbefoundintheUnitedNationsCharterandcertainothertreaties,incustomaryinternationallaw and in the relevant resolutions adopted pursuant to the

Charterby theGeneralAssemblyand theSecurityCouncil .Itisaware,however,thatdoubtshavebeenexpressedbyIsraelastotheapplicabilityintheOccupiedPalestinianTerritoryofcertain rules of international humanitarian law and humanrightsinstruments .

United Nations Charter and General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV)(paras .87–88)

TheCourtfirstrecallsArticle2,paragraph4,oftheUnitedNationsCharter,whichprovidesthat:

“All Members shall refrain in their international rela-tionsfromthethreatoruseofforceagainsttheterritorialintegrityorpoliticalindependenceofanyState,orinanyothermannerinconsistentwiththePurposesoftheUnitedNations,”

andGeneralAssemblyresolution2625(xxV),entitled“Decla-rationonPrinciplesofInternationalLawconcerningFriendlyRelationsandCo-operationamongStates”(hereinafter“reso-lution2625(xxV)”),inwhichtheAssemblyemphasizedthat“Noterritorialacquisitionresultingfromthethreatoruseofforce shall be recognized as legal .” As stated in the Court’sJudgment in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v . United States of America),theprinciplesastotheuseofforceincorporatedin theCharterreflectcustomary international law(seeI.C.J. Reports 1986,pp .98–101,paras .187–190);thesameistrue,itobserves,of itscorollaryentailingtheillegalityofterritorialacquisitionresultingfromthethreatoruseofforce .

As to the principle of self-determination of peoples, theCourt points out that it has been enshrined in the UnitedNationsCharterandreaffirmedbytheGeneralAssemblyinresolution2625(xxV)citedabove,pursuanttowhich“EveryStatehas theduty to refrain fromany forcibleactionwhichdeprives peoples referred to [in that resolution] . . . of theirrighttoself-determination .”Article1commontotheInterna-tionalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRightsandtheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRightsreaf-firms therightofallpeoples to self-determination,and laysupon the States parties the obligation to promote the reali-zationofthatrightandtorespectit, inconformitywiththeprovisionsof theUnitedNationsCharter .TheCourt recallsitspreviouscaselaw,whichemphasizedthatcurrentdevelop-ments in “international law in regard to non-self-governingterritories,asenshrinedintheCharteroftheUnitedNations,madetheprincipleofself-determinationapplicabletoall[suchterritories]”,andthattherightofpeoplestoself-determinationistodayarighterga omnes.

International humanitarian law(paras .89–101)

Asregardsinternationalhumanitarianlaw,theCourtfirstrecallsthatIsraelisnotapartytotheFourthHagueConven-tionof1907,towhichtheHagueRegulationsareannexed .Itconsiders,however,thattheprovisionsoftheHagueRegula-tionshavebecomepartofcustomarylaw,asisinfactrecog-nized by all the participants in the proceedings before theCourt .TheCourtalsoobservesthat,pursuanttoArticle154

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of the Fourth Geneva Convention, that Convention is sup-plementary toSections IIandIIIof theHagueRegulations .Section III of those Regulations, which concerns “MilitaryauthorityovertheterritoryofthehostileState”,isparticularlypertinentinthepresentcase .

Secondly, with regard to the Fourth Geneva Convention,theCourttakesnotethatdifferingviewshavebeenexpressedby the participants in these proceedings . Israel, contrary tothegreatmajorityoftheparticipants,disputestheapplicabil-ityde jureoftheConventiontotheOccupiedPalestinianTer-ritory .TheCourtrecallsthattheFourthGenevaConventionwasratifiedbyIsraelon6July1951andthatIsraelisapartytothatConvention;thatJordanhasalsobeenapartytheretosince29May1951;andthatneitherofthetwoStateshasmadeany reservation that would be pertinent to the present pro-ceedings .TheCourtobservesthattheIsraeliauthoritieshaveindicatedonanumberofoccasionsthatinfacttheygenerallyapplythehumanitarianprovisionsoftheFourthGenevaCon-vention within the occupied territories . However, accordingtoIsrael’sposition,thatConventionisnotapplicablede jure within those territories because, under Article 2, paragraph2,itappliesonlyinthecaseofoccupationofterritoriesfallingunderthesovereigntyofaHighContractingPartyinvolvedinanarmedconflict .Israelexplainsthattheterritoriesoccupiedby Israel subsequent to the1967conflicthadnotpreviouslyfallenunderJordaniansovereignty .

TheCourtnotes that, according to thefirstparagraphofArticle2oftheFourthGenevaConvention,whentwocondi-tionsarefulfilled,namelythatthereexistsanarmedconflict(whetherornotastateofwarhasbeenrecognized),andthattheconflicthasarisenbetweentwocontractingparties,thentheConventionapplies,inparticular,inanyterritoryoccupiedinthecourseoftheconflictbyoneofthecontractingparties .TheobjectofthesecondparagraphofArticle2,whichrefersto“occupationoftheterritoryofaHighContractingParty”,isnottorestrictthescopeofapplicationoftheConvention,asdefinedbythefirstparagraph,byexcludingtherefromterrito-riesnotfallingunderthesovereigntyofoneofthecontractingparties,butsimplytomakingitclearthat,evenifoccupationeffectedduringtheconflictmetnoarmedresistance,theCon-ventionisstillapplicable .

ThisinterpretationreflectstheintentionofthedraftersoftheFourthGenevaConventiontoprotectcivilianswhofindthemselves, in whateverway, in the hands of the occupyingPower,regardlessofthestatusoftheoccupiedterritories,andis confirmed by theConvention’s travaux préparatoires.TheStatespartiestotheFourthGenevaConvention,attheirCon-ferenceon15July1999,approvedthat interpretation,whichhasalsobeenadoptedbytheInternationalCommitteeoftheRed Cross (ICRC), the General Assembly and the SecurityCouncil .TheCourtfinallymakesmentionofa judgmentoftheSupremeCourtofIsraeldated30May2004,toasimilareffect .

In view of the foregoing, the Court considers that theFourth Geneva Convention is applicable in the Palestinianterritorieswhichbeforethe1967conflictlaytotheeastoftheGreenLineandwhich,duringthatconflict,wereoccupiedby

Israel, there being no need for any enquiry into the precisepriorstatusofthoseterritories .

Human rights law(paras .102–113)

TheparticipantsintheproceedingsbeforetheCourtalsodisagreewhethertheinternationalhumanrightsconventionstowhichIsrael ispartyapplywithintheOccupiedPalestin-ianTerritory .AnnexItothereportoftheSecretary-Generalstates:

“4 . Israeldenies that the InternationalCovenantonCiviland Political Rights and the International Covenant onEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights,bothofwhichithassigned,areapplicabletotheoccupiedPalestinianterritory .ItassertsthathumanitarianlawistheprotectiongrantedinaconflictsituationsuchastheoneintheWestBankandGaza Strip, whereas human rights treaties were intendedfortheprotectionofcitizensfromtheirownGovernmentintimesofpeace .”On 3 October 1991 Israel ratified both the International

Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 19December1966andtheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRightsofthesamedate,aswellastheUnitedNationsConventionontheRightsoftheChildof20November1989 .

Onthequestionoftherelationshipbetweeninternationalhumanitarianlawandhumanrightslaw,theCourtfirstrecallsitsfinding,inapreviouscase,thattheprotectionoftheInter-nationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRightsdoesnotceaseintimeofwar(I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I),p .240,para .25) .Moregenerally, it considers that the protection offered by humanrights conventionsdoesnot cease incaseof armedconflict,savethroughtheeffectofprovisionsforderogationofthekindtobefoundinArticle4oftheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights .Itnotesthattherearethusthreepossiblesituations:somerightsmaybeexclusivelymattersofinterna-tional humanitarian law; others may be exclusively mattersofhumanrightslaw;yetothersmaybemattersofboththesebranchesofinternationallaw .Inordertoanswerthequestionputtoit,theCourtwillhavetotakeintoconsiderationboththesebranchesofinternationallaw,namelyhumanrightslawand,aslex specialis,internationalhumanitarianlaw .

ItremainstobedeterminedwhetherthetwointernationalCovenantsandtheConventionontheRightsoftheChildareapplicableonlyontheterritoriesoftheStatespartiestheretoor whether they are also applicable outside those territoriesand, if so, in what circumstances . After examination of theprovision of the two international Covenants, in the lightof the relevant travaux préparatoires and of the position ofIsrael in communications to the Human Rights CommitteeandtheCommitteeonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights,theCourtconcludesthatthoseinstrumentsareapplicableinrespectofactsdonebyaStateintheexerciseofitsjurisdictionoutsideitsownterritory .InthecaseoftheInternationalCov-enantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights,Israelisalsounderanobligationnottoraiseanyobstacletotheexerciseofsuchrightsinthosefieldswherecompetencehasbeentrans-ferredtoPalestinianauthorities .TheCourtfurtherconcludes

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thattheConventionontheRightsoftheChildisalsoapplica-blewithintheOccupiedPalestinianTerritory .

Violation of relevant rules(paras .114–142)

The Court next proceeds to ascertain whether the con-structionof thewallhasviolatedtherulesandprinciplesofinternationallawfoundrelevanttoreplytothequestionposedbytheGeneralAssembly .

Impact on right of Palestinian people to self-determination(paras .115–122)

ItnotesinthisregardthecontentionsofPalestineandoth-erparticipantsthattheconstructionofthewallis“anattemptto annex the territory contrary to international law” and “aviolationof the legalprincipleprohibitingtheacquisitionofterritorybytheuseofforce”andthat“thede factoannexationof landinterfereswiththeterritorialsovereigntyandconse-quentlywith therightof thePalestinians toself-determina-tion” .ItnotesalsothatIsrael,foritspart,hasarguedthatthewall’ssolepurposeistoenableiteffectivelytocombatterror-istattackslaunchedfromtheWestBank,andthatIsraelhasrepeatedlystatedthattheBarrierisatemporarymeasure .

TheCourtrecallsthatboththeGeneralAssemblyandtheSecurityCouncilhavereferred,withregardtoPalestine,tothecustomary rule of “the inadmissibility of the acquisition ofterritorybywar” .Asregardstheprincipleoftherightofpeo-plestoself-determination,theCourtobservesthattheexist-enceofa“Palestinianpeople” isno longer in issue,andhasbeenrecognizedbyIsrael,alongwiththatpeople’s“legitimaterights” .TheCourtconsidersthatthoserightsincludetherighttoself-determination,astheGeneralAssemblyhasmoreoverrecognizedonanumberofoccasions .

TheCourtnotesthattherouteofthewallasfixedbytheIsraeliGovernmentincludeswithinthe“ClosedArea”(i .e .thepartoftheWestBanklyingbetweentheGreenLineandthewall)some80percentofthesettlerslivingintheOccupiedPalestinian Territory, and has been traced in such a way asto include within that area the great majority of the IsraelisettlementsintheOccupiedPalestinianTerritory(includingEastJerusalem) .TheinformationprovidedtotheCourtshowsthat,since1977,Israelhasconductedapolicyanddevelopedpractices involving the establishment of settlements in theOccupiedPalestinianTerritory,contrarytothetermsofArti-cle49,paragraph6,oftheFourthGenevaConventionwhichprovides:“TheOccupyingPowershallnotdeportortransferpartsofitsowncivilianpopulationintotheterritoryitoccu-pies .”TheSecurityCouncilhastakentheviewthatsuchpolicyand practices “have no legal validity” and constitute a “fla-grantviolation”oftheConvention .TheCourtconcludesthattheIsraelisettlements intheOccupiedPalestinianTerritory(includingEastJerusalem)havebeenestablishedinbreachofinternationallaw .

WhilsttakingnoteoftheassurancegivenbyIsraelthattheconstructionofthewalldoesnotamounttoannexationandthatthewallisofatemporarynature,theCourtneverthelessconsidersthattheconstructionofthewallanditsassociatedrégimecreatea“faitaccompli”onthegroundthatcouldwell

becomepermanent, inwhichcase,andnotwithstandingtheformalcharacterizationofthewallbyIsrael,itwouldbetan-tamounttode facto annexation .

The Court considers moreover that the route chosen forthewallgivesexpressionin loco totheillegalmeasurestakenby Israel with regard to Jerusalem and the settlements, asdeploredbytheSecurityCouncil .Thereisalsoariskoffur-theralterationstothedemographiccompositionoftheOccu-pied Palestinian Territory resulting from the constructionofthewallinasmuchasitiscontributingtothedepartureofPalestinianpopulationsfromcertainareas .Thatconstruction,alongwithmeasurestakenpreviously,thusseverelyimpedestheexercisebythePalestinianpeopleofitsrighttoself-deter-mination, and is therefore a breach of Israel’s obligation torespectthatright .

Relevant international humanitarian law and human rights instruments(paras .123–137)

Theconstructionofthewallalsoraisesanumberofissuesinrelationtotherelevantprovisionsofinternationalhumani-tarianlawandofhumanrightsinstruments .

TheCourtfirstenumeratesandquotesanumberof suchprovisions applicable in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,includingarticlesofthe1907HagueRegulations,theFourthGenevaConvention,theInternationalCovenantonCivilandPolitical Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,SocialandCulturalRightsandtheUnitedNationsConven-tionontheRightsoftheChild .InthisconnectionitalsoreferstoobligationsrelatingtoguaranteesofaccesstotheChristian,JewishandIslamicHolyPlaces .

FromtheinformationsubmittedtotheCourt,particularlythereportof theSecretary-General, itappears that thecon-structionofthewallhasledtothedestructionorrequisitionofpropertiesunderconditionswhichcontravenetherequire-mentsofArticles46and52oftheHagueRegulationsof1907andofArticle53oftheFourthGenevaConvention .

That construction, the establishment of a closed areabetweentheGreenLineandthewallitself,andthecreationofenclaves,havemoreover imposedsubstantial restrictionsonthefreedomofmovementoftheinhabitantsoftheOccupiedPalestinian Territory (with the exception of Israeli citizensand thoseassimilated thereto) .Therehavealsobeenseriousrepercussions for agricultural production, and increasingdifficulties for the population concerned regarding accessto health services, educational establishments and primarysourcesofwater .

In the view of the Court, the construction of the wallwouldalsodepriveasignificantnumberofPalestiniansofthe“freedomtochoose[their]residence” .Inaddition,sinceasig-nificantnumberofPalestinianshavealreadybeencompelledby the construction of the wall and its associated régime todepart from certain areas, a process that will continue asmoreofthewallisbuilt,thatconstruction,coupledwiththeestablishment of the Israeli settlements mentioned above, istendingtoalterthedemographiccompositionoftheOccupiedPalestinianTerritory .

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Insum,theCourtisoftheopinionthattheconstructionofthewallanditsassociatedrégimeimpedethelibertyofmove-mentoftheinhabitantsoftheOccupiedPalestinianTerritory(with the exception of Israeli citizens and those assimilatedthereto)asguaranteedunderArticle12,paragraph1,of theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights . Theyalsoimpedetheexercisebythepersonsconcernedoftherighttowork,tohealth,toeducationandtoanadequatestandardoflivingasproclaimedintheInternationalCovenantonEco-nomic,SocialandCulturalRightsandintheUnitedNationsConventionontheRightsoftheChild .Lastly,theconstruc-tionofthewallanditsassociatedrégime,bycontributingtothedemographicchangesmentioned,contraveneArticle49,paragraph6,oftheFourthGenevaConventionandtheperti-nentSecurityCouncilresolutionscitedearlier .

TheCourtthenexaminescertainprovisionsoftheappli-cableinternationalhumanitarianlawenablingaccounttobetakenincertaincircumstancesofmilitaryexigencies,whichmayinitsviewbeinvokedinoccupiedterritoriesevenafterthegeneral closeof themilitaryoperations that led to theiroccupation;itpointsout,however,thatonlyArticle53oftheFourth Geneva Convention contains a relevant provision ofthiskind,andfindsthat,onthematerialbeforeit,theCourtisnotconvincedthatthedestructionscarriedoutcontrarytotheprohibitioninthatArticlewere“renderedabsolutelynecessarybymilitaryoperations”soastofallwithintheexception .

Similarly,theCourtexaminesprovisionsinsomehumanrightsconventionspermittingderogationfrom,orqualifying,therightsguaranteedbythoseconventions,butfinds,onthebasisoftheinformationavailabletoit,thattheconditionslaiddownbysuchprovisionsarenotmetinthepresentinstance .

Insum,theCourtfindsthat,fromthematerialavailabletoit,itisnotconvincedthatthespecificcourseIsraelhaschosenforthewallwasnecessarytoattainitssecurityobjectives .Thewall,alongtheroutechosen,anditsassociatedrégimegravelyinfringe a number of rights of Palestinians residing in theterritoryoccupiedbyIsrael,andtheinfringementsresultingfromthatroutecannotbejustifiedbymilitaryexigenciesorbytherequirementsofnationalsecurityorpublicorder .Thecon-struction of such a wall accordingly constitutes breaches byIsraelofvariousofitsobligationsundertheapplicableinter-nationalhumanitarianlawandhumanrightsinstruments .

Self-defence and state of necessity(paras .138–141)

TheCourtrecallsthatAnnexItothereportoftheSecre-tary-General states, however, that, according to Israel: “theconstruction of the Barrier is consistent with Article 51 oftheCharterof theUnitedNations, its inherentright toself-defence and Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and1373(2001)” .

Article51oftheCharter,theCourtnotes,recognizestheexistence of an inherent right of self-defence in the case ofarmed attack by one State against another State . However,Israeldoesnotclaimthattheattacksagainstitareimputableto a foreign State . The Court also notes that Israel exercisescontrol in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and that, asIsraelitselfstates,thethreatwhichitregardsasjustifyingthe

construction of the wall originates within, and not outside,thatterritory .Thesituationisthusdifferentfromthatcontem-platedbySecurityCouncilresolutions1368(2001)and1373(2001),andthereforeIsraelcouldnotinanyeventinvokethoseresolutionsinsupportofitsclaimtobeexercisingarightofself-defence .Consequently, theCourtconcludes thatArticle51oftheCharterhasnorelevanceinthiscase .

TheCourtconsiders furtherwhether Israelcouldrelyona state of necessity which would preclude the wrongfulnessoftheconstructionofthewall .Inthisregard,citingitsdeci-sioninthecaseconcerningtheGabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia),itobservesthatthestateofnecessityisagroundrecognizedbycustomaryinternationallawthat“canonly be invoked under certain strictly defined conditionswhichmustbecumulativelysatisfied”(I.C.J. Reports 1997,p .40,para .51),oneofthoseconditionsbeingthattheactatissuebe the only way for the State to guard an essential interestagainstagraveandimminentperil .Inthelightofthemate-rial before it, the Court is not convinced that the construc-tionofthewallalongtheroutechosenwastheonlymeanstosafeguardtheinterestsofIsraelagainsttheperilwhichithasinvokedasjustificationforthatconstruction .WhileIsraelhastheright,andindeedthedutytorespondtothenumerousanddeadlyactsofviolencedirectedagainstitscivilianpopulation,inordertoprotectthelifeofitscitizens,themeasurestakenarebound to remain inconformitywithapplicable interna-tionallaw .Israelcannotrelyonarightofself-defenceoronastateofnecessityinordertoprecludethewrongfulnessoftheconstructionofthewall .TheCourtaccordinglyfindsthattheconstructionof thewall,and itsassociatedrégime,arecon-trarytointernationallaw .

Legal consequences of the violations(paras .143–160)

The Court then examines the consequences of the viola-tionsbyIsraelofitsinternationalobligations .Afterrecallingthecontentionsinthatrespectofvariousparticipantsintheproceedings, the Court observes that the responsibility ofIsraelisengagedunderinternationallaw .Itthenproceedstoexamine the legal consequences by distinguishing between,on the one hand, those arising for Israel and, on the other,thosearisingforotherStatesand,whereappropriate,fortheUnitedNations .

Legal consequences of those violations for Israel(paras .149–154)

TheCourtnotesthatIsraelisfirstobligedtocomplywiththe international obligations it has breached by the con-struction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory .Consequently, Israel is bound to comply with its obligationtorespecttherightofthePalestinianpeopletoself-determi-nationand itsobligationsunder internationalhumanitarianlawandinternationalhumanrightslaw .Furthermore,itmustensurefreedomofaccesstotheHolyPlacesthatcameunderitscontrolfollowingthe1967War .

TheCourtobservesthatIsraelalsohasanobligationtoputanendtotheviolationofitsinternationalobligationsflowingfromtheconstructionofthewallintheOccupiedPalestinian

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Territory .Israelaccordinglyhastheobligationtoceaseforth-withtheworksofconstructionofthewallbeingbuiltbyitintheOccupiedPalestinianTerritory,includinginandaroundEastJerusalem .IntheviewoftheCourt,cessationofIsrael’sviolations of its international obligations entails in practicethedismantlingforthwithofthosepartsofthatstructuresitu-atedwithintheOccupiedPalestinianTerritory, includinginandaroundEastJerusalem .Alllegislativeandregulatoryactsadoptedwithaviewtoitsconstruction,andtotheestablish-mentofitsassociatedrégime,mustforthwithberepealedorrenderedineffective,exceptwhereofcontinuingrelevancetoIsrael’sobligationofreparation .

The Court finds further that Israel has the obligation tomakereparationforthedamagecausedtoallthenaturalorlegal persons concerned . The Court recalls the establishedjurisprudence that “The essential principle contained in theactualnotionofanillegalact . . .isthatreparationmust,asfaraspossible,wipeoutalltheconsequencesoftheillegalactandreestablishthesituationwhichwould,inallprobability,haveexistedifthatacthadnotbeencommitted .”Israelisaccord-inglyunderanobligationtoreturntheland,orchards,olivegrovesandotherimmovablepropertyseizedfromanynaturalorlegalpersonforpurposesofconstructionofthewallintheOccupied Palestinian Territory . In the event that such res-titution should prove to be materially impossible, Israel hasanobligation tocompensate thepersons inquestion for thedamagesuffered .TheCourtconsidersthatIsraelalsohasanobligation tocompensate, inaccordancewith theapplicablerulesofinternationallaw,allnaturalorlegalpersonshavingsufferedanyformofmaterialdamageasaresultofthewall’sconstruction .

Legal consequences for other States(paras .154–159)

TheCourtpointsoutthattheobligationsviolatedbyIsraelincludecertainobligationserga omnes.AstheCourtindicatedin theBarcelona Traction case, suchobligationsareby theirvery nature “the concern of all States” and, “In view of theimportance of the rights involved, all States can be held tohavealegalinterestintheirprotection .”(Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970,p .32,para .33 .)Theobligationserga omnes violatedbyIsraelaretheobligationtorespecttherightofthePalestinian people to self-determination, and certain of itsobligationsunderinternationalhumanitarianlaw .Asregardsself-determination, theCourtrecalls itsfindings in theEast Timor case, and General Assembly resolution 2625 (xxV) .It recalls thatagreatmanyrulesofhumanitarian law“con-stituteintransgressibleprinciplesofinternationalcustomarylaw”(I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I),p .257,para .79),andobservesthattheyincorporateobligationswhichareessentiallyofanerga omnes character .ItalsonotestheobligationofStatespartiestotheFourthGenevaConventionto“ensurerespect”for itsprovisions .

Giventhecharacterandtheimportanceoftherightsandobligations involved, the Court is of the view that all Statesareunderanobligationnottorecognizetheillegalsituationresulting fromtheconstructionof thewall in theOccupiedPalestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusa-

lem . They are also under an obligation not to render aid orassistanceinmaintainingthesituationcreatedbysuchcon-struction .ItisalsoforallStates,whilerespectingtheUnitedNations Charter and international law, to see to it that anyimpediment, resulting from the construction of the wall,to the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self-determinationisbroughttoanend .Inaddition,alltheStatespartiestotheGenevaConventionrelativetotheProtectionofCivilianPersonsinTimeofWarof12August1949areunderan obligation, while respecting the United Nations Charterand international law, to ensure compliance by Israel withinternationalhumanitarianlawasembodiedinthatConven-tion .

The United Nations(para .160)

Finally, theCourt isof theviewthat theUnitedNations,andespeciallytheGeneralAssemblyandtheSecurityCoun-cil,shouldconsiderwhatfurtheractionisrequiredtobringtoanendtheillegalsituationresultingfromtheconstructionofthewallandtheassociatedrégime,takingdueaccountofthepresentAdvisoryOpinion .

TheCourtconsidersthatitsconclusionthattheconstruc-tionof thewallby Israel in theOccupiedPalestinianTerri-toryiscontrarytointernationallawmustbeplacedinamoregeneralcontext .Since1947,theyearwhenGeneralAssemblyresolution181(II)wasadoptedandtheMandateforPalestinewasterminated,therehasbeenasuccessionofarmedconflicts,actsofindiscriminateviolenceandrepressivemeasuresontheformermandatedterritory .TheCourtwouldemphasizethatbothIsraelandPalestineareunderanobligationscrupulouslytoobservetherulesofinternationalhumanitarianlaw,oneofthe paramount purposes of which is to protect civilian life .Illegalactionsandunilateraldecisionshavebeentakenonallsides,whereas,intheCourt’sview,thistragicsituationcanbebroughttoanendonlythroughimplementationingoodfaithofallrelevantSecurityCouncilresolutions,inparticularreso-lutions242(1967)and338(1973) .The“Roadmap”approvedby Security Council resolution 1515 (2003) represents themostrecentofeffortstoinitiatenegotiationstothisend .TheCourtconsidersthatithasadutytodrawtheattentionoftheGeneralAssembly,towhichthepresentOpinionisaddressed,totheneedfortheseeffortstobeencouragedwithaviewtoachievingassoonaspossible,onthebasisofinternationallaw,a negotiated solution to the outstanding problems and theestablishmentofaPalestinianState,existingsidebysidewithIsraelanditsotherneighbours,withpeaceandsecurityforallintheregion .

** *


InhisseparateopinionJudgeKoromastatedthatalthoughhe concurred with the Court’s ruling that the constructionofthewallbeingbuiltbyIsrael,theoccupyingPower,intheOccupiedPalestinianTerritory,includinginandaroundEast

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Jerusalem,anditsassociatedrégimearecontrarytointerna-tionallaw,hethoughtthefollowingpointsworthstressing .

Inhisview,theconstructionofthewallhas involvedtheannexationofpartsoftheoccupiedterritoryandthedispos-session of some of the Palestinians of their land, contraryto international law (inparticular, the principle of the non-acquisitionofterritorybyforce),humanrightslawandinter-nationalhumanitarian law,according towhichtherightsofan occupying Power in an occupied territory and over theinhabitantsareofalimitednature;suchrightsdonotamounttosovereignrightswhichwouldentitletheoccupiertobringaboutchangesinthestatusofthatterritorysuchasthecon-structionof thewall . Inotherwords, it is aviolationof theexistinglawforanoccupyingPowerunilaterallybyitsactionto bring about changes in the status of a territory under itsmilitaryoccupation .

On the issue of jurisdiction, Judge Koroma stated thatwhileitisunderstandableforadiversityoflegalviewstoexistonthequestionsubmittedtotheCourt,heisoftheopinionthattheobjectionthattheCourtlacksjurisdictiontoconsidertheissuesraisedinthequestionisnotsustainablewhenseeninthelightoftheUnitedNationsCharter,theStatuteoftheCourtanditsjurisprudence;alsonotsustainable,inhisview,istheobjectionbasedonjudicialpropriety—amatterwhichtheCourtconsideredextensivelyintermsofthefairadminis-trationofjustice .Inthejudge’sview,notonlyisthequestionpresentedtotheCourtaneminentlylegalonesusceptibleofa legalresponsebutnocompellingevidencewasadducedtopersuadetheCourttodenyitselfitsadvisorycompetence .

Equally worth stressing were the Court’s finding regard-ing theright to self-determinationof thePalestinianpeopleincludingtheestablishmentofaStateoftheirownasenvis-agedinresolution181(II)andthefindingthattheconstruc-tionofthewallwouldbeanimpedimenttotherealizationofthatright .

Healsoemphasizedtheauthoritativecharacterofthefind-ingsoftheCourt,someofwhicharebasedontheprinciplesofjus cogens andareofanerga omnes character .

Alsoofimportanceisthecalluponthepartiestothecon-flicttorespecttheprinciplesofhumanitarianlaw,inparticu-lartheFourthGenevaConvention,intheongoinghostilities .

Finally, the judge stated that, the Court having made itsfindings, it was now up to the General Assembly to utilizethosefindingsinsuchawayastobringaboutajustandpeace-fulsolutiontotheIsraeli-Palestinianconflict,aconflictwhichhasnotonlylastedfortoolongbuthasbeenthecauseofenor-mous suffering to those directly involved and has poisonedinternationalrelationsingeneral .


Judge Higgins, who voted with the Court on each of theparagraphs in thedispositif, expounds inher separateopin-iononsomeoftheproblemsfacedbytheCourtindecidingwhetheritshouldexerciseitsdiscretiontodeclinetorespondtothequestionputtoit .Inherview,aconditionelaboratedbytheCourtintheWestern Sahara Advisory Opinion isnotmet—namely,thatwheretwoStatesareindispute,anopinion

should not be requested by the General Assembly “in orderthatitmaylater,onthebasisoftheCourt’sopinion,exerciseits powers and functions for the peaceful settlement of thatdisputeorcontroversy” (I.C.J. Reports 1975,p .26,para .39) .Participantsinthiscasemadeclearthattheintentionwaspre-ciselytouseanyopiniontobringpressuretobear .

JudgeHiggins furtheropines that it is inprincipleunde-sirable foraquestion tobeput to theCourt,whilepreclud-ing it fromlookingat thecontext inwhichtheproblemhasarisen .ShespecifieswhattheCourtshouldhavedone,bothtoensurethattheOpinionwasbalancedandevenhanded,andtomakeuseofthepossibilitiesaffordedbyanadvisoryopinionto remind both Palestine and Israel of their responsibilitiesunderinternationallaw .

JudgeHigginsfurtherexplainsthat,whilesheagreesthatArticles 46and52of theHague RegulationsandArticle 53of theFourthGenevaConventionhavebeenviolatedbythebuildingofthewallwithintheOccupiedTerritory,shedoesnot fully share all the reasoning of the Court in arriving atthisconclusion .Inparticular,shedoubtsthewallconstitutesa“seriousimpediment”totheexerciseofPalestinianrighttoself-determination,seeingtherealimpedimentaslyingelse-where .While sheagrees that Israelmaynotexcludewrong-fulnessbyinvokingtherightofself-defence,herreasonsaredifferentfromthoseoftheCourt,whoseviewsonself-defenceas expressed inparagraph139of thisOpinion shedoesnotshare .

AstothelegalconsequencesoftheCourt’sfindings,JudgeHigginsnotesthatwhileshehasvotedinfavour,inter alia,ofsubparagraph(3)(D),shedoesnotbelievethattheobligationsincumbentonUnitedNationsMembersstemfromorrelyonthelegalconceptofobligationserga omnes.


Judge Kooijmans starts by summarily explaining why hevotedagainstoperativesubparagraph(3)(D) .

HethensketchesthebackgroundandcontextoftheGen-eralAssembly’srequest .HefeelsthattheCourtshouldhavedescribedmoreindetailthiscontext;theOpinionwouldthenhavereflectedinamoresatisfactorywaythelegitimateinter-estsandresponsibilitiesofallgroupsandpersonsinvolved .

JudgeKooijmansthenmakessomecommentsonjurisdic-tionalissuesandthequestionofjudicialpropriety .Heisoftheviewthattherequest,whichispremisedontheillegalityoftheconstructionofthewall,isdraftedinaratherinfelicitousway;itis,however,theCourt’sjudicialresponsibilitytoanalysetherequestand,ifnecessary,torestateitsobject .

With regard to the merits Judge Kooijmans dissociateshimselffromtheCourt’sfindingthattheconstructionofthewallconstitutesabreachof Israel’sobligation torespect thePalestinianpeople’s right to self-determination .Therealiza-tionofthatrightispartofthemuchwiderpoliticalprocess,althoughheagreeswiththeCourt that thewall impedes itsrealization .

JudgeKooijmansfurtherregretsthatthemeasurestakenbyIsraelhavenotbeenputtotheproportionalitytestbutmerelyto that of military exigencies and requirements of national

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security; in international humanitarian law the criteria ofmilitarynecessityandproportionalityarecloselylinked .

WithregardtoIsrael’sclaimtohaveactedinself-defenceJudge Kooijmans observes that the Court has failed to notethatSecurityCouncilresolutions1368(2001)and1373(2001)on which Israel relies do not refer to an armed attack byanotherStatebutthatitcorrectlypointsoutthatthesereso-lutionsrefertoactsofinternational terrorism .Inthepresentcase the terroristactshave theirorigin in territorywhich isunderIsraelicontrol .

Finally Judge Kooijmans explains why he supports theCourt’s findings on the legal consequences for the UnitedNationsandforIsraelbutwhyhedissociateshimselffromthefindingsvis-à-visotherStateswiththeexceptionofthedutynot to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situationcreatedbytheconstructionofthewall .

Withregard to thedutyofnon-recognitionand thedutytoensurerespectforcompliancebyIsraelwithinternationalhumanitarian law Judge Kooijmans is of the view that theCourt’s findings are not well founded in positive interna-tional law and that, moreover, these duties are without realsubstance .

Separate opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh

Judge Al-Khasawneh, appending a separate opinion,expressedhisagreementwiththeCourt’sfindingsanditsrea-soningbutwishedtoelucidatethreepoints:

Firstly,thatthecharacterizationofIsrael’spresenceintheWestBankincludingEastJerusalemandGazaasoneofmili-taryoccupation, restsonsolidopinio juris and is supportedbymanyresolutions,someofabindingnature,aswellasthepositionofgovernmentsindividuallyoringroups .TheCourt,whiletakingcognizanceofthatconstantopinio juris,arrivedatsimilarconclusionsindependentlyofthoseresolutionsandotherfindings .TheCourtwaswise,JudgeAl-Khasawnehsaid,innotenquiringintotheprecisepriorstatusoftheoccupiedterritoriesbefore1967,becauseafindingthattheseterritoriesareoccupiedandthattheinternationallegalrégimeofoccu-pationappliesinthemcanbearrivedatwithoutreferencetotheirpriorstatus .Moreover,exceptonthe impossible thesisthattheterritorieswereterra nullius wouldtheirprevioussta-tusmatter .Noonecanseriouslyarguethat those territorieswere terra nullius for that isadiscreditedconcept thatdoesnothaverelevanceinthecontemporaryworld .Moreover,theterritorieswerepartofmandatory territoryandtheright toself-determinationoftheirinhabitantswasnotextinguishedandwouldnotbeuntilthePalestiniansachievedthatright .

Secondly, Judge Al-Khasawneh advanced the question ofthe Green Line recalling that before 1967 prominent Israelijuristssoughttoproveitwasmorethanamerearmisticeline,at the present it is the point from which Israeli occupationismeasured .DenigratingtheimportanceofthatLineworksbothwaysandopensthedoorforquestioningIsrael’stitleanditsterritoryexpansebeyondwhatwasenvisionedintheparti-tionplanofPalestinein1947 .

Thirdly, Judge Al-Khasawneh recalled that referring tonegotiationsispossiblebuttheyareameanstoanendandnot

anendto themselves . If theyarenotgoingtoproducenon-principled solutions they should be grounded in law . Theyshouldbeconductedingoodfaiththatshouldbeconcretizedbynotcreatingfaitsaccomplis .

Declaration of Judge Buergenthal

In Judge Buergenthal’s view the Court should have exer-cised its discretion and declined to render the requestedadvisoryopinionbecauseitlackedsufficientinformationandevidencetorendertheopinion .Theabsenceinthiscaseoftherequisite factual basis vitiates the Court’s sweeping findingsonthemerits,whichisthereasonforhisdissentingvotes .

Judge Buergenthal is prepared to assume that on a thor-ough analysis of all relevant facts, a finding could well bemade thatsomeorevenall segmentsof thewallbeingcon-structedbyIsraelintheOccupiedPalestinianTerritoryviolateinternationallaw .ButhebelievesthatfortheCourttoreachsuch conclusion with regard to the wall as a whole withouthavingbeforeitorseekingtoascertainallrelevantfactsbear-ingdirectlyonissuesofIsrael’slegitimaterightofself-defence,military necessity and security needs, given the repeateddeadly terrorist attacks in and upon Israel proper comingfromtheOccupiedPalestinianTerritory towhichIsraelhasbeenandcontinues tobe subjected, cannotbe justifiedasamatter of law . In this connection, Judge Buergenthal showsthattherightofself-defencedoesnotapplyonlytoattacksbyStateactorsandthatarmedattacksonIsraelproperoriginat-ingfromtheOccupiedPalestinianTerritorymustbedeemed,inthecontextofthiscase,tomeettherequirementsofArticle51oftheUnitedNationsCharter .

JudgeBuergenthalalsoconcludesthattheCourt’soverallfindingsthatthewallviolatesinternationalhumanitarianlawand human rights instruments are not convincing becausetheyfailtoaddressanyfactsorevidencespecificallyrebuttingIsrael’sclaimofmilitaryexigenciesorrequirementsofnation-alsecurity .JudgeBuergenthalrecognises,however,thatsomeinternational humanitarian law provisions the Court citesadmitofnoexceptionsbasedonmilitaryexigencies,namely,Article46oftheHagueRulesandparagraph6ofArticle49oftheFourthGenevaConvention .WhileJudgeBuergenthalbelievesthattheCourt’sanalysisoftherelevancetothiscaseofArticle46isnotwellfounded,heconcludesthatArticle49,paragraph6,whichprovidesthat“theOccupyingPowershallnotdeportortransferpartsofitsowncivilianpopulationintotheterritoryitoccupies”,appliestotheIsraelisettlementsintheWestBank,andthattheyviolateArticle49,paragraph6 .Hence,thesegmentsofthewallbeingbuiltbyIsraeltoprotectthesettlementsareipso facto inviolationofthatprovision .

Finally,JudgeBuergenthalnotesthatitcouldbearguedthattheCourtlackedmanyrelevantfactsbearingonthelegalityofIsrael’sconstructionofthewallbecauseIsraelfailedtopresentthem, and that the Court was therefore justified in relyingalmost exclusively on the United Nations reports submittedtoit .Thiswouldbetrueif,insteadofdealingwithanadvisoryopinion request, the Court had before it a contentious casewhereeachpartyhastheburdenofprovingitsclaims .Thatisnottheruleapplicabletoadvisoryopinionproceedings .Israelhadnolegalobligationtoparticipateintheseproceedingsor

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toadduceevidencesupportingitsclaimregardingthelegal-ity of the wall . Consequently, the Court may not draw anyadverseevidentiaryconclusionsfromIsrael’sfailuretosupplyitorassume,withoutitselffullyinquiringintothematter,thattheinformationbeforeitissufficienttosupportitssweepinglegalconclusions .

Separate opinion of Judge Elaraby

JudgeElarabyexpressedhiscompleteandunqualifiedsup-portforthefindingsandconclusionsoftheCourt .He,how-ever,considereditnecessarytoappendaseparateopinioninordertoelaborateonsomeofthehistoricalandlegalaspectsintheAdvisoryOpinion .

He first addressed the nature and scope of the UnitedNationsresponsibilitytowardsPalestine,whichhasitsgenesisinGeneralAssemblyresolution181(II)of29November1947 .KnownasthePartitionResolution,itcalledfortheestablish-mentoftwoindependentStates,oneArabandoneJewish,andaffirmedthattheperiodpriortotherealizationoftheobjec-tive“shallbeatransitionalperiod” .

JudgeElarabythenaddressedtheinternationallegalstatusoftheOccupiedPalestinianTerritory,andthelegalimplica-tionsoftheMandateoverPalestineanditsterminationbytheGeneralAssembly .JudgeElarabyalsorecalledthattheCourthas, in the South West Africa and Namibia cases, held thatformermandatoryterritorieswere“asacredtrustofciviliza-tion”andwere“nottobeannexed” .HealsoreferredtoIsrael’svariousundertakingstowithdrawandtorespecttheterrito-rialintegrityoftheOccupiedPalestinianTerritory .

In a third section of his separate opinion, he provided abrief analysis of the effects of the prolonged Israeli occupa-tion,andthelimitationsintherulesofjus in bello thatensure

protectionfornon-combatants .HeconsidersthatthebreachesbyIsraelofinternationalhumanitarianlawshouldhavebeencharacterizedasgravebreaches .

JudgeElarabyalsocommentedontheCourt’sfindingthat“theconstructionofthewallseverelyimpedestheexerciseofthePalestinianpeopleoftheirrighttoself-determination” .Heis of the view that this important finding should have beenreflectedinthedispositif.


InhisseparateopinionJudgeOwadaconcurswiththecon-clusionsof theAdvisoryOpinionof theCourt,bothon thepreliminaryissuesofjurisdictionandofjudicialproprietyinexercisingjurisdiction,andonmostofthepointsbelongingtothemerits .HehoweverhassomereservationsaboutthewaytheCourthasproceededinexercisingitsjudicialproprietyinthepresentcase .

Morespecifically,JudgeOwadaisoftheviewthattheCourtshould have approached the issue of judicial propriety, notsimplyintermsofwhetheritshouldcomplywiththerequestfor an advisory opinion, but also in terms of how it shouldexercisejurisdictiononceithasdecidedtoexerciseit,withaviewtoensuring fairness in theadministrationof justice inthe case which involves an underlying bilateral dispute . Inthissituation,considerationoffairnessintheadministrationofjusticewouldalsorequirefairtreatmentofthepositionsoftheparties involvedinthesubject-matterwithregardtotheassessment of facts and of law . Finally, Judge Owada wouldhavewishedtoseeintheOpinionoftheCourtacategoricalrejection by the Court of the tragic circle of indiscriminateviolence perpetrated by both sides against innocent civilianpopulations, which forms an important background to thepresentcase .

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149. CAseConCeRnInGLeGALItYoFUseoFFoRCe(seRBIAAnDMonteneGRov.BeLGIUM)(PReLIMInARYoBJeCtIons)


InitsJudgmentinthecaseconcerningLegality of the Use of Force(Serbia and Montenegro v . Belgium),theCourtunani-mouslyconcludedthatithadnojurisdictiontoentertaintheclaimsmadeintheApplicationfiledbySerbiaandMontene-groagainstBelgiumon29April1999 .

TheCourtwascomposedas follows:PresidentShi;Vice-PresidentRanjeva;JudgesGuillaume,Koroma,Vereshchetin,Higgins,Parra-Aranguren,Kooijmans,Rezek,Al-Khasawneh,Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada, Tomka; Judge ad hoc Kreća;RegistrarCouvreur .

** *

Thetextoftheoperativeparagraph(para .129)oftheJudg-mentreadsasfollows:

“ . . .TheCourt,Unanimously,Finds that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the claimsmade in the Application filed by Serbia and Montenegroon29April1999 .”

** *

Vice-President Ranjeva and Judges Guillaume, Hig-gins, Kooijmans, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal and Elaraby

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appended a joint declaration to the Judgment of the Court;JudgeKoromaappendedadeclarationtotheJudgmentoftheCourt;JudgesHiggins,KooijmansandElarabyandJudgead hocKrećaappendedseparateopinionstotheJudgmentoftheCourt .

** *


On29April1999theGovernmentoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(witheffectfrom4February2003,“SerbiaandMontenegro”)filedintheRegistryoftheCourtanApplica-tioninstitutingproceedingsagainsttheKingdomofBelgium(hereinafter“Belgium”)inrespectofadisputeconcerningactsallegedlycommittedbyBelgium .

“bywhichithasviolateditsinternationalobligationban-ningtheuseofforceagainstanotherState,theobligationnot to intervene in the internal affairs of another State,the obligation not to violate the sovereignty of anotherState,theobligationtoprotectthecivilianpopulationandcivilian objects in wartime, the obligation to protect theenvironment,theobligationrelatingtofreenavigationoninternationalrivers,theobligationregardingfundamentalhumanrightsandfreedoms,theobligationnottousepro-hibited weapons, the obligation not to deliberately inflictconditionsoflifecalculatedtocausethephysicaldestruc-tionofanationalgroup” .TheApplicationinvokedasabasisoftheCourt’sjurisdic-

tion Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, aswell as Article Ix of the Convention on the Prevention andPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocide,adoptedbytheUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyon9December1948(hereinafter“theGenocideConvention”) .

On29April1999,immediatelyafterfilingitsApplication,theFederalRepublicofYugoslaviaalsosubmittedarequestfortheindicationofprovisionalmeasurespursuanttoArticle73oftheRulesofCourt .

Onthesameday,theFederalRepublicofYugoslaviafiledApplicationsinstitutingproceedingsandsubmittedrequestsfortheindicationofprovisionalmeasures,inrespectofotherdisputes arising out of the same facts, against Canada, theFrenchRepublic,theFederalRepublicofGermany,theItalianRepublic, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the PortugueseRepublic, the Kingdom of Spain, the United Kingdom ofGreatBritainandNorthernIrelandandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica .

Since the Court included upon the Bench no judge ofthe nationality of the Parties, each of them exercised itsrightunderArticle31,paragraph3,of theStatutetochoosea judge ad hoc to sit in the case: the Yugoslav GovernmentchoseMr .MilenkoKrećaandtheBelgianGovernmentchoseMr .PatrickDuinslaeger .ReferringtoArticle31,paragraph5,oftheStatute,theYugoslavGovernmentobjectedtothelatterchoice .TheCourt,afterdeliberating,foundthatthenomina-tionofajudgead hocbyBelgiumwasjustifiedintheprovi-sionalmeasuresphaseofthecase .

Byletterof12May1999theAgentoftheFederalRepublicof Yugoslavia submitted a “Supplement to the Application”,invokingasafurtherbasisfortheCourt’sjurisdiction“Arti-cle 4 of the Convention of Conciliation, Judicial SettlementandArbitrationbetweentheKingdomofYugoslaviaandBel-gium,signedatBelgradeon25March1930andinforcesince3September1930” .

BytenOrdersdated2June1999theCourt,afterhearingthe Parties, rejected the request for the indication of provi-sional measures in all of the cases, and further decided toremovefromtheListthecasesagainstSpainandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica .

On5July2000,withinthetime–limitfixedforthefilingofitsCounter-Memorial,Belgium,referringtoArticle79,para-graph1,oftheRules,submittedpreliminaryobjectionsrelat-ingtotheCourt’sjurisdictiontoentertainthecaseandtotheadmissibilityoftheApplication .Accordingly,theproceedingsonthemeritsweresuspended .

On 20 December 2002, within the prescribed time-limitastwiceextendedbytheCourtattherequestoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia,thelatterfiledawrittenstatementofitsobservationsandsubmissionsonthosepreliminaryobjec-tions(hereinafterreferredtoasits“Observations”),togetherwithidenticalwrittenstatementsinthesevenotherpendingcases .

Pursuant to Article 24, paragraph 1, of the Statute, on25November2003JudgeSimmainformedthePresidentthatheconsideredthatheshouldnottakepartinanyofthecases .

At a meeting held by the President of the Court on12December2003withtherepresentativesof theParties intheeightcasesconcerningLegality of Use of Force,theques-tionsofthepresenceontheBenchofjudgesad hocduringthepreliminaryobjectionsphaseandofapossiblejoinderoftheproceedingswerediscussed,amongotherissues .Byletterof23 December 2003 the Registrar informed the Agents of allthePartiesthattheCourthaddecided,pursuanttoArticle31,paragraph5,oftheStatute,that,takingintoaccountthepres-enceupontheBenchof judgesofBritish,DutchandFrenchnationality,thejudgesad hocchosenbytherespondentStatesshould not sit during the current phase of the procedure inthesecases .TheAgentswerealsoinformedthattheCourthaddecidedthatajoinderoftheproceedingswouldnotbeappro-priateatthatstage .

Public sittings in all the cases were held between 19 and23April2004 .

AftersettingouttheParties’claimsintheirwrittenplead-ings (which are not reproduced here), the Judgment recallsthat,attheoralproceedings,thefollowingfinalsubmissionswerepresentedbytheParties:

OnbehalfoftheBelgianGovernment,atthehearingof22April2004:“InthecaseconcerningtheLegality of the Use of Force (Ser-bia and Montenegro v . Belgium),forthereasonssetoutinthePreliminaryObjectionsofBelgiumdated5July2000,andalsoforthereasonssetoutduringtheoralsubmissionson19and22April2004,BelgiumrequeststheCourtto:

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(a) remove the case brought by Serbia and MontenegroagainstBelgiumfromtheList;(b)inthealternative,torulethattheCourtlacksjurisdic-tioninthecasebroughtbySerbiaandMontenegroagainstBelgiumand/orthatthecasebroughtbySerbiaandMon-tenegroagainstBelgiumisinadmissible .”OnbehalfoftheGovernmentofSerbiaandMontenegroatthehearingof23April2004:“Forthereasonsgiveninitspleadings,andinparticularinitsWrittenObservations,subsequentcorrespondencewiththeCourt,andattheoralhearing,SerbiaandMontenegrorequeststheCourt:—toadjudgeanddeclareonitsjurisdictionratione perso-

naeinthepresentcases;and—todismisstheremainingpreliminaryobjectionsofthe

respondentStates,andtoorderproceedingsonthemer-itsifitfindsithasjurisdictionratione personae.”

Before proceeding to its reasoning, the Court includes aparagraph (para .25)dealingwith theApplicant’s changeofname on 4 February 2003 from “Federal Republic of Yugo-slavia”to“SerbiaandMontenegro” .Itexplainsthat,asfaraspossible,exceptwheretheterminahistoricalcontextmightcauseconfusion, itwilluse thename“SerbiaandMontene-gro”,evenwherereferenceismadetoaproceduralsteptakenbeforethechange .

Dismissal of the case inliminelitis (paras .26–44)

TheCourtbeginsbyobservingthatitmustfirstdealwithapreliminaryquestionthathasbeenraisedineachofthecases,namelythecontention,presentedinvariousformsbytheeightrespondentStates,that,asaresultofthechangedattitudeofthe Applicant to the question of the Court’s jurisdiction asexpressedinitsObservations,theCourtisnolongerrequiredtoruleonthoseobjectionstojurisdiction,butcansimplydis-miss thecases in limine litisandremovethemfromitsList,withoutenquiringfurtherintomattersofjurisdiction .

TheCourtthenexaminesanumberofargumentsadvancedbydifferentRespondentsaspossiblelegalgroundsthatwouldleadtheCourttotakethiscourse,including,inter alia:(i)thatthepositionofSerbiaandMontenegroistobetreatedasonethatineffectresultsinadiscontinuanceoftheproceedingsorthattheCourtshouldex officioputanendtothecaseintheinterestsoftheproperadministrationofjustice;(ii)thatthereisagreementbetweenthePartiesona“questionofjurisdictionthatisdeterminativeofthecase”,andthatasaresultthereisnowno“disputeastowhethertheCourthasjurisdiction”;(iii)thatthesubstantivedisputeundertheGenocideConventionhasdisappearedandthusthewholedisputehasdisappearedinthosecasesinwhichtheonlygroundofjurisdictionreliedonisArticleIxofthatConvention;(iv)thatSerbiaandMon-tenegro,byitsconduct,hasforfeitedorrenounceditsrightofactioninthepresentcaseandisnowestoppedfrompursuingtheproceedings .

TheCourtfindsitselfunabletoupholdthevariousconten-tionsoftheRespondents .TheCourtconsidersthatitisunabletotreattheObservationsofSerbiaandMontenegroashaving

thelegaleffectofadiscontinuanceoftheproceedingsunderArticle88or89oftheRulesofCourtandfindsthatthecasedoesnotfallintothecategoryofcasesinwhichitmayofitsownmotionputanendtoproceedingsinacase .AsregardstheargumentadvancedbycertainRespondentsthatthedis-pute on jurisdiction has disappeared since the Parties nowagreethattheApplicantwasnotapartytotheStatuteattherelevanttime,theCourtpointsoutthatSerbiaandMontene-grohasnot invitedtheCourttofindthat ithasnojurisdic-tion;whileitisapparentlyinagreementwiththeargumentsadvancedbytheRespondentsinthatregardintheirprelimi-naryobjections,ithasspecificallyaskedinitssubmissionsfora decision of the Court on the jurisdictional question . Thisquestion, in the view of the Court, is a legal question inde-pendentoftheviewsofthepartiesuponit .Astotheargumentconcerningthedisappearanceofthesubstantivedispute,itisclearthatSerbiaandMontenegrohasbynomeanswithdrawnitsclaimsas to themerits . Indeed, theseclaimswereexten-sivelyarguedanddevelopedinsubstanceduringthehearingsonjurisdiction,inthecontextofthequestionofthejurisdic-tionoftheCourtunderArticleIxoftheGenocideConven-tion .Itisequallyclearthattheseclaimsarebeingvigorouslydeniedby theRespondents . It couldnotevenbe saidunderthesecircumstancesthat,whiletheessentialdisputestillsub-sists,SerbiaandMontenegroisnolongerseekingtohaveitsclaimdeterminedbytheCourt .SerbiaandMontenegrohasnotsoughtadiscontinuanceandhasstatedthatit“wantstheCourt to continue the case and to decide upon its jurisdic-tion—and to decide on the merits as well, if it has jurisdic-tion” .TheCourtthereforefindsitselfunabletoconcludethatSerbiaandMontenegrohasrenouncedanyofitssubstantiveorproceduralrights,orhastakenthepositionthatthedisputebetweenthePartieshasceasedtoexist .Asfortheargumentbasedonthedoctrineofestoppel,theCourtdoesnotconsiderthatSerbiaandMontenegro,byaskingtheCourt“todecideonitsjurisdiction”onthebasisofcertainalleged“newfacts”aboutitsownlegalstatusvis-à-vistheUnitedNations,shouldbeheldtohaveforfeitedorrenounceditsrightofactionandtobeestoppedfromcontinuingthepresentactionbeforetheCourt .

For all these reasons, the Court concludes that it cannotremove the cases concerning Legality of Use of Force fromthe List, or take any decision putting an end to those casesinlimine litis.Inthepresentphaseoftheproceedings,itmustproceedtoexaminethequestionof its jurisdictiontoenter-tainthecase .

Serbia and Montenegro’s access to the Court under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute(paras .45–91)

TheCourtrecallsthattheApplicationfiledon29April1999stated that “[t]he Government of the Federal Republic ofYugoslaviainvokesArticle36,paragraph2,oftheStatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeaswellasArticleIxoftheConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocide” .TheCourtfurtherrecallsthatSerbiaandMon-tenegro claims as an additional basis of jurisdiction “Arti-cle 4 of the Convention of Conciliation, Judicial SettlementandArbitrationbetweentheKingdomofYugoslaviaandBel-

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gium,signedatBelgradeon25March1930andinforcesince3September1930” .

TheCourtnotesthatinitsjurisprudenceithasreferredto“itsfreedomtoselectthegrounduponwhichitwillbaseitsjudgment”, and that, when its jurisdiction is challenged ondiversegrounds,itisfreetobaseitsdecisionononeormoregroundsofitsownchoosing,inparticular“thegroundwhichin its judgment is more direct and conclusive” . However, inthoseinstances,thePartiestothecasesbeforetheCourtwere,without doubt, parties to the Statute of the Court and theCourtwasthusopentothemunderArticle35,paragraph1,of theStatute .TheCourtpointsout that this isnotthecasein the present proceedings, in which an objection has beenmaderegardingtherightoftheApplicanttohaveaccesstotheCourt .AnditisthisissueofaccesstotheCourtwhichdistin-guishesthepresentcasefromthosecitedinthejurisprudenceconcerned .

TheCourtobservesthatthequestionwhetherSerbiaandMontenegrowasorwasnotapartytotheStatuteoftheCourtat the time of the institution of the present proceedings isfundamental;forifitwerenotsuchaparty,theCourtwouldnotbeopentoitunderArticle35,paragraph1,oftheStatute .Inthatsituation,subjecttoanyapplicationofparagraph2ofthatArticle,SerbiaandMontenegrocouldnothaveproperlyseisedtheCourt,whatevertitleof jurisdictionitmighthaveinvoked,forthesimplereasonthatitdidnothavetherighttoappearbefore theCourt .Hence, theCourtmustfirstexam-inethequestionwhethertheApplicantmeetstheconditionslaiddowninArticles34and35oftheStatuteforaccesstotheCourt .Onlyif theanswertothatquestionis intheaffirma-tive,willtheCourthavetodealwiththeissuesrelatingtotheconditionslaiddowninArticles36and37oftheStatute .

TheCourtnotesinthisrespectthatthereisnodoubtthatSerbiaandMontenegroisaStateforthepurposeofArticle34,paragraph 1, of the Statute . However, certain Respondentsobjected that, at the time of the filing of its Application on29April1999,thatStatedidnotmeettheconditionssetdowninArticle35oftheStatute .

ThusBelgiumargued,interalia,that:“TheFRY[theFederalRepublicofYugoslavia]isnotnowand has never been a member of the United Nations .Thisbeing thecase, there isnobasis for theFRY’sclaimtobeapartytotheStatuteoftheCourtpursuanttoArti-cle93(1)oftheCharter.TheCourtisnottherefore,onthisbasisopentotheFRYinaccordancewithArticle35(1)ofthe Statute.” (Preliminary Objections of Belgium, p . 69,para .206;emphasisoriginal .)TheCourtthenrecapitulatesthesequenceofeventsrelat-

ingtothelegalpositionoftheApplicantvis-à-vistheUnitedNationsovertheperiod1992–2000 .Itrefers,interalia,tothefollowing: the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic ofYugoslaviain1991–1992;adeclarationof27April1992bytheSFRYAssembly,theNationalAssemblyoftheRepublicofSer-biaandtheAssemblyoftheRepublicofMontenegroassertingthecontinuationof the international legalandpoliticalper-sonalityoftheSFRYbytheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia;anoteofthesamedayfromYugoslaviatotheUnitedNationsSecretary-General asserting the continuation by the FRY of

the membership of the SFRY in the Organization; SecurityCouncilresolution777of1992consideringthattheFRYcouldnotcontinueautomaticallytheSFRY’smembership;GeneralAssembly resolution 47/1 of 1992 stating that the FRY shallnot participate in the work of the General Assembly; and aletterdated29September1992fromtheUnitedNationsLegalCounsel regarding the “practical consequences” of GeneralAssemblyresolution47/1 .

TheCourtconcludesthatthelegalsituationthatobtainedwithin the United Nations during the period 1992–2000concerning the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslaviaremainedambiguousandopentodifferentassessments .Thiswasdue,interalia,totheabsenceofanauthoritativedetermi-nationbythecompetentorgansoftheUnitedNationsdefiningclearly the legalstatusof theFederalRepublicofYugoslaviavis-à-vistheUnitedNations .

TheCourtnotes that threedifferentpositionsweretakenwithin the United Nations . In the first place, there wasthe position taken by the two political organs concerned .The Court refers in this respect to Security Council resolu-tion777(1992)of19September1992andtoGeneralAssem-blyresolution47/1of22September1992,accordingtowhich“the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montene-gro) cannot continue automatically the membership of theformerSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslaviaintheUnitedNations”, and “should apply for membership in the UnitedNations” . The Court points out that, while it is clear fromthe voting figures that these resolutions reflected a positionendorsedbythevastmajorityoftheMembersoftheUnitedNations,theycannotbeconstruedasconveyinganauthorita-tivedeterminationofthelegalstatusoftheFederalRepublicof Yugoslavia within, or vis-à-vis, the United Nations . Theuncertaintysurroundingthequestionisevidenced,inter alia,bythepracticeoftheGeneralAssemblyinbudgetarymattersduringtheyearsfollowingthebreak-upoftheSocialistFed-eralRepublicofYugoslavia .

The Court recalls that, secondly, the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia, for its part, maintained its claim that it contin-uedthelegalpersonalityoftheSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia, “including its membership in all internationalorganizationsandparticipationininternationaltreatiesrati-fiedoraccededtobyYugoslavia” .ThisclaimhadbeenclearlystatedintheofficialNoteof27April1992fromthePermanentMissionofYugoslaviatotheUnitedNationsaddressedtotheSecretary-GeneraloftheUnitedNations .ItwassustainedbytheApplicantthroughouttheperiodfrom1992to2000 .

Thirdly, another organ that came to be involved in thisproblem was the Secretariat of the United Nations . In theabsenceofanyauthoritativedetermination,theSecretariat,astheadministrativeorganoftheOrganization,simplycontin-uedtokeeptothepracticeofthestatusquoantethathadpre-vailedpriortothebreak-upoftheSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslaviain1992 .

TheCourtpointsout that itwasagainst thisbackgroundthat the Court itself, in its Judgment of 3 February 2003 inthecaseconcerningApplication for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case concerning Application of theConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrime

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of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v . Yugoslavia), Pre-liminary Objections (Yugoslavia v . Bosnia and Herzegovina)(hereinafterthe“Application for Revision case”),referredtothe“suigenerispositionwhichtheFRYfounditselfin”duringtherelevantperiod;however,inthatcase,nofinalanddefinitiveconclusionwasdrawnbytheCourtfromthisdescriptivetermontheamorphousstatusoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslaviavis-à-visorwithintheUnitedNationsduringthisperiod .

TheCourtconsidersthatthissituationcametoanendwithanewdevelopmentin2000 .On27Octoberofthatyear,theFederalRepublicofYugoslaviarequestedadmissiontomem-bershipintheUnitedNations,andon1November,byGen-eralAssemblyresolution55/12,itwassoadmitted .SerbiaandMontenegrothushasthestatusofmembershipintheOrgani-zationas from1November2000 .However, itsadmissiontotheUnitedNationsdidnothave,andcouldnothavehad,theeffectofdatingbacktothetimewhentheSFRYbrokeupanddisappeared . It became clear that the sui generis position oftheApplicantcouldnothaveamountedtoitsmembershipintheOrganization .

IntheviewoftheCourt,thesignificanceofthisnewdevel-opmentin2000isthatithasclarifiedthethusfaramorphouslegalsituationconcerningthestatusoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslaviavis-à-vistheUnitedNations .

TheCourtfindsthatfromthevantagepointfromwhichitnowlooksatthelegalsituation,andinlightofthelegalcon-sequencesofthenewdevelopmentsince1November2000,itis ledtotheconclusionthatSerbiaandMontenegrowasnotaMemberoftheUnitedNations,andinthatcapacityaStatepartytotheStatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJustice,atthetimeoffilingitsApplication .

AfurtherpointtheCourtconsidersistherelevancetothepresentcaseof theJudgment in theApplication for Revisioncase,of3February2003 .TheCourtpointsoutthat,giventhespecific characteristics of the procedure under Article 61 oftheStatute,inwhichtheconditionsforgrantinganapplica-tion for revision of a judgment are strictly circumscribed,thereisnoreasontotreattheJudgmentintheApplication for RevisioncaseashavingpronouncedupontheissueofthelegalstatusofSerbiaandMontenegrovis-à-vistheUnitedNations .NordoestheJudgmentpronounceuponthestatusofSerbiaandMontenegroinrelationtotheStatuteoftheCourt .

Forallthesereasons,theCourtconcludesthat,atthetimewhenthepresentproceedingswereinstituted,theApplicantinthepresentcase,SerbiaandMontenegro,wasnotaMemberoftheUnitedNations,andconsequently,wasnot,onthatbasis,aStatepartytotheStatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJustice .TheApplicantnothavingbecomeapartytotheStatuteonanyotherbasis,itfollowsthattheCourtwasnotthenopentoitunderArticle35,paragraph1,oftheStatute .

Serbia and Montenegro’s possible access to the Court on the basis of Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute(paras .92–114)

TheCourtthenconsiderswhetheritmightbeopentoSer-biaandMontenegrounderparagraph2ofArticle35,whichprovides:

“The conditions under which the Court shall be open tootherStates[i .e .StatesnotpartiestotheStatute]shall,sub-jecttothespecialprovisionscontainedintreatiesinforce,belaiddownbytheSecurityCouncil,butinnocaseshallsuchconditionsplacethepartiesinapositionofinequalitybeforetheCourt .”In this regard, it quotes from its Order of 8 April 1993

in thecaseconcerningApplication of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v . Serbia and Montenegro) (hereinafter the“Genocide Convention case”),where it stated, inter alia, thata “compromissory clause in a multilateral convention, suchasArticle Ixof theGenocideConventionreliedonbyBos-nia and Herzegovina in the present case, could, in the viewof the Court, be regarded prima facie as a special provisioncontainedinatreatyinforce”(emphasisadded) .

TheCourtrecallsthatanumberofRespondentscontendedin theirpleadings that the reference to “treaties in force” inArticle35,paragraph2,oftheStatuterelatesonlytotreatiesinforcewhentheStatuteoftheCourtenteredintoforce,i .e .on24October1945 .InrespectoftheOrderof8April1993intheGenocide Conventioncase,theRespondentspointedoutthatthatwasaprovisionalassessment,notconclusiveofthemat-ter,andconsideredthat“there[were]persuasivereasonswhytheCourtshouldrevisittheprovisionalapproachitadoptedtotheinterpretationofthisclauseintheGenocide Conventioncase” .

TheCourtnotesthatthepassagefromthe1993OrderintheGenocide ConventioncasewasaddressedtothesituationinwhichtheproceedingswereinstitutedagainstaStatewhosemembershipintheUnitedNationsandstatusasapartytotheStatutewasunclear .ItobservesthattheOrderof8April1993wasmadeonthebasisofanexaminationoftherelevantlawandfactsinthecontextofincidentalproceedingsonarequestfor the indication of provisional measures, and concludesthat it would therefore now be appropriate for the Court tomakeadefinitivefindingonthequestionwhetherArticle35,paragraph2,affordsaccesstotheCourtinthepresentcase,and for thatpurpose, toexamine further thequestionof itsapplicabilityandinterpretation .

TheCourtthusproceedstotheinterpretationofArticle35,paragraph2,of theStatute,anddoes so inaccordancewithcustomaryinternational law,asreflectedinArticle31ofthe1969ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties .Accordingtoparagraph1ofArticle31,atreatymustbeinterpretedingoodfaithinaccordancewiththeordinarymeaningtobegiventoitstermsintheircontextandinthelightofthetreaty’sobjectand purpose . Interpretation must be based above all uponthe textof the treaty .Asa supplementarymeasure recoursemaybehadtomeansofinterpretationsuchasthepreparatoryworkofthetreatyandthecircumstancesofitsconclusion .

TheCourtpointsoutthatthewords“treatiesinforce”inArticle35,paragraph2,donot,intheirnaturalandordinarymeaning, indicate at what date the treaties contemplatedaretobeinforce,andmaythuslendthemselvestodifferentinterpretations .TheymaybeinterpretedasreferringeithertotreatieswhichwereinforceatthetimethattheStatuteitselfcameintoforce,ortothosewhichwereinforceonthedateof

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theinstitutionofproceedingsinacaseinwhichsuchtreatiesareinvoked .

The Court observes that the object and purpose of Arti-cle 35 of the Statute is to define the conditions of access totheCourt .Whileparagraph1ofthatArticleopensit totheStatespartiestotheStatute,paragraph2isintendedtoregu-lateaccesstotheCourtbyStateswhicharenotpartiestotheStatute .ItwouldhavebeeninconsistentwiththemainthrustofthetexttomakeitpossibleinthefutureforStatesnotpar-tiestotheStatutetoobtainaccesstotheCourtsimplybytheconclusionbetweenthemselvesofaspecialtreaty,multilateralorbilateral,containingaprovisiontothateffect .

TheCourtmoreovernotesthattheinterpretationofArti-cle35,paragraph2,wherebythatparagraphistobeconstruedas referring to treaties in force at the time that the Statutecameintoforce,isinfactreinforcedbyanexaminationofthetravaux préparatoiresofthetext;theCourtconsidersthatthelegislative history of Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statuteof thePermanentCourtof International Justice(hereinafterthe“PermanentCourt”)demonstratesthatitwasintendedasanexceptiontotheprinciplestatedinparagraph1, inordertocovercasescontemplated inagreementsconcluded intheaftermathof theFirstWorldWarbefore theStatuteenteredinto force .However, the travaux préparatoiresof theStatuteofthepresentCourtare less illuminating .ThediscussionofArticle35wasprovisionalandsomewhatcursory;ittookplaceatastageintheplanningofthefutureinternationalorganiza-tionwhenitwasnotyetsettledwhetherthePermanentCourtwouldbepreservedor replacedbyanewcourt . Indeed, therecords do not include any discussion which would suggestthat Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute should be givenadifferentmeaningfromthecorrespondingprovisionintheStatuteofthePermanentCourt .ItwouldratherseemthatthetextwasreproducedfromtheStatuteofthePermanentCourt;thereisnoindicationthatanyextensionofaccesstotheCourtwasintended .

AccordinglyArticle35,paragraph2,mustbeinterpreted,mutatis mutandis,inthesamewayastheequivalenttextintheStatuteofthePermanentCourt,namelyasintendedtorefertotreatiesinforceatthedateoftheentryintoforceofthenewStatute,andprovidingforthejurisdictionofthenewCourt .Infact,nosuchpriortreaties,referringtothejurisdictionofthepresentCourt,havebeenbroughttotheattentionoftheCourt,anditmaybethatnoneexist .IntheviewoftheCourt,however,neitherthiscircumstance,noranyconsiderationoftheobjectandpurposeof thetext,northe travaux prépara-toires,offersupporttothealternativeinterpretationthattheprovision was intended as granting access to the Court toStatesnotpartiestotheStatutewithoutanyconditionotherthantheexistenceofatreaty,containingaclauseconferringjurisdictionontheCourt,whichmightbeconcludedatanytime subsequently to the entry into force of the Statute . Aspreviouslyobserved,thisinterpretationwouldleadtoaresultquiteincompatiblewiththeobjectandpurposeofArticle35,paragraph 2, namely the regulation of access to the CourtbyStatesnon-partiestotheStatute .IntheviewoftheCourttherefore,thereferenceinArticle35,paragraph2,oftheStat-ute to “the specialprovisions contained in treaties in force”appliesonly to treaties in forceat thedateof theentry into

force of the Statute, and not to any treaties concluded sincethatdate .

TheCourtthusconcludesthat,evenassumingthatSerbiaandMontenegrowasapartytotheGenocideConventionattherelevantdate,Article35,paragraph2,oftheStatutedoesnotprovideitwithabasistohaveaccesstotheCourt,underArticle Ix of that Convention, since the Convention onlyentered into force on 12 January 1951, after the entry intoforceoftheStatute .TheCourtdoesnotthereforeconsideritnecessary to decide whether Serbia and Montenegro was orwasnotapartytotheGenocideConventionon29April1999whenthecurrentproceedingswereinstituted .

Jurisdiction on the basis of Article 4 of the 1930 Convention of Conciliation, Judicial Settlement and Arbitration between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and Belgium(paras .115–126)

Asnotedabove,bya letterof12May1999, theAgentofSerbiaandMontenegrosubmittedtotheCourta“SupplementtotheApplication”againsttheKingdomofBelgium .InthatSupplement, it invoked as an additional ground of jurisdic-tionoftheCourt“Article4oftheConventionofConciliation,JudicialSettlementandArbitrationbetweentheKingdomofYugoslaviaandBelgium,signedatBelgradeon25March1930and in force since3September1930” (hereinafter“the1930Convention”) .

TheCourtrecalls itsfindingthatSerbiaandMontenegrowas not a party to the Statute at the date of the filing of itsApplication instituting proceedings in this case, and conse-quentlythattheCourtwasnotopentoitatthattimeunderArticle35,paragraph1,oftheStatute .Therefore,totheextentthatSerbiaandMontenegro’scaserestsonrelianceonArti-cle 35, paragraph 1, it is irrelevant whether or not the 1930Conventioncouldprovideabasisofjurisdiction .

Thequestionnonethelessremainswhetherthe1930Con-vention,whichwasconcludedpriortotheentryintoforceoftheStatute,mightrankasa“treatyinforce”forpurposesofArticle 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute, and hence provide abasisofaccess .

The Court observes that Article 35 of the Statute of theCourt concerns access to the present Court and not to itspredecessor,thePermanentCourt .Theconditionsfortrans-ferof jurisdiction fromthePermanentCourt to thepresentCourtaregovernedbyArticle37oftheStatute .However,thisdoesnotsignifythatasimilarsubstitutionistobereadintoArticle35,paragraph2,of theStatute,which relates,not toconsensualjurisdiction,buttotheconditionsofaccesstotheCourt .TheCourtnotesthatArticle37oftheStatutecanbeinvokedonlyincaseswhicharebroughtbeforeitasbetweenpartiestotheStatute,i .e .underparagraph1ofArticle35,andnotonthebasisofparagraph2ofthatArticle .Itthenadds,as regards jurisdiction, thatwhena treatyproviding for thejurisdictionofthePermanentCourtisinvokedinconjunctionwithArticle37,theCourthastosatisfyitself,inter alia,thatboththeApplicantandtheRespondentwere,atthemomentwhenthedisputewassubmittedtoit,partiestotheStatute .AstheCourtobservedintheBarcelona Tractioncase,

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“three conditions are actually stated in the Article . Theyarethatthereshouldbeatreatyorconventioninforce;thatitshouldprovide(i .e .,makeprovision)forthereferenceofa ‘matter’ (i .e ., the matter in litigation) to the PermanentCourt;andthatthedisputeshouldbebetweenStatesbothorallofwhicharepartiestotheStatute .”Having already determined that Serbia and Montenegro

wasnotapartytotheStatuteoftheCourtwhentheproceed-ingswere institutedagainstBelgium, theCourt accordinglyconcludesthatArticle37cannotgiveSerbiaandMontenegroaccesstothepresentCourtunderArticle35,paragraph2,onthebasisof the1930Convention, irrespectiveofwhetherornotthatinstrumentwasinforceon29April1999atthedateofthefilingoftheApplication .

Unnecessary to consider other preliminary objections(para .127)

HavingfoundthatSerbiaandMontenegrodidnot,atthetimeoftheinstitutionofthepresentproceedings,haveaccesstotheCourtundereitherparagraph1orparagraph2ofArti-cle 35 of the Statute, the Court states that it is unnecessaryforittoconsidertheotherpreliminaryobjectionsfiledbytheRespondentstoitsjurisdiction .

*The Court finally recalls (para . 128) that, irrespective of

whetherithasjurisdictionoveradispute,theparties“remaininallcasesresponsibleforactsattributabletothemthatvio-latetherightsofotherStates” .

** *

Joint declaration of Vice-President Ranjeva and Judges Guillaume, Higgins, Kooijmans, Al-Khasawneh,

Buergenthal and Elaraby

1 .Vice-PresidentRanjevaandJudgesGuillaume,Higgins,Kooijmans,Al-Khasawneh,BuergenthalandElarabyvotedinfavour of the dispositif of the Judgments because they agreethat these cases cannot, as a matter of law, proceed to themerits . They have added in their joint declaration that theyneverthelessprofoundlydisagreewiththereasoningadoptedbytheCourt .

2 .TheynotethatwhentheCourtfinds inacasethat,ontwo or more grounds, its jurisdiction is not well foundedrationepersonae,rationemateriaeorrationetemporis,itmaychoosethemostappropriategroundonwhichtobaseitsdeci-sion of lack of competence . They point out that this choicemust be guided by three criteria: consistency with the pastcase law; degree of certitude of the ground chosen; possibleimplicationsfortheotherpendingcases .

3 . In the present instances, according to the Judgmentsof the Court, Serbia and Montenegro was not a Member ofthe United Nations in 1999 and, as a result, was not then apartytotheStatuteoftheCourt .IntheJudgments,theCourtconcludestherefromthatitwasnotatthattimeopentotheApplicantunderArticle35,paragraph1,of theStatute .TheJudgmentsgoontostatethatparagraph2ofthatArticleena-blesStatesnotpartiestotheStatutetoappearbeforetheCourt

onlybyvirtueofSecurityCouncildecisionsor treatiescon-cludedpriortotheentryintoforceoftheStatute .ItisobservedintheJudgmentsthattheUnitedNationsGenocideConven-tiononlyenteredintoforcein1951 .ItisthusconcludedthatArticle35,paragraph2,of theStatutedoesnotgrantSerbiaandMontenegroaccesstotheCourteither .

4 . In the view of the seven judges making the joint dec-laration, this solution is at odds with a number of previousdecisionsof theCourt, inparticular the Judgmentrenderedon3February2003inacasebetweenBosniaandHerzegovinaandYugoslavia,inwhichitwasfoundthatYugoslaviacouldappearbeforetheCourtbetween1992and2000andthatthispositionhadnotbeenchangedbyitsadmissiontotheUnitedNationsin2002 .Further,theauthorsofthedeclarationnotethat inreality it is far fromself-evident thatYugoslaviawasnotaMemberoftheUnitedNationsatthattime .Lastly,theyregret that the Judgment leaves some doubt as to whetherYugoslaviawasaparty,between1992and2000,totheUnitedNationsGenocideConventionandthuscouldcallintoques-tion thesolutionsadoptedby theCourt in thecasebroughtbyBosniaandHerzegovinaagainstSerbiaandMontenegro .Thus, the Court’s Judgment does not meet any of the threecriteriasetoutinparagraph2above .

5 . The seven judges finally observe that the Court couldeasilyhavefoundeditsJudgmentthatitlackedjurisdictiononthegroundsonwhichitreliedin1999whentherequestsforthe indicationofprovisionalmeasureswereconsidered .TheCourtthenfoundthatitlackedjurisdictionrationetemporisinrespectofthedeclarationacceptingthecompulsoryjuris-dictionoftheCourtwhichSerbiaandMontenegrohadfiledseveralweeksafterthestartofmilitaryoperationsinKosovo .Italsofounditselftobewithoutjurisdictionratione materiaein respect of the United Nations Genocide Convention, asnogenocidalintentionhadbeenestablished .Thesesolutionscouldeasilyhavebeenconfirmed .


InhisdeclarationJudgeKoromastatedthat,whileconcur-ringintheJudgment,heconsidereditnecessarytostressthefollowing .ThequestionwhichtheCourtwasrequestedtoruleon and which it in fact did decide in this phase of the casewastheissueofjurisdiction,namely,whethertheCourtcouldentertain the merits of the case . The jurisdictional functionisintendedtoestablishwhethertheCourtisentitledtoenterintoandadjudicateon the substantive issues inacase .Thisfunction, inhisview,cannotbedispensedwithas it isbothrequiredbylawandstipulatedintheStatuteoftheCourt .Itis this function that theCourthascarriedout in this Judg-mentanditiswithinthisparadigmthattheJudgmentmustbeunderstood .TheJudgmentcannotbeinterpretedastheCourttakingapositiononanyofthemattersofsubstancebeforetheCourt .


JudgeHigginsagreesthatSerbiaandMontenegrohavenotdiscontinuedthecase .However,shedisagreeswiththeappar-entfindingoftheCourtthatacasemayonlyberemovedfrom

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theListwherethereisadiscontinuancebytheapplicantortheparties,orwhereanapplicantdisclosednosubsistingtitleofjurisdiction,orwheretheCourtmanifestlylackedjurisdiction(seeparagraph33oftheJudgment) .Inherview,therightoftheCourtexceptionallytoremoveacasefromtheListrestsonitsinherentpowers,whicharenotlimitedtoa prioricat-egories .

JudgeHigginsisoftheopinionthatthepresentcaseshouldhavebeenremovedfromtheList,astheApplicanthasbyitsownconductputitself inapositionincompatiblewithArti-cle 38, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court . The manner inwhichithasdealtwithpreliminaryobjectionswouldfurtherwarrantthecasenotbeingproceededwith .

Finally, Judge Higgins greatly regrets the attention theCourthasaffordedtoArticle35,paragraph2,oftheStatute,believingitsrelevanceliesonlyinanotherpendingcase .


JudgeKooijmanshasaddedaseparateopiniontotheJudg-mentandthejointdeclarationofsevenMembersoftheCourt,whichheco-signed,fortworeasons .

FirsthewishestoexplainwhyinhisviewtheCourtshouldnothavedecidedtheissueofjurisdictiononthegroundofSer-biaandMontenegro’slackofaccesstotheCourt,althoughin1999,whentheCourtrejectedYugoslavia’srequestforinterimmeasuresofprotection,hewasinfavourofthisapproach .Inhisview,theCourthasnotinaconvincingandtransparentwayelucidatedthestatusoftheFederalRepublicofYugosla-via vis-à-vis the United Nations before its admission to theOrganization in 2000 . Further, the Court’s Judgment hasundeniableimplicationsforotherpendingcases,inparticulartheGenocide Convention case (Bosnia Herzegovina v . Serbia and Montenegro), which could easily have been avoided bychoosinganotherapproach .Finally,theJudgmentisatoddswith previous decisions of the Court, thus endangering theprinciple of consistency of reasoning . This consistency withearliercaselawshouldprevailoverpresentorearliermisgiv-ingsof individual judges if anapproach inconformitywiththatconsistencydoesnotleadtolegallyuntenableresults .

In the second place Judge Kooijmans sets out why in hisview theCourtwouldhavedonebetter todismiss thecasesin limine litis. In 1999 the Applicant invoked two groundsof jurisdiction which it explicitly abandoned in its WrittenObservations of 20 December 2002 without replacing themby other grounds . Nevertheless it did not discontinue thecasebutaskedtheCourttodecidewhetherithadjurisdiction .ThustheApplicationsdidnolongermeettherequirementofArticle 38, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, which statesthat the application shall specify as far as possible the legalgroundsuponwhichthejurisdictionoftheCourtissaidtobebased .SincetheCourthastheinherentpowertostrikeacasefromtheGeneralListinordertosafeguardtheintegrityoftheprocedure,itshouldhavedonesoinviewofthefactthattheApplicanthas failed todemonstrate andevendidnotmakean effort to demonstrate that a valid ground of jurisdictionexisted .


Judge Elaraby voted in favour of the dispositif, but disa-greedbothwiththegroundsonwhichtheCourtdecidedtobase its Judgment—Article 35, paragraph 1 and Article 35,paragraph2oftheCourt’sStatute—andwiththeconclusionswhichtheCourtreachedoneachofthesegrounds .Thejointdeclaration, to which Judge Elaraby is a signatory, explainswhyhebelievesthattheCourtshouldhavechosenalternativegrounds toreach itsdecision .His separateopinionexplainswhyhedisagreeswithitssubstantivefindings .

Beginning with the issue of access to the Court underArticle35,paragraph1,JudgeElarabyexplainedwhy, inhisview,theFederalRepublicofYugoslaviawasaMemberoftheUnitedNationsatthetimeitfileditsApplicationinthecase .He emphasized that, although the FRY was excluded fromparticipation in the work of the General Assembly and itssubsidiary organs, it remained, as the Court had previouslyfound, a sui generis Member between 1992 and 2000 . ThusJudgeElarabypointedoutthatduringthisperioditcontinuedtoexhibitmanyattributesofUnitedNationsmembershipandwas neither suspended nor expelled from the OrganizationundertherelevantprovisionsoftheUnitedNationsCharter .On this basis, Judge Elaraby concluded that the FRY was aMember of the United Nations when it filed its Applicationin1999and,asaresult,hedisagreedwith theCourt’sfind-ingthatitwasnot“open”totheFRYunderArticle35,para-graph1,oftheCourt’sStatute .

HealsodisagreedwiththeCourt’sfindingthat,assumingtheFRYwasanon-MemberoftheUnitedNations, itwouldnothavehadaccesstotheCourtunderArticle35,paragraph2 .ForJudgeElaraby,theCourt’sinterpretationoftheterm“trea-tiesinforce”inArticle35,paragraph2,asmeaning“treatiesinforceatthetimetheStatuteoftheCourtenteredintoforce”wasundulyrestrictive .LiketheCourt,JudgeElarabyanalysedtherelevant travaux préparatoires,but,unlike theCourt,hefoundthattheexpression“treatiesinforce”shouldbereadtoincludeanytreatiesconnectedwiththepeacesettlementfol-lowingtheSecondWorldWar,whethertheyenteredintoforcebeforeorafter theStatuteof theCourt .Thiswould include,accordingtoJudgeElaraby,theGenocideConvention,atreatydrafted under the auspices of the United Nations in directresponse to the tragic events of the Second World War . Inthealternative,JudgeElarabystatedthat,eveniftheCourt’sreadingof“treaties inforce”wereadoptedasageneralrule,thereshouldbeanexceptionfortreatiesintendedtoremedyviolationsofjus cogens.These,hewrote,shouldbesubjecttoabroaderinterpretationsothatanyStateseekingaccesstotheCourtonthebasisofatreatythataddressesajus cogensviola-tioncoulddosoas longas thetreatywas inforcewhentheApplicationwasfiled .

BecauseJudgeElarabyconcludedthattheCourtwasopento the FRY under Article 35 when it filed its Application in1999,hewentontoassesswhethertheCourthasjurisdictionratione personaeunderArticleIxoftheGenocideConvention .Heconcludedthatitdoes,becausetheFRYsucceededtothetreatyobligationsoftheformerSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia,includingtheGenocideConvention .Inreachingthisconclusionheexplainedthat,incasesinvolvingthesepa-

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rationofpartsoftheterritoryofaStatetoformoneormorenewStates,Article34oftheViennaConventiononSuccessionofStatesinrespectofTreatiesembodiedacustomaryruleofautomaticsuccessionbythenewStatetothetreatiesinforceontheterritoryofitspredecessor .HepointedoutthatitwasallthemoreimportantfortheCourttorecognizeandapplythisruleinthecaseofafundamentalhumanrightstreatysuchas the Genocide Convention . Judge Elaraby thus concludedthattheFRYwasapartytotheGenocideConventiononthebasis of succession—not its subsequent purported accessionand reservation—and therefore that the Court had jurisdic-tionratione personae.Hefound,however,thattheCourtdidnothavejurisdictionratione materiaeundertheConvention,sointhefinalanalysisagreedwiththeCourtthattherewasnojurisdictiontoexaminethemeritsoftheFRY’scase .

Separate opinion of Judge Kreća

Judgead hocKrećanotedthattheRespondent,aswellasthe Applicant, attached crucial importance to the issue oflocus standiofSerbiaandMontenegrobeforetheCourt .

In the case at hand, it is closely, and even organically,linkedwiththemembershipofSerbiaandMontenegrointheUnitedNations,duetothefactthatitcouldnotbeconsideredasbeingpartytotheStatuteoftheCourtapartfrombeingaMemberStateoftheUnitedNationsaswellasthefactthatitslocus standicannotbebasedonconditionssetforthinArti-cle35,paragraph2,oftheStatute .

Inthatregardhefindsthatattheendoftheyear2000theApplicantdidtwothings:

(i)renouncedthecontinuityclaimandacceptedthestatusofthesuccessorStateoftheformerSFRY;and

(ii)proceedingfromaqualitativelynewlegalbasis—asthesuccessor State—submitted the application for admission tomembershipintheUnitedNations .

TheadmissionoftheFRYtotheUnitedNationsasaMem-berasfrom1November2000hastwoprincipalconsequencesinthecircumstancesofthecaseathand:

(i)withrespecttotheadmissionofYugoslaviaasaMemberasfrom1November2000,itcanbesaidthatwhatisinvolvedistheadmissionasanewMember;and

(ii) the admission of Yugoslavia as a Member as from1November2000qualifiedper seitsstatusvis-à-vistheUnit-ed Nations before that date . It seems clear that, in the lightofthedecisionstakenbythecompetentorgansoftheUnitedNations,thisstatuscouldnotbeamembershipstatus .A con-trario,YugoslaviacouldnothavebeenadmittedasaMemberasfrom1November2000 .

Heisalsooftheopinionthattheformulationofthedisposi-tifexplicitlylinkedtotheabsenceoflocus standiofSerbiaandMontenegrowouldbemoreappropriateconsideringthecir-cumstancesofthecaseaswellasthereasoningoftheCourt .

InitsJudgmentinthecaseconcerningLegality of the Use of Force(Serbia and Montenegro v . Canada),theCourtunani-mouslyconcludedthatithadnojurisdictiontoentertaintheclaimsmadeintheApplicationfiledbySerbiaandMontene-groagainstCanadaon29April1999 .


** *

Theoperativeparagraph(para .116)oftheJudgmentreadsasfollows:

“ . . .TheCourt,Unanimously,

150. CAseConCeRnInGLeGALItYoFUseoFFoRCe(seRBIAAnDMonteneGRo v. CAnADA)(PReLIMInARYoBJeCtIons)


___________

Finds that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the claimsmade in theApplicationfiledbySerbiaandMontenegroon29April1999 .”

** *

Vice-President Ranjeva and Judges Guillaume, Hig-gins, Kooijmans, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal and Elarabyappended a joint declaration to the Judgment of the Court;JudgeKoromaappendedadeclarationtotheJudgmentoftheCourt;JudgesHiggins,KooijmansandElarabyandJudgead hocKrećaappendedseparateopinionstotheJudgmentoftheCourt .

** *


On29April1999theGovernmentoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(witheffectfrom4February2003,“Serbiaand

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Montenegro”)filedintheRegistryoftheCourtanApplicationinstitutingproceedingsagainsttheGovernmentofCanadainrespectofadisputeconcerningactsallegedlycommittedbyCanada

“bywhichithasviolateditsinternationalobligationban-ningtheuseofforceagainstanotherState,theobligationnot to intervene in the internal affairs of another State,the obligation not to violate the sovereignty of anotherState,theobligationtoprotectthecivilianpopulationandcivilian objects in wartime, the obligation to protect theenvironment,theobligationrelatingtofreenavigationoninternationalrivers,theobligationregardingfundamentalhumanrightsandfreedoms,theobligationnottousepro-hibited weapons, the obligation not to deliberately inflictconditionsoflifecalculatedtocausethephysicaldestruc-tionofanationalgroup” .TheApplicationinvokedasabasisoftheCourt’sjurisdic-

tion Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, aswell as Article Ix of the Convention on the Prevention andPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocide,adoptedbytheUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyon9December1948(hereinafter“theGenocideConvention”) .


Onthesameday,theFederalRepublicofYugoslaviafiledApplicationsinstitutingproceedingsandsubmittedrequestsfortheindicationofprovisionalmeasures,inrespectofotherdisputesarisingoutofthesamefacts,againsttheKingdomofBelgium, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Ger-many,theItalianRepublic,theKingdomoftheNetherlands,thePortugueseRepublic, theKingdomofSpain, theUnitedKingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and theUnitedStatesofAmerica .

SincetheCourtincludedupontheBenchnojudgeofthenationality of the Parties, each of them exercised its rightunderArticle31,paragraph3,oftheStatutetochooseajudgead hoc to sit in the case: the Yugoslav Government choseMr . Milenko Kreca and the Canadian Government choseMr .MarcLalonde .ReferringtoArticle31,paragraph5,oftheStatute,theYugoslavGovernmentobjectedtothelatterchoice .TheCourt,afterdeliberating,foundthatthenominationofajudgead hocbyCanadawasjustifiedintheprovisionalmeas-uresphaseofthecase .


On5July2000,withinthetime–limitfixedforthefilingofitsCounter-Memorial,Canada,referringtoArticle79,para-graph1,oftheRules,submittedpreliminaryobjectionsrelat-ingtotheCourt’sjurisdictiontoentertainthecaseandtotheadmissibilityoftheApplication .Accordingly,theproceedingsonthemeritsweresuspended .






OnbehalfoftheCanadianGovernment,atthehearingof22April2004:“1 . The Government of Canada requests the Court toadjudge and declare that the Court lacks jurisdictionbecause the Applicant has abandoned all the grounds ofjurisdictionoriginallyspecifiedinitsApplicationpursuanttoArticle38,paragraph2,oftheRulesandhasidentifiednoalternativegroundsofjurisdiction .2 .Inthealternative, theGovernmentofCanadarequeststheCourttoadjudgeanddeclarethat:(a) the Court lacks jurisdiction over the proceedingsbroughtbytheApplicantagainstCanadaon29April1999,onthebasisofthepurporteddeclarationof25April1999;(b) theCourtalso lacks jurisdictionon thebasisofArti-cleIxoftheGenocideConvention;(c) the new claims respecting the period beginning10 June 1999 are inadmissible because they would trans-form the subject of the dispute originally brought beforetheCourt;and,(d)theclaimsintheirentiretyareinadmissiblebecausethesubject-matterofthecaserequiresthepresenceofessentialthirdpartiesthatarenotbeforetheCourt .”OnbehalfoftheGovernmentofSerbiaandMontenegroatthehearingof23April2004:

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“Forthereasonsgiveninitspleadings,andinparticularinitsWrittenObservations,subsequentcorrespondencewiththeCourt,andattheoralhearing,SerbiaandMontenegrorequeststheCourt:-toadjudgeanddeclareonitsjurisdictionratione personaeinthepresentcases;and- to dismiss the remaining preliminary objections of therespondentStates,andtoorderproceedingsonthemeritsifitfindsithasjurisdictionratione personae.”Before proceeding to its reasoning, the Court includes a

paragraph (para .24)dealingwith theApplicant’s changeofname on 4 February 2003 from “Federal Republic of Yugo-slavia”to“SerbiaandMontenegro” .Itexplainsthat,asfaraspossible,exceptwheretheterminahistoricalcontextmightcauseconfusion, itwilluse thename“SerbiaandMontene-gro”,evenwherereferenceismadetoaproceduralsteptakenbeforethechange .

Dismissal of the case inliminelitis(paras .25–43)



TheCourtfindsitselfunabletoupholdthevariousconten-tionsoftheRespondents .TheCourtconsidersthatitisunabletotreattheObservationsofSerbiaandMontenegroashavingthelegaleffectofadiscontinuanceoftheproceedingsunderArticle88or89oftheRulesofCourtandfindsthatthecasedoesnotfallintothecategoryofcasesinwhichitmayofitsownmotionputanendtoproceedingsinacase .AsregardstheargumentadvancedbycertainRespondentsthatthedis-pute on jurisdiction has disappeared since the Parties nowagreethattheApplicantwasnotapartytotheStatuteattherelevanttime,theCourtpointsoutthatSerbiaandMontene-grohasnot invitedtheCourttofindthat ithasnojurisdic-

tion;whileitisapparentlyinagreementwiththeargumentsadvancedbytheRespondentsinthatregardintheirprelimi-naryobjections,ithasspecificallyaskedinitssubmissionsfora decision of the Court on the jurisdictional question . Thisquestion, in the view of the Court, is a legal question inde-pendentoftheviewsofthepartiesuponit .Astotheargumentconcerningthedisappearanceofthesubstantivedispute,itisclearthatSerbiaandMontenegrohasbynomeanswithdrawnitsclaimsas to themerits . Indeed, theseclaimswereexten-sivelyarguedanddevelopedinsubstanceduringthehearingsonjurisdiction,inthecontextofthequestionofthejurisdic-tionoftheCourtunderArticleIxoftheGenocideConven-tion .Itisequallyclearthattheseclaimsarebeingvigorouslydeniedby theRespondents . It couldnotevenbe saidunderthesecircumstancesthat,whiletheessentialdisputestillsub-sists,SerbiaandMontenegroisnolongerseekingtohaveitsclaimdeterminedbytheCourt .SerbiaandMontenegrohasnotsoughtadiscontinuanceandhasstatedthatit“wantstheCourt to continue the case and to decide upon its jurisdic-tion—and to decide on the merits as well, if it has jurisdic-tion” .TheCourtthereforefindsitselfunabletoconcludethatSerbiaandMontenegrohasrenouncedanyofitssubstantiveorproceduralrights,orhastakenthepositionthatthedisputebetweenthePartieshasceasedtoexist .Asfortheargumentbasedonthedoctrineofestoppel,theCourtdoesnotconsiderthatSerbiaandMontenegro,byaskingtheCourt“todecideonitsjurisdiction”onthebasisofcertainalleged“newfacts”aboutitsownlegalstatusvis-à-vistheUnitedNations,shouldbeheldtohaveforfeitedorrenounceditsrightofactionandtobeestoppedfromcontinuingthepresentactionbeforetheCourt .



TheCourtrecallsthattheApplicationfiledon29April1999stated that “[t]he Government of the Federal Republic ofYugoslaviainvokesArticle36,paragraph2,oftheStatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeaswellasArticleIxoftheConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocide” .

TheCourtnotesthatinitsjurisprudenceithasreferredto“itsfreedomtoselectthegrounduponwhichitwillbaseitsjudgment”, and that, when its jurisdiction is challenged ondiversegrounds,itisfreetobaseitsdecisionononeormoregroundsofitsownchoosing,inparticular“thegroundwhichin its judgment is more direct and conclusive” . However, inthoseinstances,thePartiestothecasesbeforetheCourtwere,without doubt, parties to the Statute of the Court and theCourtwasthusopentothemunderArticle35,paragraph1,of theStatute .TheCourtpointsout that this isnotthecasein the present proceedings, in which an objection has beenmaderegardingtherightoftheApplicanttohaveaccesstothe

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Court .AnditisthisissueofaccesstotheCourtwhichdistin-guishesthepresentcasefromthosecitedinthejurisprudenceconcerned .

TheCourtobservesthatthequestionwhetherSerbiaandMontenegrowasorwasnotapartytotheStatuteoftheCourtat the time of the institution of the present proceedings isfundamental;forifitwerenotsuchaparty,theCourtwouldnotbeopentoitunderArticle35,paragraph1,oftheStatute .Inthatsituation,subjecttoanyapplicationofparagraph2ofthatArticle,SerbiaandMontenegrocouldnothaveproperlyseisedtheCourt,whatevertitleof jurisdictionitmighthaveinvoked,forthesimplereasonthatitdidnothavetherighttoappearbefore theCourt .Hence, theCourtmustfirstexam-inethequestionwhethertheApplicantmeetstheconditionslaiddowninArticles34and35oftheStatuteforaccesstotheCourt .Onlyif theanswertothatquestionis intheaffirma-tive,willtheCourthavetodealwiththeissuesrelatingtotheconditionslaiddowninArticle36oftheStatute .


ThusCanadaargued,inter alia,that:“TheApplicantisnotaMemberoftheUnitedNationsandaccordingly is not party to the Statute of the Court . . .”(PreliminaryObjectionsofCanada,p .9,para .32 .)“InordertohaveaccesstotheCourt,theApplicantmustbeeitherbeaparty to theStatuteof theCourt,orclaimtoapplytheexceptionalmechanismsprovidedforinArti-cle 93, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United NationsorinArticle35,paragraph2,oftheStatute .TheApplicantmeets neither of these requirements .” (Ibid., para . 35;emphasisoriginal .)TheCourtthenrecapitulatesthesequenceofeventsrelat-

ingtothelegalpositionoftheApplicantvis-à-vistheUnitedNationsovertheperiod1992–2000 .Itrefers,interalia,tothefollowing: the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic ofYugoslaviain1991–1992;adeclarationof27April1992bytheSFRYAssembly,theNationalAssemblyoftheRepublicofSer-biaandtheAssemblyoftheRepublicofMontenegroassertingthecontinuationof the international legalandpoliticalper-sonalityoftheSFRYbytheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia;anoteofthesamedayfromYugoslaviatotheUnitedNationsSecretary-General asserting the continuation by the FRY ofthe membership of the SFRY in the Organization; SecurityCouncilresolution777of1992consideringthattheFRYcouldnotcontinueautomaticallytheSFRY’smembership;GeneralAssembly resolution 47/1 of 1992 stating that the FRY shallnot participate in the work of the General Assembly; and aletterdated29September1992fromtheUnitedNationsLegalCounsel regarding the “practical consequences” of GeneralAssemblyresolution47/1 .

TheCourtconcludesthatthelegalsituationthatobtainedwithin the United Nations during the period 1992–2000concerning the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslaviaremainedambiguousandopentodifferentassessments .This

wasdue,interalia,totheabsenceofanauthoritativedetermi-nationbythecompetentorgansoftheUnitedNationsdefiningclearly the legalstatusof theFederalRepublicofYugoslaviavis-à-vistheUnitedNations .

TheCourtnotes that threedifferentpositionsweretakenwiththeUnitedNations .Inthefirstplace,therewastheposi-tiontakenbythetwopoliticalorgansconcerned .TheCourtrefersinthisrespecttoSecurityCouncilresolution777(1992)of19September1992andtoGeneralAssemblyresolution47/1of22September1992,accordingtowhich“theFederalRepub-lic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continueautomaticallythemembershipoftheformerSocialistFederalRepublic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations”, and “shouldapply for membership in the United Nations” . The Courtpointsout that,while it isclear fromthevotingfigures thatthese resolutions reflected a position endorsed by the vastmajorityoftheMembersoftheUnitedNations,theycannotbeconstruedasconveyinganauthoritativedeterminationofthelegalstatusoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslaviawithin,or vis-à-vis, the United Nations . The uncertainty surround-ing the question is evidenced, inter alia, by the practice oftheGeneralAssemblyinbudgetarymattersduringtheyearsfollowing the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic ofYugoslavia .



TheCourtpointsout that itwasagainst thisbackgroundthat the Court itself, in its Judgment of 3 February 2003 inthecaseconcerningApplication for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case concerning Application of theConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeof Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v . Yugoslavia), Pre-liminary Objections (Yugoslavia v . Bosnia and Herzegovina)(hereinafterthe“Application for Revision case”),referredtothe“suigenerispositionwhichtheFRYfounditselfin”duringtherelevantperiod;however,inthatcase,nofinalanddefinitiveconclusionwasdrawnbytheCourtfromthisdescriptivetermontheamorphousstatusoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslaviavis-à-visorwithintheUnitedNationsduringthisperiod .

TheCourtconsidersthatthissituationcametoanendwithanewdevelopmentin2000 .On27Octoberofthatyear,theFederalRepublicofYugoslaviarequestedadmissiontomem-bershipintheUnitedNations,andon1November,byGen-

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eralAssemblyresolution55/12,itwassoadmitted .SerbiaandMontenegrothushasthestatusofmembershipintheOrgani-zationas from1November2000 .However, itsadmissiontotheUnitedNationsdidnothave,andcouldnothavehad,theeffectofdatingbacktothetimewhentheSFRYbrokeupanddisappeared . It became clear that the sui generis position oftheApplicantcouldnothaveamountedtoitsmembershipintheOrganization .








in thecaseconcerningApplication of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v . Serbia and Montenegro) (hereinafter the“Genocide Convention case”),where it stated, inter alia, thata “compromissory clause in a multilateral convention, suchasArticle Ixof theGenocideConventionreliedonbyBos-

nia and Herzegovina in the present case, could, in the viewof the Court, be regarded prima facie as a special provisioncontainedinatreatyinforce”(emphasisadded) .




TheCourtpointsoutthatthewords“treatiesinforce”inArticle35,paragraph2,donot,intheirnaturalandordinarymeaning, indicate at what date the treaties contemplatedaretobeinforce,andmaythuslendthemselvestodifferentinterpretations .TheymaybeinterpretedasreferringeithertotreatieswhichwereinforceatthetimethattheStatuteitselfcameintoforce,ortothosewhichwereinforceonthedateoftheinstitutionofproceedingsinacaseinwhichsuchtreatiesareinvoked .


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TheCourtmoreovernotesthattheinterpretationofArti-cle35,paragraph2,wherebythatparagraphistobeconstruedas referring to treaties in force at the time that the Statutecameintoforceisinfactreinforcedbyanexaminationofthetravaux préparatoiresofthetext;theCourtconsidersthatthelegislative history of Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statuteof thePermanentCourtof International Justice(hereinafterthe“PermanentCourt”)demonstratesthatitwasintendedasanexceptiontotheprinciplestatedinparagraph1, inordertocovercasescontemplated inagreementsconcluded intheaftermathof theFirstWorldWarbefore theStatuteenteredinto force .However, the travaux préparatoiresof theStatuteofthepresentCourtare less illuminating .ThediscussionofArticle35wasprovisionalandsomewhatcursory;ittookplaceatastageintheplanningofthefutureinternationalorganiza-tionwhenitwasnotyetsettledwhetherthePermanentCourtwouldbepreservedor replacedbyanewcourt . Indeed, therecords do not include any discussion which would suggestthat Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute should be givenadifferentmeaningfromthecorrespondingprovisionintheStatuteofthePermanentCourt .ItwouldratherseemthatthetextwasreproducedfromtheStatuteofthePermanentCourt;thereisnoindicationthatanyextensionofaccesstotheCourtwasintended .

AccordinglyArticle35,paragraph2,mustbeinterpreted,mutatis mutandis,inthesamewayastheequivalenttextintheStatuteofthePermanentCourt,namelyasintendedtorefertotreatiesinforceatthedateoftheentryintoforceofthenewStatute,andprovidingforthejurisdictionofthenewCourt .Infact,nosuchpriortreaties,referringtothejurisdictionofthepresentCourt,havebeenbroughttotheattentionoftheCourt,anditmaybethatnoneexist .IntheviewoftheCourt,however,neitherthiscircumstance,noranyconsiderationoftheobjectandpurposeof thetext,northe travaux prépara-toires,offersupporttothealternativeinterpretationthattheprovision was intended as granting access to the Court toStatesnotpartiestotheStatutewithoutanyconditionotherthantheexistenceofatreaty,containingaclauseconferringjurisdictionontheCourt,whichmightbeconcludedatanytime subsequently to the entry into force of the Statute . Aspreviouslyobserved,thisinterpretationwouldleadtoaresultquiteincompatiblewiththeobjectandpurposeofArticle35,paragraph 2, namely the regulation of access to the CourtbyStatesnon-partiestotheStatute .IntheviewoftheCourttherefore,thereferenceinArticle35,paragraph2,oftheStat-ute to “the specialprovisions contained in treaties in force”appliesonly to treaties in forceat thedateof theentry intoforce of the Statute, and not to any treaties concluded sincethatdate .






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3 . In the present instances, according to the Judgmentsof the Court, Serbia and Montenegro was not a Member ofthe United Nations in 1999 and, as a result, was not then apartytotheStatuteoftheCourt .IntheJudgments,theCourtconcludestherefromthatitwasnotatthattimeopentotheApplicantunderArticle35,paragraph1,of theStatute .TheJudgmentsgoontostatethatparagraph2ofthatArticleena-blesStatesnotpartiestotheStatutetoappearbeforetheCourtonlybyvirtueofSecurityCouncildecisionsor treatiescon-cludedpriortotheentryintoforceoftheStatute .ItisobservedintheJudgmentsthattheUnitedNationsGenocideConven-tiononlyenteredintoforcein1951 .ItisthusconcludedthatArticle35,paragraph2,of theStatutedoesnotgrantSerbiaandMontenegroaccesstotheCourteither .

4 . In the view of the seven judges making the joint dec-laration, this solution is at odds with a number of previousdecisionsof theCourt, inparticular the Judgmentrenderedon3February2003inacasebetweenBosniaandHerzegovinaandYugoslavia,inwhichitwasfoundthatYugoslaviacouldappearbeforetheCourtbetween1992and2000andthatthispositionhadnotbeenchangedbyitsadmissiontotheUnitedNationsin2002 .Further,theauthorsofthedeclarationnote

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that inreality it is far fromself-evident thatYugoslaviawasnotaMemberoftheUnitedNationsatthattime .Lastly,theyregret that the Judgment leaves some doubt as to whetherYugoslaviawasaparty,between1992and2000,totheUnitedNationsGenocideConventionandthuscouldcallintoques-tion thesolutionsadoptedby theCourt in thecasebroughtbyBosniaandHerzegovinaagainstSerbiaandMontenegro .Thus, the Court’s Judgment does not meet any of the threecriteriasetoutinparagraph2above .





JudgeHigginsagreesthatSerbiaandMontenegrohavenotdiscontinuedthecase .However,shedisagreeswiththeappar-entfindingoftheCourtthatacasemayonlyberemovedfromtheListwherethereisadiscontinuancebytheapplicantortheparties,orwhereanapplicantdisclosednosubsistingtitleofjurisdiction,orwheretheCourtmanifestlylackedjurisdiction(seeparagraph32oftheJudgment) .Inherview,therightoftheCourtexceptionallytoremoveacasefromtheListrestsonitsinherentpowers,whicharenotlimitedtoa prioricat-egories .





FirsthewishestoexplainwhyinhisviewtheCourtshouldnothavedecidedtheissueofjurisdictiononthegroundofSer-biaandMontenegro’slackofaccesstotheCourt,althoughin1999,whentheCourtrejectedYugoslavia’srequestforinterimmeasuresofprotection,hewasinfavourofthisapproach .Inhisview,theCourthasnotinaconvincingandtransparentwayelucidatedthestatusoftheFederalRepublicofYugosla-via vis-à-vis the United Nations before its admission to theOrganization in 2000 . Further, the Court’s Judgment hasundeniableimplicationsforotherpendingcases,inparticulartheGenocide Convention case (Bosnia Herzegovina v . Serbia and Montenegro), which could easily have been avoided bychoosinganotherapproach .Finally,theJudgmentisatoddswith previous decisions of the Court, thus endangering theprinciple of consistency of reasoning . This consistency withearliercaselawshouldprevailoverpresentorearliermisgiv-ingsof individual judges if anapproach inconformitywiththatconsistencydoesnotleadtolegallyuntenableresults .




Beginning with the issue of access to the Court underArticle35,paragraph1,JudgeElarabyexplainedwhy, inhisview,theFederalRepublicofYugoslaviawasaMemberoftheUnitedNationsatthetimeitfileditsApplicationinthecase .

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He emphasized that, although the FRY was excluded fromparticipation in the work of the General Assembly and itssubsidiary organs, it remained, as the Court had previouslyfound, a sui generis Member between 1992 and 2000 . ThusJudgeElarabypointedoutthatduringthisperioditcontinuedtoexhibitmanyattributesofUnitedNationsmembershipandwas neither suspended nor expelled from the OrganizationundertherelevantprovisionsoftheUnitedNationsCharter .On this basis, Judge Elaraby concluded that the FRY was aMember of the United Nations when it filed its Applicationin1999and,asaresult,hedisagreedwith theCourt’sfind-ingthatitwasnot“open”totheFRYunderArticle35,para-graph1,oftheCourt’sStatute .


BecauseJudgeElarabyconcludedthattheCourtwasopento the FRY under Article 35 when it filed its Application in1999,hewentontoassesswhethertheCourthasjurisdictionratione personaeunderArticleIxoftheGenocideConvention .Heconcludedthatitdoes,becausetheFRYsucceededtothetreatyobligationsoftheformerSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia,includingtheGenocideConvention .Inreachingthisconclusionheexplainedthat,incasesinvolvingthesepa-rationofpartsoftheterritoryofaStatetoformoneormorenewStates,Article34oftheViennaConventiononSuccessionofStatesinrespectofTreatiesembodiedacustomaryruleofautomaticsuccessionbythenewStatetothetreatiesinforceontheterritoryofitspredecessor .Hepointedoutthatitwas

allthemoreimportantfortheCourttorecognizeandapplythisruleinthecaseofafundamentalhumanrightstreatysuchas the Genocide Convention . Judge Elaraby thus concludedthattheFRYwasapartytotheGenocideConventiononthebasis of succession—not its subsequent purported accessionand reservation—and therefore that the Court had jurisdic-tionratione personae.Hefound,however,thattheCourtdidnothavejurisdictionratione materiaeundertheConvention,sointhefinalanalysisagreedwiththeCourtthattherewasnojurisdictiontoexaminethemeritsoftheFRY’scase .











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InitsJudgmentinthecaseconcerningLegality of the Use of Force(Serbia and Montenegrov .France),theCourtunani-mouslyconcludedthatithadnojurisdictiontoentertaintheclaimsmadeintheApplicationfiledbySerbiaandMontene-groagainstFranceon29April1999 .


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On29April1999theGovernmentoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(witheffectfrom4February2003,“SerbiaandMontenegro”)filedintheRegistryoftheCourtanApplicationinstitutingproceedingsagainsttheFrenchRepublic(hereinaf-ter“France”)inrespectofadisputeconcerningactsallegedlycommittedbyFrance

“bywhichithasviolateditsinternationalobligationban-ningtheuseofforceagainstanotherState,theobligationnot to intervene in the internal affairs of another State,the obligation not to violate the sovereignty of anotherState,theobligationtoprotectthecivilianpopulationandcivilian objects in wartime, the obligation to protect theenvironment,theobligationrelatingtofreenavigationoninternationalrivers,theobligationregardingfundamental

humanrightsandfreedoms,theobligationnottousepro-hibited weapons, the obligation not to deliberately inflictconditionsoflifecalculatedtocausethephysicaldestruc-tionofanationalgroup” .The Application invoked as a basis of the Court’s juris-

dictionArticle Ixof theConventionon thePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocide,adoptedbytheUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyon9December1948(hereinafter“theGenocideConvention”),aswellasArticle38,paragraph5,oftheRulesofCourt .


Onthesameday,theFederalRepublicofYugoslaviafiledApplicationsinstitutingproceedingsandsubmittedrequestsfortheindicationofprovisionalmeasures,inrespectofotherdisputes arising out of the same facts, against the Kingdomof Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, theItalianRepublic,theKingdomoftheNetherlands,thePortu-gueseRepublic,theKingdomofSpain,theUnitedKingdomofGreatBritainandNorthernIrelandandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica .

SincetheCourtincludedupontheBenchnojudgeofYugo-slavnationality,theYugoslavGovernmentexerciseditsrightunderArticle31oftheStatuteandchoseMr .MilenkoKrećatositasjudgead hocinthecase .


On5July2000,withinthetime–limitfixedforthefilingofits Counter-Memorial, France, referring to Article 79, para-graph1,oftheRules,submittedpreliminaryobjectionsrelat-ingtotheCourt’sjurisdictiontoentertainthecaseandtotheadmissibilityoftheApplication .Accordingly,theproceedingsonthemeritsweresuspended .



At a meeting held by the President of the Court on12December2003withtherepresentativesof theParties intheeightcasesconcerningLegality of Use of Force,theques-

151. CAseConCeRnInGLeGALItYoFUseoFFoRCe(seRBIAAnDMonteneGRov.FRAnCe)(PReLIMInARYoBJeCtIons)


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tionsofthepresenceontheBenchofjudgesad hocduringthepreliminaryobjectionsphaseandofapossiblejoinderoftheproceedingswerediscussed,amongotherissues .Byletterof23 December 2003 the Registrar informed the Agents of allthePartiesthattheCourthaddecided,pursuanttoArticle31,paragraph5,oftheStatute,that,takingintoaccountthepres-enceupontheBenchof judgesofBritish,DutchandFrenchnationality,thejudgesad hocchosenbytherespondentStatesshould not sit during the current phase of the procedure inthesecases .TheAgentswerealsoinformedthattheCourthaddecidedthatajoinderoftheproceedingswouldnotbeappro-priateatthatstage .



OnbehalfoftheFrenchGovernment,atthehearingof22April2004:“For the reasons it has set out orally and in its writtenpleadings, theFrenchRepublicrequests theInternationalCourtofJusticeto:—principally,removethecasefromtheList;— in the alternative, decide that it lacks jurisdiction to

ruleontheApplicationfiledbytheFederalRepublicofYugoslaviaagainstFrance;and,

—inthefurtheralternative,decidethattheApplicationisinadmissible .”

OnbehalfoftheGovernmentofSerbiaandMontenegroatthehearingof23April2004:“Forthereasonsgiveninitspleadings,andinparticularinitsWrittenObservations,subsequentcorrespondencewiththeCourt,andattheoralhearing,SerbiaandMontenegrorequeststheCourt:—toadjudgeanddeclareonitsjurisdictionratione perso-





TheCourtbeginsbyobservingthatitmustfirstdealwithapreliminaryquestionthathasbeenraisedineachofthecases,namelythecontention,presentedinvariousformsbytheeightrespondentStates,that,asaresultofthechangedattitudeof

the Applicant to the question of the Court’s jurisdiction asexpressedinitsObservations,theCourtisnolongerrequiredtoruleonthoseobjectionstojurisdiction,butcansimplydis-miss thecases in limine litisandremovethemfromitsList,withoutenquiringfurtherintomattersofjurisdiction .

TheCourtthenexaminesanumberofargumentsadvancedbydifferentRespondentsaspossiblelegalgroundsthatwouldleadtheCourttotakethiscourse,including,inter alia:(i)thatthepositionofSerbiaandMontenegroistobetreatedasonethatineffectresultsinadiscontinuanceoftheproceedingsorthattheCourtshouldex officioputanendtothecaseintheinterestsoftheproperadministrationofjustice;(ii)thatthereisagreementbetweenthePartiesona“questionofjurisdictionthat is determinative of the case”, and that as a result thereisnowno“disputeastowhethertheCourthasjurisdiction”;(iii)thatthesubstantivedisputeundertheGenocideConven-tion has disappeared and thus the whole dispute has disap-pearedinthosecasesinwhichtheonlygroundofjurisdictionreliedonisArticleIxofthatConvention;(iv)thatSerbiaandMontenegro, by its conduct, has forfeited or renounced itsrightofactioninthepresentcaseandisnowestoppedfrompursuingtheproceedings .

TheCourtfindsitselfunabletoupholdthevariousconten-tionsoftheRespondents .TheCourtconsidersthatitisunabletotreattheObservationsofSerbiaandMontenegroashavingthelegaleffectofadiscontinuanceoftheproceedingsunderArticle88or89oftheRulesofCourtandfindsthatthecasedoesnotfallintothecategoryofcasesinwhichitmayofitsownmotionputanendtoproceedingsinacase .AsregardstheargumentadvancedbycertainRespondentsthatthedis-pute on jurisdiction has disappeared since the Parties nowagreethattheApplicantwasnotapartytotheStatuteattherelevanttime,theCourtpointsoutthatSerbiaandMontene-grohasnot invitedtheCourttofindthat ithasnojurisdic-tion;whileitisapparentlyinagreementwiththeargumentsadvancedbytheRespondentsinthatregardintheirprelimi-naryobjections,ithasspecificallyaskedinitssubmissionsfora decision of the Court on the jurisdictional question . Thisquestion, in the view of the Court, is a legal question inde-pendentoftheviewsofthepartiesuponit .Astotheargumentconcerningthedisappearanceofthesubstantivedispute,itisclearthatSerbiaandMontenegrohasbynomeanswithdrawnitsclaimsas to themerits . Indeed, theseclaimswereexten-sivelyarguedanddevelopedinsubstanceduringthehearingsonjurisdiction,inthecontextofthequestionofthejurisdic-tionoftheCourtunderArticleIxoftheGenocideConven-tion .Itisequallyclearthattheseclaimsarebeingvigorouslydeniedby theRespondents . It couldnotevenbe saidunderthesecircumstancesthat,whiletheessentialdisputestillsub-sists,SerbiaandMontenegroisnolongerseekingtohaveitsclaimdeterminedbytheCourt .SerbiaandMontenegrohasnotsoughtadiscontinuanceandhasstatedthatit“wantstheCourt to continue the case and to decide upon its jurisdic-tion—and to decide on the merits as well, if it has jurisdic-tion” .TheCourtthereforefindsitselfunabletoconcludethatSerbiaandMontenegrohasrenouncedanyofitssubstantiveorproceduralrights,orhastakenthepositionthatthedisputebetweenthePartieshasceasedtoexist .Asfortheargumentbasedonthedoctrineofestoppel,theCourtdoesnotconsider

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thatSerbiaandMontenegro,byaskingtheCourt“todecideonitsjurisdiction”onthebasisofcertainalleged“newfacts”aboutitsownlegalstatusvis-à-vistheUnitedNations,shouldbeheldtohaveforfeitedorrenounceditsrightofactionandtobeestoppedfromcontinuingthepresentactionbeforetheCourt .



TheCourtrecallsthattheApplicationfiledon29April1999statedthat“[t]heGovernmentoftheFederalRepublicofYugo-slaviainvokesArticleIxoftheConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocideaswellasArticle38,paragraph5,oftheRulesofCourt” .Withregardtothesec-ondgroundofjurisdictionthusinvokedbytheApplicant,theCourtrecallsthatattheprovisionalmeasuresstage,itfoundthat“itisquiteclearthat,intheabsenceofconsentbyFrance,given pursuant to Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules, theCourtcannotexercisejurisdiction . . .evenprima facie”(I.C.J. Reports 1999 (I), p . 373, para . 31) . The Court notes that thePartieshavenotreturnedtothismatter .



TheCourtnotesinthisrespectthatthereisnodoubtthatSerbiaandMontenegroisaStateforthepurposeofArticle34,paragraph 1, of the Statute . However, certain Respondentsobjected that, at the time of the filing of its Application on29April1999,thatStatedidnotmeettheconditionssetdownin Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute since it was not amember of the United Nations and was not on that basis apartytotheStatute .TheCourtrecallsthatFrancedidnotraisethisissuebutreiteratesthatthequestionisfundamentalandmustbeexaminedirrespectiveoftheattitudeoftheParties .

TheCourtthenrecapitulatesthesequenceofeventsrelat-ingtothelegalpositionoftheApplicantvis-à-vistheUnitedNationsovertheperiod1992–2000 .Itrefers,interalia,tothefollowing: the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic ofYugoslaviain1991–1992;adeclarationof27April1992bytheSFRYAssembly,theNationalAssemblyoftheRepublicofSer-biaandtheAssemblyoftheRepublicofMontenegroassertingthecontinuationof the international legalandpoliticalper-sonalityoftheSFRYbytheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia;anoteofthesamedayfromYugoslaviatotheUnitedNationsSecretary-General asserting the continuation by the FRY ofthe membership of the SFRY in the Organization; SecurityCouncilresolution777of1992consideringthattheFRYcouldnotcontinueautomaticallytheSFRY’smembership;GeneralAssembly resolution 47/1 of 1992 stating that the FRY shallnot participate in the work of the General Assembly; and aletterdated29September1992fromtheUnitedNationsLegalCounsel regarding the “practical consequences” of GeneralAssemblyresolution47/1 .

TheCourtconcludesthatthelegalsituationthatobtainedwithin the United Nations during the period 1992–2000concerningthestatusof theFederalRepublicofYugoslavia,remainedambiguousandopentodifferentassessments .Thiswasdue,interalia,totheabsenceofanauthoritativedetermi-nationbythecompetentorgansoftheUnitedNationsdefiningclearly the legalstatusof theFederalRepublicofYugoslaviavis-à-vistheUnitedNations .


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TheCourtpointsout that itwasagainst thisbackgroundthat the Court itself, in its Judgment of 3 February 2003 inthecaseconcerningApplication for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case concerning Application of theConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeof Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Pre-liminary Objections (Yugoslavia v . Bosnia and Herzegovina)(hereinafterthe“Application for Revision case”),referredtothe“suigenerispositionwhichtheFRYfounditselfin”duringtherelevantperiod;however,inthatcase,nofinalanddefinitiveconclusionwasdrawnbytheCourtfromthisdescriptivetermontheamorphousstatusoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslaviavis-à-visorwithintheUnitedNationsduringthisperiod .




AfurtherpointtheCourtconsidersistherelevancetothepresentcaseof theJudgment in theApplication for Revisioncase,of3February2003 .TheCourtpointsoutthat,giventhespecific characteristics of the procedure under Article 61 oftheStatute,inwhichtheconditionsforgrantinganapplica-

tion for revision of a judgment are strictly circumscribed,thereisnoreasontotreattheJudgmentintheApplication for RevisioncaseashavingpronouncedupontheissueofthelegalstatusofSerbiaandMontenegrovis-à-vistheUnitedNations .NordoestheJudgmentpronounceuponthestatusofSerbiaandMontenegroinrelationtotheStatuteoftheCourt .







TheCourtnotesthatthepassagefromthe1993OrderintheGenocide ConventioncasewasaddressedtothesituationinwhichtheproceedingswereinstitutedagainstaStatewhosemembershipintheUnitedNationsandstatusasapartytotheStatutewasunclear .ItobservesthattheOrderof8April1993wasmadeonthebasisofanexaminationoftherelevantlawandfactsinthecontextofincidentalproceedingsonarequestfor the indication of provisional measures, and concludesthat it would therefore now be appropriate for the Court tomakeadefinitivefindingonthequestionwhetherArticle35,

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paragraph2,affordsaccesstotheCourtinthepresentcase,and for thatpurpose, toexamine further thequestionof itsapplicabilityandinterpretation .





AccordinglyArticle35,paragraph2,mustbeinterpreted,mutatis mutandis,inthesamewayastheequivalenttextintheStatuteofthePermanentCourt,namelyasintendedtorefertotreatiesinforceatthedateoftheentryintoforceofthenewStatute,andprovidingforthejurisdictionofthenewCourt .Infact,nosuchpriortreaties,referringtothejurisdictionofthepresentCourt,havebeenbroughttotheattentionoftheCourt,anditmaybethatnoneexist .IntheviewoftheCourt,however,neitherthiscircumstance,noranyconsiderationoftheobjectandpurposeof thetext,northe travaux prépara-toires,offersupporttothealternativeinterpretationthattheprovision was intended as granting access to the Court toStatesnotpartiestotheStatutewithoutanyconditionotherthantheexistenceofatreaty,containingaclauseconferringjurisdictionontheCourt,whichmightbeconcludedatanytime subsequently to the entry into force of the Statute . Aspreviouslyobserved,thisinterpretationwouldleadtoaresultquiteincompatiblewiththeobjectandpurposeofArticle35,paragraph 2, namely the regulation of access to the CourtbyStatesnon-partiestotheStatute .IntheviewoftheCourttherefore,thereferenceinArticle35,paragraph2,oftheStat-ute to “the special provisions contained in treaties in force”appliesonly to treaties in forceat thedateof theentry intoforce of the Statute, and not to any treaties concluded sincethatdate .






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1 .Vice-PresidentRanjevaandJudgesGuillaume,Higgins,Kooijmans,Al-Khasawneh,BuergenthalandElarabyvotedin

80

favour of the dispositif of the Judgments because they agreethat these cases cannot, as a matter of law, proceed to themerits . They have added in their joint declaration that theyneverthelessprofoundlydisagreewiththereasoningadoptedbytheCourt .













FirsthewishestoexplainwhyinhisviewtheCourtshouldnothavedecidedtheissueofjurisdictiononthegroundofSer-biaandMontenegro’slackofaccesstotheCourt,althoughin1999,whentheCourtrejectedYugoslavia’srequestforinterimmeasuresofprotection,hewasinfavourofthisapproach .Inhisview,theCourthasnotinaconvincingandtransparentwayelucidatedthestatusoftheFederalRepublicofYugosla-via vis-à-vis the United Nations before its admission to theOrganization in 2000 . Further, the Court’s Judgment hasundeniableimplicationsforotherpendingcases,inparticulartheGenocide Convention case (Bosnia Herzegovina v .Serbia and Montenegro), which could easily have been avoided bychoosinganotherapproach .Finally,theJudgmentisatoddswith previous decisions of the Court, thus endangering theprinciple of consistency of reasoning . This consistency with

81

earliercaselawshouldprevailoverpresentorearliermisgiv-ingsof individual judges if anapproach inconformitywiththatconsistencydoesnotleadtolegallyuntenableresults .





HealsodisagreedwiththeCourt’sfindingthat,assumingtheFRYwasanon-MemberoftheUnitedNations, itwouldnothavehadaccesstotheCourtunderArticle35,paragraph2 .ForJudgeElaraby,theCourt’sinterpretationoftheterm“trea-tiesinforce”inArticle35,paragraph2,asmeaning“treatiesinforceatthetimetheStatuteoftheCourtenteredintoforce”wasundulyrestrictive .LiketheCourt,JudgeElarabyanalysedtherelevant travaux préparatoires,but,unlike theCourt,hefoundthattheexpression“treatiesinforce”shouldbereadtoincludeanytreatiesconnectedwiththepeacesettlementfol-

lowingtheSecondWorldWar,whethertheyenteredintoforcebeforeorafter theStatuteof theCourt .Thiswould include,accordingtoJudgeElaraby,theGenocideConvention,atreatydrafted under the auspices of the United Nations in directresponse to the tragic events of the Second World War . Inthealternative,JudgeElarabystatedthat,eveniftheCourt’sreadingof“treaties inforce”wereadoptedasageneralrule,thereshouldbeanexceptionfortreatiesintendedtoremedyviolationsofjus cogens.These,hewrote,shouldbesubjecttoabroaderinterpretationsothatanyStateseekingaccesstotheCourtonthebasisofatreatythataddressesajus cogensviola-tioncoulddosoas longas thetreatywas inforcewhentheApplicationwasfiled .

BecauseJudgeElarabyconcludedthattheCourtwasopento the FRY under Article 35 when it filed its Application in1999,hewentontoassesswhethertheCourthasjurisdictionratione personaeunderArticleIxoftheGenocideConvention .Heconcludedthatitdoes,becausetheFRYsucceededtothetreatyobligationsoftheformerSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia,includingtheGenocideConvention .Inreachingthisconclusionheexplainedthat,incasesinvolvingthesepa-rationofpartsoftheterritoryofaStatetoformoneormorenewStates,Article34oftheViennaConventiononSuccessionofStatesinrespectofTreatiesembodiedacustomaryruleofautomaticsuccessionbythenewStatetothetreatiesinforceontheterritoryofitspredecessor .HepointedoutthatitwasallthemoreimportantfortheCourttorecognizeandapplythisruleinthecaseofafundamentalhumanrightstreatysuchas the Genocide Convention . Judge Elaraby thus concludedthattheFRYwasapartytotheGenocideConventiononthebasis of succession—not its subsequent purported accessionand reservation—and therefore that the Court had jurisdic-tionratione personae.Hefound,however,thattheCourtdidnothavejurisdictionratione materiaeundertheConvention,sointhefinalanalysisagreedwiththeCourtthattherewasnojurisdictiontoexaminethemeritsoftheFRY’scase .







82



(ii) the admission of Yugoslavia as a Member as from1November2000qualifiedper seitsstatusvis-à-vistheUnit-

ed Nations before that date . It seems clear that, in the lightofthedecisionstakenbythecompetentorgansoftheUnitedNations,thisstatuscouldnotbeamembershipstatus .A con-trario,YugoslaviacouldnothavebeenadmittedasaMemberasfrom1November2000 .


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152. CAseConCeRnInGLeGALItYoFUseoFFoRCe(seRBIAAnDMonteneGRov.GeRMAnY)(PReLIMInARYoBJeCtIons)


InitsJudgmentinthecaseconcerningLegality of the Use of Force(Serbia and Montenegrov .Germany),theCourtunani-mouslyconcludedthatithadnojurisdictiontoentertaintheclaimsmadeintheApplicationfiledbySerbiaandMontene-groagainstGermanyon29April1999 .


** *


“ . . .

TheCourt,

Unanimously,

Finds that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the claimsmade in the Application filed by Serbia and Montenegroon29April1999 .”

** *


** *

History of the proceedings and submissions of the Parties(paras .1-22)

On29April1999theGovernmentoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(witheffectfrom4February2003,“SerbiaandMontenegro”)filedintheRegistryoftheCourtanApplica-tion instituting proceedings against the Federal Republic ofGermany(hereinafter“Germany”)inrespectofadisputecon-cerningactsallegedlycommittedbyGermany

“bywhichithasviolateditsinternationalobligationban-ningtheuseofforceagainstanotherState,theobligationnot to intervene in the internal affairs of another State,the obligation not to violate the sovereignty of anotherState,theobligationtoprotectthecivilianpopulationandcivilian objects in wartime, the obligation to protect theenvironment,theobligationrelatingtofreenavigationoninternationalrivers,theobligationregardingfundamentalhumanrightsandfreedoms,theobligationnottousepro-hibited weapons, the obligation not to deliberately inflictconditionsoflifecalculatedtocausethephysicaldestruc-tionofanationalgroup” .

The Application invoked as a basis of the Court’s juris-dictionArticle Ixof theConventionon thePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocide,adoptedbytheUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyon9December1948(hereinafter“the Genocide Convention”), as well as Article 38, para-graph5,oftheRulesofCourt .


Onthesameday,theFederalRepublicofYugoslaviafiledApplicationsinstitutingproceedingsandsubmittedrequestsfortheindicationofprovisionalmeasures,inrespectofotherdisputesarisingoutofthesamefacts,againsttheKingdomofBelgium,Canada,theFrenchRepublic, theItalianRepublic,theKingdomoftheNetherlands,thePortugueseRepublic,theKingdomofSpain,theUnitedKingdomofGreatBritainandNorthernIrelandandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica .

83



On5July2000,withinthetime-limitfixedforthefilingofitsCounter-Memorial,Germany,referringtoArticle79,para-graph1,oftheRules,submittedpreliminaryobjectionsrelat-ingtotheCourt’sjurisdictiontoentertainthecaseandtotheadmissibilityoftheApplication .Accordingly,theproceedingsonthemeritsweresuspended .






OnbehalfoftheGermanGovernment,atthehearingof22April2004:“Germany requests the Court to dismiss the Applicationforlackofjurisdictionand,additionally,asbeinginadmis-sibleonthegroundsithasstatedinitsPreliminaryObjec-tionsandduringitsoralpleadings .”OnbehalfoftheGovernmentofSerbiaandMontenegroatthehearingof23April2004:“Forthereasonsgiveninitspleadings,andinparticularinitsWrittenObservations,subsequentcorrespondencewith

theCourt,andattheoralhearing,SerbiaandMontenegrorequeststheCourt:—toadjudgeanddeclareonitsjurisdictionratione perso-




Dismissal of the case inliminelitis(paras .24-42)



TheCourtfindsitselfunabletoupholdthevariousconten-tionsoftheRespondents .TheCourtconsidersthatitisunabletotreattheObservationsofSerbiaandMontenegroashavingthelegaleffectofadiscontinuanceoftheproceedingsunderArticle88or89oftheRulesofCourtandfindsthatthecasedoesnotfallintothecategoryofcasesinwhichitmayofitsownmotionputanendtoproceedingsinacase .AsregardstheargumentadvancedbycertainRespondentsthatthedis-pute on jurisdiction has disappeared since the Parties nowagreethattheApplicantwasnotapartytotheStatuteattherelevanttime,theCourtpointsoutthatSerbiaandMontene-grohasnot invitedtheCourttofindthat ithasnojurisdic-tion;whileitisapparentlyinagreementwiththeargumentsadvancedbytheRespondentsinthatregardintheirprelimi-

84

naryobjections,ithasspecificallyaskedinitssubmissionsfora decision of the Court on the jurisdictional question . Thisquestion, in the view of the Court, is a legal question inde-pendentoftheviewsofthepartiesuponit .Astotheargumentconcerningthedisappearanceofthesubstantivedispute,itisclearthatSerbiaandMontenegrohasbynomeanswithdrawnitsclaimsas to themerits . Indeed, theseclaimswereexten-sivelyarguedanddevelopedinsubstanceduringthehearingsonjurisdiction,inthecontextofthequestionofthejurisdic-tionoftheCourtunderArticleIxoftheGenocideConven-tion .Itisequallyclearthattheseclaimsarebeingvigorouslydeniedby theRespondents . It couldnotevenbe saidunderthesecircumstancesthat,whiletheessentialdisputestillsub-sists,SerbiaandMontenegroisnolongerseekingtohaveitsclaimdeterminedbytheCourt .SerbiaandMontenegrohasnotsoughtadiscontinuanceandhasstatedthatit“wantstheCourt to continue the case and to decide upon its jurisdic-tion—and to decide on the merits as well, if it has jurisdic-tion” .TheCourtthereforefindsitselfunabletoconcludethatSerbiaandMontenegrohasrenouncedanyofitssubstantiveorproceduralrights,orhastakenthepositionthatthedisputebetweenthePartieshasceasedtoexist .Asfortheargumentbasedonthedoctrineofestoppel,theCourtdoesnotconsiderthatSerbiaandMontenegro,byaskingtheCourt“todecideonitsjurisdiction”onthebasisofcertainalleged“newfacts”aboutitsownlegalstatusvis-à-vistheUnitedNations,shouldbeheldtohaveforfeitedorrenounceditsrightofactionandtobeestoppedfromcontinuingthepresentactionbeforetheCourt .


Serbia and Montenegro’s access to the Court under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute(paras .43-89)

TheCourtrecallsthattheApplicationfiledon29April1999stated that “[t]he Government of the Federal Republic ofYugoslaviainvokesArticleIxoftheConventiononthePre-ventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocideaswellasArticle38,paragraph5,oftheRulesofCourt” .WithregardtothesecondgroundofjurisdictionthusinvokedbytheAppli-cant,theCourtrecallsthatattheprovisionalmeasuresstage,itfoundthat“itisquiteclearthat,intheabsenceofconsentbyGermany,givenpursuanttoArticle38,paragraph5,oftheRules,theCourtcannotexercisejurisdiction . . .evenprima facie”(I.C.J. Reports 1999(I),p .432,para .31) .TheCourtnotesthatthePartieshavenotreturnedtothismatter .

TheCourtnotesthatinitsjurisprudenceithasreferredto“itsfreedomtoselectthegrounduponwhichitwillbaseitsjudgment”, and that, when its jurisdiction is challenged ondiversegrounds,itisfreetobaseitsdecisionononeormoregroundsofitsownchoosing,inparticular“thegroundwhichin its judgment is more direct and conclusive” . However, inthoseinstances,thePartiestothecasesbeforetheCourtwere,without doubt, parties to the Statute of the Court and the

CourtwasthusopentothemunderArticle35,paragraph1,of theStatute .TheCourtpointsout that this isnotthecasein the present proceedings, in which an objection has beenmaderegardingtherightoftheApplicanttohaveaccesstotheCourt .AnditisthisissueofaccesstotheCourtwhichdistin-guishesthepresentcasefromthosecitedinthejurisprudenceconcerned .



ThusGermanyconsidered, inter alia, that “theFRYdoesnotfulfiltherequirementssetforthinArticle93oftheChar-terandArticle35oftheStatute .NotbeingamemberoftheUnitedNations,itisnotapartytotheStatute”(PreliminaryObjectionsofGermany,p .26,para .3 .1)andconcluded that“[i]norder toenjoya full rightof standingratione personaebefore the Court, as claimed by the FRY, a State must be amemberoftheUnitedNations”(ibid.,p .38,para .3 .25) .

TheCourtthenrecapitulatesthesequenceofeventsrelat-ingtothelegalpositionoftheApplicantvis-à-vistheUnitedNationsovertheperiod1992-2000 .Itrefers,interalia,tothefollowing: the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic ofYugoslaviain1991-1992;adeclarationof27April1992bytheSFRYAssembly,theNationalAssemblyoftheRepublicofSer-biaandtheAssemblyoftheRepublicofMontenegroassertingthecontinuationof the international legalandpoliticalper-sonalityoftheSFRYbytheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia;anoteofthesamedayfromYugoslaviatotheUnitedNationsSecretary-General asserting the continuation by the FRY ofthe membership of the SFRY in the Organization; SecurityCouncilresolution777of1992consideringthattheFRYcouldnotcontinueautomaticallytheSFRY’smembership;GeneralAssembly resolution 47/1 of 1992 stating that the FRY shallnot participate in the work of the General Assembly; and aletterdated29September1992fromtheUnitedNationsLegalCounsel regarding the “practical consequences” of GeneralAssemblyresolution47/1 .

TheCourtconcludesthatthelegalsituationthatobtainedwithin the United Nations during the period 1992-2000concerning the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

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remainedambiguousandopentodifferentassessments .Thiswasdue,interalia,totheabsenceofanauthoritativedetermi-nationbythecompetentorgansoftheUnitedNationsdefiningclearly the legalstatusof theFederalRepublicofYugoslaviavis-à-vistheUnitedNations .




TheCourtpointsout that itwasagainst thisbackgroundthat the Court itself, in its Judgment of 3 February 2003 inthecaseconcerningApplication for Revision of the Judgment of 11July1996 in the Case concerning ApplicationoftheCon-vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime ofGenocide(Bosnia and Herzegovina v . Yugoslavia),PreliminaryObjections (Yugoslaviav .Bosnia and Herzegovina)(hereinafterthe“Application for Revision case”),referredtothe“suigenerisposition which the FRY found itself in” during the relevantperiod;however,inthatcase,nofinalanddefinitiveconclu-sion was drawn by the Court from this descriptive term onthe amorphous status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslaviavis-à-visorwithintheUnitedNationsduringthisperiod .

TheCourtconsidersthatthissituationcametoanendwithanewdevelopmentin2000 .On27Octoberofthatyear,theFederalRepublicofYugoslaviarequestedadmissiontomem-

bershipintheUnitedNations,andon1November,byGen-eralAssemblyresolution55/12,itwassoadmitted .SerbiaandMontenegrothushasthestatusofmembershipintheOrgani-zationas from1November2000 .However, itsadmissiontotheUnitedNationsdidnothave,andcouldnothavehad,theeffectofdatingbacktothetimewhentheSFRYbrokeupanddisappeared . It became clear that the sui generis position oftheApplicantcouldnothaveamountedtoitsmembershipintheOrganization .





Serbia and Montenegro’s possible access to the Court on the basis of Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute(paras .90-112)



in thecaseconcerningApplication of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v . Serbia and Montenegro) (hereinafter the“Genocide Convention case”),where it stated, inter alia, thata “compromissory clause in a multilateral convention, such

86

asArticle Ixof theGenocideConventionreliedonbyBos-nia and Herzegovina in the present case, could, in the viewof the Court, be regarded prima facie as a special provisioncontainedinatreatyinforce”(emphasisadded) .









87

Unnecessary to consider other preliminary objections (para .113)




** *






4 . In the view of the seven judges making the joint dec-laration, this solution is at odds with a number of previousdecisionsof theCourt, inparticular the Judgmentrenderedon3February2003inacasebetweenBosniaandHerzegovinaandYugoslavia,inwhichitwasfoundthatYugoslaviacouldappearbeforetheCourtbetween1992and2000andthatthispositionhadnotbeenchangedbyitsadmissiontotheUnitedNationsin2002 .Further,theauthorsofthedeclarationnote

that inreality it is far fromself-evident thatYugoslaviawasnotaMemberoftheUnitedNationsatthattime .Lastly,theyregret that the Judgment leaves some doubt as to whetherYugoslaviawasaparty,between1992and2000,totheUnitedNationsGenocideConventionandthuscouldcallintoques-tion thesolutionsadoptedby theCourt in thecasebroughtbyBosniaandHerzegovinaagainstSerbiaandMontenegro .Thus, the Court’s Judgment does not meet any of the threecriteriasetoutinparagraph2above .



InhisdeclarationJudgeKoromastatedthat,whileconcur-ringintheJudgment,heconsidereditnecessarytostress thefollowing . The question which the Court was requested toruleonandwhichitinfactdiddecideinthisphaseofthecasewastheissueofjurisdiction,namely,whethertheCourtcouldentertainthemeritsofthecase .ThejurisdictionalfunctionisintendedtoestablishwhethertheCourtisentitledtoenterintoandadjudicateonthesubstantiveissuesinacase .Thisfunction,inhisview,cannotbedispensedwithasitisbothrequiredbylawandstipulatedintheStatuteoftheCourt .ItisthisfunctionthattheCourthascarriedoutinthisJudgmentanditiswithinthis paradigm that the Judgment must be understood . TheJudgmentcannotbeinterpretedastheCourttakingapositiononanyofthemattersofsubstancebeforetheCourt .





88



FirsthewishestoexplainwhyinhisviewtheCourtshouldnothavedecidedtheissueofjurisdictiononthegroundofSer-biaandMontenegro’slackofaccesstotheCourt,althoughin1999,whentheCourtrejectedYugoslavia’srequestforinterimmeasuresofprotection,hewasinfavourofthisapproach .Inhisview,theCourthasnotinaconvincingandtransparentwayelucidatedthestatusoftheFederalRepublicofYugosla-via vis-à-vis the United Nations before its admission to theOrganization in 2000 . Further, the Court’s Judgment hasundeniableimplicationsforotherpendingcases,inparticulartheGenocide Convention case (Bosnia Herzegovina v .Serbia and Montenegro), which could easily have been avoided bychoosinganotherapproach .Finally,theJudgmentisatoddswith previous decisions of the Court, thus endangering theprinciple of consistency of reasoning . This consistency withearliercaselawshouldprevailoverpresentorearliermisgiv-ingsof individual judges if anapproach inconformitywiththatconsistencydoesnotleadtolegallyuntenableresults .




Beginning with the issue of access to the Court underArticle35,paragraph1,JudgeElarabyexplainedwhy, inhisview,theFederalRepublicofYugoslaviawasaMemberoftheUnitedNationsatthetimeitfileditsApplicationinthecase .He emphasized that, although the FRY was excluded fromparticipation in the work of the General Assembly and itssubsidiary organs, it remained, as the Court had previouslyfound, a sui generis Member between 1992 and 2000 . Thus

JudgeElarabypointedoutthatduringthisperioditcontinuedtoexhibitmanyattributesofUnitedNationsmembershipandwas neither suspended nor expelled from the OrganizationundertherelevantprovisionsoftheUnitedNationsCharter .On this basis, Judge Elaraby concluded that the FRY was aMember of the United Nations when it filed its Applicationin1999and,asaresult,hedisagreedwith theCourt’sfind-ingthatitwasnot“open”totheFRYunderArticle35,para-graph1,oftheCourt’sStatute .



89











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153. CAseConCeRnInGLeGALItYoFUseoFFoRCe(seRBIAAnDMonteneGRov.ItALY)(PReLIMInARYoBJeCtIons)


InitsJudgmentinthecaseconcerningLegality of the Use of Force(Serbia and Montenegrov .Italy),theCourtunanimouslyconcludedthatithadnojurisdictiontoentertaintheclaimsmade in the Application filed by Serbia and MontenegroagainstItalyon29April1999 .


** *



** *

Vice-President Ranjeva and Judges Guillaume, Hig-gins, Kooijmans, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal and Elarabyappended a joint declaration to the Judgment of the Court;JudgeKoromaappendedadeclarationtotheJudgmentofthe

Court; Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Elaraby and Judgead hocKrećaappendedseparateopinionstotheJudgmentoftheCourt .

** *


On29April1999theGovernmentoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(witheffectfrom4February2003,“SerbiaandMontenegro”)filedintheRegistryoftheCourtanApplicationinstitutingproceedingsagainsttheItalianRepublic(hereinaf-ter “Italy”) in respect of a dispute concerning acts allegedlycommittedbyItaly

“bywhichithasviolateditsinternationalobligationban-ningtheuseofforceagainstanotherState,theobligationnot to intervene in the internal affairs of another State,the obligation not to violate the sovereignty of anotherState,theobligationtoprotectthecivilianpopulationandcivilian objects in wartime, the obligation to protect theenvironment,theobligationrelatingtofreenavigationoninternationalrivers,theobligationregardingfundamentalhumanrightsandfreedoms,theobligationnottousepro-hibited weapons, the obligation not to deliberately inflictconditionsoflifecalculatedtocausethephysicaldestruc-tionofanationalgroup” .The Application invoked as a basis of the Court’s juris-

dictionArticle Ixof theConventionon thePreventionand

90

PunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocide,adoptedbytheUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyon9December1948(hereinafter“the Genocide Convention”), as well as Article 38, para-graph5,oftheRulesofCourt .


Onthesameday,theFederalRepublicofYugoslaviafiledApplicationsinstitutingproceedingsandsubmittedrequestsfortheindicationofprovisionalmeasures,inrespectofotherdisputesarisingoutofthesamefacts,againsttheKingdomofBelgium,Canada,theFrenchRepublic,theFederalRepublicofGermany,theKingdomoftheNetherlands,thePortugueseRepublic, the Kingdom of Spain, the United Kingdom ofGreatBritainandNorthernIrelandandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica .

Since the Court included upon the Bench no judge ofthe nationality of the Parties, each of them exercised itsrightunderArticle31,paragraph3,of theStatutetochoosea judge ad hoc to sit in the case: the Yugoslav GovernmentchoseMr .MilenkoKrećaandtheItalianGovernmentchoseMr .GiorgioGaja .ReferringtoArticle31,paragraph5,oftheStatute,theYugoslavGovernmentobjectedtothelatterchoice .TheCourt,afterdeliberating,foundthatthenominationofajudgead hocbyItalywasjustifiedintheprovisionalmeasuresphaseofthecase .


On4July2000,withinthetime–limitfixedforthefilingof itsCounter-Memorial, Italy, referring toArticle79,para-graph1,oftheRules,submittedpreliminaryobjectionsrelat-ingtotheCourt’sjurisdictiontoentertainthecaseandtotheadmissibilityoftheApplication .Accordingly,theproceedingsonthemeritsweresuspended .



At a meeting held by the President of the Court on12December2003withtherepresentativesof theParties intheeightcasesconcerningLegality of Use of Force,theques-tionsofthepresenceontheBenchofjudgesad hocduringthepreliminaryobjectionsphaseandofapossiblejoinderoftheproceedingswerediscussed,amongotherissues .Byletterof23 December 2003 the Registrar informed the Agents of allthePartiesthattheCourthaddecided,pursuanttoArticle31,paragraph5,oftheStatute,that,takingintoaccountthepres-

enceupontheBenchof judgesofBritish,DutchandFrenchnationality,thejudgesad hocchosenbytherespondentStatesshould not sit during the current phase of the procedure inthesecases .TheAgentswerealsoinformedthattheCourthaddecidedthatajoinderoftheproceedingswouldnotbeappro-priateatthatstage .



OnbehalfoftheItalianGovernment,atthehearingof22April2004:“ForthereasonssetoutinitsPreliminaryObjectionsandoral statements, the Italian Government submits as fol-lows:MayitpleasetheCourttoadjudgeanddeclare,Principally,that:I . No decision is called for on the Application filed intheRegistryoftheCourton29April1999bySerbiaandMontenegro against the Italian Republic for ‘violation ofthe obligation not to use force’, as supplemented by theMemorialfiledon5January2000,inasmuchasthereisnolongeranydisputebetweenSerbiaandMontenegroandtheItalianRepublicorasthesubject-matterofthedisputehasdisappeared .In the alternative,that:II . The Court lacks jurisdiction ratione personarum todecidethepresentcase,sinceSerbiaandMontenegrowasnotaparty to theStatutewhentheApplicationwasfiledandalsodoesnotconsideritselfapartytoa‘treatyinforce’suchaswouldconferjurisdictionontheCourt,inaccord-ancewithArticle35,paragraph2,oftheStatute;III .TheCourtlacksjurisdictionratione materiaetodecidethe present case, since Serbia and Montenegro does notregarditselfasboundbyArticleIxoftheGenocideCon-vention,towhichitmadeareservationupongivingnoticeof accession in March 2001 and since, in any event, thedispute arising from the terms of the Application insti-tuting proceedings, as supplemented by the Memorial, isnot a dispute relating to ‘the interpretation, applicationorfulfilment’oftheGenocideConvention,asprovidedinArticleIx;IV .SerbiaandMontenegro’sApplication,assupplementedbytheMemorial,isinadmissibleinitsentirety,inasmuchasSerbiaandMontenegroseekstherebytoobtainfromtheCourt a decision regarding the legality of action under-taken by subjects of international law not present in theproceedingsornotallsopresent;V . Serbia and Montenegro’s Application is inadmissiblewithrespecttotheeleventhsubmission,mentionedforthefirsttimeintheMemorial, inasmuchasSerbiaandMon-tenegroseekstherebytointroduceadisputealtogetherdif-ferentfromtheoriginaldisputederivingfromtheApplica-tion .”

91

OnbehalfoftheGovernmentofSerbiaandMontenegroatthehearingof23April2004:“Forthereasonsgiveninitspleadings,andinparticularinitsWrittenObservations,subsequentcorrespondencewiththeCourt,andattheoralhearing,SerbiaandMontenegrorequeststheCourt:—toadjudgeanddeclareonitsjurisdictionratione perso-naeinthepresentcases;and—todismisstheremainingpreliminaryobjectionsoftherespondentStates,andtoorderproceedingsonthemeritsifitfindsithasjurisdictionratione personae.”Before proceeding to its reasoning, the Court includes a


Dismissal of the case inliminelitis (paras .25–43)



TheCourtfindsitselfunabletoupholdthevariousconten-tionsoftheRespondents .TheCourtconsidersthatitisunabletotreattheObservationsofSerbiaandMontenegroashavingthelegaleffectofadiscontinuanceoftheproceedingsunderArticle88or89oftheRulesofCourtandfindsthatthecasedoesnotfallintothecategoryofcasesinwhichitmayofitsownmotionputanendtoproceedingsinacase .AsregardstheargumentadvancedbycertainRespondentsthatthedis-pute on jurisdiction has disappeared since the Parties now

agreethattheApplicantwasnotapartytotheStatuteattherelevanttime,theCourtpointsoutthatSerbiaandMontene-grohasnot invitedtheCourttofindthat ithasnojurisdic-tion;whileitisapparentlyinagreementwiththeargumentsadvancedbytheRespondentsinthatregardintheirprelimi-naryobjections,ithasspecificallyaskedinitssubmissionsfora decision of the Court on the jurisdictional question . Thisquestion, in the view of the Court, is a legal question inde-pendentoftheviewsofthepartiesuponit .Astotheargumentconcerningthedisappearanceofthesubstantivedispute,itisclearthatSerbiaandMontenegrohasbynomeanswithdrawnitsclaimsas to themerits . Indeed, theseclaimswereexten-sivelyarguedanddevelopedinsubstanceduringthehearingsonjurisdiction,inthecontextofthequestionofthejurisdic-tionoftheCourtunderArticleIxoftheGenocideConven-tion .Itisequallyclearthattheseclaimsarebeingvigorouslydeniedby theRespondents . It couldnotevenbe saidunderthesecircumstancesthat,whiletheessentialdisputestillsub-sists,SerbiaandMontenegroisnolongerseekingtohaveitsclaimdeterminedbytheCourt .SerbiaandMontenegrohasnotsoughtadiscontinuanceandhasstatedthatit“wantstheCourt to continue the case and to decide upon its jurisdic-tion—and to decide on the merits as well, if it has jurisdic-tion” .TheCourtthereforefindsitselfunabletoconcludethatSerbiaandMontenegrohasrenouncedanyofitssubstantiveorproceduralrights,orhastakenthepositionthatthedisputebetweenthePartieshasceasedtoexist .Asfortheargumentbasedonthedoctrineofestoppel,theCourtdoesnotconsiderthatSerbiaandMontenegro,byaskingtheCourt“todecideonitsjurisdiction”onthebasisofcertainalleged“newfacts”aboutitsownlegalstatusvis-à-vistheUnitedNations,shouldbeheldtohaveforfeitedorrenounceditsrightofactionandtobeestoppedfromcontinuingthepresentactionbeforetheCourt .

For all these reasons, the Court concludes that it cannotremove the cases concerning Legality of Use of Force fromthe List, or take any decision putting an end to those casesin limine litis.Inthepresentphaseoftheproceedings,itmustproceedtoexaminethequestionof its jurisdictiontoenter-tainthecase .


TheCourtrecallsthattheApplicationfiledon29April1999stated that “[t]he Government of the Federal Republic ofYugoslaviainvokesArticleIxoftheConventiononthePre-ventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocideaswellasArticle38,paragraph5,oftheRulesofCourt” .WithregardtothesecondgroundofjurisdictionthusinvokedbytheAppli-cant,theCourtrecallsthatattheprovisionalmeasuresstage,itfoundthat“itisquiteclearthat,intheabsenceofconsentbyItaly,givenpursuanttoArticle38,paragraph5,oftheRules,theCourtcannotexercise jurisdiction . . .evenprima facie”(I.C.J. Reports 1999 (I),p .492,para .31) .TheCourtnotesthatthePartieshavenotreturnedtothismatter .

TheCourtnotesthatinitsjurisprudenceithasreferredto“itsfreedomtoselectthegrounduponwhichitwillbaseitsjudgment”, and that, when its jurisdiction is challenged on

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diversegrounds,itisfreetobaseitsdecisionononeormoregroundsofitsownchoosing,inparticular“thegroundwhichin its judgment is more direct and conclusive” . However, inthoseinstances,thePartiestothecasesbeforetheCourtwere,without doubt, parties to the Statute of the Court and theCourtwasthusopentothemunderArticle35,paragraph1,of theStatute .TheCourtpointsout that this isnotthecasein the present proceedings, in which an objection has beenmaderegardingtherightoftheApplicanttohaveaccesstotheCourt .AnditisthisissueofaccesstotheCourtwhichdistin-guishesthepresentcasefromthosecitedinthejurisprudenceconcerned .



ThusItalyarguedthattheApplicantdoesnothaveaccesstotheCourt .ItconsideredthattheApplicantwasnotaMemberoftheUnitedNationsandconcluded, inter alia,that

“[s]ince it isnotaMemberof theUnitedNations,by thesametokenYugoslaviaisnotapartytotheStatuteunderArticle 93, paragraph 1, of the Charter [of the UnitedNations]”(PreliminaryObjectionsofItaly,p .27) .TheCourtthenrecapitulatesthesequenceofeventsrelat-

ingtothelegalpositionoftheApplicantvis-à-vistheUnitedNationsovertheperiod1992–2000 .Itrefers,inter alia,tothefollowing: the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic ofYugoslaviain1991–1992;adeclarationof27April1992bytheSFRYAssembly,theNationalAssemblyoftheRepublicofSer-biaandtheAssemblyoftheRepublicofMontenegroassertingthecontinuationof the international legalandpoliticalper-sonalityoftheSFRYbytheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia;anoteofthesamedayfromYugoslaviatotheUnitedNationsSecretary-General asserting the continuation by the FRY ofthe membership of the SFRY in the Organization; SecurityCouncilresolution777of1992consideringthattheFRYcouldnotcontinueautomaticallytheSFRY’smembership;GeneralAssembly resolution 47/1 of 1992 stating that the FRY shallnot participate in the work of the General Assembly; and aletterdated29September1992fromtheUnitedNationsLegal

Counsel regarding the “practical consequences” of GeneralAssemblyresolution47/1 .

TheCourtconcludesthatthelegalsituationthatobtainedwithin the United Nations during the period 1992–2000concerning the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslaviaremainedambiguousandopentodifferentassessments .Thiswasdue,inter alia,totheabsenceofanauthoritativedetermi-nationbythecompetentorgansoftheUnitedNationsdefiningclearly the legalstatusof theFederalRepublicofYugoslaviavis-à-vistheUnitedNations .



Thirdly, another organ that came to be involved in thisproblem was the Secretariat of the United Nations . In theabsenceofanyauthoritativedetermination,theSecretariat,astheadministrativeorganoftheOrganization,simplycontin-uedtokeeptothepracticeofthestatus quo antethathadpre-vailedpriortothebreak-upoftheSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslaviain1992 .

TheCourtpointsout that itwasagainst thisbackgroundthat the Court itself, in its Judgment of 3 February 2003 inthecaseconcerningApplication for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case concerning Application of theConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeof Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Pre-liminary Objections (Yugoslavia v . Bosnia and Herzegovina)(hereinafterthe“Application for Revision case”),referredtothe“sui generispositionwhichtheFRYfounditselfin”duringtherelevantperiod;however,inthatcase,nofinalanddefinitiveconclusionwasdrawnbytheCourtfromthisdescriptiveterm

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ontheamorphousstatusoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslaviavis-à-visorwithintheUnitedNationsduringthisperiod .








“The conditions under which the Court shall be open tootherStates[i .e .StatesnotpartiestotheStatute]shall,sub-jecttothespecialprovisionscontainedintreatiesinforce,belaiddownbytheSecurityCouncil,butinnocaseshallsuchconditionsplacethepartiesinapositionofinequalitybeforetheCourt .”

In this regard, it quotes from its Order of 8 April 1993in thecaseconcerningApplication of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v . Serbia and Montenegro) (hereinafter the“Genocide Convention case”),where it stated, inter alia, thata “compromissory clause in a multilateral convention, suchasArticle Ixof theGenocideConventionreliedonbyBos-nia and Herzegovina in the present case, could, in the viewof the Court, be regarded prima facie as a special provisioncontainedinatreatyinforce”(emphasisadded) .





The Court observes that the object and purpose of Arti-cle 35 of the Statute is to define the conditions of access totheCourt .Whileparagraph1ofthatArticleopensit totheStatespartiestotheStatute,paragraph2isintendedtoregu-

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lateaccesstotheCourtbyStateswhicharenotpartiestotheStatute .ItwouldhavebeeninconsistentwiththemainthrustofthetexttomakeitpossibleinthefutureforStatesnotpar-tiestotheStatutetoobtainaccesstotheCourtsimplybytheconclusionbetweenthemselvesofaspecialtreaty,multilateralorbilateral,containingaprovisiontothateffect .


AccordinglyArticle35,paragraph2,mustbeinterpreted,mutatis mutandis,inthesamewayastheequivalenttextintheStatuteofthePermanentCourt,namelyasintendedtorefertotreatiesinforceatthedateoftheentryintoforceofthenewStatute,andprovidingforthejurisdictionofthenewCourt .Infact,nosuchpriortreaties,referringtothejurisdictionofthepresentCourt,havebeenbroughttotheattentionoftheCourt,anditmaybethatnoneexist .IntheviewoftheCourt,however,neitherthiscircumstance,noranyconsiderationoftheobjectandpurposeof thetext,northe travaux prépara-toires,offersupporttothealternativeinterpretationthattheprovision was intended as granting access to the Court toStatesnotpartiestotheStatutewithoutanyconditionotherthantheexistenceofatreaty,containingaclauseconferringjurisdictionontheCourt,whichmightbeconcludedatanytime subsequently to the entry into force of the Statute . Aspreviouslyobserved,thisinterpretationwouldleadtoaresultquiteincompatiblewiththeobjectandpurposeofArticle35,paragraph 2, namely the regulation of access to the CourtbyStatesnon-partiestotheStatute .IntheviewoftheCourttherefore,thereferenceinArticle35,paragraph2,oftheStat-ute to “the specialprovisions contained in treaties in force”appliesonly to treaties in forceat thedateof theentry intoforce of the Statute, and not to any treaties concluded sincethatdate .

TheCourtthusconcludesthat,evenassumingthatSerbiaandMontenegrowasapartytotheGenocideConventionattherelevantdate,Article35,paragraph2,oftheStatutedoesnotprovideitwithabasistohaveaccesstotheCourt,under

Article Ix of that Convention, since the Convention onlyentered into force on 12 January 1951, after the entry intoforceoftheStatute .TheCourtdoesnotthereforeconsideritnecessary to decide whether Serbia and Montenegro was orwasnotapartytotheGenocideConventionon29April1999whenthecurrentproceedingswereinstituted .





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2 .TheynotethatwhentheCourtfinds inacasethat,ontwo or more grounds, its jurisdiction is not well foundedratione personae,ratione materiaeorratione temporis,itmaychoosethemostappropriategroundonwhichtobaseitsdeci-sion of lack of competence . They point out that this choicemust be guided by three criteria: consistency with the pastcase law; degree of certitude of the ground chosen; possibleimplicationsfortheotherpendingcases .


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5 . The seven judges finally observe that the Court couldeasilyhavefoundeditsJudgmentthatitlackedjurisdictiononthegroundsonwhichitreliedin1999whentherequestsforthe indicationofprovisionalmeasureswereconsidered .TheCourtthenfoundthatitlackedjurisdictionratione temporisinrespectofthedeclarationacceptingthecompulsoryjuris-dictionoftheCourtwhichSerbiaandMontenegrohadfiledseveralweeksafterthestartofmilitaryoperationsinKosovo .Italsofounditselftobewithoutjurisdictionratione materiaein respect of the United Nations Genocide Convention, asnogenocidalintentionhadbeenestablished .Thesesolutionscouldeasilyhavebeenconfirmed .












Judge Elaraby voted in favour of the dispositif, but disa-greedbothwiththegroundsonwhichtheCourtdecidedtobase its Judgment—Article 35, paragraph 1 and Article 35,paragraph2oftheCourt’sStatute—andwiththeconclusionswhichtheCourtreachedoneachofthesegrounds .Thejointdeclaration, to which Judge Elaraby is a signatory, explainswhyhebelievesthattheCourtshouldhavechosenalternative

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grounds toreach itsdecision .His separateopinionexplainswhyhedisagreeswithitssubstantivefindings .



BecauseJudgeElarabyconcludedthattheCourtwasopento the FRY under Article 35 when it filed its Application in1999,hewentontoassesswhethertheCourthasjurisdictionratione personaeunderArticleIxoftheGenocideConvention .Heconcludedthatitdoes,becausetheFRYsucceededtothetreatyobligationsoftheformerSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia,includingtheGenocideConvention .Inreachingthisconclusionheexplainedthat,incasesinvolvingthesepa-rationofpartsoftheterritoryofaStatetoformoneormore

newStates,Article34oftheViennaConventiononSuccessionofStatesinrespectofTreatiesembodiedacustomaryruleofautomaticsuccessionbythenewStatetothetreatiesinforceontheterritoryofitspredecessor .HepointedoutthatitwasallthemoreimportantfortheCourttorecognizeandapplythisruleinthecaseofafundamentalhumanrightstreatysuchas the Genocide Convention . Judge Elaraby thus concludedthattheFRYwasapartytotheGenocideConventiononthebasis of succession—not its subsequent purported accessionand reservation—and therefore that the Court had jurisdic-tionratione personae.Hefound,however,thattheCourtdidnothavejurisdictionratione materiaeundertheConvention,sointhefinalanalysisagreedwiththeCourtthattherewasnojurisdictiontoexaminethemeritsoftheFRY’scase .











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InitsJudgmentinthecaseconcerningLegality of the Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v . Netherlands), the Courtunanimouslyconcluded that ithadno jurisdiction toenter-tain the claims made in the Application filed by Serbia andMontenegroagainstNetherlandson29April1999 .


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On29April1999theGovernmentoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(witheffectfrom4February2003,“SerbiaandMontenegro”)filedintheRegistryoftheCourtanApplica-tioninstitutingproceedingsagainsttheKingdomoftheNeth-erlands(hereinafter“theNetherlands”)inrespectofadisputeconcerningactsallegedlycommittedbytheNetherlands


humanrightsandfreedoms,theobligationnottousepro-hibited weapons, the obligation not to deliberately inflictconditionsoflifecalculatedtocausethephysicaldestruc-tionofanationalgroup” .

The Application invoked as a basis of the Court’s jurisdic-tion Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, aswell as Article Ix of the Convention on the Prevention andPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocide,adoptedbytheUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyon9December1948(hereinafter“theGenocideConvention”) .


Onthesameday,theFederalRepublicofYugoslaviafiledApplicationsinstitutingproceedingsandsubmittedrequestsfortheindicationofprovisionalmeasures,inrespectofotherdisputesarisingoutofthesamefacts,againsttheKingdomofBelgium,Canada,theFrenchRepublic,theFederalRepublicof Germany, the Italian Republic, the Portuguese Republic,theKingdomofSpain,theUnitedKingdomofGreatBritainandNorthernIrelandandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica .

SincetheCourtincludedupontheBenchnojudgeofYugo-slavnationality theYugoslavGovernmentexerciseditsrightunderArticle31oftheStatuteandchoseMr .MilenkoKrećatositasjudgead hocinthecase .

Byletterof12May1999theAgentoftheFederalRepublicof Yugoslavia submitted a “Supplement to the Application”,invokingasafurtherbasisfortheCourt’sjurisdiction“Arti-cle 4 of the Treaty of Judicial Settlement, Arbitration andConciliation between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and theNetherlands,signedinTheHagueon11March1931andinforcesince2April1932” .


On5July2000,withinthetime–limitfixedforthefilingof itsCounter-Memorial, theNetherlands,referringtoArti-cle79,paragraph1,oftheRules,submittedpreliminaryobjec-tionsrelatingtotheCourt’sjurisdictiontoentertainthecaseandtotheadmissibilityoftheApplication .Accordingly,theproceedingsonthemeritsweresuspended .

On 20 December 2002, within the prescribed time-limitastwiceextendedbytheCourtattherequestoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia,thelatterfiledawrittenstatementofitsobservationsandsubmissionsonthosepreliminaryobjec-tions(hereinafterreferredtoasits“Observations”),together

154. CAseConCeRnInGLeGALItYoFUseoFFoRCe(seRBIAAnDMonteneGRov.netHeRLAnDs)(PReLIMInARYoBJeCtIons)


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withidenticalwrittenstatementsinthesevenotherpendingcases .





OnbehalfoftheDutchGovernment,atthehearingof22April2004:“MayitpleasetheCourttoadjudgeanddeclarethat:— the Court has no jurisdiction or should decline to

exercise jurisdiction as the parties in fact agree thatthe Court has no jurisdiction or as there is no longeradisputebetweenthepartiesonthejurisdictionoftheCourt .

Alternatively,—SerbiaandMontenegroisnotentitledtoappearbefore

theCourt;—theCourthasno jurisdictionover theclaimsbrought

against the Netherlands by Serbia and Montenegro;and/or

— the claims brought against the Netherlands by SerbiaandMontenegroareinadmissible .”

OnbehalfoftheGovernmentofSerbiaandMontenegroatthehearingof23April2004:“Forthereasonsgiveninitspleadings,andinparticularinitsWrittenObservations,subsequentcorrespondencewiththeCourt,andattheoralhearing,SerbiaandMontenegrorequeststheCourt:—toadjudgeanddeclareonitsjurisdictionratione perso-



Before proceeding to its reasoning, the Court includes aparagraph (para .24)dealingwith theApplicant’s changeof

name on 4 February 2003 from “Federal Republic of Yugo-slavia”to“SerbiaandMontenegro” .Itexplainsthat,asfaraspossible,exceptwheretheterminahistoricalcontextmightcauseconfusion, itwilluse thename“SerbiaandMontene-gro”,evenwherereferenceismadetoaproceduralsteptakenbeforethechange .




TheCourtfindsitselfunabletoupholdthevariousconten-tionsoftheRespondents .TheCourtconsidersthatitisunabletotreattheObservationsofSerbiaandMontenegroashavingthelegaleffectofadiscontinuanceoftheproceedingsunderArticle88or89oftheRulesofCourtandfindsthatthecasedoesnotfallintothecategoryofcasesinwhichitmayofitsownmotionputanendtoproceedingsinacase .AsregardstheargumentadvancedbycertainRespondentsthatthedis-pute on jurisdiction has disappeared since the Parties nowagreethattheApplicantwasnotapartytotheStatuteattherelevanttime,theCourtpointsoutthatSerbiaandMontene-grohasnot invitedtheCourttofindthat ithasnojurisdic-tion;whileitisapparentlyinagreementwiththeargumentsadvancedbytheRespondentsinthatregardintheirprelimi-naryobjections,ithasspecificallyaskedinitssubmissionsfora decision of the Court on the jurisdictional question . Thisquestion, in the view of the Court, is a legal question inde-pendentoftheviewsofthepartiesuponit .Astotheargumentconcerningthedisappearanceofthesubstantivedispute,itisclearthatSerbiaandMontenegrohasbynomeanswithdrawnitsclaimsas to themerits . Indeed, theseclaimswereexten-sivelyarguedanddevelopedinsubstanceduringthehearingsonjurisdiction,inthecontextofthequestionofthejurisdic-tionoftheCourtunderArticleIxoftheGenocideConven-

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tion .Itisequallyclearthattheseclaimsarebeingvigorouslydeniedby theRespondents . It couldnotevenbe saidunderthesecircumstancesthat,whiletheessentialdisputestillsub-sists,SerbiaandMontenegroisnolongerseekingtohaveitsclaimdeterminedbytheCourt .SerbiaandMontenegrohasnotsoughtadiscontinuanceandhasstatedthatit“wantstheCourt to continue the case and to decide upon its jurisdic-tion—and to decide on the merits as well, if it has jurisdic-tion” .TheCourtthereforefindsitselfunabletoconcludethatSerbiaandMontenegrohasrenouncedanyofitssubstantiveorproceduralrights,orhastakenthepositionthatthedisputebetweenthePartieshasceasedtoexist .Asfortheargumentbasedonthedoctrineofestoppel,theCourtdoesnotconsiderthatSerbiaandMontenegro,byaskingtheCourt“todecideonitsjurisdiction”onthebasisofcertainalleged“newfacts”aboutitsownlegalstatusvis-à-vistheUnitedNations,shouldbeheldtohaveforfeitedorrenounceditsrightofactionandtobeestoppedfromcontinuingthepresentactionbeforetheCourt .



TheCourtrecallsthattheApplicationfiledon29April1999stated that “[t]he Government of the Federal Republic ofYugoslaviainvokesArticle36,paragraph2,oftheStatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeaswellasArticleIxoftheConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocide” .TheCourtfurtherrecallsthatSerbiaandMon-tenegroclaimsasanadditionalbasisofjurisdiction“Article4oftheTreatyofJudicialSettlement,ArbitrationandConcilia-tionbetweentheKingdomofYugoslaviaandtheNetherlands,signed in The Hague on 11 March 1931 and in force since2April1932” .


TheCourtobservesthatthequestionwhetherSerbiaandMontenegrowasorwasnotapartytotheStatuteoftheCourtat the time of the institution of the present proceedings is

fundamental;forifitwerenotsuchaparty,theCourtwouldnotbeopentoitunderArticle35,paragraph1,oftheStatute .Inthatsituation,subjecttoanyapplicationofparagraph2ofthatArticle,SerbiaandMontenegrocouldnothaveproperlyseisedtheCourt,whatevertitleof jurisdictionitmighthaveinvoked,forthesimplereasonthatitdidnothavetherighttoappearbefore theCourt .Hence, theCourtmustfirstexam-inethequestionwhethertheApplicantmeetstheconditionslaiddowninArticles34and35oftheStatuteforaccesstotheCourt .Onlyif theanswertothatquestionis intheaffirma-tive,willtheCourthavetodealwiththeissuesrelatingtotheconditionslaiddowninArticles36and37oftheStatute .


ThustheNetherlandsarguedthat“theFRYisnotentitledtoappearbeforetheCourt”andasserted,inter alia,that

“theFRYasoneofthesuccessorStatesoftheformerSFRYis at present not a member of the United Nations and istherefore not a party to the Statute of the InternationalCourtofJusticebyvirtueofArticle93,paragraph1,oftheUNCharter”(PreliminaryObjectionsoftheNetherlands,p .11,paras .3 .1and3 .2respectively) .TheCourtthenrecapitulatesthesequenceofeventsrelat-

ingtothelegalpositionoftheApplicantvis-à-vistheUnitedNationsovertheperiod1992–2000 .Itrefers,interalia,tothefollowing: the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic ofYugoslaviain1991–1992;adeclarationof27April1992bytheSFRYAssembly,theNationalAssemblyoftheRepublicofSer-biaandtheAssemblyoftheRepublicofMontenegroassertingthecontinuationof the international legalandpoliticalper-sonalityoftheSFRYbytheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia;anoteofthesamedayfromYugoslaviatotheUnitedNationsSecretary-General asserting the continuation by the FRY ofthe membership of the SFRY in the Organization; SecurityCouncilresolution777of1992consideringthattheFRYcouldnotcontinueautomaticallytheSFRY’smembership;GeneralAssembly resolution 47/1 of 1992 stating that the FRY shallnot participate in the work of the General Assembly; and aletterdated29September1992fromtheUnitedNationsLegalCounsel regarding the “practical consequences” of GeneralAssemblyresolution47/1 .


TheCourtnotes that threedifferentpositionsweretakenwithin the United Nations . In the first place, there wasthe position taken by the two political organs concerned .The Court refers in this respect to Security Council resolu-tion777(1992)of19September1992andtoGeneralAssem-

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blyresolution47/1of22September1992,accordingtowhich“the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montene-gro) cannot continue automatically the membership of theformerSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslaviaintheUnitedNations”, and “should apply for membership in the UnitedNations” . The Court points out that, while it is clear fromthe voting figures that these resolutions reflected a positionendorsedbythevastmajorityoftheMembersoftheUnitedNations,theycannotbeconstruedasconveyinganauthorita-tivedeterminationofthelegalstatusoftheFederalRepublicof Yugoslavia within, or vis-à-vis, the United Nations . Theuncertaintysurroundingthequestionisevidenced,inter alia,bythepracticeoftheGeneralAssemblyinbudgetarymattersduringtheyearsfollowingthebreak-upoftheSocialistFed-eralRepublicofYugoslavia .



TheCourtpointsout that itwasagainst thisbackgroundthat the Court itself, in its Judgment of 3 February 2003 inthecaseconcerningApplication for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case concerning Application of theConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeof Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Pre-liminary Objections (Yugoslavia v . Bosnia and Herzegovina)(hereinafterthe“Application for Revision case”),referredtothe“suigenerispositionwhichtheFRYfounditselfin”duringtherelevantperiod;however,inthatcase,nofinalanddefinitiveconclusionwasdrawnbytheCourtfromthisdescriptivetermontheamorphousstatusoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslaviavis-à-visorwithintheUnitedNationsduringthisperiod .










TheCourtrecallsthatanumberofRespondentscontendedin their pleadings that the reference to “treaties in force” inArticle35,paragraph2,oftheStatuterelatesonlytotreatiesinforcewhentheStatuteoftheCourtenteredintoforce, i .e .on24October1945 .InrespectoftheOrderof8April1993inthe

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Genocide Convention case, the Respondents pointed out thatthatwasaprovisionalassessment,notconclusiveofthematter,andconsidered that“there [were]persuasivereasonswhy theCourtshouldrevisittheprovisionalapproachitadoptedtotheinterpretationofthisclauseintheGenocide Conventioncase” .





TheCourtmoreovernotesthattheinterpretationofArti-cle35,paragraph2,wherebythatparagraphistobeconstruedas referring to treaties in force at the time that the Statutecameintoforce,isinfactreinforcedbyanexaminationofthetravaux préparatoiresofthetext;theCourtconsidersthatthelegislative history of Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statuteof thePermanentCourtof International Justice(hereinafterthe“PermanentCourt”)demonstratesthatitwasintendedasanexceptiontotheprinciplestatedinparagraph1, inordertocovercasescontemplated inagreementsconcluded inthe

aftermathof theFirstWorldWarbefore theStatuteenteredinto force .However, the travaux préparatoiresof theStatuteofthepresentCourtare less illuminating .ThediscussionofArticle35wasprovisionalandsomewhatcursory;ittookplaceatastageintheplanningofthefutureinternationalorganiza-tionwhenitwasnotyetsettledwhetherthePermanentCourtwouldbepreservedor replacedbyanewcourt . Indeed, therecords do not include any discussion which would suggestthat Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute should be givenadifferentmeaningfromthecorrespondingprovisionintheStatuteofthePermanentCourt .ItwouldratherseemthatthetextwasreproducedfromtheStatuteofthePermanentCourt;thereisnoindicationthatanyextensionofaccesstotheCourtwasintended .



Jurisdiction on the basis of Article 4 of the 1931 Treaty of Judicial Settlement, Arbitration and Conciliation between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Netherlands(paras .114–125)

Asnotedabove,bya letterof12May1999, theAgentofSerbiaandMontenegrosubmittedtotheCourta“Supplementto theApplication”against theNetherlands . In thatSupple-ment,itinvokedasanadditionalgroundofjurisdictionoftheCourt“Article4oftheTreatyofJudicialSettlement,Arbitra-

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tionandConciliationbetweentheKingdomofYugoslaviaandtheNetherlands,signedinTheHagueon11March1931andinforcesince2April1932”(hereinafter“the1931Treaty”) .

TheCourtrecalls itsfindingthatSerbiaandMontenegrowas not a party to the Statute at the date of the filing of itsApplication instituting proceedings in this case, and conse-quentlythattheCourtwasnotopentoitatthattimeunderArticle35,paragraph1,oftheStatute .Therefore,totheextentthatSerbiaandMontenegro’scaserestsonrelianceonArti-cle 35, paragraph 1, it is irrelevant whether or not the 1931Treatycouldprovideabasisofjurisdiction .

Thequestionnonethelessremainswhetherthe1931Treaty,whichwasconcludedpriortotheentryintoforceoftheStat-ute, might rank as a “treaty in force” for purposes of Arti-cle35,paragraph2,oftheStatute,andhenceprovideabasisofaccess .

The Court observes that Article 35 of the Statute of theCourt concerns access to the present Court and not to itspredecessor,thePermanentCourt .Theconditionsfortrans-ferof jurisdiction fromthePermanentCourt to thepresentCourtaregovernedbyArticle37oftheStatute .However,thisdoesnotsignifythatasimilarsubstitutionistobereadintoArticle35,paragraph2,of theStatute,which relates,not toconsensualjurisdiction,buttotheconditionsofaccesstotheCourt .TheCourtnotesthatArticle37oftheStatutecanbeinvokedonlyincaseswhicharebroughtbeforeitasbetweenpartiestotheStatute,i .e .underparagraph1ofArticle35,andnotonthebasisofparagraph2ofthatArticle .Itthenadds,as regards jurisdiction, thatwhena treatyproviding for thejurisdictionofthePermanentCourtisinvokedinconjunctionwithArticle37,theCourthastosatisfyitself,inter alia,thatboththeApplicantandtheRespondentwere,atthemomentwhenthedisputewassubmittedtoit,partiestotheStatute .AstheCourtobservedintheBarcelona Tractioncase,

“three conditions are actually stated in the Article . Theyarethatthereshouldbeatreatyorconventioninforce;thatitshouldprovide(i .e .,makeprovision)forthereferenceofa ‘matter’ (i .e ., the matter in litigation) to the PermanentCourt;andthatthedisputeshouldbebetweenStatesbothorallofwhicharepartiestotheStatute .”Having already determined that Serbia and Montenegro

was not a party to the Statute of the Court when the pro-ceedings were institutedagainst theNetherlands, theCourtaccordinglyconcludesthatArticle37cannotgiveSerbiaandMontenegro access to the present Court under Article 35,paragraph 2, on the basis of the 1931 Treaty, irrespective ofwhetherornotthatinstrumentwasinforceon29April1999atthedateofthefilingoftheApplication .



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The Court finally recalls (para . 127) that, irrespective ofwhetherithasjurisdictionoveradispute,theparties“remaininallcasesresponsibleforactsattributabletothemthatvio-latetherightsofotherStates” .

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103










FirsthewishestoexplainwhyinhisviewtheCourtshouldnothavedecidedtheissueofjurisdictiononthegroundofSer-

biaandMontenegro’slackofaccesstotheCourt,althoughin1999,whentheCourtrejectedYugoslavia’srequestforinterimmeasuresofprotection,hewasinfavourofthisapproach .Inhisview,theCourthasnotinaconvincingandtransparentwayelucidatedthestatusoftheFederalRepublicofYugosla-via vis-à-vis the United Nations before its admission to theOrganization in 2000 . Further, the Court’s Judgment hasundeniableimplicationsforotherpendingcases,inparticulartheGenocide Convention case (Bosnia Herzegovina v .Serbia and Montenegro), which could easily have been avoided bychoosinganotherapproach .Finally,theJudgmentisatoddswith previous decisions of the Court, thus endangering theprinciple of consistency of reasoning . This consistency withearliercaselawshouldprevailoverpresentorearliermisgiv-ingsof individual judges if anapproach inconformitywiththatconsistencydoesnotleadtolegallyuntenableresults .




Beginning with the issue of access to the Court underArticle35,paragraph1,JudgeElarabyexplainedwhy, inhisview,theFederalRepublicofYugoslaviawasaMemberoftheUnitedNationsatthetimeitfileditsApplicationinthecase .He emphasized that, although the FRY was excluded fromparticipation in the work of the General Assembly and itssubsidiary organs, it remained, as the Court had previouslyfound, a sui generis Member between 1992 and 2000 . ThusJudgeElarabypointedoutthatduringthisperioditcontinuedtoexhibitmanyattributesofUnitedNationsmembershipandwas neither suspended nor expelled from the OrganizationundertherelevantprovisionsoftheUnitedNationsCharter .On this basis, Judge Elaraby concluded that the FRY was aMember of the United Nations when it filed its Application

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in1999and,asaresult,hedisagreedwith theCourt’sfind-ingthatitwasnot“open”totheFRYunderArticle35,para-graph1,oftheCourt’sStatute .


BecauseJudgeElarabyconcludedthattheCourtwasopento the FRY under Article 35 when it filed its Application in1999,hewentontoassesswhethertheCourthasjurisdictionratione personaeunderArticleIxoftheGenocideConvention .Heconcludedthatitdoes,becausetheFRYsucceededtothetreatyobligationsoftheformerSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia,includingtheGenocideConvention .Inreachingthisconclusionheexplainedthat,incasesinvolvingthesepa-rationofpartsoftheterritoryofaStatetoformoneormorenewStates,Article34oftheViennaConventiononSuccessionofStatesinrespectofTreatiesembodiedacustomaryruleofautomaticsuccessionbythenewStatetothetreatiesinforceontheterritoryofitspredecessor .HepointedoutthatitwasallthemoreimportantfortheCourttorecognizeandapplythisruleinthecaseofafundamentalhumanrightstreatysuchas the Genocide Convention . Judge Elaraby thus concludedthattheFRYwasapartytotheGenocideConventiononthebasis of succession—not its subsequent purported accession

and reservation—and therefore that the Court had jurisdic-tionratione personae.Hefound,however,thattheCourtdidnothavejurisdictionratione materiaeundertheConvention,sointhefinalanalysisagreedwiththeCourtthattherewasnojurisdictiontoexaminethemeritsoftheFRY’scase .











___________

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155. CAseConCeRnInGLeGALItYoFUseoFFoRCe(seRBIAAnDMonteneGRov.PoRtUGAL)(PReLIMInARYoBJeCtIons)


InitsJudgmentinthecaseconcerningLegality of the Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegrov .Portugal), theCourtunani-mouslyconcludedthatithadnojurisdictiontoentertaintheclaimsmadeintheApplicationfiledbySerbiaandMontene-groagainstPortugalon29April1999 .


** *



** *

Vice-President Ranjeva and Judges Guillaume, Hig-gins, Kooijmans, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal and Elarabyappended a joint declaration to the Judgment of the Court;JudgeKoromaappendedadeclarationtotheJudgmentoftheCourt; Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Elaraby and Judgead hocKrećaappendedseparateopinionstotheJudgmentoftheCourt .

** *


On29April1999theGovernmentoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(witheffectfrom4February2003,“SerbiaandMontenegro”)filedintheRegistryoftheCourtanApplica-tioninstitutingproceedingsagainstthePortugueseRepublic(hereinafter “Portugal”) in respect of a dispute concerningactsallegedlycommittedbyPortugal


humanrightsandfreedoms,theobligationnottousepro-hibited weapons, the obligation not to deliberately inflictconditionsoflifecalculatedtocausethephysicaldestruc-tionofanationalgroup” .



Onthesameday,theFederalRepublicofYugoslaviafiledApplicationsinstitutingproceedingsandsubmittedrequestsfortheindicationofprovisionalmeasures,inrespectofotherdisputes arising out of the same facts, against the KingdomofBelgium,Canada,theFrenchRepublic,theFederalRepub-lic of Germany, the Italian Republic, the Kingdom of theNetherlands,theKingdomofSpain,theUnitedKingdomofGreatBritainandNorthernIrelandandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica .

SincetheCourtincludedupontheBenchnojudgeofYugo-slavnationality,theYugoslavGovernmentexerciseditsrightunderArticle31oftheStatuteandchoseMr .MilenkoKrećatositasjudgead hocinthecase .Byletterof10May1999,Por-tugalinformedtheCourtthatitreservedtherighttochooseajudgead hocinthecase,inaccordancewithArticle31oftheStatuteoftheCourt .


On5July2000,withinthetime–limitfixedforthefilingofitsCounter-Memorial,Portugal,referringtoArticle79,para-graph1,oftheRules,submittedpreliminaryobjectionsrelat-ingtotheCourt’sjurisdictiontoentertainthecaseandtotheadmissibilityoftheApplication .Accordingly,theproceedingsonthemeritsweresuspended .



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OnbehalfofthePortugueseGovernment,

atthehearingof22April2004:

“MayitpleasetheCourttoadjudgeanddeclarethat:

(i) theCourt isnotcalledupon togiveadecisionon theclaimsofSerbiaandMontenegro .

Alternatively,

(ii)theCourtlacksjurisdiction,either

(a)underArticle36,paragraph2,oftheStatute;

(b)underArticleIxoftheGenocideConvention;

and

Theclaimsareinadmissible .”

OnbehalfoftheGovernmentofSerbiaandMontenegro

atthehearingof23April2004:

“Forthereasonsgiveninitspleadings,andinparticularinitsWrittenObservations,subsequentcorrespondencewiththeCourt,andattheoralhearing,SerbiaandMontenegrorequeststheCourt:

—toadjudgeanddeclareonitsjurisdictionratione perso-naeinthepresentcases;and

—todismisstheremainingpreliminaryobjectionsoftherespondentStates,andtoorderproceedingsonthemer-itsifitfindsithasjurisdictionratione personae.”





TheCourtfindsitselfunabletoupholdthevariousconten-tionsoftheRespondents .TheCourtconsidersthatitisunabletotreattheObservationsofSerbiaandMontenegroashavingthelegaleffectofadiscontinuanceoftheproceedingsunderArticle88or89oftheRulesofCourtandfindsthatthecasedoesnotfallintothecategoryofcasesinwhichitmayofitsownmotionputanendtoproceedingsinacase .AsregardstheargumentadvancedbycertainRespondentsthatthedis-pute on jurisdiction has disappeared since the Parties nowagreethattheApplicantwasnotapartytotheStatuteattherelevanttime,theCourtpointsoutthatSerbiaandMontene-grohasnot invitedtheCourttofindthat ithasnojurisdic-tion;whileitisapparentlyinagreementwiththeargumentsadvancedbytheRespondentsinthatregardintheirprelimi-naryobjections,ithasspecificallyaskedinitssubmissionsfora decision of the Court on the jurisdictional question . Thisquestion, in the view of the Court, is a legal question inde-pendentoftheviewsofthepartiesuponit .Astotheargumentconcerningthedisappearanceofthesubstantivedispute,itisclearthatSerbiaandMontenegrohasbynomeanswithdrawnitsclaimsas to themerits . Indeed, theseclaimswereexten-sivelyarguedanddevelopedinsubstanceduringthehearingsonjurisdiction,inthecontextofthequestionofthejurisdic-tionoftheCourtunderArticleIxoftheGenocideConven-tion .Itisequallyclearthattheseclaimsarebeingvigorouslydeniedby theRespondents . It couldnotevenbe saidunderthesecircumstancesthat,whiletheessentialdisputestillsub-sists,SerbiaandMontenegroisnolongerseekingtohaveitsclaimdeterminedbytheCourt .SerbiaandMontenegrohasnotsoughtadiscontinuanceandhasstatedthatit“wantsthe

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Court to continue the case and to decide upon its jurisdic-tion—and to decide on the merits as well, if it has jurisdic-tion” .TheCourtthereforefindsitselfunabletoconcludethatSerbiaandMontenegrohasrenouncedanyofitssubstantiveorproceduralrights,orhastakenthepositionthatthedisputebetweenthePartieshasceasedtoexist .Asfortheargumentbasedonthedoctrineofestoppel,theCourtdoesnotconsiderthatSerbiaandMontenegro,byaskingtheCourt“todecideonitsjurisdiction”onthebasisofcertainalleged“newfacts”aboutitsownlegalstatusvis-à-vistheUnitedNations,shouldbeheldtohaveforfeitedorrenounceditsrightofactionandtobeestoppedfromcontinuingthepresentactionbeforetheCourt .





TheCourtobservesthatthequestionwhetherSerbiaandMontenegrowasorwasnotapartytotheStatuteoftheCourtat the time of the institution of the present proceedings isfundamental;forifitwerenotsuchaparty,theCourtwouldnotbeopentoitunderArticle35,paragraph1,oftheStatute .Inthatsituation,subjecttoanyapplicationofparagraph2ofthatArticle,SerbiaandMontenegrocouldnothaveproperlyseisedtheCourt,whatevertitleof jurisdictionitmighthaveinvoked,forthesimplereasonthatitdidnothavetherighttoappearbefore theCourt .Hence, theCourtmustfirstexam-inethequestionwhethertheApplicantmeetstheconditionslaiddowninArticles34and35oftheStatuteforaccesstotheCourt .Onlyif theanswertothatquestionis intheaffirma-

tive,willtheCourthavetodealwiththeissuesrelatingtotheconditionslaiddowninArticle36oftheStatute .

TheCourtnotesinthisrespectthatthereisnodoubtthatSerbiaandMontenegroisaStateforthepurposeofArticle34,paragraph 1, of the Statute . However, certain Respondentsobjected that, at the time of the filing of its Application on29April1999,thatStatedidnotmeettheconditionssetdowninArticle35oftheStatute .ThusPortugalargued,interalia,that the Applicant did not have access to the Court underArticle35,paragraph1,oftheStatute(PreliminaryObjectionsofPortugal,pp .5–17) .ItconsideredthattheApplicantwasnotaMemberoftheUnitedNationsandthatthereforeitwasnotapartytotheStatutesince“onlymemberStates[oftheUnitedNations]areipso factopartiesintheStatuteoftheCourt(Arti-cle93(1)oftheCharter)”andtheApplicanthadnot“soughttobeboundbytheStatutepursuanttoArticle93(2)[oftheCharter of the United Nations]” (Preliminary Objections ofPortugal,pp .9and16,paras .29and56respectively) .

TheCourtthenrecapitulatesthesequenceofeventsrelat-ingtothelegalpositionoftheApplicantvis-à-vistheUnitedNationsovertheperiod1992–2000 .Itrefers,interalia,tothefollowing: the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic ofYugoslaviain1991–1992;adeclarationof27April1992bytheSFRYAssembly,theNationalAssemblyoftheRepublicofSer-biaandtheAssemblyoftheRepublicofMontenegroassertingthecontinuationof the international legalandpoliticalper-sonalityoftheSFRYbytheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia;anoteofthesamedayfromYugoslaviatotheUnitedNationsSecretary-General asserting the continuation by the FRY ofthe membership of the SFRY in the Organization; SecurityCouncilresolution777of1992consideringthattheFRYcouldnotcontinueautomaticallytheSFRY’smembership;GeneralAssembly resolution 47/1 of 1992 stating that the FRY shallnot participate in the work of the General Assembly; and aletterdated29September1992fromtheUnitedNationsLegalCounsel regarding the “practical consequences” of GeneralAssemblyresolution47/1 .

TheCourtconcludesthatthelegalsituationthatobtainedwithin the United Nations during the period 1992–2000concerningthestatusof theFederalRepublicofYugoslavia,remainedambiguousandopentodifferentassessments .Thiswasdue,interalia,totheabsenceofanauthoritativedetermi-nationbythecompetentorgansoftheUnitedNationsdefiningclearly the legalstatusof theFederalRepublicofYugoslaviavis-à-vistheUnitedNations .

TheCourtnotes that threedifferentpositionsweretakenwithin the United Nations . In the first place, there wasthe position taken by the two political organs concerned .The Court refers in this respect to Security Council resolu-tion777(1992)of19September1992andtoGeneralAssem-blyresolution47/1of22September1992,accordingtowhich“the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montene-gro) cannot continue automatically the membership of theformerSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslaviaintheUnitedNations”, and “should apply for membership in the UnitedNations” . The Court points out that, while it is clear fromthe voting figures that these resolutions reflected a positionendorsedbythevastmajorityoftheMembersoftheUnited

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Nations,theycannotbeconstruedasconveyinganauthorita-tivedeterminationofthelegalstatusoftheFederalRepublicof Yugoslavia within, or vis-à-vis, the United Nations . Theuncertaintysurroundingthequestionisevidenced,inter alia,bythepracticeoftheGeneralAssemblyinbudgetarymattersduringtheyearsfollowingthebreak-upoftheSocialistFed-eralRepublicofYugoslavia .



TheCourtpointsout that itwasagainst thisbackgroundthat the Court itself, in its Judgment of 3 February 2003 inthecaseconcerningApplication for Revision of the Judgment of 11July1996 in the Case concerning Application of the Con-vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovinav. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections (Yugoslaviav .Bosnia and Herzegovina)(hereinafterthe“Application for Revision case”),referredtothe“suigenerisposition which the FRY found itself in” during the relevantperiod;however,inthatcase,nofinalanddefinitiveconclu-sion was drawn by the Court from this descriptive term onthe amorphous status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslaviavis-à-visorwithintheUnitedNationsduringthisperiod .



TheCourtfindsthatfromthevantagepointfromwhichitnowlooksatthelegalsituation,andinlightofthelegalcon-sequencesofthenewdevelopmentsince1November2000,itis ledtotheconclusionthatSerbiaandMontenegrowasnotaMemberoftheUnitedNations,andinthatcapacityaState

partytotheStatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJustice,atthetimeoffilingitsApplication .







TheCourtinitiallynotesthatPortugalhascontendedthat,atthedateofthefilingoftheApplication,29April1999,itwasnotapartytotheGenocideConvention .However,theCourtconsiders that logicalprioritymustbegivento thequestionwhetherSerbiaandMontenegrocaninvokeArticle35,para-graph2,of theStatute, that is tosay,whetherornotArticleIxoftheGenocideConventioncanberegardedasoneofthe“specialprovisionsintreatiesinforce”contemplatedbythattext .

TheCourtrecallsthatanumberofRespondentscontendedin their pleadings that the reference to “treaties in force” inArticle35,paragraph2,oftheStatuterelatesonlytotreatiesinforcewhentheStatuteoftheCourtenteredintoforce, i .e .on24October1945 .InrespectoftheOrderof8April1993inthe

109

Genocide Convention case, the Respondents pointed out thatthatwasaprovisionalassessment,notconclusiveofthematter,andconsidered that“there [were]persuasivereasonswhy theCourtshouldrevisittheprovisionalapproachitadoptedtotheinterpretationofthisclauseintheGenocide Conventioncase” .





TheCourtmoreovernotesthattheinterpretationofArti-cle35,paragraph2,wherebythatparagraphistobeconstruedas referring to treaties in force at the time that the Statutecameintoforce,isinfactreinforcedbyanexaminationofthetravaux préparatoiresofthetext;theCourtconsidersthatthelegislative history of Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statuteof thePermanentCourtof International Justice(hereinafterthe“PermanentCourt”)demonstratesthatitwasintendedasanexceptiontotheprinciplestatedinparagraph1, inordertocovercasescontemplated inagreementsconcluded inthe

aftermathof theFirstWorldWarbefore theStatuteenteredinto force .However, the travaux préparatoiresof theStatuteofthepresentCourtare less illuminating .ThediscussionofArticle35wasprovisionalandsomewhatcursory;ittookplaceatastageintheplanningofthefutureinternationalorganiza-tionwhenitwasnotyetsettledwhetherthePermanentCourtwouldbepreservedor replacedbyanewcourt . Indeed, therecords do not include any discussion which would suggestthat Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute should be givenadifferentmeaningfromthecorrespondingprovisionintheStatuteofthePermanentCourt .ItwouldratherseemthatthetextwasreproducedfromtheStatuteofthePermanentCourt;thereisnoindicationthatanyextensionofaccesstotheCourtwasintended .





*

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The Court finally recalls (para . 118) that, irrespective ofwhetherithasjurisdictionoveradispute,theparties“remaininallcasesresponsibleforactsattributabletothemthatvio-latetherightsofotherStates” .

** *
















FirsthewishestoexplainwhyinhisviewtheCourtshouldnothavedecidedtheissueofjurisdictiononthegroundofSer-biaandMontenegro’slackofaccesstotheCourt,althoughin

111

1999,whentheCourtrejectedYugoslavia’srequestforinterimmeasuresofprotection,hewasinfavourofthisapproach .Inhisview,theCourthasnotinaconvincingandtransparentwayelucidatedthestatusoftheFederalRepublicofYugosla-via vis-à-vis the United Nations before its admission to theOrganization in 2000 . Further, the Court’s Judgment hasundeniableimplicationsforotherpendingcases,inparticulartheGenocide Convention case (Bosnia Herzegovina v .Serbia and Montenegro), which could easily have been avoided bychoosinganotherapproach .Finally,theJudgmentisatoddswith previous decisions of the Court, thus endangering theprinciple of consistency of reasoning . This consistency withearliercaselawshouldprevailoverpresentorearliermisgiv-ingsof individual judges if anapproach inconformitywiththatconsistencydoesnotleadtolegallyuntenableresults .

InthesecondplaceJudgeKooijmanssetsoutwhyinhisviewtheCourtwouldhavedonebettertodismissthecasesin limine litis.In1999theApplicantinvokedtwogroundsofjurisdictionwhich it explicitly abandoned in its Written Observations of20December2002withoutreplacingthembyothergrounds .NeverthelessitdidnotdiscontinuethecasebutaskedtheCourtto decide whether it had jurisdiction . Thus the Applicationsdid no longer meet the requirement of Article 38, paragraph2,oftheRulesofCourt,whichstatesthattheapplicationshallspecify as far as possible the legal grounds upon which thejurisdictionof theCourt is said tobebased .Since theCourthasthe inherentpowertostrikeacasefromtheGeneralListinordertosafeguardtheintegrityoftheprocedure,itshouldhavedonesoinviewofthefactthattheApplicanthasfailedtodemonstrateandevendidnotmakeaneffort todemonstratethatavalidgroundofjurisdictionexisted .



Beginning with the issue of access to the Court underArticle35,paragraph1,JudgeElarabyexplainedwhy, inhisview,theFederalRepublicofYugoslaviawasaMemberoftheUnitedNationsatthetimeitfileditsApplicationinthecase .He emphasized that, although the FRY was excluded fromparticipation in the work of the General Assembly and itssubsidiary organs, it remained, as the Court had previouslyfound, a sui generis Member between 1992 and 2000 . ThusJudgeElarabypointedoutthatduringthisperioditcontinuedtoexhibitmanyattributesofUnitedNationsmembershipandwas neither suspended nor expelled from the OrganizationundertherelevantprovisionsoftheUnitedNationsCharter .On this basis, Judge Elaraby concluded that the FRY was aMember of the United Nations when it filed its Applicationin1999and,asaresult,hedisagreedwith theCourt’sfind-

ingthatitwasnot“open”totheFRYunderArticle35,para-graph1,oftheCourt’sStatute .





In the case at hand, it is closely, and even organically,linkedwiththemembershipofSerbiaandMontenegrointheUnitedNations,duetothefactthatitcouldnotbeconsideredasbeingpartytotheStatuteoftheCourtapartfrombeingaMemberStateoftheUnitedNationsaswellasthefactthatits

112

locus standicannotbebasedonconditionssetforthinArti-cle35,paragraph2,oftheStatute .








InitsJudgmentinthecaseconcerningLegality of the Use of Force(Serbia and Montenegrov .United Kingdom),theCourtunanimouslyconcluded that ithadno jurisdiction toenter-tain the claims made in the Application filed by Serbia andMontenegroagainstUnitedKingdomon29April1999 .


** *


“ . . .TheCourt,Unanimously,Finds that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the claims

made in theApplicationfiledbySerbiaandMontenegroon29April1999 .”

** *

Vice-President Ranjeva and Judges Guillaume, Hig-gins, Kooijmans, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal and Elarabyappended a joint declaration to the Judgment of the Court;JudgeKoromaappendedadeclarationtotheJudgmentoftheCourt; Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Elaraby and Judgead hocKrećaappendedseparateopinionstotheJudgmentoftheCourt .

** *

156. CAseConCeRnInGLeGALItYoFUseoFFoRCe(seRBIAAnDMonteneGRov.UnIteDKInGDoM)(PReLIMInARYoBJeCtIons)


___________


On29April1999theGovernmentoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(witheffectfrom4February2003,“SerbiaandMontenegro”)filedintheRegistryoftheCourtanApplica-tion instituting proceedings against the United Kingdom ofGreatBritainandNorthernIreland(hereinafter“theUnitedKingdom”) inrespectofadisputeconcerningactsallegedlycommittedbytheUnitedKingdom

“bywhichithasviolateditsinternationalobligationban-ningtheuseofforceagainstanotherState,theobligationnot to intervene in the internal affairs of another State,the obligation not to violate the sovereignty of anotherState,theobligationtoprotectthecivilianpopulationandcivilian objects in wartime, the obligation to protect theenvironment,theobligationrelatingtofreenavigationoninternationalrivers,theobligationregardingfundamentalhumanrightsandfreedoms,theobligationnottousepro-hibited weapons, the obligation not to deliberately inflictconditionsoflifecalculatedtocausethephysicaldestruc-tionofanationalgroup” .



Onthesameday,theFederalRepublicofYugoslaviafiledApplicationsinstitutingproceedingsandsubmittedrequestsfortheindicationofprovisionalmeasures,inrespectofother

113

disputesarisingoutofthesamefacts,againsttheKingdomofBelgium,Canada,theFrenchRepublic,theFederalRepublicofGermany,theItalianRepublic,theKingdomoftheNether-lands,thePortugueseRepublic,theKingdomofSpainandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica .



On4July2000,withinthetime–limitfixedforthefilingof its Counter-Memorial, the United Kingdom, referring toArticle79,paragraph1,of theRules,submittedpreliminaryobjectionsrelatingtotheCourt’sjurisdictiontoentertainthecaseandtotheadmissibilityoftheApplication .Accordingly,theproceedingsonthemeritsweresuspended .






OnbehalfoftheGovernmentoftheUnitedKingdom,atthehearingof22April2004:“ForthereasonsgiveninourwrittenPreliminaryObjec-tionsandattheoralhearing,theUnitedKingdomrequeststheCourt:

—toremovethecasefromitsList,orinthealternative,—toadjudgeanddeclarethat:—itlacksjurisdictionovertheclaimsbroughtagainstthe

UnitedKingdombySerbiaandMontenegro,and/or—theclaimsbroughtagainsttheUnitedKingdombySer-

biaandMontenegroareinadmissible .”OnbehalfoftheGovernmentofSerbiaandMontenegroatthehearingof23April2004:“Forthereasonsgiveninitspleadings,andinparticularinitsWrittenObservations,subsequentcorrespondencewiththeCourt,andattheoralhearing,SerbiaandMontenegrorequeststheCourt:—toadjudgeanddeclareonitsjurisdictionratione perso-naeinthepresentcases;and—todismisstheremainingpreliminaryobjectionsoftherespondentStates,andtoorderproceedingsonthemeritsifitfindsithasjurisdictionratione personae.”Before proceeding to its reasoning, the Court includes a





114

TheCourtfindsitselfunabletoupholdthevariousconten-tionsoftheRespondents .TheCourtconsidersthatitisunabletotreattheObservationsofSerbiaandMontenegroashavingthelegaleffectofadiscontinuanceoftheproceedingsunderArticle88or89oftheRulesofCourtandfindsthatthecasedoesnotfallintothecategoryofcasesinwhichitmayofitsownmotionputanendtoproceedingsinacase .AsregardstheargumentadvancedbycertainRespondentsthatthedis-pute on jurisdiction has disappeared since the Parties nowagreethattheApplicantwasnotapartytotheStatuteattherelevanttime,theCourtpointsoutthatSerbiaandMontene-grohasnot invitedtheCourttofindthat ithasnojurisdic-tion;whileitisapparentlyinagreementwiththeargumentsadvancedbytheRespondentsinthatregardintheirprelimi-naryobjections,ithasspecificallyaskedinitssubmissionsfora decision of the Court on the jurisdictional question . Thisquestion, in the view of the Court, is a legal question inde-pendentoftheviewsofthepartiesuponit .Astotheargumentconcerningthedisappearanceofthesubstantivedispute,itisclearthatSerbiaandMontenegrohasbynomeanswithdrawnitsclaimsas to themerits . Indeed, theseclaimswereexten-sivelyarguedanddevelopedinsubstanceduringthehearingsonjurisdiction,inthecontextofthequestionofthejurisdic-tionoftheCourtunderArticleIxoftheGenocideConven-tion .Itisequallyclearthattheseclaimsarebeingvigorouslydeniedby theRespondents . It couldnotevenbe saidunderthesecircumstancesthat,whiletheessentialdisputestillsub-sists,SerbiaandMontenegroisnolongerseekingtohaveitsclaimdeterminedbytheCourt .SerbiaandMontenegrohasnotsoughtadiscontinuanceandhasstatedthatit“wantstheCourt to continue the case and to decide upon its jurisdic-tion—and to decide on the merits as well, if it has jurisdic-tion” .TheCourtthereforefindsitselfunabletoconcludethatSerbiaandMontenegrohasrenouncedanyofitssubstantiveorproceduralrights,orhastakenthepositionthatthedisputebetweenthePartieshasceasedtoexist .Asfortheargumentbasedonthedoctrineofestoppel,theCourtdoesnotconsiderthatSerbiaandMontenegro,byaskingtheCourt“todecideonitsjurisdiction”onthebasisofcertainalleged“newfacts”aboutitsownlegalstatusvis-à-vistheUnitedNations,shouldbeheldtohaveforfeitedorrenounceditsrightofactionandtobeestoppedfromcontinuingthepresentactionbeforetheCourt .







ThustheUnitedKingdomarguedthat“theFRYisnotqual-ified tobring theseproceedings”on thegrounds, interalia,that

“[t]heFRYisnotapartytotheStatuteoftheCourt,sinceitisneitheraMemberoftheunitedNationsnoranon-Mem-berStatethathasbecomeapartytotheStatuteunderArti-cle93(2)oftheCharter[oftheUnitedNations]”(Prelimi-naryObjectionsoftheUnitedKingdom,p .25,para .3 .1) .TheCourtthenrecapitulatesthesequenceofeventsrelat-

ingtothelegalpositionoftheApplicantvis-à-vistheUnitedNationsovertheperiod1992–2000 .Itrefers,interalia,tothefollowing: the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic ofYugoslaviain1991–1992;adeclarationof27April1992bytheSFRYAssembly,theNationalAssemblyoftheRepublicofSer-biaandtheAssemblyoftheRepublicofMontenegroassertingthecontinuationof the international legalandpoliticalper-sonalityoftheSFRYbytheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia;anoteofthesamedayfromYugoslaviatotheUnitedNationsSecretary-General asserting the continuation by the FRY ofthe membership of the SFRY in the Organization; SecurityCouncilresolution777of1992consideringthattheFRYcouldnotcontinueautomaticallytheSFRY’smembership;General

115

Assembly resolution 47/1 of 1992 stating that the FRY shallnot participate in the work of the General Assembly; and aletterdated29September1992fromtheUnitedNationsLegalCounsel regarding the “practical consequences” of GeneralAssemblyresolution47/1 .





TheCourtpointsout that itwasagainst thisbackgroundthat the Court itself, in its Judgment of 3 February 2003 inthecaseconcerningApplication for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case concerning Application of theConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeof Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Pre-liminary Objections (Yugoslavia v . Bosnia and Herzegovina)(hereinafterthe“Application for Revision case”),referredtothe

“suigenerispositionwhichtheFRYfounditselfin”duringtherelevantperiod;however,inthatcase,nofinalanddefinitiveconclusionwasdrawnbytheCourtfromthisdescriptivetermontheamorphousstatusoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslaviavis-à-visorwithintheUnitedNationsduringthisperiod .








“The conditions under which the Court shall be open tootherStates[i .e .StatesnotpartiestotheStatute]shall,sub-jecttothespecialprovisionscontainedintreatiesinforce,belaiddownbytheSecurityCouncil,butinnocaseshall

116

suchconditionsplacethepartiesinapositionofinequalitybeforetheCourt .”In this regard, it quotes from its Order of 8 April 1993






The Court observes that the object and purpose of Arti-cle 35 of the Statute is to define the conditions of access to

theCourt .Whileparagraph1ofthatArticleopensit totheStatespartiestotheStatute,paragraph2isintendedtoregu-lateaccesstotheCourtbyStateswhicharenotpartiestotheStatute .ItwouldhavebeeninconsistentwiththemainthrustofthetexttomakeitpossibleinthefutureforStatesnotpar-tiestotheStatutetoobtainaccesstotheCourtsimplybytheconclusionbetweenthemselvesofaspecialtreaty,multilateralorbilateral,containingaprovisiontothateffect .



TheCourtthusconcludesthat,evenassumingthatSerbiaandMontenegrowasapartytotheGenocideConventionat

117

therelevantdate,Article35,paragraph2,oftheStatutedoesnotprovideitwithabasistohaveaccesstotheCourt,underArticle Ix of that Convention, since the Convention onlyentered into force on 12 January 1951, after the entry intoforceoftheStatute .TheCourtdoesnotthereforeconsideritnecessary to decide whether Serbia and Montenegro was orwasnotapartytotheGenocideConventionon29April1999whenthecurrentproceedingswereinstituted .





** *











JudgeHigginsagreesthatSerbiaandMontenegrohavenotdiscontinuedthecase .However,shedisagreeswiththeappar-entfindingoftheCourtthatacasemayonlyberemovedfromtheListwherethereisadiscontinuancebytheapplicantortheparties,orwhereanapplicantdisclosedno subsisting titleofjurisdiction,orwheretheCourtmanifestlylackedjurisdiction(seeparagraph31oftheJudgment) .Inherview,therightoftheCourtexceptionallytoremoveacasefromtheListrestsonitsinherentpowers,whicharenotlimitedtoa prioricategories .

JudgeHigginsisoftheopinionthatthepresentcaseshouldhavebeenremovedfromtheList,astheApplicanthasbyits

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ownconductputitself inapositionincompatiblewithArti-cle 38, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court . The manner inwhichithasdealtwithpreliminaryobjectionswouldfurtherwarrantthecasenotbeingproceededwith .






Separate opinion of Judge ElarabyJudge Elaraby voted in favour of the dispositif, but disa-

greedbothwiththegroundsonwhichtheCourtdecidedtobase its Judgment—Article 35, paragraph 1 and Article 35,paragraph2oftheCourt’sStatute—andwiththeconclusionswhichtheCourtreachedoneachofthesegrounds .Thejointdeclaration, to which Judge Elaraby is a signatory, explainswhyhebelievesthattheCourtshouldhavechosenalternativegrounds toreach itsdecision .His separateopinionexplainswhyhedisagreeswithitssubstantivefindings .



BecauseJudgeElarabyconcludedthattheCourtwasopento the FRY under Article 35 when it filed its Application in1999,hewentontoassesswhethertheCourthasjurisdictionratione personaeunderArticleIxoftheGenocideConvention .Heconcludedthatitdoes,becausetheFRYsucceededtothetreatyobligationsoftheformerSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia,includingtheGenocideConvention .Inreachingthisconclusionheexplainedthat,incasesinvolvingthesepa-rationofpartsoftheterritoryofaStatetoformoneormorenewStates,Article34oftheViennaConventiononSuccessionofStatesinrespectofTreatiesembodiedacustomaryruleofautomaticsuccessionbythenewStatetothetreatiesinforceontheterritoryofitspredecessor .HepointedoutthatitwasallthemoreimportantfortheCourttorecognizeandapplythisruleinthecaseofafundamentalhumanrightstreatysuchas the Genocide Convention . Judge Elaraby thus concludedthattheFRYwasapartytotheGenocideConventiononthebasis of succession—not its subsequent purported accessionand reservation—and therefore that the Court had jurisdic-

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tionratione personae.Hefound,however,thattheCourtdidnothavejurisdictionratione materiaeundertheConvention,sointhefinalanalysisagreedwiththeCourtthattherewasnojurisdictiontoexaminethemeritsoftheFRY’scase .











157. CAseConCeRnInGCeRtAInPRoPeRtY(LIeCHtensteInv.GeRMAnY)(PReLIMInARYoBJeCtIons)


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In the case concerning Certain Property (Liechtenstein v .Germany),on10February2005,theCourtfoundthatithadnojurisdictiontoentertaintheapplicationfiledbyLiechten-stein .

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TheCourtwascomposedas follows:PresidentShi;Vice-PresidentRanjeva;JudgesGuillaume,Koroma,Vereshchetin,Higgins,Parra-Aranguren,Kooijmans,Rezek,Al-Khasawneh,Buergenthal,Elaraby,OwadaandTomka;Judgesad hocFleis-chhauerandSirFranklinBerman;RegistrarCouvreur .

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Theoperativeparagraph54of theJudgmentreadsas fol-lows:

“ . . .TheCourt,(1)(a)byfifteenvotestoone,Rejects thepreliminaryobjection that there isnodisputebetweenLiechtensteinandGermany;infavour:PresidentShi;Vice-PresidentRanjeva; JudgesGuillaume, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buer-genthal,Elaraby,Owada,Tomka;Judgead hocSirFranklinBerman;against:Judgead hocFleischhauer;

(b)bytwelvevotestofour,Upholds the preliminary objection that Liechtenstein’sApplication should be rejected on the grounds that theCourtlacksjurisdictionratione temporistodecidethedis-pute;infavour:PresidentShi;Vice-PresidentRanjeva; JudgesGuillaume, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, Tomka;Judgead hocFleischhauer;against:JudgesKooijmans,Elaraby,Owada;Judgead hocSirFranklinBerman;(2)bytwelvevotestofour,Finds that ithasnojurisdictiontoentertaintheApplica-tionfiledbyLiechtensteinon1June2001 .infavour:PresidentShi;Vice-PresidentRanjeva; JudgesGuillaume, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, Tomka;Judgead hocFleischhauer;against:JudgesKooijmans,Elaraby,Owada;Judgead hocSirFranklinBerman .”

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Judges Kooijmans, Elaraby and Owada appended dis-sentingopinionstotheJudgmentoftheCourt .Judgead hocFleischhauerappendedadeclaration to the Judgmentof the

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Court .Judgead hocSirFranklinBermanappendedadissent-ingopiniontotheJudgmentoftheCourt .

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TheCourtbeginsbyrecallingthehistoryoftheproceed-ings .

On1June2001,thePrincipalityofLiechtenstein(hereinaf-ter“Liechtenstein”)filedanApplicationinstitutingproceed-ings against the Federal Republic of Germany (hereinafter“Germany”)relating to a dispute concerningrelatingtoadisputeconcerning

“decisionsofGermany,inandafter1998,totreatcertainpropertyofLiechtensteinnationalsasGermanassetshav-ingbeen‘seizedforthepurposesofreparationorrestitu-tion,orasaresultofthestateofwar’—i .e .,asaconsequenceofWorldWarII-,withoutensuringanycompensationforthelossofthatpropertytoitsowners,andtothedetrimentofLiechtensteinitself” .InordertofoundthejurisdictionoftheCourt,theAppli-

cation relied on ArticleArticle 1 of the European Convention forthe Peaceful Settlement of Disputes of 29 April 1957, whichentered into force between Liechtenstein and Germany on18February1980 .

On27June2002,GermanyraisedpreliminaryobjectionsrelatingtothejurisdictionoftheCourttoentertainthecaseand to the admissibility of the Application submitted byLiechtenstein .InaccordancewithArticle79,paragraph5,ofthe Rules of the Court, the proceedings on the merits weresuspended .

Liechtensteinfiledawrittenstatementof itsobservationsandsubmissionsonthesepreliminaryobjectionswithinthetime-limitfixed .

Publichearingswereheldon14,16,17and18June2004 .Atthosehearings,thefollowingsubmissionswerepresentedbytheParties:

OnbehalfoftheGovernmentofGermany,atthehearingof17June2004:“GermanyrequeststheCourttoadjudgeanddeclarethat:—itlacksjurisdictionovertheclaimsbroughtagainstGer-

manybythePrincipalityofLiechtenstein,referredtoitbytheApplicationofLiechtensteinof30May2001,

andthat—theclaimsbroughtagainstGermanybythePrincipality

ofLiechtensteinareinadmissibletotheextentspecifiedinitsPreliminaryObjections .”

OnbehalfoftheGovernmentofLiechtenstein,atthehearingof18June2004:“For the reasons set out in its Written Observations andduringtheoralproceedings,thePrincipalityofLiechten-steinrespectfullyrequeststheCourt:

(a) toadjudgeanddeclarethattheCourthasjurisdictionovertheclaimspresentedinitsApplicationandthattheyareadmissible;andaccordingly,(b) to reject the Preliminary Objections of Germany intheirentirety .”

Historical background of the case(paras .13–17))

The Court first sets out the historical background of thecase .

During the Second World War Czechoslovakia was analliedcountryandabelligerentinthewaragainstGermany .In1945,itadoptedaseriesofdecrees(the“BenešDecrees”),among them Decree No . 12 of 21 June 1945, under whichcertainpropertyownedbyLiechtensteinnationals,includingPrinceFranzJosefIIofLiechtenstein,wasconfiscated .

Following earlier allied enactments concerning a repara-tionsrégimeingeneralandGermanexternalassetsandotherpropertyseizedinconnectionwiththeSecondWorldWarinparticular,aspecialrégimedealingwiththelattersubjectwascreatedbyChapterSixof theConventionontheSettlementofMattersArisingoutoftheWarandtheOccupation,signedbytheUnitedStatesofAmerica,theUnitedKingdom,FranceandtheFederalRepublicofGermany,atBonnon26May1952(asamendedbyScheduleIVtotheProtocolontheTermina-tion of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic ofGermany,signedatParison23October1954)(hereinafterthe“SettlementConvention”) .ThisConventionenteredintoforceon5May1955 .

Article3ofChapterSixoftheSettlementConventionreadsasfollows:

“1 .TheFederalRepublicshallinthefutureraisenoobjec-tions against the measures which have been, or will be,carriedoutwithregardtoGermanexternalassetsorotherproperty, seized for the purpose of reparation or restitu-tion, or as a result of the state of war, or on the basis ofagreements concluded, or to be concluded, by the ThreePowers with other Allied countries, neutral countries orformeralliesofGermany . . . .3 .Noclaimoractionshallbeadmissibleagainstpersonswhoshallhaveacquiredortransferredtitletopropertyonthebasisofthemeasuresreferredtoinparagraph1and2ofthisArticle,oragainstinternationalorganizations,foreigngovernmentsorpersonswhohaveacteduponinstructionsofsuchorganizationsorgovernments .”The régime of the Settlement Convention was intended

to be temporary until the problem of reparationwas finallysettled “by the peace treaty between Germany and itsformer enemies or by earlier agreements concerning thismatter” (Article 1 of Chapter Six) . A final settlement wasbroughtabout through theconclusion in1990of theTreatyon the Final Settlement with respect to Germany (signed atMoscow on 12 September 1990 and entered into force on15March1991) .On27and28September1990,anExchangeofNoteswasexecutedbetweenthethreeWesternPowersand

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the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany (theparties to the Settlement Convention) under which the Set-tlementConventionwouldterminatesimultaneouslywiththeentryintoforceoftheTreaty .WhereasthatExchangeofNotesterminatedtheSettlementConventionitself, includingArti-cle5ofChapterSix(relatingtocompensationbyGermany),itprovidedthatparagraphs1and3ofArticle3,ChapterSix,“shall,however,remaininforce” .

In1991,apaintingbytheseventeenthcenturyDutchartistPietervanLaerwaslentbyamuseuminBrno(Czechoslova-kia)toamuseuminCologne(Germany)for inclusioninanexhibition .Thispaintinghadbeenthepropertyofthefamilyof theReigningPrinceofLiechtensteinsince theeighteenthcentury;itwasconfiscatedin1945byCzechoslovakiaundertheBenešDecrees .

A lawsuit filed in his personal capacity by Prince Hans-AdamIIofLiechtensteinintheGermancourtsinthe1990stohavethepaintingreturnedtohimashispropertywasdis-missedonthebasisthat,underArticle3,ChapterSix,oftheSettlementConvention,noclaimoractioninconnectionwithmeasures takenagainstGermanexternalassets intheafter-math of the Second World War was admissible in Germancourts(hereinafterthe“Pieter van Laer Painting”case) .

A claim relating to the decisions of the German courtsbrought by Prince Hans-AdamPrince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein beforethe European Court of Human Rights was dismissed inJuly2001 .

The Court begins its reasoning by recalling that in thepresentproceedings,LiechtensteinbasedtheCourt’sjurisdic-tiononArticle1oftheEuropeanConventionforthePeacefulSettlementofDisputeswhichprovidesthat:

“TheHighContractingPartiesshallsubmit tothe judge-mentoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeallinternationallegaldisputeswhichmayarisebetweenthemincluding,inparticular,thoseconcerning:(a)theinterpretationofatreaty;(b)anyquestionofinternationallaw;(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, wouldconstituteabreachofaninternationalobligation;(d)thenatureorextentofthereparationtobemadeforthebreachofaninternationalobligation .”Article27(a)ofthatConventionreadsasfollows:“TheprovisionsofthisConventionshallnotapplyto:(a)disputesrelatingtofactsorsituationspriortotheentryintoforceofthisConventionasbetweenthepartiestothedispute” .Germanyraisedsixpreliminaryobjectionstothejurisdic-

tionoftheCourtandtheadmissibilityoftheApplication .

Germany’s first preliminary objection(paras .20–27)

The Court recalls that Germany, in its first preliminaryGermany, in its first preliminaryobjection, argues that there is no dispute between the Par-argues that there is no dispute between the Par-ties . Germany in particular observes that even though thefactsthatareatthecoreofthedisputelieinCzechoslovakia’sseizure of certain Liechtenstein property under the Beneš

Decrees of 1945, Liechtenstein bases its claims before theCourtonanalleged“changeofposition”byGermanyinthe1990s as to the need to apply the Settlement Convention tothat property, whilst Germany contends that such a changehasneveroccurred . Germany maintains that a distinction is .Germany maintains that a distinction isGermanymaintainsthatadistinctionistobemadebetweentheissueofthelawfulnessoftheCzecho-slovakexpropriationsandthatofthejurisdictionoftheGer-man courts regarding this matter . Germany contends thaton neither issue has it changed its position either before orafter 1995: as to the first, it has never accepted the validityoftherelevantCzechoslovakmeasuresagainstLiechtensteinproperty; as to the second, the German courts have alwaysheldthattheyarebarredbytheSettlementConventionfromadjudicatingonthelawfulnessofconfiscationmeasures,andforthepurposesoftheapplicationofArticle3ofChapterSixoftheSettlementConvention,theyhavealwaysreliedontheassessmentoftheexpropriatingState .Germanyfurtherclaimsthat it isnotGermanacts related toCzechoslovakconfisca-tionsbutthelawfulnessoftheCzechoslovakmeasuresassuchandtheresultingobligationsofcompensationonthepartofthesuccessorStatestotheformerCzechoslovakiathatareinquestion .Germanythereforeconcludesthattheonlydisputewhichexists isonebetweenLiechtensteinandthesuccessorStatesoftheformerCzechoslovakia .

LiechtensteinmaintainsthatitsdisputewithGermanycon-cernsGermany’sposition,wherebyforthefirsttimein1995itbegantotreatLiechtensteinassetsasGermanexternalassetsfor purposes of the Settlement Convention, thus infringingLiechtenstein’sneutralityandsovereignty . Liechtenstein rec-Liechtensteinrec-ognizes the existence of another dispute, one between itselfandtheCzechRepublic,butobservesthatthisdoesnotnegatethe existence of a separate dispute between itself and Ger-many, based on Germany’s unlawful conduct in relation toLiechtenstein . Liechtenstein contends further that GermanyitselfacknowledgedtheexistenceofthedisputebetweenthembothinthecourseofbilateralconsultationsheldinJuly1998andJune1999,andinaletterfromtheGermanMinisterforForeignAffairstohisLiechtensteincounterpartdated20Jan-uary2000 .

Germanyforitspartdeniesthatitacknowledgedtheexist-enceofadisputebyparticipatingindiplomaticconsultationsattherequestofLiechtenstein .ItarguesthatadiscussionofdivergentlegalopinionsshouldnotbeconsideredasevidenceoftheexistenceofadisputeinthesenseoftheCourt’sStatute“beforeitreachesacertainthreshold” .

In examining Germany’s first preliminary objection theCourt refers to itsownconsistent jurisprudenceand thatofthe Permanent Court of International Justice, according towhichadisputeisadisagreementonapointoflaworfact,aconflictoflegalviewsorinterestsbetweenparties .Itgoesonto observe that, moreover, for the purposes of verifying theor the purposes of verifying theof verifying the verifying theexistenceofalegaldispute,itfallstotheCourttodeterminewhether“the claim of one party is positively opposed by thetheclaimofonepartyispositivelyopposedbytheother” .

TheCourtfinds that in the present proceedings complaintsfindsthatinthepresentproceedingscomplaintsoffactandlawformulatedbyLiechtensteinagainstGermanyaredeniedbythelatter,andconcludesthat“[b]yvirtueofthisdenial, there is a legal dispute” between Liechtenstein and

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Germany . The Court further notes that Germany’s positionThe Court further notes that Germany’s positiontaken in thecourseofbilateralconsultationsand in the let-terbytheMinisterforForeignAffairsof20January2000hasevidentiaryvalueinsupportofthepropositionthatLiechten-stein’s claimswerepositivelyopposedbyGermanyand thatthiswasrecognizedbythelatter .

Turningtothedeterminationofthesubject-matterofthedispute, the Court, upon examination of the case file, findsthatthesubject-matterofthedisputeiswhether,byapplyingArticle3,ChapterSix,oftheSettlementConventiontoLiech-tensteinpropertythathadbeenconfiscatedinCzechoslovakiaundertheBenešDecreesin1945,Germanywasinbreachofthe internationalobligations itowedtoLiechtensteinand, ifso,whatisGermany’sinternationalresponsibility .

HavingthusestablishedtheexistenceofadisputebetweenLiechtensteinandGermanyandidentifieditssubject-matter,the Court concludes that the first preliminary objection ofGermanymustbedismissed .

Germany’s second preliminary objection(paras .28–52)

TheCourt thenexaminesGermany’s secondpreliminaryobjectionthatLiechtenstein’sApplicationshouldberejectedonthegroundsthattheCourtlacksjurisdictionratione tem-poristodecidethepresentdispute .

Germany asserts that were the Court to find that thereexistsadispute,itwouldneverthelessfalloutsidethejurisdic-tionoftheCourtbyvirtueofArticle27(a)oftheEuropeanConventionforthePeacefulSettlementofDisputes(seeabove,p .3) .Initsview,suchadisputewouldrelatetofactsorsitua-tionspriorto18February1980,thedatewhentheEuropeanConvention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes enteredintoforceasbetweenGermanyandLiechtenstein .InGerma-ny’sview,theApplicationshouldthereforeberejected .

GermanyclaimsthatthepropertyofPrinceFranzJosephIIofLiechtenstein,includingthepaintingbyPietervanLaer,aswell as property belonging to other Liechtenstein nationals,wasseizedinCzechoslovakiapursuanttotheBenešDecrees;andthattheSettlementConventionrequiredGermanytobaranyaction in itscourts that sought tochallenge the legalityofsuchconfiscations .InGermany’sview,thelawsuitbroughtbyPrinceHans-AdamIIofLiechtensteinbeforetheGermancourts torecoverthePietervanLaerpaintingwasgovernedbytheprovisionsoftheSettlementConvention .ThedismissalofthelawsuitbyvariousGermancourts,beginningwiththedecision of the Cologne Regional Court in 1995, acting incompliance with the provisions of that Convention, was inconformitywithearlierdecisionsofGermancourts .Accord-ing to Germany, its courts have consistently held that theylacked jurisdiction to evaluate the lawfulness of such con-fiscations .InGermany’sviewthedisputewhicharoseinthe1990swithregardtothePietervanLaerpaintingwasdirectlyrelatedtotheSettlementConventionandtheBenešDecrees;ithaditsrealsourceinfactsandsituationsexistingpriortothe1980criticaldate .

TheCourtobservesthatLiechtensteincontendsthatuntilthe decisions of the German courts in the Pieter van Laer Paintingcase,itwasunderstoodbetweenGermanyandLiech-

tenstein thatLiechtensteinpropertyconfiscatedpursuant totheBenešDecreescouldnotbedeemedtohavebeencoveredbytheSettlementConventionbecauseofLiechtenstein’sneu-trality .GermancourtswouldthereforenotbebarredbythatConvention from passing on the lawfulness of these confis-cations .InLiechtenstein’sview,thedecisionsoftheGermancourts in the 1990s with regard to the painting made clearthatGermanynolongeradheredtothatsharedview,andthusamounted to a change of position . Liechtenstein maintains,inter alia,that,insofarastherewasachangeofpositionbyGermany, the decisions of the German courts in the Pieter van Laer Paintingcaseandthe“positions takenby theGer-manGovernment, in theperiodafter1995”gave rise to thepresent dispute . The facts that triggered the present disputewere therefore not the Settlement Convention or the BenešDecrees,butGermany’sdecisionin1995toapplytheSettle-mentConventiontoLiechtensteinproperty .

The Court notes that in support of their arguments onthe subject of the legal test for temporal jurisdiction, bothLiechtensteinandGermanyrefertothejurisprudenceofthePermanentCourtof International Justice (thePhosphates in Morocco case and the Electricity Company case) and of thisCourt(Right of Passagecase) .

The Court observes that Germany’s second preliminaryobjectionrequiresittodecidewhether,applyingtheprovisionsofArticle27(aoftheEuropeanConventionforthePeaceful SettlementofDisputes,thepresentdisputerelatestofactsorsituationsthatarosebeforeorafterthe1980criticaldate .

TheCourtfindsthatthetextofArticle27(a)oftheEuro-pean Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputesdoes not differ in substance from the temporal jurisdictionlimitationsdealtwithinthePhosphates in Moroccocase,theElectricity Company in Sofia and BulgariacaseandtheRight of Passagecase .Inparticular,noconsequencecanbedrawnfromtheuseoftheexpressions“withregardto”or“relatingto” which have been employed indifferently in the varioustextsinquestion .TheCourtnotesfurtherthatinthosecasesthePermanentCourtofInternationalJusticeandthisCourtwerecalledupon to interpretunilateraldeclarationsaccept-ingtheCourt’sjurisdictionunderitsStatute,whereas,inthepresentcase,theCourthastointerpretamultilateralConven-tion .Withoutpronouncing inanymoregeneral senseupontheextenttowhichsuchinstrumentsaretobetreatedcom-parably, the Court finds no reason on this ground to inter-pretdifferentlythephraseinissue .Nor,itobserves,havethePartiessuggestedotherwise .TheCourtaccordinglyfinds itsprevious jurisprudenceon temporal limitationsof relevanceinthepresentcase .

TheCourtconsidersthat, insofaras ithastodeterminethe facts or situations to which this dispute relates, the testin the above-mentioned jurisprudence for establishing thejurisdictionof theCourtratione temporis,whichconsistsoffindingthesourceorrealcauseofthedispute,isequallyappli-cabletothiscase .

TheCourtpointsoutthatitisnotcontestedthatthepresentdisputewastriggeredbythedecisionsoftheGermancourtsinthePieter van Laer Paintingcase .Thisconclusiondoesnot,however,disposeofthequestiontheCourtiscalleduponto

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decide,forunderArticle27(a)oftheEuropeanConventionforthePeacefulSettlementofDisputes,thecriticalissueisnotthedatewhenthedisputearose,but thedateof the factsorsituationsinrelationtowhichthedisputearose .

IntheCourt’sview,thepresentdisputecouldonlyrelatetotheeventsthattranspiredinthe1990sif,asarguedbyLiech-tenstein,inthisperiod,Germanyeitherdepartedfromapre-vious common position that the Settlement Convention didnotapplytoLiechtensteinproperty,orifGermancourts,byapplyingtheirearliercaselawundertheSettlementConven-tionforthefirsttimetoLiechtensteinproperty,appliedthatConvention“toanewsituation”afterthecriticaldate .

With regard to the first alternative, the Court finds thatit has no basis for concluding that prior to the decisions oftheGermancourtsinthePieter van Laer Paintingcase,thereexisted a common understanding or agreement betweenLiechtenstein and Germany that the Settlement ConventiondidnotapplytotheLiechtensteinpropertyseizedabroadas“Germanexternalassets”forthepurposeofreparationorasa resultof thewar .The issuewhetherornot theSettlementConventionappliedtoLiechtensteinpropertyhadnotprevi-ouslyarisenbeforeGermancourts,norhaditbeendealtwithprior thereto in intergovernmental talks between Germanyand Liechtenstein . The Court observes, moreover, that Ger-man courts have consistently held that the Settlement Con-ventiondeprivedthemof jurisdictiontoaddressthe legalityof any confiscation of property treated as German propertybytheconfiscatingState .InthePieter van Laer Paintingcase,the German courts confined themselves to stating that theSettlement Convention was applicable in cases of confisca-tionunderDecreeNo .12, aswith theotherBenešDecrees,and that, consequently, the Convention was also applicabletotheconfiscationofthepainting .IntheviewoftheCourt,Liechtenstein’s contentionregarding theexistenceofaprioragreementorcommonunderstandingandanalleged“changeofposition”byGermanycannotthereforebeupheld .

AstoLiechtenstein’scontentionthatthedisputerelatestotheapplication,forthefirsttime,ofpre-1990Germanjuris-prudence to Liechtenstein property in the 1990s, the Courtpointsout thatGermancourtsdidnot faceany“newsitua-tion”whendealingforthefirst timewithacaseconcerningthe confiscation of Liechtenstein property as a result of theSecondWorldWar .TheCourtfindsthatthiscase,likeprevi-ousonesontheconfiscationofGermanexternalassets,wasinextricably linked to the Settlement Convention . It furtherfindsthatthedecisionsoftheGermancourtsinthePieter van Laer Painting case cannotbe separated from theSettlementConventionand theBenešDecrees,andthatthesedecisionscannotconsequentlybeconsideredasthesourceorrealcauseofthedisputebetweenLiechtensteinandGermany .

TheCourtconcludesthereforethat,whilethedecisionsofthe German courts triggered the dispute between Liechten-steinandGermany,thesourceorrealcauseofthedisputeistobefoundintheSettlementConventionandtheBenešDecrees .In light of the provisions of Article 27 (a) of the EuropeanConventionforthePeacefulSettlementofDisputes,Germa-ny’ssecondpreliminaryobjectionmustthereforebeupheld .

Having dismissed the first preliminary objection of Ger-many, but upheld its second, the Court finds that it is notrequired to consider Germany’s other objections and that itcannotruleonLiechtenstein’sclaimsonthemerits .

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Dissenting opinion of Judge Kooijmans

Judge Kooijmans agrees with the Court’s finding on theexistence of a dispute between Liechtenstein and Germanyand with its identification of the subject-matter of that dis-pute .

He cannot, however, subscribe to the Court’s conclusionthatthedisputerelatestofactsorsituationspriortotheentryinto force of the European Convention on Dispute Settle-ment as between the Parties on 18 February 1980 and thattheCourtisconsequentlywithoutjurisdiction .AfterhavinganalysedthecaselawofGermancourtsontheapplicationofArticle3,ChapterSix,ofthe1952SettlementConvention,heconcludesthatGermancourtsdidnotrulebeforethecriticaldateontheapplicabilityofthatArticletoassetsofthenation-alsofaStatewhichhadremainedneutralduringtheSecondWorldWar .TheydidsofortheveryfirsttimeinthePieter van Laer Painting case,submittedbythethenReigningPrinceofLiechtenstein,thusestablishinga“newsituation”subsequenttothecriticaldate .Thepreliminaryobjectionratione temporisshould,therefore,nothavebeenupheld .

Since Judge Kooijmans is of the view that the remainingpreliminaryobjectionswhichhavenotbeenconsideredbytheCourtarewithoutmerit,heconcludesthattheCourthasjuris-dictionandthatLiechtenstein’sApplicationisadmissible .

Dissenting opinion of Judge Elaraby

JudgeElarabyagreedwiththeCourt’sconclusionthatGer-many’sfirstpreliminaryobjection—allegingthattherewasnodispute—shouldberejected .Hedisagreed,however,withtheCourt’sfindingthatthesecondpreliminaryobjectionshouldbeupheld,andwith theCourt’sconsequentdismissalof thecaseonthegroundthatitlackedjurisdictionratione temporis.

Judge Elaraby began by noting that the temporal limita-tionclausebefore theCourtwasdifferent fromthosewhichtheCourt,anditspredecessorthePermanentCourtofInter-national Justice, had interpreted in prior cases (a) becauseitstermswerebroaderand(b)becauseitwascontainedinamultilateral treaty, as opposed to a unilateral acceptance ofjurisdiction .Inhisview,thesedifferencesmayhavejustifiedadeparturefromtheapproachadoptedinpriorcases—accord-ingtowhichthefactsorsituationsrelevanttoaratione tem-poris analysisarethosethatconstitutethe“realcause”ofthedispute—but he confined his opinion to an explanation ofwhy,inhisview,theCourtreachedthewrongconclusioninapplyingthe“realcause”testtothespecificfactsofthecase .

In Judge Elaraby’s view, the real cause of the disputebetweenLiechtensteinandGermanywas theGermancourtdecisions of the 1990s—well after the critical date—in thePieter van Laer Painting case .Because thesecourtdecisions

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purported for the first time to include neutral Liechtensteinproperty as “German external assets” under the SettlementConvention,JudgeElarabyfoundthatanyfactsorsituationsbeforethesecourtdecisions(suchastheSettlementConven-tion,theBenešDecrees,andpriorcasesdealingwiththeCon-vention) were mere historical background and could not betherealcauseofthedisputebetweentheParties .

In reaching this conclusion, Judge Elaraby found it per-tinent that,unlike in the threecases reliedonby theCourt(Right of Passage over Indian Territory, Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria and Phosphates in Morocco),therewerenopre-critical-dateacts imputable to theRespondent thatwererelevant to theApplicant’s claims; theonlyactionsattribut-abletoGermanythatmightpotentiallyhaveengageditsinter-national responsibilityvis-à-visLiechtensteinoccurredafterthecriticaldate .

JudgeElaraby’sconclusionwasthattheCourtshouldnothave found that itwasprecludedby the temporal limitationclausefromexercisingitsjurisdictionandhepointedoutthattheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsreachedthesamecon-clusionashimwhenitanalysedthequestionofitsjurisdictionratione temporisinthecasefiledbythePrinceofLiechtensteinundertheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights .Headdedthat,inthealternative,theCourtshouldhavejoinedtheobjec-tionratione temporistothemeritsinsteadofdisposingofthecasein limine.Finally,JudgeElarabyexpressedregretthattheCourt,havingrecognizedanddefinedthedisputebetweentheParties,thenoptedtodisposeofitwithoutahearing,asthiswasnot,inhisview,apositivecontributiontothesettlementofinternationaldisputes .

Dissenting opinion of Judge Owada

Judge Owada appends his opinion dissenting from themainconclusionoftheJudgmentthattheCourthasnojuris-dictiontoentertaintheApplicationfiledbythePrincipalityofLiechtenstein .

Judge Owada concurs in the first finding of the Court(paragraph1(a)ofthedispositif)inrejectingthepreliminaryobjectionoftheFederalRepublicofGermany that there is noGermanythatthereisnodisputebetweenLiechtensteinandGermany .However,hedis-sentsfromthesecondfindingoftheCourt(paragraph1(b)of thedispositif)upholdingthepreliminaryobjectionof theRespondentthatLiechtenstein’sApplicationshouldbereject-ed on the grounds that the Court lacks jurisdiction ratione temporistodecidethedispute .

InJudgeOwada’sview,theCourthascorrectly identifiedthesubject-matterofthedisputethatexistsbetweenthePar-tiesas consisting in the treatmentbyGermanyofLiechten-steinpropertyconfiscatedinCzechoslovakiaundertheBenešDecrees,inthatGermanyhasappliedArticle3,ChapterSix,oftheSettlementConventiontothepropertyinquestion .Onthisbasisthecriticaldatefordeterminingthescopeoflimi-tationratione temporisuponjurisdictionoftheCourtunderArticle 27 (a) of the European Convention for the PeacefulSettlement of Disputes should be determined with reference to this subject-matter of the dispute thus defined.Itcannotbedeniedinthisrespectthatthealleged“changeinpositionofGermany” in the treatmentof theLiechtensteinproperty in

questioninapplyingtheSettlementConvention,whichcamethroughaseriesofdecisionsofGermancourtsandconfirmedbyGermanauthorities,createdasituationthatgaverisetoadispute which had not existed between the Parties prior tothoseevents .ThusJudgeOwadaarguesthattheseeventsdidinfactamounttocreatinga“newsituation”,forthepurposeofapplicationofthejurisdictionratione temporisruleasestab-lishedby jurisprudenceoftheCourt, throughthetreatmentofLiechtensteinpropertybytheGermancourts inapplyingArticle3,ChapterSix,of theSettlementConvention for thefirsttimetoneutralproperty .Itgoeswithoutsayingthatthequestionofwhetherthis“newsituation”hashadtheeffectofbringing into existence international responsibility attrib-utable toGermany isamatter tobeexaminedat themeritsstage of the proceedings . Since this new development tookplaceonlyinthelate1990s,to that extent and strictly for the purposes of determining its jurisdiction,theCourtshouldhaveconcludedthatthisdevelopmentcouldconstitute“factsorsit-uationsgivingrisetothedispute”betweenthePartiesforthepurposeofapplicationofthecompromissoryclausecontainedinArticle27 (a)of theEuropeanConvention for thePeace-fulSettlementofDisputes .Thisquestion,whichmayrequirefurtherexaminationatthemeritsstageoftheproceedings,isthereforetobejoinedtothemeritsofthecase .

AsfortheotherpreliminaryobjectionsofGermanyrelat-ing to the jurisdiction of the Court (the third preliminaryobjection)ortotheadmissibilityoftheLiechtensteinclaimsbeforetheCourt(thefourth,fifthandsixthobjections),itistheviewofJudgeOwadathattheyareeithertoberejectedasunfounded (the third, fourth and sixth objections) or to bejoinedtothemeritsofthecase(thefifthobjection)asnotpos-sessinganexclusivelypreliminarycharacter .

Declaration of Judge Fleischhauer

Judge ad hoc Fleischhauer expresses his agreement withtheupholdingbytheCourtofGermany’ssecondpreliminaryobjection .Regardingthefirstpreliminaryobjection,hecan-not follow the Court with respect to Germany’s position inbilateral consultations and in the letter of the Minister forForeignAffairsof20January2000 .

Dissenting opinion of Judge Berman

Judge ad hoc Berman explains in his dissenting opinionwhy, although he agrees with much of what the Court hassaid,heagreesneitherwiththefindingthatGermany’ssecondpreliminaryobjectionshouldbeupheldnorwiththeCourt’shandlingofthepreliminaryphaseofthecasemoregenerally .

Having pointed out that Liechtenstein’s claim, althoughpossiblywithoutprecedent,isneverthelessessentiallystraight-forward,JudgeBermandrawsattentiontothefactthatithasbeenopposedbynolessthansixpreliminaryobjectionsraisedbyGermany,threeofwhichasktheCourttodeclinetohearthecaseeven if itfinds that ithas the jurisdiction todo so .HeisinfullagreementwiththeCourtinrejectingGermany’sfirstpreliminaryobjection(that there isnodisputebetweentheParties)andwouldhavebeenpreparedtogofurther,andholdthatGermanyisprecludedfromraisingsuchanobjec-tionnow,havingearlierrecognizedinitsdiplomaticcontacts

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withLiechtensteinthatthereexisteddifferencesbetweenthetwoStateswhichmighthavetobesettledbyjudicialmeans .

WhilehehasnofundamentaldisagreementwiththewayinwhichtheCourtassessesitspreviousjurisprudenceontem-poralclauseslimitingtheacceptanceoftheCourt’sjurisdic-tion(Germany’ssecondpreliminaryobjection),JudgeBermanstatesthat,inhisview,theearliercaselawestablishesthattheCourtpossessesadegreeoflatitudeordiscretionindecidingwhatsituationsorfactsareindeedthe“sourceorrealcause”ofaparticulardispute,notleastbecausenotwointernationaldisputes arise in exactly the same way . He adds that, in hisopinion,thisdiscretionmight,inappropriatecircumstances,beinfluencedbywhethertheparties’acceptanceofthejuris-diction is inanagreedgeneral treatyonthepeacefulsettle-mentofdisputes,asopposedtounilateraldeclarationsundertheoptionalclause .

His main disagreement with the Court is however overitsuncriticalacceptanceofanargumentthatliesattheheartof the German case and also of the Court’s own reasoning,namelytheclaimthattheGermancourtshadnooptionbutto apply the Settlement Convention of 1952/1955 to neutralpropertywhenthequestionaroseforthefirsttimemanyyearslater . He demonstrates that, on his reading of the Germancase law (not all of which had been presented to the Court,orexplainedtoitindetail),theGermansuperiorcourtshadclearlynotregardedthemselvesintheearlydaysaspreventedfromconsideringwhether theSettlementConvention(or itspredecessor Allied legislation) did apply, or even should beapplied,inparticularcases,andthatthepracticeofconsider-ingwhetherthepreconditionsweremetforapplyingtheCon-ventioncontinuedthroughoutthehandlingofthecaseofthePieter van Laer Painting itself inthe1990s, includingbeforetheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights .

Moreover, to interpret the Settlement Convention (towhichLiechtensteinwasnotinanycaseaparty)ascoveringneutralpropertyiscontrarytothewordingoftheConvention,andhadneverbeenjustifiedbeforetheGermancourtswithevidence that thiswas in fact the intentionof theContract-ingParties .ToattributesuchanintentiontotheThreeAlliedPowers was, furthermore, against all logic, and would haveentailedabreachoftheirownobligationstowardstheStateswhichhadbeenneutralintheSecondWorldWar .Itwasnottherefore to be foreseen that Germany would in due courseadopt such a position in its bilateral relations, and use it as

an argument for excluding any possibility of compensation .It is,however,precisely theadoptionof thispositionwhich,accordingtoJudgeBerman,wastherealsourceofthedispute;itgaverisetoanewsituation,andittookplacewellafterthecritical date . While it cannot be denied that the SettlementConvention and Beneš Decrees are connected with the dis-pute,thatdoesnotinitselfmakethemthedispute’s“sourceorrealcause” .

JudgeBermangoesontodiscussthecircumstancesunderwhichcertainpartsofwhathadbeenanavowedlytemporaryrégimeundertheSettlementConventionweremadeperma-nent, whereas other parts (the obligation to pay compensa-tion)wereabrogated,ontheunificationofGermanyin1990 .AlthoughthePartieshadeithernotpossessed,oratleastnotproduced,evidencetotheCourtshowingwhythishadbeendone, the inference must be that it had been at Germany’srequest,andthattooreinforcedtheviewthatthesourceofthedisputelayafterthecriticaldate .

JudgeBermanconcludesbystatingthat,iftherewashow-everanyremainingdoubtonanyofthesepoints,thecorrectprocedure would have been to join the second preliminaryobjectiontothemerits,soastoallowtheopportunityforfullevidenceandargument .

Astotheremainingpreliminaryobjections,JudgeBermanstatesthathewouldreject themall .Hediscussesbrieflythefifthobjection(absenceofanindispensablethirdparty),butfindsitclearthatthedispute,asnowdefinedintheJudgmentoftheCourt,wouldnothaverequiredtheCourttohavepro-nouncedinanywayonthe lawfulnessof theBeneš Decreesas such, or particular confiscations undertaken pursuantto them . Once again, he concludes, any doubt on this scorewouldmostappropriatelyhavebeenmanagedbyjoiningtheobjectiontothemerits .

Finally,JudgeBermanpointsoutthattheJudgmentoftheCourtdeclining jurisdictiondoesnotdisposeof thedisputeitself,whichtheCourthasnowformallydeterminedtoexistbetween the two States, and regrets their failure to agree, ifnecessaryad hoc, that thedisputebesettledby theInterna-tionalCourtinaccordancewiththetraditionsofbothParties .HecommentsontheproprietyofclaimingprotectionundertheSettlementConventionwhiledisclaimingitscorrespond-ing obligation to pay compensation, and indicates that theclaimsadvancedbyLiechtenstein,evenifunusual,deservedahearing .

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158. FRontIeRDIsPUte(BenIn/nIGeR)

Judgmentof12July2005

On12July2005,theChamberoftheCourtconstitutedinthecaseconcerningFrontier Dispute(Benin/Niger)delivereditsJudgment.

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The Chamber was composed as follows: Judge Ranjeva,Vice-PresidentoftheCourt,PresidentoftheChamber;JudgesKooijmans, Abraham; Judges ad hoc Bedjaoui, Bennouna;RegistrarCouvreur .

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Theoperativeparagraphofthejudgmentreadsasfollows:“ . . .TheChamber,(1)Byfourvotestoone,Finds that the boundary between the Republic of BeninandtheRepublicofNiger intheRiverNigersectortakesthefollowingcourse:— the line of deepest soundings of the main navigablechannelofthatriver,fromtheintersectionofthesaidlinewiththemedianlineoftheRiverMekrouuntilthepointsituated at co-ordinates 11° 52’ 29” latitude North and3°25’34”longitudeEast;—fromthatpoint,thelineofdeepestsoundingsoftheleftnavigable channel until the point located at co-ordinates11° 51’ 55” latitude North and 3° 27’ 41” longitude East,wheretheboundarydeviatesfromthischannelandpassesto the left of the island of Kata Goungou, subsequentlyrejoiningthemainnavigablechannelatthepointlocatedat co-ordinates 11° 51’ 41” latitude North and 3° 28’ 53”longitudeEast;—fromthislatterpoint,thelineofdeepestsoundingsofthemainnavigablechanneloftheriverasfarasthebound-aryofthePartieswithNigeria;and that the boundary line, proceeding downstream,passesthroughthepointsnumberedfrom1to154,theco-ordinates of which are indicated in paragraph 115 of thepresentJudgment;in favour: Judge Ranjeva, Vice-President of the Court,President of the Chamber; Judges Kooijmans, Abraham;Judgead hocBedjaoui;against:Judgead hocBennouna;(2)Byfourvotestoone,FindsthattheislandssituatedintheRiverNigerthereforebelongtotheRepublicofBeninortotheRepublicofNigerasindicatedinparagraph117ofthepresentJudgment;

in favour: Judge Ranjeva, Vice-President of the Court,President of the Chamber; Judges Kooijmans, Abraham;Judgead hocBedjaoui;against:Judgead hocBennouna;(3)Byfourvotestoone,Finds that the boundary between the Republic of BeninandtheRepublicofNigeronthebridgesbetweenGayaandMalanvillefollowsthecourseoftheboundaryintheriver;in favour: Judge Ranjeva, Vice-President of the Court,President of the Chamber; Judges Kooijmans, Abraham;Judgead hocBedjaoui;against:Judgead hocBennouna;(4)Unanimously,Finds that the boundary between the Republic of BeninandtheRepublicofNigerintheRiverMekrousectorfol-lowsthemedianlineofthatriver,fromtheintersectionofthesaidlinewiththelineofdeepestsoundingsofthemainnavigablechanneloftheRiverNigerasfarastheboundaryofthePartieswithBurkinaFaso .”

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JudgeadhocBennounaappendedadissentingopiniontotheJudgment .

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TheChamberrecallsattheoutsetthat,on3May2002,byajointletterofnotificationdated11April2002,theRepublicofBenin(hereinafter“Benin”)andtheRepublicofNiger(here-inafter“Niger”)transmittedtotheRegistraraSpecialAgree-ment whereby the Governments of the two States agreed tosubmittoaChamberoftheCourtadisputeconcerning“thedefinitivedelimitationofthewholeboundarybetweenthem” .InArticle2oftheSpecialAgreement,theCourtisrequestedto:

“(a) determine the course of the boundary between theRepublicofBeninandtheRepublicofNiger intheRiverNigersector;(b)specifywhichStateownseachoftheislandsinthesaidriver,andinparticularLétéIsland;(c)determinethecourseoftheboundarybetweenthetwoStatesintheRiverMekrousector .”The Chamber then recalls the history of the proceedings

includingwith respect to the formationandcompositionofthe Chamber . By an Order of 27 November 2002 the Courtconstituted a Chamber to deal with the case, composed ofPresident Guillaume and Judges Ranjeva and Kooijmans

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togetherwith the judgesad hoc. InaccordancewithArticle18,paragraph2,oftheRulesofCourt,JudgeGuillaume,whoheld theofficeofPresidentof theCourtwhen theChamberwas formed, was to preside over the Chamber . However, bya letter of 11 October 2004, Judge Guillaume informed thePresidentoftheCourt,pursuanttoArticle13,paragraph4,oftheStatute,thathehaddecidedtoresignfromtheCourtwitheffectfrom11February2005 .On16February2005theCourtelectedJudgeAbrahamasamemberoftheChambertofilltheseatleftvacantbyJudgeGuillaume’sresignation .ByanOrderof16February2005,theCourtdeclaredthat,asaresultofthiselection, theChamberwascomposedas follows: JudgeRan-jeva,who,inhiscapacityasVice-PresidentoftheCourt,hadbecome President of the Chamber, pursuant to Article 18,paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court; Judges Kooijmans andAbraham;andJudgesadhocBedjaouiandBennouna .

TheChamberfinallyreproduces, inter alia, thefinalsub-missionspresentedbythePartiesattheconclusionoftheoralproceedings:

OnbehalfoftheGovernmentofBenin,“Forthereasonssetoutinitswrittenandoralpleadings,theRepublicofBeninrequeststheChamberoftheInterna-tionalCourtofJusticetodecide:(1)thattheboundarybetweentheRepublicofBeninandtheRepublicofNigertakesthefollowingcourse:—fromthepointhavingco-ordinates11°54’15”latitude

Northand2°25’10”longitudeEast,itfollowsthemedi-anlineoftheRiverMekrouasfarasthepointhavingco-ordinates12°24’29” latitudeNorthand2°49’38”longitudeEast,

—fromthatpoint, theboundaryfollowsthe leftbankoftheRiver[Niger]asfarasthepointhavingco-ordinates11°41’44”Northand3°36’44”East;

(2) that sovereignty over all of the islands in the River[Niger],andinparticularthe islandofLété, lieswiththeRepublicofBenin .”OnbehalfoftheGovernmentofNiger,“TheRepublicofNigerrequeststheCourttoadjudgeanddeclarethat:(1)TheboundarybetweentheRepublicofBeninandtheRepublicofNigerfollowsthelineofdeepestsoundingsintheRiverNiger,insofarasthatlinecouldbeestablishedatthedateofindependence,fromthepointhavingco-ordi-nateslatitude12°24’27”North,longitude2°49’36”East,asfarasthepointhavingco-ordinateslatitude11°41’40 .7”North,longitude3°36’44”East .(2) That line determines which islands belong to eachParty .—Theislandsbetweenthelineofdeepestsoundingsand

the right bank of the river, namely Pekinga, TondiKwariaBarou,KokiBarou,SandiToungaBarou,Gan-dégabiBarouKaïna,DanKoréGuirawa,BarouElhadjiDanDjoda,KoundouBarouandElhadjiChaïbouBarouKaïna,belongtotheRepublicofBenin;

—Theislandslocatedbetweenthelineofdeepestsound-ingsandtheleftbankoftheriver,namelyBoumbaBarou

Béri, Boumba Barou Kaïna, Kouassi Barou, SansanGoungou,LétéGoungou,MonboyeToungaBarou,SiniGoungou,LamaBarou,KotchaBarou,GagnoGoungou,KataGoungou,GandégabiBarouBéri,GuirawaBarou,Elhadji Chaïbou Barou Béri, Goussou Barou, BeyoBarouandDoléBarou,belongtotheRepublicofNiger .

(3) The attribution of islands to the Republic of BeninandtheRepublicofNigeraccordingtothelineofdeepestsoundingsasdeterminedatthedateofindependenceshallberegardedasfinal .(4)WithregardtotheGaya-Malanvillebridges,thebound-arypassesthroughthemiddleofeachofthosestructures .(5)TheboundarybetweentheRepublicofBeninandtheRepublicofNigerintheRiverMekrousectorfollowsalinecomprisingtwoparts:—thefirstpartisastraightlinejoiningthepointofcon-

fluence of the River Mekrou with the River Niger tothepointwhere theParismeridianmeets theAtacoramountainrange,indicativeco-ordinatesofwhichareasfollows:latitude:11°41’50”North;longitude:2°20’14”East;

—thesecondpartofthelinejoinsthislatterpointtothepointwheretheformerboundarybetweenthecerclesofSayandFadameets theformerboundarybetweenthecerclesofFadaandAtacora, indicativeco-ordinatesofwhichareasfollows:latitude:11°44’37”North;longi-tude:2°18’55”East .”

Geographical context and historical background of the dispute(paras .17–22)

TheChambernotesthatArticle2oftheSpecialAgreementdivides the disputed boundary into two sectors, the RiverMekrousector inthewestandtheRiverNigersector intheeast . The Chamber then briefly describes each of these sec-tors .

Thewesternpartoftheboundaryfollowsacourserunningapproximatelysouth-westtonorth-eastfromapointmarkingtheboundarybetweenthetwoStatesandBurkinaFasoasfarastheconfluenceoftheRiverMekrouandtheRiverNiger .

Theeasternpartof theboundaryfollowstheRiverNigerinasouth-easterlydirectionoveradistanceofsome150kmfromthatconfluenceandendsatapointmarkingthebound-aryof the twoStateswithNigeria .Thereare several islandswithin the stretch concerned; their exact number and theirattributiontoeitherPartyaremattersofdisputeinthepresentcase .TheislandofLété,referredtoexpresslyinArticle2(b)oftheSpecialAgreement,isthelargest,coveringapproximately40sq .km .Theislandisfertile,withrichpastures,andisper-manently inhabited; according to information supplied byNiger,itspopulationnumberedsome2,000intheyear2000 .

ThefrontierdisputebetweenthePartiesissetwithinahis-torical context marked by the accession to independence oftheterritoriesthatwereformerlypartofFrenchWestAfrica(“Afrique occidentale française”, hereinafter “AOF”) . Benin,whichhasbeenindependentsince1August1960,correspondstotheformercolonyofDahomey,andNiger,whichhasbeenindependentsince3August1960,correspondstoaterritory

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which underwent various administrative transformationsduringthecolonialperiod .

Both Parties referred to incidents that occurred on theislandofLétéontheeveoftheirindependence,in1959and1960 . The two States subsequently set up a process for thefriendly settlement of their frontier dispute: in 1961 and1963 two Dahomey-Niger joint commissions met to discussthematter .InOctober1963thecrisisbetweenDahomeyandNiger regarding the island of Lété deepened and each StatesubsequentlypublishedaWhitePapersettingout,inter alia,their positions regarding the frontier dispute . There werefreshattemptstoreachapeacefulsettlementintheyearsthatfollowed . However, the issue of sovereignty over the islandofLétéwasnotresolvedandtherewerefurther incidents insubsequentyears,notablyin1993and1998 .On8April1994Benin and Niger entered into an agreement creating a jointcommission for the delimitation of their common border .Sinceeffortstoarriveatanegotiatedsolutiontothedisputewereunsuccessful,thecommissionproposedthatthegovern-mentsofthetwoStatesbringthedisputebeforetheInterna-tionalCourtofJusticebySpecialAgreement .

Applicable law and principle of utipossidetisjuris(paras .23–31)

The Chamber notes that, under Article 6 of the SpecialAgreement (“Applicable Law”), the rules and principles ofinternationallawapplicabletothepresentdisputeinclude“theprincipleofStatesuccessiontotheboundariesinheritedfromcolonization,thatistosay,theintangibilityofthosebounda-ries” .TheChamberobservesthatitfollowsfromthewordingofthisprovisionandfromtheargumentsofthePartiesthattheyareinagreementontherelevanceoftheprincipleofuti possidetis juris for the purposes of determining their com-monborder . It recalls that theChamber formed in the caseconcerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali)hadoccasiontostate,that,accordingtotheprincipleinquestion,“pre-eminence[is]accordedtolegaltitleovereffec-tivepossessionasabasisofsovereignty”andthatitsessencelies“initsprimaryaimofsecuringrespectfortheterritorialboundariesat themomentwhenindependence isachieved”,including former administrative delimitations establishedduringthecolonialperiodthatbecameinternationalfrontiers(Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986,pp .586–587,para .63,andp .566,para .23) .

TheChamberconcludesthatonthebasisoftheprincipleofuti possidetis juris, itmust seek todetermine, in thecasebefore it, the boundary that was inherited from the Frenchadministration .ThePartiesagree that thedates tobe takeninto account for this purpose are those of their respectiveindependence, namely 1 and 3 August 1960 . The Chamberobserves that there was no change in the frontier betweenthesetwoveryclosedates .

InresponsetodifferingopinionsexpressedbythePartiesregardingcertainaspectsof theapplicationof theuti possi-detis juris principle in the present case, the Chamber firstlyobservesthatthePartiesagreethatthecourseoftheircom-monboundaryshouldbedetermined,inaccordancewiththeuti possidetis jurisprinciple,byreferencetothephysicalsitu-

ationtowhichFrenchcoloniallawwasapplied,asthatsitua-tionexistedatthedatesofindependence .Itemphasizes,how-ever, that theconsequencesof suchacourseon theground,particularlywithregardtothequestionoftowhichPartytheislandsintheRiverNigerbelong,mustbeassessedinrelationtopresent-dayphysicalrealitiesandthat,incarryingoutthetaskassignedtoitunderArticle2oftheSpecialAgreement,theChambercannotdisregardthepossibleappearanceordis-appearanceofcertainislandsinthestretchconcerned .

The Chamber secondly points out that it cannot excludeapriorithepossibilitythatmaps,researchorotherdocumentssubsequent to thedatesof independencemaybe relevant inorder to establish, in application of the uti possidetis jurisprinciple,thesituationthatexistedatthetime .Inanyevent,since theeffectof theutipossidetisprinciple is to freeze theterritorial title, the examination of documents posterior toindependence cannot lead to any modification of the “pho-tographoftheterritory”atthecriticaldateunless,ofcourse,suchdocumentsclearlyexpresstheParties’agreementtosuchachange .

TheChamberthirdlynotesthattheapproachemployedbybothParties,whichhaveonoccasionsoughttoconfirmtheirclaimstolegaltitlebyrelyingonactswherebytheirauthoritiesallegedly exercised sovereignty over the disputed territoriesafter1960,shouldnotnecessarilybeexcluded .

TheChamberrecallsthatbothPartiesacknowledgethat,inaccordancewiththeprincipleofuti possidetis juris,thecourseof the frontier and the attribution of islands in the RiverNigertoeitheroneofthemmustbedeterminedinthelightofFrenchcoloniallaw,knownas“droit d’outre-mer” .ThePartiesalsoagreeontheidentificationoftherelevantrulesofthatlaw,butdonotsharethesameinterpretationthereof .Beforeturn-ingtothoserules,theChamberrecallsthat,whenreferenceismadetodomesticlawinsuchacontext,thatlawisapplicable“notinitself(asiftherewereasortofcontinuum juris,alegalrelaybetweensuchlawandinternationallaw),butonlyasonefactualelementamongothers,orasevidenceindicativeof . . .the‘colonialheritage’”(ibid.,p .568,para .30) .

The Chamber then observes that the territorial adminis-trationoftheFrenchpossessionsinWestAfricawascentral-ized by a decree of the President of the French Republic of16June1895andplacedundertheauthorityofaGovernor-General .TheentityoftheAOFthuscreatedwasdividedintocolonies, headed by Lieutenant-Governors and themselvesmadeupofbasicunits called “cercles”whichwereadminis-teredbycommandants de cercle;eachcercle wasinturncom-posedofsubdivisions, eachadministeredbyachef de subdi-vision.Thesubdivisions consistedofcantons,whichgroupedtogetheranumberofvillages .

TheChambernotesthatthePartiesacknowledgethatthecreationandabolitionofcoloniesfellwithinthejurisdictionoftheauthoritiesofmetropolitanFrance:thePresidentoftheFrenchRepublic,actingbydecree,undertheConstitutionoftheThirdRepublic,andsubsequentlytheFrenchParliament,followingtheadoptionoftheConstitutionof27October1946 .The power to create territorial subdivisions within a single

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colony,ontheotherhand,wasvestedintheAOFuntilbeingtransferredtothelocalrepresentativeinstitutionsin1957 .

Article5ofthedecreeofthePresidentoftheFrenchRepub-lic dated 18 October 1904, providing for the reorganizationof the AOF, vested the Governor-General with authority to“determineingovernmentcouncil(conseil de gouvernement),andontheproposaloftheLieutenant-Governorsconcerned,the administrative districts in each of the colonies” . In hiscircularNo .114cof3November1912,concerningtheformof instruments for the organization of administrative dis-tricts and subdivisions, the Governor-General interpretedthis text as conferring upon him “the right to establish . . .thenumberandextentofthecercleswhich,withinthecolo-nies,constitute[d]theactualadministrativeunit”,butpointedoutthatitwas“acknowledgedthattheLieutenant-Governorswouldretainthepowertodeterminetheterritorialsubdivi-sionscreatedwithinthesecerclesbymeasuresadoptedundertheirownauthority” .Accordingtothatcircular,“anymeas-ure concerning the administrative district, the territorialunitproper, i .e .affectingthecercle, in termsof itsexistence(creationorabolition),itsextent,itsname,orthelocationofits administrative centre”, was tobe confirmed byanarrêté généraladoptedingovernmentcouncil; it laywiththeLieu-tenant-Governors“todefine,bymeansofarrêtés,theapprovalofwhich[was]reservedto[theGovernor-General],theexactand detailed topographical boundaries of each of these dis-tricts”,aswellas“withinthecercles,[to]fix . . . thenumberandextentoftheterritorialsubdivisions . . .andthelocationoftheircentre”bymeansoflocaldecisions .

Evolution of legal status of territories concerned(paras .32–36)

For a better understanding of the historical context inwhichtheParties’claimsstandinrelationtothedetermina-tionofthefrontierandtothequestionoftowhomtheislandsintheRiverNigerbelong, theChamberbrieflyrecapitulatesthe evolution of the legal status of the territories concernedduringthecolonialperiod .

Documents and cartographic material relevant to the settlement of the dispute(paras .37–44)

TheChambergoesontodescribethemaindocumentsrel-evanttothesettlementofthefrontierdispute,listingontheone hand the documents that concern the determination ofthecourseoftheboundaryintheRiverNigersectorandthequestionoftowhomtheislandsinthatriverbelong,andontheotherhandthedocumentsthatrelatetothedelimitationintheRiverMekrousector .TheChamberalsodescribesthelargequantityofcartographicandphotographicmaterialproducedbythePartiesinsupportoftheirrespectivearguments.

The course of the boundary in the sector of the River Niger and the question of to which Party each of the islands belongs(paras .45–124)

Evidence of title(paras .45–74)

Benin’s claims to title

TheChamberrecallsthatitisfirstlyasked,inaccordancewithArticle2,paragraphs(a)and(b),of theSpecialAgree-ment,todeterminethecourseoftheboundaryinthesectoroftheRiverNigerandthentospecifytowhichPartyeachoftheislandsintheriverbelongs .

TheChamberpointsoutthatinthepresentcasetheseter-ritorialboundarieswerenomorethandelimitationsbetweendifferent administrative divisions or colonies subject to thesame colonial authority . Only at the moment of independ-ence, also called the “critical date”, did these boundariesbecome international frontiers . Since the Parties achievedindependencevirtuallysimultaneouslytheperiodbetween1and3August1960canbeconsideredasthecriticaldate .TheChamberindicatesthat, inaccordancewiththeapproachoftheChamberintheFrontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali) case, it will first consider the various regulative oradministrativeactsinvokedbytheParties .

Inthisrespect,theChamberrecallsthatthePartiesagreethat,duringtheperiodunderconsideration,thepowertocre-ate colonies or territories was vested in the President of theFrenchRepublicuntil1946andthereafterintheFrenchPar-liament,whilecolonial subdivisionscouldbecreatedby theGovernor-GeneraloftheAOFunderthetermsofthedecreeof18October1904 .InhiscircularNo .114cof3November1912,theGovernor-GeneraloftheAOFdeterminedthatthemainsubdivisions(“cercles”)wouldbeestablishedbytheGov-ernor-General, but that the Lieutenant-Governors would beentitled to create further territorial subdivisions within thecercles. The Chamber observes that it appears that it is notdisputedbetweenthePartiesthatthecompetencetocreateorestablishterritorialentitiesincludedthepowertodeterminetheir extent and todelimit them,although during the colo-nialperiodthiswasnevermadeexplicitinanyregulativeoradministrativeact .

The Chamber further recalls that it is not contested thatin the initial period after its creation in 1894 the colony ofDahomeycomprisedterritoriessituatedonbothbanksoftheRiverNiger .Byarrêtéof23July1900,theGovernor-GeneraloftheAOFestablishedathirdmilitaryterritory,which“willencompasstheareasontheleftbankoftheNigerbetweenSayandLakeChadthatwereplacedwithintheFrenchsphereofinfluencebythe[Anglo-French]Conventionof14June1898” .On20December1900adecreeofthePresidentoftheFrenchRepublicwasissuedwhichestablishedathirdmilitaryterri-tory“betweentheNigerandLakeChad” .Thedecree,whichwassuperiortoanarrêté inthehierarchyoflegalacts,madenoreference to thearrêtéof23 July1900 . In theChamber’sview,thedecreemustneverthelessbeseenasaconfirmationofthearrêté oftheGovernor-Generalsinceitcoversthesameareabetweenthe(River)Nigerand(Lake)Chad .

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TheChambernotesthatBenincontendsthatthearrêté of23July1900establishedtheboundarybetweentheThirdMili-taryTerritoryandthecolonyofDahomeyattheleftbankoftheRiverNiger,leavingtheriveritselfandtheislandslocatedthereinaspartofthatcolony .Beninfurthercontendsthattheboundary thus established was confirmed by the Governorad interimofNigerinaletterof27August1954whichstated“thattheboundaryoftheTerritoryofNiger[was]constitutedbythelineofhighestwaterontheleftbankoftheriver,fromthe village of Bandofay to the frontier of Nigeria” and that“[c]onsequently,alltheislandssituatedinthispartoftheriver[formed]partoftheTerritoryofDahomey” .Niger,foritspart,deniesthatthearrêté of23July1900establishedaboundary;initsviewtherelevantwordingwasmerelyintendedtoindi-catetheterritorialextentofthenewlycreatedTerritory .Itfur-therobservesthatanunderstandingsoondevelopedthattheboundarywasconstitutedby“thecourseoftheriver”andthatthiscouldonlymeanthattheboundarywassituatedwithinthewatercourseoftheriver .

TheChamberisoftheviewthatthearrêtéof23July1900inconjunctionwiththedecreeofthePresidentoftheFrenchRepublicof20December1900,whichcreatedtheThirdMili-taryTerritory,cannotbereadasdeterminingtheboundariesthereof .Thegeographicalreferencesusedcanonlybeseenasindicating in general terms the extent of the newly createdterritory;thewords“theareasontheleftbankoftheNiger”inthearrêtéand“theNiger”inthedecreemakeitclearthatthese areas are detached from the colony of Dahomey towhichtheypreviouslybelonged .Theconclusionthatthelegalinstrumentsof23Julyand20December1900didnotdeter-mineanyboundary,andwerenotconsideredat the timeasdoingso,isconfirmedbytheletterof7September1901oftheFrenchMinisterfortheColoniesaddressedtotheGovernor-Generalof theAOF,referring to the“courseof theNigerasthebestdemarcationline” .Althoughthisletterdidnotdeter-mine the boundary, the Chamber considers that it providessufficient evidence that a delimitation had not taken placethe year before . Nor has the Chamber found any documentwhichshowsthatadelimitationwascarriedoutinsubsequentyears .

The Chamber therefore concludes that Benin’s argumentthatthearrêté of23July1900locatedtheboundaryattheleftbankoftheRiverNiger,andthatthisdelimitationremainedinforceuntilthedateofindependence,cannotbeupheld .

Turningtotheletterof27August1954oftheGovernorad interimofNiger, theChamber initially analyses thecontextinwhichthisletterwaswritten .Itconcludesthat,inviewofitsfindingthatthearrêté of23July1900didnotestablishaboundary,thislettercannotbeseenasanauthoritativeconfir-mationofsuchaboundary,asclaimedbyBenin .TheChamberfurthernotesthat,underFrenchcoloniallaw,theLieutenant-Governorofacolonyhadnocompetencetodelimitunilater-allytheexternalboundariesofthecolony .Therefore,theletterin itselfcannotbereliedonbyBeninasa legal titleplacingtheboundaryontheleftbankoftheriver .TheChamberthusfindsthatitcannotupholdBenin’sclaimaccordingtowhichtheletterof27August1954inconjunctionwiththearrêtéof23July1900providesitwithlegaltitletoaboundaryontheleftbank .

Niger’s claims to title

TheChamber then turns to theacts invokedbyNigerasevidenceofitslegaltitle,namelythearrêtés issuedbytheGov-ernor-GeneraloftheAOFon8December1934and27Octo-ber1938reorganizingtheinternaladministrativestructureofthe colony of Dahomey and containing a description of theboundariesof thevariouscercles. Inbotharrêtés thenorth-west boundary of the cercle of Kandi is described as “thecourseoftheNigerasfarasitsconfluencewiththeMekrou” .

TheChamberfirstnotes thatbotharrêtéswere issuedbythe Governor-General, who was the authority competent toestablish,delimitandreorganizethecercles ofcolonies .Insofaras theydescribe theboundariesof thesecercles with theneighbouringcolonieswhichalsocameunderhisauthority,thearrêtésdonothaveanexclusiveinternalcharacterbutmayalsoberelieduponinintercolonialrelations .Consequentlyitcanbeconcludedonthebasisofthesearrêtés thatthecourseoftheRiverNigerconstitutedtheintercolonialboundary .TheChamber finds itself unable, however, to deduce therefromthat that boundary was situated in the river, whether at thethalweg or the median line . It notes in this regard that theterminologyusedinthearrêtésisidenticaltothatofthe1901letterandisjustasimprecise .Thenotionofthe“courseoftheriver”coversarangeofpossibilities:aboundaryoneitherriverbankoraboundarysomewherewithintheriver .TheCham-berthusfindsthatthe1934and1938arrêtés didnotestablishaboundary in theriver;andthatitcannotthereforesustainNiger’sclaimsastotitle .

Effectivités as basis for determination of the frontier(paras .75–102)

SincetheChamberhasconcludedthatneitherofthePar-tieshassucceededinprovidingevidenceoftitleonthebasisofregulativeoradministrativeactsduringthecolonialperiod,itturnstoconsiderwhethertheevidencefurnishedbythePar-tieswithrespecttoeffectivitéscanprovidethebasisfor it todeterminethecourseofthefrontierinthesectoroftheRiverNigerandtowhichofthetwoStateseachoftheislandsintheriverbelongs .

ItrecallsinthisregardthattheCourthaspreviouslyruledinanumberofcasesonthelegalrelationshipbetweeneffec-tivitésandtitle .ThepassagemostpertinenttothepresentcasecanbefoundintheJudgmentintheFrontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali) case, in which the Chamber of theCourt,havingnotedthat“adistinctionmustbedrawnamongseveral eventualities” when evaluating the legal relationshipbetweeneffectivités andtitle,stated,inter alia, that:“[i]ntheeventthattheeffectivitédoesnotco-existwithanylegaltitle,itmustinvariablybetakenintoconsideration”(I.C.J. Reports 1986,p .587,para .63) .

TheChamberfirstanalyses thevariousactivitiesprior to1954, presented as effectivités by the Parties . It refers to theletterof3July1914ofthecommandant of the secteurofGaya(Niger),administrateur adjointSadoux,tothecommandantofthecercleofMoyen-Niger(Dahomey),writtenforthepurposeof determining when grazing permits should be issued anddelimitingthejurisdictionofthetwocolonies’indigenoustri-bunals. AdministrateuradjointSadouxattachedtohislettera

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listofislandsintheborderarea,drawnuponthebasisofanexplorationofthewholestretchoftheriver,withanindica-tion of the colony to which each island belonged accordingtoitspositionwithrespecttothemainnavigablechannel .Hedefinedthischannelas“theriver’smainchannel,notthewid-estchannel,buttheonly channel navigable at low water” .TheChambernotesthatitappearsthatameetingtookplaceandledtoanagreement .Althoughdifficultiesarosein1919withregard to the administration of the island of Lété by Gaya,which was contested by Dahomey, the 1914 arrangement,which became known as the 1914 modus vivendi, seems tohavebeencompliedwithinsubsequentyears .

The Chamber then turns to the effectivités in the periodfrom 1954 until the critical date in 1960 . It recalls that, on27 August 1954, the Governor ad interim of Niger wrote aletter inwhichhe stated that theboundarywas situated “atthe lineofhighestwater,on the leftbankof the river, fromthevillageofBandofaytothefrontierofNigeria”andthat“alltheislandssituatedinthispartoftheriver[formed]partoftheterritoryofDahomey” .TheChambertakesnoteofthefactthat,duringthisperiod,theclaimsofDahomeytobeentitledtoadministertheislandofLétébecamemorefrequent .

Onthebasisoftheevidencebeforeit,theChamberfindsthat,from1914to1954,thetermsofthemodus vivendiestab-lishedbythe1914Sadouxletterwereingeneralrespectedandthat, during this period, the main navigable channel of theRiverNigerwasconsideredbybothsidestobetheboundary .Asa result, administrativeauthoritywasexercisedbyNigerontheislandstotheleftandbyDahomeyontheislandstotherightofthatline .TheentitlementofNigertoadministertheislandofLétéwassporadicallycalledintoquestionforpracti-calreasonsbutwasneitherlegallynorfactuallycontested .

With respect to the islands opposite Gaya, the Chambernotesthat,onthebasisofthemodus vivendiestablishedbythe1914Sadouxletter,theseislandswereconsideredtofallunderthejurisdictionofDahomeyandthatithasnotreceivedanyinformationtoindicatethattheseislandswereadministeredfromanywhereelseotherthanthecercleofKandi(Dahomey) .The Chamber therefore concludes that, in this sector of theriver,theboundarywasregardedaspassingtotheleftofthesethreeislands .

The Chamber finds that the situation is less clear in theperiodbetween1954and1960 .ItisapparentthatbothPartiesperiodicallyclaimedrightsovertheislands,inparticularLété,andalsooccasionallyperformedadministrativeactsasadis-playofauthority .However,onthebasisoftheevidencebeforeit, theChambercannot conclude that theadministration oftheislandofLété,whichbefore1954wasundoubtedlycarriedoutbyNiger,waseffectively transferred toor takenoverbyDahomey .Inthisrespect,theChambernotesthatareportofthegendarmerieofMalanvilleof1July1960statedthatLétéwas“currentlyadministeredbythesubdivisionofGaya” .

Forallthesereasonsandinthecircumstancesofthecase,particularlyinlightoftheevidencefurnishedbytheParties,theChamberconcludesthattheboundarybetweenBeninandNigerfollowsthemainnavigablechanneloftheRiverNigerasitexistedatthedatesofindependence,itbeingunderstoodthat, in the vicinity of the three islands opposite Gaya, the

boundary passes to the left of these islands . Consequently,BeninhastitletotheislandssituatedbetweentheboundarythusdefinedandtherightbankoftheriverandNigerhastitletotheislandsbetweenthatboundaryandtheleftbankoftheriver .

Precise location of the boundary line in the main navigable channel(paras .103–115)

TheChamberthenproceeds todeterminethe locationoftheboundarylineinthemainnavigablechannel,namelytheline of deepest soundings, as it existed at the dates of inde-pendence .

TheChamberinitiallynotesthat,overthecourseoftime,anumberofhydrographicandtopographicsurveyshavetakenplace on the River Niger and that the position of the mainnavigable channel of the river as determined by each of themissionsisverysimilar .TheChamberconsidersthatthisindi-catesthattheriverbedisrelativelystableandthatanysiltationwhichhastakenplacehasrarelyledtoanoticeablechangeinthe location of the main navigable channel . This appears tohavebeenthecaseinboththecolonialandpost-independenceperiod .

Giventhatithastodeterminethecourseoftheboundaryatthetimeofindependence,theChamberisoftheviewthatthereportofastudyonthenavigabilityoftheMiddleNiger,carriedoutbytheNEDECOfirmbetween1967and1970,pro-videsthemostusefulinformationonthesituationatthecriti-caldate .Inviewoftheprovenstabilityoftheriverbed,itmaybeassumedthatthesituationbetween1967and1970wasvir-tuallyidenticalwiththatin1960 .Inthisrespect,theChamberconsidersitofgreatimportancethatthe1967–1970surveywascarriedoutbyanindependentfirmrenownedforitsexpertiseandexperienceandthattheresultswerecontainedinareportpresentedtothegovernmentsoffourriparianStates,includ-ingthePartiestothepresentcase .Furthermore,thefindingsoftheNEDECOstudywerenotcontestedatthetimeoftheirpublicationandtheyarecorroboratedbybothearlierandlaterstudies .

The Chamber notes that map No . 36 of the NEDECOreportindicatesthatinthesectoroppositethevillageofGaya,theriverhastwonavigablechannels .Onthebasisoftheavail-able data, it is not possible to say which one is consistentlydeeper . This is however without consequence in the presentcasegiventheconclusionsdrawnabovebytheChamber,fromthe colonial effectivités in that sector . The Chamber consid-ersthat,inthesectorofthethreeislandsoppositeGaya,theboundary is constituted by the line of deepest soundings oftheleftnavigablechannel .However,inthevicinityofthelastoftheseislands,KataGoungou,theboundarydeviatesfromthatlineandpassestotheleftofthatisland .

With the exception indicated in the previous paragraph,the boundary between the Parties therefore follows the lineof deepest soundings of the main navigable channel of theRiverNigerasitappearsinthe1970NEDECOreport,fromtheintersectionofthislinewiththemedianlineoftheRiverMekrouuntilitsintersectionwiththeboundaryofthePartieswithNigeria .

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Opposite Gaya, the boundary is constituted by the lineof deepest soundings of the left navigable channel from thepointsituatedatco-ordinates11°52’29”latitudeNorthand3°25’34”longitudeEastuntilthepointlocatedatco-ordinates11°51’55”latitudeNorthand3°27’41”longitudeEast,wherethe boundary deviates from this channel and passes to theleftoftheislandofKataGoungou,subsequentlyrejoiningthemain navigable channel at the point located at co-ordinates11°51’41”latitudeNorthand3°28’53”longitudeEast .

TheChamberthenprovidesatable,indicatingtheco-ordi-natesofthepointsnumberedfrom1to154,throughwhichtheboundarylinebetweenBeninandNigerpassesinthesectoroftheRiverNiger,proceedingdownstream .Thesepointsthatconstitute theboundary lineare further represented,purelyforillustrativepurposes,onasketch-map(No .4)attachedtothejudgment .

Determination of to which of the Parties each of the islands belongs(paras .116–118)

TheChamberproceedstodeterminetowhichofthePar-tieseachoftheislandsintheRiverNigerbelongs,followingthecourseoftheriverdownstreamfromitsconfluencewiththeMekroutothefrontierwithNigeria .

TheChambernotesthatithasnotreceivedreliableinfor-mationthatnewislandsformednorthatislandsdisappearedbetween1960and1967–1970 .Asregardssubsequentyears,itobserves that one of the islands identified by Niger, namelySandiToungaBarou,whichisnotrepresentedonanymappre-paredbefore1973,doesappearonvariousaerialphotographsand SPOT images taken from 1973 onwards . The ChamberfindsitmustconsequentlydeterminetowhichofthePartiesthis islandbelongs .Withrespect to the“island”ofPekinga,whichNigerinitsfinalsubmissionsattributedtoBenin,theChambernotesthatitisnotidentifiableasaseparateislandonthemapsannexedtotheNEDECOreport,butinsteadappearstobepartoftheriverbankontheBeninside .Thejudgmentthen lists all the islands in the relevant sector of the RiverNiger, indicating to which Party they belong in accordancewith theChamber’sfindings .Finally, theChamberobservesthatthedeterminationinregardtotheattributionofislandsiswithoutprejudicetoanyprivatelawrightswhichmaybeheldinrespectofthoseislands .

The frontier on the two bridges between Gaya (Niger) and Malanville (Benin)(paras .119–124)

The Chamber finally notes that Niger has also asked itto determine the frontier on the two bridges between Gaya(Niger)andMalanville(Benin) .BenincontendsthatthisissueisnotcoveredbytheSpecialAgreementandthattheChamberthereforehasnojurisdictiontocomplywithNiger’srequest .The Chamber observes in this regard that, in the SpecialAgreement, “[t]he Court is requested to . . . determine thecourseoftheboundary . . . intheRiverNigersector” .SincethebridgesbetweenGayaandMalanvillearelocatedinthatsector,theChamberconsidersthatithasjurisdictiontodeter-minewheretheboundaryislocatedonthesebridges .

TheChambernotesthatNigerclaimsthattheboundaryissituatedatthemiddlepointofeachofthebridgesgiventhatthe construction and maintenance of these structures hasbeenfinancedby thePartiesonanequalbasis and that thebridges are their joint property . Benin, for its part, submitsthatadifferencebetweenthelocationoftheboundaryonthebridgesandthecourseoftheboundaryintheriverbeneathwouldbeincoherent .

TheChamberobservesthat,intheabsenceofanagreementbetween the Parties, the solution is to extend vertically thelineoftheboundaryonthewatercourse .ThissolutionaccordswiththegeneraltheorythataboundaryrepresentsthelineofseparationbetweenareasofStatesovereignty,notonlyontheearth’ssurfacebutalsointhesubsoilandinthesuperjacentcolumnofair .Moreover,thesolutionconsistingoftheverticalextensionoftheboundarylineonthewatercourseavoidsthedifficultieswhichcouldbeengenderedbyhavingtwodifferentboundariesongeometricalplanessituatedincloseproximitytooneanother .

Inlightoftheforegoing,theChamberconcludesthattheboundary on the bridges between Gaya and Malanville fol-lowsthecourseof theboundary intheriver .ThisfindingiswithoutprejudicetothearrangementsinforcebetweenBeninandNigerregardingtheuseandmaintenanceofthesebridg-es, which are financed by the two States on an equal basis .TheChamberobservesinparticularthatthequestionofthecourseoftheboundaryonthebridgesistotallyindependentofthatoftheownershipofthosestructures,whichbelongtothePartiesjointly .

The course of the boundary in the River Mekrou sector (paras .125–145)

TheChamberthendetermines“thecourseof thebound-ary between the two States in the River Mekrou sector”, ataskwithwhichitischargedunderArticle2(c)oftheSpecialAgreement .

Itnotesthat,accordingtoBenin,theboundaryfollowsthemedian line of the River Mekrou as far as the boundary ofthe Parties with Burkina Faso . That is said to result, on theonehand,fromtheapplicationoftheutipossidetisjurisprin-ciple,since,at theirdatesof independence, theterritoriesofDahomeyandNigerwereseparatedbythecourseofthatriverpursuantbothtothelegaltitlesinforceandtotheeffectivités;ontheotherhandandinanyevent,suchaboundaryissaidtohavebeenconfirmedbyNiger’sformalrecognition,atthetimeofthenegotiationsbetweenthetwoPartiesin1973and1974withaviewtotheconstructionoftheDyodyongadam,thattheMekroudidindeedconstitutetheboundarybetweentheirrespectiveterritories .

TheChambernotesthat,accordingtoNiger,theboundaryinthesectorinquestionfollowsalinecomprisingtwoparts:thefirstisastraightlineinasouth-westerlydirectionjoiningthe point of confluence of the River Mekrou with the RiverNigertothepointwheretheParismeridianmeetstheAtakoramountainrange:thesecondpartjoinsthislatterpointtothepointwheretheformerboundarybetweenthecerclesofSayandFadameets the formerboundarybetween thecercles ofFadaandAtakora .Thatisclaimedtoresultfromthecombined

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effectoftheregulatoryinstrumentswhich,duringthecolonialperiod, defined the boundary between Dahomey and Nigerinthesectorinquestion,namelythedecreeof2March1907incorporatingthecerclesofFada-N’GourmaandSayintothecolonyofHaut-Sénégal etNiger (towhichNiger succeeded)andthedecreesof12August1909and23April1913modify-ingtheboundaryofthelattercolonywithDahomey .

TheChamberstatesthatitwillfirstascertain,byapplica-tionoftheprincipleofutipossidetisjuris,whatthecourseofthe intercolonialboundarywasat thecriticaldatesof inde-pendenceinAugust1960 .Itobservesthat, forthatpurpose,it is necessary to examine first the legal titles relied on bythe Parties, with any effectivités being considered only on aconfirmatoryorsubsidiarybasis,inaccordancewiththerulesrecalledearlierinitsjudgment .

Thefirsttextforconsiderationisthedecreeof2March1907,theobjectofwhichwas tochange thecourseof thebound-arybetweenthecolonyofHaut-SénégaletNigerandthatofDahomeybyincorporatingthecerclesofFadaN’GourmaandSay,untilthenpartofDahomey,intotheneighbouringcolony .Article 1 of that decree provides that the new intercolonialboundary:

“isconstituted,fromtheboundaryofTogo,bythepresentboundary of the cercle of Gourma until it reaches theAtakora mountain range, whose summit it follows untilitmeetstheParismeridian,fromwhichpointitrunsinastraight line in a north-easterly direction, terminating attheconfluenceoftheRiverMekrouwiththeNiger” .The Chamber considers that that delimitation, which

clearlydoesnotcoincidewiththecourseoftheRiverMekrou,tendstosupportthepositionofNiger .

The Chamber finds that it cannot accept the propositionputforwardbyBeninthatthedecreeof1March1919implic-itly abrogated or amended that of 2 March 1907 in relationto the intercolonialboundary in the sector inquestion .The1919 decree created the colony of Haute-Volta, which wasconstitutedbydetachingacertainnumberofcercles,includ-ing Fada N’Gourma and Say, from Haut-Sénégal et Niger .However,thereisnothinginthetermsofthe1919decreetosuggestthatitsauthorsintendedtocallintoquestionthelinedefinedastheintercolonialboundaryin1907 .

That does not suffice nevertheless to refute Benin’s argu-mentwithrespecttothecourseoftheboundaryinthesectorconcerned .

The Chamber is bound to note, first of all, that the 1919decreerefersneitherinitscitationsnorinitsoperativearticlesto the 1907 decree, and that it does not include any precisedefinitionoftheintercolonialboundary,astheearlierdecreehaddone . In reality, the1919decreedefines the territoryofHaute-Voltasolelybyreferencetothecercles whichcomposeit,andit is thusalsobythismeansthat it indirectlydefinesthe boundaries between Haute-Volta and the neighbour-ingcolonies,andinparticularDahomey .It isbytheprecisedelimitationofthecercles mentionedinArticle1ofthedecreeof 1 March 1919—a delimitation not effected by the decreeitself—that,fromthisdate,theintercolonialboundarycouldbedefined .However,thedelimitationofthecercles,theprin-cipaladministrativesubdivisionsofthecolonies,wasatthat

timeamatterfallingwithinthecompetenceoftheGovernor-General . It must therefore be concluded from the foregoingthat,whilethe1919decreedidnotcallintoquestiontheinter-colonialboundarydetermined in1907, it leftunaffected thepower of the Governor-General to modify the boundary inthefuturebyfixingtheboundariesofthecerclesinquestioninaccordancewithhisnormalcompetenceinthatregard .

TheChambernotesthatanarrêtéoftheGovernor-Generalof31August1927definestheRiverMekrouastheboundaryofthecercleofSayintheareacontiguouswiththecolonyofDahomey .Thatarrêté wasadoptedbytheGovernor-Generalfollowing,andasaconsequenceof,thedecreeof28Decem-ber 1926 incorporating the cercle of Say into the colony ofNiger(createdsomeyearsearlier) .ItwasthusfortheGover-nor-GeneraltodefinetheboundariesbetweenthecoloniesofHaute-VoltaandNiger,intheexerciseofhispowertodefinetheboundariesofthecercles:thatwasthepurposeofthearrêté of31August1927 .Thatinstrument,inthesecondparagraphofArticle1,defined theboundarybetween thecercleofSayandHaute-Voltainthefollowingterms:

“IntheSouth-West[by]alinestartingapproximatelyfromthe[River]SirbaattheleveloftheSayparallelandtermi-natingattheMekrou;IntheSouth-East,bytheMekroufromthatpointasfarasitsconfluencewiththeNiger .”Thus, by this arrêté the Governor-General clearly fixed

theboundaryofthecercle ofSay,andhencetheintercolonialboundary,ontheMekrou .

The Chamber observes that the arrêté of 31 August 1927wasfollowedon15Octoberbyanerratum amendingitstextretroactively by removing the reference to the course of theMekrouasthesouth-easternboundarybetweenthecercleofSay and Haute-Volta . However, the erratum would seem ineffecttohavebeenmotivatednotbythefactthattheGover-nor-Generaldidnotmeantofixthesouth-easternboundaryof the cercle of Say along the Mekrou, but rather by a wishnottodefinetheboundarybetweenDahomeyandNigerinanarrêtéwhosepurpose,aswasclearfromitstitle,wastofixtheboundarybetweenNigerandHaute-Volta .

The Chamber furthermore takes account of the instru-mentsconcerningthecreationofgamereservesandnationalparks in the area knownas “The Niger W”; it notes that allthose instruments use the River Mekrou for purposes ofdelimitation of the areas in question . If, in the eyes of theadministrativeauthoritiescompetenttopromulgatethearrêtésin question, the Mekrou did not represent the intercolonialboundary,itisdifficulttoseewhyitshouldhavebeenchosenastheboundaryofthesenationalparksandnaturereserves .Finally,theChambernotesthatthecartographicmaterialinthe file clearly confirms that, certainly from 1926–1927, theMekrouwasgenerallyregardedastheintercolonialboundaryby all the administrative authorities and institutions of thecolonialPower .

All of the foregoing considerations confirm the positionthatthe1907linenolongercorresponded,atthecriticaldate,totheintercolonialboundaryandthat,onthecontrary,atthatdate, it was the course of the Mekrou which, in the view ofall thecompetentauthoritiesof thecolonialadministration,

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constituted theboundarybetween theadjacent colonies—atthatdatethecoloniesofDahomeyandNiger .

TheChamberobservesthat,asarguedbyNiger,thedecreeof 2 March 1907, which clearly defined a different bound-ary, was never expressly abrogated or amended, or indeedsupersededbysomeotherinstrumentofatleastequalauthor-ity—eitheradecreeorastatute—containingprovisionsclearlyincompatiblewithitsown .However,theChamberemphasizesthat the uti possidetis juris principle requires not only thatreliancebeplacedonexistinglegaltitles,butalsothataccountbetakenofthemannerinwhichthosetitleswereinterpretedandappliedbythecompetentpublicauthoritiesofthecolo-nialPower, inparticular intheexerciseoftheir law-makingpower .TheChamberisboundtonotethattheadministrativeinstrumentspromulgatedafter1927wereneverthesubjectofanychallengebeforethecompetentcourts,andthatthereisno evidence that the colonial administration was ever criti-cizedatthetimeforhavingimproperlydepartedfromthelineresultingfromthe1907decree .

The Chamber concludes from all of the foregoing that,at least from 1927 onwards, the competent administrativeauthorities regarded the course of the Mekrou as the inter-colonial boundary separating Dahomey from Niger; thatthose authorities reflected that boundary in the successiveinstrumentspromulgatedbythemafter1927,someofwhichexpressly indicated that boundary, whilst others necessarilyimpliedit;andthatthiswasthestateofthelawatthedatesofindependenceinAugust1960 .Inthesecircumstances,theChamberfinds,itisunnecessarytolookforanyeffectivitésinordertoapplytheutipossidetisprinciple,sinceeffectivitéscanonlybeofinterestinacaseinordertocompleteormakegooddoubtfulorabsentlegaltitles,butcanneverprevailovertitleswithwhichtheyareatvariance .TheChambernotesmoreo-ver,ex abundanti,thattheeffectivitésreliedonbythePartiesinthesectorinquestionarerelativelyweak .

In the light of this conclusion, the Chamber notes thatthe dispute between the Parties regarding the Dyodyongadamnegotiationsof1973and1974becomesmoot .It isthusunnecessaryfortheChambertodecidewhethertheresultingdocumentscouldhaveconstitutedalegallybindingobligationforNigerand,ifso,whetherthatobligationcouldhavebeenvitiatedbyanerrorfulfillingtheconditionslaiddownbycus-tomaryinternationallaw .

Location of the boundary line in the River Mekrou(paras .143–145)

Lastly, theChamberdetermines theexact location in theRiverMekrouoftheboundarybetweenBeninandNiger .

TheChamberrecallsthat,inthecaseconcerningKasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia),theCourtobservedthat:

“Treatiesorconventionswhichdefineboundariesinwatercoursesnowadaysusuallyrefertothethalwegasthebound-arywhenthewatercourseisnavigableandtothemedianlinebetweenthetwobankswhenitisnot,althoughitcan-notbesaidthatpracticehasbeenfullyconsistent .”(I.C.J. Reports 1999(II),p .1062,para .24 .)In the present case, the Chamber observes that the Par-

ties did not provide the Chamber with any documents thatwouldenabletheexactcourseofthethalwegoftheMekroutobeidentified .TheChambernotesthatinalllikelihoodthereis a negligible difference between the course of the thalwegand thecourseof themedian lineof theRiverMekrou,butconsiders that, in view of the circumstances, including thefactthattheriverisnotnavigable,aboundaryfollowingthemedianlineoftheMekrouwouldmoresatisfactorilymeettherequirementoflegalsecurityinherentinthedeterminationofaninternationalboundary .

TheChamberconcludestherefore,that,inthesectoroftheRiverMekrou,theboundarybetweenBeninandNigeriscon-stitutedbythemedianlineofthatriver .

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Dissenting opinion of Judge Bennouna

JudgeBennounacannotagreewiththefirstthreefindingsoftheChamberonthecourseoftheboundarybetweenBeninand Niger in the River Niger sector and on the question ofwhich State the islands in the river belong to . However, hedoesagreewiththeChamber’sfourthfinding,concerningthecourseoftheboundarybetweenBeninandNigerintheRiverMekrousector .

JudgeBennounaconsidersthattheboundaryintheRiverNigersectorislocatedontheleftbankoftheriver,byvirtueboth of the legal title and of the effectivités. He accordinglyconcludesthatalloftheislandsintheriverbelongtoBenin .Finally,inJudgeBennouna’sview,theChamberhasnojuris-dictiontodeterminethecourseoftheboundaryonthetwobridgesacrosstheRiverNiger .

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On 19 December 2005, the Court delivered its JudgmentinthecaseconcerningArmed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congov .Uganda) .

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TheCourtwascomposedas follows:PresidentShi;Vice-President Ranjeva; Judges Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins,Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buer-genthal, Elaraby, Owada, Simma, Tomka, Abraham; Judg-esadhocVerhoeven,Kateka;RegistrarCouvreur .

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“ . . .TheCourt,(1)Bysixteenvotestoone,FindsthattheRepublicofUganda,byengaginginmilitaryactivities against the Democratic Republic of the Congoonthelatter’sterritory,byoccupyingIturiandbyactivelyextending military, logistic, economic and financial sup-porttoirregularforceshavingoperatedontheterritoryoftheDRC,violatedtheprincipleofnon-useofforceininter-nationalrelationsandtheprincipleofnon-intervention;infavour:PresidentShi;Vice-PresidentRanjeva; JudgesKoroma,Vereshchetin,Higgins,Parra-Aranguren,Kooij-mans,Rezek,Al-Khasawneh,Buergenthal,Elaraby,Owada,Simma,Tomka,Abraham;JudgeadhocVerhoeven;against:JudgeadhocKateka;(2)Unanimously,Finds admissible the claim submitted by the DemocraticRepublicoftheCongorelatingtoallegedviolationsbytheRepublicofUgandaof itsobligationsunder internationalhumanrights lawand internationalhumanitarian law inthe course of hostilities between Ugandan and RwandanmilitaryforcesinKisangani;(3)Bysixteenvotestoone,Finds that the Republic of Uganda, by the conduct of itsarmedforces,whichcommittedactsofkilling,tortureandotherformsofinhumanetreatmentoftheCongolesecivil-ian population, destroyed villages and civilian buildings,failedtodistinguishbetweencivilianandmilitarytargetsand to protect the civilian population in fighting withother combatants, trained child soldiers, incited ethnicconflictandfailedtotakemeasurestoputanendtosuchconflict; as well as by its failure, as an occupying Power,totakemeasurestorespectandensurerespectforhumanrightsandinternationalhumanitarianlawinIturidistrict,

violated its obligations under international human rightslawandinternationalhumanitarianlaw;infavour:PresidentShi;Vice-PresidentRanjeva; JudgesKoroma,Vereshchetin,Higgins,Parra-Aranguren,Kooij-mans,Rezek,Al-Khasawneh,Buergenthal,Elaraby,Owada,Simma,Tomka,Abraham;JudgeadhocVerhoeven;against:JudgeadhocKateka;(4)Bysixteenvotestoone,FindsthattheRepublicofUganda,byactsoflooting,plun-dering and exploitation of Congolese natural resourcescommitted by members of the Ugandan armed forces intheterritoryoftheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoandbyitsfailuretocomplywithitsobligationsasanoccupyingPowerinIturidistricttopreventactsoflooting,plunderingand exploitation of Congolese natural resources, violatedobligationsowedtotheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongounderinternationallaw;in favour: President Shi; Vice-President Ranjeva; JudgesKoroma,Vereshchetin,Higgins,Parra-Aranguren,Kooij-mans,Rezek,Al-Khasawneh,Buergenthal,Elaraby,Owada,Simma,Tomka,Abraham;Judgead hocVerhoeven;against:Judgead hocKateka;(5)Unanimously,Finds that the Republic of Uganda is under obligation tomakereparationtotheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongofortheinjurycaused;(6)Unanimously,Decides that, failing agreement between the Parties, thequestionofreparationduetotheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoshallbesettledby theCourt,andreserves forthispurposethesubsequentprocedureinthecase;(7)Byfifteenvotestotwo,FindsthattheRepublicofUgandadidnotcomplywiththeOrderoftheCourtonprovisionalmeasuresof1July2000;infavour:PresidentShi;Vice-PresidentRanjeva; JudgesKoroma,Vereshchetin,Higgins,Parra-Aranguren,Rezek,Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada, Simma,Tomka,Abraham;JudgeadhocVerhoeven;against:JudgeKooijmans;JudgeadhocKateka;(8)Unanimously,Rejects the objections of the Democratic Republic of theCongototheadmissibilityofthefirstcounter-claimsub-mittedbytheRepublicofUganda;(9)Byfourteenvotestothree,Findsthatthefirstcounter-claimsubmittedbytheRepub-licofUgandacannotbeupheld;infavour:PresidentShi;Vice-PresidentRanjeva; JudgesKoroma,Vereshchetin,Higgins,Parra-Aranguren,Rezek,

159. ARMeDACtIVItIesontHeteRRItoRYoFtHeConGo(DeMoCRAtICRePUBLICoFtHeConGov.UGAnDA)


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Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada, Simma,Abraham;Judgead hocVerhoeven;AGAINST:JudgesKooijmans,Tomka;Judgead hocKateka;(10)Unanimously,Rejects the objection of the Democratic Republic of theCongototheadmissibilityofthepartofthesecondcoun-ter-claimsubmittedbytheRepublicofUgandarelatingtothebreachoftheViennaConventiononDiplomaticRela-tionsof1961;(11)Bysixteenvotestoone,Upholds the objection of the Democratic Republic of theCongototheadmissibilityofthepartofthesecondcoun-ter-claimsubmittedbytheRepublicofUgandarelatingtothemaltreatmentofindividualsotherthanUgandandiplo-matsatNdjiliInternationalAirporton20August1998;infavour:PresidentShi;Vice-PresidentRanjeva; JudgesKoroma,Vereshchetin,Higgins,Parra-Aranguren,Kooij-mans,Rezek,Al-Khasawneh,Buergenthal,Elaraby,Owada,Simma,Tomka,Abraham;Judgead hocVerhoeven;against:Judgead hocKateka;(12)Unanimously,Finds that theDemocraticRepublicof theCongo,by theconductof itsarmedforces,whichattackedtheUgandanEmbassyinKinshasa,maltreatedUgandandiplomatsandother individuals on the Embassy premises, maltreatedUgandan diplomats at Ndjili International Airport, aswellasbyitsfailuretoprovidetheUgandanEmbassyandUgandan diplomats with effective protection and by itsfailure to prevent archives and Ugandan property frombeingseizedfromthepremisesoftheUgandanEmbassy,violatedobligationsowedtotheRepublicofUgandaundertheViennaConventiononDiplomaticRelationsof1961;(13)Unanimously,FindsthattheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoisunderobligation tomake reparation to theRepublicofUgandafortheinjurycaused;(14)Unanimously,Decides that, failing agreement between the Parties, thequestionofreparationduetotheRepublicofUgandashallbesettledby theCourtandreserves for thispurpose thesubsequentprocedureinthecase .”

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JudgeKoromahasappendedadeclarationtotheJudgmentof the Court; Judges Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Elarabyand Simma have appended separate opinions; Judge Tomkaand Judge ad hoc Verhoeven have appended declarations;JudgeadhocKatekahasappendedadissentingopinion .

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TheCourtbeginsbyrecapitulatingthevariousstagesoftheproceedings .

On 23 June 1999, the Democratic Republic of the Congo(hereinafter “the DRC”) filed an Application institutingproceedings against the Republic of Uganda (hereinafter“Uganda”)inrespectofadisputeconcerning“actsofarmed aggression perpetrated by Uganda on the territory of theDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,inflagrantviolationoftheUnitedNationsCharterandoftheCharteroftheOrganiza-tionofAfricanUnity”(emphasisintheoriginal) .

InordertofoundthejurisdictionoftheCourt,theApplica-tionreliedonthedeclarationsmadebythetwoPartiesaccept-ing the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36,paragraph2,oftheStatuteoftheCourt .

ByanOrderof21October1999,theCourtfixedtime-lim-itsforthefilingoftheMemorialoftheDRCandtheCounter-MemorialofUganda .TheDRCfileditsMemorialwithinthetime-limitprescribed .On19June2000, theDRCsubmittedarequestfortheindicationofprovisionalmeasurespursuanttoArticle41of theStatuteof theCourt .ByanOrderdated1 July 2000, the Court, after hearing the Parties, indicatedcertain provisional measures . Uganda subsequently filed itsCounter-Memorialwithinthetime-limitfixed .Thatpleadingincludedcounter-claims .

SincetheCourtincludedupontheBenchnojudgeofthenationalityoftheParties,eachPartyavaileditselfofitsrightunderArticle31oftheStatuteoftheCourttochooseajudgead hoc tosit in thecase .TheDRCchoseMr . JoeVerhoevenandUgandaMr .JamesL .Kateka .

AtameetingheldbythePresidentof theCourtwiththeAgents of the Parties on 11 June 2001, the DRC, invokingArticle80oftheRulesofCourt,raisedcertainobjectionstotheadmissibilityofUganda’scounter-claims .ThetwoAgentsagreed that their respectiveGovernmentswouldfilewrittenobservationsonthatquestion;theyalsoagreedonthetime-limitsforthatpurpose .Thoseobservationswerefiledwithintheprescribedtime-limits .

ByanOrderof29November2001,theCourtheldthattwoofthethreecounter-claimssubmittedbyUgandawereadmis-sibleassuchandformedpartofthecurrentproceedings,butthatthethirdwasnot .ItalsodirectedtheDRCtofileaReplyandUgandatofileaRejoinder,addressingtheclaimsofbothParties, and fixed time-limits for the filing of those plead-ings .Lastly,theCourtheldthatitwasnecessary,“inordertoensurestrictequalitybetweentheParties,toreservetherightoftheCongotopresentitsviewsinwritingasecondtimeontheUgandancounter-claims,inanadditionalpleadingwhich[might]bethesubjectofasubsequentOrder” .TheDRCdulyfileditsReplywithinthetime-limitprescribedwhileUgandafileditsRejoinderwithinthetime-limitextendedbyafurtherOrder . By an Order of 29 January 2003 the Court, takingaccountoftheagreementoftheParties,authorizedthesub-missionbytheDRCofanadditionalpleadingrelatingsolelytothecounter-claimssubmittedbyUgandaandfixedatime-limit for the filing of that pleading . The DRC duly filed theadditionalpleadingwithinthetime-limitfixed .

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AtameetingheldbythePresidentof theCourtwiththeAgentsofthePartieson24April2003,theAgentspresentedtheirviewsontheorganizationoftheoralproceedingsonthemerits .PursuanttoArticle54,paragraph1,oftheRules,theCourtfixed10November2003asthedatefortheopeningoftheoralproceedings .On5November2003,theAgentoftheDRCenquiredwhetheritmightbepossibletopostponetoalaterdate, inApril2004, theopeningof thehearings in thecase,“soastopermitthediplomaticnegotiationsengagedbythePartiestobeconductedinanatmosphereofcalm” .Byaletter of 6 November 2003, the Agent of Uganda informedthe Court that his Government “supporte[d] the proposaland adopt[ed] the request” . On the same day, the Regis-trar informed both Parties by letter that the Court, “takingaccountoftherepresentationsmadetoitbytheParties,[had]decidedtopostponetheopeningoftheoralproceedingsinthecase” .Byaletterof9September2004,theAgentoftheDRCformallyrequestedthattheCourtfixanewdatefortheopen-ingoftheoralproceedings .Bylettersof20October2004,theRegistrarinformedthePartiesthattheCourthaddecidedtofixMonday11April2005fortheopeningoftheoralproceed-ingsinthecase .

Publichearingswereheldfrom11Aprilto29April2005,duringwhichthefollowingsubmissionswerepresentedbytheParties:

OnbehalfoftheDRC,atthehearingof25April2005,ontheclaimsoftheDRC:“TheCongorequeststheCourttoadjudgeanddeclare:1 . That the Republic of Uganda, by engaging in militaryandparamilitaryactivitiesagainsttheDemocraticRepub-licoftheCongo,byoccupyingitsterritoryandbyactivelyextending military, logistic, economic and financial sup-porttoirregularforceshavingoperatedthere,hasviolatedthe following principles of conventional and customarylaw:—theprincipleofnon-useof force in international rela-

tions,includingtheprohibitionofaggression;—theobligationtosettleinternationaldisputesexclusively

by peaceful means so as to ensure that internationalpeaceandsecurity,aswellasjustice,arenotplacedinjeopardy;

— respect for the sovereignty of States and the rights ofpeoplestoself-determination,andhencetochoosetheirownpoliticalandeconomicsystemfreelyandwithoutoutsideinterference;

—theprincipleofnon-interventioninmatterswithinthedomestic jurisdiction of States, including refrainingfromextendinganyassistance to theparties toa civilwaroperatingontheterritoryofanotherState .

2 .ThattheRepublicofUganda,bycommittingactsofvio-lenceagainstnationalsoftheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo, by killing and injuring them or despoiling themoftheirproperty,byfailingtotakeadequatemeasurestopreventviolationsofhumanrightsintheDRCbypersonsunder its jurisdictionorcontrol,and/or failingtopunishpersonsunderitsjurisdictionorcontrolhavingengagedin

theabove-mentionedacts,hasviolatedthefollowingprin-ciplesofconventionalandcustomarylaw:—theprincipleofconventionalandcustomarylawimpos-

ing an obligation to respect, and ensure respect for,fundamentalhumanrights,includingintimesofarmedconflict,inaccordancewithinternationalhumanitarianlaw;

—theprincipleofconventionalandcustomarylawimpos-inganobligation,atalltimes,tomakeadistinctioninanarmedconflictbetweencivilianandmilitaryobjec-tives;

—therightofCongolesenationalstoenjoythemostbasicrights, both civil and political, as well as economic,socialandcultural .

3 .ThattheRepublicofUganda,byengagingintheillegalexploitationofCongolesenaturalresources,bypillagingitsassetsandwealth,byfailingtotakeadequatemeasurestopreventtheillegalexploitationoftheresourcesoftheDRCbypersonsunderitsjurisdictionorcontrol,and/orfailingtopunishpersonsunderitsjurisdictionorcontrolhavingengagedintheabove-mentionedacts,hasviolatedthefol-lowingprinciplesofconventionalandcustomarylaw:—theapplicablerulesofinternationalhumanitarianlaw;—respectforthesovereigntyofStates,includingovertheir

naturalresources;—theduty topromote therealizationof theprincipleof

equalityofpeoplesandoftheirrightofself-determina-tion,andconsequentlytorefrainfromexposingpeoplestoforeignsubjugation,dominationorexploitation;

—theprincipleofnon-interferenceinmatterswithinthedomestic jurisdiction of States, including economicmatters .

4 .(a)Thattheviolationsofinternationallawsetoutinsub-missions1,2and3constitutewrongfulactsattributabletoUgandawhichengageitsinternationalresponsibility;(b) that the Republic of Uganda shall cease forthwith allcontinuinginternationallywrongfulacts,andinparticularitssupportforirregularforcesoperatingintheDRCanditsexploitationofCongolesewealthandnaturalresources;(c)thattheRepublicofUgandashallprovidespecificguar-anteesandassurancesthatitwillnotrepeatthewrongfulactscomplainedof;(d) thattheRepublicofUgandaisunderanobligationtothe Democratic Republic of the Congo to make repara-tion for all injury caused to the latter by the violation oftheobligationsimposedbyinternationallawandsetoutinsubmissions1,2and3above;(e)thatthenature,formandamountofthereparationshallbe determined by the Court, failing agreement thereonbetween theParties,and that theCourt shall reserve thesubsequentprocedureforthatpurpose .5 .ThattheRepublicofUgandahasviolatedtheOrderoftheCourtonprovisionalmeasuresof1July2000,inthatithasfailedtocomplywiththefollowingprovisionalmeasures:

‘(1) both Parties must, forthwith, prevent and refrainfrom any action, and in particular any armed action,

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whichmightprejudicetherightsof theotherParty inrespectofwhateverjudgmenttheCourtmayrenderinthecase,orwhichmightaggravateorextendthedisputebeforetheCourtormakeitmoredifficulttoresolve;(2) both Parties must, forthwith, take all measuresnecessarytocomplywithalloftheirobligationsunderinternationallaw,inparticularthoseundertheUnitedNationsCharterandtheCharteroftheOrganizationofAfricanUnity,andwithUnitedNationsSecurityCoun-cilresolution1304(2000)of16June2000;(3)bothPartiesmust,forthwith,takeallmeasuresnec-essarytoensurefullrespectwithinthezoneofconflictfor fundamental human rights and for the applicableprovisionsofhumanitarianlaw’”;

at thehearingof29April2005,onthecounter-claimsofUganda:

“TheCongorequeststheInternationalCourtofJusticetoadjudgeanddeclare:Asregardsthefirstcounter-claimsubmittedbyUganda:(1) to the extent that it relates to the period before Lau-rent-DésiréKabilacametopower,Uganda’sclaimisinad-missible because Uganda had previously renounced itsrighttolodgesuchaclaim:inthealternative,theclaimisunfoundedbecauseUgandahasfailedtoestablishthefactsonwhichitisbased;(2)totheextentthatitrelatestotheperiodfromthetimewhen Laurent-Désiré Kabila came to power to the timewhen Uganda launched its armed attack, Uganda’s claimisunfoundedinfactbecauseUgandahasfailedtoestablishthefactsonwhichitisbased;(3)totheextentthatitrelatestotheperiodsubsequenttothe launching of Uganda’s armed attack, Uganda’s claimisunfoundedbothinfactandinlawbecauseUgandahasfailedtoestablishthefactsonwhichitisbasedand,inanyevent, from2August1998theDRCwas inasituationofself-defence .Asregardsthesecondcounter-claimsubmittedbyUganda:(1)totheextentthatitnowrelatestotheinterpretationandapplication of the Vienna Convention of 1961 on Diplo-maticRelations,theclaimsubmittedbyUgandaradicallychangesthesubject-matterofthedispute,contrarytotheStatute and to the Rules of Court; that part of the claimmustthereforebedismissedfromthepresentproceedings;(2)thatpartof theclaimrelatingtotheallegedmistreat-mentof certainUgandannationals remains inadmissiblebecause Uganda has still failed to show that the require-ments laid down by international law for the exercise ofitsdiplomaticprotectionweresatisfied;inthealternative,thatpartoftheclaimisunfoundedbecauseUgandaisstillunabletoestablishthefactualandlegalbasesofitsclaims .(3) that part of the claim relating to the alleged expro-priationofUganda’spublicpropertyisunfoundedbecauseUganda is still unable to establish the factual and legalbasesofitsclaims .”OnbehalfofUganda,

atthehearingof27April2005,ontheclaimsoftheDRCandthecounter-claimsofUganda:

“TheRepublicofUgandarequeststheCourt:(1)Toadjudgeanddeclareinaccordancewithinternationallaw:(A) that the requests of the Democratic Republic of theCongorelatingtotheactivitiesorsituationsinvolvingtheRepublicofRwandaorheragentsareinadmissibleforthereasonssetforthinChapterxVoftheCounter-Memorialandreaffirmedintheoralpleadings;(B) that the requests of the Democratic Republic of theCongothattheCourtadjudgeanddeclarethattheRepub-licofUgandaisresponsibleforvariousbreachesofinterna-tionallaw,asallegedintheMemorial,theReplyand/ortheoralpleadingsarerejected;and(C) that Uganda’s counter-claims presented in Chap-ter xVIII of the Counter-Memorial, and reaffirmed inChapterVIof theRejoinderaswellas theoralpleadingsbeupheld .(2)ToreservetheissueofreparationinrelationtoUganda’scounter-claimsforasubsequentstageoftheproceedings .”

Situation in the Great Lake region and task of the Court(para .26)

TheCourtnotesthatitisawareofthecomplexandtragicsituationwhichhaslongprevailedintheGreatLakesregionandofthesufferingbythelocalpopulation .ItobservesthattheinstabilityintheDRCinparticularhashadnegativesecu-rity implications for Uganda and some other neighbouringStates .Ithoweverstatesthatitstaskistorespond,onthebasisof international law, to the particular legal dispute broughtbeforeit .

The DRC’s first submission(paras .28–165)

Contentions of the Parties (paras .29–41)TheCourtsetsoutthecontentionsoftheParties .TheDRC

assertsthat,followingPresidentLaurent-DésiréKabila’sacces-siontopowerinMay1997,UgandaandRwandaweregrantedsubstantialbenefitsintheDRCinthemilitaryandeconomicfields .AccordingtotheDRC,PresidentKabilasubsequentlysought toreduce the twocountries’ influenceand this“newpolicyofindependenceandemancipation”fromRwandaandUgandaconstitutedthereasonfortheinvasionofCongoleseterritorybyUgandanforcesinAugust1998 .TheDRCclaimsthaton4August1998UgandaandRwandaorganizedanair-borneoperation,flyingtheirtroopsfromGomaontheeasternfrontier of the DRC to Kitona, some 1,800 km away on theothersideoftheDRC,ontheAtlanticcoast .Itfurtherstatesthat,inthenorth-easternpartofthecountry,withinamatterofmonths, troopsfromtheUgandaPeoples’DefenceForces(UPDF) had advanced and progressively occupied a sub-stantialpartofCongoleseterritoryinseveralprovinces .TheDRC also submits that Uganda supported Congolese armedgroupsopposedtoPresidentKabila’sGovernment .ForitspartUgandaaffirms thaton4August1998 therewerenoUgan-

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dantroopspresentineitherGomaorKitona,oronboardtheplanesreferredtobytheDRC .Itclaimsthatuponassumingpower,PresidentKabila invitedUganda todeploy its troopsineasternCongosincetheCongolesearmydidnothavetheresources to control the remote eastern provinces, and inorder to “eliminate” the anti-Ugandan insurgents operatinginthatzoneandtosecuretheborderregion .Ugandamain-tainsthatbetweenMayandJuly1998PresidentKabilabrokeoff his alliances with Rwanda and Uganda and establishednewallianceswithChad, theSudanandvariousanti-Ugan-dan insurgent groups . Uganda affirms that it did not sendadditionaltroopsintotheDRCduringAugust1998butstates,however,thatbyAugust-September1998,astheDRCandtheSudanprepared toattackUgandan forces ineasternCongo,itssecuritysituationhadbecomeuntenable .Ugandasubmitsthatinresponsetothis“gravethreat,andinthelawfulexer-ciseofitssovereignrightofself-defence”,itmadeadecisionon11September1998toaugmentitsforcesineasternCongoandtogaincontrolofthestrategicairfieldsandriverportsinnorthernandeasternCongo .Ugandanotesthattheon-goingregionalpeaceprocess led to the signingon10 July1999ofthe Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, followed by the Kampalaand Harare Disengagement Plans . Finally, under the termsof the bilateral Luanda Agreement, signed on 6 September2002,UgandaagreedtowithdrawallitstroopsfromtheDRC,exceptforthoseexpresslyauthorizedbytheDRCtoremainontheslopesofMt .Ruwenzori .UgandaclaimsthatitcompletedthiswithdrawalinJune2003andthatsincethattime,“notasingleUgandansoldierhasbeendeployedinsidetheCongo” .

Issue of consent(paras .42–54)After having examined the materials put before it by the

Parties, the Court finds that it is clear that in the periodpreceding August 1998 the DRC did not object to Uganda’smilitary presence and activities in its eastern border area .The Court takes note of the Protocol on Security along theCommon Border signed on 27 April 1998 between the twocountries, inwhich theyagreed that their respectivearmieswould“co-operateinordertoensuresecurityandpeacealongthe common border” . The Court finds however, that, whiletheco-operationenvisagedintheProtocolmaybereasonablyunderstoodashavingitseffectinacontinuedauthorizationofUgandantroopsintheborderarea,itwasnotthelegalbasisforsuchauthorizationorconsent .Thesourceofanauthoriza-tionorconsenttothecrossingoftheborderbythesetroopsantedated the Protocol; this prior authorization or consentcouldthusbewithdrawnatanytimebytheGovernmentoftheDRC,withoutfurtherformalitiesbeingnecessary .

The Court observes that when President Kabila cameto power, the influence in the DRC of Uganda, and in par-ticular of Rwanda, became substantial . It states that fromlateSpring1998PresidentKabilasought,forvariousreasons,toreduce this foreign influence .On28July1998,anofficialstatement by President Kabila was published, in which heannouncedthathe“hadjustterminated,witheffectfrom . . .Monday27July1998,theRwandanmilitarypresencewhichhasassistedusduringtheperiodofthecountry’sliberation”andconcludedthat“thismarkstheendofthepresenceofall

foreignmilitaryforcesintheCongo” .TheDRCcontendsthat,although therewasno specific reference toUgandan troopsinthestatement,thefinalphraseindicatedthatconsentwaswithdrawnforUgandanaswellasRwandantroops .Uganda,for its part, maintains that the President’s statement wasdirectedattheRwandanforcesalone .TheCourtobservesthatthecontentofPresidentKabila’sstatement,asapurelytextualmatter,wasambiguous .

The Court draws attention to the fact that the consentthathadbeengiventoUgandatoplaceitsforcesintheDRC,andtoengageinmilitaryoperations,wasnotanopen-endedconsent .EvenhadconsenttotheUgandanmilitarypresenceextendedmuchbeyondtheendofJuly1998,theparametersofthatconsent,intermsofgeographiclocationandobjectives,wouldhaveremainedthusrestricted .

Intheevent,theissueofwithdrawalofconsentbytheDRC,andthatofexpansionbyUgandaofthescopeandnatureofits activities, went hand in hand . The Court observes thatat the Summit of Heads of State held in Victoria Falls on 7and8August1998theDRCaccusedRwandaandUgandaofinvadingitsterritory .ItthusappearsevidenttotheCourtthatanyearlierconsentby theDRCto thepresenceofUgandantroops on its territory had at the latest been withdrawn by8August1998,i .e .theclosingdateoftheSummit .

Findings of fact concerning Uganda’s use of force in respect of Kitona(paras .55–71)TheCourtnotesthatthedisputeaboutthecommencement

dateofthemilitaryactionbyUgandathatwasnotcoveredbyconsentis,inthemostpart,directedatthelegalcharacteriza-tionofeventsrather thanatwhether theseeventsoccurred .In some instances, however, Uganda denies that its troopswereeverpresentatparticularlocations,themilitaryactionatKitonabeinganimportantexample .

The Court then sets out its method of assessing the vastamount of evidentiary materials proffered by the Parties . Itrecallsthatitstaskistodecidenotonlywhichofthosemateri-alsmustbeconsideredrelevant,butalsowhichofthemhaveprobative value with regard to the alleged facts . The Courtexplains that itwill treatwithcautionevidentiarymaterialsspeciallypreparedforthiscaseandalsomaterialsemanatingfromasinglesource .Itwillprefercontemporaneousevidencefrom persons with direct knowledge; it will give particularattentiontoreliableevidenceacknowledgingfactsorconductunfavourable to theStaterepresentedby thepersonmakingthem; and it will give weight to evidence that has not beenchallenged by impartial persons for the correctness of whatit contains . It further points out that evidence obtained byexaminationofpersonsdirectlyinvolved,andwhoweresubse-quentlycross-examinedbyjudgesskilledinexaminationandexperiencedinassessinglargeamountsoffactualinformation,meritsspecialattention .Itwillthusgiveappropriateconsid-erationtotheReportoftheJudicialCommissionofInquiryintoAllegationsof IllegalExploitationofNaturalResourcesandOtherFormsofWealthintheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongosetupbytheUgandanGovernmentinMay2001andheaded by Justice David Porter (“the Porter Commission”),whichhasbeenacceptedbybothParties .

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HavingexaminedtheevidenceinrelationtotheDRC’scon-tentionconcerningtheeventsatKitona,theCourtconcludesthatithasnotbeenestablishedtoitssatisfactionthatUgandaparticipatedintheattackonKitonaon4August1998 .

Findings of fact: military action in the east of the DRC and in other areas of that country(paras .72–91)TheCourtstatesthatthefactsregardingthemilitaryaction

byUgandaintheeastoftheDRCbetweenAugust1998andJuly 1999 are relatively little contested between the Parties .Based on the evidence in the case file, it determines whichlocations were taken by Uganda in this period and the cor-responding“datesofcapture” .

TheCourtstatesthatthereis,however,considerablecon-troversybetweenthePartiesovertheDRC’sclaimregardingtownstakenafter10July1999 .TheCourtrecallsthatonthisdate the Parties had agreed to a ceasefire and to all furtherprovisionsoftheLusakaAgreement .ItmakesnofindingsastotheresponsibilityofeachofthePartiesforanyviolationsoftheLusakaAgreement,confining itself to stating that ithasnot received convincing evidence that Ugandan forces werepresentat locationsclaimedby theDRCtohavebeentakenafter10July1999 .

Did the Lusaka, Kampala and Harare Agreements constitute any consent of the DRC to the presence of Ugandan troops?(paras .92–105)TheCourtturnstothequestionwhethertheLusakaAgree-

ment,theKampalaandHarareDisengagementPlansandtheLuanda Agreement constituted consent to the presence ofUgandantroopsontheterritoryoftheDRC .

It observes that nothing in the provisions of the LusakaAgreementcanbeinterpretedasanaffirmationthatthesecu-rityinterestsofUgandahadalreadyrequiredthepresenceofUgandanforcesontheterritoryoftheDRCasfromSeptember1998 .ItfindsthattheLusakaAgreementonlyrepresentedanagreedmodus operandifortheparties,providingaframeworkfortheorderlywithdrawalofallforeignforcesfromtheDRC .Inacceptingthismodus operanditheDRCdidnot“consent”to the presence of Ugandan troops . This conclusion did notchangewiththerevisionstothescheduleforwithdrawalthatsubsequentlybecamenecessary .

AftercarefulexaminationoftheKampalaandHarareDis-engagement Plans, as well as of the Luanda Agreement, theCourtconcludesthatthevarioustreatiesdirectedtoachievingandmaintainingaceasefire,thewithdrawalofforeignforcesandthestabilizationofrelationsbetweentheDRCandUgan-da,didnot(saveforthelimitedexceptionregardingtheborderregionoftheRuwenzoriMountainscontainedintheLuandaAgreement)constituteconsentbytheDRCtothepresenceofUgandantroopsonitsterritoryfortheperiodafterJuly1999,inthesenseofvalidatingthatpresenceinlaw .

Self-defence in the light of proven facts(paras .106–147)TheCourtstatesthatUgandanactionsatAru,Beni,Bunia

andWatsainAugust1998wereofadifferentnaturefrompre-

viousoperationsalongthecommonborder .TheCourtfindsthese actions to be quite outside any mutual understandingbetween the Parties as to Uganda’s presence on Congoleseterritory near the border . Such actions could therefore onlybe justified, ifatall,asactions inself-defence .However, theCourtnotesthatatnotimehasUgandasoughttojustifythemonthisbasis .Bycontrast,theoperationknownasoperation“SafeHaven”,i .e .militaryactionsofUgandaontheDRC’ster-ritoryafter7August1998,wasfirmlyrootedinaclaimedenti-tlement“tosecureUganda’slegitimatesecurityinterests”and,accordingtotheCourt,thosewhowereintimatelyinvolvedinitsexecutionregardedthemilitaryactionsthroughoutAugust1998asalreadypartandparcelofthatoperation .

TheCourtobserves that theobjectivesofoperation“SafeHaven”, as stated in a Ugandan High Command documentissued on 11 September 1998, were not consonant with theconcept of self-defence as understood in international law .Uganda maintains that the operation had been launchedbecauseof “stepped-upcross-borderattacksagainstUgandaby the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which was beingre-supplied and re-equipped by the Sudan and the DRCGovernment” . Uganda claims that there existed a tripartiteanti-Ugandan conspiracy between the DRC, the ADF andtheSudanforthispurpose .AftercarefulconsiderationoftheevidenceproducedbyUganda,theCourtobservesthatitcan-notsafelybereliedontoprovethattherewasanagreementbetweentheDRCandtheSudantoparticipateinortosup-portmilitaryactionagainstUganda;orthatanyactionbytheSudanwasofsuchcharacterastojustifyUganda’sclaimthatitwasactinginself-defence .

TheCourtfurthernotesthatUgandadidnotreporttotheSecurityCouncileventsthatithadregardedasrequiringittoactinself-defence .ItfurtherstatesthatUgandaneverclaimedthat ithadbeen subjected toanarmedattackby thearmedforcesoftheDRC .The“armedattacks”towhichreferencewasmadecameratherfromtheADF .Furthermore,therewasnosatisfactoryproofoftheinvolvementintheseattacks,directorindirect,oftheGovernmentoftheDRC .

The Court concludes that the legal and factual circum-stances for theexerciseof a rightof self-defencebyUgandaagainsttheDRCwerenotpresent .

Findings of law on the prohibition against the use of force(paras .148–165)AstotheDRC’sclaimthat,fromSeptember1998onwards,

Uganda both created and controlled the Congo LiberationMovement (MLC),a rebelmovement ledbyMr .Bemba, theCourtstatesthatthereisnocredibleevidencetosupportthisallegation .TheCourthowevernotesthatthetrainingandmil-itarysupportgivenbyUgandatotheALC,themilitarywingoftheMLC,violatedcertainobligationsofinternationallaw .

InrelationtothefirstoftheDRC’sfinalsubmissions,theCourtfindsthatUgandahasviolatedthesovereigntyandalsotheterritorialintegrityoftheDRC .Uganda’sactionsequallyconstitutedaninterferenceintheinternalaffairsoftheDRCandinthecivilwarragingthere .Theunlawfulmilitaryinter-ventionbyUgandawasofsuchmagnitudeanddurationthattheCourtconsidersittobeagraveviolationoftheprohibition

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ontheuseofforceexpressedinArticle2,paragraph4,oftheCharter .

The issue of belligerent occupation(paras .166–180)

BeforeturningtotheDRC’ssecondandthirdsubmissions,theCourtconsidersthequestionastowhetherornotUgandawasanoccupyingPowerinthepartsoftheCongoleseterri-torywhereitstroopswerepresentattherelevanttime .

It observes that, under customary international law, asreflectedinArticle42oftheHagueRegulationsof1907,ter-ritoryisconsideredtobeoccupiedwhenitisactuallyplacedunder theauthorityof thehostilearmy,and theoccupationextends only to the territory where such authority has beenestablishedandcanbeexercised .

TheCourtstatesthatitisnotdisputedbetweenthePartiesthatGeneralKazini,commanderoftheUgandanforcesintheDRC,createdthenew“provinceofKibali-Ituri”inJune1999 .Itconsidersthat,regardlessofwhetherornotGeneralKaziniacted inviolationofordersandwaspunishedasa result,hisconductisclearevidenceofthefactthatUgandaestablishedandexercisedauthorityinIturiasanoccupyingPower .TheCourthoweverobservesthattheDRCdoesnotprovideanyspecificevidencetoshowthatauthoritywasexercisedbytheUgandanarmedforcesinanyareasotherthaninIturidistrict .

HavingconcludedthatUgandawastheoccupyingPowerinIturiattherelevanttime,theCourtstatesthat,assuch,itwasunderanobligation,accordingtoArticle43oftheHagueRegulations,totakeallmeasuresinitspowertorestore,andensure,asfaraspossible,publicorderandsafetyintheoccu-pied area,while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, thelawsinforceintheDRC .Thisobligationcomprisedthedutytosecurerespectfortheapplicablerulesofinternationalhumanrightslawandinternationalhumanitarianlaw,toprotecttheinhabitantsoftheoccupiedterritoryagainstactsofviolence,andnottotoleratesuchviolencebyanythirdparty .

The Court finds that Uganda’s responsibility is engagedbothforanyactsofitsmilitarythatviolateditsinternationalobligationsandforanylackofvigilanceinpreventingviola-tionsofhumanrightsandinternationalhumanitarianlawbyotheractorspresentintheoccupiedterritory,includingrebelgroupsactingontheirownaccount .ItnotesthatUgandaatalltimeshasresponsibilityforallactionsandomissionsofitsownmilitaryforcesintheterritoryoftheDRCinbreachofitsobligationsundertherulesofinternationalhumanrightslawand international humanitarian law which are relevant andapplicableinthespecificsituation .

The DRC’s second submission(paras .181–221)

Violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law: contentions of the Parties(paras .181–195)TheCourtsetsoutthecontentionoftheDRCthatUgandan

armedforcescommittedwide-scalehumanrightsviolationson Congolese territory, particularly in Ituri, and Uganda’scontention that the DRC has failed to provide any credibleevidentiarybasistosupportitsallegations .

Admissibility of claims in relation to events in Kisangani(paras .196–204)The DRC’s claim relates in part to events in Kisangani,

whereinJune2000fightingbrokeoutbetweenUgandanandRwandantroops .ItisUganda’scontentionthat,intheabsenceofRwandafromtheproceedings,theDRC’sclaimrelatingtoUganda’sresponsibilityfortheseeventsisinadmissible .

TheCourtpointsoutthatithashadtoexaminequestionsof this kind on previous occasions . In the case concerningCertain Phosphate Lands (Nauru v . Australia), the CourtobservedthatitisnotprecludedfromadjudicatingupontheclaimssubmittedtoitinacaseinwhichathirdState“hasaninterestofalegalnaturewhichmaybeaffectedbythedecisioninthecase”,providedthat“thelegalinterestsofthethirdStatewhichmaypossiblybeaffecteddonotformtheverysubject-matterofthedecisionthatisappliedfor” .TheCourtconsidersthat this jurisprudence is applicable in thecurrentproceed-ingssincetheinterestsofRwandadonotconstitutethe“verysubject-matter” of the decision to be rendered by it . Thus itisnotnecessaryforRwandatobeapartytothiscasefortheCourttobeabletoruleonUganda’sresponsibilityforviola-tionsofitsobligationsunderinternationalhumanrightslawandinternationalhumanitarianlawinthecourseoffightinginKisangani .

Violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law: findings of the Court(paras .205–221)Having examined the case file, the Court considers that

ithascredibleevidencesufficienttoconcludethattheUPDFtroopscommittedactsofkilling,tortureandotherformsofinhumane treatment of the civilian population, destroyedvillagesandcivilianbuildings,failedtodistinguishbetweencivilianandmilitarytargetsandtoprotectthecivilianpopula-tioninfightingwithothercombatants,incitedethnicconflictandtooknostepstoputanendtosuchconflicts,wasinvolvedinthetrainingofchildsoldiers,andfailedtotakemeasurestoensurerespectforhumanrightsandinternationalhumanitar-ianlawinIturi .

TheCourthoweverdoesnotconsiderthattheallegationoftheDRCthattheUgandanGovernmentcarriedoutadeliber-atepolicyofterrorhasbeenproven .

Turningtothequestionastowhetheractsandomissionsof the UPDF and its officers and soldiers are attributable toUganda,theCourtstatesthattheconductoftheUPDFasawholeisclearlyattributabletoUganda,beingtheconductofaStateorgan .TheconductofindividualsoldiersandofficersoftheUPDFistobeconsideredastheconductofaStateorgan .IntheCourt’sview,byvirtueofthemilitarystatusandfunc-tionofUgandansoldiersintheDRC,theirconductisattribut-abletoUganda .Itisfurthermoreirrelevantfortheattributionof their conduct to Uganda whether UPDF personnel actedcontrarytotheinstructionsgivenorexceededtheirauthority .Accordingtoawell-establishedruleofacustomarynature,asreflectedinArticle3oftheFourthHagueConventionrespect-ingtheLawsandCustomsofWaronLandof1907aswellasinArticle91ofProtocolIadditionaltotheGenevaConven-tionsof1949,apartytoanarmedconflictshallberesponsibleforallactsbypersonsformingpartofitsarmedforces .

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TheCourtfindsthattheactscommittedbytheUPDFandofficersandsoldiersoftheUPDFareinclearviolationoftheobligationsundertheHagueRegulationsof1907,Articles25,27and28,aswellasArticles43,46and47withregardtoobli-gationsofanoccupyingPower .Theseobligationsarebindingon the Parties as customary international law . Uganda alsoviolatedthefollowingprovisionsoftheinternationalhumani-tarianlawandinternationalhumanrightslawinstruments,towhichbothUgandaandtheDRCareparties:

–FourthGenevaConvention,Articles27and32aswellasArticle53withregardtoobligationsofanoccupyingPower;

– International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,Articles6,paragraph1,and7;

–FirstProtocolAdditionaltotheGenevaConventionsof12August1949,Articles48,51,52,57,58and75,paragraphs1and2;

– African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Arti-cles4and5;

–ConventionontheRightsoftheChild,Article38,para-graphs2and3;

–OptionalProtocoltotheConventionontheRightsoftheChild,Articles1,2,3,paragraph3,Articles4,5and6 .

The Court thus concludes that Uganda is internationallyresponsible for violations of international human rights lawandinternationalhumanitarianlawcommittedbytheUPDFandbyitsmembersintheterritoryoftheDRCandforfailingtocomplywithitsobligationsasanoccupyingPowerinIturi .

TheCourtpointsoutthat,whileithaspronouncedontheviolationsofinternationalhumanrightslawandinternationalhumanitarian law committed by Ugandan military forceson the territory of the DRC, the actions of the various par-ties in thecomplexconflict in theDRChavecontributed tothe immense suffering faced by the Congolese population .TheCourt ispainfullyawarethatmanyatrocitieshavebeencommittedinthecourseoftheconflict .ItisincumbentonallthoseinvolvedintheconflicttosupportthepeaceprocessintheDRCandotherpeaceprocessesintheGreatLakesarea,inordertoensurerespectforhumanrightsintheregion .

The DRC’s third submission(paras .222–250)

Illegal exploitation of natural resources(paras .222–236)TheCourtsetsoutthecontentionoftheDRCthatUgan-

dantroopssystematicallylootedandexploitedtheassetsandnatural resources of the DRC and Uganda’s contention thattheDRChasfailedtoprovidereliableevidencetocorroborateitsallegations .

Findings of the Court concerning acts of illegal exploitation of natural resources(paras .237–250)Havingexaminedthecasefile,theCourtfindsthatitdoes

nothaveat itsdisposalcredibleevidencetoprovethattherewasagovernmentalpolicyonthepartofUgandadirectedattheexploitationofnaturalresourcesoftheDRCorthatUgan-da’smilitaryinterventionwascarriedout inordertoobtain

access to Congolese resources . At the same time, the Courtconsiders that ithasamplecredibleandpersuasiveevidencetoconcludethatofficersandsoldiersoftheUPDF,includingthemosthigh-rankingofficers,wereinvolvedinthelooting,plundering and exploitation of the DRC’s natural resourcesandthatthemilitaryauthoritiesdidnottakeanymeasurestoputanendtotheseacts .

AstheCourthasalreadynoted,UgandaisresponsiblebothfortheconductoftheUPDFasawholeandfortheconductofindividualsoldiersandofficersoftheUPDFintheDRC .TheCourtfurtherrecallsthatitisalsoirrelevantforthepurposesofattributingtheirconducttoUgandawhetherUPDFofficersandsoldiersactedcontrarytoinstructionsgivenorexceededtheirauthority .

The Court finds that it cannot uphold the contention ofthe DRC that Uganda violated the principle of the DRC’ssovereigntyoveritsnaturalresources .Whilerecognizingtheimportanceofthisprinciple,theCourtdoesnotbelievethatitisapplicabletothespecificsituationoflooting,pillageandexploitation of certain natural resources by members of thearmyofaStatemilitarilyinterveninginanotherState .

As the Court has already stated, the acts and omissionsof members of Uganda’s military forces in the DRC engageUganda’s international responsibility in all circumstances,whether itwasanoccupyingPower inparticular regionsornot .Thus,whenevermembersoftheUPDFwereinvolvedinthelooting,plunderingandexploitationofnaturalresourcesintheterritoryoftheDRC,theyactedinviolationofthejus in bello,whichprohibitsthecommissionofsuchactsbyaforeignarmyintheterritorywhereit ispresent .TheCourtnotesinthisregardthatbothArticle47oftheHagueRegulationsof1907andArticle33oftheFourthGenevaConventionof1949prohibitpillage .

TheCourtfurtherobservesthatboththeDRCandUgandaare parties to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’Rights of 27 June 1981, paragraph 2 of Article 21 of whichstatesthat“[i]ncaseofspoliationthedispossessedpeopleshallhavetherighttothelawfulrecoveryofitspropertyaswellastoanadequatecompensation” .

TheCourtfindsthatthereissufficientevidencetosupportthe DRC’s claim that Uganda violated its duty of vigilanceby not taking adequate measures to ensure that its militaryforcesdidnotengage in the looting,plunderingandexploi-tationof theDRC’snaturalresources . It followsthatby thisfailure to act Uganda violated its international obligations,therebyincurringitsinternationalresponsibility .Inanyevent,whatevermeasureshadbeentakenbyitsauthorities,Uganda’sresponsibility was nonetheless engaged by the fact that theunlawfulactshadbeencommittedbymembersofitsarmedforces .

AsfortheclaimthatUgandaalsofailedtopreventtheloot-ing,plunderingandillegalexploitationoftheDRC’snaturalresourcesby rebelgroups, theCourthasalready found thatthe latterwerenotunder thecontrolofUganda .Thus,withregardtotheillegalactivitiesofsuchgroupsoutsideofIturi,it cannotconclude thatUgandawas inbreachof itsdutyofvigilance .

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TheCourtfurtherobservesthatthefactthatUgandawastheoccupyingPowerinIturidistrictextendsUganda’sobliga-tiontotakeappropriatemeasurestopreventthelooting,plun-deringandexploitationofnaturalresourcesintheoccupiedterritorytocoverprivatepersonsinthisdistrictandnotonlymembersofUgandanmilitaryforces .

TheCourtfinallyconcludesthatitisinpossessionofsuf-ficientcredibleevidencetofindthatUgandaisinternationallyresponsibleforactsoflooting,plunderingandexploitationofthe DRC’s natural resources committed by members of theUPDFintheterritoryoftheDRC,forviolatingitsobligationofvigilanceinregardtotheseactsandforfailingtocomplywithitsobligationsunderArticle43oftheHagueRegulationsof1907asanoccupyingPowerinIturiinrespectofallactsoflooting, plundering and exploitation of natural resources intheoccupiedterritory .

The DRC’s fourth submission(paras .251–261)

Legal consequences of violations of international obligations by UgandaThe DRC requests the Court to adjudge and declare that

Uganda shall cease forthwith all continuing internationallywrongfulacts .

The Court observes that there is no evidence in the casefilewhichcancorroboratetheDRC’sallegationthatatpresentUgandasupports irregular forcesoperating in theDRCandcontinues to be involved in the exploitation of Congolesenaturalresources .TheCourtthusdoesnotfinditestablishedthat Uganda, following the withdrawal of its troops fromthe territoryof theDRCin June2003,continues tocommitthe internationallywrongful acts specifiedby theDRC .TheCourt accordingly concludes that the DRC’s request cannotbeupheld .

TheDRCfurther requests theCourt to rule thatUgandaprovide specific guarantees and assurances of non-repeti-tion of the wrongful acts complained of . In this respect theCourt has taken judicial notice of the Tripartite AgreementonRegionalSecurityintheGreatLakes,signedon26Octo-ber2004bytheDRC,RwandaandUganda .InthePreambleofthisAgreementthePartiesemphasize“theneedtoensurethat the principles of good neighbourliness, respect for thesovereignty, territorial integrity,andnon-interference in theinternalaffairsofsovereignstatesarerespected,particularlyintheregion” .IntheCourt’sview,thecommitmentsassumedbyUgandaundertheTripartiteAgreementmustberegardedas meeting the DRC’s request for specific guarantees andassurancesofnon-repetition .TheCourtexpectsanddemandsthat the Parties will respect and adhere to their obligationsunderthatAgreementandundergeneralinternationallaw .

Finally, the DRC asks the Court to adjudge and declarethatUgandaisunderanobligationtomakereparationtotheDRC for all injury caused by the violation by Uganda of itsobligationsunderinternationallaw .TheCourtobservesthatit iswellestablishedingeneralinternationallawthataStatewhichbearsresponsibilityforaninternationallywrongfulactisunderanobligationtomakefullreparationfortheinjurycausedby thatact .Uponexaminationof thecasefile,given

thecharacterof the internationallywrongful acts forwhichUgandahasbeenfoundresponsible,theCourtconsidersthatthose acts resulted in injury to the DRC and to persons onitsterritory .Havingsatisfieditselfthatthisinjurywascausedto theDRCbyUganda, theCourtfinds thatUgandahasanobligationtomakereparationaccordingly .

TheCourtfurtherconsidersappropriatetherequestoftheDRCforthenature,formandamountofthereparationduetoittobedeterminedbytheCourt,failingagreementbetweentheParties,inasubsequentphaseoftheproceedings .

The DRC’s fifth submission(paras .262–265)

Compliance with the Court’s Order on provisional measuresTheCourtthenexaminesthequestionwhetherUgandahas

compliedwiththeOrderoftheCourtonprovisionalmeasuresof1July2000 .Havingobservedthatits“ordersonprovisionalmeasuresunderArticle41[oftheStatute]havebindingeffect”,theCourtstatesthattheDRCdidnotputforwardanyspecificevidencedemonstratingthatafterJuly2000Ugandacommit-tedactsinviolationofeachofthethreeprovisionalmeasuresindicatedbytheCourt .TheCourthoweverobservesthatinitsJudgmentithasfoundthatUgandaisresponsibleforactsinviolationofinternationalhumanitarianlawandinternationalhumanrightlaw .TheevidenceshowsthatsuchviolationswerecommittedthroughouttheperiodwhenUgandantroopswerepresent in the DRC, including the period from 1 July 2000until practically their final withdrawal on 2 June 2003 . TheCourt thus concludes that Uganda did not comply with theOrder .

The Court further notes that the provisional measuresindicatedintheOrderof1July2000wereaddressedtobothParties .TheCourt’sfindingiswithoutprejudicetotheques-tion as to whether the DRC also failed to comply with theprovisionalmeasuresindicatedbytheCourt .

Counter-Claims(paras .266–344)

Admissibility of objections(paras .266–275)TheDRCmaintainsthatthejoinderofUganda’sfirstand

secondcounter-claimstotheproceedingsfollowingtheOrderof 29 November 2001, by which the Court found that thosetwocounter-claimswereadmissibleas such,doesnot implythat preliminary objections cannot be raised against them .UgandaassertsforitspartthattheDRCisnolongerentitledat this stage of the proceedings to plead the inadmissibilityofthecounter-claims,sincetheCourt’sOrderisadefinitivedetermination on counter-claims under Article 80 of theRulesofCourt .

TheCourtnotesthatintheOil PlatformscaseitwascalledupontoresolvethesameissueandthatitconcludedthatIranwasentitledtochallengetheadmissibilityoftheUnitedStatescounter-claimingeneral,even thoughthecounter-claimhadpreviouslybeenfoundadmissibleunderArticle80oftheRules .TheCourtalsopointsoutthatArticle79oftheRulesofCourt

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invokedbyUgandaisinapplicabletothecaseofanobjectiontocounter-claimswhichhavebeenjoinedtotheoriginalproceed-ings .ItaccordinglyfindsthattheDRCisentitledtochallengetheadmissibilityofUganda’scounter-claims .

First counter-claim(paras .276–305)Initsfirstcounter-claim,Ugandacontendsthat,since1994,

ithasbeenthevictimofmilitaryoperationsandotherdesta-bilizingactivitiescarriedoutbyhostilearmedgroupsbasedin the DRC and either supported or tolerated by successiveCongolesegovernments .

InrebuttingUganda’sfirstcounter-claim,theDRCdividesit into three periods of time: (a) the period prior to Presi-dent Laurent-Désiré Kabila coming to power in May 1997;(b)theperiodstartingfromtheaccessiontopowerofPresi-dentKabilauntil2August1998,thedateonwhichUganda’smilitaryattackwas launched; and (c) theperiod subsequentto 2 August 1998 . It submits that, in so far as the allegedclaim that the DRC was involved in armed attacks againstUgandacoversthefirstperiod,itisinadmissibleonthebasisthat Uganda renounced its right to invoke the internationalresponsibilityoftheDRC(Zaireatthetime)inrespectofactsdating back to that period; and, in the alternative, ground-less . It furtherasserts that theclaimhasnobasis in fact forthesecondperiodandthatitisnotfoundedinfactorinlawregardingthethirdperiod .

TheCourtdoesnotseeanyobstacletoexaminingUganda’sfirstcounter-claimfollowingthesethreeperiodsoftime,andforpracticalpurposesdeemsitusefultodoso .

With respect to the question of admissibility of the firstpartofthecounter-claim,theCourtobservesthatnothingintheconductofUganda in theperiodafterMay1997canbeconsideredasimplyinganunequivocalwaiverofitsrighttobringacounter-claimrelatingtoeventswhichoccurreddur-ingtheMobuturégime .Itaddsthatthe longperiodof timebetweentheeventsduringtheMobuturégimeandthefilingofUganda’scounter-claimshasnotrenderedinadmissibleUgan-da’sfirstcounter-claimfortheperiodpriortoMay1997 .TheDRC’sobjectiontoadmissibilitycannotthereforebeupheld .

With respect to the merits of the counter-claim for thefirst period, the Court finds that Uganda has not producedsufficientevidencetoshowthatZaireprovidedpoliticalandmilitarysupporttoanti-UgandanrebelgroupsoperatinginitsterritoryduringtheMobuturégime .

With regard to the second period, the Court finds thatUganda has failed to provide conclusive evidence of actualsupport for anti-Ugandan rebel groups by the DRC . TheCourtnotesthatduringthisperiod,theDRCwasinfactact-ing togetherwithUgandaagainst the rebels,not in supportofthem .

Inrelationtothethirdperiod,andinviewoftheCourt’sfindingthatUgandaengagedinanillegalmilitaryoperationagainsttheDRC,theCourtconsidersthatanymilitaryactiontaken by the DRC against Uganda during this period couldnotbedeemedwrongfulsinceitwouldbejustifiedasactiontakeninself-defenceunderArticle51oftheUnitedNationsCharter . Moreover, the Court has already found that the

allegedparticipationofDRCregulartroopsinattacksbyanti-UgandanrebelsagainsttheUPDFandtheallegedsupporttoanti-Ugandaninsurgentsinthisperiodcannotbeconsideredproven .

Thefirstcounter-claimthusfailsinitsentirety .

Second counter-claim(paras .306–344)In its second counter-claim, Uganda contends that Con-

golese armed forces attacked the premises of the UgandanEmbassy,confiscatedpropertybelongingtotheGovernmentofUganda,UgandandiplomatsandUgandannationals;andmaltreated diplomats and other Ugandan nationals presenton the premises of the mission and at Ndjili InternationalAirport .

In rebutting Uganda’s second counter-claim, the DRCargues that it is partially inadmissible on the ground thatUganda has ascribed new legal bases in its Rejoinder to theDRC’s responsibility by including claims based on the vio-lation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations .According to the DRC, Uganda thus breaks the connectionwiththeprincipalclaim .TheDRCalsoassertsthattheallegedmodificationofthesubject-matterofthispartofthedisputeismanifestlyincompatiblewiththeCourt’sOrderof29Novem-ber2001 .

TheDRCfurtherarguesthattheclaimbasedontheinhu-mane treatment of Ugandan nationals cannot be admitted,because the requirements for admissibility of a diplomaticprotectionclaimarenotsatisfied .

As to the merits of the second counter-claim, the DRCarguesthatinanyeventUgandahasbeenunabletoestablishthefactualandlegalbasesofitsclaims .

With respect to the question of admissibility, the Courtfinds that its Order of 29 November 2001 did not precludeUgandafrominvokingtheViennaConventiononDiplomaticRelations,sincetheformulationoftheOrderwassufficientlybroadtoencompassclaimsbasedontheConvention .Itfur-ther observes that the substance of the part of the counter-claimrelating toactsofmaltreatmentagainstotherpersonsonthepremisesoftheEmbassyfallswithintheambitofArti-cle22oftheConventionandisadmissible .IthoweverstatesthattheotherpartrelatingtothemaltreatmentofpersonsnotenjoyingdiplomaticstatusatNdjili InternationalAirportasthey attempted to leave the country is based on diplomaticprotectionandthat,intheabsenceofevidencewithrespecttotheUgandannationalityofthepersonsinquestion,thatpartofthecounter-claimisinadmissible .

Regarding the merits of Uganda’s second counter-claim,theCourtfinds that there issufficientevidencetoprovetheattacksagainsttheEmbassyandactsofmaltreatmentagainstUgandandiplomatsonEmbassypremisesandatNdjiliInter-nationalAirport .Itfindsthat,bycommittingthoseacts,theDRC breached its obligations under Articles 22 and 29 oftheViennaConventiononDiplomaticRelations .TheCourtfurtherfindsthattheremovalofpropertyandarchivesfromtheUgandanEmbassywasinviolationoftherulesofinterna-tionallawondiplomaticrelations .

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TheCourtpointsoutthatitwouldonlybeatasubsequentphase,failinganagreementbetweentheParties,thatthespe-cific circumstances of these violations as well as the precisedamagesufferedbyUgandaandtheextentofthereparationtowhichitisentitledwouldhavetobedemonstrated .

** *


InhisdeclarationappendedtotheJudgment,JudgeKoro-ma emphasizes that the circumstances and consequences ofthecaseinvolvinglossofmillionsoflivesandothersufferinghavemadeitoneofthemosttragicandcompellingtocomebeforetheCourt .

Judge Koroma outlines the Court’s findings confirmingthat Uganda has been in violation of a wide range of legalinstrumentstowhichitisapartyand,accordingtotheevi-dence before the Court, the violations gave rise to the mostegregious of consequences . He stresses the importance ofthese obligations with specific reference to Articles 1 and 2of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the ProtectionofCivilianPersonsinTimeofWarof12August1949;Article51ofProtocolIAdditionaltotheGenevaConventionsof12August1949;andArticles3,19,and38oftheConventionontheRightsoftheChildof28November1989 .

Judge Koroma emphasizes that, crucially and for verycogent reasons, the Court has rejected Uganda’s contentionthat it acted in self-defence in using military force in theCongo . Specifically, he observes the Court rightly rejectedUganda’sclaimthatactionsof theADFwereattributable totheCongointhesenseofArticle3,paragraph(g),oftheDefi-nitionofAggressionof1974(xxIx) .JudgeKoromanotesthatsuchafindingof theCourt is consistentwith itspast juris-prudenceand isacorrect interpretationofArticle51of theUnitedNationsCharter .

JudgeKoromanotesthattheCourtacknowledgedthecus-tomary law character of General Assembly resolution 1803(xVII)of14December1962,onpermanentsovereigntyovernatural resources,notingalso thatbothCongoandUgandaare parties to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’Rightsof1981,whichcontainsaprovisiononpermanentsov-ereigntyovernaturalresourcesinArticle21,paragraph1 .

JudgeKoromacommentsthatthefindingsoftheCourt,ajudicialorgan,areinthemaininaccordancewithdetermina-tionsmadebytheSecurityCouncilinitsresolutionsonthisdispute .

Judge Koroma concludes that, above all, Uganda shouldhave respected the fundamental and customary principleof international law, the principle of pacta sunt servanda—requiringaStatetocomplywithitsobligationsunderatreaty .ObservanceoftreatyobligationsservesanimportantroleinmaintainingpeaceandsecuritybetweenneighbouringStates,andobservanceoftheprincipleofpacta sunt servanda wouldhavepreventedthetragedysovividlyputbeforetheCourt .


His vote in favour of the Judgment does not mean thatJudge Parra-Aranguren agrees with all the findings of itsoperativepartnorthatheconcurswitheachandeverypartofthereasoningfollowedbythemajorityoftheCourtinreach-ingitsconclusions .

IInparagraph345(1)oftheoperativepartoftheJudgment

theCourt“FindsthattheRepublicofUganda,byengaginginmilitaryactivitiesagainsttheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo . . .violatedtheprincipleofnon-useof force in internationalrelationsandtheprincipleofnon-intervention .”JudgeParra-ArangurenagreesthattheRepublicofUganda

(hereinafter referred to as “Uganda”) violated the principleofnon-useof force in internationalrelationsbyengaging inmilitary activities against the Democratic Republic of theCongo(hereinafterreferredtoasthe“DRC”)between7and8August1998and10July1999,forthereasonsexplainedintheJudgment;buthedoesnotagreewiththefindingthattheviolationcontinuedfrom10July1999until2June2003,whenUgandan troops withdrew from the DRC territory, becauseinhisopiniontheDRCconsentedduringthisperiodtotheirpresenceinitsterritoryunderthetermsandconditionspre-scribedintheLusakaCeasefireAgreementof10July1999,theKampalaDisengagementPlanof8April2000,theHarareDis-engagementPlanof6December2000andtheLuandaAgree-mentof6September2002,asamendedintheDaresSalaamAgreementof10February2003 .

The majority of the Court understands that the LusakaCeasefire Agreement did not change the legal status of thepresence of Uganda, i .e ., in violation of international law,butat thesametimeitconsidersthatUgandawasunderanobligationtorespectthetimetableagreedupon,asrevisedintheKampalaDisengagementPlanof8April2000,theHarareDisengagement Plan of 6 December 2000 and the LuandaAgreementof6September2002(paragraphs95,97,99,101,and104oftheJudgment) .

In theopinionof JudgeParra-Aranguren this interpreta-tion of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the Kampala Dis-engagement Plan, the Harare Disengagement Plan and theLuanda Agreement creates an impossible legal situation forUganda .Ontheonehand,ifUgandacompliedwithitstreatyobligationsandremainedintheterritoryoftheDRCuntiltheexpiration of the timetables agreed upon, Uganda would beinviolationofinternationallawbecausethelegalstatusofitspresencehadnotbeenchanged,thestatusofitsmilitaryforcesintheDRCremainingaviolationofinternationallaw .Ontheotherhand,ifUgandachosenottoviolateinternationallawasaconsequenceofitsmilitarypresenceintheDRC,andthere-forewithdrew its troops fromthe territoryof theDRCoth-erwise than inaccordancewith the timetablesagreedupon,Ugandawouldhaveviolateditstreatyobligations,therebyalsobeinginviolationofinternationallaw .

This reasoning is persuasive enough, in the opinion ofJudgeParra-Arangurennottoaccepttheverypeculiarinter-pretationadvanced intheJudgmentof theLusakaCeasefire

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Agreement, the Kampala Disengagement Plan, the HarareDisengagement Plan and the Luanda Agreement . Moreover,an examination of the terms of these instruments leads totheconclusionthattheDRCconsented,notretroactivelybutfor the time they were in force, to the presence of Uganda’smilitaryforcesintheterritoryoftheDRC,asitisexplainedindetailinparagraphs10to20ofhisseparateopinion .

IIInparagraph345(1)oftheoperativepartoftheJudgment

theCourt“FindsthattheRepublicofUganda . . .byactivelyextend-ing military, logistic, economic and financial support toirregular forces having operated on the territory of theDRC,violatedtheprincipleofnon-useofforceininterna-tionalrelationsandtheprincipleofnon-intervention .”In this respect Judge Parra-Aranguren observes that the

Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement stipulated the importance ofthe solution of the internal conflict in the Congo by inter-Congolesedialogue .TheGovernmentof theDRC, theRallyfor theCongoleseDemocracy (RCD), theMovement for theLiberationoftheCongo(MLC),thepoliticalopposition,thecivil society, the Congolese Rally for Democracy/MovementofLiberation(RCD-NL),theCongoleseRallyforDemocratic/National(RDC/N)andtheMaiMaidecided,on16Decem-ber2002inPretoria,toputinplaceagovernmentofnationalunity, aiming at national reconciliation . A calendar was setforth but it was not complied with, political reconciliationonly being implemented through the installation of a newnational government, including leaders of the three armedrebelorganizationsandCongolesesociety;themilitaryforcesof these three rebel groups were fully integrated into thenationalarmyanddemocraticelectionsweretobeheldwithintwoyears .

Judge Parra-Aranguren accepts the principles of interna-tional law enunciated in General Assembly resolution 2625(xxV)(24October1970)mentionedinparagraph162oftheJudgment, but in his view they do not apply to the presentcase .Asaconsequenceofthedialogueamongtheparties,anewnationalgovernmentwasinstalledon1July2003intheDRCwithparticipationoftheleadersoftherebelforces,whichwereintegratedintotheCongolesearmy;thisreconciliation,intheopinionofJudgeParra-Aranguren,exoneratesUgandafrom any possible international responsibility arising out oftheassistanceitgaveinthepasttotheRCDandtotheMLC .

AsimilarsituationtookplaceintheCongonotverylongago, when in May 1997 the Alliance of Democratic Forcesfor the Liberation of the Congo (AFGL), with the supportofUgandaandRwanda,overthrewthelegalHeadofStateoftheformerZaire,MarshalMobutuSseseSeko,takingcontrolofthecountryunderthedirectionofLaurent-DésiréKabila .Judge Parra-Aranguren wonders whether Uganda wouldhave been condemned for this assistance had the CourtbeenrequestedbytheDRCtomakesuchadeclarationafterLaurent-DésiréKabila legallyassumedthePresidencyof thecountry .

IIIInparagraph345(1)oftheoperativepartoftheJudgment

theCourt

“FindsthattheRepublicofUganda . . .byoccupyingItu-ri . . .violatedtheprincipleofnon-useofforceininterna-tionalrelationsandtheprincipleofnon-intervention .”ThemajorityoftheCourtmaintainsthatcustomaryinter-

national law is reflected in the Regulations Respecting theLaws and Customs of War on Land annexed to the FourthHague Convention of 18 October 1907 (hereinafter “theHagueRegulationsof1907”) (Judgment,paragraph172) . IntheopinionofJudgeParra-Arangurenthisstatementisnote-worthybecauseoccupyingPowershavenotalwayscompliedwiththeHagueRegulationsof1907 .

TheCourtexamineswhethertherequirementsofArticle42of“theHagueRegulationsof1907”aremetinthepresentcase,stressingthatitmustsatisfyitselfthatUgandanarmedforcesintheDRCwerenotonlystationedinparticularlocationsbutthat theyhadsubstitutedtheirownauthority forthatof theCongoleseGovernment(Judgment,paragraph173) .

Paragraph175oftheJudgmentstates:“ItisnotdisputedbetweenthePartiesthatGeneralKazini,commanderoftheUgandanforcesintheDRC,createdthenew‘provinceofKibali-Ituri’inJune1999andappointedMs . Adèle Lotsove as its Governor . Various sources ofevidence attest to this fact, in particular a letter fromGeneralKazinidated18June1999, inwhichheappointsMs .AdèleLotsoveas‘provisionalGovernor’andgivessug-gestionswithregardtoquestionsofadministrationofthenewprovince .ThisisalsosupportedbymaterialfromthePorterCommission .TheCourtfurthernotesthattheSixthreportoftheSecretary-GeneralonMONUC(S/2001/128of12February2001)statesthat,accordingtoMONUCmili-taryobservers,theUPDFwasineffectivecontrolinBunia(capitalofIturidistrict) .”ThesefactsarenotdisputedbyUgandaandthemajorityof

theCourtconcludesfromthemthattheconductofGeneralKazini“isclearevidenceofthefactthatUgandaestablishedandexercisedauthorityinIturiasanoccupyingPower”(Judg-ment,paragraph176) .

In theopinionof JudgeParra-Aranguren thisconclusionisnotacceptable .ItistruethatGeneralKazini,CommanderoftheUgandanforcesintheDRC,appointedMs .AdèleLots-oveas“provisionalGovernor”inchargeofthenewlycreatedprovinceofKibali-Ituri inJune1999,givinghersuggestionswithregardtotheadministrationoftheprovince .However,this fact does not prove that either General Kazini or theappointedGovernorwereinapositiontoexercise,andinfactdidexercise,actualauthorityinthewholeprovinceofKibali-Ituri . It is also true that the UPDF was in control in Bunia(capitalofKibali-Ituridistrict),but controloverBuniadoesnotimplyeffectivecontroloverthewholeprovinceofKibali-Ituri,justascontroloverthecapitaloftheDRC(Kinshasa)bytheGovernmentdoesnotinevitablymeanthatitactuallycon-trolsthewholeterritoryofthecountry .Therefore,JudgePar-ra-Aranguren considers that the elements advanced in theJudgmentdonotprovethatUgandaestablishedandexercisedactualauthorityinthewholeprovinceofKibali-Ituri .

In addition, Judge Parra-Aranguren observes that theDRC’s Application instituting proceedings against Rwanda,filedintheRegistryon28May2002,whichisadocumentin

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thepublicdomain,statesinparagraph5ofthesectionentitledStatementofFacts,undertheheading“ArmedAggression”:

“5 .Since2August1995,RwandantroopshaveoccupiedasignificantpartoftheeasternDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,notablyintheprovincesofNord-Kivu,Sud-Kivu,Katanga,KasaiOriental,KasaiOccidental,andManiemaand in Orientale Province, committing atrocities of allkindstherewithtotalimpunity .”(Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002), I. Statement of Facts; A. Armed Aggression, p .7 .)Consequently,inthisstatement“againstinterest”theDRC

maintains that Rwanda occupied Orientale province from1995untiltheendofMay2002,thedateofitsNewApplica-tion to the Court, and Orientale province included the ter-ritoriesofwhatwastobecomeKibali-Ituriprovincein1999 .Therefore,theDRCconsideredRwandaastheoccupyingPow-erofthoseterritories,includingtheterritoriesofKibali-Ituri,andgavenoindicationinitsApplicationthattheoccupationbyRwandacametoanendafter thecreationofKibali-Ituriprovince .

Moreover,JudgeParra-ArangurenconsidersthattheSpe-cial Report on the events in Ituri, January 2002 to Decem-ber2003,preparedbytheUnitedNationsOrganizationMis-sionintheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo(MONUC),anddistributedon16July2004doesnotsupport theconclusionthat Uganda’s authority was actually exercised in the wholeterritoryofKibali-Ituriprovince,aswouldberequiredbythe1907HagueRegulationsinorderforUgandatobeconsideredits occupying Power . On the contrary, it acknowledges thatRwandaaswellasmanyrebelgroupsplayedanimportantrolein the tragedy experienced in Kibali-Ituri province, as it isexplainedinparagraphs36to41ofhisseparateopinion .

The above considerations demonstrate in the opinion ofJudge Parra-Aranguren that Uganda was not an occupyingPowerofthewholeofKibali-Ituriprovincebutofsomepartsof it and at different times, as Uganda itself acknowledges .Therefore, he considers that it is for the DRC in the secondphase of the present proceedings to demonstrate in respectof each one of the illegal acts violating human rights andhumanitarianlaw,andeachoneoftheillegalactsoflooting,plunderingandexploitationofCongolesenaturalresourcesitcomplainsof,thatitwascommittedbyUgandaorinanareaunderUganda’soccupationatthetime .

IVAs indicated above, the majority of the Court concluded

thatUgandawasanoccupyingPowerofKibali-Ituriprovinceandthatforthisreasonit

“was under an obligation, according to Article 43 of theHague Regulations of 1907, to take all the measures initspowertorestore,andensure,as faraspossible,publicorder and safety in the occupied area, while respecting,unlessabsolutelyprevented,thelawsinforceintheDRC .This obligation comprised the duty to secure respect fortheapplicablerulesofinternationalhumanrightslawandinternationalhumanitarianlaw,toprotecttheinhabitantsoftheoccupiedterritoryagainstactsofviolence,andnotto tolerate such violence by any third party .” (Judgment,paragraph178 .)

Article43oftheHagueRegulationsof1907states:“Whenthelegallyconstitutedauthorityhasactuallypassedinto the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take allmeasureswithinhispowertorestoreand,asfaraspossible,toinsurepublicorderandlife,respectingthelawsinforceinthecountryunlessabsolutelyprevented .”Consequently, application of Article 43 is conditional on

the fact that “legally constituted authority actually passedintothehandsoftheoccupant” .ItisnotcleartoJudgeParra-ArangurenhowthemajorityoftheCourtcametotheconclu-sionthatthisrequirementwasmet,becausenoexplanationinthisrespectisgivenintheJudgment .

Moreover, the obligation imposed upon the occupyingPowerbyArticle43isnotanobligationofresult .Anoccupy-ingPowerisnotinviolationofArticle43forfailingtorestorepublicorderandlifeintheoccupiedterritory,sinceitisonlyundertheobligationto“takeallmeasureswithinhispowertorestoreand,asfaraspossible,toinsurepublicorderandlife” .JudgeParra-ArangurenconsidersitanopenquestionwhetherthenatureofthisobligationhasbeendulytakenintoaccountintheJudgment .

Furthermore, when dealing with the occupation of theprovinceofKibali-IturibyUganda,themajorityoftheCourtrarelytakesintoaccounttheprovince’sgeographicalcharac-teristicsinordertodeterminewhetherUgandacompliedwithitsobligationofduediligenceunderArticle43oftheHagueRegulations of 1907; but they were considered to exoneratetheDRCforitsfailuretopreventcross-borderactionsofanti-Ugandanrebelforces,asmaybeobservedintheexaminationofUganda’sfirstcounter-claim .

VIn the opinion of Judge Parra-Aranguren it is finally to

be observed that rebel groups existed in the province ofKibali-Ituri before May 1997, when Marshal Mobutu SseseSekogovernedtheformerZaire;theycontinuedtoexistafterPresidentLaurent-DésiréKabilacame topowerand for thisreasontheDRCexpresslyconsentedtothepresenceofUgan-dantroopsinitsterritory .TheCourtitselfacknowledgestheinabilityoftheDRCtocontroleventsalongitsborder(Judg-ment,paragraph135) .RebelgroupswerealsopresentduringUganda’s military actions in the region and continue to bepresent even after the withdrawal of Ugandan troops fromtheterritoryoftheDRCon2June2003,notwithstandingtheintensiveeffortsoftheGovernmentoftheDRC,withstronghelp from the United Nations Organization Mission in theDemocratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), employingmorethat15,000soldiers,asisamatterofpublicknowledge .


Judge Kooijmans first expresses his regret about the factthat inhisviewtheCourthas insufficiently taken intocon-siderationthegeneralcontextofthedisputebetweenthePar-tiesandthedeeplyrootedinstabilityoftheregionwhichhaspromptedUgandaandothercountriestomilitaryactions .Asaresult,theJudgmentcanbesaidtolackthebalancewhichisneededforagenuinesettlementofthedispute .

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Judge Kooijmans is further of the view that the Courtshouldhavetakenaccountofthefactthatthearmedactions,carriedoutbytheUgandanrebelmovementsfromCongoleseterritory during June and July 1998 were, because of theirscaleandeffects,equivalenttoanarmedattackhadtheybeencarriedoutbyregulararmedforces .ThefactthatthesearmedactionscannotbeattributedtotheDRC,sincenoinvolvementonitsparthasbeenproved,doesnotmeanthatUgandawasnot entitled to act in self-defence; Article 51 of the Charterdoes not make the right of self-defence conditional on anarmedattackbyaState .Inthepresentcase,however,Ugandadid not meet the standard of necessity and proportionalityfrom1September1998onwardsandthusviolatedtheprinci-pleofthenon-useofforce .

JudgeKooijmansisalsooftheviewthattheCourtunnec-essarily narrowed the criteria for applicability of the law ofbelligerentoccupationbyascertainingwhethertheUgandanarmedforceswerenotonlystationed inparticular locationsbutalsohadactuallysubstitutedtheirownauthorityforthatoftheCongoleseGovernment .Onthis,basistheCourtcon-cludedthatthiswasthecaseonlyinIturidistrictandnotintheotherinvadedareas .

AccordingtoJudgeKooijmansitwouldhavebeenprefer-abletodeterminethat,asaresultoftheseizurebyUgandanarmedforcesoftheairportsandmilitarybasesinalargearea,theDRCGovernmentwasrenderedincapableofexercisingitsauthority .AslongasUgandaeffectivelycontrolledtheseloca-tions,whichtheDRCGovernmentwouldhaveneededtore-establishitsauthorityovertheCongoleserebelmovements,itmustbeconsideredastheoccupyingPowerinallareaswhereitstroopswerepresent .

This situation changed when, as a result of the LusakaCeasefireAgreement, theserebelmovementswereupgradedto the status of formal participants in the rebuilding of theCongoleseState .Inviewoftheirpositionintheinvadedareas,Ugandacannolongerbesaidtohavereplacedtheterritorialgovernmentsincetheyhadbecomeparticipantsinthatgov-ernment .UgandaretainedthestatusofoccupyingPoweronlyinIturidistrictwhereitwasinfullandeffectivecontrol .

JudgeKooijmansalsodisagreeswiththeCourt’sfindingintheoperativepartthatbyoccupyingIturidistrict,Ugandahasviolatedtheprincipleofthenon-useofforce .InhisviewitisUganda’sarmedactionwhichconstitutesanunlawfuluseofforce,whereastheoccupationastheoutcomeofthatunlawfulactshouldmerelybeconsideredinthelightofthejus in bello.By including occupation in the conceptof theunlawfuluseofforce,theCourtmayhavecontributedtothereluctanceofStatestoapplythelawofbelligerentoccupationwhenthatiscalledfor .

JudgeKooijmanshasvotedagainsttheCourt’srulingthatUgandadidnotcomplywithitsOrderonprovisionalmeas-uresof1 July2000 . Inhisview, this ruling isnotappropri-atesincetheDRChasnotprovidedspecificevidenceinthisrespect . Moreover, the Order was addressed to both PartiesandtheCourtitselfhasexpresseditsawarenessthatmassiveviolationsofhumanrightshavebeencommittedbyallpartiesintheconflict .

Judge Kooijmans has also voted against the paragraphin thedispositif inwhichtheCourtfinds thatUganda’sfirstcounter-claimcannotbeupheld .HeisoftheopinionthatitwasnotonlyforUgandatoprovethat,duringtheperiod1994to1997,theGovernmentofZairewassupportingtheUgandanrebel movements, but also for the DRC to provide evidencethatitrespecteditsdutyofvigilance .SincetheDRCfailedtodoso,thepartofthecounter-claimdealingwiththisperiodshouldnothavebeendismissed .


JudgeElarabyexpresseshisfullsupportfortheJudgment’sfindings . His separate opinion elaborates upon the Court’sfindingrelatingtotheuseofforceinordertoexplicitlyaddressthe Democratic Republic of the Congo’s claim that certainactivitiesofUgandaintheinstantcaseamounttoaviolationoftheprohibitionofaggressionunderinternationallaw .

JudgeElarabyunderlinesthecentralplaceofthisargumentin the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s pleadings beforetheCourt .WhileheconcurswiththeCourt’sfindingofavio-lationoftheprohibitionoftheuseofforce,hearguesthat,inviewofitsgravity,theCourtshouldhaveexaminedwhethertherehadfurthermorebeenaviolationoftheprohibitionofaggressioninthepresentcase .

Judge Elaraby provides a brief historical background toGeneral Assembly resolution 3314 (xxIx) and points outthattheCourthasauthoritytofindthataggressionhasbeencommitted .Hecites theCourt’sdicta in theNicaraguacaseacknowledging the status of this resolution as customaryinternationallawand,stressingtheimportanceofconsistencywithin the Court’s jurisprudence, concludes that the CourtshouldhavefoundthattheunlawfuluseofforcebyUgandaamountstoaggression .

Separate opinion of Judge Simma

Inhisseparateopinion,JudgeSimmaemphasizesthatheis in general agreement with what the Court has said in itsJudgment,butexpressesconcernsaboutthreeissuesonwhichtheCourtdecidedtosaynothing .

First, Judge Simma associates himself with the criticismexpressed in the separate opinion of Judge Elaraby that theCourtshouldhaveacknowledgedthatUgandahascommittedan act of aggression . He notes that if there everwas a mili-taryactivitybeforetheCourtthatdeservestobequalifiedasanactofaggression,it istheUgandaninvasionoftheDRC .Comparedtoitsscaleandimpact,themilitaryadventurestheCourthadtodealwithinearliercases,asinCorfu Channel, Nicaragua,orOil Platforms,borderontheinsignificant .

In this regard, Judge Simma emphasizes that althoughthe United Nations Security Council has stopped short ofexpresslyqualifyingtheUgandaninvasionasanactofaggres-sion, ithaditsown—political—reasonstorefrainfromsucha determination . The Court, as the principal judicial organof theUnitedNations,hasas itsveryraisond’être toarriveatdecisionsbasedonlaw,keepingthepoliticalcontextofthecasesbeforeitinmind,ofcourse,butnotdesistingfromstat-

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ingwhatismanifestoutofregardforsuchnon-legalconsid-erations .

Second,JudgeSimmanotesthattheCourthas leftunan-swered the question whether, even if not attributable to theDRC,cross-boundarymilitaryactivitiesofanti-UgandanrebelgroupscouldhavebeenrepelledbyUganda,providedthattherebelattackswereofascalesufficienttoreachthethresholdofan“armedattack”withinthemeaningofArticle51oftheUnitedNationsCharter .

Inthisregard,JudgeSimmaagreeswiththeargumentpre-sentedintheseparateopinionofJudgeKooijmanstotheeffectthattheCourtshouldhavetakentheopportunityofferedbythiscasetoclarifythestateofthelawonthishighlycontro-versial matter, an issue left open by its Nicaragua Judgmentoftwodecadesago .Hebelievesthatifarmedattacksarecar-riedoutbyirregularbandsagainstaneighbouringState,theseactivitiesarestillarmedattackseveniftheycannotbeattrib-utedtotheterritorialState,andtheygiverisetotherightofself-defencewithinthesamelimitsasinaState-to-Statecase .

Third, Judge Simma stresses that although he believestheCourtcorrectlyconcludedthatUgandacouldnotraiseaclaimofdiplomaticprotectionregardingactsofmaltreatmentinflicted on private persons by Congolese soldiers at NdjiliInternational Airport in Kinshasa in August 1998, interna-tionalhumanrightsandinternationalhumanitarianlawareapplicable to the situation . Judge Simma considers that anunequivocal confirmation by the Court that these personsremainedprotectedunderthosebranchesofinternationallawwouldhavebeenimportantinthefaceofcurrentattemptstocreate legalvoids inwhichhumanbeingsmaydisappearforindefiniteperiodsoftime .

JudgeSimmaarguesthatthekeyissueinfindingwhetherinternational humanitarian law should apply also in areasof the territoryofabelligerentStategenerallyunaffectedbyactual armed conflict is whether those areas are somehowconnectedtotheconflict .Inthepresentcase,suchaconnec-tionexists .Itexistsasamatteroffactbecausetheindividualsmaltreated at Ndjili International Airport found themselvesinasituationofevacuationfromarmedconflict .Itexistsasa matter of law because the Court had already determined,initsOrderunderArticle80of29November2001,thattheeventsat theairport formedpartof the“same factual com-plex”asthearmedconflictwhichconstitutesthebasisofthemainclaim .JudgeSimmaalsomakesreferencetodecisionsoftheICTYholdingthatinternationalhumanitarianlawappliesintheentireterritoryofthebelligerentStates,whetherornotactualcombattakesplacethere .

Discussingthesubstantiverulesofinternationalhumani-tarianlawapplicabletothepersonsinquestion,JudgeSimmaconcludes that although they may not qualify as “protectedpersons”underArticle4of theFourthGenevaConvention,theyare,ataminimum,protectedbyArticle75oftheProto-col IAdditional to theGenevaConventions .Heemphasizesthatthereisthereforenolegalvoidininternationalhumani-tarianlaw .

ApplyinginternationalhumanrightslawtotheindividualsmaltreatedbytheDRCatNdjiliInternationalAirport,JudgeSimmanotesthattheconductoftheDRCviolatedprovisions

of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rightsof 19 December 1966, the African Charter on Human andPeoples’Rightsof27June1981,andtheConventionAgainstTortureandOtherCruel,InhumanorDegradingTreatmentorPunishmentof10December1984,toallofwhichboththeDRCandUgandaareparties .

JudgeSimmathendiscussestheissueofstandingtoraiseviolations of international humanitarian and human rightslawinthecaseofpersonswhomaynothavethenationalityof theclaimantState .As to internationalhumanitarian law,heconcludes,basedontheWallOpinionoftheCourtandtheICRCCommentarytocommonArticle1oftheGenevaCon-ventions,thatregardlessofwhetherthemaltreatedindividualswereUgandans,Ugandahadtheright—indeedtheduty—toraisetheviolationsofinternationalhumanitarianlawcommit-tedagainstthepersonsaspartofitsdutyto“ensurerespect”forinternationalhumanitarianlaw .Astohumanrightslaw,heconcludesbasedonArticle48oftheInternationalLawCom-mission’s 2001 draft Articles on Responsibility of States forInternationallyWrongfulActs thatUgandawouldhavehadstandingtoraiseviolationsofrelevanthumanrightstreaties .

JudgeSimmaconcludeswithageneralobservationonthecommunity interest underlying international humanitarianandhumanrightslaw,emphasizingthatatleastthecoreoftheobligationsderiving from thosebodiesof lawarevaliderga omnes.

Declaration by Judge Tomka

Judge Tomka, who voted in favour of all paragraphs ofthe operative part of the Judgment, with the exception ofone,explainswhy, inhisview, theCourtcouldhaveupheldthecounter-claimofUgandaontheallegedtolerationoftheDRC’s(thenZaire’s)authoritiesofrebelgroupattacksfromitsterritoryagainstUgandainthe1994-May1997period .

HeexpressestheopinionthatthedutyofvigilancerequiredthatZaireexertgoodeffortstopreventitsterritoryfrombeingusedagainstUganda .Zaireknewoftheexistenceofsuchrebelanti-Ugandan groups operating in its territory and causingharmtoUgandaanditspopulation .Inhisview,theDRChadtodemonstratetotheCourtthatZaire’sGovernmentexertedallgoodeffortstopreventitsterritoryfrombeingmisusedforlaunchingattacksagainstUganda .Nosuchcredibleinforma-tiononanybonafideeffortshadbeensubmittedtotheCourt .He cannot concur with the view of the majority that theabsenceofactionsbyZaire’sGovernmentagainstrebelgroupsintheborderareaisnottantamounttotoleratingoracquiesc-ingintheiractivities .

Furtherinhisdeclaration,JudgeTomkaexpresseshisviewthatUgandaremainsunderobligationtoprosecutethosewhohave committed grave breaches under the Fourth GenevaConventionof1949andtheAdditionalProtocolIof1977 .

Finally, he briefly touches upon the order in which theCourtconsideredinthiscasetheissuesofself-defenceandoftheprohibitionoftheuseofforce .

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Declaration of Judge Verhoeven

In his declaration, Judge ad hoc Verhoeven reflects uponthe conditions under which, and the limits within which,theCourtcanfindaState’sconductwrongfulwithoutrulingontheensuingconsequencesunderinternationallaw .Inthepresentcase,itiseasilyunderstandablethat,inlightofthecir-cumstances,thedecisiononreparationshouldbedeferredtoasubsequentstageoftheproceedingsifthePartiesareunabletoagreeonthispoint .Thatistrueatleastforthemainclaim;doubthoweverarisesastothisoutcomeinrespectofthesec-ondcounter-claimgiventheabsenceofelementswhichcouldobjectivelyjustifypostponingthedecision .Theotherpointsofthedispositif concerningtheconsequencesofwhattheCourthasfoundtobeviolationsbytheRespondentmaymoreoverraisesomequestionfromthispointofview,eventhoughtheCourtdidnotexpresslyruleinthisregard .

Judge Verhoeven then points out that the obligation torespectandensurerespectforhumanrightsandinternationalhumanitarianlaw,referredtoinpoint4ofthedispositif,can-notbeconfinedsolelytothecaseofoccupationinthesenseof the jus in bello; itappliesgenerally toallarmed forces inforeign territory, particularly when their presence there fol-lowsfromaviolationofthe jusad bellum.Theobligationtomakereparationderivingfromthisviolationextendsmoreo-ver toall theprejudicialconsequencesof theviolation,even

thoseresultingfromconductoractswhichareinthemselvesinaccordancewiththejus in bello.

Dissenting opinion of Judge Kateka

In his dissenting opinion, Judge ad hoc Kateka cannotagree with the Court’s findings that Uganda violated theprinciples of non-use of force in international relations andofnon-intervention; that theRespondentviolated itsobliga-tionsunderinternationalhumanrightslawandinternationalhumanitarian law; and that theRespondentviolatedobliga-tions owed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo underinternational lawbyactsofunlawfulexploitationof the lat-ter’snaturalresources .

JudgeKatekaexpressestheviewthattheCourtshouldhavereviewed its dictum in the 1986 Nicaragua case concerninginsurgentactivitiesandwhatamountstoan“armedattack” .Asinsurgentactivitiesareatthecentreofthepresentcase,itwouldhavehelpedtoclarifythelawinthisregard .

Inhisopinion,JudgeKatekaarguesthatUganda’sarmedforceswereintheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,atdif-ferent times,with theconsentof theApplicantaswellas intheexerciseoftherightofself-defence .Allegedviolationsofhumanrightsandinternationalhumanitarianlaw,intheviewofJudgeKateka,werenotprovenbytheApplicantwhichisnotinnocentinthisconnection .JudgeKatekaisoftheviewthatafindingonviolationofprovisionalmeasuresisunnecessary .

___________

160. ARMeDACtIVItIesontHeteRRItoRYoFtHeConGo(neWAPPLICAtIon:2002)(DeMoCRAtICRePUBLICoFtHeConGov.RWAnDA)(JURIsDICtIonoFtHeCoURtAnDADMIssIBILItYoFtHeAPPLICAtIon)


InitsjudgmentonjurisdictionoftheCourtandadmissi-bilityoftheapplicationinthecaseconcerningArmed Activi-ties on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v . Rwanda), theCourt,byfifteenvotes to two, found foundthatithadnojurisdictiontoentertaintheApplicationfiledbytheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoon28May2002 .

** *

TheCourtwascomposedas follows:PresidentShi;Vice-President Ranjeva; Judges Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins,Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buer-genthal,Elaraby,Owada,Simma,Tomka,Abraham;Judgesad hocDugard,Mavungu;RegistrarCouvreur .

** *

Theoperativeparagraph(para .128)ofthejudgmentreadsasfollows:

“ . . .

TheCourt,

Byfifteenvotestotwo,

Finds that ithasnojurisdictiontoentertaintheApplica-tion filed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo on28May2002 .

in favour: President Shi; Vice-President Ranjeva; Judg-es Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans,Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, Elaraby, Owada,Simma,Tomka,Abraham;Judgead hocDugard;against:JudgeKoroma;Judgead hocMavungu .”

** *

JudgeKoromaappendedadissentingopiniontotheJudg-ment of the Court; Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby,OwadaandSimmaappendedajointseparateopiniontotheJudgmentof theCourt; JudgeKooijmansappendedadecla-ration to the Judgment of the Court; Judge Al-Khasawnehappended a separate opinion to the Judgment of the Court;

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JudgeElarabyappendedadeclarationtotheJudgmentoftheCourt;JudgeadhocDugardappendedaseparateopiniontotheJudgmentoftheCourt;JudgeadhocMavunguappendedadissentingopiniontotheJudgmentoftheCourt .

** *


TheCourtbeginsbyrecapitulatingthevariousstagesoftheproceedings .

On28May2002theGovernmentoftheDemocraticRepub-licoftheCongo(hereinafter“theDRC”)filedintheRegistryof the Court an Application instituting proceedings againsttheRepublicofRwanda(hereinafter“Rwanda”)inrespectofadisputeconcerning“massive,seriousandflagrantviolationsofhumanrightsandofinternationalhumanitarianlaw”allegedtohavebeencommitted“inbreachofthe‘InternationalBillofHumanRights’,otherrelevantinternationalinstrumentsandmandatoryresolutionsoftheUnitedNationsSecurityCoun-cil” . In the Application the DRC stated that “[the] flagrantandseriousviolations[ofhumanrightsandof internationalhumanitarianlaw]”ofwhichitcomplained“resultfromactsofarmedaggressionperpetratedbyRwandaontheterritoryof theDemocraticRepublicof theCongo inflagrantbreachof the sovereignty and territorial integrity of [the latter], asguaranteed by the Charters of the United Nations and theOrganizationofAfricanUnity” .

InordertofoundthejurisdictionoftheCourt,theDRC,referring to Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute, invokedinitsApplication:Article22oftheInternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscriminationof21 December 1965 (hereinafter the “Convention on RacialDiscrimination”);Article29,paragraph1,oftheConventionon the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination AgainstWomenof18December1979(hereinafterthe“ConventiononDiscriminationAgainstWomen”);ArticleIxoftheConven-tiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGeno-cideof9December1948(hereinafterthe“GenocideConven-tion”); Article 75 of the Constitution of the World HealthOrganizationof22July1946(hereinafterthe“WHOConsti-tution”);ArticlexIV,paragraph2,oftheConstitutionoftheUnitedNationsEducational,ScientificandCulturalOrganiza-tionof16November1945(hereinafterthe“UnescoConstitu-tion”)andArticle9oftheConventiononthePrivilegesandImmunitiesoftheSpecializedAgenciesof21November1947(hereinafterthe“ConventiononPrivilegesandImmunities”);Article 30, paragraph 1, of the Convention against TortureandOtherCruel,InhumanorDegradingTreatmentorPun-ishment of 10 December 1984 (hereinafter the “ConventionagainstTorture”);andArticle14,paragraph1,oftheMontrealConventionfortheSuppressionofUnlawfulActsagainsttheSafetyofCivilAviationof23September1971(hereinafterthe“MontrealConvention”) .

The DRC further contended in its Application that Arti-cle 66 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of23May1969establishedthejurisdictionoftheCourttoset-tledisputesarising fromtheviolationofperemptorynorms

(jus cogens)intheareaofhumanrights,asthosenormswerereflectedinanumberofinternationalinstruments .

On28May2002theDRCalsosubmittedarequestfortheindicationofprovisionalmeasurespursuant toArticle41oftheStatuteof theCourtandArticles73and74of itsRules .Since the Court included upon the Bench no judge of thenationality of the Parties, each of them availed itself of therightconferreduponitbyArticle31oftheStatutetochooseajudgead hoctositinthecase .TheDRCchoseMr .Jean-PierreMavungu,andRwandaMr .ChristopherJohnRobertDugard .Atthehearingsontherequestfortheindicationofprovisionalmeasures held on 13 and 14 June 2002, Rwanda asked theCourt to remove thecase from theList formanifest lackofjurisdiction . By Orderof 10 July 2002 the Court found thatit lacked prima facie jurisdiction to indicate the provisionalmeasures requested by the DRC . The Court also rejectedRwanda’srequestthatthecaseberemovedfromtheList .

Atameetingheldon4September2002bythePresidentoftheCourtwith theAgentsof theParties,Rwandaproposedthat the procedure provided for in Article 79, paragraphs 2and3,of theRulesofCourtbefollowed,andthat theques-tionsofjurisdictionandadmissibilityinthecasethereforebedeterminedseparatelybeforeanyproceedingsonthemerits .TheDRCstatedthatitwouldleavethedecisioninthisregardto the Court . By Order of 18 September 2002 the Courtdecided that the written pleadings would first be addressedto the questions of the jurisdiction of the Court and of theadmissibilityoftheApplicationandfixedtime-limitsforthefilingofaMemorialbyRwandaandaCounter-MemorialbytheDRC .Thosepleadingswerefiledwithinthetime-limitssoprescribed . In its Counter-Memorial (and later in the hear-ings) the DRC asserted two additional bases of jurisdiction:the doctrine of forum prorogatum and the Court’s Order of10July2002ontheDRC’srequestfortheindicationofprovi-sionalmeasures .

Public hearings were held between 4 and 8 July 2005, atwhichthefollowingsubmissionswerepresentedbythePar-ties:

OnbehalfoftheRwandanGovernment,atthehearingof6July2005:“Forthereasonsgiveninourwrittenpreliminaryobjectionandattheoralhearings,theRepublicofRwandarequeststheCourttoadjudgeanddeclarethat:1 .itlacksjurisdictionovertheclaimsbroughtagainsttheRepublic of Rwanda by the Democratic Republic of theCongo;and2 . in the alternative, that the claims brought against theRepublic of Rwanda by the Democratic Republic of theCongoareinadmissible .”OnbehalfoftheCongoleseGovernment,atthehearingof8July2005:“MayitpleasetheCourt,1 .tofindthattheobjectionstojurisdictionandadmissibil-ityraisedbyRwandaareunfounded;2 .consequently,tofindthattheCourthasjurisdictiontoentertainthecaseonthemeritsandthat theApplication

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oftheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoisadmissibleassubmitted;3 .todecidetoproceedwiththecaseonthemerits .”

Object of the present proceedings limited to the questions of the Court’s jurisdiction and the admissibility of the DRC’s Application (para .14)

TheCourtnotesfirstofallthatatthepresentstageoftheproceedingsitcannotconsideranymatterrelatingtothemer-itsofthedisputebetweentheDRCandRwanda .InaccordancewiththedecisiontakeninitsOrderof18September2002,theCourtisrequiredtoaddressonlythequestionsofwhetheritiscompetenttohearthedisputeandwhethertheDRC’sAppli-cationisadmissible .

Examination of the bases of jurisdiction put forward by the DRC(paras .15–125)

TheCourtbeginsitsexaminationofthe11basesofjurisdic-tionputforwardbytheDRC .ItrecallstheParties’argumentsinrespectofthemandreachesthefollowingconclusions:

(1) 1984 Convention against Torture(para .16)TheCourtpointsoutthatithadnotedRwanda’sstatement

that it “is not, and never has been, party” to this Conven-tion .ObservingthattheDRCdidnotraiseanyargumentinresponsetothiscontention,theCourtaccordinglyconcludesthattheDRCcannotrelyuponthisConventionasabasisofjurisdiction .

(2) Convention on Privileges and Immunities(para .17)TheCourtrecallsthat,initsOrderof10July2002,itstated

thattheDRCdidnotappeartofoundthejurisdictionoftheCourt on this Convention, and that the Court was accord-inglynotrequiredtotaketheinstrumentintoconsiderationinthecontextoftherequestfortheindicationofprovisionalmeasures .Since theDRChasalsonot sought to invoke thisConventioninthepresentphaseoftheproceedings,theCourtdoesnottakeitintoconsiderationinitsJudgment .

(3)Forumprorogatum(paras .19–22)TheDRCarguesonthispointthatthewillingnessofaState

to submit a dispute to the Court may be apparent not onlyfromanexpressdeclarationbutalsofromanyconclusiveact,inparticular from theconductof the respondentState sub-sequenttoseisinoftheCourt .Inparticularitcontendsthat“theRespondent’sagreementtopleadimpliesthat itacceptsthe Court’s jurisdiction” . For its part Rwanda contends thattheDRC’sargumentiswithoutfoundation,sinceinthiscasetherehasbeenno“voluntaryandindisputableacceptanceoftheCourt’sjurisdiction” .Rwandapointsoutthatithas,onthecontrary,consistentlyassertedthattheCourthasnojurisdic-tionandthat ithasappearedsolely for thepurposeofchal-lengingthatjurisdiction .

In the present case the Court notes that Rwanda hasexpresslyandrepeatedlyobjected to its jurisdictionateverystageoftheproceedings .Rwanda’sattitudethereforecannotbe regarded as “an unequivocal indication” of its desire toacceptthejurisdictionoftheCourtina“voluntaryandindis-putable”manner .Thefact,astheDRChaspointedout,that

Rwandahas“fullyandproperlyparticipatedinthedifferentprocedures in thiscase,withouthaving itself representedorfailingtoappear”,andthat“ithasnotrefusedtoappearbeforethe Court or make submissions”, cannot be interpreted asconsenttotheCourt’sjurisdictionoverthemerits,inasmuchastheverypurposeofthisparticipationwastochallengethatjurisdiction .

(4) Court’s Order of 10 July 2002(paras .23–25)TofoundthejurisdictionoftheCourt,theDRCalsorelies

on one of the Court’s findings in its Order of 10 July 2002,whereby it stated that, “in the absence of a manifest lack ofjurisdiction,theCourtcannotgrantRwanda’srequestthatthecaseberemovedfromtheList” .IntheDRC’sview,thisfind-ingofan“absenceofamanifestlackofjurisdiction”couldbeinterpretedasanacknowledgementby theCourt that ithasjurisdiction . On this point, for its part Rwanda recalls thatinthissameOrdertheCourtclearlystatedthatthefindingsreachedbyitatthatstageintheproceedingsinnowaypre-judgedthequestionofitsjurisdictiontodealwiththemeritsofthecase .

TheCourtobservesonthissubjectthat,giventheurgen-cy which, ex hypothesi, characterizes the consideration ofrequestsfortheindicationofprovisionalmeasures,itdoesnotnormallyatthatstagetakeadefinitivedecisiononitsjurisdic-tion .Itdoessoonlyifitisapparentfromtheoutsetthatthereisnobasisonwhichjurisdictioncouldlie,andthatitthere-fore cannot entertain the case . According to the Court, thefactthatitdidnotconcludeinitsOrderof10July2002thatitmanifestly lacked jurisdictioncannotthereforeamounttoanacknowledgmentthatithasjurisdiction .Onthecontrary,theCourtpointsoutthatfromtheoutsetithadseriousdoubtsregardingitsjurisdictiontoentertaintheDRC’sApplication,forinthatsameOrderit justifieditsrefusaltoindicatepro-visional measures by the lack of prima facie jurisdiction . IndecliningRwanda’srequesttoremovethecasefromtheList,theCourtsimplyreservedtherightfullytoexaminefurthertheissueofitsjurisdictionatalaterstage .

(5) Article IX of the Genocide Convention(paras .28–70)TheCourtnotesthatboththeDRCandRwandaarepar-

ties to the Genocide Convention, the DRC having accededon 31 May 1962 and Rwanda on 16 April 1975 . The Courtobserves,however,thatRwanda’s instrumentofaccessiontothe Convention, as deposited with the Secretary-General oftheUnitedNations,containsareservationwordedasfollows:“TheRwandeseRepublicdoesnotconsideritselfasboundbyArticleIxoftheConvention .”ArticleIxprovides:“DisputesbetweentheContractingPartiesrelatingtotheinterpretation,application or fulfilment of the present Convention, includ-ingthoserelatingtotheresponsibilityofaStateforgenocideorforanyoftheotheractsenumeratedinarticleIII,shallbesubmittedtotheInternationalCourtofJusticeattherequestofanyofthepartiestothedispute .”

TheCourtalsonotesthatthePartiestakeopposingviewson two questions: first, on whether, in adopting “Décret-loiNo .014/01of15February1995withdrawingallreservationsenteredbytheRwandeseRepublicattheaccession,approvalandratificationofinternationalinstruments”,Rwandaeffec-tivelywithdrewitsreservationtoArticleIxoftheGenocide

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Conventionand,secondly,onthequestionofthelegaleffectofthestatementbyRwanda’sMinisterofJusticeattheSixty-first Session of the United Nations Commission on HumanRights,accordingtowhich,“[t]hefew[humanrights]instru-mentsnotyetratified”byRwandaatthatdate“willshortlyberatified”andreservations“notyetwithdrawnwillshortlybewithdrawn” .

In regard to the first question, the Court notes thatDécret-loi No . 014/01 was adopted on 15 February 1995 bythe President of the Rwandese Republic following an Opin-ion of the Council of Ministers and was countersigned bythePrimeMinisterandMinisterof Justiceof theRwandeseRepublic .Article1ofthisdécret-loi,whichcontainsthreearti-cles,providesthat“[a]11reservationsenteredbytheRwandeseRepublicinrespectoftheaccession,approvalandratificationofinternationalinstrumentsarewithdrawn”;Article2statesthat“[a]11priorprovisionscontrarytothepresentdécret-loiare abrogated”; while Article 3 provides that “[t]his décret-loi shall enter into forceon thedayof itspublication in theOfficialJournaloftheRwandeseRepublic” .Thedécret-loiwaspublished in the Official Journal of the Rwandese Republicandenteredintoforce .

Thevalidityofthisdécret-loiunderRwandandomesticlawhasbeendeniedbyRwanda .However,intheCourt’sviewthequestionofthevalidityandeffectofthedécret-loiwithinthedomestic legal order of Rwanda is different from that of itseffect within the international legal order . Thus a clear dis-tinction has to be drawn between a decision to withdraw areservation to a treaty taken within a State’s domestic legalorderandtheimplementationofthatdecisionbythecompe-tentnationalauthoritieswithintheinternationallegalorder,whichcanbeeffectedonlybynotificationofwithdrawalofthereservationtotheotherStatespartiestothetreatyinquestion .Itisaruleofinternationallaw,derivingfromtheprincipleoflegalsecurityandwellestablishedinpractice,that,subjecttoagreement to thecontrary, thewithdrawalbyaContractingState of a reservation to a multilateral treaty takes effect inrelationtotheotherContractingStatesonlywhentheyhavereceived notification thereof . This rule is expressed in Arti-cle22,paragraph3(a),oftheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties .

TheCourtobservesthatinthiscaseithasnotbeenshownthatRwandanotifiedthewithdrawalofitsreservationstotheotherStatespartiestothe“internationalinstruments”referredto in Article 1 of décret-loi No . 014/01, and in particular totheStatespartiestotheGenocideConvention .Norhasitbeenshownthattherewasanyagreementwherebysuchwithdrawalcould have become operative without notification . In theCourt’sview, theadoptionof thatdécret-loi and itspublica-tionintheOfficialJournaloftheRwandeseRepubliccannotin themselves amount to such notification . In order to haveeffectininternationallaw,thewithdrawalwouldhavehadtobethesubjectofanoticereceivedattheinternationallevel .

TheCourtnotesthat,asregardstheGenocideConvention,the Government of Rwanda has taken no action at interna-tionallevelonthebasisofthedécret-loi.ItobservesthatthisConvention is a multilateral treaty whose depositary is theSecretary-GeneraloftheUnitedNations,anditconsidersthat

itwasnormallythroughthe latter thatRwandashouldhavenotified withdrawal of its reservation . The Court notes thatit has no evidence that Rwanda sent any such notice to theSecretary-General .

TheCourtfindsthattheadoptionandpublicationofdécret-loiNo .014/01of15February1995byRwandadidnot, asamatterofinternationallaw,effectawithdrawalbythatStateofitsreservationtoArticleIxoftheGenocideConvention .

Inrespectofthesecondquestion,thatofthelegaleffectofthestatementmadeon17March2005byMs .Mukabagwiza,MinisterofJusticeofRwanda,theCourtbeginsbyexamin-ingRwanda’sargumentthatitcannotbelegallyboundbythestatementinquestioninasmuchasastatementmadenotbyaForeignMinisteroraHeadofGovernment“withautomaticauthority to bind the State in matters of international rela-tions, but by a Minister of Justice, cannot bind the State tolift a particular reservation” . In this connection, the Courtobservesthat,inaccordancewithitsconsistentjurisprudence,itisawell-establishedruleofinternationallawthattheHeadofState,theHeadofGovernmentandtheMinisterforForeignAffairsaredeemedtorepresenttheStatemerelybyvirtueofexercisingtheirfunctions,includingfortheperformance,onbehalfofthesaidState,ofunilateralactshavingtheforceofinternational commitments . The Court notes, however, thatwith increasing frequency in modern international rela-tionsotherpersonsrepresentingaStateinspecificfieldsmaybeauthorizedby thatState tobind itby their statements inrespectofmatters fallingwithin theirpurview .Thismaybetrue,forexample,ofholdersoftechnicalministerialportfoliosexercisingpowers intheirfieldofcompetence intheareaofforeignrelations,andevenofcertainofficials .

In thiscase, theCourtnotesfirst thatMs .Mukabagwizaspoke before the United Nations Commission on HumanRights inhercapacityasMinisterof JusticeofRwandaandthat she indicated inter alia that she was making her state-ment“onbehalfoftheRwandanpeople” .TheCourtfurthernotesthatthequestionsrelatingtotheprotectionofhumanrightswhichwerethesubjectofthatstatementfallwithinthepurviewofaMinisterofJustice .ItistheCourt’sviewthatthepossibilitycannotberuledoutinprinciplethataMinisterofJusticemay,undercertaincircumstances,bindtheStateheorsherepresentsbyhisorherstatements .

Inordertodeterminethelegaleffectofthatstatement,theCourtexaminesitsactualcontentaswellasthecircumstancesinwhich itwasmade .TheCourt recalls thata statementofthiskindcancreatelegalobligationsonlyifitismadeinclearandspecificterms .TheCourtobservesthatinherstatementthe Minister of Justice of Rwandadid not refer explicitly tothereservationmadebyRwandatoArticleIxoftheGenocideConvention .ThestatementmerelyraisesingeneraltermsthequestionofRwandanreservationsandsimply indicates that“past reservations not yet withdrawn will shortly be with-drawn”,withoutsettingoutanyprecisetime-frameforsuchwithdrawals . It follows that the statement was not made insufficientlyspecifictermsinrelationtotheparticularquestionofthewithdrawalofreservations .Giventhegeneralnatureofitswording,thestatementcannotthereforebeconsideredasconfirmationbyRwandaofapreviousdecisiontowithdraw

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itsreservationtoArticleIxof theGenocideConvention,orasanysortofunilateralcommitmentonitsparthavinglegaleffectsinregardtosuchwithdrawal;atmost,itcanbeinter-pretedasadeclarationofintent,verygeneralinscope .

The Court lastly addresses Rwanda’s argument that thestatementbyitsMinisterofJusticecouldnotinanyeventhaveanyimplicationsforthequestionoftheCourt’sjurisdictioninthiscase,sinceitwasmadenearlythreeyearsaftertheinstitu-tionoftheproceedings .Inthisconnection,theCourtrecallsthat ithasconsistentlyheld that,while its jurisdictionmustsurelybeassessedonthedateofthefilingoftheactinstitut-ing proceedings, the Court should not, however, penalize adefectinprocedurewhichtheApplicantcouldeasilyremedy .Inthepresentcase,iftheRwandanMinister’sstatementhadsomehowentailedthewithdrawalofRwanda’sreservationtoArticle Ix of the Genocide Convention in the course of theproceedings, theDRCcouldon itsown initiativehave rem-ediedtheproceduraldefectinitsoriginalApplicationbyfilinga new Application . This argument by Rwanda must accord-inglyberejected .

TheCourtthenturnstotheDRC’sargumentthatRwan-da’s reservation is invalid . In order to show that Rwanda’sreservationisinvalid,theDRCmaintainsthattheGenocideConventionhas “the forceofgeneral lawwith respect toallStates” includingRwanda, inasmuchas itcontainsnormsofjuscogens.Rwandaobserves inter alia that,although,astheDRCcontends, thenormscodified in thesubstantiveprovi-sionsoftheGenocideConventionhavethestatusofjus cogensandcreaterightsandobligationserga omnes,thatdoesnotinitselfsufficeto“conferjurisdictionontheCourtwithrespectto a dispute concerning the application of those rights andobligations” .

The Court reaffirms in this regard that “the principlesunderlying the [Genocide] Convention are principles whicharerecognizedbycivilizednationsasbindingonStates,evenwithoutanyconventionalobligation”andthataconsequenceof that conception is “the universal character both of thecondemnationofgenocideandof theco-operationrequired‘inorder to liberatemankind fromsuchanodious scourge’(Preamble to the Convention)” . It follows that “the rightsandobligationsenshrinedby theConventionarerightsandobligations erga omnes” . The Court observes, however, as ithasalreadyhadoccasiontoemphasize,that“theerga omnescharacterofanormandtheruleofconsenttojurisdictionaretwodifferent things”,and that themere fact that rightsandobligationserga omnesmaybeatissueinadisputewouldnotgivetheCourtjurisdictiontoentertainthatdispute .Thesameappliestotherelationshipbetweenperemptorynormsofgen-eralinternationallaw(jus cogens)andtheestablishmentoftheCourt’sjurisdiction:thefactthatadisputerelatestocompli-ancewithanormhavingsuchacharacter,whichisassuredlythe case with regard to the prohibition of genocide, cannotof itself provide a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court toentertainthatdispute .UndertheCourt’sStatutethatjurisdic-tionisalwaysbasedontheconsentoftheparties .TheCourtaddsthatRwanda’sreservationtoArticleIxoftheGenocideConventionbearsonthejurisdictionoftheCourt,anddoesnotaffectsubstantiveobligationsrelatingtoactsofgenocidethemselves under that Convention . In the circumstances of

the present case, the Court cannot conclude that Rwanda’sreservation, which is meant to exclude a particular methodofsettlingadisputerelatingtotheinterpretation,applicationor fulfilment of the Convention, is to be regarded as beingincompatiblewiththeobjectandpurposeoftheConvention .TheCourtfurthernotesthat,asamatterofthelawoftreaties,whenRwandaaccededtotheGenocideConventionandmadethereservationinquestion,theDRCmadenoobjectiontoit .

TheCourtconcludesfromtheforegoingthat,havingregardtoRwanda’sreservationtoArticleIxoftheGenocideConven-tion,thisArticlecannotconstituteabasisforjurisdictioninthepresentcase .

(6) Article 22 of the Convention on Racial Discrimination(paras .71–79)TheCourtnotesthatboththeDRCandRwandaarepar-

ties to the Convention on Racial Discrimination, the DRChaving acceded thereto on 21 April 1976 and Rwanda on16April1975 .Rwanda’sinstrumentofaccessiontotheCon-vention,asdepositedwiththeUnitedNationsSecretary-Gen-eral, does however include a reservation reading as follows:“TheRwandeseRepublicdoesnotconsideritselfasboundbyarticle22oftheConvention” .Underthatarticle:“AnydisputebetweentwoormoreStatesPartieswithrespecttotheinter-pretationorapplicationofthisConvention,whichisnotset-tledbynegotiationorbytheproceduresexpresslyprovidedforinthisConvention,shall,attherequestofanyofthepartiestothedispute,bereferredtotheInternationalCourtofJusticefordecision,unlessthedisputantsagreetoanothermodeofsettlement .”

TheCourtfirstaddressestheDRC’sargumentthattheres-ervationhas“lapsedorfallenintodesuetudeasaresultoftheundertaking,enshrinedintheRwandanFundamentalLaw,to‘withdrawallreservationsenteredbyRwandawhenitadheredto . . . international instruments’” relating to human rights .Withoutprejudicetotheapplicabilitymutatis mutandistotheConventiononRacialDiscriminationoftheCourt’sreasoningand conclusions in respect of the DRC’s claim that Rwandawithdrew its reservation to the Genocide Convention, theCourtobservesthattheproceduresforwithdrawingareserva-tiontotheConventiononRacialDiscriminationareexpresslyprovided for inArticle20,paragraph3,of thatConvention,whichstates:“ReservationsmaybewithdrawnatanytimebynotificationtothiseffectaddressedtotheSecretary-General .Suchnotificationshall takeeffecton thedateonwhich it isreceived .”However,thereisnoevidencebeforetheCourtofanynotificationbyRwandatotheUnitedNationsSecretary-Generalofitsintentiontowithdrawitsreservation .TheCourtaccordingly concludes that the respondent State has main-tainedthatreservation .

Regarding the DRC’s argument that the reservation isinvalid, theCourtnotes that theConventiononRacialDis-crimination prohibits reservations incompatible with itsobject and purpose . The Court observes in this connectionthat, under Article 20, paragraph 2, of the Convention, “[a]reservation shall be considered incompatible . . . if at leasttwo-thirds of the States Parties to [the] Convention objectto it” .TheCourtnotes,however, that suchhasnotbeen thecaseasregardsRwanda’sreservationinrespectoftheCourt’s

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jurisdiction . Without prejudice to the applicability mutatis mutandistoRwanda’sreservationtoArticle22oftheConven-tion on Racial Discrimination of the Court’s reasoning andconclusionsinrespectofRwanda’sreservationtoArticleIxoftheGenocideConvention,theCourtisoftheviewthatRwan-da’sreservationtoArticle22cannotthereforeberegardedasincompatiblewiththatConvention’sobjectandpurpose .TheCourtobserves,moreover,thattheDRCitselfraisednoobjec-tiontothereservationwhenitaccededtotheConvention .

Inrelation to theDRC’sargument that thereservation iswithoutlegaleffectbecause,ontheonehand,theprohibitionon racial discrimination is a peremptory norm of generalinternational law and, on the other, such a reservation is inconflictwithaperemptorynorm,theCourtreferstoitsrea-soningwhendismissingtheDRC’ssimilarargumentinregardtoRwanda’s reservation toArticle Ixof theGenocideCon-vention .

TheCourtconcludesfromtheforegoingthat,havingregardto Rwanda’s reservation to Article 22 of the Convention onRacial Discrimination, this instrument cannot constitute abasisforjurisdictioninthepresentcase .

(7) Article 29, paragraph 1, of the Convention on Discrimination Against Women(paras .80–93)TheCourtnotesthatboththeDRCandRwandaarepar-

tiestotheConventiononDiscriminationAgainstWomen,theDRC having ratified it on 17 October 1986 and Rwanda on2March1981 .ItalsonotesthatArticle29ofthisConventiongivestheCourtjurisdictioninrespectofanydisputebetweenStatespartiesconcerningitsinterpretationorapplication,oncondition that: it has not been possible to settle the disputebynegotiation;that,followingthefailureofnegotiations,thedisputehas,attherequestofonesuchState,beensubmittedtoarbitration;andthat,ifthepartieshavebeenunabletoagreeontheorganizationofthearbitration,aperiodofsixmonthshaselapsedfromthedateoftherequestforarbitration .

IntheviewoftheCourt,itisapparentfromthelanguageofArticle29oftheConventionthattheseconditionsarecumu-lative . It must therefore consider whether the preconditionsonitsseisinsetoutinthesaidArticle29havebeensatisfiedinthiscase .

The Court however first addresses the DRC’s argumentthat the objection based on non-fulfilment of the precondi-tionssetoutinthecompromissoryclauses,andinparticularinArticle29oftheConvention,isanobjectiontotheadmis-sibilityofitsApplicationratherthantothejurisdictionoftheCourt . The Court recalls in this regard that its jurisdictionisbasedontheconsentofthepartiesandisconfinedtotheextentacceptedbythem .Whenthatconsent isexpressed ina compromissory clause in an international agreement, anyconditionstowhichsuchconsentissubjectmustberegardedasconstitutingthelimitsthereon .TheCourtaccordinglycon-siders that the examination of such conditions relates to itsjurisdictionandnottotheadmissibilityoftheapplication .ItfollowsthatinthepresentcasetheconditionsforseisinoftheCourt set out in Article 29 of the Convention on Discrimi-nationAgainstWomenmustbeexamined in thecontextofthe issueof theCourt’s jurisdiction .Thisconclusionapplies

mutatis mutandis to all of the other compromissory clausesinvokedbytheDRC .

TheCourtthenconsiderswhetherinthiscasethereexistsadisputebetweentheParties“concerningtheinterpretationorapplicationof[that]Convention”whichcouldnothavebeensettledbynegotiation .ItnotesthattheDRCmadenumerousprotestsagainstRwanda’sactionsinallegedviolationofinter-nationalhumanrightslaw,bothatthebilaterallevelthroughdirectcontactwithRwandaandatthemultilaterallevelwithintheframeworkofinternationalinstitutionssuchastheUnitedNations Security Council and the Commission on HumanandPeoples’RightsoftheOrganizationofAfricanUnity .TheCourtrecallsthat,initsCounter-Memorialandatthehear-ings,theDRCpresentedtheseprotestsasproofthat“theDRChassatisfiedthepreconditionstotheseisinoftheCourtinthecompromissoryclausesinvoked” .Whatevermaybethelegalcharacterizationofsuchprotestsasregards therequirementoftheexistenceofadisputebetweentheDRCandRwandaforpurposesofArticle29oftheConvention,thatArticlerequiresalsothatanysuchdisputebethesubjectofnegotiations .TheCourtstatesthattheevidencehasnotsatisfieditthattheDRCin fact sought to commence negotiations in respect of theinterpretationorapplicationoftheConvention .

ItaddsthattheDRChasalsofailedtoproveanyattemptson its part to initiate arbitration proceedings with Rwandaand that the Court cannot accept the DRC’s argument thattheimpossibilityofopeningoradvancinginnegotiationswithRwandapreventeditfromcontemplatinghavingrecoursetoarbitration;sincethisisaconditionformallysetoutinArti-cle29oftheConventiononDiscriminationAgainstWomen,thelackofagreementbetweenthepartiesastotheorganiza-tionofanarbitrationcannotbepresumed .Theexistenceofsuchdisagreementcanfollowonlyfromaproposalforarbi-trationbytheapplicant,towhichtherespondenthasmadenoanswerorwhichithasexpressedits intentionnottoaccept .TheCourthasfoundnothinginthefilewhichwouldenableittoconcludethattheDRCmadeaproposaltoRwandathatarbitrationproceedingsshouldbeorganized,andthatthelat-terfailedtorespondtothatproposal .

It follows from the foregoing that Article 29, paragraph 1,oftheConventiononDiscriminationAgainstWomencannotservetofoundthejurisdictionoftheCourtinthepresentcase .

(8) Article 75 of the WHO Constitution(paras .94–101)TheCourtobservesthattheDRChasbeenapartytothe

WHO Constitution since 24 February 1961 and Rwandasince 7 November 1962 and that both are thus members ofthatOrganization .TheCourtfurthernotesthatArticle75oftheWHOConstitutionprovidesfortheCourt’sjurisdiction,undertheconditionslaiddowntherein,over“anyquestionordisputeconcerningtheinterpretationorapplication”ofthatinstrument . The Article requires that a question or disputemustspecificallyconcerntheinterpretationorapplicationoftheConstitution .IntheopinionoftheCourt,theDRChasnotshownthattherewasaquestionconcerningtheinterpretationorapplicationoftheWHOConstitutiononwhichitselfandRwandahadopposingviews,orthatithadadisputewiththatStateinregardtothismatter .

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TheCourtfurthernotesthat,eveniftheDRChaddemon-strated the existence of a question or dispute falling withinthescopeofArticle75of theWHOConstitution, ithasnotproved that the other preconditions for seisin of the Courtestablishedbythatprovisionhavebeensatisfied,namelythatit attempted to settle the questionor disputeby negotiationwith Rwanda or that the World Health Assembly had beenunabletosettleit .

The Court accordingly concludes that Article 75 of theWHOConstitutioncannotservetofoundits jurisdictioninthepresentcase .

(9) Article XIV, paragraph 2, of the Unesco Constitution(paras .102–109)TheCourtnotesthatboththeDRCandRwandaareparties

to theUnescoConstitutionandhavebeensince25Novem-ber 1960 in the case of the DRC and 7 November 1962 inthecaseofRwanda,andthatbotharethusmembersofthatOrganization . The Court further observes that Article xIV,paragraph2,oftheUnescoConstitutionprovidesfortherefer-ral,undertheconditionsestablishedtherein,ofquestionsordisputesconcerningtheConstitution,butonlyinrespectofitsinterpretation .TheCourtconsidersthatsuchisnottheobjectof the DRC’s Application . It finds that the DRC has in thiscase invoked the Unesco Constitution and Article I thereofforthesolepurposeofmaintainingthat“[o]wingtothewar”,it “today isunable to fulfil itsmissionswithinUnesco” .TheCourtisoftheopinionthatthisisnotaquestionordisputeconcerning the interpretation of the Unesco Constitution .ThustheDRC’sApplicationdoesnotfallwithinthescopeofArticlexIVoftheConstitution .

TheCourt furtherconsiders that,evenif theexistenceofa question or dispute falling within the terms of the aboveprovisionwereestablished, theDRChas failed to show thatthepriorprocedure for seisinof theCourtpursuant to thatprovisionandtoArticle38of theRulesofProcedureof theUnescoGeneralConferencewasfollowed .

The Court accordingly concludes that Article xIV, para-graph2,oftheUnescoConstitutioncannotfounditsjurisdic-tioninthepresentcase .

(10) Article 14, paragraph 1, of the Montreal Convention(paras .110–119)TheCourtnotesthatboththeDRCandRwandaareparties

totheMontrealConventionandhavebeensince6July1977in thecaseof theDRCand3November1987 in thecaseofRwanda, that both are members of the ICAO, and that theMontrealConventionwasalreadyinforcebetweenthematthetimewhentheCongoAirlinesaircraftisstatedtohavebeendestroyed above Kindu, on 10 October 1998, and when theApplicationwasfiled,on28May2002 .TheCourtalsonotesthatArticle14,paragraph1,oftheMontrealConventiongivestheCourtjurisdictioninrespectofanydisputebetweenCon-tractingStatesconcerningtheinterpretationorapplicationoftheConvention,onconditionthat:ithasnotbeenpossibletosettlethedisputebynegotiation;that,followingthefailureofnegotiations,thedisputehas,attherequestofonesuchState,been submitted to arbitration; and that, if the parties havebeenunabletoagreeontheorganizationofthearbitration,aperiodofsixmonthshaselapsedfromthedateoftherequest

forarbitration .Inordertodeterminewhetherithasjurisdic-tionunderthisprovision,theCourtmustthereforefirstascer-tainwhetherthereisadisputebetweenthePartiesrelatingtotheinterpretationorapplicationoftheMontrealConventionwhichcouldnothavebeensettledbynegotiation .

The Court observes in this regard that the DRC has notindicatedtoitwhicharethespecificprovisionsoftheMon-trealConventionwhichcouldapplytoitsclaimsonthemer-its .InitsApplicationtheDRCconfineditselftoinvokingthatConventioninconnectionwiththedestructionshortlyaftertake-off from Kindu Airport of a civil aircraft belonging toCongoAirlines .Evenifitcouldbeestablishedthatthefactscited by the DRC might, if proved, fall within the terms ofthe Convention and gave rise to a dispute between the Par-tiesconcerningitsinterpretationorapplication,andevenifitcouldbeconsideredthatthediscussionswithintheCounciloftheICAOamountedtonegotiations,theCourtfindsthat,inanyevent,theDRChasfailedtoshowthatitsatisfiedthecon-ditionsrequiredbyArticle14,paragraph1,of theMontrealConventionconcerningrecoursetoarbitration:inparticular,ithasnotshownthatitmadeaproposaltoRwandathatarbi-trationproceedings shouldbeorganized,and that the latterfailedtorespondtothatproposal .

The Court considers that Article 14, paragraph 1, of theMontreal Convention cannot therefore serve to found itsjurisdictioninthepresentcase .

(11) Article 66 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (paras .120–125)TofoundthejurisdictionoftheCourtinthepresentcase,

theDRCreliesfinallyonArticle66oftheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,whichprovidesinter aliathat“[a]nyoneof theparties toadisputeconcerningtheapplicationor theinterpretationofarticle53or64”,relatingtoconflictsbetweentreaties and peremptory norms of general international law,“may,byawrittenapplication,submitittotheInternationalCourtofJusticeforadecisionunlessthepartiesbycommonconsentagreetosubmitthedisputetoarbitration” .

The Court recalls that the DRC explained at the hearingsthatArticle66oftheViennaConventionontheLawofTrea-ties,towhichRwandaisaparty,allowstheCourttoruleonanydisputeconcerning“thevalidityofatreatywhichiscontrarytoanormof jus cogens” . In this regard theDRCargued thatreservationstoatreatyformanintegralpartthereof,andthattheymustaccordingly“avoideitherbeingindirectcontradic-tionwithanormofjus cogens,orpreventingtheimplementa-tionofthatnorm” .AccordingtotheDRC,Rwanda’sreservationtoArticleIxoftheGenocideConvention,aswellasto“othersimilarprovisionsandcompromissoryclauses,seekstopreventthe . . .Courtfromfulfillingitsnoblemissionofsafeguardingperemptorynorms,includingtheprohibitionofgenocide”,andmustthereforeberegardedas“nullandvoid” .

InreplytoRwanda’srelianceatthehearingsonArticle4oftheViennaConvention,whichprovidesthattheConventionapplies only to treaties which are concluded by States afteritsentryintoforcewithregardtosuchStates,theDRCcon-tendedthat“thesupremacyandmandatoryforceofthenormsreferredtointhisConvention(Articles53and64)bindStatesirrespectiveofanytemporalconsiderationoranytreaty-based

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link”;accordingtotheDRC,therulecantherefore“haveret-roactiveeffectintheoverridinginterestofhumanity” .

TheCourtrecallsthatArticle4oftheViennaConventionon the Law of Treaties provides for the non-retroactivity ofthat Convention in the following terms: “Without prejudicetotheapplicationofanyrulessetforthinthepresentConven-tiontowhichtreatieswouldbesubjectunderinternationallawindependentlyoftheConvention,theConventionappliesonlytotreatieswhichareconcludedbyStatesaftertheentryintoforceofthepresentConventionwithregardtosuchStates .”

Inthisconnection,theCourtnotesfirstthattheGenocideConventionwasadoptedon9December1948,theDRCandRwandahavingaccededtoiton31May1962and16April1975respectively;andthattheConventiononRacialDiscrimina-tionwasadoptedon21December1965,theDRCandRwandahaving acceded on 21 April 1976 and 16 April 1975 respec-tively .TheCourtnotessecondlythattheViennaConventionontheLawofTreatiesenteredintoforcebetweentheDRCandRwandaonlyon3February1980,pursuanttoArticle84,par-agraph2, thereof .TheConventionsonGenocideandRacialDiscriminationwereconcludedbeforethelatterdate .ThusinthepresentcasetherulescontainedintheViennaConventionarenotapplicable,saveinsofarastheyaredeclaratoryofcus-tomaryinternationallaw .TheCourtconsidersthattherulescontainedinArticle66oftheViennaConventionarenotofthischaracter .NorhavethetwoPartiesotherwiseagreedtoapplyArticle66betweenthemselves .

Finally,theCourtdeemsitnecessarytorecallthatthemerefactthatrightsandobligationserga omnesorperemptorynormsofgeneralinternationallaw(jus cogens)areatissueinadisputecannotinitselfconstituteanexceptiontotheprinciplethatitsjurisdictionalwaysdependsontheconsentoftheparties .

*

Lack of jurisdiction to entertain the Application; no need for the Court to rule on its admissibility(para .126)

TheCourtconcludes fromallof theforegoingconsidera-tionsthatitcannotacceptanyofthebasesofjurisdictionputforwardbytheDRCinthepresentcase .Sinceithasnojuris-dictiontoentertaintheApplication,theCourtisnotrequiredtoruleonitsadmissibility .

*

Fundamental distinction between the acceptance by States of the Court’s jurisdiction and the conformity of their acts with international law(para .127)

WhiletheCourthascometotheconclusionthatitcannotacceptanyofthegroundsputforwardbytheDRCtoestablishitsjurisdictioninthepresentcase,andcannotthereforeenter-tainthelatter’sApplication,itstressesthatithasreachedthisconclusionsolelyinthecontextofthepreliminaryquestionofwhetherithasjurisdictioninthiscase—theissuetobedeter-minedatthisstageoftheproceedings .TheCourtisprecludedby its Statute from taking any position on the merits of theclaims made by the DRC . However, as the Court has statedonnumerouspreviousoccasions,thereisafundamentaldis-tinctionbetweenthequestionof theacceptancebyStatesof

theCourt’sjurisdictionandtheconformityoftheiractswithinternational law . Whether or not States have accepted thejurisdictionoftheCourt,theyarerequiredtofulfiltheirobli-gationsundertheUnitedNationsCharterandtheotherrulesof international law, including international humanitarianandhumanrights law,and they remain responsible foractsattributabletothemwhicharecontrarytointernationallaw .

** *

Dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma

Inhisdissentingopinion,JudgeKoromaanalysesRwanda’sreservationtoArticleIxoftheGenocideConvention,arguingthat if theCourthadundertakensuchananalysis, itwouldhavefoundthereservationcontrarytotheobjectandpurposeoftheConventionandjurisdictionisthereforeproperunderArticleIxoftheGenocideConvention .

Judge Koroma points out that the dispute settlementclause inArticle Ix relatesnotonly to the interpretationorapplicationoftheConventionbutalsotothefulfilmentoftheConvention . Recalling the language of Article Ix “includ-ing those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide”,JudgeKoromaemphasizesthatthemonitoringfunctiongivento the Court by that Article extends to disputes relating toStateresponsibilityforgenocide .

JudgeKoromarecallsthegravityoftheDRC’sallegationsto the effect that Rwandan forces, directly or through theirRassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD/Goma)agents,committedactsofgenocideagainst3,500,000Congo-lese,bycarryingoutlarge-scalemassacres,assassinationsandothermurderstargetingwell-identifiedgroups .

Henotes that,while a reservation toa treaty clausecon-cerning dispute settlement or the monitoring of the imple-mentationofthetreatyisnot,initself,incompatiblewiththeobjectandpurposeofthetreaty,itisincompatibleifthepro-visiontowhichthereservationrelatesconstitutestheraisond’êtreofthetreaty .Inthisregard,theobjectandpurposeoftheGenocideConventionisthepreventionandpunishmentofthecrimeofgenocide,andthisencompassesholdingaStateresponsiblewheneveritisfoundtobeinbreachofitsobliga-tionsundertheConvention .

Analysing the structure of the Genocide Convention,JudgeKoromanotes thatunlikeArticles IV,V,VI,andVII,ArticleIxistheonlyprovisionoftheGenocideConventionwithspecificlanguageconcerningtheresponsibilityofaStateforgenocide .BecausethepoweroftheCourttoenquireintodisputesbetweenContractingPartiesrelatingtotherespon-sibility of a State for genocide derives from Article Ix, thatprovisioniscrucialtofulfillingtheobjectandpurposeoftheConvention .

JudgeKoromathenexplainsthattheDRC’sfailuretoobjecttoRwanda’sreservationatthetimeitwasmadeisnotsuffi-cient to prevent the Court from examining the reservation,as human rights treaties like the Genocide Convention arenotbasedonreciprocitybetweenStatesbut insteadserve toprotectindividualsandtheinternationalcommunityatlarge .He draws a parallel to General Comment 24 of the Human

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Rights Committee, which noted: “The absence of protest byStatescannotimplythatareservationiseithercompatibleorincompatiblewiththeobjectandpurposeoftheCovenant .”

JudgeKoromaobserves that,while thequestionof reser-vations to Article Ix of the Genocide Convention came upin connection with the provisional measures orders againstSpainandtheUnitedStatesinthecaseconcerningLegality of Use of Force, theCourtdidnotconductafullexaminationofthecompatibilityofareservationtoArticleIxwiththeobjectandpurposeoftheConventionbecausetheissuehadnotbeenraised by Yugoslavia . Judge Koroma contrasts the presentcase—in which both Parties raised and argued the ques-tion—concludingthattheCourtwasthusentitledtoexamineRwanda’s reservation indetail in the lightof theobjectandpurposeoftheConvention .

Judge Koroma emphasizes that, in considering Rwanda’sposition on Article Ix, the Court should have taken dueaccountoftheprincipleofgoodfaith .Inthisregard,Rwanda’spriordeclarationsontheimportanceofhumanrightstreatiesmustbejuxtaposedwithitspresentattempttoavoidscrutinyof itsownconduct .Similarly, it isneithermorally rightnorjust forRwanda to shield itself from judicial scrutinyunderArticle Ix of the Convention for the very same conduct forwhich it successfullyurged theestablishmentofan interna-tionaltribunalfortheprosecutionofpersonsresponsibleforgenocideandotherseriousviolationsofinternationalhuman-itarianlaw .

This prior conduct and the principle of good faith leadJudgeKoromato take theviewthat,giventhenatureof theConvention,andthegravityoftheallegationbeforetheCourt,Rwanda should have accepted the jurisdiction of the Courtbasedontheprincipleofforum prorogatum,therebyallowingittoadjudicatethemeritsofthecase .Henotesthatgenocidehasbeendeclared“thecrimeofallcrimes”and“theprinci-plesunderlyingthe[Genocide]Convention”characterizedas“principleswhicharerecognizedbycivilizednationsasbind-ingonStates, evenwithoutanyconventionalobligation” . Inhisview,theletteraswellasthespiritoftheConventionmustberespectedatalltimes .

The Court’s pronouncements fostered high hopes andexpectations that the object and purpose of the Conventionwouldbefulfilled .Thiscasepresentedanopportunitytoapplythe Convention and its principles . In Judge Koroma’s view,apartfromArticleIxoftheGenocideConvention,sufficientmaterial,includingvariousothercompromissoryclauses,wasputbeforetheCourtforittohavebeenabletoentertainthedispute . He also notes that the Court could have exercisedjurisdictionundertheMontrealConventionfortheSuppres-sionofUnlawfulActsagainsttheSafetyofCivilAviationandtheConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofDiscrimi-nationAgainstWomen .

Joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada and Simma

JudgesHiggins,Kooijmans,Elaraby,OwadaandSimmaintheirjointseparateopinionemphasizethataproperreadingoftheCourt’s1951AdvisoryOpinionshowsthatthereisnoincompatibilitybetweencertaindevelopmentsinthepractice

ofhumanrightscourtsandbodiesandthelawastherestatedbytheInternationalCourt .

Theconcordanceofpractice isevidencedby the Interna-tional Court’s Order of 10 July 2002, at paragraph 72, andagainatparagraph67ofthepresentJudgment .

In their view the Court had in mind certain factors indeciding on several recent occasions that a reservation toArticle Ix of the Genocide Convention is not incompatiblewiththeobjectandpurposeofthattreaty .Whilethesefactorsareentirelyunderstandable, thereareotherelementswithinArticleIxwhichmakeitlessthanself-evidentthatareserva-tion thereto might not be incompatible with the object andpurposeoftheGenocideConvention .

TheauthorsofthejointseparateopinionsuggestthattheCourtshouldrevisitthismatterforfurtherconsideration .

Declaration of Judge Kooijmans

InhisdeclarationJudgeKooijmanssetsoutwhyheisoftheviewthattheCourthasbeenundulyrestrictiveinconcludingthatoneoftheconditionsonitsjurisdictionhasnotbeenmet .Article29,paragraph1,oftheConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofDiscriminationAgainstWomenprovidesthatadisputecanbebroughtbeforetheCourtonlyifnegotiationshave been unsuccessful and a subsequent effort to settle itthrougharbitrationhasalsoturnedouttobefruitless .

TheCourtrecognizesthat,bybringingtheconflictwithitsneighbourstotheattentionoftheSecurityCouncil, theDRCcanbesaidtohavetriedtoinitiatenegotiationsinamultilateralcontext .InitscomplaintstheDRCdidnot,however,explicitlyrefertotheConventiononDiscriminationAgainstWomen .

Judge Kooijmans observes that the DRC in its protestsreferredtoallegedviolationsofagreatnumberoftreaty-basedhumanrightsnorms,includingnormsprovidingforthepro-tection of women . In view of the facts that the complaintswere made in a general context and that they were ignoredbyRwanda,theCourtshouldhaveconcludedthattheDRC’sattempttoenterintonegotiationshadbeentonoavail .

Inholdingasithasinthepresentcase,theCourthasmadeit more difficult for States to satisfy the condition of priornegotiationsrequiredinmanycompromissoryclauses .

Separate opinion of Judge Al-KhasawnehWhile Judge Al-Khasawneh concurred that the Court

lacked jurisdiction, he felt compelled to append a separateopinioninviewofthecontinuingdoubtshehadwithrespecttotheCourt’sreasoningregardingtherequirement(containedin Article 29 of the Convention on Discrimination AgainstWomen) that prior negotiations should be attempted beforereferraltotheCourt .

TheCourtacknowledgedthatsuchnegotiationstookplacebutfoundthemirrelevantinviewofthefactthattheydidnotrefertotheinterpretationorapplicationoftheConventiononDiscriminationAgainstWomen .

JudgeAl-Khasawnehbelievedthatsucharequirementwasnot realistic as a matter of diplomatic practice especially inmultifaceteddisputesandwherecontextwasimportant,i .e .,it

159

isnotusualbeforetheSecurityCouncil,forexample,toitem-izecomplaintsonatreaty-by-treatybasis .

What was important was the substantive relevance of thetreaty . There was no doubt in his mind that the ConventiononDiscriminationAgainstWomenwasrelevantinviewofthecommentofthemonitoringcommitteewhichfoundviolenceagainstwomentoconstitutediscrimination .Moreimportantly,thejurisprudenceoftheCourtfavouredabroadinterpretationof compromissory clauses, e .g ., in the Ambatielos (Greece v .United Kingdom)casetherequirementwasoneofadefensibleargumentonrelevance .Inothercasesthetestofreasonableortangibleconnectionwasdevised .HefelttherewasnoneedtoreferexpresslytoaparticulartreatyinpriornegotiationsandageneralreferenceaswasthecasetocomplaintsmadebyDRCto the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ RightsandtotheSecurityCouncilconstitutedpriornegotiations .HewasneverthelessabletoconcurwiththemajorityviewthattheCourt lacked jurisdiction because another condition underArticle29,namelyarbitrationwasnotmet .

Declaration of Judge ElarabyJudge Elaraby agrees with the finding of the Court .

Althoughsoundinlaw,hebelievesthefindingthattheCourtlacks jurisdiction highlights certain important limitationsof the contemporary international legal system . Unlike insituationswherebothStateshaverecognizedthecompulsoryjurisdictionoftheCourt,independentgroundsofjurisdictionare necessary in the instant case for the Court to examinethemeritsoftheApplication .However,noneofthegroundswhich the DRC has advanced to this end grant the Courtjurisdiction .

JudgeElarabyacknowledgesthegravityof thesituationinthiscaseaswellasthecomplexityofthecircumstancesintheGreat Lakes region . Although he agrees that the consensualnatureoftheCourt’sjurisdictionpreventsitfromconsideringthesubstantiveissues,heemphasizesthedutyofStatestosettletheirdisputespeacefullyandinaccordancewithinternationallaw .Inthisrespect,JudgeElarabyhighlightstheimportanceofStatesrecognitionofthecompulsoryjurisdictionoftheCourtandtheeffortsthathavebeenmadetothiseffect .

Inconclusion, JudgeElarabyexpressesahope thatStatesmustprioritizeinternationaladjudicationasavitalmeansofpeacefulsettlementofdisputesinaccordancewiththeprinci-plesandpurposesoftheCharteroftheUnitedNations .

Separate opinion of Judge DugardInhisseparateopinionJudgeadhocDugardendorsesthe

Court’s finding that it has no jurisdiction to entertain theApplication filed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo .HecommentsontwoissuesraisedbythepresentJudgment .

The Court has for the first time acknowledged the exist-enceofperemptorynorms(juscogens)initsJudgment .JudgeDugardwelcomesthisacknowledgmentandstatesthatnormsof jus cogens have an important role to play in the judicialprocess .HearguesthatinmostinstancessuchnormswillbeusedtoguidetheCourt intheexerciseof its judicialchoicebetweencompetingprecedents,conflictingStatepracticesanddifferentgeneralprinciplesof law . Inorder to illustrate thispointheexaminesanumberofearlierdecisionsoftheCourtinwhichnormsofjuscogensmighthavebeeninvoked .Normsofjuscogens per secannot,however,conferjurisdictionontheCourtas theprincipleofconsentas thebasisof theCourt’sjurisdiction is founded in the Court’s Statute (Art . 36) andmayitselfbedescribedasanormofgeneralinternationallawacceptedandrecognizedbythe internationalcommunityofStatesasawhole .

JudgeDugard thenexamines theargumentof theAppli-cantthatithasengagedinnegotiationsininternationalbodiesinrespectoftheConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofDiscriminationAgainstWomenandthatthesenegotiationsshowthatthedisputeisnotcapableofsettlement,asrequiredbythecompromissoryclauseoftheConventionfortheestab-lishment of jurisdiction . Judge Dugard concludes that theApplicanthasfailedtoshowthatithasclearlyidentifiedtheConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofDiscrimina-tionAgainstWomenasthebasisofitscomplaintin“confer-enceorparliamentarydiplomacy”ininternationalbodies .Ithas therefore failed to satisfy the requirement contained inArticle29of theConventionthat thedisputecannotbeset-tledbynegotiation .JudgeDugarddistinguishesthedecisionoftheCourtintheSouth West Africacases(South West Africa (Ethiopiav .South Africa; Liberiav .South Africa), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962) .

Dissenting opinion of Judge Mavungu

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) invoked anumberofbasesinordertoestablishtheCourt’sjurisdiction .Whileitistruethatnotallofthesebasesarerelevantinorderto found such jurisdiction, three clauses at least could havebeen accepted for this purpose . These are Article 75 of theConstitutionoftheWHO,Article14oftheMontrealConven-tionfortheSuppressionofUnlawfulActsagainsttheSafetyofCivilAviation,readinconjunctionwiththeChicagoConven-tiononCivilAviation,andArticle29of theConventiononDiscriminationAgainstWomen .

The Court’s failure to take account of the above mattersprovidesgroundsforadissentingopinion .

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In thecaseconcerning theStatus vis-à-vis the Host State of a Diplomatic Envoy to the United Nations(Commonwealth of Dominica v . Switzerland), the Court issued an Order on9June2006,recordingthediscontinuanceoftheproceedingsanddirectingtheremovalofthecasefromtheCourt’slist .

** *

The Court was composed as follows: President Higgins;Vice-President Al-Khasawneh; Judges Koroma, Parra-Aranguren, Buergenthal, Owada, Simma, Abraham, Keith,Sepúlveda,Bennouna,Skotnikov;Registrar Couvreur .

** *

TheorderoftheCourtreadsasfollows:“HavingregardtoArticle48oftheStatuteoftheCourtandtoArticle89,paragraph1,oftheRulesofCourt,Having regard to the Application filed in the Registry oftheCourton26April2006,wherebytheCommonwealthofDominicainstitutedproceedingsagainsttheSwissCon-federationinrespectofadisputeconcerning‘violationsoftheViennaConventiononDiplomaticRelationsof18April1961 . . . , theHeadquartersAgreementbetweenSwitzer-land and the United Nations of 11 June and 1 July 1946,theAgreementonPrivilegesandImmunitiesoftheUnitedNationsbetweenSwitzerlandandtheUnitedNationsof11April1946,theConventiononPrivilegesandImmunitiesoftheUnitedNationsof13February1946aswellasgen-eralwell-established rulesandprinciplesof internationallawonappointmentandwithdrawalofdiplomats,ondip-lomaticimmunity,onequalityofStatesandontherightsoftheUnitedNationsofpassivelegation’;

WhereasacertifiedcopyofthisApplicationwasimmedi-atelytransmittedtotheGovernmentoftheSwissConfed-eration,pursuanttoArticle38,paragraph4,of theRulesofCourt;Whereas, by a letter dated 15 May 2006, received in theRegistrybyfacsimileon24May2006undercoveroftwolettersfromthePermanentRepresentativeoftheCommon-wealthofDominicatotheUnitedNations,andtheoriginalofwhichhasreachedtheRegistryon6June2006,thePrimeMinisteroftheCommonwealthofDominica,referringtoArticle89oftheRulesofCourt,informedtheCourtthattheGovernmentoftheCommonwealthofDominica‘[did]notwishtogoonwiththeproceedingsinstitutedagainstSwitzerland, and requested the Court to make an Order‘officially recording the unconditional discontinuance’ ofthese proceedings and ‘directing the removal of the casefromtheGeneralList’;WhereasacopyofthatletterwasimmediatelytransmittedtotheGovernmentoftheSwissConfederation;Whereas,byaletterdated24May2006andreceivedintheRegistryonthesamedaybyfacsimile,theAmbassadorofSwitzerland inTheHagueadvised theCourt thathehadinformed the competent Swiss authorities of the discon-tinuancenotifiedbythePrimeMinisterofDominica;WhereastheGovernmentoftheSwissConfederationhasnottakenanystepintheproceedings,Places on record thediscontinuancebytheCommonwealthofDominicaoftheproceedingsinstitutedbytheApplica-tionfiledon26April2006;andOrders thatthecaseberemovedfromtheList .”

161. CAseConCeRnInGtHestAtUsVIs-À-VIstHeHoststAteoFADIPLoMAtICenVoYtotHeUnIteDnAtIons(CoMMonWeALtHoFDoMInICAv.sWItZeRLAnD)(DIsContInUAnCe)

orderof9June2006

___________

InthecaseconcerningPulp Mills on the River Uruguay,theInternationalCourtofJusticeissuedanOrderon13July2006,inwhichitfoundthatthecircumstances,astheynowpresentthemselvestotheCourt,arenotsuchastorequiretheexerciseofitspowerunderArticle41oftheStatutetoindicateprovi-sionalmeasures .

** *

The Court was composed as follows: President Higgins;Vice-President Al-Khasawneh;JudgesRanjeva, Koroma,Par-ra-Aranguren,Buergenthal,Owada,Simma,Abraham,Keith,Sepúlveda-Amor,Bennouna,Skotnikov;Judgesad hocTorresBernárdez,Vinuesa;Registrar Couvreur .

** *

162. PULPMILLsontHeRIVeRURUGUAY(ARGentInAv.URUGUAY)(PRoVIsIonALMeAsURes)

orderof13July2006

161

The operative paragraph (para . 87) of the Order reads asfollows:

“ . . .TheCourt,Byfourteenvotestoone,Finds that the circumstances, as they now present them-selvestotheCourt,arenotsuchastorequiretheexerciseofitspowerunderArticle41oftheStatutetoindicatepro-visionalmeasures .in favour: President Higgins; Vice-President Al-Kha-sawneh;JudgesRanjeva,Koroma,Parra-Aranguren,Buer-genthal,Owada,Simma,Abraham,Keith,Sepúlveda-Amor,Bennouna,Skotnikov;Judgead hocTorresBernárdez;Against:Judgead hocVinuesa .”

** *

JudgeRanjevaappendedadeclarationtotheOrderoftheCourt; Judges Abraham and Bennouna appended separateopinions to the Order of the Court; Judge ad hoc VinuesaappendedadissentingopiniontotheOrderoftheCourt .

** *

The Court recalls that, by an Application filed in theRegistryoftheCourton4May2006,theArgentineRepub-lic (hereinafter “Argentina”) instituted proceedings againstthe Eastern Republic of Uruguay (hereinafter “Uruguay”)for the alleged breach by Uruguay of obligations under theStatuteoftheRiverUruguay,whichwassignedbyArgentinaand Uruguay on 26 February 1975 and entered into forceon18September1976(hereinafterthe“1975Statute”) .InitsApplication, Argentina claims that that breach arises from“the authorization, construction and future commissioningof two pulp mills on the River Uruguay”, with reference inparticular“totheeffectsofsuchactivitiesonthequalityofthewatersoftheRiverUruguayandontheareasaffectedbytheriver” .Argentinaexplainsthatthe1975StatutewasadoptedinaccordancewithArticle7oftheTreatydefiningtheboundaryontheRiverUruguaybetweenArgentinaandUruguay,signedatMontevideoon7April1961andwhichenteredintoforceon19February1966,whichprovidedfortheestablishmentofajointrégimefortheuseoftheriver .

ArgentinabasesthejurisdictionoftheCourtonArticle36,paragraph1,oftheStatuteoftheCourtandonthefirstpara-graphofArticle60ofthe1975Statute,whichprovidesasfol-lows:“Anydisputeconcerningthe interpretationorapplica-tionofthe[1961]Treatyandthe[1975]StatutewhichcannotbesettledbydirectnegotiationsmaybesubmittedbyeitherPartytotheInternationalCourtofJustice” .ArgentinaclaimsthatdirectnegotiationsbetweenthePartieshavefailed .

AccordingtoArgentina,thepurposeofthe1975Statuteis“toestablishthejointmachinerynecessaryfortheoptimumand rational utilization” of that part of the River UruguaywhichissharedbythetwoStatesandconstitutestheircom-mon boundary . In addition to governing “activities such asconservation, utilization and development of other natural

resources”, the 1975 Statute deals with “obligations of thePartiesregardingthepreventionofpollutionandtheliabilityresultingfromdamageinflictedasaresultofpollution”andsets up an “Administrative Commission of the River Uru-guay” (hereinafter “CARU”, in its Spanish acronym) whosefunctions include regulation and co-ordination . Argentinasubmits,inparticular,thatArticles7to13oftheStatutepro-vide for an obligatory procedure for prior notification andconsultationthroughCARUforanypartyplanningtocarryoutworksliabletoaffectnavigation,therégimeoftheriverorthequalityofitswaters .

ArgentinastatesthattheGovernmentofUruguay,inOcto-ber2003,“unilaterallyauthorizedtheSpanishcompanyENCEtoconstructapulpmillnearthecityofFrayBentos”,aprojectknownas“CelulosadeM’Bopicuá”(hereinafter“CMB”),andclaimsthatthiswasdonewithoutcomplyingwiththeabove-mentioned notification and consultation procedure . It main-tains that, despite its repeated protests concerning “the envi-ronmental impact of the proposed mill”, made both directlytotheGovernmentofUruguayandtoCARU,“theUruguayanGovernmenthaspersistedinitsrefusaltofollowtheproceduresprescribedbythe1975Statute”,andthatUruguayhas infact“aggravatedthedispute”byauthorizingtheFinnishcompanyOyMetsä-BotniaAB(hereinafter“Botnia”) inFebruary2005toconstructasecondpulpmill,the“Orionmill”,inthevicin-ityoftheCMBplant .AccordingtoArgentinathe“UruguayanGovernment has further aggravated the dispute” by issuingauthorizationtoBotniainJuly2005“fortheconstructionofaportfortheexclusiveuseoftheOrionmillwithoutfollowingtheproceduresprescribedbythe1975Statute” .

Argentina concludes its Application by requesting theCourtto

“adjudgeanddeclare:1 . that Uruguay has breached the obligations incumbentuponitunderthe1975Statuteandtheotherrulesofinter-nationallawtowhichthatinstrumentrefers,includingbutnotlimitedto:(a) the obligation to take all necessary measures for theoptimumandrationalutilizationoftheRiverUruguay;(b) the obligation of prior notification to CARU and toArgentina;(c)theobligationtocomplywiththeproceduresprescribedinChapterIIofthe1975Statute;(d)theobligationtotakeallnecessarymeasurestopreservethe aquatic environment and prevent pollution and theobligation to protect biodiversity and fisheries, includingtheobligationtoprepareafullandobjectiveenvironmen-talimpactstudy;(e) the obligation to co-operate in the prevention of pol-lution and the protection of biodiversity and of fisheries;and2 . that, by its conduct, Uruguay has engaged its interna-tionalresponsibilitytoArgentina;3 .thatUruguayshallceaseitswrongfulconductandcom-plyscrupulouslyinfuturewiththeobligationsincumbentuponit;and

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4 . thatUruguay shallmake full reparation for the injurycausedbyitsbreachoftheobligationsincumbentuponit .”The Court recalls that, after filing its Application on

4May2006,Argentinaalsosubmittedarequestfortheindi-cationofprovisionalmeasures,pursuanttoArticle41oftheStatuteoftheCourtandtoArticle73oftheRulesofCourt,in which it refers to the basis of jurisdiction of the CourtinvokedinitsApplication,andtothefactssetouttherein .AttheconclusionofitsrequestfortheindicationofprovisionalmeasuresArgentinaaskstheCourttoindicatethat:

“(a) pendingtheCourt’sfinaljudgment,Uruguayshall:(i) suspend forthwithall authorizations for the construc-tionoftheCMBandOrionmills;(ii)takeallnecessarymeasurestosuspendbuildingworkontheOrionmill;and(iii)takeallnecessarymeasurestoensurethatthesuspen-sionofbuildingworkontheCMBmillisprolongedbeyond28June2006;(b)Uruguayshallco-operateingoodfaithwithArgentinawithaviewtoensuringtheoptimumandrationalutiliza-tionoftheRiverUruguayinordertoprotectandpreservetheaquaticenvironmentandtopreventitspollution;(c) pending the Court’s final judgment, Uruguay shallrefrain from taking any further unilateral action withrespecttoconstructionoftheCMBandOrionmillswhichdoes not comply with the 1975 Statute and the rules ofinternational law necessary for the latter’s interpretationandapplication;(d) Uruguay shall refrain from any other action whichmightaggravateorextendthedisputewhichisthesubject-matterofthepresentproceedingsorrenderitssettlementmoredifficult .”

Arguments of the Parties at the hearingsTheCourtobservesthatatthehearings,whichtookplace

on 8 and 9 June 2006, Argentina reiterated the argumentssetoutinitsApplicationanditsrequestfortheindicationofprovisionalmeasures,andclaimedthattheconditionsfortheindicationofprovisionalmeasureshadbeenfulfilled .

Argentina inter alia argued that its rights under the1975 Statute arose in relation to two interwoven categoriesofobligations:“obligationsofresultthatareofasubstantivecharacter,andobligationsofconductthathaveaproceduralcharacter” .Withrespecttosubstantiveobligations,ArgentinaobservedthatArticle41(a)ofthe1975Statutecreatedforitatleasttwodistinctrights:first,“therightthatUruguayshallpreventpollution”and,second,“therighttoensurethatUru-guayprescribesmeasures‘inaccordancewithapplicableinter-national standards’”, and Argentina claimed that Uruguayhadrespectedneitheroftheseobligations .Argentinafurtherasserted that the substantive obligations under the Statuteincluded “Uruguay’s obligation not to cause environmentalpollution or consequential economic losses, for example totourism” . It added that Articles 7 to 13 of the 1975 StatuteandArticle60thereofgiveitanumberofproceduralrights:“first,therighttobenotifiedbyUruguaybeforeworksbegin;secondly, to expressviews that are tobe taken intoaccount

inthedesignofaproposedproject;and,thirdly,tohaveth[e]Courtresolveanydifferencesbeforeconstructiontakesplace” .Argentinaemphasizedthat,accordingtoArticles9and12ofthe1975Statute,Uruguayhadtheobligation“toensurethatnoworksarecarriedoutuntileitherArgentinahasexpressednoobjections,orArgentinafailstorespondtoUruguay’snotifica-tion,ortheCourthadindicatedthepositiveconditionsunderwhichUruguaymayproceedtocarryoutworks” .Itsubmittedthatnoneofthesethreeconditionshadyetbeenmet,despitethefactthattheabove-mentionedproceduresaremandatoryand “admit of no exception” . Argentina further emphasizedthat, in its view, Article 9 of the 1975 Statute “established a‘noconstruction’obligation . . .ofcentralimportancetothisphaseoftheproceedings” .

Argentina maintained that its rights, derived from bothsubstantiveandproceduralobligations,were“underimmedi-ate threat of serious and irreparable prejudice”, contendingthatthesitechosenforthetwoplantswas“theworstimagi-nableintermsofprotectionoftheriverandthetransbound-aryenvironment”andthatenvironmentaldamagewas,attheleast,“averyseriousprobability”andwouldbeirreparable .Itsubmittedthateconomicandsocialdamagewouldalsoresultandwouldbeimpossibletoassess,andfurthercontendedthatthe construction of the mills “[was] already having seriousnegativeeffectson tourismandothereconomicactivitiesofthe region”, including suspension of investment in tourismand a drastic decline in real estate transactions . Argentinaassertedthattherewasnodoubtthattheconditionofurgencynecessaryfortheindicationofprovisionalmeasureswassatis-fied, since “when there is a reasonable risk that the damagecitedmayoccurbeforedeliveryofjudgmentonthemerits,therequirement of urgency broadly merges with the condition[ofthe]existenceofaseriousriskofirreparableprejudicetotherightsinissue” .Moreover,itobservedthattheconstruc-tion of the mills was “underway and advancing at a rapidrate”andthattheconstructionitselfofthemillswascausing“real and present damage” and noted that the mills “wouldpatentlybecommissionedbefore[theCourt][wouldbe]abletorenderjudgment”sincecommissioningwasscheduledforAugust 2007 for Orion and June 2008 for CMB . Argentinaclaimed that the suspension of both the authorizations fortheconstructionof theplantsandof theconstructionworkitselfwastheonlymeasurecapableofpreventingthechoiceofsitesfortheplantsbecomingafaitaccompliandwouldavoidaggravating the economic and social damage caused by theconstructionoftheplants .

The Court then considers the arguments put forward byUruguay .ItnotesthatUruguaystatedthatit“hadfullycom-pliedwiththe1975StatuteoftheRiverUruguaythroughouttheperiodinwhichthiscasehasdeveloped”andarguedthatArgentina’s request was unfounded and that the requisitecircumstances for a request for provisional measures wereentirelylacking .

UruguaystatedthatitdidnotdisputethatArticle60ofthe1975Statuteconstitutedaprima faciebasisforthejurisdictionoftheCourttohearArgentina’srequestfortheindicationofprovisionalmeasures,but that thisprovisionestablishes theCourt’s jurisdiction only in relation to Argentina’s claimsconcerningthe1975Statuteandnotfordisputesfallingout-

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sidetheCourt’sjurisdiction,suchasthoseconcerning“tour-ism,urbanandruralpropertyvalues,professionalactivities,unemploymentlevels,etc .”inArgentina,andthoseregardingotheraspectsofenvironmentalprotectionintransboundaryrelationsbetween the twoStates . It contended thatArgenti-na’srequestfortheindicationofprovisionalmeasuresmustberejectedbecausethebreachesoftheStatuteofwhichUruguayisaccused“prima facielacksubstance”and,in“applyingboththehighestandthemostappropriateinternationalstandardsofpollutioncontroltothesetwomills”,Uruguayhad“metitsobligationsunderArticle41oftheStatute” .Uruguayfurtherstated that ithad“discharged theobligations imposeduponitbyArticles7et seq.[ofthe1975Statute]ingoodfaith” .Inparticular,itcontendedthatthoseArticlesdidnotgiveeitherpartya“rightofveto”overtheimplementationbytheotherpartyofindustrialdevelopmentprojects,butwereconfinedtoimposingonthepartiesanobligationtoengageinafullandgood-faithexchangeofinformationundertheprocedurespro-videdbytheStatuteoragreedbetweenthem .Uruguaynotedthatithadcompliedfullywiththatobligationby“inform[ing]Argentina—through CARU or through other channels—ofthe existence of th[e] [pulp mill] projects, describing themindetailwithanimpressiveamountofinformation”,andby“suppl[ying]allthenecessarytechnicaldatatomakeArgen-tinaawareoftheabsenceofanyriskinregardtotheirpoten-tialenvironmental impactontheRiverUruguay” .It furtherasserted that it was the first time “in the 31 years since the[1975]Statutecameintobeing”thatArgentinahadclaimedithad“aproceduralrightundertheStatute,notonlytoreceivenotice and information and to engage in good faith nego-tiations,buttoblockUruguayfrominitiatingprojectsduring[the]procedural stagesandduringany litigation thatmightensue” . Uruguay moreover stated that the dispute betweenUruguay and Argentina over the pulp mills had in realitybeensettledbyanagreemententered intoon2March2004between the Uruguayan Minister for Foreign Affairs andhis Argentine counterpart, by which the two Ministers hadagreed, first, that theCMBmill could bebuilt according tothe Uruguayan plan, secondly, that Uruguay would provideArgentina with information regarding its specifications andoperationand,thirdly,thatCARUwouldmonitorthequalityoftheriverwateroncethemillbecameoperationalinordertoensurecompliancewiththeStatute .AccordingtoUruguay,theexistenceofthisagreementhadbeenconfirmedanumberof times, inter alia, by the Argentine Minister for ForeignAffairsandbytheArgentinePresident,anditstermshadbeenextendedsoastoapplyalsototheprojectedOrionmill .

Moreover, according to Uruguay there is no current orimminentthreattoanyrightofArgentina,sothatthecondi-tionsofriskofirreparableharmandurgencyarenotfulfilled .Insupportof itsposition,Uruguay inter alia explained thattheenvironmentalimpactassessmentssofarundertaken,aswellasthosetocome,andtheregulatorycontrolsandstrictlicensingconditionsimposedbyUruguayanlawforthecon-structionandoperationofthemills,guaranteedthatthelatterwouldnotcauseanyharmtotheRiverUruguayortoArgen-tina, and that they would abide by the strict requirementsimposed by “the latest European Union 1999 InternationalPollutionPreventionandControl (IPPC)recommendations,

with which compliance is required by all pulp plants inEuropeby2007” .Uruguaypointedout that themillswouldnotbeoperationalbeforeAugust2007andJune2008respec-tively,andthatanumberoffurtherconditionswouldhavetobemetbeforethatstagewasreached .Uruguayconcludedthat,evenifitweretobeconsideredthattheoperationofthemillsmightleadto“thecontaminationoftheriver”,thegravityofthe“allegedperil toArgentina”wasnot“sufficientlycertainorimmediateastosatisfytheCourt’srequirementthatitbe‘imminent’orurgent” .

Lastly, Uruguay argued that suspending constructions ofthe millswould cause such economic loss to the companiesinvolvedandtheirshareholdersthatitwouldbehighlylikelytojeopardizetheentiretwoprojects .UruguaycontendedthattheprovisionalmeasuressoughtbyArgentinawouldthereforeirreparably prejudice its sovereign right to implement sus-tainableeconomicdevelopmentprojectsinitsownterritory .Itpointedout in thisconnection that thepulpmillprojectsrepresented the largest foreign investment inUruguay’shis-tory,thatconstructioninitselfwouldcreatemanythousandsofnewjobsandthat,onceinservice,themillswouldhave“aneconomic impact of more than $350 million per year”, rep-resenting“anincreaseoffully2percentinUruguay’sgrossdomesticproduct” .

In its second round of oral observations Argentina inter alia maintained that, according to Article 42 of the 1975Statute and established international principles, the 1975Statutecoverednotonlythepollutionoftheriver,asclaimedby Uruguay, but also pollution of all kinds resulting fromtheuseoftheriveraswellastheeconomicandsocialconse-quencesofthemills .ArgentinastronglydisputedUruguay’sassertionthatithadprima faciefulfilleditsobligationsunderthe1975Statute;itobservedthattheprojectshadneverbeenformerly notified to CARU by Uruguay, and that Uruguayhad not provided adequate information regarding the pulpmills .Argentina furtherasserted that therewasnobilateralagreementof2March2004totheeffectthatconstructionofthe CMB mill could proceed as planned . It contended thatthearrangementreachedatthemeetingofthatdatebetweentheMinistersforForeignAffairsofthetwoStateswassimplythatUruguaywouldtransmitalltheinformationonCMBtoCARUandthatCARUwouldbeginmonitoringwaterqualityintheareaoftheproposedsite,butthatUruguayhadfailedtosupplytheinformationpromised .

Foritspart,Uruguaynotedthat“Argentina[did]notdenyobtainingfromUruguayasubstantialamountofinformationthroughavarietyofmachineryandchannels”, and that themeasurestakenbyUruguayinthisregardwere“fullysupport-edbytheCARUminutes” .Itreiterateditscontentionthatthe1975Statutedoesnotconfera“rightofveto”uponthepartiesandarguedthat,inordertoresolveany“difficultiesofinter-pretationcausedbyan incomplete text”, itwasnecessary toturntoArticle31,paragraph3,oftheViennaConventionontheLawofTreatiesand,inparticular,toconsider“anysubse-quentpracticefromwhichimportantinferencescanbedrawn,makingitpossibletoidentifytheagreementbetweenthepar-tiesonhowtointerpretthetreatyinquestion” .AccordingtoUruguay,“thesubsequentverbalagreementbetweenthetwocountriesof2March2004madebytheirForeignMinisters”

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constituted a specific example of such subsequent practiceexcludinganyinterpretationwhichwouldrecognizearightofveto .Uruguayfurtherreiteratedthatthebilateralagreementof2March2004,whoseexistencehadbeenacknowledgedbythe President of the Argentine Republic, clearly authorizedconstructionofthemills . Inconcludingitssecondroundoforalobservations,Uruguayexpresslyreiterated“itsintentiontocomplyinfullwiththe1975StatuteoftheRiverUruguayand its application”, and repeated “as a concrete expressionofthatintention . . . itsofferofconductingcontinuousjointmonitoringwiththeArgentineRepublic”regardingtheenvi-ronmentalconsequencesofthemills’futureoperations .

The Court’s reasoningThe Court begins by observing that, in dealing with a

request for provisional measures, it need not finally satisfyitselfthatithasjurisdictiononthemeritsofthecase,butwillnotindicatesuchmeasuresunlesstheprovisionsinvokedbytheapplicantappear,prima facie, toaffordabasisonwhichthejurisdictionoftheCourtmightbeestablished .

The Court notes that Uruguay does not deny that theCourthasjurisdictionunderArticle60ofthe1975Statute .ItexplainsthatUruguay,however,assertsthatsuchjurisdictionexistsprima facieonlywithregardtothoseaspectsofArgen-tina’srequestthataredirectlyrelatedtotherightsArgentinaisentitledtoclaimunderthe1975Statute,andthatUruguayinsistsinthisregardthatrightsclaimedbyArgentinarelatingto any alleged consequential economic and social impact ofthemills,includinganyimpactontourism,arenotcoveredbythe1975Statute .

TheCourt,takingaccountofthefactthatthePartiesareinagreementthatithasjurisdictionwithregardtotherightstowhichArticle60of the1975Statuteapplies, states that itdoesnotneedatthisstageoftheproceedingstoaddressthisfurtherissueraisedbyUruguay .Itconcludes,therefore,thatithasprima faciejurisdictionunderArticle60ofthe1975Stat-utetodealwiththemerits,andthusmayaddressthepresentrequestforprovisionalmeasures .

*The Court then recalls that the object of its power to

indicateprovisionalmeasures is topermit it topreserve therespectiverightsof theparties toacase“[p]endingthefinaldecision”inthejudicialproceedings,providedsuchmeasuresare necessary to prevent irreparable prejudice to the rightsindispute .TheCourt further states that thispower is tobeexercisedonlyifthereisanurgentneedtopreventirreparableprejudicetotherightsthatarethesubjectofthedisputebeforetheCourthashadanopportunitytorenderitsdecision .

The Court begins by addressing Argentina’s requestsdirected at the suspension of the authorization to constructthe pulp mills and the suspension of the construction workitself .AsregardstherightsofaproceduralnatureinvokedbyArgentina,theCourtleavestothemeritsstagethequestionofwhetherUruguaymayhavefailedtoadherefullytotheprovi-sionsofChapterIIofthe1975Statutewhenitauthorizedtheconstructionofthetwomills .TheCourtaddsthatitisnotatpresentconvincedthat,ifitshouldlaterbeshownthatUru-guayhadfailed,priortothepresentproceedingsoratsome

laterstage,fullytoadheretotheseprovisions,anysuchviola-tions would not be capable of being remedied at the meritsstageoftheproceedings .

TheCourttakesnoteoftheinterpretationofthe1975StatuteadvancedbyArgentinatotheeffect that itprovidesfora“noconstruction”obligation,that istosaythat itstipulatesthataprojectmayonlyproceedifagreedtobybothpartiesorthat,lackingsuchagreement,itshallnotproceeduntiltheCourthasruledonthedispute .TheCourt,however,takestheviewthatitdoesnothavetoconsiderthatissueforcurrentpurposes,sinceit isnotatpresentconvincedthat, if itshould laterbeshownthatsuchisthecorrectinterpretationofthe1975Statute,anyconsequent violations of the Statute that Uruguay might befoundtohavecommittedwouldnotbecapableofbeingrem-ediedatthemeritsstageoftheproceedings .

As regard the rights of a substantive nature invoked byArgentina, the Court recognizes the concerns expressed byArgentinafortheneedtoprotectitsnaturalenvironmentand,inparticular,thequalityofthewateroftheRiverUruguay .Itrecallsthatithashadoccasioninthepasttostressthegreatsig-nificanceitattachestorespectfortheenvironment,inparticu-larinitsAdvisoryOpinionontheLegality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons andinitsJudgmentinthecaseconcerningtheGabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia).

IntheCourt’sview,thereis,however,nothingintherecordtodemonstratethattheactualdecisionbyUruguaytoauthor-ize the construction of the mills poses an imminent threatof irreparable damage to the aquatic environment of theRiverUruguayortotheeconomicandsocialinterestsoftheriparianinhabitantsontheArgentinesideoftheriver .

The Court observes that Argentina has not persuaded itthattheconstructionofthemillspresentsariskofirreparabledamage to the environment; nor has it been demonstratedthattheconstructionofthemillsconstitutesapresentthreatof irreparable economic and social damage . Furthermore,Argentina has not shown that the mere suspension of theconstruction of the mills, pending final judgment on themerits,wouldbecapableofreversingorrepairingtheallegedeconomicandsocialconsequencesattributedbyArgentinatothebuildingworks .

Moreover,Argentinahasnotatpresentprovidedevidencethatsuggests thatanypollutionresulting fromthecommis-sioningofthemillswouldbeofacharactertocauseirrepa-rable damage to the River Uruguay . The Court notes that itis a functionofCARUtoensure thequalityofwaterof theriverbyregulatingandminimizingthelevelofpollutionandthat, in any event, the threat of any pollution is not immi-nent as the mills are not expected to be operational beforeAugust2007(Orion)andJune2008(CMB) .

TheCourtadds that it isnotpersuadedby theargumentthattherightsclaimedbyArgentinawouldnolongerbecapa-bleofprotection if theCourtwere todecidenot to indicateatthisstageoftheproceedingthesuspensionoftheauthori-zationtoconstructthepulpmillsandthesuspensionoftheconstructionworkitself .

TheCourtfinds,inviewoftheforegoing,thatthecircum-stancesof thecasearenot suchas to require the indicationofaprovisionalmeasureorderingthesuspensionbyUruguay

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of the authorization to construct the pulp mills or the sus-pensionoftheactualconstructionworks .TheCourtmakesitclear,however,that,inproceedingwiththeauthorizationandconstructionofthemills,Uruguaynecessarilybearsallrisksrelating to any finding on the merits that the Court mightlatermake .Itpointsoutthattheirconstructionatthecurrentsitecannotbedeemedtocreateafaitaccomplibecause,astheCourthashadoccasiontoemphasize,“ifitisestablishedthattheconstructionofworksinvolvesaninfringementofalegalright,thepossibilitycannotandshouldnotbeexcludeda pri-oriofajudicialfindingthatsuchworksmustnotbecontinuedormustbemodifiedordismantled” .

TheCourtthenturnstotheremainingprovisionalmeas-uressoughtbyArgentinainitsrequest .TheCourtpointsoutthatthepresentcasehighlightstheimportanceoftheneedtoensureenvironmentalprotectionofsharednaturalresourceswhile allowing for sustainable economic development, andthatitisinparticularnecessarytobearinmindtherelianceofthePartiesonthequalityofthewateroftheRiverUruguayfor their livelihood and economic development; from thispointofview,accountmustbetakenoftheneedtosafeguardthecontinuedconservationof the riverenvironmentandoftherightsofeconomicdevelopmentoftheriparianStates .

TheCourtrecallsinthisconnectionthatthe1975Statutewasestablishedpursuanttothe1961MontevideoTreatydefin-ing the boundary on the River Uruguay between ArgentinaandUruguay,andthatitisnotdisputedbetweenthePartiesthatthe1975Statuteestablishesajointmachineryfortheuseand conservation of the river . The Court observes that thedetailedprovisionsofthe1975Statute,whichrequireco-oper-ationbetweenthepartiesforactivitiesaffectingtheriverenvi-ronment,createdacomprehensiveandprogressiverégime;ofsignificanceinthisregardistheestablishmentoftheCARU,a joint mechanism with regulatory, executive, administra-tive,technicalandconciliatoryfunctions,entrustedwiththeproperimplementationoftherulescontainedinthe1975Stat-utegoverning themanagementof thesharedriverresource,and that the procedural mechanism put in place under the1975Statuteconstitutesavery importantpartof that treatyrégime .

The Court declares that the Parties are required to fulfiltheirobligationsunderinternationallawandstressestheneedfor Argentina and Uruguay to implement in good faith theconsultationandco-operationproceduresprovidedforbythe1975 Statute, with CARU constituting the envisaged foruminthisregard .TheCourtfurtherencouragesbothPartiestorefrain from any actions which might render more difficulttheresolutionofthepresentdispute .

Having regard to all the above considerations and to thecommitment affirmed before the Court by Uruguay duringtheoralproceedingstocomplyinfullwiththe1975StatuteoftheRiverUruguay,theCourtdoesnotconsiderthattherearegroundsforittoindicatetheremainingprovisionalmeasuresrequestedbyArgentina .TheCourtconcludesbyrecallingthatitsdecisioninnowayprejudgesthequestionofthejurisdic-tionof theCourt todealwith themeritsof thecaseoranyquestionsrelatingto theadmissibilityof theApplication,orrelatingtothemeritsthemselves,andthatitleavesunaffected

therightofArgentinaandofUruguaytosubmitargumentsinrespectofthosequestions .ThedecisionalsoleavesunaffectedtherightofArgentinatosubmitinthefutureafreshrequestfor the indication of provisional measures under Article 75,paragraph3,oftheRulesofCourt,basedonnewfacts .

** *

Declaration of Judge Ranjeva

Judge Ranjeva agrees with the Court’s decision to dis-miss the request for provisional measures . However, he isnot entirely satisfiedwith theapproachof theCourt,whichfocusesonurgencyandtheriskofirreparableprejudiceintheeventofthenon-indicationofsuchmeasures .

Theparties’obligationtocomplywithprovisionalmeasurespursuanttoArticle94oftheUnitedNationsCharterrequiresthe Court to ensure that its decision cannot be viewed as aprovisionaljudgmentcapableofprejudgingfuturescrutinyofandfindingsonthemerits .Anexaminationoftheeffectsofthemeasures is thusnot, in itself, sufficient toprevent suchapossibility;thatexaminationmustalsobesupportedbyananalysisoftheverypurposeofthemeasuresrequested .

ItisfortheCourttocomparein liminethepurposeofthosemeasureswiththatsoughtthroughtheprincipalproceedingsandthustodismissdirect,orinsomecasesindirect,requeststhatwould,inreality,resultinaprovisionaljudgment .Suchanapproachwill,first,helptoclarifytherelationshipbetweenthe incidentalproceedingsand theprincipalproceedingssoastoensurethattheCourt,whenrulingonthemerits,isnotboundbytheprovisionalmeasuresand,secondly,tolimittheincidentalproceedingstoanexaminationofonlytheurgentpartsoftherequest .

Separate opinion of Judge Abraham

Whileexpressinghisagreementwith thedispositif of theOrder, Judge Abraham regrets that the Court did not seizethe opportunity presented by this case to clarify the ques-tionofprincipleastotherelationshipbetweenthemerit,orprima faciemerit,oftheApplicant’scontentionsinrespectofthe right it claims and the ordering of the urgent measuresitseeks .Accordingtomanycommentators,theCourt,whenrulingonarequest forprovisionalmeasures, shouldrefrainfromanyconsiderationatallofthemeritoftheparties’argu-mentsas to theexistenceand scopeof the rights indisputeand should confine itself to ascertaining whether, assumingthattherightclaimedbytheapplicantisultimatelyupheldinthe final judgment, that right is threatened with irreparableinjury in themeantime . JudgeAbrahamconsiders thisviewto be misguided . He points out that a provisional measureenjoining the respondent toactor to refrain fromacting inaparticularwaynecessarilyinterfereswiththefundamentalrightofallsovereignStatestoactastheythinkbestprovidedthat their acts comply with international law . He deems itunthinkable that such an injunction could be issued with-outtheCourthavingfirstsatisfieditselfthatthereisatleastan appearance of merit in the applicant’s argument . In thisregard,JudgeAbrahamdrawsaconnectionbetweentheissuehe addresses and the Court’s affirmation in its Judgment in

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LaGrand (Germanyv . United States of America) (I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 466) thatmeasuresindicatedunderArticle41oftheStatutearebinding .Sinceanorderby theCourtobliges theState to which the indicated measure is directed to complywith it, the Court cannot prescribe such a measure withouthavingconductedsomeminimumdegreeofreviewastotheexistenceoftherightsclaimedbytheapplicant,andwithoutthereforetakingalookatthemeritsofthedispute .

JudgeAbrahamisoftheviewthatthisreviewmustnecessar-ilybelimitedandcloselyresemblethestandardoffumus boni jurissofamiliartootherinternationalcourtsandmanydomes-ticlegalsystems .Regardlessoftheterminologyemployed,thisamounts in substance toverifying that threeconditionshavebeensatisfiedtoenabletheCourttoorderameasuretosafe-guardarightclaimedbytheapplicant:theremustbeaplausiblecasefortheexistenceoftheright;theremustbeareasonableargument that the respondent’s conduct is causing, or liabletocause,imminentinjurytotheright;and,finally,urgencyinthespecificcircumstancesmustjustifyaprotectivemeasuretosafeguardtherightfromirreparableinjury .

Separate opinion of Judge Bennouna

Judge Bennouna regrets that the Court did not take theopportunity in the present case to clarify the relationshipbetween the principal proceedings and the request for theindicationofprovisionalmeasures .

The two Parties engaged in a full-scale debate before theCourtastotheveryexistenceoftherightclaimedbyArgen-tina,wherebyauthorizationtobuildthepulpmillscouldnotbegiven,norworkonthesitesbegun,withouttheprioragree-mentofbothStates .Ifsucharightexisted,theindicationofprovisionalmeasures,namelythewithdrawalofthatauthori-zationandthesuspensionofbuildingwork,wouldeffectivelyfollownaturallyfromit .

TheCourtshouldhaveconsideredwhether,incertaincir-cumstances,itisnotobligedtoexaminetheprima facieexist-enceoftherightatissue—althoughitmustnotcometoafinaldecisionat thatpoint—whendoubtremainsdue to thepos-siblecomplexity,ambiguityorsilenceofthetextsconcerned .

JudgeBennounaregretsthattheCourtdidnotenterintothis issueandisof theopinionthat there is thereforea linkmissinginthereasoningoftheOrder .

Nevertheless, since Judge Bennouna considers that theevidence presented to the Court was insufficient for it todetermine prima facie whether the right claimed by Argen-tinaexisted,andsinceheisinagreementwiththerestoftheCourt’sreasoning,hevotedinfavouroftheOrder .

Dissenting opinion of Judge Vinuesa

Judge ad hoc Vinuesa disagrees with the Court’s findingthat “the circumstances, as they present themselves to theCourt,arenotsuchastorequiretheexerciseofitspower”toindicateprovisionalmeasures .

He insists on the necessity to apply the joint mechanismprovidedforbythe1975StatutefortheoptimumandrationalutilizationoftheRiverUruguay,andnotesthepresentuncer-taintyofariskofirreparableharmtotheenvironmentoftheRiverUruguay .Inhisopinion,therightsanddutiesunderthe1975Statuteareanexpressionoftheprecautionaryprinciple,whichhasbeenconventionallyincorporatedbyUruguayandArgentina .TakingnoteofthelegaleffectsofUruguay’scom-mitmentsbeforetheCourttofullycomplywiththe1975Stat-ute,JudgeadhocVinuesaconsidersthattheCourt,inordertoguarantee thosecommitments, shouldhave indicated thetemporary suspension of the construction of the mills untilUruguaynotifiestheCourtofthefulfilmentofitsobligationsunderthe1975Statute .

___________

InanOrderissuedinthecaseconcerningPulp Mills on the River Uruguay,theCourt,byfourteenvotestoone,foundthatthecircumstances,astheynowpresentthemselvestotheCourt,arenotsuchastorequiretheexerciseofitspowerunderArti-cle41oftheStatutetoindicateprovisionalmeasures .

** *

The Court was composed as follows: President Higgins;Vice-PresidentAl-Khasawneh;JudgesRanjeva,Shi,Koroma,Buergenthal, Owada, Simma, Abraham, Keith, Sepúlveda-Amor,Bennouna,Skotnikov;Judgesad hocTorresBernárdez,Vinuesa;RegistrarCouvreur .

** *

163. PULPMILLsontHeRIVeRURUGUAY(ARGentInAv.URUGUAY)(PRoVIsIonALMeAsURes)

orderof23January2007

Theoperativeparagraph (para .56)of theOrder reads asfollows:

“ . . .TheCourtByfourteenvotestoone,Finds that the circumstances, as they now present them-selvestotheCourt,arenotsuchastorequiretheexerciseofitspowerunderArticle41oftheStatutetoindicatepro-visionalmeasures .in favour: President Higgins; Vice-President Al-Kha-sawneh;JudgesRanjeva,Shi,Koroma,Buergenthal,Owa-da,Simma,Abraham,Keith,Sepúlveda-Amor,Bennouna,Skotnikov;Judgead hocVinuesa;against:Judgead hocTorresBernárdez .”

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JudgesKoromaandBuergenthalappendeddeclarationstotheOrder .JudgeadhocTorresBernárdezappendedadissent-ingopiniontotheOrder .

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Application and requests for the indication of provisional measures

TheCourtrecallsthat,byanApplicationfiledintheRegis-tryoftheCourton4May2006,theArgentineRepublic(here-inafter“Argentina”)institutedproceedingsagainsttheEasternRepublicofUruguay(hereinafter“Uruguay”)fortheallegedbreachbyUruguayofobligationsundertheStatuteoftheRiv-erUruguay,whichwassignedbyArgentinaandUruguayon26February1975andenteredintoforceon18September1976(hereinafterthe“1975Statute”) .InitsApplication,Argentinaclaims that that breach arises from “the authorization, con-structionandfuturecommissioningoftwopulpmillsontheRiverUruguay”,withreferenceinparticular“totheeffectsofsuchactivitiesonthequalityofthewatersoftheRiverUru-guayandontheareasaffectedbytheriver” .

ArgentinabasesthejurisdictionoftheCourtonArticle36,paragraph1,oftheStatuteoftheCourtandonthefirstpara-graphofArticle60ofthe1975Statute,whichprovides inter alia thatanydisputeconcerningthe interpretationorappli-cationofthe1975Statute“whichcannotbesettledbydirectnegotiationsmaybesubmittedbyeitherPartytotheInterna-tionalCourtofJustice” .

Onthebasisofthestatementoffactsandthelegalgroundsset out in the Application, Argentina requests the Court toadjudgeanddeclare:

“1 . thatUruguayhasbreachedtheobligations incumbentuponitunderthe1975Statuteandtheotherrulesofinter-nationallawtowhichthatinstrumentrefers,includingbutnotlimitedto:(a) the obligation to take all necessary measures for theoptimumandrationalutilizationoftheRiverUruguay;(b)theobligationofpriornotificationtoCARU[theSpan-ish acronym of the Administrative Commission of theRiverUruguay]andtoArgentina;(c)theobligationtocomplywiththeproceduresprescribedinChapterIIofthe1975Statute;(d)theobligationtotakeallnecessarymeasurestopreservethe aquatic environment and prevent pollution and theobligation to protect biodiversity and fisheries, includingtheobligationtoprepareafullandobjectiveenvironmentalimpactstudy;(e) the obligation to co-operate in the prevention of pol-lution and the protection of biodiversity and of fisheries;and2 . that, by its conduct, Uruguay has engaged its interna-tionalresponsibilitytoArgentina;

3 .thatUruguayshallceaseitswrongfulconductandcom-plyscrupulouslyinfuturewiththeobligationsincumbentuponit;and4 . thatUruguay shallmake full reparation for the injurycausedbyitsbreachoftheobligationsincumbentuponit .”TheCourt recalls that, immediatelyafterfiling itsAppli-

cationon4May2006,ArgentinasubmittedarequestfortheindicationofprovisionalmeasuresrequiringUruguay:tosus-pendtheauthorizationsfortheconstructionofthemillsandtosuspendbuildingworkonthempendingtheCourt’sfinaldecision;andtoco-operatewithArgentinainordertoprotectandpreservetheaquaticenvironmentoftheRiverUruguay,torefrainfromtakinganyfurtherunilateralactionwithrespecttoconstructionofthetwomillswhichdoesnotcomplywiththe 1975 Statute and also to refrain from any other actionwhich might aggravate the dispute or render its settlementmoredifficult .ByOrderdated13July2006,theCourtfound“that the circumstances, as they now present themselves totheCourt,arenotsuchastorequiretheexerciseofitspowerunderArticle41oftheStatutetoindicateprovisionalmeas-ures” .ByOrderofthesamedate,theCourtfixedtime-limitsforthefilingoftheinitialwrittenpleadings .

On 29 November 2006, Uruguay, referring to the pend-ingcaseandcitingArticle41oftheStatuteoftheCourtandArticle73oftheRulesofCourt,inturnsubmittedarequestfortheindicationofprovisionalmeasures,assertingthattheywere“urgentlyneeded toprotect the rightsofUruguay thatareatissueintheseproceedingsfromimminentandirrepa-rableinjury,andtopreventtheaggravationofthepresentdis-pute” .Uruguaystatedinteraliathat,since20November2006,“[o]rganized groups of Argentine citizens have blockaded avitalinternationalbridgeovertheUruguayRiver,shuttingoffcommercial and tourist travel from Argentina to Uruguay”and that those groups planned to extend the blockades totheriver itself .Uruguayclaimedtohavesufferedsignificanteconomicinjuryfromtheseactions,againstwhichArgentinahasfailed,accordingtoUruguay,totakeanysteps .ItallegedthatthestatedpurposeoftheactionswastoforceittoaccedetoArgentina’sdemandthatitpermanentlyendconstructionoftheBotniapulpmill,thesubject-matterofthedispute,andpreventtheplantfromevercomingintooperation .

AttheconclusionofitsrequestUruguayaskedtheCourttoindicatethefollowingmeasures:

“Whileawaiting thefinal judgmentof theCourt,Argen-tina(i)shalltakeallreasonableandappropriatestepsatitsdis-posaltopreventorendtheinterruptionoftransitbetweenUruguay and Argentina, including the blockading ofbridgesandroadsbetweenthetwoStates;(ii) shallabstain fromanymeasure thatmightaggravate,extend or make more difficult the settlement of this dis-pute;and(iii)shallabstainfromanyothermeasurethatmightpreju-dicetherightsofUruguayindisputebeforetheCourt .”

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Jurisdiction of the Court

TheCourtnotesthatatthehearingson18and19Decem-ber2006ArgentinachallengedthejurisdictionoftheCourttoindicatetheprovisionalmeasuressoughtbyUruguayontheground,notably,thattherequesthadnolinkwiththeStatuteoftheRiverUruguayorwiththeApplicationinstitutingpro-ceedings .InArgentina’sview,therealpurposeofUruguay’srequestwastoobtaintheremovaloftheroadblocksandnoneoftherightspotentiallyaffectedbytheroadblocks,thatistheright to freedom of transport and to freedom of commercebetween the two States, were rights governed by the StatuteoftheRiverUruguay .Argentinaarguedthatthoserightsweregoverned by the Treaty of Asunción, which established theSouthern Common Market (hereinafter “Mercosur”), point-ing out that Uruguay had already seised a Mercosur ad hocTribunalinrelationtotheroadblocksandthatthattribunalhadhandeddownitsdecisiononthecaseon6Septemberlast,whichdecisionwasfinalandbindingandconstitutedresjudi-cata with respect to the Parties . Argentina contended thatMercosur’sdisputesettlementsystemruledoutthepossibilityofapplyingtoanyotherforum .

The Court next sets out Uruguay’s arguments . Uruguaydenied that its request for the indication of provisionalmeasuressoughttoobtainfromtheCourtcondemnationoftheunlawfulnessof theblockingof international roadsandbridges connecting Argentina to Uruguay under generalinternational law or under the rules of the Treaty of Asun-ción . According to Uruguay, the roadblocks constitutedunlawful acts violating and threatening irreparable harmto the very rights which it was defending before the Court .Uruguaymaintainedthattheblockingofinternationalroadsandbridgeswasamatterdirectly,intimatelyandindissociablyrelatedtothesubject-matterofthecasebeforetheCourtandthattheCourtunquestionablyhadjurisdictiontoentertainit .UruguayfurtherdeniedthatthemeasuresithadtakenwithintheframeworkoftheMercosurinstitutionshadanybearingwhatsoeverontheCourt’sjurisdiction,giventhatthedecisionoftheadhocTribunalof6September2006concerneddiffer-entroadblocks—establishedatanothertimeandwithadiffer-entpurpose—tothosereferredtoinitsrequestforprovisionalmeasuresandthatithadnotinstitutedanyfurtherproceed-ingswithinMercosur’sdisputesettlementmechanismswithrespecttotheexistingroadblocks .

TheCourtfirstpointsout that, indealingwitha requestforprovisionalmeasures,itneednotfinallysatisfyitselfthatithasjurisdictiononthemeritsofthecasebutthatitwillnotindicatesuchmeasuresunlessthereis,prima facie,abasisonwhich its jurisdiction might be established . It observes thatthisissowhethertherequestismadebytheapplicantorbytherespondentintheproceedingsonthemerits .

After noting that it already concluded, in its Order of13July2006,thatithadprima faciejurisdictionunderArti-cle60ofthe1975Statutetodealwiththemeritsofthecase,theCourtexaminesthelinkbetweentherightssoughttobeprotectedthroughtheprovisionalmeasuresandthesubjectoftheproceedingsbeforetheCourtonthemeritsofthecase .ItobservesthatArticle41oftheCourt’sStatuteauthorizesittoindicate“anyprovisionalmeasureswhichought tobe taken

to preserve the respective rights of either party” and statesthattherightsoftherespondent(Uruguay)arenotdependentsolelyuponthewayinwhichtheapplicant(Argentina)formu-latesitsapplication .

TheCourtfindsthatanyrightUruguaymayhavetocon-tinue the construction and to begin the commissioning ofthe Botnia plant in conformity with the provisions of the1975Statute,pendingafinaldecisionbytheCourt,effectivelyconstitutesaclaimedrightinthepresentcase,whichmayinprinciplebeprotectedbytheindicationofprovisionalmeas-ures .ItaddsthatUruguay’sclaimedrighttohavethemeritsofthepresentcaseresolvedbytheCourtunderArticle60ofthe1975StatutealsohasaconnectionwiththesubjectoftheproceedingsonthemeritsinitiatedbyArgentinaandmayinprinciplebeprotectedbytheindicationofprovisionalmeas-ures .

The Court concludes that the rights which Uruguayinvokesin,andseekstoprotectby,itsrequesthaveasufficientconnectionwiththemeritsofthecaseandthatArticle60ofthe1975Statutemay thusbeapplicable to those rights .TheCourtpointsout that the rights invokedbyUruguaybeforetheMercosuradhocTribunalaredifferentfromthosethatitseekstohaveprotectedinthepresentcaseandthatitfollowsthattheCourthasjurisdictiontoaddressUruguay’srequestforprovisionalmeasures .

Provisional measures: reasoning of the Court

TheCourtobserves that itspower to indicateprovisionalmeasureshasasitsobjecttopreservetherespectiverightsofeachpartytotheproceedings“[p]endingthefinaldecision”,providingthatsuchmeasuresarejustifiedtopreventirrepa-rableprejudicetotherightswhicharethesubjectofthedis-pute .Itaddsthatthispowercanbeexercisedonlyifthereisan urgent necessity to prevent irreparable prejudice to suchrights,beforetheCourthasgivenitsfinaldecision .

InrespectofthefirstprovisionalmeasuresoughtbyUru-guay, namely that Argentina “shall take all reasonable andappropriate stepsat itsdisposal topreventor end the inter-ruptionoftransitbetweenUruguayandArgentina,includingtheblockadingofbridgesandroadsbetweenthetwoStates”,the Court notes that, according to Uruguay: roadblockshavebeeninstalledonallof thebridges linkingUruguaytoArgentina; the Fray Bentos bridge, which normally carries91percentofUruguay’sexportstoArgentina,hasbeensub-ject toacompleteanduninterruptedblockade; and the twootherbridges linking the twocountries “haveat timesbeenclosed”andthattherewasarealriskofthembeingblockedpermanently .AgainaccordingtoUruguay, theseroadblockshaveanextremelyseriousimpactonUruguay’seconomyandonitstouristindustryandaremoreoveraimedatcompellingUruguaytohaltconstructionoftheBotniaplant,whichwouldbelostinitsentirety,therebyleadingtoirreparableprejudice .Uruguayfurtherclaimedthat,inencouragingtheblockades,Argentinahad initiateda trend intendedtoresult in irrepa-rableharmtotheverysubstanceoftherightsindisputeandthat,accordingly,“itistheblockadesthatpresenttheurgentthreat,not . . .[the]impacttheymayeventuallyhaveontheBotnia plant” . The Court notes that Argentina disputed the

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versionofthefactspresentedbyUruguayandarguedthattheissuewastheblockadeofroadsinArgentineterritoryandnotof an international bridge . In its view, the roadblocks were“sporadic,partialandgeographically localized”andmoreo-verhadnoimpactoneithertourismortradebetweenthetwocountries, nor on the construction of the pulp mills, whichhascontinued .ArgentinastatedinthisrespectthattheOrionmillwas“at70percentoftheplannedconstruction” .Itaddedthatithadneverencouragedtheroadblocks,norprovidedtheblockaderswithanysupport,andsubmittedthat thepartialblocking of roads in Argentina was not capable of causingirreparable prejudice to the rights which will be the subjectof theCourt’sdecisiononthemerits,andthat therewasnourgencytotheprovisionalmeasuressoughtbyUruguay .

Referring to the arguments of the Parties, the Courtexpresses its view that, notwithstanding the blockades, theconstructionoftheBotniaplanthasprogressedsignificantlysince the summer of 2006 with two further authorizationshavingbeengrantedandthatitisnowwelladvancedandthuscontinuing . It states that it is not convinced that the block-ades risk prejudicing irreparably the rights which Uruguayclaimsinthepresentcasefromthe1975Statuteassuchandaddsthatithasnotbeenshownthat,weretheresucharisk,itwouldbeimminent .TheCourtconsequentlyfindsthatthecircumstancesofthecasearenotsuchastorequiretheindi-cationofthefirstprovisionalmeasurerequestedbyUruguay,to “prevent or end the interruption of transit” between thetwoStatesandinter alia“theblockadingof[the]bridgesandroads”linkingthem .

The Court next turns to the other two provisional meas-uressoughtbyUruguay,namelythatArgentina“shallabstainfromanymeasurethatmightaggravate,extendormakemoredifficultthesettlementofthisdispute;andshallabstainfromanyothermeasurethatmightprejudicetherightsofUruguayin dispute before the Court” . The Court refers to Uruguay’sargument that an order can be made to prevent aggravationofthedisputeevenwheretheCourthasfoundthatthereisnothreatofirreparabledamagetotherightsindisputeandnotesthat, according to Uruguay, the blockade of the bridges overthe River Uruguay amounts to an aggravation of the disputewhich threatens the due administration of justice . Uruguayfurtherarguedthat,givenArgentina’sconductaimedatcom-pellingUruguaytosubmit,withoutwaiting for the judgmenton themerits, to theclaimsassertedbyArgentinabefore theCourt,theCourtshouldorderArgentinatoabstainfromanyothermeasurethatmightprejudiceUruguay’srightsindispute .TheCourtobservesthat,inArgentina’sview,therewasnoriskof aggravation or extension of the dispute and nothing in itsconductinfringedUruguay’sproceduralrightsorendangeredUruguay’srightstocontinuetheproceedings,todeployallitsgrounds of defence and to obtain from the Court a decisionwithbindingforce .Argentinaaddedthat,intheabsenceofanylinktothesubject-matteroftheproceedings,shouldtheCourtdecidenottoindicatethefirstprovisionalmeasure,thesecondandthirdprovisionalmeasuresrequestedbyUruguaycouldnotbeindicatedindependentlyfromthefirst .

The Court points out that it has on several occasions, inpast cases of which it cites examples, indicated provisionalmeasuresdirectingthepartiesnottotakeanyactionswhich

couldaggravateorextendthedisputeorrendermoredifficultitssettlement .Itnotesthatinthosecasesprovisionalmeasuresother thanthosedirecting thepartiesnot to takeactions toaggravateorextendthedisputeortorendermoredifficultitssettlementwerealsoindicated .InthiscasetheCourtdoesnotfind that there isatpresentan imminent riskof irreparableprejudicetotherightsofUruguayindisputebeforeit,causedby the blockades of the bridges and roads linking the twoStates .Itthereforeconsidersthattheblockadesthemselvesdonot justify the indicationof thesecondprovisionalmeasurerequested by Uruguay, in the absence of the conditions forthe Court to indicate the first provisional measure . For theaforementionedreasons,theCourtcannotindicatethethirdprovisionalmeasurerequestedbyUruguayeither .

Having rejected Uruguay’s request for the indication ofprovisionalmeasuresinitsentirety,theCourtreiteratesitscalltothePartiesmadeinitsOrderof13July2006“tofulfiltheirobligationsunder international law”,“to implement ingoodfaiththeconsultationandco-operationproceduresprovidedforbythe1975Statute,withCARU[AdministrativeCommis-sionoftheRiverUruguay]constitutingtheenvisagedforuminthisregard”,and“torefrainfromanyactionswhichmightrendermoredifficulttheresolutionofthepresentdispute” .Itpointsoutthatitsdecisioninnowayprejudgesthequestionof its jurisdiction todealwith themeritsof the caseoranyquestionsrelatingtotheadmissibilityoftheApplicationortothemeritsthemselvesandthatthedecisionleavesunaffectedtherightofArgentinaandofUruguaytosubmitargumentsinrespectofthosequestions .ThedecisionalsoleavesunaffectedtherightofUruguay tosubmit in the futurea freshrequestfor the indication of provisional measures under Article 75,paragraph3,oftheRulesofCourt,basedonnewfacts .

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InadeclarationattachedtotheOrderJudgeKoromahaspointedoutthatthedecisiontakenbytheCourtinthiscasewas judicious .ThatwhiletheCourtfoundthat ithadprima faciejurisdiction,but,becausenoimminentthreatofirrepa-rableharmorprejudicetoUruguay’srightswasdemonstrated,itcouldnotupholdtherequestinitsentirety,JudgeKoromaconsidereditappropriatetocallonthePartiesnottotakeanyactionthatmightrendermoredifficult theresolutionof thedispute .HebelievesthatthisexhortationnotonlyfallswithinthepurviewofArticle41oftheStatute—thepreservationofthe respective rights of the Parties—but should encouragethemtosolvetheirdisputepeacefully .Inhisview,thejudicialfunctionisnot limitedtosettlingdisputesandfosteringthedevelopment of the law but includes encouraging parties indisputetofindapeacefulsolutiontotheirdisputeonthebasisoflawratherthanotherwise .

Declaration of Judge Buergenthal

AlthoughagreeingwiththeCourt’sdecisionrejectingUru-guay’s request for provisional measures, Judge Buergenthalargues in his Declaration that the Court has the power to

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granttwodistincttypesofprovisionalmeasures .Onetypeisbasedonafindingthatthereisanurgentneedforsuchmeas-uresbecauseoftheriskofirreparableprejudiceorharmtotherightsthatarethesubjectofthedisputeoverwhichtheCourthas prima facie jurisdiction . The other type of provisionalmeasuresmaybeindicated,accordingtoJudgeBuergenthal,inordertopreventtheaggravationorextensionofthedisputebyextrajudicialcoercivemeansunrelatedtothesubjectmat-terofthedispute .Hesubmitsthatbyfocusingonlyonthefirsttype,theCourtmissedanopportunitytothoroughlyconsiderthe full scope of its power under Article 41 of its Statute incircumstances involvingallegationsofextrajudicialcoercivemeasures .

Judge Buergenthal concludes that, despite the regrettableeconomicharmcausedUruguaybytheblockadesofthebridg-es,theseactionsappearnottohaveseriouslyunderminedtheabilityofUruguaytoeffectivelyprotectitsrightsgenerallyinthependingjudicialproceedings .

Dissenting opinion of Judge Torres Bernárdez

1 .InhisdissentingopinionJudgead hoc TorresBernárdezfirstexaminesthequestionoftheCourt’sprima faciejurisdic-tionandtheadmissibilityofUruguay’srequestfortheindica-tionofprovisionalmeasuresand then thequestionwhetherornotthereisariskofirreparableprejudicetothedisputedrightsclaimedbyUruguayandanurgentneedtoremedyit .

2 .Inrespectofthefirstquestion,JudgeTorresBernárdezconcludesthatArgentina’scontentionsastolackofjurisdic-tionandinadmissibilityarenotsupportedbyeitherthefactsofthecaseortheapplicable law .Thus,JudgeTorresBernár-dezexpresseshisagreementwiththeCourt’srejectionoftheobjectionssubmittedbyArgentina(para .30oftheOrder) .HealsoseesinthisrejectionconfirmationthattherightsinvokedbyUruguayasapartytothe1975StatuteoftheRiverUruguay,forwhichUruguayseeksprotectionthroughtheindicationofprovisional measures, are not, prima facie, non-existent oralientothedispute .Theyarefullyplausiblerightsindisputeandaresufficientlyimportantandsolidtomeritpossiblepro-tectivemeasuresinresponsetoaparty’sconductthreateningtoinfringethem .Thus,Uruguay’sclaimsatisfiesthe“ fumus boni juris”or“ fumus non mali juris”test .

3 .InrespectofthequestionwhetherornotthereisariskofirreparableprejudicetothedisputedrightsclaimedbyUru-guayandanurgentneedtoremedyit,JudgeTorresBernárdezbeginsbyrecallingthat,underArticle41oftheStatuteoftheCourt, the indication of provisional measures presupposesthat“irreparableprejudice”shallnotbecausedinthecourseofthejudicialproceedingstorightswhicharethesubjectofdispute and that the Court must therefore be concerned topreservebysuchmeasurestherightswhichmaysubsequentlybe adjudged by the Court to belong either to the Applicantor to the Respondent (see, for example, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovinav. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993,p .19,para .34) .Butitisobviouslyunnec-essary, where provisional measures are to be indicated, forthe “prejudice” itself already to have occurred . It is enough

fortheretobeaserious“risk”ofirreparableprejudicetotherightsatissue .Thisexplainswhyitiswell-establishedinthejurisprudence of the Court that provisional measures areaimedatrespondingnotto“irreparableprejudice”per se,butto a “risk of irreparable prejudice” to the rights in dispute .Anditisindeedthe“risk”andthe“urgency”whichmustbeshown .

4 .JudgeTorresBernárdezpointsoutthat,inaddressingtheissueoftheexistenceoftheriskanditsimminence,hewillrelyessentiallyonfactualelements .Henotesthattheterm“preju-dice”asusedinthejurisprudenceoftheCourthasabroader,moreelasticmeaningthaneconomicinjuryorlossalone .Asforthe“irreparability”oftheprejudice,heconcursthatthemaintest employed in the jurisprudence refers to preserving theintegrityandeffectivenessofthejudgmentonthemerits .

5 . The fact that in the present case the rights claimed byUruguay,targetedbythe“asambleistas”ofGualeguaychuandits environs, are “rights in dispute” before the Court in noway changes Argentina’s obligations as territorial sovereign .Further,asaParty to thecase,Argentinamustnot forestalltheCourt’sfinaldecisiononthe“rightsindispute”inthecasewhich it itself referredto theCourt .Moreover, thesituationhas deteriorated since late November 2006 . It should haveprompted the exercise by the Court of its power to indicatesuch measures to preserve Uruguay’s rights at issue and tocheckthemarkedproclivitytowardsaggravatingandextend-ingthedispute .

6 . In theopinionof JudgeTorresBernárdez, thecircum-stances of the present case require the indication of veryspecificprovisionalmeasures .ItisrareforarespondentStatetofinditselfexposed,asa“litigant”,toeconomic,socialandpoliticalinjuryasaresultofcoerciveactionstakenbynation-alsoftheapplicantStateinthatState .Theavowedpurposeofthosecoerciveactionsistohalttheconstructionofthe“Ori-on”pulpmillortoforceitsrelocation,i .e .tocauseprejudicetoUruguay’smainrightatissueinthecase .NorisitfrequentforanapplicantStateto“tolerate”suchasituation,relyingonadomesticpolicyofpersuasion,ratherthanrepression,vis-à-vissocialmovementsand,forthatreason,failingtoexercisethe “due diligence” required of the territorial sovereign bygeneralinternationallawinthearea,includingfirstandfore-mostcompliancewiththeobligationnotknowinglytoallowitsterritorytobeusedforactscontrarytotherightsofotherStates (case concerning Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v . Albania), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949,p .22) .

7 .Notwithstandingtheforegoingpoints,theCourtfoundthatthecircumstancesofthecasewerenotsuchastorequirethe indication of the first provisional measure requestedby Uruguay, to “prevent or end the interruption of transit”betweenthetwoStatesandinter alia“theblockadingof[the]bridgesandroads”linkingthem(paragraph43oftheOrder) .IntheOrderthisconclusionissupportedbyreasoningwhichcastsnodoubtonthefactsassuch,i .e .ontheexistenceoftheblockadesof theArgentineaccessroads to the internationalbridges .However,theCourtdidnotseeinthemany“immi-nent risk” of “irreparable prejudice” to Uruguay’s right tobuildthe“Orion”plantatFrayBentospendente lite.

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8 .JudgeTorresBernárdeztakesissuewiththisfindinginthe Order because it is based on a “reductionist” approachto the concept of “imminent risk of irreparable prejudice”andtothescopeof“Uruguay’srightsindispute”inthecase .This “reductionism” is evidenced by the fact that the Courtrefrainedfromconsideringwhethertheblockadeshavecausedand/ormaycontinuetocauseeconomicandsocialprejudicetoUruguay .Thathoweverwastheraisond’êtreofUruguay’srequest .UruguaysoughttoprotectitselffromthesignificantdamagecausedtoUruguayantradeandtourisminherentinthesituationcreatedbytheblockades .Afterall,theblockadesweresetupwiththegoalofmakingUruguaypayaprice,ora“toll”,tobeabletopursuethebuildingofthe“Orion”plantatFrayBentos .

9 .Inthisconnection, theJudgepointsout inhisopinionthat the blockades tolerated by Argentina have created adilemmaforUruguay:eitherithaltsconstructionofthe“Ori-on”plantoritspaysaneconomicandsocial“toll”tobeabletocontinuethebuildingwork .Thus,thefactthatconstructionoftheplantiscontinuingdoesnotdispelthe“risk of prejudice”toUruguay’srightswhichareinfringedbytheblockades .Onthecontrary,the“toll”growsheavierbythedayandthereisarec-ognizedrelationshipbetweenthefactsoutofwhichthe“toll”arisesandUruguay’sclaimed“right”tobuildtheFrayBentosmillpending thefinal decisionby theCourt .Moreover, the“toll” creates a security problem because the actions by the“asambleistas” cause alarm and social tension which couldgiverisetoborderandtrans-borderincidents .

10 .ForJudgeTorresBernárdez,that“toll”mayessentiallybeviewedas lost profit fortheUruguayaneconomyandonewhichbears“ariskofprejudice”fortherightsthatthecoun-tryisdefendingintheinstantcasebasedontheStatuteoftheRiverUruguay,inter aliatherighttocontinueconstructionoftheOrionmillinFrayBentosandtherighttohavethelegaldisputebetweenArgentinaandUruguayoverthepapermillsdecided in accordance with Article 60 of the river’s Statute,as“subsequenteventsmay[effectively]renderanapplicationwithout object” (case concerning Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v . Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1988,p .95,para .66) .For example, the passage of time has stripped certain con-clusions of Argentina’s Application of 4 May 2006 of theirrelevance, as ENCE’s planned CMB mill has been relocatedto Punta Pereyra on the Uruguayan side of the River Plata .Thereinliesthe“riskofprejudice”totherightsindisputeforUruguayinthepresentcase .Socialpeaceismuchappreciatedbyindustrialconcerns .TheArgentinedemonstratorsarewellawareofthis,asindicatedbythefactthattheybeganthecur-rentroadandbridgeblockadesshortlyaftertheOrionprojectwasapprovedbytheWorldBankanditslendinginstitutions .

11 .Theprejudiceinquestionis,byitsverynature,“irrepa-rable”,astheCourt’sJudgmentcouldnotrestorethe“Orion”projecttoFrayBentosshouldBotniadecidetoleave .Althoughthisisnotsoforthemoment,itisnotthepoint .Whatmatters,inJudgeTorresBernárdez’sview,isthe“riskofprejudice”andthisriskisarealandpresentoneasArgentinahasnottakenthemeasuresnecessarytoputanendtothesituationcausedby the roadblocks nor to prevent a repetition of them . The

“irreparableprejudice”alsourgentlyneeds tobeeliminatedbecauseitisa“present risk”.

12 .Thatpresent riskhas steadily increased since theendofNovember2006withtheregrettableconsequencesthatcanreadilybeimaginedforthesustainableeconomicdevelopmentof the country . It also impairs the right to have the disputeresolvedby theCourtunderArticle60of theStatuteof theRiverUruguay .Theneedtoprotectthisrightasofnowcan-notbeopentodoubtasthedurationoftheriskofprejudicecreatedbythe“toll”threatenstheveryintegrityofthejudicialsettlement .

13 . Furthermore, the harm caused to the Uruguayaneconomy by the roadblocks is in no way a prejudice whichUruguayissupposedtosufferunderthemateriallawapplica-bletothelegaldisputebeforetheCourt—i .e .the1975StatuteoftheRiverUruguay—norundertheStatuteortheRulesofCourt or the Order of 13 July 2006 either . Uruguay is enti-tledtocallforanendtotheroadblocksandtheactionsofthedemonstratorswhicharedamagingitseconomy,thuscreatinga“presentrisk”fortherightsclaimedbyitinthecase .Argen-tina,inturn,hasparticulardutiesofitsowninthisrespectastheStatewithauthorityovertheterritoryinwhichtheactsinquestionaretakingplace,andalsoasaPartytothepresentcase .Itissurprisingthat,hitherto,neitherofthesetwodutieshaspromptedtheArgentineauthoritiestoputanendtotheroadblocks .

14 . Lastly, Judge Torres Bernárdez considers that, for theindicationofprovisionalmeasures, there is anampleprima facie legal linkbetween: (1) the facts related to theblockadeof roads and bridges by Argentine demonstrators, toleratedbythatcountry’sauthorities;(2)thepresentriskofirrepara-bleprejudicetoUruguay’srightsatissue;(3)theprincipleofoptimumandrationalutilizationoftheRiverUruguayanditswater, including for industrial purposes in conformity withthe régime governing the river and the quality of its water(Article27ofthe1975Statute);and(4)thejudicialresolutionofdisputesundertheStatute .Argentina’sApplicationinstitut-ingproceedingswouldappeartoconfirmtheselinks .

15 . In light of these considerations, and taking accountof the arguments and documents presented by the Parties,Judge Torres Bernárdez considers that the circumstances ofthecasefavourtheindicationofthefirst provisional measurerequestedbyUruguay,namely,thatArgentinamusttake“allreasonableandappropriatestepsatitsdisposaltopreventorendtheinterruptionoftransitbetweenUruguayandArgen-tina,includingtheblockadingofbridgesandroadsbetweenthetwoStates” .

16 .JudgeTorresBernárdezalsodisagreeswiththeOrderasregardsthefailuretoindicate,initsoperativepart,apro-visionalmeasuretoavoidtheaggravationorextensionofthedisputeortomakeitssettlementmoredifficult,whichisthematterraisedbythesecond provisional measurerequestedbyUruguay .ForJudgeTorresBernárdez,theparticularcircum-stancesofthecase,includingthosesubsequenttothehearingswhich are in the public domain, call for the urgent indica-tionofprovisionalmeasuresrelatingtothenon-aggravationand non-extension of the dispute addressed to both Parties.Regardingthelatteraspect,JudgeTorresBernárdeztherefore

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divergesfromUruguay’sformulationofthesecondmeasureitrequests(Article75,paragraph2,oftheRulesofCourt) .

17 .TheopinionstressesthefullimportanceoftheCourt’spowertoindicatetheabove-mentionedmeasures“independ-ently”oftherequestsfortheindicationofprovisionalmeas-ures presented by the parties with a view to safeguardingspecificrights .SuchdeclarationshavebeenincorporatedintothereasoningofOrdersforprovisionalmeasuresbothbeforeandaftertheLaGrandcase .

18 .JudgeTorresBernárdezregretsthefactthattheCourthas not indicated provisional measures for both Parties toavoidaggravatingorextendingthedispute .TheCourtshouldhavedonesoonthebasisofinternationallaw,namely,onthe

“principle universally accepted by international tribu-nals and likewise laid down in many conventions . . . totheeffectthatthepartiestoacasemustabstainfromanymeasurecapableofexercisingaprejudicialeffectinregardtotheexecutionofthedecisiontobegivenand,ingeneral,not allow any step of any kind to be taken which might

aggravate or extend the dispute” (Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, P.C.I.J., Series A/B No. 79, p . 199;LaGrand (Germanyv . United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001,p .503,para .103) .19 .Lastly,JudgeTorresBernárdezconcurswiththeOrder

as regards its rejection of the third provisional measurerequestedbyUruguay,butnotforthereasonindicatedintheOrder(para .51) .Forhim,thatthirdprovisionalmeasurelacksprecision,isinsufficientlyspecificandthecircumstanceofthecaseatpresentdonotrequiretheindicationofameasuresobroadinscope .

20 . In short, Judge Torres Bernárdez concurs with theOrder’sconclusionregardingtheCourt’sprima faciejurisdic-tion toentertainUruguay’s requestandwith its rejectionofthethirdmeasurerequested .Ontheotherhand,hedisagreeswith the Order’s rejection of the first measure requested, aswellaswithitsrejectionofthesecondmeasurereformulatedsothatitisaddressedtobothparties .Thesetwopointsofdisa-greementpreventedhimfromvotinginfavouroftheOrder .

164. APPLICAtIonoFtHeConVentIonontHePReVentIonAnDPUnIsHMentoFtHeCRIMeoFGenoCIDe(BosnIAAnDHeRZeGoVInAv.seRBIAAnDMonteneGRo)


___________

In its Judgment in the case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v . Serbia and Montenegro), theCourtaffirmed that ithad jurisdiction,onthebasisofarticleIxoftheConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocide,toadjudicateuponthedispute .ItfoundthatSerbiahadnotcommittedgenocide,hadnotconspiredtocommitgenocidenorincitedthecommissionofgenocideandhadnotbeencomplicitingenocide,inviola-tionofitsobligationsundertheConvention .

TheCourtfurtherfoundthatSerbiahadviolatedtheobli-gation to prevent genocide in respect of the genocide thatoccurredinSrebrenicaanditsobligationsundertheConven-tion by having failed to transfer Ratko Mladić, indicted forgenocideandcomplicityingenocide,fortrialbytheInterna-tionalCriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslavia,andthushavingfailedfullytoco-operatewiththatTribunal .

TheCourtalsofoundthatSerbiahadviolateditsobligationtocomplywiththeprovisionalmeasuresorderedbytheCourton8Apriland13September1993inthiscase,inasmuchasitfailedtotakeallmeasureswithinitspowertopreventgeno-cideinSrebrenicainJuly1995 .

TheCourtdecidedthatSerbiashallimmediatelytakeeffec-tivestepstoensurefullcompliancewithitsobligationundertheConventiontopunishactsofgenocide,oranyoftheotheractsproscribedbyArticleIIIoftheConvention,andtotrans-ferindividualsaccusedofgenocideoranyofthoseotheractsfortrialbytheInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformer

Yugoslavia,andtoco-operatefullywiththatTribunal .Finally,theCourtfoundthatitsfindingsinthejudgmentonSerbia’sviolationsofitsobligationsundertheConventionconstitutedappropriatesatisfactionandthatthecasewasnotoneinwhichanorder forpayment of compensation, or, in respectof theviolationoftheobligationtopreventgenocide,adirectiontoprovideassurancesandguaranteesofnon-repetition,wouldbeappropriate .

The Court was composed as follows: President Higgins;Vice-PresidentAl-Khasawneh;JudgesRanjeva,Shi,Koroma,Owada, Simma, Tomka, Abraham, Keith, Sepúlveda-Amor,Bennouna, Skotnikov; Judges ad hoc Mahiou, Kreća; Regis-trarCouvreur .

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“ . . .TheCourt,(1)bytenvotestofive,Rejects the objections contained in the final submissionsmade by the Respondent to the effect that the Court hasnojurisdiction;andaffirmsthatithasjurisdiction,onthebasis of Article Ix of the Convention on the PreventionandPunishmentof theCrimeofGenocide, toadjudicate

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uponthedisputebroughtbeforeiton20March1993bytheRepublicofBosniaandHerzegovina;in favour: President Higgins; Vice-President Al-Kha-sawneh;JudgesOwada,Simma,Tomka,Abraham,Keith,Sepúlveda-Amor,Bennouna;Judgead hocMahiou;against: Judges Ranjeva, Shi, Koroma, Skotnikov; Judgead hocKreća;(2)bythirteenvotestotwo,Finds that Serbia has not committed genocide, throughits organs or persons whose acts engage its responsibil-ity under customary international law, in violation of itsobligations under the Convention on the Prevention andPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocide;infavour:PresidentHiggins;JudgesRanjeva,Shi,Koro-ma,Owada,Simma,Tomka,Abraham,Keith,Sepúlveda-Amor,Bennouna,Skotnikov;Judgead hocKreća;against: Vice-President Al-Khasawneh; Judge ad hocMahiou;(3)bythirteenvotestotwo,Finds that Serbia has not conspired to commit genocide,norincitedthecommissionofgenocide,inviolationofitsobligations under the Convention on the Prevention andPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocide;infavour:PresidentHiggins;JudgesRanjeva,Shi,Koro-ma,Owada,Simma,Tomka,Abraham,Keith,Sepúlveda-Amor,Bennouna,Skotnikov;Judgead hocKreća;against: Vice-President Al-Khasawneh; Judge ad hocMahiou;(4)byelevenvotestofour,Finds that Serbia has not been complicit in genocide, inviolation of its obligations under the Convention on thePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocide;infavour:PresidentHiggins;JudgesRanjeva,Shi,Koro-ma, Owada, Simma, Tomka, Abraham, Sepúlveda-Amor,Skotnikov;Judgead hocKreća;against: Vice-President Al-Khasawneh; Judges Keith,Bennouna;Judgead hocMahiou;(5)bytwelvevotestothree,Finds that Serbia has violated the obligation to preventgenocide, under the Convention on the Prevention andPunishment of the Crime of Genocide, in respect of thegenocidethatoccurredinSrebrenicainJuly1995;in favour: President Higgins; Vice-President Al-Kha-sawneh; Judges Ranjeva, Shi, Koroma, Owada, Simma,Abraham, Keith, Sepúlveda-Amor, Bennouna; Judge ad hocMahiou;against:JudgesTomka,Skotnikov;Judgead hocKreća;(6)byfourteenvotestoone,FindsthatSerbiahasviolateditsobligationsundertheCon-ventionon thePreventionandPunishmentof theCrimeof Genocide by having failed to transfer Ratko Mladić,indicted for genocide and complicity in genocide, fortrialbytheInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformer

Yugoslavia,andthushavingfailedfullytoco-operatewiththatTribunal;in favour: President Higgins; Vice-President Al-Kha-sawneh; Judges Ranjeva, Shi, Koroma, Owada, Simma,Tomka, Abraham, Keith, Sepúlveda-Amor, Bennouna,Skotnikov;Judgead hocMahiou;against:Judgead hocKreća;(7)bythirteenvotestotwo,Finds that Serbia has violated its obligation to complywith the provisional measures ordered by the Court on8Apriland13September1993 in thiscase, inasmuchasit failed to take all measures within its power to preventgenocideinSrebrenicainJuly1995;in favour: President Higgins; Vice-President Al-Kha-sawneh; Judges Ranjeva, Shi, Koroma, Owada, Simma,Tomka, Abraham, Keith, Sepúlveda-Amor, Bennouna;Judgead hocMahiou;against:JudgeSkotnikov;Judgead hocKreća;(8)byfourteenvotestoone,DecidesthatSerbiashallimmediatelytakeeffectivestepstoensurefullcompliancewithitsobligationundertheCon-ventiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocidetopunishactsofgenocideasdefinedbyArticleIIoftheConvention,oranyoftheotheractsproscribedbyArticle IIIof theConvention,and to transfer individualsaccusedofgenocideoranyofthoseotheractsfortrialbytheInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformerYugo-slavia,andtoco-operatefullywiththatTribunal;in favour: President Higgins; Vice-President Al-Kha-sawneh; Judges Ranjeva, Shi, Koroma, Owada, Simma,Tomka, Abraham, Keith, Sepúlveda-Amor, Bennouna,Skotnikov;Judgead hocMahiou;against:Judgead hocKreća;(9)bythirteenvotestotwo,Findsthat,asregardsthebreachesbySerbiaoftheobliga-tions referred to in subparagraphs (5) and (7) above, theCourt’sfindingsinthoseparagraphsconstituteappropriatesatisfaction,andthatthecaseisnotoneinwhichanorderfor payment of compensation, or, in respect of the viola-tionreferredtoinsubparagraph(5),adirectiontoprovideassurances and guarantees of non-repetition, would beappropriate .infavour:PresidentHiggins;JudgesRanjeva,Shi,Koro-ma,Owada,Simma,Tomka,Abraham,Keith,Sepúlveda-Amor,Bennouna,Skotnikov;Judgead hocKreća;against: Vice-President Al-Khasawneh; Judge ad hocMahiou .”

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Vice-PresidentAl-Khasawnehappendedadissentingopin-ion to the Judgment of the Court; Judges Ranjeva, Shi andKoroma appended a joint dissenting opinion; Judge Ranjevaappendedaseparateopinion;JudgesShiandKoromaappendedajointdeclaration;JudgesOwadaandTomkaappendedsepa-

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rateopinions;JudgesKeith,BennounaandSkotnikovappendeddeclarations;Judgead hocMahiouappendedadissentingopin-ion;Judgead hocKrećaappendedaseparateopinion .

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The Court begins by recapitulating the various stages oftheproceedings (thishistorymaybe found inPressReleaseNo .2006/9of27February2006) .Italsorecallsthefinalsub-missionspresentedbythePartiesattheoralproceedings(seePressReleaseNo .2006/18of9May2006) .

Identification of the respondent party(paras .67–79)

The Court first identifies the respondent party before itintheproceedings .Itobservesthatafterthecloseoftheoralproceedings, by a letter dated 3 June 2006, the President oftheRepublicofSerbiainformedtheSecretary-GeneraloftheUnitedNationsthat,followingtheDeclarationofIndepend-ence adopted by the National Assembly of Montenegro on3June2006,“themembershipof thestateunionSerbiaandMontenegrointheUnitedNations,includingallorgansandorganisationsoftheUnitedNationssystem,[wouldbe]con-tinuedbytheRepublicofSerbiaonthebasisofArticle60ofthe Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro” . On28June2006,byitsresolution60/264,theGeneralAssemblyadmittedtheRepublicofMontenegroasanewMemberoftheUnitedNations .

AfterhavingexaminedtheviewsexpressedonthisissuebytheAgentofBosniaandHerzegovina,theAgentofSerbiaandMontenegro and the Chief State Prosecutor of Montenegro,theCourtobservesthatthefactsandeventsonwhichthefinalsubmissions of Bosnia and Herzegovina are based occurredataperiodoftimewhenSerbiaandMontenegroconstitutedasingleState .

It notes that Serbia has accepted “continuity betweenSerbiaandMontenegroandtheRepublicofSerbia”,andhasassumed responsibility for “its commitments deriving frominternational treatiesconcludedbySerbiaandMontenegro”,thus including commitments under the Genocide Conven-tion .Montenegro,ontheotherhand,doesnotclaimtobethecontinuatorofSerbiaandMontenegro .

The Court recalls a fundamental principle that no Statemaybesubjecttoitsjurisdictionwithoutitsconsent .ItstatesthattheeventsrelatedclearlyshowthattheRepublicofMon-tenegrodoesnotcontinuethelegalpersonalityofSerbiaandMontenegro;itcannotthereforehaveacquired,onthatbasis,thestatusofRespondentinthecase .ItisalsoclearthatMon-tenegro does not give its consent to the jurisdiction of theCourt over it for the purposes of the dispute . Furthermore,theApplicantdidnotassertthatMontenegroisstillapartytothepresentcase;itmerelyemphasizeditsviewsastothejointandseveralliabilityofSerbiaandofMontenegro .

TheCourtthusnotesthattheRepublicofSerbiaremainsarespondentinthecase,andatthedateofthepresentJudgment

isindeedtheonlyRespondent .Accordingly,anyfindingsthattheCourtmaymakeintheoperativeparagraphoftheJudg-mentaretobeaddressedtoSerbia .Thatbeingsaid,theCourtrecalls that any responsibility for past events determined inthepresentJudgmentinvolvedattherelevanttimetheStateofSerbiaandMontenegro .ItfurtherobservesthattheRepublicofMontenegroisapartytotheGenocideConventionandthatParties to that Convention have undertaken the obligationsflowingfromit,inparticulartheobligationtoco-operateinordertopunishtheperpetratorsofgenocide .

The Court’s jurisdiction(paras .80–141)

The jurisdictional objection of the RespondentThe Court proceeds to examine an important issue of

jurisdictionalcharacterraisedbythe“InitiativetoReconsiderex officioJurisdictionoverYugoslavia”filedbytheRespond-entin2001(hereinafter“theInitiative”) .Itexplainsthatthecentral question raised by the Respondent is whether at thetime of the filing of the Application instituting proceedingstheRespondentwasorwasnotthecontinuatoroftheSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(SFRY) .TheRespondentnowcontendsthatitwasnotacontinuatorState,andthatthereforenotonlywasitnotapartytotheGenocideConventionwhentheproceedingswere instituted,but itwasnot thenapartyto the Statute of the Court by virtue of membership in theUnited Nations; and that, not being such a party, it did nothaveaccesstotheCourt,withtheconsequencethattheCourthadnojurisdictionratione personaeoverit .

The Court recalls the circumstances underlying that Ini-tiative .Brieflystated,thesituationwasthattheRespondent,after claiming that since the break-up of the SFRY in 1992itwas thecontinuatorof thatState,andassuchmaintainedthemembershipof theSFRY in theUnitedNations,hadon27October2000applied,“in lightof the implementationoftheSecurityCouncilresolution777(1992)”tobeadmittedtothe Organization as a new Member, thereby in effect relin-quishingitspreviousclaim .

In order to clarify the background to these issues, theCourtreviewsthehistoryofthestatusoftheRespondentwithregardtotheUnitedNationsfromthebreak-upoftheSFRYtotheadmissionofSerbiaandMontenegroon1November2000asanewMember .

The response of Bosnia and HerzegovinaThe Court observes that the Applicant contends that the

CourtshouldnotexaminethequestionraisedbytheRespond-entinitsInitiative .BosniaandHerzegovinafirstlyarguesthattheRespondentwasunderadutytoraisetheissueofwhethertheFRYwasaMemberoftheUnitedNationsatthetimeoftheproceedingsonthepreliminaryobjections,in1996,andthatsinceitdidnotdoso,theprincipleofres judicata,attachingtotheCourt’s1996Judgmentonthoseobjections,preventsitfromreopeningthe issue .BosniaandHerzegovinasecondlymaintainsthattheCourtitself,havingdecidedin1996thatithadjurisdictioninthecase,wouldbeinbreachoftheprinci-pleofres judicataifitwerenowtodecideotherwise,andthat

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theCourtcannotcallinquestiontheauthorityofitsdecisionsasres judicata.

With respect to the first contention of Bosnia and Herze-govina,theCourtnotesthatifapartytoproceedingsbeforetheCourtchoosesnottoraiseanissueofjurisdictionbywayofthepreliminaryobjectionprocedureunderArticle79oftheRules,thatpartyisnotnecessarilytherebydebarredfromraisingsuchissueduringtheproceedingsonthemeritsofthecase .

TheCourtdoesnotfinditnecessarytoconsiderwhethertheconductoftheRespondentcouldbeheldtoconstituteanacquiescence in the jurisdictionof theCourt .Suchacquies-cence, if established, might be relevant to questions of con-sensual jurisdiction,butnot to thequestionwhetheraStatehasthecapacityundertheStatutetobeapartytoproceedingsbeforetheCourt .TheCourtobservesthatthelatterquestionmayberegardedasanissuepriortothatofjurisdictionratione personae,orasoneconstitutiveelementwithintheconceptofjurisdictionratione personae.Eitherway,unlikethemajorityofquestionsof jurisdiction, it isnotamatterof theconsentoftheparties .Itfollowsthat,whetherornottheRespondentshould be held to have acquiesced in the jurisdiction of theCourtinthecase,suchacquiescencewouldinnowaydebarthe Court from examining and ruling upon the question itraised .ThesamereasoningappliestotheargumentthattheRespondentisestoppedfromraisingthematteratthisstage,or debarred from doing so by considerations of good faith .TheCourtthereforeturnstoexaminethesecondcontentionofBosniaandHerzegovinathatthequestionofthecapacityoftheRespondenttobeapartytoproceedingsbeforetheCourthas already been resolved as a matter of res judicata by the1996Judgmentonjurisdiction .

The principle of resjudicataAfterhavingreviewed its relevantpastdecisions,notably

its1996JudgmentonPreliminaryObjectionsinthecaseandthe 2003 Judgment in the Application for Revision case, theCourtconsiderstheprincipleofres judicata,anditsapplica-tiontothe1996Judgment .

TheCourtrecallsthattheprincipleofres judicataappearsfromthetermsoftheStatuteoftheCourtandtheCharteroftheUnitedNations .ThatprinciplesignifiesthatthedecisionsoftheCourtarenotonlybindingontheparties,butarefinal,in the sense that they cannot be reopened by the parties asregardstheissuesthathavebeendetermined,savebyproce-dures,ofanexceptionalnature, specially laiddownfor thatpurpose(theprocedureforrevisionsetdowninArticle61oftheStatute) .IntheviewoftheCourt,twopurposesunderliethe principle of res judicata: first, the stability of legal rela-tionsrequiresthatlitigationcometoanend;secondly,itisintheinterestofeachpartythatanissuewhichhasalreadybeenadjudicatedinfavourofthatpartybenotarguedagain .

The Court observes that it has been suggested inter aliabytheRespondentthatadistinctionmaybedrawnbetweenthe application of the principle of res judicata to judgmentsgivenonthemeritsofacaseandjudgmentsdeterminingtheCourt’s jurisdiction, in response to preliminary objections .TheRespondentcontendsthatthelatter“donotandcannothavethesameconsequencesasdecisionsonthemerits” .The

Court dismisses this contention, explaining that the deci-siononquestionsofjurisdictionisgivenbyajudgment,andArticle60oftheStatuteprovidesthat“[t]hejudgmentisfinaland without appeal”, without distinguishing between judg-ments on jurisdiction and admissibility, and judgments onthemerits .TheCourtdoesnotuphold theotherargumentsof the Respondent in respect of res judicata. It states that,should a party to a case believe that elements have come tolight subsequent to the decision of the Court which tend toshow that the Court’s conclusions may have been based onincorrectorinsufficientfacts,theStatuteprovidesforonlyoneprocedure:thatunderArticle61,whichoffersthepossibilityoftherevisionofjudgments,subjecttotherestrictionsstatedinthatArticle .Inthisregard,itrecallsthattheRespondent’sApplicationforrevisionofthe1996Judgmentinthecasewasdismissed,asnotmeetingtheconditionsofArticle61 .

Application of the principle of resjudicata to the 1996 JudgmentTheCourtrecallsthattheoperativepartofajudgmentof

theCourtpossessestheforceofres judicata.Theoperativepartofthe1996JudgmentstatedthattheCourtfound“that,onthebasisofArticleIxoftheConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentof theCrimeofGenocide, ithas jurisdictiontodecideuponthedispute” .AccordingtotheCourt,thatjuris-dictionisthusestablishedwiththefullweightoftheCourt’sjudicialauthority .Forapartytoasserttodaythat,atthedatethe1996Judgmentwasgiven,theCourthadnopowertogiveit, because one of the parties can now be seen to have beenunabletocomebeforetheCourtistocallinquestiontheforceasres judicataoftheoperativeclauseoftheJudgment .There-fore,theCourtneednotexaminetheRespondent’sobjectiontojurisdictionbasedonitscontentionastoitslackofstatusin1993 .

TheRespondenthashoweveradvancedanumberofargu-ments tending to show that the 1996 Judgment is not con-clusive on the matter . It has been inter alia suggested that,for the purposes of applying the principle of res judicata toa judgment on preliminary objections, the operative clauseto be taken into account and given the force of res judicatais the decision rejecting specified preliminary objections,ratherthanthebroadascertainmentupholding jurisdiction .TheCourtdoesnotupholdthiscontention,explainingthatitdoesnotconsiderthatitwasthepurposeofArticle79oftheRulesofCourttolimittheextentoftheforceofres judicataattachingtoajudgmentonpreliminaryobjections,northat,inthecaseofsuchjudgment,suchforceisnecessarilylimitedtotheclausesofthedispositifspecificallyrejectingparticularobjections .Ifanyquestionarisesastothescopeofres judicataattachingtoajudgment,itmustbedeterminedineachcasehavingregardtothecontextinwhichthejudgmentwasgiven .It may be necessary to distinguish between, first, the issueswhich have been decided with the force of res judicata, orwhicharenecessarilyentailedinthedecisionofthoseissues;secondlyanyperipheralorsubsidiarymatters,orobiter dicta;andfinallymatterswhichhavenotbeenruleduponatall .

TheCourtnotesthatthefactthatithasdealt,inanumberofpastcases,withjurisdictionalissuesafterhavingdeliveredajudgmentonjurisdictiondoesnotsupportthecontentionthat

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suchajudgmentcanbereopenedatanytime,soastopermitreconsiderationofissuesalreadysettledwiththeforceofres judicata.Thereisanessentialdifferencebetweenthosecasesmentionedinparagraph127oftheJudgmentandthepresentcase:thejurisdictionalissuesexaminedatalatestageinthosecasesweresuchthatthedecisiononthemwouldnotcontra-dictthefindingofjurisdictionmadeintheearlierjudgment .Bycontrast,thecontentionsoftheRespondentinthepresentcasewould,ifupheld,effectivelyreversethe1996Judgment .

AddressingtheargumentoftheRespondentthattheissuewhethertheFRYhadaccesstotheCourthadnotbeendecidedinthe1996Judgment,theCourtnotesthatthestatementsitmade in the 2004 Judgments in the Legality of Use of Forcecases do not signify that in 1996 the Court was unaware ofthefactthatthesolutionadoptedintheUnitedNationsastothequestionofcontinuationofthemembershipoftheSFRY“[was] not free from legal difficulties” . As the Court recog-nizedinthe2004Judgments,in1999—andevenmoresoin1996—itwasbynomeanssoclearastheCourtfoundittobein2004thattheRespondentwasnotaMemberoftheUnitedNations .Althoughthe legalcomplicationsofthepositionoftheRespondentinrelationtotheUnitedNationswerenotspe-cificallymentionedinthe1996Judgment,theCourtaffirmedits jurisdiction toadjudicateupon thedisputeandsince thequestionofaState’scapacity tobeaparty toproceedings isamatterwhichtheCourtmust, ifnecessary,raiseex officio,thisfindingmustasamatterofconstructionbeunderstood,bynecessaryimplication,tomeanthattheCourtatthattimeperceivedtheRespondentasbeinginapositiontoparticipateincasesbeforetheCourt .Onthatbasis,itproceededtomakea finding on jurisdiction which would have the force of res judicata.TheCourtdoesnotneedtogobehindthatfindingandconsideronwhatbasistheCourtwasabletosatisfyitselfonthepoint .WhetherthePartiesclassifythematterasoneof“accesstotheCourt”orof“jurisdictionratione personae”,the fact remains that the Court could not have proceededto determine the merits unless the Respondent had had thecapacityundertheStatutetobeapartytoproceedingsbeforethe Court . That the FRY had the capacity to appear beforetheCourt inaccordancewith theStatutewasanelement inthereasoningofthe1996Judgmentwhichcan—andindeedmust—bereadintotheJudgmentasamatterof logicalcon-struction .

Conclusion: jurisdiction affirmedTheCourtconcludesthat,inrespectofthecontentionthat

theRespondentwasnot,onthedateoffilingoftheApplica-tion instituting proceedings, a State having the capacity tocomebeforetheCourtundertheStatute,theprincipleofres judicataprecludesanyreopeningofthedecisionembodiedinthe1996Judgment .TheRespondenthashoweveralsoarguedthat the 1996 Judgment is not res judicata as to the furtherquestion whether the FRY was, at the time of institution ofproceedings, a party to the Genocide Convention, and hassought to show that at that time it was not, and could nothavebeen,suchaparty .TheCourthoweverconsidersthatthereasonsgivenforholdingthatthe1996Judgmentsettlesthequestionofjurisdictioninthiscasewiththeforceofres judi-cataareapplicablea fortioriasregardsthiscontention,since

onthispointthe1996Judgmentwasquitespecific,asitwasnotonthequestionofcapacitytocomebeforetheCourt .TheCourtthusconcludesthat,asstatedinthe1996Judgment,ithas jurisdiction, under Article Ix of the Genocide Conven-tion,toadjudicateuponthedispute .ItfollowsthattheCourtdoes not find it necessary to consider the questions, exten-sivelyaddressedbytheParties,ofthestatusoftheRespondentundertheCharteroftheUnitedNationsandtheStatuteoftheCourt,anditspositioninrelationtotheGenocideConventionatthetimeofthefilingoftheApplication .

The applicable law(paras .142–201)

The Court first recalls that its jurisdiction in the case isbasedsolelyonArticleIxoftheGenocideConvention,sincealltheothergroundsofjurisdictioninvokedbytheApplicantwererejectedinthe1996Judgmentonjurisdiction .ArticleIxprovidesthat

“DisputesbetweentheContractingPartiesrelatingtotheinterpretation, application or fulfilment of the presentConvention, includingthoserelatingtotheresponsibilityofaStateforgenocideorforanyoftheotheractsenumer-atedinArticleIII,shallbesubmittedtotheInternationalCourtofJusticeattherequestofanyofthepartiestothedispute” .ItfollowsthattheCourtmayruleonlyondisputesbetween

theStatespartiesrelatingtotheinterpretation,applicationorfulfilmentoftheConventionandthatithasnopowertoruleonallegedbreachesofotherobligationsunder internationallaw,notamountingtogenocide,particularlythoseprotectinghumanrightsinarmedconflict .Thatissoeveniftheallegedbreaches are of obligations under peremptory norms, or ofobligationswhichprotectessentialhumanitarianvalues,andwhichmaybeowederga omnes.

Obligations imposed by the Convention on the Contracting PartiesThe Court notes that there exists a dispute between the

PartiesastothemeaningandthelegalscopeofArticleIxoftheConvention,especiallyaboutwhethertheobligationstheConventionimposesuponthePartiesarelimitedtolegislate,andtoprosecuteorextradite,orwhethertheobligationsoftheStatespartiesextendtotheobligationnottocommitgenocideandtheotheractsenumeratedinArticleIII .

TheCourtobservesthatwhatobligationstheConventionimposesuponthepartiestoitdependsontheordinarymean-ingofthetermsoftheConventionreadintheircontextandinthelightofitsobjectandpurpose .ItreviewsthewordingofArticleI,whichprovidesinter aliathat“[t]heContractingParties confirm that genocide, whether committed in timeofpeaceorintimeofwar,isacrimeunderinternationallawwhich theyundertake topreventandtopunish” .TheCourtfindsthatArticleI, inparticular itsundertakingtoprevent,creates obligations distinct from those which appear in thesubsequent Articles . This finding is confirmed by the pre-paratoryworkoftheConventionandthecircumstancesofitsconclusion .

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TheCourtthenconsiderswhetherthePartiesareunderanobligationnottocommitgenocidethemselvessincesuchanobligationisnotexpresslyimposedbytheactualtermsoftheConvention .IntheviewoftheCourt,takingintoaccounttheestablishedpurposeoftheConvention,theeffectsofArticleIis to prohibit States from themselves committing genocide .Suchaprohibition follows,first, fromthe fact thatArticle Icategorizesgenocideas“acrimeunderinternationallaw”:byagreeingtosuchacategorization,theStatespartiesmustlogi-callybeundertakingnottocommittheactsodescribed .Sec-ondly,itfollowsfromtheexpresslystatedobligationtopreventthecommissionofactsofgenocide .Itwouldbeparadoxical,ifStateswerethusunderanobligationtoprevent,butwerenotforbiddentocommitsuchactsthroughtheirownorgans,orpersonsoverwhomtheyhavesuchfirmcontrolthattheircon-ductisattributabletotheStateconcernedunderinternationallaw . In short, the obligation to prevent genocide necessarilyimpliestheprohibitionofcommissionofgenocide .TheCourtnotesthatitsconclusionisconfirmedbyoneunusualfeatureof the wording of Article Ix, namely the phrase “includingthose [disputes] relating to the responsibility of a State forgenocideoranyoftheotheractsenumeratedinArticleIII” .AccordingtotheEnglishtextoftheConvention,theresponsi-bilitycontemplatedisresponsibility“forgenocide”,notmerelyresponsibility“forfailingtopreventorpunishgenocide” .TheparticulartermsofthephraseasawholeconfirmthatCon-tractingPartiesmaybeheldresponsibleforgenocideandtheotheractsenumeratedinArticleIIIoftheConvention .

TheCourtsubsequentlydiscussesthreefurtherargumentswhich may be seen as contradicting the proposition that theConventionimposesadutyontheContractingPartiesnottocommitgenocideandtheotheractsenumeratedinArticleIII .

Thefirstisthat,asamatterofprinciple,internationallawdoes not recognize the criminal responsibility of the State,andtheGenocideConventiondoesnotprovideavehicleforthe imposition of such criminal responsibility . The CourtobservesthattheobligationforwhichtheRespondentmaybeheldresponsible,intheeventofbreach,inproceedingsunderArticleIx,issimplyanobligationarisingunderinternationallaw,inthiscasetheprovisionsoftheConvention,andthattheobligationsinquestionandtheresponsibilitiesofStatesthatwould arise from breach of such obligations are obligationsandresponsibilitiesunderinternationallaw .Theyarenotofacriminalnature .

The second is that the nature of the Convention is suchastoexcludefromitsscopeStateresponsibilityforgenocideandtheotherenumeratedacts .TheConvention,itissaid,isa standard international criminal law convention focussedessentially on the criminal prosecution and punishment ofindividualsandnotontheresponsibilityofStates .However,theCourtseesnothinginthewordingorthestructureoftheprovisions of the Convention relating to individual crimi-nal liability which would displace the meaning of Article I,readwithparagraphs (a) to (e)ofArticle III, so faras theseprovisions impose obligations on States distinct from theobligationswhichtheConventionrequiresthemtoplaceonindividuals .

Concerningthethirdandfinalargument,theCourtexam-inesthedraftinghistoryoftheConvention,intheSixthCom-

mittee of the General Assembly, which is said to show that“therewasnoquestionofdirectresponsibilityoftheStateforactsofgenocide” .However,havingreviewedsaidhistory,theCourtconcludesthatitmaybeseenassupportingtheconclu-sionthatContractingPartiesareboundnottocommitgeno-cide,throughtheactionsoftheirorgansorpersonsorgroupswhoseactsareattributabletothem .

Question whether the Court may make a finding of genocide by a State in the absence of a prior conviction of an individual for genocide by a competent courtThe Court observes that if a State is to be responsible

becauseithasbreacheditsobligationnottocommitgenocide,itmustbeshownthatgenocideasdefinedintheConventionhas been committed . That will also be the case with con-spiracyunderArticleIII,paragraph(b),andcomplicityunderArticleIII,paragraph(e);and,forpurposesoftheobligationtopreventgenocide .

According to the Respondent, the condition sine qua nonforestablishingStateresponsibilityisthepriorestablishment,accordingtotherulesofcriminallaw,oftheindividualrespon-sibilityofaperpetratorengagingtheState’sresponsibility .

IntheviewoftheCourt,thedifferentproceduresfollowedby,andpowersavailableto,theCourtandtothecourtsandtribunalstryingpersonsforcriminaloffences,donotthem-selvesindicatethatthereisalegalbartotheCourtitselffind-ingthatgenocideortheotheractsenumeratedinArticleIIIhave been committed . Under its Statute the Court has thecapacitytoundertakethattask,whileapplyingthestandardofproofappropriatetochargesofexceptionalgravity .Turningto the termsof theConvention itself, theCourthasalreadyheld that it has jurisdiction under Article Ix to find a StateresponsibleifgenocideorotheractsenumeratedinArticleIIIarecommittedbyitsorgans,orpersonsorgroupswhoseactsareattributabletoit .

TheCourtaccordinglyconcludesthatStateresponsibilitycanariseundertheConventionforgenocideandcomplicity,withoutanindividualbeingconvictedofthecrimeoranasso-ciatedone .

Possible territorial limits of the obligationsTheCourtobservesthatthesubstantiveobligationsarising

fromArticlesIandIIIarenotontheirfacelimitedbyterri-tory .TheyapplytoaStatewhereveritmaybeactingormaybeabletoactinwaysappropriatetomeetingtheobligationsinquestion .

The obligation to prosecute imposed by Article VI is bycontrastsubjecttoanexpressterritoriallimit .Thetrialofper-sonschargedwithgenocideistobeinacompetenttribunaloftheStateintheterritoryofwhichtheactwascommitted,orbyaninternationalpenaltribunalwithjurisdiction .

The question of intent to commit genocideTheCourt notes thatgenocide asdefined inArticle IIof

theConventioncomprises“acts”and“intent” .Itiswellestab-lishedthattheacts-

“(a)Killingmembersofthegroup;

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(b)Causingseriousbodilyormentalharmtomembersofthegroup;(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of lifecalculatedtobringaboutitsphysicaldestructioninwholeorinpart;(d) Imposingmeasures intended topreventbirthswithinthegroup”;and(e)“Forciblytransferringchildrenofthegrouptoanothergroup”-themselves include mental elements . The Court stresses

that,inadditiontothosementalelements,ArticleIIrequiresafurthermentalelement:theestablishmentofthe“intenttodestroy,inwholeorinpart, . . .[theprotected]group,assuch” .It is often referred to as a special or specific intent or dolus specialis.Itisnotenoughthatthemembersofthegrouparetargetedbecausetheybelongtothatgroup .Somethingmoreisrequired .TheactslistedinArticleIImustbedonewithintenttodestroythegroupassuchinwholeorinpart .Thewords“assuch”emphasizethatintenttodestroytheprotectedgroup .

Intent and “ethnic cleansing”TheCourtstatesthat“ethniccleansing”canonlybeaform

ofgenocidewithinthemeaningoftheConvention,ifitcor-respondstoorfallswithinoneofthecategoriesofactspro-hibitedbyArticleIIoftheConvention .Neithertheintent,asamatterofpolicy,torenderanarea“ethnicallyhomogeneous”,northeoperationsthatmaybecarriedouttoimplementsuchpolicy,canas suchbedesignatedasgenocide .However, thisdoesnotmeanthatactsdescribedas“ethniccleansing”mayneverconstitutegenocide,iftheyaresuchastobecharacter-izedas,forexample,“deliberatelyinflictingonthegroupcon-ditionsoflifecalculatedtobringaboutitsphysicaldestructioninwholeorinpart”,contrarytoArticleII,paragraph(c),oftheConvention,providedsuchactioniscarriedoutwiththenecessary specific intent (dolus specialis), that is to say witha view to the destruction of the group, as distinct from itsremovalfromtheregion .

Definition of the protected groupTheCourtneedstoidentifythegroupagainstwhichgeno-

cidemaybeconsideredtohavebeencommitted .ItnotesthatthePartiesdisagreeonaspectsofthedefinitionofthe“group”,theApplicantrefersto“thenon-Serbnational,ethnicalorreli-giousgroupwithin,butnotlimitedto,theterritoryofBosniaandHerzegovina,includinginparticulartheMuslimpopula-tion” .ItthusfollowswhatistermedthenegativeapproachtothedefinitionoftheprotectedgroupundertheConvention .

TheCourtrecallsthattheessenceoftheintentistodestroytheprotectedgroup,inwholeorinpart,assuch .Itisagroupwhichmusthaveparticularpositivecharacteristics—national,ethnical, racial or religious—and not the lack of them . ThisinterpretationisconfirmedbythedraftinghistoryoftheCon-vention .

Accordingly,theCourtconcludesthatitshoulddealwiththematteronthebasisthatthetargetedgroupmustinlawbedefinedpositively,andthusnotnegativelyasthe“non-Serb”population .TheApplicanthasmadeonlyverylimitedrefer-

encetothenon-SerbpopulationsofBosniaandHerzegovinaother thantheBosnianMuslims,e .g . theCroats .TheCourtwillthereforeexaminethefactsofthecaseonthebasisthatgenocidemaybefoundtohavebeencommittedifanintenttodestroytheBosnianMuslims,asagroup,inwholeorinpart,canbeestablished .

TheCourtfurtherspecifiesthatforthepurposesofArti-cleII,first,theintentmustbetodestroyatleastasubstantialpart of the particular group . That is demanded by the verynatureofthecrimeofgenocide:sincetheobjectandpurposeof the Convention as a whole is to prevent the intentionaldestruction of groups, the part targeted must be significantenoughtohaveanimpactonthegroupasawhole .Second,theCourtobservesthatitiswidelyacceptedthatgenocidemaybefoundtohavebeencommittedwheretheintentistodestroythegroupwithinageographicallylimitedarea .

Questions of proof(paras .202–230)

TheCourtfirstconsiderstheburdenoronusofproof,thestandardofproof,andthemethodsofproof .

Burden of proofTheCourtstatesthat it iswellestablishedingeneralthat

theapplicantmustestablishitscaseandthatapartyassertingafactmustestablishit .

With regard to the refusal of the Respondent to producethe full text of certain documents, the Court observes thatthe Applicant has had extensive documentation and otherevidenceavailabletoit,especiallyfromthereadilyaccessiblerecordsoftheInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslavia(ICTY),andthatithasmadeveryampleuseofit .TheCourtfinallyobservesthatalthoughithasnotagreedtoeitheroftheApplicant’srequeststobeprovidedwithunedit-edcopiesofcertaindocuments, ithasnot failed tonote theApplicant’ssuggestionthattheCourtmaybefreetodrawitsownconclusions .

Standard of proofThePartiesalsodifferonthestandardofproof .TheCourthaslongrecognizedthatclaimsagainstaState

involving charges of exceptional gravity must be proved byevidence that is fully conclusive . It requires that it be fullyconvinced thatallegationsmadeintheproceedings,thatthecrimeofgenocideortheotheractsenumeratedinArticleIIIhavebeencommitted,havebeenclearlyestablished .Thesamestandardappliestotheproofofattributionforsuchacts .

InrespectoftheApplicant’sclaimthattheRespondenthasbreached its undertakings to prevent genocide and to pun-ish and extradite persons charged with genocide, the Courtrequiresproofatahigh levelofcertaintyappropriate to theseriousnessoftheallegation .

Methods of proofThe Court recalls that the Parties submitted a vast array

of material, from different sources . It included reports,resolutions and findings by various United Nations organs;documents from other intergovernmental organizations;

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documents,evidenceanddecisions fromtheICTY;publica-tionsfromgovernments;documentsfromnon-governmentalorganizations; media reports, articles and books . They alsocalledwitnesses,expertsandwitness-experts .

TheCourtmust itselfmake itsowndeterminationof thefactswhicharerelevanttothelawwhichtheApplicantclaimstheRespondenthasbreached . Ithoweveracknowledges thatthepresentcasedoeshaveanunusualfeaturesincemanyoftheallegationsbefore ithavealreadybeenthesubjectof theprocesses anddecisionsof the ICTY .TheCourthas thus toconsidertheirsignificance .

It recalls that in thecaseconcerningArmed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congov .Uganda),itnotablysaidthat“evidenceobtainedbyexamina-tionofpersonsdirectlyinvolved,andwhoweresubsequentlycross-examinedbyjudgesskilledinexaminationandexperi-encedinassessinglargeamountsoffactualinformation,someofitofatechnicalnature,meritsspecialattention” .

TheCourtstatesthatthefact-findingprocessoftheICTYfallswithinthisformulation,as“evidenceobtainedbypersonsdirectlyinvolved”,testedbycross-examination,thecredibilityofwhichhasnotbeenchallengedsubsequently .

After having set out the arguments of the Parties on theweight to be given to the ICTY material and after havingreviewed the various ICTY processes, the Court concludesthatitshouldinprincipleacceptashighlypersuasiverelevantfindingsoffactmadebytheTribunalattrial,unlessofcoursethey have been upset on appeal . For the same reasons, anyevaluationbytheTribunalbasedonthefactsassofoundforinstance about the existence of the required intent, is alsoentitledtodueweight .

TheCourtfinallycommentsonsomeoftheotherevidencesubmitted to it . Evoking inter alia the report entitled “TheFallofSrebrenica”,whichtheUnitedNationsSecretary-Gen-eral submitted in November 1999 to the General Assembly,it observes that the care taken in preparing said report, itscomprehensivesourcesandtheindependenceofthoserespon-sibleforitspreparationalllendconsiderableauthoritytoit .Itassureshavinggainedsubstantialassistancefromthisreport .

The facts(paras .231–376)

TheCourtreviewsthebackgroundofthefactsinvokedbythe Applicant, as well as the entities involved in the eventscomplained of . It notes that on 9 January 1992, the Repub-licoftheSerbPeopleofBosniaandHerzegovina,latertobecalledtheRepublikaSrpska(RS),declareditsindependence .AccordingtotheCourt,thisentityneverattainedinternation-alrecognitionasasovereignState,butithadde factocontrolof substantial territory, and the loyalty of large numbers ofBosnianSerbs .

The Court observes that the Applicant has assertedthe existence of close ties between the Government of theRespondentandtheauthoritiesoftheRepublikaSrpska,ofapoliticalandfinancialnature,andalsoasregardsadministra-tionandcontrolofthearmyoftheRepublikaSrpska(VRS) .TheCourtfindsitestablishedthattheRespondentwasmak-ingitsconsiderablemilitaryandfinancialsupportavailableto

theRepublikaSrpska,andhaditwithdrawnthatsupport, thiswouldhavegreatlyconstrainedtheoptionsthatwereavailabletotheRepublikaSrpskaauthorities .

TheCourt thenembarkson theexaminationof the factsallegedbytheApplicant,inordertosatisfyitself,first,thattheallegedatrocitiesoccurred;secondly,whethersuchatrocities,ifestablished,fallwithinthescopeofArticleIIoftheGeno-cideConvention,thatistosaywhetherthefactsestablishtheexistenceofanintent,onthepartoftheperpetratorsofthoseatrocities, to destroy, in whole or in part, a defined group,namelythatoftheBosnianMuslims .

Article II (a): Killing members of the protected groupTheCourtexamines theevidenceofkillingsofmembers

oftheprotectedgroup(ArticleII(a)oftheGenocideConven-tion) in theprincipal areasofBosnia:Sarajevo,DrinaRiverValley, Prijedor, Banja Luka and Brčko—and in the variousdetentioncamps .

It finds that it is established by overwhelming evidencethat massive killings in specific areas and detention campsthroughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina wereperpetrated during the conflict . Furthermore, the evidencepresentedshowsthatthevictimswereinlargemajoritymem-bersoftheprotectedgroup,whichsuggeststhattheymayhavebeensystematicallytargetedbythekillings .

The Court is however not convinced, on the basis of theevidence before it, that it has been conclusively establishedthat themassivekillingsofmembersof theprotectedgroupwere committed with the specific intent (dolus specialis) onthe part of the perpetrators to destroy, in whole or in part,thegroupassuch .Thekillingsoutlinedabovemayamounttowarcrimesandcrimesagainsthumanity,but theCourthasnojurisdictiontodeterminewhetherthisisso .

The massacre at SrebrenicaHavingrecapitulatedtheeventssurroundingthetakeoverof

Srebrenica,theCourtobservesthattheTrialChambersintheKrstićandBlagojevićcasesbothfoundthatBosnianSerbforceskilledover7,000BosnianMuslimmenfollowingthetakeoverofthe“safearea”inJuly1995 .Accordinglytheyfoundthattheactus reus of killings in Article II (a) of the Convention was satisfied .Bothalso found thatactionsofBosnianSerb forcesalsosatisfiedtheactus reusofcausingseriousbodilyormentalharm,asdefinedinArticleII(b)oftheConvention—bothtothosewhowhereabouttobeexecuted,andtotheotherswhowereseparatedfromtheminrespectoftheir forceddisplace-mentandthelosssufferedbysurvivorsamongthem .TheCourtis thus fullypersuadedthatbothkillingswithin the termsofArticleII(a)oftheConvention,andactscausingseriousbod-ily or mental harm within the terms of Article II (b) thereofoccurredduringtheSrebrenicamassacre .

TheCourtgoesontoexaminewhethertherewasspecificintent(dolus specialis) onthepartoftheperpetrators .Itscon-clusion,fortifiedbytheJudgmentsoftheICTYTrialCham-bers in theKrstić andBlagojević cases, is that thenecessaryintentwasnotestablisheduntilafterthechangeinthemili-taryobjective(from“reducingtheenclavetotheurbanarea”to taking over Srebrenica town and the enclave as a whole)

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andafter the takeoverofSrebrenica,onabout12or13July .Thismaybesignificantfortheapplicationoftheobligationsof theRespondentunder theConvention .TheCourthasnoreasontodepart fromtheTribunal’sdeterminationthat thenecessaryspecificintent(dolus specialis)wasestablishedandthatitwasnotestablisheduntilthattime .

TheCourtturnstothefindingsintheKrstićcase,inwhichthe Appeals Chamber endorsed the findings of the TrialChamberinthefollowingterms:

“Inthiscase,havingidentifiedtheprotectedgroupasthenational group of Bosnian Muslims, the Trial Chamberconcluded that the part the VRS Main Staff and Radis-lavKrstićtargetedwastheBosnianMuslimsofSrebrenica,ortheBosnianMuslimsofEasternBosnia .Thisconclusioncomportswith theguidelinesoutlinedabove .ThesizeoftheBosnianMuslimpopulationinSrebrenicapriorto itscaptureby theVRS forces in1995amounted toapproxi-mately forty thousand people . This represented not onlytheMusliminhabitantsoftheSrebrenicamunicipalitybutalsomanyMuslimrefugeesfromthesurroundingregion .Althoughthispopulationconstitutedonlyasmallpercent-ageoftheoverallMuslimpopulationofBosniaandHerze-govinaatthetime,theimportanceoftheMuslimcommu-nityofSrebrenicaisnotcapturedsolelybyitssize .”TheCourtseesnoreasontodisagreewiththeconcordant

findingsoftheTrialChamberandtheAppealsChamber .TheCourtconcludesthattheactscommittedatSrebrenica

falling within Article II (a) and (b) of the Convention werecommitted with the specific intent to destroy in part thegroupoftheMuslimsofBosniaandHerzegovinaassuch;andaccordingly that these were acts of genocide, committed bymembers of the VRS in and around Srebrenica from about13July1995 .

Article II (b): Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the protected groupHavingexaminedthespecificallegationsoftheApplicant

under this heading, and having taken note of the evidencepresented to the ICTY, the Court considers that it has beenestablishedbyfullyconclusiveevidencethatmembersoftheprotectedgroupweresystematicallyvictimsofmassivemis-treatment,beatings, rapeand torturecausingseriousbodilyand mental harm, during the conflict and, in particular, inthedetentioncamps .TheCourtfinds,however,thatithasnotbeen conclusively established that those atrocities, althoughthey too may amount to war crimes and crimes againsthumanity,werecommittedwiththespecificintent(dolus spe-cialis)todestroytheprotectedgroup,inwholeorinpart .

Article II (c): Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in partTheCourtgoeson toexamine in turn theevidencecon-

cerningthethreesetsofclaimsmadebytheApplicant:encir-clement,shellingandstarvation;deportationandexpulsion;destruction of historical, religious and cultural property . Itconsiderstheevidencepresentedregardingtheconditionsoflifeinthedetentioncampsalreadyreferredtoabove .

Onthebasisofacarefulexaminationoftheevidencesub-mitted by the Parties with respect to encirclement, shellingandstarvationontheonehand,anddeportationandexpul-sion on the other hand, the Court cannot establish that theallegedactswereaccompaniedbythespecificintenttodestroytheprotectedgroupinwholeorinpart .

Withrespecttothedestructionofhistorical,religiousandculturalproperty,theCourtfindsthatthereisconclusiveevi-denceofthedeliberatedestructionofthehistorical,culturalandreligiousheritageoftheprotectedgroup .However,suchdestructiondoesnotfallassuchwithinthecategoriesofactsofgenocidesetoutinArticleIIoftheConvention .

Onthebasisoftheelementspresentedtoitconcerningthecamps,theCourtconsidersthatthereisconvincingandper-suasiveevidencethatterribleconditionswereinflictedupondetaineesofthecamps .However,theevidencepresentedhasnotenabledtheCourttofindthatthoseactswereaccompa-niedbyspecificintent(dolus specialis)todestroytheprotectedgroup,inwholeorinpart .Inthisregard,theCourtobservesthat,innoneoftheICTYcasesconcerningcampscitedabove,hastheTribunalfoundthattheaccusedactedwithsuchspe-cificintent(dolus specialis).

Article II (d): Imposing measures to prevent births within the protected group

Article II (e): Forcibly transferring children of the protected group to another groupHaving carefully examined the arguments of the Parties

underthesetwoheadings,theCourtfindsthattheevidenceplacedbeforeitbytheApplicantdoesnotenableittoconcludethatBosnianSerbforcescommittedsuchacts .

Alleged genocide outside Bosnia and HerzegovinaThe Court finds that the Applicant has not established

to the satisfaction of the Court any facts in support of theallegationaccordingtowhichactsofgenocide,forwhichtheRespondentwasallegedlyresponsible,alsotookplaceontheterritoryoftheFRY .

The question of pattern ofacts said to evidence an intent to commit genocideTheApplicantreliesontheallegedexistenceofanoverall

plan to commit genocide throughout the territory, againstpersonsidentifiedeverywhereandineachcaseonthebasisoftheirbelongingtoaspecifiedgroup .

TheCourtnotesthatthisargumentoftheApplicantmovesfromthe intentof the individualperpetratorsof theallegedactsofgenocidecomplainedof,totheintentofhigherauthor-ity, whether within the VRS or the Republika Srpska, or attheleveloftheGovernmentoftheRespondentitself .Havingexamined,incontext,theDecisiononStrategicGoalsissuedin May 1992 by Momčilo Krajišnik as the President of theNationalAssemblyofRepublikaSrpska,whichintheAppli-cant’sviewapproachesanofficialstatementofanoverallplan,theCourtdoesnotseethe1992StrategicGoalsasestablishingthespecificintent .

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TurningtotheApplicant’scontentionthattheverypatternof the atrocities committed over many communities, over alengthyperiod,focussedonBosnianMuslimsandalsoCroats,demonstrates the necessary intent, the Court cannot agreewith such a broad proposition . The dolus specialis, the spe-cificintenttodestroythegroupinwholeorinpart,hastobeconvincinglyshownbyreferencetoparticularcircumstances,unlessageneralplantothatendcanbeconvincinglydemon-stratedtoexist;andforapatternofconducttobeacceptedasevidenceofitsexistence,itwouldhavetobesuchthatitcouldonlypointtotheexistenceofsuchintent .

TheCourtfindsthattheApplicanthasnotestablishedtheexistenceofthatintentonthepartoftheRespondent,eitheronthebasisofaconcertedplan,oronthebasisthattheeventsreviewedaboverevealaconsistentpatternofconductwhichcouldonlypointtotheexistenceofsuchintent .Havinghow-ever concluded, in the specific case of the massacres at Sre-brenicainJuly1995,thatactsofgenocidewerecommitted,theCourtturnstothequestionwhetherthoseactsareattributabletotheRespondent .

Responsibility for events at Srebrenica(paras .377–415)

The alleged admissionTheCourtfirstnotesthattheApplicantcontendsthatthe

Respondent has in fact recognized that genocide was com-mittedatSrebrenica,andhasacceptedlegalresponsibilityforit .ForpurposesofdeterminingwhethertheRespondenthasrecognizeditsresponsibility,theCourtmaytakeintoaccountanystatementsmadebyeitherpartythatappeartobearuponthematters in issue,andhavebeenbrought to itsattention,and may accord to them such legal effect as may be appro-priate .However, in thepresentcase, itappears to theCourtthatthedeclarationmadebytheCouncilofMinistersoftheRespondenton15June2005followingtheshowingonaBel-gradetelevisionchannelon2June2005ofavideo-recordingofthemurderbyaparamilitaryunitofsixBosnianMuslimprisoners near Srebrenica was of a political nature; it wasclearlynotintendedasanadmission .

The test of responsibilityInordertoascertainwhethertheinternationalresponsibil-

ity of the Respondent can have been incurred, on whateverbasis, in connection with the massacres committed in theSrebrenicaareaduringtheperiodinquestion,theCourtmustconsider three questions in turn . First, it needs to be deter-minedwhethertheactsofgenocidecouldbeattributedtotheRespondentonthebasisthatthoseactswherecommittedbyitsorgansorpersonswhoseactsareattributable to itundercustomary rules of State Responsibility . Second, the Courtneeds to ascertain whether acts of the kind referred to inArticleIII,paragraphs(b)to(e),oftheConvention,otherthangenocideitself,werecommittedbypersonsororganswhoseconductisattributabletotheRespondent .Finally,itwillbefortheCourttoruleontheissueastowhethertheRespondentcompliedwithitstwofoldobligationderivingfromArticleIoftheConventiontopreventandpunishgenocide .

The question of attribution of the Srebrenica genocide to the Respondent on the basis of the conduct of its organsThe first of these two questions relates to the well-estab-

lishedrule,oneofthecornerstonesofthelawofStaterespon-sibility,thattheconductofanyStateorganistobeconsideredanactoftheStateunderinternationallaw,andthereforegivesrisetotheresponsibilityoftheStateifitconstitutesabreachofaninternationalobligationoftheState .

When applied to the present case, this rule first calls fora determination whether the acts of genocide committed inSrebrenica were perpetrated by “persons or entities” havingthestatusoforgansoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(astheRespondentwasknownatthetime)underitsinternallaw,astheninforce .AccordingtotheCourt,itmustbesaidthatthereisnothingwhichcouldjustifyanaffirmativeresponsetothisquestion .IthasnotbeenshownthattheFRYarmytookpartinthemassacres,northatthepoliticalleadersoftheFRYhadahandinpreparing,planningorinanywaycarryingoutthemassacres .ItistruethatthereismuchevidenceofdirectorindirectparticipationbytheofficialarmyoftheFRY,alongwith the Bosnian Serb armed forces, in military operationsinBosniaandHerzegovinaintheyearspriortotheeventsatSrebrenica .

Thatparticipationwasrepeatedlycondemnedbythepoliti-calorgansoftheUnitedNations,whichdemandedthattheFRYputanendtoit .Ithashowevernotbeenshownthattherewasanysuchparticipationinrelationtothemassacrescommittedat Srebrenica . Further, neither the Republika Srpska, nor theVRSwerede jureorgansoftheFRY,sincenoneofthemhadthestatusoforganofthatStateunderitsinternallaw .

WithregardtotheparticularsituationofGeneralMladić,theCourtnotesfirstthatnoevidencehasbeenpresentedthateitherGeneralMladićoranyoftheotherofficerswhoseaffairswerehandledbythe30thPersonnelCentreinBelgradewere,accordingtotheinternallawoftheRespondent,officersofthearmyoftheRespondent—ade jureorganoftheRespondent .NorhasitbeenconclusivelyestablishedthatGeneralMladićwasoneofthoseofficers;andevenonthebasisthathemighthavebeen,theCourtdoesnotconsiderthathewould,forthatreasonalone,havetobetreatedasanorganoftheFRYforthepurposesof theapplicationof therulesofStateresponsibil-ity .ThereisnodoubtthattheFRYwasprovidingsubstantialsupport,inter alia,financialsupport,totheRepublikaSrpska,andthatoneoftheformsthatsupporttookwaspaymentofsalariesandotherbenefitstosomeofficersoftheVRS,buttheCourt considers that this did not automatically make themorgansoftheFRY .TheparticularsituationofGeneralMladić,or of any other VRS officer present at Srebrenica who mayhave been being “administered” from Belgrade, is not suchastoleadtheCourttomodifytheconclusionreachedinthepreviousparagraph .

TheissuealsoarisesastowhethertheRespondentmightbear responsibility for the acts of the paramilitary militiaknownasthe“Scorpions”intheSrebrenicaarea .Judgingonthebasisofmaterialssubmittedtoit, theCourtisunabletofindthatthe“Scorpions”—referredtoas“aunitofMinistryofInteriorsofSerbia”inthosedocuments—were,inmid-1995,de jureorgansoftheRespondent .Furthermore,theCourtnotes

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thatinanyeventtheactofanorganplacedbyaStateatthedisposalofanotherpublicauthorityshallnotbeconsideredanactofthatStateiftheorganwasactingonbehalfofthepublicauthorityatwhosedisposalithadbeenplaced .

The Court observes that, according to its jurisprudence(notably its 1986 Judgment in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicara-guav .United States of America)),persons,groupsofpersonsorentitiesmay,forpurposesofinternationalresponsibility,beequatedwithStateorgansevenifthatstatusdoesnotfollowfrominternallaw,providedthatinfactthepersons,groupsorentitiesact in“completedependence”ontheState,ofwhichtheyareultimatelymerelytheinstrument .Inthepresentcase,the Court however cannot find that the persons or entitiesthat committed the acts of genocide at Srebrenica had suchtieswiththeFRYthattheycanbedeemedtohavebeencom-pletelydependentonit .

At the relevant time, July 1995, according to the Court,neithertheRepublikaSrpskanortheVRScouldberegardedasmereinstrumentsthroughwhichtheFRYwasacting,andas lacking any real autonomy . The Court further states thatit has not been presented with materials indicating that the“Scorpions”wereinfactactingincompletedependenceontheRespondent .

TheCourtthereforefindsthattheactsofgenocideatSre-brenica cannot be attributed to the Respondent as havingbeencommittedbyitsorgansorbypersonsorentitieswhollydependent upon it, and thus do not on this basis entail theRespondent’sinternationalresponsibility .

The question of attribution of the Srebrenica genocide to the Respondent on the basis of direction or controlTheCourtthendetermineswhetherthemassacresatSre-

brenicawerecommittedbypersonswho,thoughnothavingthestatusoforgansoftheRespondent,neverthelessactedonitsinstructionsorunderitsdirectionorcontrol .

TheCourtindicatesthattheapplicablerule,whichisoneof customary law of international responsibility, is that theconductofapersonorgroupofpersonsshallbeconsideredanactofaStateunderinternationallawifthepersonorgroupof persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or underthedirectionorcontrolof,thatStateincarryingoutthecon-duct . This provision must be understood in the light of theCourt’sjurisprudenceonthesubject,particularlythatofthe1986JudgmentinthecaseconcerningMilitary and Paramili-tary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaraguav .United States of America).

Under the test set out above, it must be shown that this“effective control” was exercised, or that the State’s instruc-tions were given, in respect of each operation in which thealleged violations occurred, not generally in respect of theoverallactionstakenbythepersonsorgroupsofpersonshav-ingcommittedtheviolations .

TheCourtfindsthatinthelightoftheinformationavail-able to it, it has not been established that the massacres atSrebrenicawerecommittedbypersonsorentitiesrankingasorgans of the Respondent . It finds also that it has not beenestablished that those massacres were committed on the

instructions,orunderthedirectionoforgansoftheRespond-entState,northattheRespondentexercisedeffectivecontrolover theoperations in thecourseofwhich thosemassacres,whichconstitutedthecrimeofgenocide,wereperpetrated .

IntheviewoftheCourt,theApplicanthasnotprovedthatinstructionswereissuedbythefederalauthoritiesinBelgrade,orbyanyotherorganoftheFRY,tocommitthemassacres,still less thatanysuchinstructionsweregivenwiththespe-cificintent(dolus specialis)characterizingthecrimeofgeno-cide .Allindicationsaretothecontrary:thatthedecisiontokill theadultmalepopulationof theMuslimcommunity inSrebrenicawastakenbysomemembersoftheVRSMainStaff,butwithoutinstructionsfromoreffectivecontrolbytheFRY .

The Court concludes from the foregoing that the acts ofthosewhocommittedgenocideatSrebrenicacannotbeattrib-uted to theRespondentunder the rulesof international lawofStateresponsibility:thus,theinternationalresponsibilityoftheRespondentisnotengagedonthisbasis .

Responsibility, in respect of Srebrenica, for acts enumerated in Article III, paragraphs (b) to (e), of the Genocide Convention(paras .416–424)

The Court comes to the second of the questions set outabove, namely, that relating to the Respondent’s possibleresponsibilityonthegroundofoneoftheactsrelatedtogeno-cideenumeratedinArticleIIIoftheConvention .Itnotesthatitisclearfromanexaminationofthefactsthatonlyallegedacts of complicity in genocide, within the meaning of Arti-cleIII,paragraph(e),arerelevantinthepresentcase .

The question is whether such acts can be attributed toorgans of the Respondent or to persons acting under itsinstructionsorunderitseffectivecontrol .

The Court states that, in order to ascertain whether theRespondentisresponsiblefor“complicityingenocide”,itmustexaminewhether thoseorgansorpersons furnished“aidorassistance”inthecommissionofthegenocideinSrebrenica,inasensenotsignificantlydifferent fromthatof thosecon-ceptsinthegenerallawofinternationalresponsibility .Italsoneedstoconsiderwhethertheorganorpersonfurnishingaidorassistancetoaperpetratorofthecrimeofgenocideactedknowingly, that is tosay, inparticular,wasawareor shouldhavebeenawareofthespecific intent(dolus specialis)of theprincipalperpetrator .

TheCourt isnotconvincedbytheevidencefurnishedbythe Applicant that the above conditions were met . In par-ticular, it hasnot been established beyond anydoubt in theargumentbetweenthePartieswhethertheauthoritiesoftheFRY supplied—and continued to supply—the VRS leaderswhodecideduponandcarriedoutthoseactsofgenocidewiththeiraidandassistance,atatimewhenthoseauthoritieswereclearly aware that genocide was about to take place or wasunderway .

The Court notes that a point which is clearly decisive inthisconnectionisthatitwasnotconclusivelyshownthatthedecisiontoeliminatephysicallytheadultmalepopulationoftheMuslimcommunity fromSrebrenicawasbrought to theattentionoftheBelgradeauthoritieswhenitwastaken .

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TheCourtconcludesfromtheabovethattheinternationalresponsibility of the Respondent is not engaged for acts ofcomplicityingenocidementionedinArticleIII,paragraph(e),oftheConvention .Inthelightofthisfinding,andofthefind-ingsaboverelatingtotheotherparagraphsofArticleIII,theinternationalresponsibilityoftheRespondentisnotengagedunderArticleIIIasawhole .

Responsibility for breach of the obligations to prevent and punish genocide(paras .425–450)

TheCourtpointsoutthatintheGenocideConvention,thedutytopreventgenocideandthedutytopunishitsperpetra-torsaretwodistinctyetconnectedobligations .Eachofthemmustaccordinglybeconsideredinturn .

The obligation to prevent genocide (paras .428–438)The Court makes a few preliminary remarks . First, the

GenocideConventionisnottheonlyinternationalinstrumentprovidingforanobligationontheStatespartiestoittotakecertainstepstopreventtheactsitseekstoprohibit .Secondly,itisclearthattheobligationinquestionisoneofconductandnot one of result, in the sense that a State cannot be underanobligationtosucceed,whateverthecircumstances,inpre-ventingthecommissionofgenocide:theobligationofStatesparties israthertoemployallmeansreasonablyavailable tothem,soastopreventgenocidesofaraspossible .AStatedoesnot incur responsibility simply because the desired result isnot achieved; responsibility is however incurred if the Statemanifestly failed to take all measures to prevent genocidewhichwerewithinitspower,andwhichmighthavecontrib-utedtopreventingthegenocide .Thirdly,aStatecanbeheldresponsible forbreaching theobligation topreventgenocideonlyifgenocidewasactuallycommitted .Fourthandfinally,theCourtbelievesitespeciallyimportanttolaystressonthedifferencesbetweentherequirementstobemetbeforeaStatecanbeheld tohaveviolated theobligation topreventgeno-cide—withinthemeaningofArticleIoftheConvention—andthosetobesatisfiedinorderforaStatetobeheldresponsiblefor “complicity in genocide”—within the meaning of Arti-cleIII,paragraph(e)—aspreviouslydiscussed .

TheCourt thenconsiders the factsof thecase, confiningitselftotheFRY’sconductvis-à-vistheSrebrenicamassacres .Itfirstnotesthat,duringtheperiodunderconsideration,theFRY was in a position of influence, over the Bosnian Serbswho devised and implemented the genocide in Srebrenica,unlikethatofanyoftheotherStatespartiestotheGenocideConvention owing to the strength of the political, militaryandfinanciallinksbetweentheFRYontheonehandandtheRepublikaSrpskaand theVRSon theother,which, thoughsomewhatweakerthanintheprecedingperiod,nonethelessremainedveryclose .

Secondly,theCourtcannotbutnotethat,ontherelevantdate,theFRYwasboundbyveryspecificobligationsbyvirtueofthetwoOrdersoftheCourtindicatingprovisionalmeasuresdeliveredin1993 .Inparticular,initsOrderof8April1993,the Court stated, inter alia, that the FRY was required toensure “that any military, paramilitary or irregular armedunitswhichmaybedirectedorsupportedbyit,aswellasany

organizationsandpersonswhichmaybesubjecttoitscontrol,directionorinfluence,donotcommitanyactsofgenocide,ofconspiracy to commit genocide, of direct and public incite-menttocommitgenocide,orofcomplicityingenocide . . .” .TheCourt’suse,intheabovepassage,oftheterm“influence”isparticularlyrevealingofthefactthattheOrderconcernednotonlythepersonsorentitieswhoseconductwasattribut-abletotheFRY,butalsoallthosewithwhomtheRespondentmaintainedcloselinksandonwhichitcouldexertacertaininfluence .

Thirdly, the Court recalls that although it has not foundthattheinformationavailabletotheBelgradeauthoritiesindi-cated, as a matter of certainty, that genocide was imminent(whichiswhycomplicityingenocidewasnotupheldabove),theycouldhardlyhavebeenunawareoftheseriousriskofitonce the VRS forces had decided to occupy the Srebrenicaenclave .

Inviewoftheirundeniableinfluenceandoftheinforma-tion,voicingseriousconcern, in theirpossession, theYugo-slavfederalauthoritiesshould,intheviewoftheCourt,havemadethebesteffortswithintheirpowertotryandpreventthetragiceventsthentakingshape,whosescale,thoughitcouldnothavebeenforeseenwithcertainty,mightatleasthavebeensurmised .TheFRY leadership,andPresidentMiloševićaboveall,werefullyawareoftheclimateofdeep-seatedhatredwhichreigned between the Bosnian Serbs and the Muslims in theSrebrenicaregion .Yet theRespondenthasnotshownthat ittookanyinitiativetopreventwhathappened,oranyactiononitsparttoaverttheatrocitieswhichwerecommitted .ItmustthereforebeconcludedthattheorgansoftheRespondentdidnothing to prevent the Srebrenica massacres, claiming thattheywerepowerlesstodoso,whichhardlytallieswiththeirknowninfluenceovertheVRS .Asindicatedabove,foraStatetobeheldresponsibleforbreachingitsobligationofpreven-tion, itdoesnotneed tobeproven that theStateconcerneddefinitelyhadthepowertopreventthegenocide;itissufficientthatithadthemeanstodosoandthatitmanifestlyrefrainedfromusingthem .

Suchisthecasehere .Inviewoftheforegoing,theCourtconcludesthattheRespondent violateditsobligationtopre-venttheSrebrenicagenocideinsuchamannerastoengageitsinternationalresponsibility .

The obligation to punish genocide (paras .439–450)TheCourtfirstrecallsthatthegenocideinSrebrenica,the

commission of which it has established above, was not car-riedoutintheRespondent’sterritory .ItconcludesfromthisthattheRespondentcannotbechargedwithnothavingtriedbeforeitsowncourtsthoseaccusedofhavingparticipatedinthe Srebrenica genocide, either as principal perpetrators orasaccomplices,orofhavingcommittedoneoftheotheractsmentionedinArticleIIIoftheConventioninconnectionwiththeSrebrenicagenocide .

TheCourtneedsthentoconsiderwhethertheRespondentfulfilled its obligation to co-operate with the “internationalpenal tribunal” referred to inArticleVIof theConvention .Forit iscertainthatoncesuchacourthasbeenestablished,ArticleVIobligestheContractingParties“whichshallhave

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accepteditsjurisdiction”toco-operatewithit,whichimpliesthattheywillarrestpersonsaccusedofgenocidewhoareintheir territory—even if thecrimeofwhich theyareaccusedwascommittedoutsideit—and,failingprosecutionofthemintheparties’owncourts,thattheywillhandthemoverfortrialbythecompetentinternationaltribunal .

TheCourtestablishesthattheICTYconstitutesan“inter-nationalpenaltribunal”withinthemeaningofArticleVIandthat theRespondentmustberegardedhashaving“acceptedthe jurisdiction” of the tribunal within the meaning of theprovisionfrom14December1995atthelatest,thedateofthesigningandentryintoforceoftheDaytonAgreementbetweenBosniaandHerzegovina,CroatiaandtheFRY .Annex1Aofthattreaty,madebindingonthepartiesbyvirtueofitsArti-cleII,providesnamelythattheymustfullyco-operate,nota-blywiththeICTY .

Inthisconnection,theCourtfirstobservesthat,duringtheoralproceedings,theRespondentassertedthatthedutytoco-operatehadbeencompliedwithfollowingtherégimechangein Belgrade in the year 2000, thus implicitly admitting thatsuchhadnotbeenthecaseduringtheprecedingperiod .Theconduct of the organs of the FRY before the régime changehowever engagestheRespondent’sinternationalresponsibilityjustasmuchasitdoesthatof itsStateauthoritiesfromthatdate . Further, the Court cannot but attach a certain weighttotheplentiful,andmutuallycorroborative,informationsug-gestingthatGeneralMladić,indictedbytheICTYforgeno-cide,asoneofthoseprincipallyresponsiblefortheSrebrenicamassacres,wasontheterritoryoftheRespondentatleastonseveraloccasionsandforsubstantialperiodsduringthe lastfewyearsandisstilltherenow,withouttheSerbauthoritiesdoing what they could and can reasonably do to ascertainexactlywhereheislivingandarresthim .

It therefore appears to the Court sufficiently establishedthattheRespondentfailedinitsdutytoco-operatefullywiththeICTY .ThisfailureconstitutesaviolationbytheRespond-entofitsdutiesasapartytotheDaytonAgreement,andasaMember of the United Nations, and accordingly a violationof itsobligationsunderArticleVIof theGenocideConven-tion . On this point, the Applicant’s submissions relating tothe violation by the Respondent of Articles I and VI of theConventionmustthereforebeupheld .

Responsibility for breach of the Court’s Orders indicating provisional measures(paras .451–458)

Having recalled that its “orders on provisional measuresunder Article 41 [of the Statute] have binding effect”, theCourt finds that it is clear that in respect of the massacresat Srebrenica in July 1995 the Respondent failed to fulfil itsobligation indicated in paragraph 52 A (1) of the Order of8April1993andreaffirmedintheOrderof13September1993to“takeallmeasureswithinitspowertopreventcommissionofthecrimeofgenocide” .Nordiditcomplywiththemeasureindicatedinparagraph52A(2)oftheOrderof8April1993,reaffirmedintheOrderof13September1993,insofarasthatmeasurerequireditto“ensurethatany . . .organizationsand

personswhichmaybesubjecttoits . . . influence . . .donotcommitanyactsofgenocide” .

The question of reparation(paras .459–470)

Inthecircumstancesofthepresentcase,astheApplicantrecognizes,itisinappropriatetoasktheCourttofindthattheRespondent is under an obligation of restitutio in integrum.Insofar as restitution is not possible, as the Court stated inthecaseoftheGabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slova-kia),“[i]tisawell-establishedruleofinternationallawthataninjuredStateisentitledtoobtaincompensationfromtheStatewhichhascommittedaninternationallywrongfulactforthedamagecausedbyit” .

TheCourt,inordertoruleontheclaimforreparationmustascertainwhether,andtowhatextent,theinjuryassertedbytheApplicantistheconsequenceofwrongfulconductbytheRespondentwiththeconsequencethattheRespondentshouldbe required to make reparation for it, in accordance withtheprincipleofcustomaryinternationallawstatedabove .Inthiscontext,thequestionwhetherthegenocideatSrebrenicawouldhavetakenplaceeveniftheRespondenthadattemptedtopreventitbyemployingallmeansinitspossession,becomesdirectlyrelevant .However,theCourtclearlycannotconcludefromthecaseasawholeandwithasufficientdegreeofcer-taintythatthegenocideatSrebrenicawouldinfacthavebeenaverted if the Respondent had acted in compliance with itslegalobligations .Since theCourtcannotregardasprovenacausalnexusbetweentheRespondent’sviolationofitsobliga-tion of prevention and the genocide at Srebrenica, financialcompensationisnottheappropriateformofreparationforthebreachoftheobligationtopreventgenocide .

ItishoweverclearthattheApplicantisentitledtorepara-tion in the formof satisfaction, and thismay take themostappropriateform,astheApplicantitselfsuggested,ofadecla-rationinthepresentJudgmentthattheRespondenthasfailedtocomplywiththeobligationimposedbytheConventiontopreventthecrimeofgenocide .

Turningto thequestionof theappropriatereparationforthebreachbytheRespondentofitsobligationundertheCon-ventiontopunishactsofgenocide,theCourtnotesthatitissatisfied that theRespondenthasoutstandingobligationsasregardsthetransfertotheICTYofpersonsaccusedofgeno-cide,inordertocomplywithitsobligationsunderArticlesIandVIoftheGenocideConvention,inparticularinrespectofGeneralRatkoMladić .

TheCourtdoesnotfinditappropriatetogiveeffecttotheApplicant’s request for an order for symbolic compensationinrespectofthenon-complianceoftheRespondentwiththeCourt’sOrderof8April1993onprovisionalmeasures .

** *

Dissenting opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh

Vice-President Al-Khasawneh felt that he should explainthenatureofhisdissentbeforeexplainingthereasonsforit .

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Hebelievedhisdisagreementwiththemajority,relatingasitdid,notonlytotheirconclusionsbutalsototheirreasoning,assumptions and methodology was deep enough to justifyhisdissentnotwithstandinghisagreementwithcertainotherpartsoftheJudgmentnotably:Jurisdiction—SerbianfailuretopreventgenocideinSrebrenica—failuretoco-operatewiththeICTY—failuretocomplywithearlierprovisionalmeasures .

Onjurisdiction,theVice-Presidentrecalledthatanunprec-edented number of jurisdictional rounds has been partlyresponsible for the huge delay in dispensing justice in thepresentcase .JurisdictioncentredontheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia’s(FRY)internationalstatusanditsUnitedNationsmembership and consequently the question of “access”—blown out of proportion, in an attempt to undermine theCourt’s clearly established jurisdiction in the 1996 Judg-ment—cametoplayacentralrole .HeanalysedthecontextinwhichtheissueofFRYmembershipintheUnitedNationsanditsclaimtobeacontinuatorof theSocialistFederalRepub-lic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) arose and came to the conclusionsthattheFRYwasalwaysaUnitedNationsMemberandcouldnot have been otherwise and that the sole effect of relevantSecurityCouncilandGeneralAssemblyresolutionswasFRYnon-participationintheworkoftheGeneralAssembly .Thisconclusion was based on the objectively verifiable criterionthattheSFRYwasanoriginalMemberoftheUnitedNationsandthatitwasneverextinguishedandthatthereisageneralpresumptionagainstlossofUnitedNationsmembership .

TheVice-PresidentalsorecalledthatonlytheFRYcould,ofitsownwill,giveupitsmembershipasacontinuatorofSFRYandapplyasanewMember,i .e .asasuccessor .Therefore,whenit did so in 2000 this meant that it was a continuator from1992–2000 and a successor from 2000 and not that it was anon-Memberbefore2000asthe2004JudgmentsontheLegal-ity of Use of Force found .Becausenoconclusion,forthepast,couldbederivedfromthefactofFRYadmissiontotheUnitedNations in2000, andbecausean independentanalysisof theFRYstatusin1992–2000(ananalysisindependentfromthefactofadmission)couldleadonlytooneconclusion,i .e .1992–2000membership,hefeltthelogicofthe2004Judgmentswasdefec-tive .Healsofeltitcontradictedearlierjurisprudence,i .e .1993Order,1996Judgmentandparticularlythe2003Application for Revision Judgment which correctly found that no retroactiveconsequencesforFRYmembershipintheUnitedNationscouldbederivedfromFRYadmissionin2000 .

TheVice-PresidentalsofeltthatFRYinitiativetotheCourtto reconsider ex officio its jurisdiction to be irregular andfeltitregrettablethattheCourtin2003acceptedthatinitia-tivebecause thatcontradicted itsown jurisdiction .Thus,hethought, the initiative led to contradictions in the Court’sjurisprudenceandhadnoplaceundertheCourt’sStatute .Hefelt thatprecedentscited insupportof thepropositions thatthe“Courtmustalwaysbesatisfiedithasjurisdiction”tobeinapplicable .

Withall thesecontradictions—forwhich theCourt itselfhadbeenmainlyresponsible—beingquotedbackattheCourtandthecontagionspreading,theCourthadtorelyundulyonthe principle of res judicata which was correct but not very

satisfying .ClearlytheCourthadretreatedtothe last lineofdefencepartlybecauseofitsowndoing .

On the merits, Vice-President Al-Khasawneh felt thatthroughacombinationofmethodsandassumptions,uncalledforinlawandnotsuitabletothefactsofthecase,theCourtachieved the extraordinary feat of absolving Serbia of itsresponsibilityforgenocideinBosniaandHerzegovinasaveforfailuretopreventthegenocideatSrebrenica,whereinanycasehethoughtSerbianresponsibilitywasmoreactivelyinvolvedthanthemerefailuretoprevent .

Firstly, since intent is usually elusive and, together withattributability, often carefully concealed, the Court shouldhavesoughtaccesstothepapersofthe“Serbian Defence Coun-cil”whichwouldprobablyhavemadetheCourt’staskmucheasier .RefusalofSerbiatodivulgedocumentsshouldhaveledatleasttomoreliberalrecoursetoevidence .Byinsistingonaveryhighevidentiary“standard”andnoshiftingof“Burden of proof”,theApplicantwasputatahugedisadvantage .Sec-ondly,theCourtalsoappliedastricttestofeffective control:the Nicaragua test to a different situation where inter aliasharedethnicityandsharedpurposetocommitinternationalcrimes, e .g . ethnic cleansing require only an overall control test.Thirdly,theCourtalsorefusedtoinfergenocidefroma“consistent pattern of conduct”disregardinginthisrespectarichandrelevantjurisprudenceofothercourts .Fourthly,theCourt failed to appreciate genocide as a complex crime andnotasinglemurder .Therefore,eventswhichwhenlookedatcomprehensively gave rise to responsibility of Serbia, wereinsteadseeninadisconnected manner,e .g .theparticipationofGeneralMladićinSrebrenicaandtheroleofthe“Scorpions” .Fifthly, even when there was a clear admission of guilt, e .g .theSerbianCouncilofMinisters’ statementasa reaction tothevideoshowingtheexecutionofMuslimprisonersbythe“Scorpions” was dismissed as a political statement thoughlegalweightisattachedtosuchstatementsinpreviousCourtjurisprudencesomeofwhichtheCourtdidnoteveninvoke .

TheVice-PresidentconcludedthathadtheCourttriedtoseeforitselfitmostprobablywouldhavefoundSerbiaresponsibleeitherasprincipaloranaccompliceinthegenocideinBosnia .Thisitcouldhavedonewithoutlosingtherigorofitsreason-ingorthehighstandardsofevidenceitrequired .WithregardtoSrebrenicahewassurethatactiveSerbianinvolvementwasprovedtosatisfactorytostandardsinfactsandinlaw .

Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Ranjeva, Shi, and Koroma

In a joint dissenting opinion attached to the Judgment(Merits), Judges Ranjeva, Shi, and Koroma have expressedtheir serious misgivings about the Judgment’s applicationofthedoctrineofres judicata[thatamatterhasbeenfinallyadjudicated] to the Court’s 1996 Judgment on PreliminaryObjections to conclude by “necessary implication” that theissue of jurisdiction ratione personae had been decided . Intakingthispositionthejudgespointedoutthattheirsispurelyalegalone,notinvolvinganypoliticalormoraljudgmentinrespectofthemeritsofthecase .Intheirview,theJudgment’srelianceonres judicatalargelysidestepstwofundamentalandrelatedquestionsbeforetheCourtwhichhaveabearingonthe

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existenceoftheCourt’sjurisdictionatthetimetheApplica-tionwasfiled:namely,whetherSerbiaandMontenegrowasaUnitedNationsMemberandwhetheritwasapartytoand/orboundbytheGenocideConvention .

Accordingtothejudges,thescopeandeffectofres judicataisproperlyderivedfromconstitutionalandstatutoryrequire-mentsandfromthesubmissionsbythepartiestoaparticulardispute . Moreover, Article 56 of the Statute provides: “Thejudgmentshallstatethereasonsonwhichitisbased .”Inthepresentcase,theJudgmentimpliesthattheissueofaccesshadbeenconsideredanddecided,buttheissueofaccesshadnotbeenaddressedbytheParties—whotheJudgmentacknowl-edges did not have “any interest” in raising the issue at thetime—ordecidedbytheCourtinits1996Judgment .Moreo-ver,thejudgeshavepointedout,the2004JudgmentinLegality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegrov .Belgium)concludedthatSerbiaandMontenegrowasnotaMemberoftheUnitedNations in 1999 and that the Genocide Convention did notcontain any of the “special provisions contained in treatiesinforce”thatwouldgrantStatespartiesaccesstotheCourt .Accordingly, in the view of the judges, from both factualandlegalperspectivesitwouldseemclearthat,ifSerbiaandMontenegrowasnotaUnitedNationsMemberin1999,thenitalsomustnothavebeenaMemberwhentheApplicationinthiscasewasfiledon28March1993andtheRespondentwasthusineligibletoaccedetotheGenocideConventionpursu-ant to one of the two means specified in its Article xI . Res judicata serves a purpose which, in the view of the judges,cannotreplacetherequirementsoftheUnitedNationsChar-ter or the Statute of the Court . They have pointed out thattheCourtshouldalways face jurisdictionalchallengeswhentheyarepresented,astheyarenow,andthattheCourtfirstexamined the issue of access in the Legality of Use of Force inanexception to thegeneral rule that theCourt is free todetermine which jurisdictional ground to examine first . Inany event, the Court’s application of res judicata, they havepointedout, isinconsistentevenwithinthepresentJudgment,asthejurisdictionalfindingsmadeinthe1996Judgmentandrelied on in the present Judgment were addressed to SerbiaandMontenegro,whereas theres judicata effectof the1996JudgmentisappliedonlytoSerbiainthepresentJudgment .

JudgesRanjeva,Shi,andKoromahavethusconcludedthattheJudgmenthasneglectedtodealwithoneofthesubstantivesubmissionssquarelyputbeforetheCourtatthisjunctureandthat itwouldonlyhavebeenbyaddressingallof thosesub-missionsthattheCourtcouldhavearrivedata legallyvalidconclusion .

Separate opinion of Judge Ranjeva

Theinternational responsibilityof aState foromission isthe sanctionwhichattaches to theobligation toprevent thecrime of genocide, which is an obligation erga omnes. Toachievetheinternationalsolidaritywhichisitsbasis,constantvigilanceisrequiredinacontextofmultilateralco-operation .Thisobligation,whichmustbefulfilledwithdiscernment,isoneincumbentonallStatesparties .Theobligationisassessedin concreto by the Court, a task not without difficulty, for

it essentially entails sovereign States acting preventativelythroughconcerteddiplomaticaction .

Joint declaration of Judges Shi and Koroma

In a joint declaration attached to the Judgment (Merits),Judges Shi and Koroma have expressed their serious doubtsabouttheinterpretationgiventotheGenocideConventionbytheJudgmenttotheeffectthataStateitselfcouldbeheldtohavecommittedthecrimeofgenocideandtobeheldrespon-sible therefor . In their view, such an interpretation, derived“by implication” fromArticleIof theConvention, is incon-sistent with the object and purpose of the Convention as awhole,withitsplainmeaning,andwiththeintentionofthepartiesatthetimethetreatywasconcluded .ThejudgeshavemaintainedthatwhattheConventionenvisagesisthetrialandpunishmentofindividualsforthecrimeofgenocideandthatStateresponsibilityisdefinedintermsofvariousspecificobli-gationsrelatedtotheundertakingtopreventthecrimeandtopunishthosewhocommititandthatitwouldbeabsurdforaStatepartytotheConventiontoundertaketopunishitselfasaState .Inthejudges’view,iftheConventionhadbeenintendedtocontainanobligationofsuchimportanceastoenvisionthecriminal responsibility of States, then this would have beenexpressly stipulated in the Convention, but there is no suchstipulation .TheyhavepointedoutthatproposalsmadeduringthenegotiationoftheConventionthatwouldhaveprescribedStateresponsibilityforthecommissionofgenocideitselfwererejected .Thejudgeshavealsopointedoutthatthepurposeofinterpretingatreatyistodiscoveritsmeaningandtheinten-tionofthepartiesatthetimeofthetreaty’snegotiationandnottoachieveadesiredobjective .

* *However, notwithstanding their disagreement with the

interpretationgiventotheConvention,includingitsfirstArti-cle,intheJudgment,JudgesShiandKoromavotedinfavourof thefindings regarding thepreventionofgenocide inSre-brenicainJuly1995astheybelieveintheintrinsichumanitar-ianvalueoftheconclusionreachedbytheCourtaswellasintheoverridinglegalimperativeestablishedbyArticleIoftheConvention,namely:thedutyofaStatetodowhatitproperlycan,withinitsmeansandthelaw,totrytopreventgenocidewhenthereisaseriousdangerofitsoccurrenceofwhichtheState isor shouldbeaware . JudgesShiandKoromabelieve,however,thattheconclusionreachedbytheJudgmentinthisregardcouldhavebeenmorelegallysecureifanchoredontherelevantChapterVIISecurityCouncilresolutionsthatidenti-fiedseveralclearmissedmomentsofopportunityfortheFRYleadership to have acted with respect to the imminent andserioushumanitarianriskposedbyanyadvanceofBosnianSerbparamilitaryunitsonSrebrenicaand its surroundings .Mr .Miloševićcouldandshouldhaveexertedwhateverpres-surehehadathisdisposalovertheBosnianSerbleadershiptotrytopreventthegenocideatSrebrenica .


Judge Owada has appended his separate opinion to theJudgment of the Court . He argues that while he concurs in

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generalwiththeconclusionsthattheCourthasreachedinitsdispositif,hefindsthatsomeofthereasoningsoftheJudgmentdifferfromhisownorneedsomefurtherelaborationinsomeimportantrespects .

First,JudgeOwadafindsthattheCourt’spronouncementon the issue of jus standi of the Respondent in the presentcase should not be understood based on an oversimplifiedapplicationoftheprincipleofres judicata.TheApplicanthasarguedineffectthatthepointraisedinthesubmissionoftheRespondentintheformofthe“Initiative”of4May2001isinthenatureofanobjectiontojurisdiction,thatthe1996Judg-ment on Preliminary Objections in this case has settled allissuesofjurisdictionandthusconstitutesres judicataonthematterofjurisdictioninthiscaseandthatergothatistheendofthestoryandtheobjectionraisedanewbytheRespondentshouldberejected .AccordingtoJudgeOwadait isnotsucha simple case of application of the principle of res judicata simpliciter,andhewishestoexpoundalittletherationaleoftheJudgmentonthispointaccordingtohisownview .Whilefullyendorsingthelegalgroundonwhichthe2004Judgmentsin the Legality of Use of Force cases is based with regard tothesameissueofjus standioftheFRY,JudgeOwadaempha-sizesthatthe1996Judgmentistobedistinguishedfromthe2004 Judgment in one important respect . His conclusion isthatwhileitistruethatthe1996Judgmentdidnotspecificallyaddressasamatteroffacttheissueofjus standi,itnonethelessmustbeconstrued as a matter of lawashavingmadethe final determinationonthispointof jus standiof theRespondent,whichhadbeenleftopeninthe1993JudgmentontheRequestforProvisionalMeasuresinthepresentcase .

Second,JudgeOwadadoesnotassociatehimselfwiththepositionoftheJudgmentthatunderArticleIoftheGenocideConventiontheStatespartiestotheConventionhaveunder-takentheobligation,notjusttopreventandpunishthecrimeofgenocidecommittedbyindividuals,buttheobligationnottocommitgenocidethemselvesunderpainofdirectinterna-tional responsibilityunder the Convention itself in the caseofthebreachofthisobligation .IntheviewofJudgeOwada,whiletheobjectandpurposeoftheGenocideConventionistobanishtheheinouscrimeofgenocide,theapproachemployedbytheConventionisspecific:inordertoachievethispurpose,theConventionpurportstogothroughthechannelofprose-cutingtheindividualsinnationalcourtsandinternationaltri-bunalsbyholdingthemtoaccountforthecrimeofgenocide .AccordingtoJudgeOwada,theunderlyingassumptionoftheConventionisnodoubtthatnobody,includingStates,shouldbeallowedtocommitthisheinouscrimeofgenocide,butthisdoesnotmean,intheabsenceofaprooftothecontrary,thattheStatespartieshaveundertaken the legal commitment toaccepttheirlegalresponsibilityundertheConventioninsuchawaythatinthecaseofdefaultinthisundertakingtheycanbeheldtoaccountforthisactwithin the régime of the Conven-tion.WhileJudgeOwadareachesthesameconclusionastheJudgment to the extent that the Court is empowered underArticle Ix of the Convention to deal with the issue of Stateresponsibilityundergeneral international lawonthepartofa State for an act of individuals whose act is attributable totheState—anissuenotcoveredinhisviewbythesubstantiveprovisionsoftheConvention—hetriestoshowthattheCourt

shouldarriveatthesameconclusiononamuchlesscontro-versialground .

Separate opinion of Judge Tomka

In his separate opinion, Judge Tomka disagrees with themajority’sviewthatres judicatabarstheCourt’sreconsidera-tionoftheissueofitsjurisdiction,as“embodied”initsJudg-mentof11July1996 .ThisfindingcontradictstheCourt’sear-lierposition,communicatedtothePartiesin2003byaletterfromtheCourt’sRegistrar,thattheFRYcouldpresentfurtherarguments on jurisdiction at the merits stage . Neither theCourt’s Statute nor its Rules prohibit objections to jurisdic-tionduringmeritsproceedings,andtheCourtmustexaminesuchissuesproprio motuifnecessary .Inanyevent,theCourt’sdecisionof11July1996didnotaddressthespecificjurisdic-tional question now raised—whether the FRY was party totheCourt’sStatutebyvirtueofUnitedNationsmembershipwhentheApplicationwasfiledinMarch1993 .Therefore,theCourt’searlierdecisionisnotpreclusive,andtheCourtshouldhavemadethisjurisdictionalenquiryde novo.

Reviewing jurisdiction de novo, Judge Tomka concludesthat the Court has jurisdiction . The exercise of the Court’sjurisdiction requires both access to the Court under Arti-cle35oftheCourt’sStatuteandjurisdictionratione personae.JudgeTomkaexplainsthattheaccessrequirementisnowmetbecausetheFRYbecameaMemberoftheUnitedNationson1November2000,andhasthereforehadaccesstotheCourtsince that date . Jurisdiction ratione personae is establishedbecausetheFRYhasbeenpartytotheGenocideConventionsinceApril1992underthecustomaryruleofipso juresucces-sion,asappliedtocasesofStatedissolution .TheFRY’sattempt,inMarch2001, toaccede to theGenocideConvention,withareservationtoArticleIx,wascompletelyinconsistentwithits contemporaneous succession to other conventions as thesuccessorStatetotheSFRY,includingtheViennaConventiononSuccessionofStatesinRespectofTreaties,whichprovidesthatincasesofStatedissolution,thetreatiesofthepredeces-sorStatecontinueinforceinrespectofeachsuccessorState .Moreover,BosniaandHerzegovinatimelyraisedanobjectionto the FRY’s notification of accession to the Genocide Con-vention .Assuch,theFRY’sattempttoaccedetotheGenocideConventionwithareservationtoArticleIxshouldbedeemedineffective .The fact that theFRYdidnothaveaccess to theCourtwhenBosniaandHerzegovinafiled itsApplication isaremediabledefectwhich,onceremedied,doesnotprecludetheexerciseofjurisdiction .Therefore,JudgeTomkaconcludes,(1) it was improper for the Court to decline to consider theFRY’sobjectionstoitsjurisdictionatthemeritsstageonthegroundofres judicata;and(2)reviewingtheFRY’snon-pre-cludedobjectionsde novo,theCourthasjurisdiction .

JudgeTomkanextturnstohisdivergentviewsonthepur-pose of the Genocide Convention and the interpretation ofsomeof itsprovisions in lightof thatpurpose .TheConven-tionisprimarilyaninstrumentofinternationalcriminallawwhich compels States to prevent genocide and to punish itsindividualperpetrators .ThedraftinghistoryoftheConven-tiondoesnotsupporttheviewthattheConventionconceivesgenocideasacriminalactofaState .JudgeTomkadisagrees

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with the majority’s position that the compromissory clauseinArticleIxoftheConventionencompassesthejurisdictionto determine whether a State has committed genocide . HebelievesthatsuchclauseundoubtedlyconfersjurisdictionontheCourttodeterminewhetheraStatehasfulfilleditsdutiestopreventgenocideandtopunishindividualsforsuchcrime,aswellastheresponsibilityaStateincursforneglectingthoseduties .Further, inhisview,the jurisdictionoftheCourt,asaconsequenceoftheadditionofthewords“includingthose[disputes]relatingtotheresponsibilityofaStateforgenocideorforanyoftheotheractsenumeratedinarticleIII”intothecompromissoryclauseinArticleIx,alsoincludesthepoweroftheCourttodetermineinternational“responsibilityofaStatefor genocide” on the basis of attribution to the State of thecriminalactofgenocideperpetratedbyaperson .TheCourt,however,isnottheproperforuminwhichtomakealegallybindingpronouncementthatacrimeofgenocidewascommit-ted .Suchafindingistobemadewithintheframeworkofacriminalprocedurewhichalsoprovidesforarightofappeal .TheCourthasnocriminal jurisdictionand itsprocedure isnotacriminalone .

JudgeTomkafurtherreasonsthattheCourt’sfindingsonthe Respondent’s breach of its obligation to prevent geno-cide are not clearly supported by the evidence and fail tofully address the Parties’ arguments . Regarding the territo-rialscopeofStatesparties’obligationtopreventgenocide,hetakestheviewthatunderArticleIoftheGenocideConven-tion the State does have an obligation to prevent genocideoutsideitsterritorytotheextentthatitexercisesjurisdictionoutsideitsterritory,orexercisescontrolovercertainpersonsin their activities abroad . This obligation exists in additiontotheunequivocaldutytopreventthecommissionofgeno-cidewithin its territory . Ithasnotbeenestablished that theFederal Republic of Yugoslavia exercised jurisdiction in theareas surrounding Srebrenica where atrocious mass killingstookplace .NorhasitbeenestablishedbeforetheCourtthatitexercisedcontrolovertheperpetratorswhoconductedtheseatrociouskillingsoutsidetheterritoryoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia .TheplantoexecuteasmanyaspossibleofthemilitaryagedBosnianMuslimmenpresentintheSrebrenicaenclavewasdevisedand implemented by theBosnianSerbsfollowing the take-overofSrebrenica in July1995 .ThatwasthefactualfindingoftheICTY .IthasnotbeenestablishedasamatteroffactbeforethisCourtthattheFederalRepublicofYugoslaviaauthoritiesknewinadvanceofthisplan .InsuchasituationtheycouldnothavepreventedtheterriblemassacresinSrebrenica .

Finally, JudgeTomkaexplainsthatalthoughtheFRYdidnot become a party to the Court’s Statute until 1 Novem-ber 2000 when it was admitted as a Member of the UnitedNations,theFRYclaimedtobeaUnitedNationsMemberatthetimetheCourtrendereditsOrdersonprovisionalmeas-ures in 1993, and therefore should have perceived itself asbound by those Orders . In any event, orders on provisionalmeasuresproducetheireffectsfromthetimeoftheirnotifi-cationtothepartiesandremaininforceuntilacourt’sfinaljudgmentonthecase,evenifthecourteventuallyfindsthatitiswithoutjurisdiction .JudgeTomkaaccordinglyagreesthat

theFRYfailedtocomplywithsomeoftheprovisionalmeas-uresorderedbytheCourtin1993whiletheywereineffect .

Declaration of Judge Keith

Judge Keith explained his reasons for finding that SerbiaandMontenegrowascomplicitinthegenocidecommittedatSrebrenicainJuly1995,intermsofArticleIII(e)oftheGeno-cideConvention .

In summary his position on the law was that Serbia andMontenegro, as an alleged accomplice, had to be proved tohavehadknowledgeof thegenocidal intentof theprincipalperpetrator (but need not share that intent) and, with thatknowledge,tohaveprovidedaidandassistancetotheperpe-trator .Hispositiononthefactswasthatthosetwoelementswereprovedtothenecessarystandard .

Declaration of Judge Bennouna

ConcurringintheCourt’srenewedaffirmationofjurisdic-tioninthepresentcase,JudgeBennounaneverthelesswishedtopointoutthattheadmissionofSerbiaandMontenegrotothe United Nations on 1 November 2000 was effective onlyprospectivelyanddidnotundoitspreviousstatus,orthatofthe FRY, within the Organization; it was on that basis thattheStatewasabletoappearbeforetheCourtin1993andtoanswerforitsactsbeforetheSecurityCouncil .

Inaddition,JudgeBennouna,whovotedagainstpoint4of theoperativepartconcerningSerbia’s lackofcomplicityingenocide,considersthatall theelementswerepresenttojustify a finding by the Court of complicity on the part ofthe authorities in Belgrade: not only the various forms ofassistance they provided to Republika Srpska and its armybutalso theknowledge theyhadorshouldhavehadof thegenocidalintentionoftheprincipalperpetratorofthemas-sacreatSrebrenica .

Declaration of Judge Skotnikov

InJudgeSkotnokiv’sview,theCourtdidnothavejurisdic-tion in this case . He points out that in the 2004 Legality of Use of Forcecases,whichtheRespondentbroughtagainsttheNATO States, the Court decided that Serbia and Montene-gro had not been a Member of the United Nations prior to1November2001 .TheCourtdeterminedthatmembershipoftheUnitedNationsatthetimeoffilinganapplicationwasarequirement of the Court’s Statute for it to entertain SerbiaandMontenegro’sclaims,andthereforeithadnojurisdictiontohearthesecases .

However, in this case the Court has avoided making thesame finding, even though in Judge Skotnikov’s view it wasboundtodoso(asthiscasewasalsofiledbeforeSerbiaandMontenegro became a United Nations Member), by statingthatitsfindingonjurisdictioninthe1996incidentalproceed-ingswasfinalandwithoutappeal .

Judge Skotnikov points out that the question of theRespondent’saccesstotheCourtbyvirtueofitsmembershipof the United Nations was not addressed in the 1996 Judg-mentonPreliminaryObjections .Accordingly,inhisviewthequestionofjurisdictioninthiscasewasnotthendefinitively

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determined .Byapplyingnowtheprincipleofres judicatatoitsfindingonjurisdictioninthe1966proceedings,theCourthascreated“parallel realities”: theonebeing that theCourthas jurisdiction over Serbia and Montenegro in cases filedbefore 1 November 2001 (in this case) and the other that itdoesnot(inthe2004Legality of Use of Forcecases) .

JudgeSkotnikovdisagreeswiththeCourt’sinterpretationoftheGenocideConventionascontaininganimpliedobliga-tionforStatestonotthemselvescommitgenocideortheotheracts enumerated in Article III of that Convention . He findstheveryideaofanunstatedobligationtobeobjectionableingeneral .Inaddition,inthisparticularcaseitisatoddswiththetermsoftheConvention,aninstrumentwhichdealswiththecriminalculpabilityofindividuals .

However, Judge Skotnikov does not think that such anunstated obligation is necessary at all for a State to be heldresponsible for genocide under the Genocide Convention .He states that, generally, as a matter of principle, whereverinternationallawcriminalizesanact,ifthatactiscommittedbysomeonecapableofengagingtheState’sresponsibility,theStatecanbeheldresponsible .Thisis,inhisview,definitelysointhecaseoftheGenocideConvention .

InJudgeSkotnikov’sviewtheGenocideConventiondoesnotempowertheCourttogobeyondsettlingdisputesrelat-ingtoaState’sresponsibilityforgenocideandtoconductanenquiryandmakeadeterminationwhetherornotthecrimeofgenocidewascommitted .TheCourtcannotperformthistask because it lacks criminal jurisdiction . In particular, byreasonof its lackofcriminal jurisdiction, theCourtcannotestablishtheexistenceorabsenceofgenocidalintent,whichisarequisiteelement,amentalpart,ofthecrimeofgenocide .

Accordingly,JudgeSkotnikovdisagreesthattheCourthasthecapacitytodeterminewhetherornotthecrimeofgenocidehasbeencommitted . Inhisviewthisapproach isconsistentneitherwiththeGenocideConventionortheCourt’sStatute .

Judge Skotnikov believes that in this case it would havebeensufficientfortheCourttorelyuponthefindingsoftheInternational Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia(ICTY)todeterminewhetherthecrimeofgenocidehadbeencommitted .However,heplacesoneimportantcaveatonthatstatement:thosefindingscanonlybereliedupontotheextenttheyareinconformitywiththeGenocideConvention .

In the view of Judge Skotnikov, the only findings by theICTY of the commission of genocide-related crimes in theformer Yugoslavia, in the Krstić and Blagojević cases, havenot been made in conformity with the Genocide Conven-tion .Inbothcasesthedefendantswereconvictedofacrimenot recognized in the Genocide Convention, but rather onewhich is established in the ICTY’s Statute, namely “aidingand abetting” genocide without having genocidal intent . Inaddition,thesecasesdeterminedthatgenocidehadoccurredinSrebrenicabymakingfindingsaboutthegenocidal intentof unidentified persons not before the ICTY . For these rea-sons, Judge Skotnikov considers that the Court should havedisregardedthesefindingsandconcludedthatithadnotbeensufficientlyestablishedthatthemassacreinSrebrenicacanbequalifiedasgenocide .

Consequently, Judge Skotnikov also disagrees with thefindingoftheCourtthattheRespondentbreachedtheprovi-sionalmeasuresorderedin1993 .

JudgeSkotnikovfindsthattheCourthasintroducedacon-ceptofthedutytopreventwhichmaybepoliticallyappealing,but hardly measurable at all in legal terms . In his view, theobligationtopreventappliesonlyintheterritorywhereaStateexercisesitsjurisdictionorwhichisunderitscontrol .Hecon-sidersthatthedutyisoneofresultandnotconduct:ifgeno-cidehasoccurredinthatterritory,theStateisresponsible .

Finally, Judge Skotnikov notes that the Respondent hasnot provided a clear-cut statement before this Court that ithasdoneeverything in itspower toapprehendand transferRatkoMladićtotheICTY .HeagreeswiththeCourtthatSer-biaisunderanobligationtoco-operatewiththatTribunal .

Dissenting opinion of Judge Mahiou

ThisisthefirsttimetheCourthasbeencalledupontoruleonanaccusationofgenocideanditsconsequences,genocidebeingseenasthemosthorribleofcrimesthatcanbeascribedtoanindividualoraState,asinthepresentproceedings .ThiscasegivestheCourttheopportunitytoenforcetheConven-tiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGeno-cideandtointerpretthegreaterpartofitsprovisions,someofwhichhavegivenrisetomuchdebateovertheirmeaningandscope .Theimportance,complexityanddifficultyofthecaseliebothintheproceduralfacet—thecasehavingbynowbeenpendingbeforetheCourtfor14yearsandtheproceedingsonthe merits having suffered repeated delay owing to conductonthepartoftheRespondent,conductwhichshouldnotgounmarked—andinthesubstantivefacet,thisterribletragedyhaving taken form in some 100,000 deaths, suffered for themostpartundergruesomeconditions,andphysicalandpsy-chologicalafter-effectsonanineffablygreatscale .

Judge ad hoc Mahiou concurs in all the Court’s findingsonthejurisdictionalissue,eventhoughmyapproachissome-times quite different in respect of the route taken to thoseconclusions .Significantly,theCourthasnotonlyconfirmeditsjurisdictionandits1996JudgmentbuthasalsonowmadeclearhowStateresponsibility,asrecognizedintheConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocide,istobeinterpreted .

On the other hand, Judge Mahiou cannot subscribe tomostofthesubstantivefindingsreachedbytheCourtbywayofwhathebelievestobe:atimorous,questionableviewofitsroleintheevidentiaryprocess,adeficientexaminationoftheevidencesubmittedbytheApplicant,aratheroddinterpreta-tionofthefactsinthecaseandoftherulesgoverningthemand, finally, a method of reasoning which remains uncon-vincing on a number of very important points . It is seriouscauseforconcernthattheCourtcouldnothaveaccomplisheditstaskofestablishingthefactsandinferringfromthemtheconsequencesastoresponsibilitywithouthelpfromtheInter-national Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia . Thisraises the problem if not of the efficacy of the Court’s rulesofprocedure thenat leastof their applicationby theCourt,which did not truly seek to secure for itself the means toaccomplish its mission . Further, in Judge Mahiou’s opinion,

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theRespondentincurredresponsibilityinthiscaseasadirectperpetratorofsomeofthecrimes,eventhoughheconcedesthatcertaininstancesmightbearguable,opentointerpreta-tionormattersfortheadjudicator’sinnermostconviction .Inhisview,theRespondent’sresponsibilityappearsclearlyestab-lishedinrespectofRepublikaSrpska’sactions,eitherbecauseoftheveryclosetiesbetweenthatentityandtheRespondent,resultingintheRespondent’simplicationintheethniccleans-ingplancarriedoutbetween1992and1995,orbecauseoftherelationshipofsubordinationorcontrolbetweentheRespond-entandthosewhoplayedacrucialroleinthatethniccleans-ing,whichextendedtothecommissionofgenocideinBosniaand Herzegovina . Even assuming the findings in respect ofthesechargestobeproblematic,theevidencebeforetheCourtappearssufficientlystrongandconvincingtohaveattheveryleastjustifiedafindingofcomplicityinthecrimeofgenocide;seriousweaknessesandcontradictionsclearlyemerge inthereasoning of the Court, which exonerates the Respondentfromsuchresponsibility .


Although termed as a separate opinion, the opinion ofJudgead hocKrećais,formasubstantivepointofview,adis-sentingopinionforthemostpart .

It is a separate opinion as regards the principal claim,rejected by the Court, that the Respondent has violated itsobligation under the Genocide Convention by committinggenocide,conspiracytocommitgenocide,incitementtocom-mitgenocideandcomplicityinallegedgenocide .

Inrelationtotheremainingpartsofthedispositif aswellasthereasoningpartoftheJudgment,theopinionofJudgeKrećaisstronglydissenting .JudgeKrećafindsnotonlythattherea-soningandfindingsof themajorityareunfounded,butruncounterinmorethanoneelementtocogentlegalconsidera-tionsand,even,commonsense,thusassumingthearomaofargumentum ad casum.

Themajorityviewontheres iudicatarule,exempli causa,issimilartoanodetoinfallibilityofJudgesratherthantoaproperlegalreasoningaboutthecharacteristicsandeffectsofthat rule in themilieuof the lawwhich theCourt isboundtoapply .Theinterpretationoftheres iudicataruleinthecir-cumstancessurroundingthecaseinevitablyledtothenulli-ficationoftherelevanceofjus standioftheRespondentbeinganessentialconditionforthevalidityofanydecisiontakenbytheCourtin casu.

ItappearsthatthedeterminationofthetragicmassacreinSrebrenicaasgenocideis,bothintheformalandthesubstan-tivesense,wellbeyondtherealmeaningoftheprovisionsofthe Genocide Convention as applicable law in casu. Hardlyanyofthecomponentsofthespecialintentasasine qua nonofthecrimeofgenocideasestablishedbytheConventionissatisfiedintherelevantjudgmentsoftheICTYasregardsthemassacreinSrebrenica .JudgeKrećaisoftheopinionthatthemassacreinSrebrenica,accordingtoitscharacteristics,ratherfitsintheframeofcrimesagainsthumanityandwarcrimescommittedinthefratricidalwarinBosniaandHerzegovina .

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165. AHMADoUsADIoDIALLo(RePUBLICoFGUIneAv.DeMoCRAtICRePUBLICoFtHeConGo)(PReLIMInARYoBJeCtIons)

Judgmentof24May2007

TheCourtinajudgmenthandeddowninthecaseconcern-ingAhmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guineav .Democratic Republic of the Congo),concludedthatGuinea’sApplicationisadmissible insofaras itconcernsprotectionofMr .Diallo’srightsasanindividualandhisdirectrightsasassociéinAfri-com-ZaireandAfricontainers-Zaire .TheCourtalsoindicatedthat,inaccordancewithArticle79,paragraph7,oftheRulesofCourtasadoptedon14April1978,time-limitsforthefur-therproceedingsshallsubsequentlybefixedbyOrderoftheCourt(para .96–97)

** *

The Court was composed as follows: President Higgins;Vice-PresidentAl-Khasawneh;JudgesRanjeva,Shi,Koroma,Buergenthal,Owada,Simma,Tomka,Abraham,Keith,Ben-nouna,Skotnikov; Judgesad hocMahiou,Mampuya;Regis-trarCouvreur .

** *


“ . . .

TheCourt,

(1) As regards the preliminary objection to admissibilityraisedbytheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoforlackofstandingbytheRepublicofGuineatoexercisediplomaticprotectioninthepresentcase:

(a)unanimously,

RejectstheobjectioninsofarasitconcernsprotectionofMr .Diallo’sdirectrightsasassocié inAfricom-ZaireandAfricontainers-Zaire;

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(b)byfourteenvotestoone,

Upholds the objection in so far as it concerns protectionof Mr . Diallo in respect of alleged violations of rights ofAfricom-ZaireandAfricontainers-Zaire;in favour: President Higgins; Vice-President Al-Kha-sawneh;JudgesRanjeva,Shi,Koroma,Buergenthal,Owada,Simma, Tomka, Abraham, Keith, Bennouna, Skotnikov;Judgead hocMampuya;against:Judgead hocMahiou;(2) As regards the preliminary objection to admissibilityraisedbytheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoonaccountofnon-exhaustionbyMr .Diallooflocalremedies:(a)unanimously,RejectstheobjectioninsofarasitconcernsprotectionofMr .Diallo’srightsasanindividual;(b)byfourteenvotestoone,RejectstheobjectioninsofarasitconcernsprotectionofMr .Diallo’sdirectrightsasassocié inAfricom-ZaireandAfricontainers-Zaire;in favour: President Higgins; Vice-President Al-Kha-sawneh;JudgesRanjeva,Shi,Koroma,Buergenthal,Owada,Simma, Tomka, Abraham, Keith, Bennouna, Skotnikov;Judgead hocMahiou;against:Judgead hocMampuya;(3)Inconsequence,(a)unanimously,Declares the Application of the Republic of Guinea to beadmissibleinsofarasitconcernsprotectionofMr .Diallo’srightsasanindividual;(b)byfourteenvotestoone,Declares the Application of the Republic of Guinea to beadmissibleinsofarasitconcernsprotectionofMr .Diallo’sdirectrightsasassocié inAfricom-ZaireandAfricontain-ers-Zaire;in favour: President Higgins; Vice-President Al-Kha-sawneh;JudgesRanjeva,Shi,Koroma,Buergenthal,Owada,Simma, Tomka, Abraham, Keith, Bennouna, Skotnikov;Judgead hocMahiou;against:Judgead hocMampuya;(c)byfourteenvotestoone,Declares the Application of the Republic of Guinea to beinadmissibleinsofarasitconcernsprotectionofMr .Dial-loinrespectofallegedviolationsofrightsofAfricom-ZaireandAfricontainers-Zaire .in favour: President Higgins; Vice-President Al-Kha-sawneh;JudgesRanjeva,Shi,Koroma,Buergenthal,Owada,Simma, Tomka, Abraham, Keith, Bennouna, Skotnikov;Judgead hocMampuya;against:Judgead hocMahiou .”

** *

Judge ad hoc Mahiou has appended a declaration to theJudgmentoftheCourt;Judgead hocMampuyahasappendedaseparateopinion .

** *

History of proceedings and submissions of the Parties(paras .1–12)

The Court begins by recapitulating the various stages oftheproceedings (thishistorymaybe found inPressReleaseNo .2006/36of9November2006) .Italsorecallsthefinalsub-missionspresentedbythePartiesattheoralproceedings(seePressReleaseNo .2006/41of1December2006) .

Background to the case(paras .13–25)

The Court indicates that, in their written pleadings, thePartiesareinagreementastothefollowingfacts .Mr .Ahma-douSadioDiallo,aGuineancitizen,settledintheDRC(called“Congo”between1960and1971and“Zaire”between1971and1997) in1964 .There, in1974,he foundedan import-exportcompany,Africom-Zaire,asociété privée à responsabilité lim-itée (private limited liability company, hereinafter “SPRL”)incorporatedunderZaireanlawandenteredintheTradeReg-isterofthecityofKinshasa,andhebecameitsgérant(man-ager) .In1979Mr .Dialloexpandedhisactivities,takingpart,asgérantofAfricom-Zaireandwithbackingfromtwoprivatepartners, in the foundingofanotherZaireanSPRL,special-izinginthecontainerizedtransportofgoods .Thecapital inthenewcompany,Africontainers-Zaire,washeldasfollows:40percentbyMr .Zala,aZaireannational;30percentbyMs .Dewast,aFrenchnational;and30percentbyAfricom-Zaire .IttoowasenteredintheTradeRegisterofthecityofKinshasa .In1980Africom-Zaire’stwopartnersinAfricontainers-Zairewithdrew . The parts sociales in Africontainers-Zaire werethenheldasfollows:60percentbyAfricom-Zaireand40percentbyMr .Diallo .AtthesametimeMr .DiallobecamethegérantofAfricontainers-Zaire .Towardstheendofthe1980s,Africom-Zaire’sandAfricontainers-Zaire’srelationshipswiththeirbusinesspartners started todeteriorate .The twocom-panies,actingthroughtheirgérant,Mr .Diallo,theninitiatedvarioussteps,includingjudicialones,inanattempttorecoveralleged debts . The various disputes between Africom-ZaireorAfricontainers-Zaire,ontheonehand,andtheirbusinesspartners,on theother,continued throughout the1990sandfor the most part remain unresolved today . Thus, Africom-ZaireclaimspaymentfromtheDRCofadebt(acknowledgedbytheDRC)resultingfromdefaultinpaymentfordeliveriesoflistingpapertotheZaireanStatebetween1983and1986 .Africom-Zaire is involved in another dispute, concerningarrears or overpayments of rent, with Plantation Lever auZaire (“PLZ”) . Africontainers-Zaire is in dispute with thecompanies Zaire Fina, Zaire Shell and Zaire Mobil Oil, aswellaswiththeOfficeNationaldesTransports(“ONATRA”)and Générale des Carrières et des Mines (“Gécamines”). Forthemostpartthesedifferencesconcernallegedviolationsofcontractualexclusivityclausesandthelay-up,improperuseordestructionorlossofcontainers .

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The Court considers the following facts also to be estab-lished . On 31 October 1995, the Prime Minister of ZaireissuedanexpulsionOrderagainstMr .Diallo .TheOrdergavethefollowingreasonfortheexpulsion:Mr .Diallo’s“presenceandconducthavebreachedpublicorderinZaire,especiallyintheeconomic,financialandmonetaryareas,andcontinuetodoso” .On31January1996,Mr .Diallo,alreadyunderarrest,wasdeportedfromZaireandreturnedtoGuineabyair .TheremovalfromZairewasformalizedandservedonMr .Dialloin the shape of a notice of refusal of entry (refoulement) onaccountof“illegalresidence”(séjour irrégulier)thathadbeendrawnupattheKinshasaairportonthesameday .

However,throughouttheproceedingsGuineaandtheDRCcontinuedtodifferonanumberofotherfacts,inter aliathespecific circumstances of Mr . Diallo’s arrest, detention andexpulsionand the reasons therefor .Guineamaintained thatMr .Diallo’sarrest,detentionandexpulsionweretheculmi-nation of a DRC policy to prevent him from recovering thedebtsowedtohiscompanies .TheDRCrejectedthatallegationandarguedthathisexpulsionwasjustifiedbythefactthathispresenceandconductbreachedpublicorderinZaire .

Violations of rights invoked by Guinea for which it seeks to exercise diplomatic protection(paras .26–31)

TheCourtnotesthatGuinea,aswellasclaimingthepay-mentofdebtsduetoMr .Dialloandhiscompanies,seekstoexerciseitsdiplomaticprotectiononbehalfofMr .Diallofortheviolation,allegedtohaveoccurredatthetimeofhisarrest,detention and expulsion, or to have derived therefrom, ofthreecategoriesof rights:his individualpersonal rights,hisdirectrightsasassociéinAfricom-ZaireandAfricontainers-Zaireandtherightsofthosecompanies,by“substitution” .

Jurisdiction of the Court(para .32)

ToestablishthejurisdictionoftheCourt,GuineareliesonthedeclarationsmadebythePartiesunderArticle36,para-graph2,oftheStatute .TheDRCacknowledgesthatthedec-larationsaresufficienttofoundthejurisdictionoftheCourtin the present case . The DRC nevertheless challenges theadmissibilityofGuinea’sApplicationandraisestwoprelimi-naryobjectionsindoingso .Firstofall,accordingtotheDRC,Guinealacksstandingtoactinthecurrentproceedingssincetherightswhich it seeks toprotectbelong toAfricom-Zaireand Africontainers-Zaire, Congolese companies, not to Mr .Diallo .Guinea,itisargued,isfurtherprecludedfromexercis-ingitsdiplomaticprotectiononthegroundthatneitherMr .Diallonorthecompanieshaveexhaustedtheremediesavail-ableintheCongoleselegalsystemtoobtainreparationfortheinjuriesclaimedbyGuineabeforetheCourt .

Admissibility of the Application in so far as it concerns the protection of Mr. Diallo’s rights as an individual(paras .33–48)

The Court recalls that, according to the DRC, Guinea’sclaims in respect of Mr . Diallo’s rights as an individual areinadmissiblebecausehe“[hasnot]exhaustedtheavailableandeffective local remedies existing in Zaire, and subsequently

intheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo” .TheCourtnotes,however, that in the course of the present proceedings theDRCelaboratedononlyasingleaspectofthatobjection:thatconcerninghisexpulsionfromCongoleseterritory .ItindicatesthatonthissubjecttheDRCmaintainedthatitsdomesticlegalsystem provided for available, effective remedies which Mr .Dialloshouldhaveexhausted,andthathisexpulsionfromtheterritorywas lawful .TheDRCacknowledges that thenoticesigned by the immigration officer “inadvertently” refers to“refusalofentry”(refoulement)insteadof“expulsion” .ItdoesnotchallengeGuinea’sassertionthatCongoleselawprovidesthatrefusalsofentryarenotappealable .TheDRCneverthe-less maintains that “despite this error, it is indisputable . . .thatthiswasindeedanexpulsionandnotarefusalofentry” .According to the DRC, calling the action a refusal of entrywasthereforenotintendedtodepriveMr .Dialloofaremedy .

Guinea responds, with respect to Mr . Diallo’s expulsionfromtheCongoleseterritory,thattherewerenoeffectiverem-ediesfirstinZaire,norlaterintheDRC,againstthismeasure .ItrecallsthattheexpulsionOrderagainstMr .Diallowascar-riedoutbywayofanactiondenominated“refusalofentry”,which precluded any possibility of redress . Guinea adds,moreover,that“[a]dministrativeorotherremedieswhichareneither judicial nor quasi-judicial and are discretionary innaturearenot . . . taken intoaccountby the local remediesrule” .Guineafurthercontendsthat,eventhoughsomerem-ediesmayintheoryhavebeenavailabletoMr .DiallointheCongoleselegalsystem,theywouldinanyeventhaveofferedhimnoreasonablepossibilityofprotectionatthetimeastheobjectiveinexpellingMr .Diallowaspreciselytopreventhimfrompursuinglegalproceedings .

TheCourtrecallsthatundercustomaryinternationallaw,diplomatic protection “consists of the invocation by a State,throughdiplomaticactionorothermeansofpeacefulsettle-ment,oftheresponsibilityofanotherStateforaninjurycausedbyaninternationallywrongfulactofthatStatetoanaturalorlegalpersonthatisanationaloftheformerStatewithaviewtotheimplementationofsuchresponsibility”(Article1ofthedraftArticlesonDiplomaticProtectionadoptedbytheInter-national Law Commission (ILC) at its Fifty-eighth Session(2006)) .Inthepresentcase,itfallstotheCourttoascertainwhethertheApplicanthasmettherequirementsfortheexer-ciseofdiplomaticprotection,thatistosaywhetherMr .DialloisanationalofGuineaandwhetherhehasexhaustedthelocalremediesavailableintheDRC .

On the first point,theCourtobservesthatitisnotdisputedbytheDRCthatMr .Diallo’ssolenationalityisthatofGuineaand that he has continuously held that nationality from thedate of the alleged injury to the date the proceedings wereinitiated .

On the second point, the Court notes, as it stated in theInterhandel (Switzerland v. United States of America)case,that“[t]herulethatlocalremediesmustbeexhaustedbeforeinter-national proceedings may be instituted is a well-establishedruleofcustomaryinternationallaw”which“hasbeengener-allyobservedincasesinwhichaStatehasadoptedthecauseofitsnationalwhoserightsareclaimedtohavebeendisregardedinanotherStateinviolationofinternationallaw .”

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The Court observes that the Parties do not question thelocalremediesrule;theydohoweverdifferastowhethertheCongoleselegalsystemactuallyofferedlocalremedieswhichMr . Diallo should haveexhausted before his cause could beespousedbyGuineabefore theCourt .Morespecifically, theCourt indicates that, in matters of diplomatic protection, itis incumbent on the applicant to prove that local remedieswere indeed exhausted or to establish that exceptional cir-cumstances relieved the allegedly injured person whom theapplicantseekstoprotectoftheobligationtoexhaustavailablelocalremedies .ItisfortherespondenttoconvincetheCourtthattherewereeffectiveremediesinitsdomesticlegalsystemthatwerenotexhausted .

Inviewof theargumentsmadebytheParties, theCourtaddresses thequestionof local remedies solely in respectofMr .Diallo’sexpulsion . Itnotes that theexpulsionwaschar-acterized as a “refusal of entry” when it was carried out, asboth Parties have acknowledged and as is confirmed by thenoticedrawnupon31January1996bythenationalimmigra-tionserviceofZaire .It isapparentthatrefusalsofentryarenotappealableunderCongoleselaw .Article13ofLegislativeOrderNo .83–033of12September1983, concerning immi-gration control, expressly states that the “measure [refusingentry]shallnotbesubjecttoappeal” .TheCourtconsidersthattheDRCcannotnowrelyonanerrorallegedlymadeby itsadministrative agencies at the time Mr . Diallo was “refusedentry”toclaimthatheshouldhavetreatedthemeasureasanexpulsion . Mr . Diallo, as the subject of the refusal of entry,wasjustifiedinrelyingontheconsequencesofthelegalchar-acterizationthusgivenbytheZaireanauthorities, includingforpurposesofthelocalremediesrule .

TheCourtfurtherobservesthat,evenifthiswasacaseofexpulsionandnotrefusalofentry,theDRChasalsofailedtoshow that means of redress against expulsion decisions areavailableunderitsdomesticlaw .TheDRCdid,itistrue,citethepossibilityofrequestingreconsiderationbythecompetentadministrativeauthority .TheCourtneverthelessrecallsthat,while the local remedies that must be exhausted include allremediesofa legalnature, judicialredressaswellasredressbefore administrative bodies, administrative remedies canonly be taken into consideration for purposes of the localremedies rule if they are aimed at vindicating a right andnotatobtainingafavour,unlesstheyconstituteanessentialprerequisite for the admissibility of subsequent contentiousproceedings .Thus,thepossibilityopentoMr .Dialloofsub-mittingarequestforreconsiderationoftheexpulsiondecisiontotheadministrativeauthorityhavingtakenit—thatistosaythe Prime Minister—in the hope that he would retract hisdecisionasamatterofgracecannotbedeemedalocalremedytobeexhausted .

HavingestablishedthattheDRChasnotprovedtheexist-ence in its domestic legal system of available and effectiveremedies allowing Mr . Diallo to challenge his expulsion,theCourtconcludes that theDRC’sobjection toadmissibil-itybasedonthe failure toexhaust local remediescannotbeupheldinrespectofthatexpulsion .

Admissibility of the Application in so far as it concerns protection of Mr. Diallo’ s direct rights as ‘associé’ in Africom-Zaire and Africontainers-Zaire(paras .49–75)

TheCourtindicatesthattheDRCraisestwoobjectionstoadmissibilityregardingthisaspectoftheApplication:theDRCcontestsGuinea’sstanding,anditsuggeststhatMr .Diallohasnot exhausted the local remedies thatwereavailable tohimin the DRC to assert his rights . The Court deals with theseobjectionsinturn .

Guinea’s standing (paras .50–67)

TheDRCacceptsthatunderinternationallawtheStateofnationalityhastherighttoexerciseitsdiplomaticprotectioninfavourofassociésorshareholderswhenthereisaninjurytotheirdirectrightsassuch .Itnonethelesscontendsthat“inter-national lawallowsfor[this]protection . . .onlyunderverylimitedconditionswhicharenotfulfilledinthepresentcase” .TheDRCmaintainsfirstofallthatGuineaisnotseeking,inthiscase,toprotectthedirectrightsofMr .Dialloasassocié,butthatitidentifiesaviolationoftherightsofAfricom-ZaireandAfricontainers-ZairewithaviolationoftherightsofMr .Diallo . The DRC further asserts that action to protect thedirectrightsofshareholdersassuchappliestoonlyverylim-itedcases and, relyingon the Judgmentof theCourt in theBarcelonaTractioncase,contendsthattheonlyactscapableofviolatingthoserightswouldconsequentlybe“actsofinterfer-enceinrelationsbetweenthecompanyanditsshareholders” .For the DRC, therefore, the arrest, detention and expulsionofMr .Diallocouldnotconstituteactsof interferenceon itspartinrelationsbetweentheassocié Mr .Dialloandthecom-panies Africom-Zaire and Africontainers-Zaire . As a result,theycouldnotinjureMr .Diallo’sdirectrights .TheDRCthusindicates that Mr . Diallo could very well have exercised hisrightsfromforeignterritoryandthathecouldhavedelegatedhistaskstolocaladministrators .

GuineaalsoreferstotheJudgmentintheBarcelonaTrac-tioncase,inwhichtheCourt,havingruledthat“anactdirect-edagainstandinfringingonlythecompany’srightsdoesnotinvolveresponsibilitytowardstheshareholders,eveniftheirinterestsareaffected”,addedthat“[t]hesituationisdifferentiftheactcomplainedofisaimedatthedirectrightsoftheshare-holderassuch” .GuineafurtherclaimsthatthispositionoftheCourtwas takenup inArticle12of the ILC’sdraftArticlesonDiplomaticProtection .Guineapointsoutthat,inSPRLs,the parts sociales “are not freely transferable”, which “con-siderablyaccentuates the intuitu personae characterof thesecompanies”andemphasizesthatthischaracterisseenasevenmoremarkedinthecaseofAfricom-ZaireandAfricontain-ers-Zaire, since Mr . Diallo was their “sole manager (gérant)andsoleassocié (directlyorindirectly)” .AccordingtoGuinea,“infactandinlawitwasvirtuallyimpossibletodistinguishMr .Diallofromhiscompanies”andthearrest,detentionandexpulsion of Mr . Diallo not only had the effect “of prevent-inghimfromcontinuingtoadminister,manageandcontrolanyoftheoperations”ofhiscompanies,butwerespecificallymotivatedbytheintenttopreventhimfromexercisingtheserights,frompursuingthelegalproceedingsbroughtonbehalf

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of the companies, and thereby from recovering their debts .Finally, Guinea maintains that, contrary to what is claimedby theDRC,Mr .Diallocouldnotvalidlyexercisehisdirectrightsasshareholderfromhiscountryoforigin .

NotingthatthePartieshavereferredtotheBarcelonaTrac-tioncase,theCourtrecallsthatthisinvolvedapubliclimitedcompanywhosecapitalwasrepresentedbyshares,whilethepresent case concerns SPRLs whose capital is composed ofpartssociales .InordertoestablishthepreciselegalnatureofAfricom-ZaireandAfricontainers-Zaire,theCourtmustreferto thedomestic lawof theDRC . It indicates thatCongoleselaw accords an SPRL independent legal personality distinctfromthatofitsassociés,particularlyinthatthepropertyoftheassociésiscompletelyseparatefromthatofthecompany,andinthattheassociésareresponsibleforthedebtsofthecom-panyonlytotheextentoftheresourcestheyhavesubscribed .Consequently,thecompany’sdebtsreceivablefromandowingtothirdpartiesrelatetoitsrespectiverightsandobligations .

TheCourtrecallsthattheexercisebyaStateofdiplomaticprotectiononbehalfofanaturalorlegalperson,whoisasso-cié orshareholder,havingitsnationality,seekstoengagetheresponsibility of another State for an injury caused to thatpersonbyaninternationallywrongfulactcommittedbythatState .Whatamounts to the internationallywrongful act, inthe case of associés or shareholders, is the violation by therespondentStateoftheirdirectrightsinrelationtoalegalper-son,directrightsthataredefinedbythedomesticlawofthatState .Onthisbasis,diplomaticprotectionofthedirectrightsofassociésofanSPRLorshareholdersofapubliclimitedcom-panyisnottoberegardedasanexceptiontothegenerallegalrégimeofdiplomaticprotectionfornaturalorlegalpersons,asderivedfromcustomaryinternationallaw .

HavingconsideredtheargumentsadvancedbytheParties,theCourtfindsthatGuineadoesindeedhavestandinginthiscase in so far as its action involves a person of its national-ity,Mr .Diallo,andisdirectedagainsttheallegedlyunlawfulactsof theDRCwhicharesaid tohave infringedhis rights,particularlyhisdirectrightsasassocié ofthetwocompaniesAfricom-Zaire and Africontainers-Zaire . The Court notesthatMr .Diallo,whowasassociéinbothcompanies,alsoheldthepositionofgérantineachofthem .AnassociéofanSPRLholdspartssocialesinitscapital,whilethegérantisanorganofthecompanyactingonitsbehalf .

In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that theobjectionofinadmissibilityraisedbytheDRCduetoGuinea’slackofstandingtoprotectMr .Diallocannotbeupheldinsofarasitconcernshisdirectrightsasassocié ofAfricom-ZaireandAfricontainers-Zaire .

Non-exhaustion of local remedies(paras .68–75)

The DRC further claims that Guinea cannot exercise itsdiplomaticprotectionfor theviolationofMr .Diallo’sdirectrightsasassociéofAfricom-ZaireandAfricontainers-Zaireinsofarashehasnotattemptedtoexhaustthe localremediesavailableinCongoleselawfortheallegedbreachofthosespe-cificrights .Itsubmitsinthisrespectthat“Mr .Diallo’sabsence

from Congolese territory was not an obstacle [in Congoleselaw] to the proceedings already initiated when Mr . DiallowasstillintheCongo”orforhimtobringotherproceedings,andthatMr .Diallocouldalsohaveappointedrepresentativestothatend .TheDRCalsoassertsthattheexistingremediesavailableintheCongoleselegalsystemareeffective .

For its part, Guinea alleges that “the Congolese StatedeliberatelychosetodenyaccesstoitsterritorytoMr .Diallobecauseofthelegalproceedingsthathehadinitiatedonbehalfofhiscompanies” .Itmaintainsthat“[i]nthesecircumstances,to accuse Mr . Diallo of not having exhausted the remedieswouldnotonlybemanifestly‘unreasonable’and‘unfair’,butalso an abuse of the rule regarding the exhaustion of localremedies” . According to Guinea, the circumstances of Mr .Diallo’s expulsion moreover precluded him from pursuinglocalremediesonhisownbehalforonthatofhiscompanies .GuineafurtheremphasizesthattheexistingremediesintheCongolese legal system are ineffective in view, inter alia, ofexcessivedelays,“unlawfuladministrativepractices”andthefact that“at the timeof theevents, theenforcementof legaldecisionsdependedsolelyonthegovernment’sgoodwill” .

TheCourtnotes that theallegedviolationofMr .Diallo’sdirect rightsasassocié wasdealtwithbyGuineaasadirectconsequence of his expulsion . The Court has already foundthattheDRChasnotprovedthattherewereeffectiveremedies,underCongoleselaw,againsttheexpulsionOrder .TheCourtfurtherobservesthatatnotimehastheDRCarguedthatrem-ediesdistinctfromthoseinrespectofMr .Diallo’sexpulsionexistedintheCongoleselegalsystemagainsttheallegedviola-tions of his direct rights as associé and that he should haveexhaustedthem .AccordingtotheCourt, theParties indeeddevotedsomediscussionto thequestionof theeffectivenessoflocalremediesintheDRCbuthaveconfinedthemselvesinittoexaminingremediesopentoAfricom-ZaireandAfricon-tainers-Zaire,withoutconsideringanywhichmayhavebeenopentoMr .Dialloasassocié inthecompanies .InasmuchasithasnotbeenarguedthattherewereremediesthatMr .Dialloshouldhaveexhaustedinrespectofhisdirectrightsasassocié,thequestionoftheeffectivenessofthoseremediesdoesnotinanycasearise .

The Court thus concludes that the objection as to inad-missibilityraisedbytheDRConthegroundofthefailuretoexhaustthelocalremediesagainsttheallegedviolationsofMr .Diallo’sdirectrightsasassociéofthetwocompaniesAfricom-ZaireandAfricontainers-Zairecannotbeupheld .

Admissibility of the Application in so far as it concerns the exercise of diplomatic protection with respect to Mr. Diallo “by substitution for” Africom-Zaire and Africontainers-Zaire(paras .76–95)

TheCourtnotes thathere too theDRCraises twoobjec-tions to the admissibility of Guinea’s Application, derivedrespectivelyfromGuinea’slackofstandingandthefailuretoexhaustlocalremedies .TheCourtagainaddressestheseissuesinturn .

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Guinea’s standing(paras .77–94)

TheDRCcontendsthatGuineacannotinvoke“‘considera-tionsofequity’inordertojustify‘therighttoexerciseitsdip-lomaticprotection[infavourofMr .Dialloandbysubstitutionfor Africom-Zaire and Africontainers-Zaire] independentlyof the violation of the direct rights [of Mr . Diallo]’” on thegroundthattheStatewhoseresponsibilityisatissueisalsotheStateofnationalityof thecompaniesconcerned .Diplomaticprotection “by substitution” is said by the DRC to go “farbeyondwhatpositiveinternationallawprovides”andneithertheCourt’sjurisprudencenorStatepracticerecognizessuchapossibility .TheDRCevengoesasfarastoassertthatGuineaisinrealityaskingtheCourttoauthorizeittoexerciseitsdip-lomaticprotectioninamannercontrarytointernationallaw .Inthisconnection,itindicatesthattheCourtshoulddismissanypossibilityofresortingtoequitycontra legem.TheDRCalso points out that Guinea has not demonstrated that pro-tectionoftheshareholder“insubstitution”forthecompanywhichpossessesthenationalityoftherespondentStatewouldbe justifiedinthepresentcase .AccordingtotheDRC,suchprotectionbysubstitutionwouldinfactleadtoadiscrimina-toryrégimeofprotection,resultingasitwouldintheunequaltreatmentoftheshareholders .

Lastly, the DRC maintains that application of protec-tion“bysubstitution” to thecaseofMr .Diallowouldprove“fundamentally inequitable”, in view of his personality andconduct,whichare“farfromirreproachable” .

Foritspart,GuineaobservesthatitisnotaskingtheCourtto resort toequitycontra legem,but it contends that, in theBarcelonaTractioncase, theCourt referred, inadictum, tothe possibility of anexception, founded on reasons of equi-ty, to thegeneral ruleof theprotectionof a companyby itsnationalState,“whentheStatewhoseresponsibilityisinvokedis thenationalStateof thecompany” .Guineacontends thattheexistenceoftheruleofprotectionbysubstitutionanditscustomarynatureareconfirmedbynumerousarbitralawards .Further,accordingtoGuinea,“[s]ubsequentpractice[follow-ing Barcelona Traction], conventional or jurisprudential . . .hasdispelledanyuncertainty . . .onthepositivenatureofthe‘exception’” .FinallyGuineaclaimsthattheapplicationofprotectionby substitution isparticularlyappropriate in thiscase, as Africom-Zaire and Africontainers-Zaire are SPRLs,whichhaveamarked intuitu personae characterandwhich,moreover,arestatutorilycontrolledandmanagedbyoneandthe same person . Further, it especially points out that Mr .Diallo was bound, under Zairean legislation, to incorporatethecompaniesinZaire .

The Court recalls that, as regards diplomatic protection,theprincipleasemphasizedintheBarcelonaTractioncase,isthat:“Notamereinterestaffected,butsolelyarightinfringedinvolves responsibility, so that an act directed against andinfringingonlythecompany’srightsdoesnotinvolverespon-sibility towards the shareholders, even if their interests areaffected .”(I.C.J. Reports 1970,p .36,para .46 .)Sinceitsdictumin the aforementioned case, the Court notes that it has nothad occasion to rule on whether, in international law, thereis indeed an exception to the general rule “that the right ofdiplomatic protection of a company belongs to its national

State”,whichallowsforprotectionoftheshareholdersbytheirownnationalState“bysubstitution”,andonthereachofanysuchexception .Itobservesthat inthecaseconcerningElet-tronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy),the Chamber of the Court allowed a claim by the UnitedStatesofAmericaonbehalfoftwoUnitedStatescorporations(whoheld100percentofthesharesinanItaliancompany),in relation to alleged acts by the Italian authorities injuringtherightsof the lattercompany .However, theCourt recallsthatindoingso,theChamberbaseditselfnotoncustomaryinternational law but on a Treaty of Friendship, CommerceandNavigationbetweenthetwocountriesdirectlygrantingtotheirnationals,corporationsandassociationscertainrightsinrelationtotheirparticipationincorporationsandassociationshavingthenationalityoftheotherState .

The Court examines whether the exception invoked byGuineaispartofcustomaryinternationallaw .Itnotesinthisrespect that the role of diplomatic protection has somewhatfaded,asinpracticerecourseisonlymadetoitinrarecaseswheretreatyrégimesdonotexistorhaveprovedinoperative .AccordingtotheCourt,thetheoryofprotectionbysubstitu-tionseekstoofferprotectiontotheforeignshareholdersofacompanywhocouldnotrelyonthebenefitofaninternationaltreatyandtowhomnootherremedyisavailable,theallegedlyunlawful acts having been committed against the companyby the State of its nationality . Protection by “substitution”would therefore appear to constitute the very last resort fortheprotectionofforeigninvestments .HavingexaminedStatepracticeanddecisionsof internationalcourtsandtribunals,it is of the opinion that these do not reveal—at least at thepresent time—an exception in customary international lawallowingforprotectionbysubstitution,suchasisreliedonbyGuinea .TheCourtaddsthatthefactinvokedbyGuineathatvariousinternationalagreementshaveestablishedspeciallegalrégimesgoverninginvestmentprotection,orthatprovisionsinthisregardarecommonlyincludedincontractsenteredintodirectlybetweenStatesandforeigninvestors,isnotsufficienttoshowthattherehasbeenachangeinthecustomaryrulesofdiplomaticprotection;itcouldequallyshowthecontrary .

TheCourtthenturnstothequestionofwhethercustomaryinternational lawcontainsamore limitedruleofprotectionby substitution, such as that set out by the ILC in its draftArticles on Diplomatic Protection, which would apply onlywhere a company’s incorporation in the State having com-mittedtheallegedviolationofinternationallaw“wasrequiredby itasapreconditionfordoingbusiness there”(Article11,paragraph(b)) .However,thisveryspecialcasedoesnotseemtocorrespondtotheonetheCourtisdealingwithhere .TheCourtobservesthatitappearsnaturalthatAfricom-ZaireandAfricontainers-ZairewerecreatedinZaireandenteredintheTradeRegisterofthecityofKinshasabyMr .Diallo,whohadsettledinthecountryin1964 .Furthermore,andaboveallithasnot satisfactorilybeenestablishedbefore theCourt thattheir incorporation in thatcountry,as legalentitiesofCon-golesenationality,wouldhavebeenrequiredoftheirfounderstoenablethefounderstooperateintheeconomicsectorscon-cerned .TheCourtthusconcludesthatthetwocompanieswerenotincorporatedinsuchawaythattheywouldfallwithinthescopeofprotectionbysubstitutioninthesenseofArticle11,

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paragraph(b),oftheILCdraftArticlesonDiplomaticProtec-tion .Therefore,thequestionofwhetherornotthisparagraphof Article 11 reflects customary international law does notariseinthiscase .TheCourtcannotacceptGuinea’sclaimtoexercisediplomaticprotectionbysubstitution .Itisthereforethenormalruleofthenationalityoftheclaimswhichgovernsthe question of the diplomatic protection of Africom-Zaireand Africontainers-Zaire . The companies in question haveCongolesenationality .

The objection as to inadmissibility raised by the DRCowingtoGuinea’slackofstandingtoofferMr .Diallodiplo-matic protection as regards the alleged unlawful acts of theDRCagainsttherightsofthetwocompaniesAfricom-Zaireand Africontainers-Zaire is consequently well founded andmustbeupheld .

Non-exhaustion of local remedies (para .95)

Having concluded that Guinea is without standing toofferMr .DiallodiplomaticprotectionasregardstheallegedunlawfulactsoftheDRCagainsttherightsofthecompaniesAfricom-Zaire and Africontainers-Zaire, the Court neednot furtherconsider theDRC’sobjectionbasedon thenon-exhaustionoflocalremedies .

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Declaration of Judge Mahiou

AfterdeclaringGuinea’sApplicationadmissibleinsofarasitconcernsprotectionof,ontheonehand,Mr .Diallo’srightsasanindividualand,ontheotherhand,hisdirectrightsasassocié inthecompaniesAfricom-ZaireandAfricontainers-Zaire, theCourtdeclares inadmissible theApplicationseek-ingtoprotectMr .Dialloinrespectoftheallegedviolationsofrightsofthesecompanies .InrejectingthislatterApplication,theCourtreliesontheapproachsetoutbytheInternationalLaw Commission (ILC) in its draft Articles on DiplomaticProtection,whichittakesupinparagraphs88and91oftheJudgment .However,afterexplainingandapparentlyaccept-ing this approach to diplomatic protection, the Court takestheviewthatitdoesnotapplyinthepresentcase .

After noting that the first condition has been satisfied—since the two companies in question do indeed have thenationalityoftheCongoleseState,whichhascommittedthewrongfulacts—itconsidersthatthesecondconditionhasnotbeenmet,becausethisnationalityresultsfromafreechoiceof theirownerandnot fromarequirementof local lawthatwouldenablediplomaticprotectiontobeinvoked .ThechoiceofCongolesenationalitywascertainlymadebyMr .Diallo,butitseemsquestionabletoconcludethatthiswasafreechoice,astheCourtdoesinparagraph92oftheJudgment .

Freedomofchoice ismoreappearance thanrealitywhenoneexaminesCongolese law,whichrequiresboththeregis-teredofficeandadministrativeheadquarterstobeintheDRCifthemainoperatingcentreislocatedinthatcountry,failingwhich the twocompanieswouldautomaticallybe struckoffthe Trade Register, thereby preventing them from existingorcarryingonactivities intheDRC .Consequently,because

of this legal and factual situation, this case falls within thescopeofArticle11,paragraph(b),oftheILCdraftasoneinwhichitwouldbelegitimatefortherighttodiplomaticpro-tection from the State of the shareholders’ nationality to beexercisedifprejudicialmeasuresaretakenbytheStateagainstacompanyhaving itsnationality .Furthermore, it shouldbenotedthatoneofthetwocompanies,Africom-Zaire,issaidtohavedisappearedasaresultofactiontakenbytheCongoleseauthorities . If that shouldprove tobe thecase,anewsitua-tionwouldresultinwhichtherewouldnolongerbeanypos-sibilityforthatcompanytoassertitsrightsdirectly,andthatcoulddeprive its sole shareholder,Mr .Diallo,of anymeansofredressifhewererefusedthebenefitofdiplomaticprotec-tion . Judgead hocMahiou thereforebelieves that theCourtshouldhave taken furtheraccountof this situation inordertosafeguardtherightsandinterestsofthesoleshareholderinthiscompany .

Separate opinion of Judge Mampuya

InthiscasebetweenGuineaandtheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,whilegenerallysubscribingtotheCourt’sfind-ingsontheadmissibilityofGuinea’sApplication,Judgead hocMampuyawouldexpressreservationsaboutcertainaspectsofthe approach taken in the Judgment and about some issuesassociatedwiththeadmissibilityoftheApplicationasregardsthe protection of the direct rights of a Guinean national asassocié in the two Congolese companies . Judge Mampuyaendorses themainoperativepartof the JudgmentdeclaringGuinea’s Application admissible in so far as it concerns thedirect rights of its national as an individual and inadmissi-ble in so faras it alsoconcerned the rightsofnon-Guineancompanies .However,itseemedtohiminfactthatwhereasastudyoftheCourt’scaselawpointstotheneedforthenatureof itsclaimtobestated“within thedegreeofprecisionandclearness requisite for the administration of justice”, Guin-ea’sApplicationwasnotwordedclearlyenoughtodefine itsobject,thecircumstancesofitsfilingexplainingwhyGuineahas, fromstart tofinish intheprocedure,waveredbetween,ontheonehand,protectionofthetwocompaniescontrolledbyitsnationalMr .DiallobutwhichareofCongolesenational-ity, whose financial claims emerge clearly as the real objectoftheApplication,and,ontheotherhand,protectionofMr .Diallo’sdirectrightsasanindividualandassocié.JudgeMam-puyabelievesthat,ongroundsofobscuri libelli,ifnotlackofstanding,theadmissibilityofGuinea’sApplicationisatleastproblematic .Moreover,byupholdingthedirectrightsofMr .DialloasanobjectoftheApplication,optingforthisartificialdispute insteadof therealone, theCourt isadmittingquitenew private claims, not hitherto known to the Congoleseauthoritiesandnotconstitutinginthemselvesadisputearis-ing directly from relations between Guinea and the Demo-craticRepublicof theCongo,withoutverifying,contrary toallitspreviouscaselaw,whetherMr .Diallo’sprivatedisputehad given rise to an international dispute between the twoStateswhichcouldbesubmittedtotheCourt,thelatteronlyentertaininginternationaldisputesandnotmereacts,eveniftheymaybeinternationallywrongful .

Lastly,whileGuinea’sright toact inrespectof thedirectrights of its national as associé cannot be contested, Judge

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Mampuya did not support the finding that, since the DRChadnotshownremediesagainsttheexpulsionordertoexist,there would also be none against the alleged infringementofthesedirectrightsasassocié,whichisregardedasadirectconsequenceof thatexpulsion .That iswhy,havingacceptedGuinea’s standing, in particular to act in respect of alleged

violationsofhumanrights,JudgeMampuyadidnotjointhemajorityinfavouroftheoperativeprovisionwhichrejects,onthegroundssetouthere,theDRC’spreliminaryobjectionthatdomesticremediesconcerningthedirectrightsasassociéhadnotbeenexhausted .

166. teRRItoRIALAnDMARItIMeDIsPUteBetWeennICARAGUAAnDHonDURAsIntHeCARIBBeAnseA(nICARAGUAv.HonDURAs)

Judgmentof8october2007

In thecaseconcerning theTerritorial and Maritime Dis-pute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaraguav .Honduras),theCourtdelivereditsjudgmenton8October2007 .

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The Court was composed as follows: President Higgins;Vice-PresidentAl-Khasawneh;JudgesRanjeva,Shi,Koroma,Parra-Aranguren,Buergenthal,Owada,Simma,Tomka,Abra-ham, Keith, Sepúlveda-Amor, Bennouna, Skotnikov; Judgesad hocTorresBernárdez,Gaja;RegistrarCouvreur .

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Paragraph321ofthejudgmentreadsasfollows:“ . . .TheCourt,(1)Unanimously,FindsthattheRepublicofHondurashassovereigntyoverBobelCay,SavannaCay,PortRoyalCayandSouthCay;(2)Byfifteenvotestotwo,Decides that the starting-point of the single maritimeboundarythatdividestheterritorialsea,continentalshelfandexclusiveeconomiczonesoftheRepublicofNicaraguaand theRepublicofHonduras shallbe locatedatapointwiththeco-ordinates15°00’52”Nand83°05’58”W;in favour: President Higgins; Vice-President Al-Kha-sawneh;JudgesRanjeva,Shi,Koroma,Buergenthal,Owada,Simma, Tomka, Abraham, Keith, Sepúlveda-Amor, Ben-nouna,Skotnikov;Judgead hocGaja;against: Judge Parra-Aranguren, Judge ad hoc TorresBernárdez;(3)Byfourteenvotestothree,Decidesthatstartingfromthepointwiththeco-ordinates15°00’52”Nand83°05’58”Wthelineofthesinglemari-timeboundaryshallfollowtheazimuth70°14’41 .25”untilits intersectionwith the12-nautical-milearcof the terri-torial sea of Bobel Cay at point A (with co-ordinates 15°05’25”Nand82°52’54”W) .FrompointAtheboundary

lineshallfollowthe12-nautical-milearcoftheterritorialseaofBobelCayinasoutherlydirectionuntilitsintersec-tionwiththe12-nautical-milearcof theterritorialseaofEdinburgh Cay at point B (with co-ordinates 14° 57’ 13”N and 82° 50’ 03” W) . From point B the boundary lineshall continuealong themedian linewhich is formedbythepointsofequidistancebetweenBobelCay,PortRoyalCayandSouthCay(Honduras)andEdinburghCay(Nica-ragua), throughpointC(withco-ordinates14°56’45”Nand82°33’56”W)andD(withco-ordinates14°56’35”Nand82°33’20”W),untilitmeetsthepointofintersectionofthe12-nautical-milearcsoftheterritorialseasofSouthCay(Honduras)andEdinburghCay(Nicaragua)atpointE(withco-ordinates14°53’15”Nand82°29’24”W) .FrompointEtheboundarylineshallfollowthe12-nautical-milearcoftheterritorialseaofSouthCayinanortherlydirec-tionuntilitmeetsthelineoftheazimuthatpointF(withco-ordinates15°16’08”Nand82°21’56”W) .FrompointF,itshallcontinuealongthelinehavingtheazimuthof70°14’41 .25”untilitreachestheareawheretherightsofthirdStatesmaybeaffected;in favour: President Higgins; Vice-President Al-Kha-sawneh; Judges Shi, Koroma, Buergenthal, Owada,Simma, Tomka, Abraham, Keith, Sepúlveda-Amor,Bennouna,Skotnikov;Judgead hocGaja;against:JudgesRanjeva,Parra-Aranguren,Judgead hocTorresBernárdez;(4)Bysixteenvotestoone,Finds that the Parties must negotiate in good faith with aviewtoagreeingonthecourseofthedelimitationlineofthatportionof the territorial sea locatedbetweentheendpointof the land boundary as established by the 1906 ArbitralAwardandthestarting-pointofthesinglemaritimebound-arydeterminedbytheCourttobelocatedatthepointwiththeco-ordinates15°00’52”Nand83°05’58”W .

in favour: President Higgins; Vice-President Al-Kha-sawneh;JudgesRanjeva,Shi,Koroma,Buergenthal,Owada,Simma, Tomka, Abraham, Keith, Sepúlveda-Amor, Ben-nouna,Skotnikov;Judgesad hocTorresBernárdez,Gaja;

AGAINST:JudgeParra-Aranguren .”

___________

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JudgeRanjevaappendsaseparateopiniontotheJudgmentof the Court; Judge Koroma appends a separate opinion totheJudgmentoftheCourt;JudgeParra-ArangurenappendsadeclarationtotheJudgmentoftheCourt;Judgead hocTorresBernárdezappendsadissentingopinion to the Judgmentofthe Court; Judge ad hoc Gaja appends a declaration to theJudgmentoftheCourt .

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Chronology of the procedure and submissions of the Parties(paras .1–19)

On8December1999NicaraguafiledanApplicationinsti-tutingproceedingsagainstHonduras inrespectofadisputerelatingtothedelimitationofthemaritimeareasappertainingtoeachofthoseStatesintheCaribbeanSea .

InitsApplication,Nicaraguasoughttofoundthejurisdic-tion of the Court on the provisions of Article xxxI of theAmericanTreatyonPacificSettlement(officiallyknownasthe“PactofBogotá”),aswellasonthedeclarationsacceptingthejurisdictionoftheCourtmadebytheParties,asprovidedforinArticle36,paragraph2,oftheStatuteoftheCourt .

SincetheCourtincludedupontheBenchnojudgeofthenationality of either of the Parties, each Party proceeded toexerciseitsrightconferredbyArticle31,paragraph3,oftheStatutetochooseajudgead hoctositinthecase .Nicaraguachose Mr . Giorgio Gaja and Honduras first chose Mr . JulioGonzálezCampos,whoresignedon17August2006,andsub-sequentlyMr .SantiagoTorresBernárdez .

By an Order dated 21 March 2000 the President of theCourtfixed21March2001and21March2002,respectively,asthetime-limitsforthefilingoftheMemorialofNicaraguaand the Counter-Memorial of Honduras . Those pleadingsweredulyfiledwithintheprescribedtime-limits .

ByanOrderof13June2002,theCourtauthorizedthesub-missionofaReplybyNicaraguaandaRejoinderbyHonduras,andfixed13January2003and13August2003astherespec-tivetime-limitsforthefilingofthosepleadings .TheReplyofNicaraguaand theRejoinderofHonduraswerefiledwithinthetime-limitssoprescribed .

Publichearingswereheldbetween5and23March2007 .Attheconclusionoftheoralproceedings,thePartiespresentedthefollowingfinalsubmissionstotheCourt:

OnbehalfoftheGovernmentofNicaragua,“Having regard to the considerations set forth in theMemorial,Replyandhearingsand,inparticular,theevi-dencerelatingtotherelationsoftheParties,MayitpleasetheCourttoadjudgeanddeclarethat:ThebisectorofthelinesrepresentingthecoastalfrontsofthetwoPartiesasdescribedinthepleadings,drawnfromafixedpointapproximately3milesfromtherivermouthintheposition15°02’00”Nand83°05’26”W,constitutesthesinglemaritimeboundaryforthepurposesofthedelimita-

tion of the disputed areas of the territorial sea, exclusiveeconomiczoneandcontinental shelf in theregionof theNicaraguanRise .Thestarting-pointofthedelimitationisthethalwegofthemain mouth of the River Coco such as it may be at anygivenmomentasdeterminedbytheAwardoftheKingofSpainof1906 .Withoutprejudicetotheforegoing,theCourtisrequiredtodecidethequestionofsovereigntyovertheislandsandcayswithintheareaindispute .”OnbehalfoftheGovernmentofHonduras:“Havingregardtothepleadings,writtenandoral,andtotheevidencesubmittedbytheParties,MayitpleasetheCourttoadjudgeanddeclarethat:1 .TheislandsBobelCay,SouthCay,SavannaCayandPortRoyal Cay, together with all other islands, cays, rocks,banksandreefsclaimedbyNicaraguawhich lienorthofthe15thparallelareunderthesovereigntyoftheRepublicofHonduras .2 . The starting-point of the maritime boundary to bedelimitedbytheCourtshallbeapointlocatedat14°59 .8’Nlatitude,83°05 .8’Wlongitude .TheboundaryfromthepointdeterminedbytheMixedCommissionin1962at14°59 .8’Nlatitude,83°08 .9’Wlongitudetothestarting-pointof the maritime boundary to be delimited by the CourtshallbeagreedbetweenthePartiestothiscaseonthebasisof theAwardof theKingofSpainof23December1906,whichisbindingupontheParties,andtakingintoaccountthechanginggeographicalcharacteristicsofthemouthoftheriverCoco(alsoknownastheriverSegoviaorWanks) .3 .Eastofthepointat14°59 .8’Nlatitude,83°05 .8’Wlon-gitude, the single maritime boundary which divides therespective territorial seas, exclusive economic zones andcontinentalshelvesofHondurasandNicaraguafollows14°59 .8’Nlatitude,astheexistingmaritimeboundary,oranadjustedequidistanceline,untilthejurisdictionofathirdStateisreached .”

Geography(paras .20–32)

TheCourtnotesthattheareawithinwhichthedelimita-tionsoughtistobecarriedoutliesinthebasinoftheAtlan-ticOceanbetween9°to22°Nand89°to60°W,commonlyknown as the Caribbean Sea . The Nicaraguan coast runsslightlywestofsouthafterCapeGraciasaDiosallthewaytothe Nicaraguan border with Costa Rica except for the east-ward protrusion at Punta Gorda . The Honduran coast, foritspart,runsgenerallyinaneast-westdirectionbetweentheparallels15ºto16ºofNorthlatitude .TheHonduransegmentof the Central American coast along the Caribbean contin-ues its northward extension beyond Cape Gracias a Dios toCapeFalsowhereitbeginstoswingtowardsthewest .AtCapeCamarónthecoastturnsmoresharplysothatitrunsalmostduewestallthewaytotheHonduranborderwithGuatemala .Thetwocoastlinesroughlyformarightanglethatjutsouttosea . The convexity of the coast is compounded by the capeformedatthemouthoftheRiverCoco,whichgenerallyruns

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eastasitnearsthecoastandmeetstheseaattheeasterntipofCapeGraciasaDios .CapeGraciasaDiosmarksthepointof convergence of both States’ coastlines . It abuts a concavecoastline on its sides and has two points, one on each sideofthemarginoftheRiverCocoseparatedbyafewhundredmeters .

ThecontinentalmarginofftheeastcoastofNicaraguaandHondurasisgenerallytermedthe“NicaraguanRise” .Ittakestheformofarelativelyflattriangularshapedplatform,withdepths around 20 m . Approximately midway between thecoastofthosecountriesandthecoastofJamaica,theNicara-guanRiseterminatesbydeepeningabruptlytodepthsofover1,500m .BeforedescendingtothesegreaterdepthstheRiseisbrokenintoseverallargebanks,suchasThunderKnollBankandRosalindBank(alsoknownasRosalindaBank)thatareseparatedfromthemainplatformbydeeperchannelsofover200m .IntheshallowareaoftheridgeclosetothemainlandofNicaraguaandHondurastherearenumerousreefs,someofwhichreachabovethewatersurfaceintheformofcays .

Cays are small, low islands composed largely of sandderived fromthephysicalbreakdownofcoral reefsbywaveaction and subsequent reworking by wind . Larger cays canaccumulate enough sediment to allow for colonization andfixationbyvegetation .Theinsularfeaturespresentonthecon-tinentalshelfinfrontofCapeGraciasaDios,tothenorthofthe15thparallel,includeBobelCay,SavannaCay,PortRoyalCayandSouthCay,locatedbetween30and40nauticalmileseastofthemouthoftheRiverCoco .

With regard to the geomorphology of the mouth of theRiver Coco, the longest river of the Central American isth-mus,theCourtnotesthat it isatypicaldeltawhichformsaprotrusion of the coastline forming a cape: Cape Gracias aDios .Alldeltasarebydefinitiongeographicalaccidentsofanunstablenature .BoththedeltaoftheRiverCocoandeventhecoastline north and south of it show a very active morpho-dynamism . The result is that the river mouth is constantlychanging its shape and unstable islands and shoals form inthemouthwheretheriverdepositsmuchofitssediment .


TheCourtgivesabriefaccountofthehistorywhichformsthebackgroundofthedisputebetweentheParties(onlypartsofwhicharereferredtobelow) .

It notes that upon gaining independence from Spain in1821, Nicaragua and Honduras obtained sovereignty overtheir respective territory including adjacent islands alongtheircoasts,without these islandsbeing identifiedbyname .On7October1894NicaraguaandHondurassuccessfullycon-cludedageneralboundarytreatyknownastheGámez-BonillaTreatywhichenteredintoforceon26December1896 .ArticleII of the Treaty, according to the principle of uti possidetis juris, provided that “each Republic is owner of the territorywhichatthedateofindependenceconstitutedrespectively,theprovincesofHondurasandNicaragua” .ArticleIoftheTreatyfurtherprovidedfortheestablishmentofaMixedBoundaryCommissiontodemarcatetheboundarybetweenNicaraguaandHonduras .TheCommissionfixedtheboundaryfromthe

PacificOceanattheGulfofFonsecatothePortillodeTeote-cacinte,whichislocatedapproximatelyonethirdofthewayacross the landterritory,but itwasunable todetermine theboundaryfromthatpointtotheAtlanticcoast .

Pursuant to the terms of Article III of the Gámez-Bon-illaTreaty,NicaraguaandHondurassubsequentlysubmittedtheir dispute over the remaining portion of the boundarytotheKingofSpainassolearbitrator .KingAlfonsoxIIIofSpainhandeddownanArbitralAwardon23December1906,which drew a boundary from the mouth of the River CocoatCapeGraciasaDiostoPortillodeTeotecacinte .Nicaraguasubsequently challenged the validity and binding characterof theArbitralAwardinaNotedated19March1912 .Afterseveralfailedattemptstosettlethisdisputeandanumberofboundaryincidentsin1957,theCounciloftheOrganizationof American States (OAS) took up the issue that same year .Throughthemediationofanad hocCommitteeestablishedbytheCounciloftheOAS,NicaraguaandHondurasagreedtosubmittheirdisputetotheInternationalCourtofJustice .

In its Judgment of 18 November 1960, the InternationalCourtof Justice found that theAwardmadeby theKingofSpainon23December1906wasvalidandbindingandthatNicaraguawasunderanobligationtogiveeffecttoit .

As Nicaragua and Honduras could not thereafter agreeon how to implement the 1906 Arbitral Award, NicaraguarequestedtheinterventionoftheInter-AmericanPeaceCom-mittee . The Committee subsequently established a MixedCommissionwhichcompletedthedemarcationofthebound-arylinewiththeplacementofboundarymarkersin1962 .TheMixedCommissiondeterminedthatthelandboundarywouldbeginatthemouthoftheRiverCoco,at14°59 .8’Nlatitudeand83°08 .9’Wlongitude .

From 1963 to 1979, Honduras and Nicaragua enjoyedfriendlyrelations .In1977NicaraguainitiatednegotiationsonmattersrelatingtothemaritimeboundaryintheCaribbean .Howeverthesenegotiationsmadenoprogress .Intheperiodthatfollowedrelationsbetweenthetwocountriesdeteriorated .Numerous incidents involving the capture and/or attack byeachStateoffishingvesselsbelongingtotheotherStateinthevicinityofthe15thparallelwererecordedinaseriesofdiplo-maticexchanges .Severalmixedcommissionswereestablishedwithaviewtofindingaresolutionto thesituationbutwereunsuccessfulintheirattempts .

On 29 November 1999, Nicaragua filed an applicationinstitutingproceedingsagainstHondurasaswellasarequestfortheindicationofprovisionalmeasuresbeforetheCentralAmericanCourtofJustice .ThisfollowedHonduras’sexpressedintention to ratify a 1986 Treaty on maritime delimitationwith Colombia in which the parallel 14° 59’ 08” to the eastof the82ndmeridian isgivenas theboundary linebetweenHondurasandColombia .InitsApplication,NicaraguaaskedtheCentralAmericanCourtofJusticetodeclarethatHondu-ras,byproceedingtotheapprovalandratificationofthe1986Treaty,wasactinginviolationofcertainlegalinstrumentsofregionalintegration,includingtheTegucigalpaProtocoltotheCharter of the Organization of Central American States . Inits request for the indication of provisional measures, Nica-raguaasked theCentralAmericanCourtof Justice toorder

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Honduras toabstain fromapprovingandratifying the1986Treaty,untilthesovereigninterestsofNicaraguainitsmari-timespaces,thepatrimonialinterestsofCentralAmericaandthe highest interests of the regional institutions had been“safeguarded” . By Order of 30 November 1999 the CentralAmericanCourtofJusticeruledthatHondurassuspendtheprocedureofratificationofthe1986Treatypendingthedeter-minationofthemeritsinthecase .

HondurasandColombiacontinuedtheratificationprocessandon20December1999exchangedinstrumentsofratifica-tion .On7 January2000,Nicaragua madea further requestfortheindicationofprovisionalmeasuresaskingtheCentralAmericanCourtofJusticetodeclarethenullityofHonduras’sprocessofratificationofthe1986Treaty .ByOrderof17Janu-ary 2000, the Central American Court of Justice ruled thatHonduras had not complied with its Order on provisionalmeasuresdated30November1999butconsideredthatitdidnothavejurisdictiontoruleontherequestmadebyNicaraguatodeclarethenullityofHonduras’sratificationprocess .Initsjudgment on the merits, on 27 November 2001, the CentralAmericanCourtofJusticeconfirmedtheexistenceofa“ter-ritorialpatrimonyofCentralAmerica” . It furtherheld that,byhavingratifiedthe1986Treaty,HondurashadinfringedanumberofprovisionsoftheTegucigalpaProtocoltotheChar-teroftheOrganizationofCentralAmericanStates,whichsetout, inter alia, the fundamental objectives and principles oftheCentralAmericanIntegrationSystem,includingthecon-ceptofthe“territorialpatrimonyofCentralAmerica” .

Throughout the 1990s several diplomatic notes were alsoexchanged with regard to the Parties’ publication of mapsconcerningtheareaindispute .

Positions of the Parties(paras .72–103)

Subject-matter of the disputeInitsApplicationandwrittenpleadingsNicaraguaasked

the Court to determine the course of the single maritimeboundary between the areas of territorial sea, continentalshelfandexclusiveeconomiczoneappertainingrespectivelytoNicaraguaandHondurasintheCaribbeanSea .NicaraguastatesthatithasconsistentlymaintainedthepositionthatitsmaritimeboundarywithHondurasintheCaribbeanSeahasnotbeendelimited .Duringtheoralproceedings,NicaraguaalsomadeaspecificrequestthattheCourtpronounceonsov-ereigntyoverislandslocatedinthedisputedareatothenorthoftheboundarylineclaimedbyHondurasrunningalongthe15thparallel(14°59 .08’Nlatitude) .

AccordingtoHonduras,therealreadyexistsintheCarib-bean Sea a traditionally recognized boundary between the

maritime spaces of Honduras and Nicaragua “which has itsorigins in the principle of uti possidetis juris and which isfirmly rooted in thepracticeofbothHondurasandNicara-gua and confirmed by the practice of third States” . Hondu-ras agrees that the Court should “determine the location ofa single maritime boundary” and asks the Court to trace itfollowingthe“traditionalmaritimeboundary”alongthe15thparallel “until the jurisdiction of a third State is reached” .DuringtheoralproceedingsHondurasalsoaskedtheCourttoadjudgethat“[t]heislandsBobelCay,SouthCay,SavannaCayandPortRoyalCay,togetherwithallotherislands,cays,rocks,banksandreefsclaimedbyNicaraguawhichlienorthofthe15thparallelareunderthesovereigntyoftheRepublicofHonduras” .For the claimsof theParties, see sketch-mapNo .2intheJudgment .

Sovereignty over the islands in the area in disputeNicaraguaclaimssovereigntyovertheislandsandcaysin

thedisputedareaoftheCaribbeanSeatothenorthofthe15thparallel, including Bobel Cay, Savanna Cay, Port Royal CayandSouthCay .HondurasclaimssovereigntyoverBobelCay,SavannaCay,PortRoyalCayandSouthCay, inaddition toclaimingtitleoverothersmallerislandsandcayslyinginthesamearea .

BothStatesagreethatnoneoftheislandsandcaysindis-putewereterra nulliusuponindependencein1821 .Howeverthe Parties disagree on the situation thereafter . Nicaraguaasserts that these featureswerenotassigned toeitherof theRepublicsandthatitisimpossibletoestablishtheuti possidetis juris situation of 1821 with respect to the cays . It concludesthatrecoursemustbehadto“othertitles”andinparticular,contends that it holds original title over the cays under theprinciple of adjacency . Honduras, for its part, claims that ithasanoriginal titleover thedisputed islandsfromthedoc-trine of uti possidetis juris and that its title is confirmed bymanyeffectivités .

Maritime delimitation beyond the territorial seaNicaragua’s line: bisector method

The Court notes that Nicaragua proposes a method ofdelimitationconsistingof“thebisectoroftheangleproducedbyconstructinglinesbasedupontherespectivecoastalfront-agesandproducingextensionsoftheselines” .Suchabisectoris calculated from the general direction of the NicaraguancoastandthegeneraldirectionoftheHondurancoast .ThesecoastalfrontsgenerateabisectorwhichrunsfromthemouthoftheRiverCocoasalineofconstantbearing(azimuth52°45’21”)untilintersectingwiththeboundaryofathirdStateinthevicinityofRosalindBank .

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Honduras’s line: “traditional boundary” along the 15th parallel

Honduras, for itspart,asks theCourt toconfirmwhat itclaims isa traditionalmaritimeboundarybasedonuti pos-sidetis jurisrunningalongthe15thparallelbetweenHondu-rasandNicaraguaintheCaribbeanSeaandtocontinuethatexistinglineuntilthejurisdictionofathirdStateisreached .Wereitscontentionsastothe15thparallelnottobeacceptedbytheCourt,HondurasasksalternativelythattheCourttraceanadjustedequidistanceline,untilthejurisdictionofathirdStateisreached .

Starting-point of the maritime boundary

BothPartiesagreethattheterminusofthelandboundarybetweenNicaraguaandHonduraswasestablishedbythe1906ArbitralAwardatthemouthoftheprincipalarmoftheRiverCoco .TheMixedBoundaryCommissiondeterminedin1962thatthestarting-pointofthelandboundaryatthemouthoftheRiverCocowassituatedat14°59 .8’Nlatitudeand83°08 .9’Wlongitude .BothPartiesalsoagreethatduetotheaccretionofsediments,thispointhasmovedsince1962 .

Nicaragua proposes, in its written pleadings, that thestarting-pointofthemaritimeboundarybeset“ataprudentdistance”,namely3nauticalmilesoutatseafromtheactualmouthoftheRiverCocoonthebisectorline .Nicaraguaini-tiallysuggestedthatthePartieswouldhavetonegotiate“alinerepresentingtheboundarybetweenthepointofdepartureoftheboundaryat themouthoftheRiverCocoandthepointof departure from which the Court will have determinedthe [maritime] boundary line” . While leaving that proposalopen,Nicaragua,initsfinalsubmissions,askedtheCourttoconfirm that: “[t]he starting-point of the delimitation is thethalwegofthemainmouthoftheRiverCocosuchasitmaybeatanygivenmomentasdeterminedby theAwardof theKingofSpainof1906” .Hondurasacceptsastarting-pointoftheboundary“at3milesfromtheterminalpointadoptedin1962”butarguesthattheseawardfixed-pointshouldbemeas-uredfromthepointestablishedbythe1962MixedCommis-sionandlocatedonthe15thparallel .

Delimitation of the territorial sea

Nicaragua states that the delimitation of the territorialsea between States with adjacent coasts must be effected onthebasisoftheprinciplessetoutinArticle15oftheUnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea(UNCLOS) .IntheviewofNicaragua, in thepresentcasehowever, it is techni-callyimpossibletodrawanequidistancelinebecauseitwouldhavetobeentirelydrawnonthebasisof thetwooutermostpointsofthemouthoftheriver,whichareextremelyunstableandcontinuouslychangeposition .Thus,accordingtoNicara-gua,thebisectorlineshouldalsobeusedforthedelimitationoftheterritorialsea .

Honduras agrees with Nicaragua that there are “specialcircumstances”which,underArticle15ofUNCLOS“requiredelimitationbyalineotherthanastrictmedianline” .How-ever, according to Honduras, while the configuration of thecontinentallandmassmaybeonesuch“specialcircumstance”,of far greater significance “is the established practice of the

Parties in treating the 15th parallel as their boundary fromthemouthof theRiverCoco” .Hondurasalso identifiesasafactorof“thegreatestsignificance . . .thegradualmovementeastwardsoftheactualmouthoftheRiverCoco” .Hondurasthereforesuggeststhatfromthefixedseawardstarting-pointthemaritimeboundaryintheterritorialseashouldfollowinaneastwarddirectionthe15thparallel .

Admissibility of the new claim to sovereignty over the islands in the area in dispute(paras .104–116)

TheCourtobservesthat,fromaformalpointofview,theclaimrelatingtosovereigntyovertheislandsinthemaritimeareaindispute,aspresentedinthefinalsubmissionsofNica-ragua,isanewclaiminrelationtotheclaimspresentedintheApplicationandinthewrittenpleadings .

However,themerefactthataclaimisnewisnotinitselfdecisive for the issueofadmissibility . Inorder todeterminewhetheranewclaimintroducedduringthecourseofthepro-ceedings isadmissible theCourtneeds toconsiderwhether,“although formally a new claim, the claim in question canbeconsideredasincludedintheoriginalclaiminsubstance”(Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Pre-liminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, pp . 265–266,para .65) .Forthispurpose,tofindthatthenewclaim,asamatterofsubstance,hasbeenincludedintheoriginalclaim,itisnotsufficientthatthereshouldbelinksbetweenthemofageneralnature .Moreover,

“[a]nadditionalclaimmusthavebeenimplicitintheappli-cation (Temple of Preah Vihear, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962,p .36)ormustarise‘directlyoutoftheques-tionwhichisthesubject-matterofthatApplication’(Fish-eries jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland),Merits, I.C.J. Reports 1974,p .203,para .72)”(Certain Phos-phate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992,p .266,para .67) .Recallingthatonanumberofoccasionsithasemphasized

that“thelanddominatesthesea”,theCourtobservesthatinordertodrawasinglemaritimeboundarylineinanareaoftheCaribbeanSeawhereanumberof islandsandrocksarelocated,itwouldhavetoconsiderwhatinfluencethesemari-time features might have on the course of that line . To plotthatlinetheCourtwouldfirsthavetodeterminewhichStatehas sovereignty over the islands and rocks in the disputedarea . The Court is bound to do so whether or not a formalclaimhasbeenmadeinthisrespect .Thustheclaimrelatingtosovereigntyisimplicitinandarisesdirectlyoutoftheques-tion which is the subject-matter of Nicaragua’s Application,namelythedelimitationofthedisputedareasoftheterritorialsea,continentalshelfandexclusiveeconomiczone .

TheCourtthusconcludesthattheNicaraguanclaimrelat-ing to sovereignty over the islands in the maritime area indispute is admissible as it is inherent in the original claimrelatingtothemaritimedelimitationbetweenNicaraguaandHondurasintheCaribbeanSea .

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The critical date (paras .117–131)

TheCourtrecallsthat,inthecontextofamaritimedelimi-tationdisputeorofadisputerelatedtosovereigntyoverland,thesignificanceofacriticaldateliesindistinguishingbetweenthoseactsperformedà titre de souverainwhichareinprinci-plerelevantforthepurposeofassessingandvalidatingeffec-tivités,andthoseactsoccurringaftersuchcriticaldate,whichareingeneralmeaninglessforthatpurpose,havingbeencar-riedoutbyaStatewhich,alreadyhavingclaimstoassertinalegaldispute,couldhavetakenthoseactionsstrictlywiththeaimofbuttressingthoseclaims .Thusacriticaldatewillbethedividing lineafterwhich theParties’actsbecome irrelevantforthepurposesofassessingthevalueofeffectivités .

Hondurascontendsthattherearetwodisputes,albeitrelat-ed:oneastowhetherNicaraguaorHondurashastitletothedisputedislands;andtheotherastowhetherthe15thparallelrepresentsthecurrentmaritimefrontierbetweentheParties .Nicaraguaperceivesitasasingledispute .

Hondurasobservesthatinrespectofthedisputeconcern-ing sovereignty over the maritime features in the disputedarea there “may be more than one critical date” . Thus, “[t]othe extent that the issue of title turns on the application ofuti possidetis”, the critical date would be 1821—the date ofindependence of Honduras and Nicaragua from Spain . Forthe purposes of post-colonial effectivités, Honduras arguesthatthecriticaldatecannotbe“earlierthanthedateofthefil-ingoftheMemorial—21March2001—sincethiswasthefirsttimethatNicaraguaassertedthat ithadtitletotheislands” .Withregardtothedisputeoverthemaritimeboundary,Hon-durasmaintainsthat1979,whentheSandinistaGovernmentcametopower,constitutesthecriticaldate,asuptothatdate“Nicaraguanevershowedtheslightestinterestinthecaysandislandsnorthofthe15thparallel” .

ForNicaragua, thecriticaldate is1977,when thePartiesinitiated negotiations on maritime delimitation, followingan exchange of letters by the two Governments . Nicaraguaassertsthatthedisputeoverthemaritimeboundary,byimpli-cation, encompasses the dispute over the islands within therelevantareaandthereforethecriticaldateforbothdisputescoincides .

HavingexaminedtheargumentsoftheParties,theCourtconsidersthatincaseswherethereexisttwointerrelateddis-putes,asinthepresentcase,thereisnotnecessarilyasinglecriticaldateandthatdatemaybedifferentinthetwodisputes .For these reasons, the Court finds it necessary to distin-guish two different critical dates which are to be applied totwo different circumstances . One critical date concerns theattributionof sovereigntyover the islands tooneof the twocontendingStates .Theothercriticaldateisrelatedtotheissueofdelimitationofthedisputedmaritimearea .

Withregardtothedisputeovertheislands,theCourtcon-siders2001asthecriticaldate,sinceitwasonlyinitsMemo-rialfiledin2001thatNicaraguaexpresslyreserved“thesover-eignrightsappurtenanttoalltheisletsandrocksclaimedbyNicaraguainthedisputedarea” .

Withregardtothedisputeoverthedelimitationline,theCourtfindsthatitisfromthetimeoftwoincidentsinvolvingthe capture of fishing vessels in March 1982 and eliciting adiplomaticexchangebetweenthePartiesthatadisputeastothemaritimedelimitationcouldbesaidtoexist .

Sovereignty over the islands(paras .132–227)

The maritime features in the area in dispute

Inassessingthelegalnatureofthelandfeaturesinthedis-putedareatheCourtnotesthatthePartiesdonotdisputethefactthatBobelCay,SavannaCay,PortRoyalCayandSouthCayremainabovewaterathightide .TheythusfallwithinthedefinitionandrégimeofislandsunderArticle121ofUNCLOS(towhichNicaraguaandHondurasarebothparties) .

Withtheexceptionofthesefourislands,theCourtstatesthat thereseemstobean insufficiency in the information itwouldrequireinordertoidentifyanumberoftheothermari-timefeaturesinthedisputedarea .Inthisregardlittleassist-ancewasprovidedinthewrittenandoralprocedurestodefinewiththenecessaryprecisiontheother“features”inrespectofwhich thePartiesasked theCourt todecide thequestionofterritorialsovereignty .

The Court notes that during the proceedings, two othercays were mentioned: Logwood Cay (also called Palo deCampeche) and Media Luna Cay . In response to a questionputbyajudgead hoc,thePartieshavestatedthatMediaLunaCayisnowsubmergedandthusthatitisnolongeranisland .Uncertainty prevails in the case of Logwood Cay’s currentcondition: according to Honduras it remains above water(thoughonlyslightly)athightide;accordingtoNicaragua,itiscompletelysubmergedathightide .

Given all these circumstances, the Court regards it asappropriate to pronounce only upon the question of sover-eigntyoverBobelCay,SavannaCay,PortRoyalCayandSouthCay .

AclaimwasalsomadeduringtheoralproceedingsbyeachPartytoanislandinanentirelydifferentlocation,namely,theisland in the mouth of the River Coco . For the last centurytheunstablenatureoftherivermouthhasmeantthatlargerislandsare liable to jointheirnearerbankandthefutureofsmallerislandsisuncertain .Becauseofthechangingcondi-tionsofthearea,theCourtmakesnofindingastosovereigntitleoverislandsinthemouthoftheRiverCoco .

The utipossidetisjuris principle and sovereignty over the islands in dispute

TheCourtobservesthattheprincipleofuti possidetis jurishasbeenreliedonbyHondurasasthebasisofsovereigntyoverthe islandsindispute .This iscontestedbyNicaraguawhichassertsthatsovereigntyovertheislandscannotbeattributedtooneortheotherPartyonthebasisofthisprinciple .

TheCourtnotesthatithasrecognizedthat“theprincipleofuti possidetishaskeptitsplaceamongthemostimportantlegal principles” regarding territorial title and boundarydelimitationat themomentofdecolonization (Frontier Dis-

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pute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986,p .567,para .26) .Itstatesthatitisbeyonddoubtthattheprincipleisapplicabletothequestionofterritorialdelimita-tionbetweenNicaraguaandHonduras,bothformerSpanishcolonial provinces . During the nineteenth century, negotia-tionsaimedatdeterminingtheterritorialboundarybetweenNicaragua and Honduras culminated in the conclusion oftheGámez-BonillaTreatyof7October1894, inwhichbothStatesagreed inArticle II,paragraph3, that “eachRepublic[was] owner of the territory which at the date of independ-enceconstituted,respectively,theprovincesofHondurasandNicaragua” .Thetermsof theAwardof theKingofSpainof1906,basedspecificallyontheprincipleofuti possidetis jurisasestablishedinArticleII,paragraph3,oftheGámez-BonillaTreaty,definedtheterritorialboundarybetweenthetwocoun-tries with regard to the disputed portions of land, i .e . fromPortillodeTeotecacintetotheAtlanticCoast .Thevalidityandbindingforceofthe1906AwardhavebeenconfirmedbytheInternationalCourtofJusticeinits1960JudgmentandbothPartiestothedisputeaccepttheAwardaslegallybinding .

Turning to the question of sovereignty over the islands,theCourtbeginsbyobservingthatuti possidetis jurismay,inprinciple, apply to offshore possessions and maritime spaces .Itobservesthatthemereinvocationoftheprincipledoesnotof itselfprovideaclearanswerastosovereigntyoverthedis-putedislands .Iftheislandsarenotterra nullius,asbothPartiesacknowledgeandasisgenerallyrecognized,itmustbeassumedthattheyhadbeenundertheruleoftheSpanishCrown .How-ever, it does not necessarily follow that the successor to thedisputedislandscouldonlybeHonduras,beingtheonlyStateformally to have claimed such status . The Court recalls thatuti possidetis jurispresupposestheexistenceofadelimitationof territorybetween thecolonialprovincesconcernedhavingbeeneffectedbythecentralcolonialauthorities .Thusinordertoapply theprincipleofuti possidetis juris to the islands indispute it must be shown that the Spanish Crown had allo-catedthemtooneortheotherofitscolonialprovinces .

The Court looks for convincing evidence which wouldallow it to determine whether and to which of the colonialprovincesoftheformerSpanishAmericatheislandshadbeenattributed .

ItstatesthatthePartieshavenotproduceddocumentaryorotherevidencefromthepre-independenceerawhichexplicitlyreferstotheislands .TheCourtalsoobservesthatproximityassuchisnotnecessarilydeterminativeoflegaltitle .Theinfor-mationprovidedbythePartiesonthecolonialadministrationofCentralAmericabySpaindoesnotallowforcertaintyastowhetheroneentity(theCaptaincy-GeneralofGuatemala),ortwo subordinate entities (the Government of Honduras andtheGeneralCommandofNicaragua),exercisedadministra-tionover the insular territoriesofHondurasandNicaraguaatthattime .Unlikethelandterritorywheretheadministra-tive boundary between different provinces was more or lessclearlydemarcated,itisapparentthattherewasnoclear-cutdemarcationwithregardtoislandsingeneral .Thisseemsallthemoresowithregardtotheislandsinquestion,sincetheymusthavebeenscarcelyinhabited,ifatall,andpossessednonaturalresourcestospeakofforexploitation,exceptforfish-inginthesurroundingmaritimearea .TheCourtalsoobserves

thattheCaptaincy-GeneralofGuatemalamaywellhavehadcontroloverlandandinsularterritoriesadjacenttocoastsinorder toprovide security,prevent smugglingandundertakeothermeasurestoensuretheprotectionoftheinterestsoftheSpanishCrown .Howeverthereisnoevidencetosuggestthatthe islands in question played any role in the fulfillment ofanyofthesestrategicaims .

Notwithstandingthehistoricalandcontinuingimportanceoftheuti possidetis jurisprinciple,socloselyassociatedwithLatinAmericandecolonization,itcannotinthiscasebesaidthat the application of this principle to these small islands,located considerably offshore and not obviously adjacent tothemainlandcoastofNicaraguaorHonduras,would settletheissueofsovereigntyoverthem .

With regard to the adjacency argument put forward byNicaragua, the Court notes that the independence treatiesconcludedbyNicaraguaandHonduraswithSpainin1850and1866respectivelyrefertoadjacencywithrespecttomainlandcoastsratherthantooffshore islands .Nicaragua’sargumentthattheislandsindisputeareclosertoEdinburghCay,whichbelongstoNicaragua,cannotthereforebeaccepted .WhiletheCourtdoesnot relyonadjacency inreaching itsfindings, itobserves that, inanyevent, the islands indisputeappear tobeinfactclosertothecoastofHondurasthantothecoastofNicaragua .

Havingconcludedthatthequestionofsovereigntyovertheislandsindisputecannotberesolvedontheabovebasis,theCourtthenascertainswhethertherewererelevanteffectivitésduringthecolonialperiod .Thistestof“colonialeffectivités”hasbeendefinedas“theconductoftheadministrativeauthor-itiesasproofoftheeffectiveexerciseofterritorialjurisdictionin the region during the colonial period” (Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 586, para. 63; Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005,p .120,para .47) .

TheCourtnotes that informationabout suchconductbythecolonialadministrativeauthoritiesislackinginthecase .Itconsidersthat,giventhelocationofthedisputedislandsandthe lackofanyparticulareconomicorstrategicsignificanceoftheseislandsatthetime,therewerenocolonialeffectivitésin relation to them . Thus the Court can neither found norconfirm on this basis a title to territory over the islands inquestion .

In light of the above considerations the Court concludesthattheprincipleofuti possidetisaffordsinadequateassistanceindeterminingsovereigntyovertheislandsbecausenothingclearlyindicateswhethertheywereattributedtothecolonialprovincesofNicaraguaorofHonduraspriortooruponinde-pendence . Neither can such attribution be discerned in theKing of Spain’s Arbitral Award of 1906 . Equally, the Courthasbeenpresentedwithnoevidenceastocolonialeffectivitésin respect of these islands . Thus it has not been establishedthateitherHondurasorNicaraguahadtitletotheseislandsbyvirtueofuti possidetis .

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Post colonial effectivités and sovereignty over the disputed islands

TheCourtfirstnotesthataccordingtoitsjurisprudence(inparticular the Indonesia/Malaysia case) and thatof thePer-manentCourtofInternationalJustice,sovereigntyoverminormaritime features, such as the islands in dispute betweenHondurasandNicaragua,maybeestablishedonthebasisofarelativelymodestdisplayofStatepowersintermsofqualityandquantity .

Itthenexaminesthedifferentcategoriesofeffectivitéspre-sentedbytheParties .

Concerning thecategoryof legislative and administrative control,theCourt,notingthatthereisnoreferencetothefourislandsindisputeinthevariousHonduranConstitutionsandintheAgrarianLaw,furthernotesthatthere isnoevidencethatHondurasappliedtheselegalinstrumentstotheislandsin any specific manner . The Court therefore finds that theHonduran claim that it had legislative and administrativecontrolovertheislandsisnotconvincing .

Concerning the application and enforcement of criminal and civil law,theCourtisoftheopinionthattheevidencepro-videdbyHondurasdoeshavelegalsignificance .Thefactthatanumberoftheactsmentioned(inter aliacriminalcomplaintsof theftandphysicalassaultonSavannaandBobelCays, aswellasa1993drugenforcementoperationintheareabyHon-duras authorities and the United States Drug EnforcementAdministration(DEA))occurredinthe1990sisnoobstacletotheirrelevanceastheCourthasfoundthecriticaldateinrela-tiontotheislandstobe2001 .Thecriminalcomplaintshaverelevancebecause the criminal actsoccurred on the islandsindispute .The1993drugenforcementoperation,whilenotnecessarilyanexampleoftheapplicationandenforcementofHondurancriminallaw,canwellbeconsideredasanauthori-zationbyHondurastotheUnitedStatesDEAgrantingittherighttoflyovertheislandsmentionedinthedocument,whichare within the disputed area . The permit extended by Hon-durastotheDEAtooverflythe“nationalairspace”,togetherwith the specific mention of the four islands and cays, maybeunderstoodasa sovereignactbyaState,amounting toarelevanteffectivitéinthearea .

Concerningtheregulation of immigration,theCourtnotesthat there appears to have been substantial activity withregardtoimmigrationandwork-permitrelatedregulationbyHondurasofpersonsontheislandsin1999and2000 .In1999Honduran authorities visited the four islands and recordedthe details of the foreigners living in South Cay, Port RoyalCayandSavannaCay(BobelCaywasuninhabitedatthetime,thoughithadpreviouslybeeninhabited) .Hondurasprovidesa statement by a Honduran immigration officer who visitedtheislandsthreeorfourtimesfrom1997to1999 .TheCourtfindsthatlegalsignificanceistobeattachedtotheevidenceprovided by Honduras on the regulation of immigration asproofofeffectivités,notwithstandingthatitbeganonlyinthelate1990s .TheissuanceofworkpermitsandvisastoJamai-canandNicaraguannationalsexhibitaregulatorypoweronthepartofHonduras .Thevisits to the islandsbyaHondu-ran immigration officer entail the exercise of jurisdictionalauthority, even if its purpose was to monitor rather than to

regulateimmigrationontheislands .Thetimespanfortheseactsofsovereigntyisrathershort,butthenitisonlyHondu-ras which has undertaken measures in the area that can beregarded as acts performed à titre de souverain . There is nocontentionbyNicaraguaofregulationbyitselfofimmigrationontheislandseitherbeforeorafterthe1990s .

Concerningtheregulation of fisheriesactivities,theCourtis of the view that the Honduran authorities issued fishingpermitswiththebeliefthattheyhadalegalentitlementtothemaritime areas around the islands, derived from Hondurantitleoverthoseislands .TheevidenceofHonduran-regulatedfishingboatsandconstructionontheislandsisalsolegallyrel-evantfortheCourtunderthecategoryofadministrativeandlegislativecontrol .TheCourtconsidersthatthepermitsissuedby the Honduran Government allowing the construction ofhousesinSavannaCayandthepermitforthestorageoffish-ingequipmentinthesamecayprovidedbythemunicipalityof Puerto Lempira may also be regarded as a display, albeitmodest,oftheexerciseofauthority,andasevidenceofeffec-tivitéswithrespecttothedisputedislands .TheCourtdoesnotfind persuasive Nicaragua’s argument that the negotiationsbetweenNicaraguaandtheUnitedKingdominthe1950soverrenewedturtlefishingrightsofftheNicaraguancoastatteststoNicaraguansovereigntyovertheislandsindispute .

Concerning naval patrols, the Court recalls that it hasalreadyindicatedthatthecriticaldateforthepurposesoftheissueoftitletotheislandsisnot1977but2001 .TheevidenceputforwardbybothPartiesonnavalpatrollingissparseanddoes not clearly entail a direct relationship between eitherNicaraguaorHondurasandtheislandsindispute .ThustheCourtdoesnotfindtheevidenceprovidedbyeitherPartyonnavalpatrolspersuasiveastotheexistenceofeffectivitéswithrespecttotheislands .

Concerning oil concessions, the Court finds that the evi-dence relating to the offshore oil exploration activities ofthe Parties has no bearing on the islands in dispute . It willthereforeconcentrateontheoilconcessionrelatedactsontheislandsunderthecategoryofpublicworks .

Concerning public works, the Court observes that theplacingonBobelCayin1975ofa10mlongantennabyGeo-physical Services Inc . for the Union Oil Company was partof a local geodetic network to assist in drilling activities inthecontextofoilconcessionsgranted .Hondurasclaimsthatthe construction of the antenna was an integral part of the“oilexplorationactivityauthorizedbyHonduras” .Reportsonthese activities were periodically submitted by the oil com-pany to the Honduran authorities, in which the amount ofthe corresponding taxes paid was also indicated . NicaraguaclaimsthattheplacementoftheantennaonBobelCaywasaprivateactforwhichnospecificgovernmentalauthorizationwasgranted .TheCourt isof theview that theantennawaserectedinthecontextofauthorizedoilexplorationactivities .Furthermore thepaymentof taxes inrespectof suchactivi-ties in general can be considered additional evidence thatthe placement of the antenna was done with governmentalauthorization .TheCourtthusconsidersthatthepublicworksreferredtobyHondurasconstituteeffectivitéswhichsupportHonduransovereigntyovertheislandsindispute .

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HavingconsideredtheargumentsandevidenceputforwardbytheParties,theCourtfindsthattheeffectivités invokedbyHondurasevidencedan“intentionandwilltoactassovereign”andconstituteamodestbutrealdisplayofauthorityoverthefourislands .AlthoughithasnotbeenestablishedthatthefourislandsareofeconomicorstrategicimportanceandinspiteofthescarcityofactsofStateauthority,Hondurashasshownasufficientoverallpatternofconducttodemonstrateitsinten-tiontoactassovereigninrespectofBobelCay,SavannaCay,PortRoyalCayandSouthCay .TheCourtfurthernotesthatthoseHonduranactivitiesqualifyingaseffectivitéswhichcanbeassumedtohavecometotheknowledgeofNicaraguadidnotelicitanyprotestonthepartofthelatter .WithregardtoNicaragua,theCourthasfoundnoproofofintentionorwilltoactassovereign,andnoproofofanyactualexerciseordis-playofauthorityovertheislands .

Evidentiary value of maps in confirming sovereignty over the disputed islands

TheCourtnotesthatalargenumberofmapswaspresentedbythePartiestoillustratetheirrespectivearguments,butthatnoneofthemapswhichincludesomeoftheislandsindisputeclearly specify which State is the one exercising sovereigntyoverthoseislands .Furthermorenoneofthemapsbeingpartofa legal instrumentinforcenormorespecificallypartofaboundarytreatyconcludedbetweenNicaraguaandHonduras,theCourtconcludesthatthecartographicmaterialpresentedbythePartiescannotofitselfsupporttheirrespectiveclaimstosovereigntyoverislandstothenorthofthe15thparallel .

Recognition by third States and bilateral treaties; the 1998 Free Trade Agreement

IntheCourt’sviewthereisnoevidencetosupportanyofthecontentionsmadebythePartieswithrespecttorecogni-tionbythirdStatesthatsovereigntyoverthedisputedislandsisvestedinHondurasorinNicaragua .SomeoftheevidenceofferedbythePartiesshowsepisodicincidentsthatareneitherconsistentnorconsecutive .Itisobviousthattheydonotsig-nifyanexplicitacknowledgmentofsovereignty,norweretheymeanttoimplyanysuchacknowledgment .

The Court observes that bilateral treaties of Colombia,onewithHondurasandonewithJamaica,havebeeninvokedbyHondurasasproofofrecognitionofsovereigntyoverthedisputed islands . The Court notes that in relation to thesetreaties Nicaragua never acquiesced in any understandingthatHondurashadsovereigntyoverthedisputedislands .TheCourtdoesnotfindthesebilateraltreatiesrelevantasregardsrecognitionbyathirdpartyoftitleoverthedisputedislands .

The Court recalls that during the oral proceedings it wasapprisedofthenegotiatinghistoryofaFreeTradeAgreementCentralAmerica-DominicanRepublicwhichwassignedon16April1998inSantoDomingobyNicaragua,Honduras,CostaRica, Guatemala, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic .According to Honduras the original text of the Agreementincluded an Annex to Article 2 .01 giving a definition of theterritory of Honduras, which referred inter alia to Palo deCampecheandMediaLunacays .Hondurasclaimsthattheterm“MediaLuna”was“frequentlyusedtorefertotheentiregroupof islands and cays” in the area in dispute . Nicaragua points

outthatduringtheratificationprocess,itsNationalAssemblyapprovedarevisedtextoftheFreeTradeAgreementwhichdidnotcontaintheAnnextoArticle2 .01 .HavingexaminedsaidAnnex,theCourtobservesthatthefourislandsindisputearenotmentionedbynameinit .Moreover,theCourtnotesthatithasnotbeenpresentedwithanyconvincingevidencethattheterm“MediaLuna”has themeaningadvancedbyHonduras .InthesecircumstancestheCourtfindsthatitneednotfurtherexamineargumentsrelatingtothisTreatynoritsstatusforthepurposesoftheseproceedings .

Decision as to sovereignty over the islands

The Court, having examined all of the evidence relatedtotheclaimsofthePartiesastosovereigntyovertheislandsof Bobel Cay, Savanna Cay, Port Royal Cay and South Cay,includingtheissueoftheevidentiaryvalueofmapsandthequestionofrecognitionbythirdStates,concludesthatHon-durashassovereigntyovertheseislandsonthebasisofpost-colonialeffectivités .

Delimitation of maritime areas(paras .228–320)

Traditional maritime boundary line claimed by Honduras

The principle of utipossidetisjuris

The Court observes that the uti possidetis juris principlemight in certain circumstances, such as in connection withhistoric bays and territorial seas, play a role in a maritimedelimitation .However,inthepresentcase,weretheCourttoacceptHonduras’sclaimthatCapeGraciasaDiosmarkedtheseparationoftherespectivemaritimejurisdictionofthecolo-nialprovincesofHondurasandNicaragua,nopersuasivecasehasbeenmadebyHondurasastowhythemaritimeboundaryshouldthenextendfromtheCapealongthe15thparallel .Itmerely asserts that the Spanish Crown tended to use paral-lels and meridians to draw jurisdictional divisions, withoutpresentinganyevidencethatthecolonialPowerdidsointhisparticularcase .

The Court thus cannot uphold Honduras’s assertion thattheuti possidetis jurisprincipleprovidedforamaritimedivi-sionalongthe15thparallel“toatleast6nauticalmilesfromCapeGraciasaDios”northattheterritorialsovereigntyoverthe islands to the north of the 15th parallel on the basis oftheuti possidetis jurisprinciple“providesthetraditionallinewhichseparatestheseHonduranislandsfromtheNicaraguanislandstothesouth”with“arichhistoricalbasisthatcontrib-utestoitslegalfoundation” .

TheCourtfurtherobservesthatNicaraguaandHondurasasnew independentStateswereentitledbyvirtueof theuti possidetis juris principle to such mainland and insular ter-ritoriesandterritorialseaswhichconstitutedtheirprovincesatindependence .TheCourt,however,hasalreadyfoundthatit is not possible to determine sovereignty over the islandsin question on the basis of the uti possidetis juris principle .Nor has it been shown that the Spanish Crown divided itsmaritimejurisdictionbetweenthecolonialprovincesofNica-raguaandHondurasevenwithinthelimitsoftheterritorial

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sea .AlthoughitmaybeacceptedthatallStatesgainedtheirindependence with an entitlement to a territorial sea, thatlegal factdoesnotdeterminewhere themaritimeboundarybetweenadjacentseasofneighbouringStateswillrun .Inthecircumstancesofthepresentcase,theuti possidetis jurisprin-ciplecannotbesaidtohaveprovidedabasis foramaritimedivisionalongthe15thparallel .

TheCourtalsonotesthatthe1906ArbitralAward,whichindeedwasbasedontheuti possidetis jurisprinciple,didnotdealwiththemaritimedelimitationbetweenNicaraguaandHondurasandthatitdoesnotconfirmamaritimeboundarybetweenthemalongthe15thparallel .

TheCourtthusfindsthatthecontentionofHondurasthattheuti possidetis jurisprincipleprovidesabasisforanalleged“traditional”maritimeboundaryalongthe15thparallelcan-notbesustained .

Tacit agreement

Having already indicated that there was no boundaryestablishedbyreferencetouti possidetis juris,theCourtmustdetermine whether, as claimed by Honduras, there was atacit agreement sufficient to establish a boundary . Evidenceofatacitlegalagreementmustbecompelling .Theestablish-mentofapermanentmaritimeboundaryisamatterofgraveimportanceandagreementisnoteasilytobepresumed .Ade facto line might in certain circumstances correspond to theexistenceofanagreedlegalboundaryormightbemoreinthenatureofaprovisionallineorofalineforaspecific,limitedpurpose,suchassharingascarceresource .Eveniftherehadbeenaprovisionallinefoundconvenientforaperiodoftime,thisistobedistinguishedfromaninternationalboundary .

As regards the evidence of oil concessions proffered byHonduras in support of its contention, the Court consid-ersthatNicaragua,byleavingopenthenorthernlimittoitsconcessionsorbyabstainingfrommentioningtheboundarywithHondurasinthatconnection,reserveditspositioncon-cerningitsmaritimeboundarywithHonduras .Moreover,theCourtobservesthattheNicaraguanconcessionsprovisionallyextendinguptothe15thparallelwereallgivenafterHondu-rashadgranteditsconcessionsextendingsouthwardstothe15thparallel .

With regard to the 1986 Treaty between Colombia andHondurasandthe1993TreatybetweenColombiaandJamaicainvoked by Honduras, the Court recalls that Nicaragua hasmaintained its persistent objections to these treaties . In the1986 Treaty the parallel 14° 59’ 08” to the east of the 82ndmeridianservesastheboundarylinebetweenHondurasandColombia .Asalreadymentioned,accordingtoHondurasthe1993Treatyproceedsfromarecognitionofthevalidityofthe1986TreatybetweenColombiaandHonduras,therebyrecog-nizingHonduranjurisdictionoverthewatersandislandstothenorthofthe15thparallel .

TheCourthasnotedthatatperiodsintime,astheevidenceshows,the15thparallelappearstohavehadsomerelevanceintheconductoftheParties .Thisevidencerelatestotheperiodafter1961whenNicaragualeftareastothenorthofCapeGra-ciasaDios followingtherenderingof theCourt’s Judgmenton the validity of the 1906 Arbitral Award and until 1977

whenNicaraguaproposednegotiationswithHonduraswiththe purpose of delimiting maritime areas in the CaribbeanSea . The Court observes that during this period several oilconcessionsweregrantedbythePartieswhichindicatedthattheirnorthernandsouthernlimitslayrespectivelyat14°59 .8’ .Furthermore,regulationoffishingintheareaattimesseemedtosuggestanunderstandingthatthe15thparalleldividedtherespectivefishingareasofthetwoStates;andinadditionthe15thparallelwasalsoperceivedbysomefishermenasa linedividingmaritimeareasunderthejurisdictionofNicaraguaandHonduras .However,theseevents,spanningashortperiodoftime,arenotsufficientfortheCourttoconcludethattherewas a legally established international maritime boundarybetweenthetwoStates .

TheCourtobservesthattheNoteoftheHonduranMinis-terforForeignAffairsdated3May1982citedbytheParties(inwhichheconcurredwiththeNicaraguanForeignMinistrythat“themaritimeborderbetweenHondurasandNicaraguahas not been legally delimited” and proposed that the Par-ties at least come to a “temporary” arrangement about theboundarysoastoavoidfurtherboundaryincidents)issome-what uncertain regarding the existence of an acknowledgedboundaryalongthe15thparallel .Theacknowledgmentthattherewasthennolegaldelimitation“wasnotaproposaloraconcessionmadeduringnegotiations,butastatementoffactstransmittedtotheForeign[Ministry,which]didnotexpressanyreservationinrespectthereof”andshouldthusbetaken“asevidenceofthe[Honduran]officialviewatthattime” .

Havingreviewedallof thispractice includingdiplomaticexchanges,theCourtconcludesthattherewasnotacitagree-ment ineffectbetweentheParties in1982—nora fortioriatanysubsequentdate—ofanaturetoestablishalegallybindingmaritimeboundary .

Determination of the maritime boundary

TheCourt,havingfoundthatthereisnotraditionalbound-ary line along the 15th parallel, proceeds to the maritimedelimitationbetweenNicaraguaandHonduras .

Applicable law

BothPartiesintheirfinalsubmissionsaskedtheCourttodrawa “singlemaritimeboundary”delimiting their respec-tiveterritorialseas,exclusiveeconomiczones,andcontinen-talshelvesinthedisputedarea .AlthoughNicaraguawasnotpartytoUNCLOSatthetimeitfiledtheApplicationinthiscase, the Parties are in agreement that UNCLOS is now inforcebetweenthemandthatitsrelevantarticlesareapplicablebetweentheminthisdispute .

Areas to be delimited and methodology

The“singlemaritimeboundary”inthepresentcasewillbetheresultofthedelimitationofthevariousareasofjurisdic-tionspanningthemaritimezonefromtheNicaragua-Hondu-rasmainlandouttoatleastthe82ndmeridian,wherethird-State interests may become relevant . In the western reachesof the area to be delimited the Parties’ mainland coasts areadjacent; thus, for some distance the boundary will delimitexclusively their territorial seas (UNCLOS, Art . 2, para . 1) .

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BothPartiesalsoacceptthatthefourislandsindisputenorthofthe15thparallel(BobelCay,SavannaCay,PortRoyalCayandSouthCay),whichhavebeenattributedtoHonduras,aswell as Nicaragua’s Edinburgh Cay south of the 15th paral-lel, are entitled togenerate theirown territorial seas for thecoastalState .TheCourtrecallsthatasregardstheislandsindisputenoclaimhasbeenmadebyeitherPartyformaritimeareasotherthantheterritorialsea .

TheCourtnotesthat,whilethePartiesdisagreeastotheappropriatebreadthoftheseislands’territorialseas,accordingtoArticle3ofUNCLOS,aState’sterritorialseacannotextendbeyond 12 nautical miles . These islands are all indisputablylocatedwithin24milesofeachotherbutmorethan24milesfromthemainlandthatliestothewest .Thusthesinglemari-timeboundarymightalsoincludesegmentsdelimitingover-lappingareasoftheislands’opposite-facingterritorialseasaswellassegmentsdelimitingthecontinentalshelfandexclusiveeconomiczonesaroundthem .

For the delimitation of the territorial seas, Article 15 ofUNCLOS, which isbindingas a treatybetween theParties,provides:

“Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacenttoeachother,neitherof the twoStates isentitled, failingagreementbetweenthemtothecontrary,toextenditster-ritorialseabeyondthemedianlineeverypointofwhichisequidistant from thenearestpointon thebaselines fromwhichthebreadthoftheterritorialseasofeachofthetwoStates is measured . The above provision does not apply,however,whereitisnecessarybyreasonofhistorictitleorotherspecialcircumstancestodelimittheterritorialseasofthetwoStatesinawaywhichisatvariancetherewith .”Asalreadyindicated,theCourthasdeterminedthatthere

is no existing “historic” or traditional line along the 15thparallel .

As theCourthasobservedwithrespect to implementingthe provisions of Article 15 of UNCLOS: “The most logicalandwidelypractisedapproachisfirsttodrawprovisionallyanequidistancelineandthentoconsiderwhetherthatlinemustbeadjustedinthelightoftheexistenceofspecialcircumstanc-es .”(Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v .Bahrain), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001,p .94,para .176 .)

ThejurisprudenceoftheCourtsetsoutthereasonswhytheequidistancemethod iswidelyused in thepracticeofmari-timedelimitation:ithasacertainintrinsicvaluebecauseofitsscientificcharacterandtherelativeeasewithwhichitcanbeapplied .However,theequidistancemethoddoesnotautomati-callyhavepriorityoverothermethodsofdelimitationand,inparticular circumstances, there may be factors which maketheapplicationoftheequidistancemethodinappropriate .

TheCourt notes that neither Partyhas as its mainargu-mentacallforaprovisionalequidistancelineasthemostsuit-ablemethodofdelimitation .

It observes at the outset that both Parties have raised anumberofgeographicalandlegalconsiderationswithregardtothemethodtobefollowedbytheCourt forthemaritimedelimitation .CapeGraciasaDios,wheretheNicaragua-Hon-

duraslandboundaryends,isasharplyconvexterritorialpro-jectionabuttingaconcavecoastlineoneithersidetothenorthandsouth-west .TakingintoaccountArticle15ofUNCLOSand given the geographical configuration described above,thepairofbasepointstobeidentifiedoneitherbankoftheRiverCocoatthetipoftheCapewouldassumeaconsiderabledominance in constructing an equidistance line, especiallyasittravelsoutfromthecoast .Giventhecloseproximityofthesebasepointstoeachother,anyvariationorerrorinsitu-atingthemwouldbecomedisproportionatelymagnifiedintheresultingequidistanceline .ThePartiesagree,moreover,thatthesedimentcarriedtoanddepositedatseabytheRiverCocohavecauseditsdelta,aswellasthecoastlinetothenorthandsouthoftheCape,toexhibitaveryactivemorpho-dynamism .ThuscontinuedaccretionattheCapemightrenderanyequi-distancelinesoconstructedtodayarbitraryandunreasonablein the near future . These geographical and geological diffi-cultiesare furtherexacerbatedbytheabsenceofviablebasepointsclaimedoracceptedbythePartiesthemselvesatCapeGraciasaDios .

This difficulty in identifying reliable base points is com-poundedbythedifferences,addressedmorefully,infra,thatapparently still remain between the Parties as to the inter-pretationandapplicationoftheKingofSpain’s1906ArbitralAward in respect of sovereignty over the islets formed nearthemouthoftheRiverCocoandtheestablishmentof“[t]heextremecommonboundarypointonthecoastoftheAtlantic”(Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1960,p .202) .

Giventhesetofcircumstancesinthecaseitisimpossiblefor theCourt to identifybasepointsandconstruct aprovi-sional equidistance line for the single maritime boundarydelimiting maritime areas off the Parties’ mainland coasts .Even if the particular features already indicated make itimpossibletodrawanequidistancelineasthesinglemaritimefrontier, the Court must nonetheless see if it would be pos-sibletostartthefrontierlineacrosstheterritorialseasasanequidistance line,asenvisaged inArticle15ofUNCLOS . Itmaybearguedthattheproblemsassociatedwithdistortion,iftheprotrusionseithersideofCapeGraciasaDioswereusedasbasepoints,arelesssevereclosetothecoast .However,theCourtnotesfirstthatthePartiesareindisagreementastotitleovertheunstableislandshavingformedinthemouthoftheRiver Coco, islands which the Parties suggested during theoral proceedings could be used as base points . It is recalledthatbecauseofthechangingconditionsoftheareatheCourthas made no finding as to sovereignty over these islands .Moreover,whateverbasepointswouldbeusedforthedrawingofanequidistanceline,theconfigurationandunstablenatureoftherelevantcoasts,includingthedisputedislandsformedinthemouthoftheRiverCoco,wouldmakethesebasepoints(whether at Cape Gracias a Dios or elsewhere) uncertainwithinashortperiodoftime .

Article15ofUNCLOSitselfenvisagesanexceptiontothedrawing of a median line, namely “where it is necessary byreasonofhistorictitleorspecialcircumstances . . .” .NothinginthewordingofArticle15suggeststhatgeomorphologicalproblems are per se precluded from being “special circum-stances”withinthemeaningof theexception,northatsuch

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“special circumstances” may only be used as a correctiveelement to a line already drawn . Indeed, the latter sugges-tion is plainly inconsistent with the wording of the excep-tion described in Article 15 . It is recalled that Article 15 ofUNCLOS,whichwasadoptedwithoutanydiscussionastothemethodofdelimitationoftheterritorialsea,isvirtuallyiden-tical (save forminoreditorialchanges) to thetextofArticle12,paragraph1,ofthe1958ConventionontheTerritorialSeaandtheContiguousZone .

Thegenesisof the textofArticle12of the1958Conven-tion on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone showsthat it was indeed envisaged that a special configuration ofthe coast might require a different method of delimitation(seeYearbookoftheInternationalLawCommission(YILC),1952, Vol . II, p . 38, commentary, para . 4) . Furthermore, theconsiderationofthismatterin1956doesnotindicateother-wise .Thetermsoftheexceptiontothegeneralruleremainedthesame(YILC,1956,Vol .I,p .284;Vol .II,pp .271,272,andp .300wheretheCommentarytotheDraftConventionontheContinentalShelfnotedthat“asinthecaseoftheboundariesoftheterritorialsea,provisionmustbemadefordeparturesnecessitated by any exceptional configuration of the coast . . .”) .Additionally, the jurisprudenceof theCourtdoesnotrevealaninterpretationthatisatvariancewiththeordinarymeaningofthetermsofArticle15ofUNCLOS .

Forallof theabovereasons, theCourtfinds itselfwithintheexceptionprovidedforinArticle15ofUNCLOS,namelyfacing special circumstances in which it cannot apply theequidistanceprinciple .Atthesametimeequidistanceremainsthegeneralrule .

Construction of a bisector line

Havingreachedtheconclusionthattheconstructionofanequidistancelinefromthemainlandisnotfeasible,theCourtmustconsidertheapplicabilityofthealternativemethodsputforwardbytheParties .

Nicaragua’sprimaryargumentisthata“bisectoroftwolinesrepresentingtheentirecoastalfrontofbothStates”shouldbeusedtoeffectthedelimitationfromthemainland,whilesover-eigntyoverthemaritimefeaturesintheareaindispute“couldbeattributedtoeitherPartydependingonthepositionofthefeatureinvolvedwithrespecttothebisectorline” .

Honduras “does not deny that geometrical methods ofdelimitation,suchasperpendicularsandbisectors,aremeth-odsthatmayproduceequitabledelimitationsinsomecircum-stances”,butitdisagreeswithNicaragua’sconstructionoftheangle to be bisected . Honduras, as already explained, advo-cates a line along the 15th parallel, no adjustment of whichwouldbenecessaryinrelationtotheislands .TheCourtnotesthatinHonduras’sfinalsubmissionsitrequestedtheCourttodeclarethatthesinglemaritimeboundarybetweenHondurasand Nicaragua “follows 14° 59 .8’ N latitude, as the existingmaritimeboundary,oranadjustedequidistanceline,untilthejurisdictionofathirdStateisreached” .

The Court recalls that both of Honduras’s proposals (themainonebasedontacitagreementastothe15thparallelrep-resenting the maritime frontier and the other on the use of

anadjustedequidistanceline)havenotbeenacceptedbytheCourt .

It states that the use of a bisector—the line formed bybisecting the angle created by the linear approximations ofcoastlines—has proved to be a viable substitute method incertain circumstances where equidistance is not possible orappropriate .Thejustificationfortheapplicationofthebisec-tormethodinmaritimedelimitationliesintheconfigurationofandrelationshipbetweentherelevantcoastalfrontsandthemaritimeareastobedelimited .Ininstanceswhere,asinthepresentcase,anybasepointsthatcouldbedeterminedbytheCourt are inherently unstable, the bisector method may beseen as an approximation of the equidistance method . Likeequidistance, thebisectormethodisageometricalapproachthatcanbeusedtogivelegaleffecttothe

“criterionlongheldtobeasequitableasitissimple,namelythatinprinciple,whilehavingregardtothespecialcircum-stancesofthecase,oneshouldaimatanequaldivisionofareaswhere themaritimeprojectionsof thecoastsof theStates . . .convergeandoverlap”(Delimitation of the Mari-time Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984,p .327,para .195) .Ifitisto“befaithfultotheactualgeographicalsituation”

(Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985,p .45,para .57),themethodofdelimitationshouldseekasolutionbyreferencefirsttotheStates’“relevantcoasts”(see Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001,p .94para .178;seealsotheLand and Mari-time Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v .Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), I.C.J. Reports 2002,p . 442, para . 90)) . Identifying the relevant coastal geogra-phycallsfortheexerciseofjudgmentinassessingtheactualcoastal geography . The equidistance method approximatestherelationshipbetweentwoparties’relevantcoastsbytakingaccountoftherelationshipsbetweendesignatedpairsofbasepoints .Thebisectormethodcomparablyseekstoapproximatetherelevantcoastalrelationships,butdoessoonthebasisofthe macro-geography of a coastline as represented by a linedrawn between two points on the coast . Thus, where thebisectormethodistobeapplied,caremustbetakentoavoid“completelyrefashioningnature”(North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969,P .49,para .91) .

TheCourtnotesthat,inthepresentcase,theapplicationofthebisectormethodisjustifiedbythegeographicalconfigu-rationofthecoast,andthegeomorphologicalfeaturesoftheareawheretheendpointofthelandboundaryislocated .

The Court considers for present purposes that it will bemostconvenienttousethepointfixedin1962bytheMixedCommission at Cape Gracias a Dios as the point where theParties’coastalfrontsmeet .TheCourtaddsthattheco-ordi-natesoftheendpointsofthechosencoastalfrontsneednotatthisjuncturebespecifiedwithexactitudeforpresentpurposes;oneofthepracticaladvantagesofthebisectormethodisthataminordeviation in theexactpositionofendpoints,whichareatareasonabledistancefromthesharedpoint,willhaveonlyarelativelyminor influenceonthecourseof theentirecoastalfrontline .Ifnecessaryinthecircumstances,theCourt

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couldadjustthelinesoastoachieveanequitableresult(seeUNCLOS,Arts .74,para .1,and83,para .1) .

TheCourt thenconsiders thevariouspossibilities for thecoastalfrontsthatcouldbeusedtodefinetheselinearapprox-imationsoftherelevantgeography .Nicaragua’sprimarypro-posalforthecoastalfronts,asrunningfromCapeGraciasaDiostotheGuatemalanborderforHondurasandtotheCostaRicanborder forNicaragua,wouldcutoffasignificantpor-tionofHonduranterritoryfallingnorthofthislineandthuswouldgivesignificantweighttoHonduranterritorythatisfarremoved fromthearea tobedelimited .Thiswould seem topresentanexaggeratedlyacuteangletobisect .

In selecting the relevant coastal fronts, the Court hasconsidered the Cape Falso-Punta Gorda coast (generating abisector with an azimuth of 70° 54’), which certainly facesthedisputedarea,butitisquiteashortfaçade(some100km)fromwhichtoreflectacoastalfrontmorethan100nauticalmilesouttosea,especiallytakingintoaccounthowquicklytothenorth-westtheHondurancoastturnsawayfromtheareato be delimited after Cape Falso, as it continues past PuntaPatucaanduptoCapeCamerón .Indeed,CapeFalsoisidenti-fiedbyHondurasasthemostrelevant“turn”inthemainlandcoastline .

A coastal front extending from Cape Camerón to RioGrande (generating a bisector with an azimuth of 64° 02’)would,liketheoriginalNicaraguanproposal,alsoovercom-pensateinthisregardsincethelinewouldrunentirelyovertheHonduranmainlandandthuswoulddeprivethesignifi-cantHonduranlandmasslyingbetweentheseaandthelineofanyeffectonthedelimitation .

The front that extends from Punta Patuca to Wouhnta,would avoid the problem of cutting off Honduran territoryand at the same time provides a coastal façade of sufficientlength to account properly for the coastal configuration inthe disputed area . Thus, a Honduran coastal front runningto Punta Patuca and a Nicaraguan coastal front running toWouhntaareintheCourt’sviewtherelevantcoastsforpur-posesofdrawingthebisector .Thisresultingbisectorlinehasanazimuthof70°14’41 .25” .

Delimitation around the islands

The Court notes that, by virtue of Article 3 of UNCLOSHonduras has the right to establish the breadth of its ter-ritorial sea up to a limit of 12 nautical miles be that for itsmainlandorforislandsunderitssovereignty .InthecurrentproceedingsHondurasclaimsforthefourislandsinquestiona territorial sea of 12 nautical miles . The Court thus findsthat,subjecttoanyoverlapbetweentheterritorialseaaroundHonduranislandsandtheterritorialseaaroundNicaraguanislands in the vicinity, Bobel Cay, Savanna Cay, Port RoyalCay and South Cay shall be accorded a territorial sea of 12nauticalmiles .

Asa12-milebreadthof territorial seahasbeenaccordedtotheseislands,itbecomesapparentthattheterritorialseasattributedtotheislandsofBobelCay,SavannaCay,PortRoyalCayandSouthCay(Honduras)andEdinburghCay(Nicara-gua)wouldleadtoanoverlapintheterritorialseaofNicara-

guaandHondurasinthisarea,bothtothesouthandtothenorthofthe15thparallel .

Drawingaprovisionalequidistancelineforthisterritorialseadelimitationbetweentheopposite-facingislandsdoesnotpresenttheproblemsthatwouldanequidistancelinefromthemainland .ThePartieshaveprovidedtheCourtwithco-ordi-natesforthefourislandsindisputenorthofthe15thparallelandforEdinburghCaytothesouth .Delimitationofthisrela-tivelysmallareacanbesatisfactorilyaccomplishedbydraw-ingaprovisionalequidistanceline,usingco-ordinatesfortheaboveislandsasthebasepointsfortheirterritorialseas,intheoverlapping areas between the territorial seas of Bobel Cay,PortRoyalCayandSouthCay(Honduras),andtheterritorialseaofEdinburghCay (Nicaragua), respectively .The territo-rialseaofSavannaCay(Honduras)doesnotoverlapwiththeterritorialseaofEdinburghCay .TheCourtdoesnotconsidertheretobeanylegallyrelevant“specialcircumstances”inthisareathatwouldwarrantadjustingthisprovisionalline .

ThemaritimeboundarybetweenNicaraguaandHondurasinthevicinityofBobelCay,SavannaCay,PortRoyalCayandSouthCay(Honduras)andEdinburghCay(Nicaragua)willthusfollowthelineasdescribedbelow .

From the intersection of the bisector line with the 12-mile arc of the territorial sea of Bobel Cay at point A (withco-ordinates15°05’25”Nand82°52’54”W)theboundarylinefollowsthe12-milearcoftheterritorialseaofBobelCayinasoutherlydirectionuntilitsintersectionwiththe12-milearc of the territorial sea of Edinburgh Cay at point B (withco-ordinates14°57’13”Nand82°50’03”W) .FrompointBtheboundarylinecontinuesalongthemedianline,whichisformedbythepointsofequidistancebetweenBobelCay,PortRoyal Cay and South Cay (Honduras) and Edinburgh Cay(Nicaragua),throughpointsC(withco-ordinates14°56’45”Nand82°33’56”W)andD(withco-ordinates14°56’35”Nand82°33’20”W),untilitmeetsthepointofintersectionofthe12-milearcsoftheterritorialseasofSouthCay(Honduras)andEdinburghCay(Nicaragua)atpointE(withco-ordinates14°53’15”Nand82°29’24”W) .FrompointEtheboundarylinefollowsthe12-milearcoftheterritorialseaofSouthCayinanortherlydirectionuntilitintersectsthebisectorlineatpointF(withco-ordinates15°16’08”Nand82°21’56”W) .

Starting-point and endpoint of the maritime boundary

HavingreviewedtheproposalsoftheParties,theCourtcon-sidersitappropriatetosetthestarting-point3milesouttosea(15°00’52”Nand83°05’58”W)fromthepointalreadyidenti-fiedbytheMixedCommissionin1962alongtheazimuthofthebisectorasdescribedabove .ThePartiesaretoagreeonalinewhichlinkstheendofthelandboundaryasfixedbythe1906AwardandthepointofdepartureofthemaritimedelimitationinaccordancewiththepresentJudgment .

As for the endpoint, neither Nicaragua nor Honduras ineach of their submissions specifies a precise seaward end totheboundarybetweenthem .

TheCourtobservesthattherearethreepossibilitiesopentoit:itcouldsaynothingabouttheendpointoftheline,stat-ingonlythatthelinecontinuesuntilthejurisdictionofathirdStateisreached;itcoulddecidethatthelinedoesnotextend

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beyondthe82ndmeridian;oritcouldindicatethattheallegedthird-Staterightssaidtoexisteastofthe82ndmeridiandonotlieintheareabeingdelimitedandthuspresentnoobstacletodecidingthatthelinecontinuesbeyondthatmeridian .

TheCourtconsiderscertaininterestsofthirdStateswhichresult from some bilateral treaties between countries in theregionandwhichmaybeofpossiblerelevancetothelimitstothemaritimeboundarydrawnbetweenNicaraguaandHon-duras .TheCourtaddsthatitsconsiderationoftheseinterestsiswithoutprejudicetoanyotherlegitimatethirdpartyinter-estswhichmayalsoexistinthearea .

The Court may accordingly, without specifying a preciseendpoint, delimit the maritime boundary and state that itextends beyond the 82nd meridian without affecting third-Staterights .Itshouldalsobenotedinthisregardthatinnocasemaythelinebeinterpretedasextendingmorethan200nauticalmilesfromthebaselinesfromwhichthebreadthoftheterritorialseaismeasured;anyclaimofcontinentalshelfrightsbeyond200milesmustbeinaccordancewithArticle76

ofUNCLOSandreviewedbytheCommissionontheLimitsoftheContinentalShelfestablishedthereunder .

Courseofthemaritimeboundary(sketch-mapsNos .7and8intheJudgment)

Thelineofdelimitationistobeginatthestarting-point3nauticalmilesoffshoreonthebisector .Fromthereitcontin-ues along the bisector until it reaches the outer limit of the12-nautical-mileterritorialseaofBobelCay .ItthentracesthisterritorialsearoundtothesouthuntilitreachesthemedianlineintheoverlappingterritorialseasofBobelCay,PortRoyalCayandSouthCay(Honduras)andEdinburghCay(Nicara-gua) .ThedelimitationlinecontinuesalongthismedianlineuntilitreachestheterritorialseaofSouthCay,whichforthemost part does not overlap with the territorial sea of Edin-burghCay .The line then traces thearcof theouter limitofthe12-nautical-mileterritorialseaofSouthCayroundtothenorthuntilitagainconnectswiththebisector,whereaftertheline continues along that azimuth until it reaches the areawheretherightsofcertainthirdStatesmaybeaffected .

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JudgeRanjevaexplainshisvoteagainstthethirdoperativeparagraph ina separateopinionappended to the Judgment .Withrespecttothelineoftheboundarysegmentbeginningat thepointwith theco-ordinates15°00’52”Nand83°05’58”W,whichfollowstheazimuth70°14’25”until its inter-sectionatpointA(co-ordinates15°05’25”Nand82°52’54”W)withthe12-nautical-milearcoftheterritorialseaofBobelCay,theJudgmentchallengesthelawandtheconsistentjuris-prudenceonthemethodofdelimitingterritorialseas .Inviewof the instability of the coastlines, the Judgment abandonsthe method of delimitation by stages in order to attribute adirectlynormativefunctiontothegeomorphologicalcircum-stancesofthecoast .JudgeRanjevacannotaccepttheapproachadoptedintheJudgment,inthesensethatsuchcircumstancesareseenbythelawofmaritimedelimitationashavingacor-rectivefunctionontherigideffectsofapplyingaprovisionalequidistanceline .Inattributinganormativefunctiontothesecircumstances, the Judgment first creates a new category ofcircumstancesalongsidetheconventionalonesofspecialandrelevantcircumstances;italsoreopensthenowsettleddebatebetween the advocates of equidistance and those of equity .Finally,thebisectormethodmakestheobjectofthejudicialdecisionanexercise individinga sector, rather thanoneofdelimitation .Asforthequestionoftheimpossibilityofdraw-ingaprovisionalequidistanceline,theargumentspresentedappear too subjective, inasmuch as the notion of unstablecoastlineswasnotunknowntotheMontegoBayConventionof1982 .


Ina separateopinion, JudgeKoromaconcurred with theCourt’s conclusion regarding the method of delimitationapplied in this case, but considered that certain significantaspectsoftheJudgmentcalledforemphasisandclarification .Heviewedtheuseofthebisectortoeffectthedelimitationasconsistentwithandreflectiveof the jurisprudenceonmari-timedelimitation,ratherthanasbeingadeparturetherefrom .Under this jurisprudence, the delimitation process beginswith defining the geographical context of the dispute andthenappliesthepertinentrulesofinternationallawandequi-tableprinciplestodeterminetherelevanceandweightofthegeographicalfeatures .Thechoiceofmethodthusverymuchdependsuponthepertinentcircumstancesofthearea .

It was in the light of the foregoing that the Court con-sidered thebisector as themost appropriate method for thedelimitation process in this case . He pointed out that equi-distancecannotbeapplieduniversallyandautomaticallyasamethodofdelimitationirrespectiveoftheareatobedelimitedand,inthiscase,neitherPartyargued,inthemain,thatthismethodshouldbeusedfordelimitingtheirrespectiveterrito-rialseasgiventheunstablecoastalgeography .Thus,theCourt,havingcarefully examined theParties’ argumentsand theirwell-foundedreluctancetoembraceequidistance,decidedto

adoptthebisectormethodasasuitabledelimitationmethodinthiscase .

Herecalledthattheuseofabisector—thelineformedbybisectingtheangleformedbythetwolinesapproximatingtheStates’coastalfronts—isageometricmethodthatcanbeusedtogivelegaleffecttothecriterionlongheldtobeasequitableasitissimple,namelythat,inprinciple,whilehavingregardtothespecialcircumstancesofthecase,adelimitationshouldaimatanequaldivisionofareaswherethemaritimeprojec-tions of the coasts of the States converge and overlap; thatwhile the equidistance method approximates the relation-ship between two parties’ relevant coasts by comparing thefinerelationshipsbetweenacceptablepairsofbasepoints,thebisector method likewise seeks to approximate the relevantcoastalrelationshipsonthebasisofthemacro-geographyofacoastline .Heacknowledgedthatcaremustalwaysbetakentoavoidcompletelyrefashioningnature .Hepointedoutthattheuseofthebisectormethodhasseveralprecedentsand,inapplying this approach here, the Court, rather than depart-ingfromitssettledjurisprudence,hasreaffirmed,appliedandgiveneffecttothatjurisprudence .

Ontheotherhand,JudgeKoromahadreservationsregard-ingthedecisiontoattribute toHondurasareasof territorialsealyingsouthofthe14°59 .8’Nparallel .Hondurasinitssub-missionsstatedthatitsterritorialseawouldnotextendsouthofthe14°59 .8’Nparallelandtherewasnocompellingreasonnottoupholdthissubmissionwhenthiswouldhavepreventedapotential sourceof futureconflictandavoidedgivingdis-proportionateeffecttothesmallislandsthetitletowhichwasindisputeinthiscase .

Declaration of Judge Parra-Aranguren

JudgeParra-ArangurenrecallstheNoteof19March1912sentby theMinister forForeignAffairsofNicaragua to theForeignMinisterofHonduras,specifyingthedisagreementtobedecidedbytheArbitratorinapplicationofArticleIIIofthe1894Treatyconcludedbetweentheircountries,i .e .,“fromthepointontheCordilleracalledTeotecacinteto its endpoint on the Atlantic coast and to the boundary in the sea marking the end of the jurisdiction of the two States”(emphasisadded),andchallengingforthefirsttimethevalidityandbindingnatureof the 1906 Arbitral Award . Nicaragua indicated severalgroundsforthenullityof thedecisionof theKingofSpain,oneofthembeingthat“there isanevident inconsistencyinthisAwardwhenitdealswiththatsectionofthefrontierlinewhich should separate the jurisdiction of the two countriesin the territorial sea” (I.C.J. Pleadings, Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906(Hondurasv .Nica-ragua), Vol . I, p . 294; emphasis added) . [Translation by theRegistry .]

Paragraph 39 of the Judgment refers to Nicaragua’s Noteof19March1912 .However, theCourtonly indicates that it“challenged the validity and binding character of the Arbi-tral Award”, not mentioning the statements quoted above,even though they demonstrate Nicaragua’s opinion that the1906ArbitralAwardhadestablished“thefrontierlinewhichshould separate the jurisdiction of the two countries in theterritorialsea” .

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Judge Parra-Aranguren agrees with Nicaragua’s Note of1912acknowledgingthatthe1906ArbitralAwarddeterminedthesovereigntyofthedisputedmainlandandinsularterrito-ries, aswell as thecontinentaland insular territorialwatersappertainingtoHondurasandNicaragua .However,hecannotshareNicaragua’sallegationthat thedecisionof theKingofSpainwasnullandvoidbecauseofits“omissions,contradic-tionsandobscurities” .NicaraguapresentedthiscontentiontotheCourt,butitwasnotupheldinitsJudgmentof18Novem-ber1960,which isres judicata (Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 (Hondurasv .Nicaragua),Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1960,pp .205–217) .

Forthesereasons,JudgeParra-Arangurenvotedinfavourofparagraph321(1)andagainstparagraph321(2),paragraph321(3)andparagraph321(4)oftheJudgment .

Dissenting opinion of Judge Torres Bernárdez

1 .Asexplained in the introductionto theopinion, Judgead hocTorresBernárdezhasvoted in favourof thedecisionintheJudgmenttotheeffectthatsovereigntyoverBobelCay,Savanna Cay and Port Royal Cay lies with the Republic ofHonduras (subparagraph (1)of theoperativeclause), as it ishisviewthattheseislands,alllyingnorthofthe15thparallel,belongtoHondurasforthreereasons:(a)Honduraspossessesa legal title to the islandspursuant to theuti possidetis jurispositionin1821,whichappliesasbetweentheParties;(b)thepost-colonialeffectivitésexercisedbyHondurasà titre de sou-verain overtheislandsandintheterritorialseaaroundthemand the absence of effectivités of Nicaragua; and (c) Nicara-gua’sacquiescenceinHonduras’ssovereigntyovertheislandsuntilthebelatedassertionofaclaimintheMemorialfiledbytheApplicantinthepresentproceedingson21March2001 .

2 .Thus,inJudgeTorresBernárdez’sview,thelegalbasisforHonduras’ssovereigntyovertheislandsisthreefold,includingthe post-colonial effectivités . In the reasoning set out in theJudgment, however, Honduran sovereignty over the islandsis based solely on the post-colonial effectivités, the evidencebeingdeemedinsufficienttoallowforascertainingwhichofthe two Parties inherited the Spanish title to the islands byoperationoftheprincipleofuti possidetis jurisandtherebeingnoproofofanyacquiescencebyNicaraguainHonduras’ssov-ereigntyovertheislands .

3 .Itfollowsthatthediscussionintheopinionconcerningthe“territorialdispute”isthestatementofaseparate,ratherthan dissenting, opinion . The reason why the present opin-ionisa“dissentingopinion”istobefoundinthe“maritimedelimitation”effectedintheJudgment,becauseonthissubjectJudgeTorresBernárdezisinutterdisagreement,saveononepoint,withthemajority’sdecisionsandsupportingreasoning,andthisexplainshisvoteagainstsubparagraphs(2)and(3)oftheoperativeclause .

4 . The point in question, and Judge Torres Bernárdezacknowledgesitsimportance,concernsthedelimitationoftheterritorial sea surrounding the islands; he believes that thisdelimitation is in full accord with the 1982 United NationsConventionontheLawoftheSea,inforcebetweenthePar-ties .Hisvoteagainstsubparagraph(3)oftheoperativeclausemustbeunderstoodasthusqualified,since,hadtherebeena

separatevoteonthesectionofthesinglemaritimeboundaryaroundtheislands,JudgeTorresBernárdezwouldhavevotedinfavourofit .

I . TheTerritorialDispute

A. The applicable law for determining sovereignty over the disputed islands

5 . The section of the opinion concerning the “territorialdispute”beginswithareaffirmationthattheapplicablelawfordeterminingsovereigntyoverthecontestedislandsisthelawgoverningacquisitionoflandterritory:inthecircumstancesofthecase,specificallytheuti possidetis jurispositionin1821,the post-colonial effectivités and acquiescence . Inoral argu-ment Nicaragua invoked “adjacency” without further quali-fication,thatistosayadjacencystandingalone,but,asstatedintheopinion,meregeographicaladjacencybyitself,withoutoperationoftheuti possidetis jurisprincipleoranotherruleofinternationallawincorporatingthecriterion,doesnotconsti-tuteterritorialtitleunderinternationallaw(Island of Palmas case) .

B. The decision in the Judgment and post-colonial effectivités

6 .Thedecision in the Judgmentconcerning theRepublicof Honduras’s sovereignty over the disputed islands basedon the post-colonial effectivités relies on generally acceptedprinciples articulated in the Permanent Court’s decision inthe case concerning Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, andonthepresentCourt’srecentjurisprudenceonthesubjectofsmallislandsthatareintermittentlyinhabited,uninhabitedorofslighteconomicimportance(Qit’atJaradah;PulauLigitanandPulauSipadan) .

7 . Judge Torres Bernárdez subscribes wholeheartedly tothese findings in the Judgment, for the evidence before theCourtweighsheavilyinfavourofHonduras .Whilethevari-ousevidentiaryofferingsarevariable innumberandproba-tivevalue,asawholetheyprovideampleproofofHonduras’sintentandwilltoactà titre de souverainandoftheeffectiveexercise and manifestation of its authority over the islandsand in the adjacent waters . Confronted with the Respond-ent’spost-colonialeffectivités,Nicaraguawasunabletoprovetheexistenceofasinglepost-colonialeffectivitéofitsowninrespect of the contested islands . Further, the fact that Hon-durasobtainedtitletotheislandsbyaprocessofacquisitionbasedonpost-colonialeffectivitéscanhardlygiverisetoanyconflictwiththeholderofatitlebasedonuti possidetis juris,sinceNicaraguaisjustaslackinginpost-colonialeffectivités intheislandsasitisintitlebywayofuti possidetis juris .

C. Honduras’s utipossidetisjuris in the disputed islands

8 .Theopinionnextturnstoanexaminationoftheappli-cabilityoftheinternationallawprincipleofuti possidetis juris to the dispute as to sovereignty over the islands, noting, asobservedintheArbitralAwardmadeon23December1906by King Alfonso xIII of Spain: “the Spanish provinces ofHonduras and Nicaragua were gradually developing by his-toricalevolutioninsuchamannerastobefinallyformedinto

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two distinct administrations (intendencias) under the Cap-taincy-General of Guatemala by virtue of the prescriptionsof the Royal Regulations of Provincial Intendants of NewSpain of 1786, which were applied to Guatemala and underwhoserégimetheycameasadministeredprovincestilltheiremancipationfromSpainin1821”(UnitedNations,Reports of International Arbitral Awards (RIAA),Vol .xI,p .112) .

9 .In1821,uponsucceedingtoindependence,theRepublicofHondurasandtheRepublicofNicaraguafreelyacceptedtheuti possidetis jurisprinciple,whichhadbeenformulatedafewyearsearlierasanobjectivecriteriontofacilitatethepeacefulsettlementofpotentialterritorialissuesforthenewSpanish-AmericanRepublics .Theprinciplewasincorporatedintotheconstitutionsof theRepublicofHondurasand theRepublicofNicaraguaandintotheirtreaties .Forexample,ArticleII,paragraph3,oftheGámez-BonillaTreatyof7October1894pithilyexpressestheverycoreoftheuti possidetis jurisprin-ciple: “It is tobeunderstood thateachRepublic isownerofthe territorywhichat thedateof independenceconstituted,respectively,theprovincesofHondurasandNicaragua” .Thisprovisionservedasthebasisforthedelimitationcarriedoutbetween 1900 and 1904 by the Mixed Commission formedundertheTreatyandforthelaterdelimitationunderthe1906ArbitralAward .

10 . The opinion notes the strong opposition historicallyencounteredfromEuropeanlegalscholarstouniversalappli-cationoftheuti possidetis jurisprincipleasapositivenormofgeneral international law .However,oncethe intangibilityofboundariesinheritedupondecolonizationhadgainedgeneralacceptanceamongAfricanStates,recognitionoftheprincipleofuti possidetis jurisbecamesowidespreadthataChamberoftheInternationalCourtofJusticewasabletostatein1986:“Uti possidetis juris . . .isthereforeaprincipleofageneralkindwhichislogicallyconnectedwiththisformofdecolonizationwhereveritoccurs .”(Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p . 566, para . 23 .) In1992,anotherChamberoftheCourtwaspromptedtoapplytheprinciple(Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening)) . More recently,theprinciplewasappliedin2005byathirdChamberinthecaseconcerningFrontier Dispute(Benin/Niger) .

11 .Theprinciplehasonoccasionalsobeencitedincasescoming before the full Court, notably in the case concern-ingMaritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, but there was no need for the Court toapplyitbecausethecasedidnotinvolveStatesuccession .Thisproblemdidnotariseinthepresentcase,concerningasitdoesapreciseinstanceofdecolonization .Thus,theCourthashadnodifficulty inthepresentJudgmentinaffirmingtheappli-cabilityofuti possidetis jurisasaprincipleofgeneralinterna-tionallawtothedisputeovertheislandsinthiscase,becausethe principle covers disputes over delimitation in the strictsenseaswellasthoseastotheholderoftitletoaparticularland,islandormaritimearea(disputesoverattribution) .

12 .Onthequestionofapplicabilityoftheprincipleper se tothecontestedislandsandonthenotionofpossessionasitrelates to uti possidetis juris, the majority and Judge TorresBernárdezareof thesameview .Where theypartways is in

respectofweighingtheevidence,specificallythebestmethodfor assessing the evidence in the light of the nature of theSpanishCrown’soriginaltitle initsformerterritories intheAmericasandofthecharacteristicsandaimsoftheAmericanlegislation . Judge Torres Bernárdez believes that the presentJudgmentconfirmsthedifficultiesstillencounteredinapply-inguti possidetis juris toaparticularareawhentheinternallawreferredtobytheLatingenitive juris isanhistorical jussuch as that which the Spanish Crown applied in Americaovermorethanthreecenturies .

13 . In theviewof themajority, itcannotbesaid that theapplicationofthisprincipletoBobelCay,SavannaCay,SouthCayandPortRoyalCay—islandsofveryminor importancelying far off the mainland—would settle the issue of sover-eigntyoverthem(paragraph163oftheJudgment) .AccordingtotheJudgment,therewasnoclear-cutadministrativedelimi-tationbetweendifferentprovincesoftheCaptaincy-Generalof Guatemala in respect of the islands; providing security,preventing smuggling and taking other steps necessary tosafeguardtheCrown’s interests intheislandswereprobablytheresponsibilityoftheCaptaincy-Generalitself .

14 .JudgeTorresBernárdezdoesnotsubscribetothemajor-ity’shypotheticalconclusiononthispoint,asitdisregardsthefact that any exercise of direct authority by the Captaincy-GeneralofGuatemalaoveranyplaceorareainaprovinceinnowayalteredthatprovince’sterritory(see:ArbitralAwardof1906,RIAA,Vol .xI,p .113) .Inhisview,wheretheuti possi-detis jurispositionmustbeprovedretroactively,itisnotalwayspossibletoobtainlegislativeorlikedocumentsspecifyingtheownershiporextentoftheterritoriesinquestionorshowingtheexact locationofprovincialboundaries .Itthenbecomesnecessary, inattempting to reconstruct theposition, to takeintoconsiderationalltheevidenceandadditionalinformationmadeavailablethroughhistoricalandlogical interpretation .Further, itmustbekept inmindthatevidence inrespectoftheterritorialfacetofuti possidetis jurisisoftenveryusefulinclarifyingthedelimitationaspectandviceversa .

15 . Identifying and proving title to the disputed islandspursuanttouti possidetis jurisinthiscaseis,inJudgeTorresBernárdez’s opinion, greatly facilitated by the fact that theKingofSpaindefinedtheterritoriesoftheprovincesofNica-raguaandHondurasontheeveof independence intherea-soningsupportinghis1906ArbitralAwardmadeonthebasisoftheprincipleofuti possidetis jurisassetoutintheGámez-Bonilla Treaty of 1894 . On this subject the Arbitral Awardstates, inter alia: (a) that the Commission of investigationhadnotfoundthattheexpandinginfluenceofNicaraguahadextendedtothenorthofCapeGraciasaDios,andthereforenotreachedCapeCamarón,therethereforebeingnoreasontoselectthelattercapeasafrontierboundarywithHondurasontheAtlanticcoast,asNicaraguahadclaimed,and(b)thattheCommissionofinvestigationhadfoundthattheextensionofHonduranjurisdictiontothesouthofCapeGraciasaDioshadneverbeenclearlydefinedandthatinanycaseithadbeenephemeral,whereasNicaragua’sinfluencehadbeenexercisedinarealandpermanentmannerasfarasthatcape,itaccord-inglynotbeingappropriateforthecommonboundaryontheAtlanticcoasttobeSandyBay,asHondurashadclaimed .

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16 .Itwasonthebasisofthisassessmentofthefullydocu-menteduti possidetis jurispositionin1821thatthearbitratorin the 1906 Arbitral Award determined the extreme com-mon boundary point on the coast of the Atlantic betweentheRepublicofHondurasand theRepublicofNicaragua tobethemouthof theRiverCoco,SegoviaorWankswhere itflowedoutinthesea,closetoCapeGraciasaDios,takingasthemouthoftheriverthemouthofitsprincipalarmbetweenHaraandtheIslandofSanPíowherethecapeissituated .TheCourt’s Judgment of 18 November 1960 confirms that thearbitrator’s decision was based on the principle of uti possi-detis juris:

“Nicaragua contends that the arbitrator fixed what heregarded as a natural boundary line without taking intoaccount the Laws and Royal Warrants of the SpanishState which established the Spanish administrative divi-sionsbeforethedateofIndependence .In the judgment of the Court thiscomplaint iswithoutfoundationinasmuchasthedecisionofthearbitratorisbasedonhistoricalandlegalconsiderations(derecho histórico)inaccordancewithparagraphs 3 and 4 of Article II [of the Gámez-BonillaTreaty] .”(Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 (Honduras v . Nicaragua), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1960,p .215;emphasisadded .)17 . In Judge Torres Bernárdez’s view, the substance of

theevidenceandother information supporting theArbitralAward of 1906 and the Court’s 1960 Judgment, that evi-dence and information being both considerable in quantityand unassailable in quality and authoritativeness, makes itessentialforajudicialdeterminationoftheuti possidetis jurisposition in the contested islands . Further, these decisionsarebinding, for,aspointedoutbyaChamberof theCourt:“Theaward’sviewoftheuti possidetis jurispositionprevailsandcannotnowbequestionedjuridically,evenifitcouldbequestionedhistorically .”(Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), Judg-ment, I.C.J. Reports 1992,p .401,para .67 .)

18 .Itisthereforecleartotheauthoroftheopinionthattheuti possidetis jurispositionin1821sawthecoastofHondurasstretchingnorthwardsfromtheextremecommonpointoftheland boundary on the Atlantic coast, situated in the mouthof the principal arm of the River Coco where it flowed outintheseaclose toCapeGraciasaDios,uptotheboundarywithGuatemala,andthecoastofNicaraguaextendingtothesouth of the same extreme common boundary point up totheboundarywithCostaRica .Thus,weknowpreciselywhatweretheParties’coastlinesin1821and,accordingly,weknowthereferencepointallowingforunproblematicapplicationofthenotionof “adjacent island”underhistoricalSpanish lawasageneralcriterionforattributingislandstoadministrativeentities; this notion, by the way, is much broader than thatof “coastal island” under contemporary international law,because an island defined or treated as an “adjacent island”canliefarfromthemainland .

19 . For example, islands such as Aves, Clipperton, Swan,SanAndrésandothershavebeenconsidered“adjacentislands”eventhoughsituatedaconsiderabledistancefromthemain-land .Thus,thefactthattheislandsindisputeinthepresent

caseliefrom27to32milesfromtheHondurancoastnorthofCapeGraciasaDiosdoesnotprecludetheircharacteriza-tionas“adjacentislands”oftheprovinceofHondurasunderhistoricalSpanishlaw .Further,thenotionof“adjacentisland”underthatlawwasmuchmoreflexiblethanundercontempo-raryinternationallaw .ItwasinfactmerelyaresidualruleinthatitcouldbesetasideatanytimebyaspecificnormativeprovisiontothecontraryenactedbytheKing,e .g .theRoyalOrderof1786ontheislandofAvesortheRoyalWarrantof1803ontheislandsofSanAndrés .

20 .ButNicaraguahasofferednoevidenceofanyspecificdecisionbytheKinginfavourof theprovinceofNicaraguainrespectoftheislandsinvolvedinthepresentcase .Accord-ingly,intheviewofJudgeTorresBernárdez,thedelimitationofthelandboundaryeffectedbytheArbitralAwardof1906enablesajudicialresponseunderthedoctrineofuti possidetis juris tothequestionofsovereigntyovertheislands,becausethefourcaysinquestionlienorthofthe15thparallel,offandinthevicinityofHonduras’smainlandcoastandnearertoitthantoNicaragua’smainlandcoastsouthofthatparallel .

21 .Under thesecircumstances, if account is takenof thegeneral criterion of attribution of “adjacent islands” underhistoricalSpanishlaw,sovereigntyoverthecayspursuanttotheuti possidetis jurisprincipleundoubtedlybelongs,inJudgeTorres Bernárdez’s opinion, to the Republic of Honduras,because,asdeterminedintheArbitralAward,theauthoritiesintheprovinceofNicaraguain1821neitherhadnorexercisedany jurisdiction in land, island or maritime areas north ofCapeGraciasaDios .

22 .Moreover,theParties’post-1821conductconfirmsthisconclusion:forexample,thediplomaticNoteof23November1844toHerBritannicMajestyfromtheMinisterrepresentingbothHondurasandNicaragua,whichrecognizesNicaragua’ssovereignrightalong theAtlanticcoastbutonly fromCapeGraciasaDios inthenorthtotheboundary lineseparatingNicaragua and Costa Rica . Further, under treaties enteredintointhenineteenthcenturybetweenSpainandtheRepub-licofNicaragua(1856)andbetweenSpainandtheRepublicofHonduras (1860), the predecessor State relinquished its titleto the mainland and island territories of the colonial prov-inces .TheConstitutionsofthetwoRepublicsalsoincludetheexpression“adjacentislands”intheirrespectivedefinitionsofnationalterritory .

23 . It is also pointed out in the opinion that Nicaraguasoughtinthearbitrationproceedingstoobtainrecognitionofaboundarylinerunningalongthe85thmeridianwest,whichpassesaboveCapeCamarón,andfollowingthatmeridiantothesea, leavingSwanIslandtoNicaragua .Aswehaveseen,however,thearbitratordidnotacceptNicaragua’sargumentand—pursuant to the principle upholding the uti possidetis jurispositionof1821—fixedtheextremecommonboundarypoint of the two Republics in the mouth of the River CococlosetoCapeGraciasaDios,because,asobservedintheArbi-tralAwardof1906,the“documents”describedCapeGraciasa Dios as the boundary point of the “jurisdictions” whichthe Royal Decrees of 1745 assigned to the Governors of theprovincesofHonduras(JuandeVera)andNicaragua(AlonsoFernándezdeHeredia) .LetusaddthattheRoyalWarrantof

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30November1803concerningtheislandsofSanAndrésandthatpartoftheMosquitoCoastfromCapeGraciasaDiostotheChagresRiverconfirmstheroleplayedbythatcapeasthejurisdictionalboundarybetween theprovincesofHondurasandNicaragua .

D. Acquiescence by Nicaragua

24 .IfNicaraguastillbelievedaftertheCourt’s1960Judg-mentregardingtheArbitralAwardmadebytheKingofSpainthat itwasentitledtothedisputedislandsnorthofthe15thparallel, it should have said so earlier . But Nicaragua failedtomakethatcleareitherbeforeorafterthemaritimedelimi-tation dispute crystallized in 1982 . For example, when thePresident of Nicaragua signed the original text of the 1998FreeTradeAgreement,Nicaraguahadnotyetexpressedanyclaims to the islands in dispute in the present proceedings(paragraph226of the Judgment) . Itwasnotuntil21March2001thatNicaraguaassertedclaimstotheseislands .

25 .Inremainingsilentovertheyears,NicaraguaengagedinconductwhichcouldhaveledHondurastobelievethat itacceptedtheuti possidetis jurispositionvis-à-visthedisputedislands,asthatpositionhad,inJudgeTorresBernárdez’sopin-ion,beenbindingonthePartieseversincethe1906ArbitralAwardfixedtheendpointofthelandboundaryatthemouthof the River Coco in the sea close to Cape Gracias a Dios .Further,underinternationallaw,Nicaragua,tosafeguardtherightsclaimedinthepresentproceedings,shouldhaveexer-cised greater vigilance and expressed clearer opposition inrespectofHonduras’spost-colonialeffectivitésintheislands .

E. Conclusion

26 .ItispursuanttotheforegoingconsiderationsthatJudgeTorresBernárdezisoftheopinionthatthelegalbasisforHon-duras’ssovereigntyoverBobelCay,SavannaCay,PortRoyalCayandSouthCayisthreefold, thepost-colonialeffectivitésandNicaragua’sacquiescencereinforcingthelegaltitletotheislandsheldbytheRepublicofHondurassince1821byvirtueoftheprincipleofuti possidetis juris .

II . DelimitationoftheMaritimeAreasbyaSingleMaritimeBoundary

A. The rejection of the “traditional maritime boundary” claimed by Honduras

27 .Hondurasdefendedtheexistenceofaso-called“tradi-tional” maritime boundary running along the 15th parallelnorth,throughtheterritorialseaandbeyond,basedinitiallyontheprincipleofuti possidetis juris(forthe6nauticalmilesof territorial waters from the colonial period) and, subse-quently, on a tacit agreement between the Parties concern-ingall theareastobedelimitedbytheCourt inthepresentcase . However, the Court, after considering the argumentsand numerous evidential offerings submitted by Honduras,aswellas theargumentsandevidence to thecontrary fromNicaragua, concludes “that there was no tacit agreement ineffectbetweenthePartiesin1982—nora fortioriatanysubse-quentdate—ofanaturetoestablishalegallybindingmaritimeboundary”(paragraph258oftheJudgment) .

28 . For the majority, the 15th parallel, at certain periods(1961–1977),“appearstohavehadsomerelevanceinthecon-ductoftheParties”,buttheeventsconcernedspannedashortperiodoftime .However,JudgeTorresBernárdezemphasizesin his opinion that the period in question is considerablylonger than that in theGulf of Maine case . Inanyevent,heholdsthattheevidencesubmittedbyHonduras,notablythatconcerning theoilandgasconcessionsandfisheriesregula-tionsandrelatedactivities,arguesdecisivelyinfavouroftheideaoftheexistenceofatacitagreementbetweenthePartiesonthe“traditional”maritimeboundary .Hethereforedoesnotsubscribetothenegativefindingofthemajorityonthisques-tion,althoughheacknowledgesthatitisajudge’sprerogativetoweighandtakeapositionontheevidencepresentedbytheParties .

29 . In this respect, the opinion contains two particularcomments . In the first, the judge declares his disagreementwith the interpretation made by the Judgment of the Notefrom the Minister Dr . Paz Barnica of 3 May 1982 . The sec-ondconcernsNicaragua’sreactiontotheHonduranNoteof21 September 1979 which stated that the seizure at sea of aHonduran vessel by the Nicaraguan navy on 18 September1979tookplace“eightmilestothenorthofthefifteenthpar-allelthat serves as the limit between Honduras and Nicaragua(Counter-MemorialofHonduras,p .48,para .3 .38;emphasisadded) . The Judgment, however, attributes no legal effect tothe fact that, in its reply, Nicaragua neither contested norqualifiedHonduras’sassertion .

B. Non-application by the Judgment of succession to the territorial waters from the colonial period under utipossidetisjuris

30 . In both its written pleadings and at the hearings,Hondurasalsoraisedthequestionof theParties’successionto themaritimeareasof thecolonialperiodpursuant touti possidetis juris .Inthisrespect,theJudgmentdeclaresthatincertaincircumstances,suchasthoseconcerninghistoricbaysandterritorialseas,theuti possidetis jurisprinciplecouldplayaroleinmaritimedelimitation(paragraph232),therebycon-firming the relevant jurisprudence of the 1992 Judgment inthecaseconcerningtheLand, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras; Nicaragua intervening) .Inhisopinion,JudgeTorresBernárdezfullyendorsesthispointoflawsetoutintheJudgment .Unfortunately,themajorityhasnotdrawnthenecessaryconclusionsfromthisdeclarationforthepresentcase .

31 .Honduras’spositiononthequestionconcernedissum-marizedintheopinionasfollows:(1)theprincipleofuti pos-sidetis juris referred to in theGámez-BonillaTreaty, aswellasinthe1906AwardoftheKingofSpain,isapplicabletothemaritimeareaoffthecoastsofHondurasandNicaragua;(2)the15thparallelconstitutesthelineofmaritimedelimitationresultingfromtheapplicationofthatprinciple;(3)HondurasandNicaraguasucceeded,in1821,toamaritimeareaconsist-ingofa6-mile territorial sea;and(4) theuti possidetis jurisgives rise to a presumption of Honduran title to the conti-nental shelf and exclusive economic zone north of the 15thparallel .

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32 .ThereactionsofJudgeTorresBernárdeztoeachoftheseelementsoftheHonduranpositionareasfollows:

Reactiontopoint(1):Nodoubt .Atpresent,asaprincipleof general international law, uti possidetis juris is applicabletobothlandandmaritimedelimitations,asisupheldbytheJudgment . Moreover, the Gámez-Bonilla Treaty constitutedafriendlysettlementof“allpendingdoubtsanddifferences”inorderto“demarcateonthespotthedividinglinewhichistoconstitutetheboundarybetweenthetwoRepublics”(Art .1 of the Treaty) . The word “boundary” is thus not qualifiedbytheadjective“land” .ThepracticeofthePartiesbearsoutthisinterpretation,moreover,astheMinutesIIoftheMixedCommissionof12June1900effectedademarcationbetweenthe two republics in the part of the Bay or Gulf of Fonseca“contiguoustothecoastlineofbothStateswithouttherebeinga distance of 33 km between their coasts” (I.C.J. Pleadings, Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 (Honduras v .Nicaragua),Vol .I,p .235) .SeealsotheNoteof19March1912fromtheNicaraguanMinisterforForeignAffairsindicatingthereasonsreliedonbyNicaraguainordertoregardtheKingofSpain’sAwardasnullandvoid(ibid .,pp .292–293) .

Reaction to point (2): Yes, if the statement is understoodtoapply to themaritimeareaof the6-nautical-mile territo-rial sea from the colonial period; no, however, as far as thewholeofthe“traditionalmaritimeboundary”isconcerned,asJudgeTorresBernárdezagreeswithNicaraguathattitletotheexclusiveeconomiczoneor thecontinental shelf isanobvi-ouslymodernlegalnotionwhichdidnotexistin1821 .

Reactiontopoint(3):Nodoubt,undertheprincipleofuti possidetis juris .

Reactiontopoint(4):JudgeTorresBernárdezunderstandsthispointasmeaningthattheuti possidetis jurisprinciplewasusedtodeterminethecoastsofeachParty,whichinturnformthebasisof thetitlegoverningthedelimitationbetweenthePartiestothepresentcaseofthemaritimeareascomprisingthecontinentalshelfandexclusiveeconomiczones .

*33 .ItisnotedintheopinionthattheJudgmentoftheCourt

acknowledges—as do both Parties—that the 1906 ArbitralAwardfixedtheextremecommonpointofthelandboundarywhichitestablishedontheAtlanticcoast .Inwhichcase,howcanitbesaidthatnothinginthe1906ArbitralAwardindi-catesthatthe15thparalleloflatitudenorthhasbeenregardedasconstitutingtheboundaryline?Thereisatleastonepoint,the extreme common boundary point on the Atlantic coastresultingfromtheArbitralAward,whichisthe“startinguti possidetis jurispoint”ofalinedelimitingtheterritorialseasbetweenthePartiesand,inthatrespect,itcanbeinvokedasevidenceofsuccessiontoamaritimedividinglinealongthehorizontal line of the 15th parallel north for the 6 nauticalmilesunderconsiderationhere, sincehistoricalSpanish lawusedparallelsandmeridianstodelimitmaritimeareas .

34 .Thefactthatthispointislocatedinthevicinityofthe15thparallelnorthclosetoCapeGraciasaDiosandnot,forexample, on a parallel or a meridian passing close by CapeCamarón,PuntaPatuca,CapeFalsoorSandyBayisundoubt-

edly,inJudgeTorresBernárdez’sview,averysignificantindi-cationorpieceofevidenceforajudgeorarbitratorinvolvedinapplyingtheuti possidetis jurisprinciple .TheChamberformedfor the caseLand, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras; Nicaragua intervening) understood thispoint well when it adopted methods of assessing and inter-pretingtheevidencethatwereinkeepingwiththeessentiallyhistoricalcharacterofthatprincipleinLatinAmerica .

35 .According to theopinion, it is correct to say that theArbitralAwardof1906didnotcarryoutanymaritimedelim-itationintheAtlantic,butmuchlesssotostatethatit“isnotapplicable”tothepresentmaritimedelimitationbetweentheParties .ItisnecessarytoexaminethereasonsfortheArbitralAwardinordertogainaproperviewoftheuti possidetis juris positionin1821alongtheParties’coastsandintheirrespec-tive adjacent maritime areas, because the land dominatesthesea .Andtheland—thecoastalfrontsoftheParties—wasdefinedbythe1906ArbitralAwardandnotbytheresourcesof theexclusiveeconomiczones locatedoutbeyond the ter-ritorialseas .

36 . As to the very different issue of the scope of the res judicataofthe1906ArbitralAward,whatisrequired,accord-ingtoJudgeTorresBernárdez,istoapply,whereappropriate,the jurisprudence of the Court concerning the relationshipbetweentheoperativepartandthereasoningofajudgment,since res judicata does not apply only to what is materiallyindicatedintheoperativepartofanawardorajudgment(see,forexample,thecaseconcerningApplication of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovinav .Serbia and Montenegro),Judgmentof26February2007,para .26) .

*37 . Judge Torres Bernárdez cannot follow the majority

when the Judgment practically ignores the historical, geo-graphicalandlegalfactssetoutinthereasoningofthe1906ArbitralAward .Heemphasizestheimportanceofthedocu-mentationinthatarbitralcaseforapplyingtheprincipleofuti possidetis juristothedelimitationoftheterritorialseasinthepresentcase .Inhisview,anexaminationofthereasoningoftheArbitralAwardandthedocumentationinquestionmakesitpossibletoappreciatethefull importanceofthehistoricalroleofCapeGraciasaDiosas theprojectionseparating thecoastoftheprovinceofHondurasfromthatoftheprovinceof Nicaragua, and thus to arrive at an image of the area ofthe6-mileterritorialseaappertainingtooneorotheroftheseSpanishcolonialprovincespriorto15September1821 .

38 . For him such an image is, moreover, sufficiently pre-cise—forthepurposeofapplyingtheprincipleoftheuti pos-sidetis juris of 1821—to acknowledge and assert that it wasindeedat theparallelrunningthroughCapeGraciasaDios(i .e .the15thparallelnorth)that,onthedayoftheirindepend-ence,theareaofthemainlandterritorialseaoftheRepublicofHondurascametoanendandtheareaofthemainlandter-ritorialseaoftheRepublicofNicaraguabegan,tothenorthand south respectively . This is, of course, a “delimitation”from1821andnota“demarcation”atseain2007 .Andwhy?Because,accordingtothe1906ArbitralAwardbasedonthehistorical “documentation” provided by the Parties, it was

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Cape Gracias a Dios which “fixes what has practically beenthelimitorexpansionorencroachmentofNicaraguatowardsthenorthandofHonduras towards the south” (RIAA,Vol .xI,p .115) .

39 .ReadingtheJudgment,JudgeTorresBernárdezsome-timeshastheimpressionthatthemajoritydemandstoomuchasevidenceoftheuti possidetis jurisof1821andasadefinitionofwhatconstituted,at thebeginningof thenineteenthcen-tury,amaritimedelimitationoftheterritorialwatersbetweenthe adjacent coasts of two States . One must ask whether itwascustomaryatthetime,eveninEurope,toeffectcollateraldelimitationofterritorialseasbymeansofpreciselydefinedlinesintreatiesconcludedindueform .Thereissomedoubtin that respect . Moreover, the evidence, information andgeographyareparticularlyclear foruti possidetis juris tobeappliedtothedelimitationofthefirst6milesofterritorialseabetween theParties’mainlandcoasts inquestion, along the15thparallel .

*40 .TheopinionrecallstheassertionbyHondurasthatthe

15th parallel is the dividing line between the Parties of themaritime area represented by the 6-mile territorial watersinheritedfromSpain,onthebasisofthe1906ArbitralAwardandthedocumentationrelatingtoit,aswellasotherevidencesuchastheRoyalDecreeof30November1803regardingtheislands of San Andrés and the Mosquito Coast from CapeGracias a Dios to the Chagres River, the geographical planoftheVice-RoyaltyofSantaFédeBogotá,NewKingdomofGranada (1774) (Rejoinder of Honduras, Vol . II, Ann . 232),thediplomaticNoteof23November1844addressed toHerBritannicMajestybytheMinisterrepresentingbothHondu-ras and Nicaragua, and two expert opinions on the generaljurisdictionoverlandandseaoftheCaptaincy-GeneralsandGovernments inhistoricalSpanishoverseas law(ibid .,Ann .266) and the issue of Honduran rights to the waters of theAtlanticOcean(ibid .,Ann .267) .

41 . During the oral arguments stage, Nicaragua attackedthefirstofthoseexpertopinionsbyinvokinginthisrespectthe Royal Order on coastguards (1802), the Instruction fortheregulationofcoastguardvessels intheIndies(1803),theOrdinance on privateering vessels (1796, amended in 1801)andtheOrdinanceconcerningtherégimeandmilitarygov-ernanceofsailors’registration(matrículademar,1802) .JudgeTorresBernárdezdoesnotseeinwhatwaythetextsoftheseinstrumentsalterthegeneralconclusionsresultingfromtheopinionsexpressedbytheHonduranexperts .

*42 .However,Nicaraguadidnotconfineitselftodiscussing

itemsofevidence .Italsopresentedargumentsintheformofapropositionentitled“Thesea,oneareaunderonejurisdic-tionintheSpanishmonarchy”,accordingtowhich“thewholesea” formed a single area, over which a special jurisdiction,centralizedinMadrid—thatofthenavy—exclusivelyapplied,andfinallyasserting that theSpanishCrown’sclaim toa6-mileterritorialsea“tells[us]nothingwithregardtothelimitofthisterritorialseabetweentheProvincesofHondurasandNicaragua”(paragraph231oftheJudgment;emphasisinthe

original) . Consequently, Nicaragua denies to the republicscreatedfromtheformercolonialprovincesofHondurasandNicaraguathis6-milemaritimeareaaspartoftheirterritorialinheritancefromSpain,thepredecessorState .

43 . The opinion takes a stance on this Nicaraguan argu-ment,asJudgeTorresBernárdezdoesnotsubscribeto it . Inhisview,itcorrespondstoadmittingthattherepublicsestab-lishedon the territoryof the former“colonialprovinces” intheAmericasreceivednomore than“drycoasts”under theuti possidetis juris principle, in the same way, possibly, asthe “Vice-Royalties” and “Captaincy-Generals”, since thepropositionthat theseawasasingleareaadministeredbyacentralizedjurisdictioninMadriddoesnotlenditselftodis-tinguishing between the “colonial provinces” and the otheradministrative territorial entities established by the SpanishCrownintheAmericas .

44 .JudgeTorresBernárdezpointsoutthattheNicaraguanargument is constructed as a syllogism, but the premissesare incorrect . First, it is not correct to claim that the wholesea formed “one area” when historical Spanish law—in anycase in the eighteenth century (Royal Decree of 17 Decem-ber1760)—distinguishedbetween thewatersunderSpanishjurisdictionadjacenttothecoast(the6miles)andtherestofthesea,withoutprejudicetotheexistenceofhistoricwatersorbayssuchasthoseoftheGulfofFonsecaonwhichNicaraguahasacoast .Further,theSpanishKingsoftheageofenlighten-mentwere,aselsewhereinEurope,attheheadofanabsolutemonarchyinwhichtheKing’swillalonewasthebeginning,middleandendofalljurisdiction .Thusinallareas,jurisdic-tionwascentralizedinthepersonoftheKingandexercisedbythoseentitledtoholdit,bothinSpainandintheAmericas,bydelegationofthesovereign’spower .

45 . Within a given area, be it on land or at sea, in theAmericas or in Spain, several jurisdictions coexisted, witheachsuchholderexercisingthefunctionsoractivitythathadbeen entrusted to him by general legislation or the specificinstructionsofthemonarch .Theexistenceofaspecialjuris-dictionofthenavydidnotinanywaypreventtheexercisingofgovernmental,militaryormaritimepowerswithinthe6-mileterritorialseabyaCaptain-GeneraloraGovernor,whosejurisdictionatseawasnotcurbedbythatoftheSpanishroyalnavy .

46 .JudgeTorresBernárdeznotesinhisopinionthat,inthelastanalysis,theargumentinquestionisbasedonaconcep-tual confusion between the respective roles of the principleof uti possidetis juris in international law and the historicalSpanishlawoftheAmericas .Theexistenceofa6-mileterrito-rialseaoffthecoastsoftheSpanishCrown’sterritoriesintheAmericasisaquestionofhistoricalSpanishlaw .However,theadministrationoftheseabytheSpanishCrown,centralizedorotherwise,isnotrelevantatall,sincethedeterminationofthesuccessorStatestotheSpanishmonarchy,benefitingfromthedateoftheirindependencefromthese6milesofterritorialseaaspartoftheirterritorialinheritancefromthepredecessorState,isaquestionofinternationallaw .

*

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47 .Afterattemptingtosowdoubtwiththeaboveargument,Nicaraguafinallyfellbackonthenon-divisionofthe6-milemaritimeareaoftheterritorialseafromthecolonialperiod .Itdidsointhefollowingterms:“[t]heonlythingthatcanbesaidisthat,atthedateofindependence,ajointsovereigntyoftheriparianrepublicsaroseoverthewatersoftheSpanishCrown . . .andpersistsuntilsuchtimeastheareascorrespondingtoeachofthemaredelimited”(CR2007/3,p .35,para .82) .

48 .ForJudgeTorresBernárdez,thisamountstoacknowl-edging that the Republic of Nicaragua and the Republic ofHonduras did indeed succeed to the 6 miles of territorialwatersfromthecolonialperiodoffCapeGraciasaDiosunderthe principle of uti possidetis juris . As the two Parties thusagreeontheexistenceofasuccessionin1821tothismaritimearea,allthatremainsistofixthedividinglinebetweentheirterritorialwaters .Inthisrespect,theopinionstatesthat“non-division”,purelyassuch,doesnotmeanthatwearedealingwithasituationof jointsovereignty .Forthat, theundividedwaterswouldhavetobeinasituationorstateofcommunity,which does not exist in the present case (Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992,p .599,para .401) .

49 .As regards the location andorientationof thisdivid-inglinein1821,JudgeTorresBernárdezconsidersthat,ifoneexaminesallthepointsoflawinthecase,itstandstoreasonthat under the uti possidetis juris principle of internationallaw,thelineoftheparallelrunningthroughCapeGraciasaDios,i .e .approximatelythe15thparallel,actedasthedivid-inglinebetweenthePartiesforthe6-mileareaofterritorialwatersintheCaribbeanSeaduringthecolonialperiod,sincethecolonialauthoritiesoftheprovinceofHondurasdidnotexerciseanyjurisdictionsouthofthatparallelandthecolonialauthoritiesoftheprovinceofNicaraguadidnotexerciseanyjurisdictionnorthofit .

50 .ThePartiesknewthisfromtheearlydaysofindepend-ence(see, forexample, thediplomaticNoteof23November1844),andthe1906ArbitralAwardconfirmeditbyfixingasres judicatatheextremecommonpointofthelandboundaryasthemouthoftheRiverCococlosetoCapeGraciasaDios .Therewasthusnoreasontolookanyfurther,astheconductofthePartiesconfirmedbytheArbitralAwardfromthenonconstitutedtheauthenticexpressionoftheuti possidetis juris of1821(see,forexample,Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), Judg-ment, I.C.J. Reports 1992,p .41,para .67) .Moreover,aftertheCourt’s1960Judgmentonthevalidityandbindingnatureofthe 1906 Arbitral Award, the Parties’ conduct was like thatfollowingindependence,i .e .asifthedividinglinewaseffec-tivelythe15thparallel(conductgivingrisetothe“traditional”maritimeboundary) .Inanyevent,sinceuti possidetis jurisisaprinciplethatautomaticallyapplies,thecolonialadministra-tivedivisionsonlandoratseaaretransformedintointerna-tionalboundaries“bytheoperationofthelaw” .Noadditionaldeliberateactisrequired(ibid.,p .565,para .345) .

51 . Judge Torres Bernárdez is accordingly of the opinionthattherearenogroundsforthefindingintheJudgmentthatHonduras ought to have shown to a greater degree that themaritimeboundaryshouldfollowthe15thparallelfromCape

GraciasaDios,andproducedevidencethatthecolonialpowerhadusedparallelsandmeridiansinthisparticularcase,whichwasitsgeneralpracticeatsea .

52 .AccordingtoJudgeTorresBernárdez,suchastandardis too demanding in terms of assessing a uti possidetis juris situationconcerningtwoStateswhich,in1821,hadthesameunderstandingofthatprincipleasregardsthemaritimeareaconcerned . This bears out his criticism of the Judgment foroptingforarathertoomechanicalandunhistoricalapproachinitsassessmentoftheevidenceregardingapplicationoftheuti possidetis jurisprinciple .

53 .Here,thishastheunfortunateconsequenceofdeprivingHondurasofa“historictitle”whichcouldbeinvokedinthepresentcaseinrelationtotheinterpretationandapplicationofArticle15ofthe1982UnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea .ThatisthefirstreasonforJudgeTorresBernárdez’svoteagainstsubparagraphs(2)and(3)oftheoperativeclause .

C. The exnovo delimitation of maritime areas effected by the Judgment

1. The Parties’ claims and the question of defining the “area in dispute”

54 . In the present case, the Parties have adopted funda-mentally different approaches towards the delimitation oftheir“singlemaritimeboundary”intheCaribbeanSea .Oneinitialconsequenceof thisdivergence is,according to JudgeTorres Bernárdez, that the “area in dispute” defined by theParties’claimsdoesnotcorrespondtothe“area”inwhichthemaritimedelimitationmustbeeffected,takingaccountofthegeographyinvolved .

55 . In the Judge’s opinion, the bisector line claimed byNicaraguaon thebasisofall thecoastal frontsofbothPar-ties,thelineofthe15thparallelnorthclaimedbyHondurasand, for the purposes of the argument, the 80th meridianwestformatriangular“areaindispute”whichisanentirelyartificialoneinthesensethat it isdivorcedfromtherealityof the geographical, legal and historical circumstances of acasethatconcernsthedelimitationofmaritimeareassituatednorthandsouthofthemouthoftheRiverCococlosetoCapeGraciasaDios .

56 . The majority of the Court appears to presuppose, inJudgeTorresBernárdez’sview,thatanequaloralmostequalsharingoftheabovetrianglerepresents,inthepresentcircum-stances,anequitableresult .Hedoesnotagree,eventhoughtheratiobetweentheareasofthetriangleattributedtoNica-raguaandthoseattributedtoHondurasisapproximately3:4(1:1 .3) in favourofHonduras (includinga significant exten-sionintermsof territorialseabecauseof the islands) .How-ever,itmustbetakenintoaccountthatthebisectorclaimedbyNicaraguawascertainlydesignedtobackuprecentpoliticalambitions(1994/1995),butlackedlegalcredibility,sinceitwasbasedonallthecoastalfrontsofbothStatesregardlessoftheirrelationshipwiththeareaofdelimitationand,moreover,thosefrontswerereplacedbystraightlineswhichborenorelationtothephysicalgeographyofthecoast .

57 . In defining the “area in dispute”, the bisector lineclaimedbytheApplicantisadevicethatcreatesadistortion

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andaninequitableresultinthiscase .TheJudgmentdoesnotcorrect this effect . Nor did the Respondent’s main positioninitiallyhelptorestoreamorebalanceddefinitionofthe“areaindispute”asregardsitssouthernlimit(Honduras’salterna-tivesubmissionofanadjustedequidistancelinewaspresentedatthehearings) .Consequently,JudgeTorresBernárdeznotesthattheareainwhichtheParties’principalclaimsoverlapissituatednorthofthe15thparallel,whereastheareaofdelimi-tationliesnorthandsouthofthatparallel .

2. The law applicable to maritime delimitation

58 .HondurasandNicaraguahavingbecomepartiestothe1982UnitedNationsConventionontheLawof theSea, theConventionisnowinforcebetweentheParties .Therelevantarticles of the Convention are therefore applicable as treatylawinthepresentdispute .JudgeTorresBernárdezapprovesofthestatementtothiseffectintheJudgment(paragraph261) .However, he points out that, the weight of tradition beingwhatitis,theoverallstructureoftheJudgmentisbasedmoreonthecaselawthanonthetextoftheConvention,oftentothedetrimentoftheparticularnatureofdelimitationoftheterritorialsea .

3. Areas to be delimited and the methodology adopted by the Judgment: the abandonment of equidistance and delimitation in stages in favour of the bisector method

59 .JudgeTorresBernárdezdoesnotagreewiththeJudg-ment as regards the methodology to be used in order todetermine the course of the single maritime boundary . HisassumptionisthattheCourtmustfirstandforemostapplytherulesondelimitationoftheterritorialsea,withoutforgettingthattheultimatetaskistodrawasinglemaritimeboundarybetweenthePartiesthatwillalsobevalidforotherpurposes(Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v . Bahrain), I.C.J. Reports 2001,p .93,para .174) .However,theJudgmentdoesnotdothis .

60 .JudgeTorresBernárdezalsocriticizesthefactthattheJudgmentrejectsoutofhandtheequidistancemethodthatisspecificallyandexpresslyreferredtoinArticle15(Delimita-tionoftheterritorialsea)ofthe1982ConventionontheLawoftheSea,relyinginthefirstplaceontheexistenceof“specialcircumstances” in order to consider the issue thereafter intermsoftheConvention’srulesondelimitationoftheexclu-siveeconomiczone (Art .74)and thecontinental shelf (Art .83),andindeedintermsofthecustomaryrulewhichitcallsthe “equitable principles/relevant circumstances method”(paragraph271oftheJudgment) .

61 .Theeffortsofrecentyearstomakejudicialdecisionsinthisfieldmoreobjectivebyfirstlydrawingaprovisionalequi-distanceline,evenif thissubsequentlyhastobeadjustedinthe light of “special” or “relevant” circumstances, have thusbeensetaside .Thisisarelapseintosuigenerissolutions,i .e .intopragmatismandsubjectivity .The least that canbe saidis that the Judgment does not put the equidistance methodat the centre of the approach to be followed, relying to thisendon“difficulties”whicharesaidtomakeitimpossiblefortheCourttoidentifybasepointsandconstructaprovisionalequidistanceline(paragraph280oftheJudgment) .

62 . It is true thatneitherPartyhasas itsmainargumentacallforaprovisionalequidistancelineasthemostsuitablemethodofdelimitation .However,thisinnowaymeansthattheParties’positionsregardingtheequidistancemethodarethesame .

63 .OneoftheParties,Honduras,putforwardaprovisionalequidistancelinedrawnfromtwobasepoints,situatedontheParties’mainlandcoastsrespectivelynorthandsouthofthemouthoftheRiverCoco,andalsopresentedtotheCourtinitsfinalsubmissions,asanalternativetothelineofthe15thparallel,anadjustedequidistanceline(approximatelyazimuth78°48’) .Ontheotherhand,Nicaraguamaintainedthrough-out the proceedings and in its final submissions that themethod of equidistance/special or relevant circumstances isnotappropriateforthepurposesofdelimitationinthepresentcasebecauseoftheinstabilityofthemouthoftheRiverCoco .ForNicaragua,theCourtwastodrawthewholeofthesinglemaritimeboundaryonthebasisof thebisectorof theangleformedbytwostraightlinesthatweredeemedtorepresenttheentire coastal front of both Parties (approximately azimuth52°45’21”) .

64 . Inorder to justify theCourt’sdecisionnot touse theequidistance method in the present case, even as an initialprovisional measure, the Judgmentpoints to the geographi-calconfigurationofthecoastlineeithersideofCapeGraciasaDiosandtothemarkedinstabilityofthedeltaoftheRiverCocoat itsmouth .JudgeTorresBernárdezagreesthattheseare physical circumstances to be taken into account in thedelimitationexercise,butinhisview,neitherofthemjustifiesabandoningtheequidistancemethodinfavourofonesuchasthebisector,whichcreates farmoreseriousproblemsof lawandequityinthiscasethanequidistance .

65 .Inthiscontext,JudgeTorresBernárdezpointsoutthatwhere physical circumstances of this type are present, thesolutionadvocatedbythe1982ConventionontheLawoftheSea is to use the “straight baselines”method to identify thebasepoints(Arts .7and9of theConvention),rather thanamethod such as the bisector, based on macro-geography,whichisunableinthepresentcircumstancestosafeguardtheprinciple of non-encroachment in the areas situated off theHonduranmainlandcoastalfront .

66 .Asexplainedintheopinion,thelineofthesinglemari-timeboundaryintheJudgment,whichbeginsbydelimitingonlytheterritorialseasofthetwoStatesforacertaindistance,passes tooclosetothemainlandcoastofHondurasbecauseof theuseof thebisectormethod .For JudgeTorresBernár-dez,thislineisthereforeinequitable,especiallyinamaritimearea in which security and defence interests are bound toprevailovereconomicconsiderations .Moreover,JudgeTorresBernárdezisnotatallconvincedthat“theconstructionofanequidistance line from the mainland is not feasible” (para-graph283),norbytheargumentthattheexistenceofonlytwobasepointsisacircumstancethatprecludestheequidistancemethod(seeLand and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v .Nigeria), I.C.J. Reports 2002,p .443,para .292) .

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4. The bisector in the Judgment and its construction (coastal fronts)

67 . The Judgment has not adopted the delimitation linesrequestedbyeitheroftheParties .WithregardtoHonduras,it rejects both the line of the 15th parallel and an adjustedequidistanceline .ButtheJudgmentalsorejectsthebisectorofazimuth52°45’21”requestedbyNicaragua,whichwasbasedonlinesrepresentingtheentirecoastalfrontofbothcountries,which theApplicantconstructedas straight lines throughaprocessof“planing”or“smoothing”thecoastalgeographyofHonduras .

68 . However, the Judgment has chosen to use the bisec-tor method to determine the course of the single maritimeboundaryestablishedbytheCourtitself,sinceforthemajor-ity,suchamethodhasprovedviableincircumstanceswhereequidistanceisnotpossibleorappropriate(paragraph287oftheJudgment) .JudgeTorresBernárdezneverthelessnotesthattheCourt’sjurisprudencereferredtointheJudgmentinsup-portofthisfindingdoesnotconcerncasesinwhichdelimita-tionoftheterritorialseawasatissue .

69 .Inhisopinion,JudgeTorresBernárdezpointsoutthatthere is a total symmetry in the Judgmentbetween the rea-soningwhichhas ledthemajority toreject theequidistancemethodandthatwhichhaspersuadedittoadoptthebisectormethod .Forhim,however,thereisnocauseandeffectrela-tionshipbetweenthesetwomethods .Abisectorisnottheonlypossiblemeansofachievinganequitablesolutioninthiscase .Infactitdoestheopposite,sinceintermsofmaritimeareas,thebisectormethodimposesononePartyalone,Honduras,theburdenofageographicalandmorphologicalsituation(thecoastalconfiguration;theinstabilityofthemouthoftheRiverCoco)(paragraph292oftheJudgment)thatissharedbybothParties,asitexistsalongtheentirecoastline,bothnorthandsouthofthemouthoftheRiverCoco,astheJudgmentitselfacknowledges .

70 .ButtheJudgmentdoesnotmakeanyequitableadjust-mentofthebisectorlineinfavourofHonduras,tocompensateforthisburdenwhichHondurashastobearalone .Therejec-tionofNicaragua’sstraightlinefromCapeGraciasaDiostothefrontierwithGuatemalahasnothingtodowithequity .AlltheJudgmenthasdoneinthisrespectistorestoretheactualcoastal geography of Honduras which had been “planed’ intheApplicant’sproposal .Furthermore,thechoiceofthebisec-tormethodhashadtheeffectofextendingtherelevantcoastsbeyondthosedirectlyconcernedbytheareaofdelimitation .HencethecoastfromCapeFalsotoLagunaWanoputforwardbyHonduraswasrejectedinfavouroflongercoastalfronts .

71 . In this context, the Judgment rejects a coastal frontextending from Cape Camarón to the Río Grande (produc-ing a bisector of azimuth 64° 02’), because the line wouldrunentirelyovertheHonduranmainland .ButtheJudgmentalso rejects the front from Cape Falso to Punta Gorda, onthe grounds that its length (some 100 km) is not sufficienttoreflectacoastalfrontmorethan100nauticalmilesouttosea,althoughtheazimuthoftheangleofthebisectorisnone-theless70°54’ .Thiswasnotenough for themajority,whichfinally settled on a Honduran coastal front extending fromCapeGraciasaDiostoPuntaPatuca(eventhoughthecoast

betweenCapeFalsoandPuntaPatucadoesnotdirectlyadjointheareaofdelimitation)andaNicaraguanfront fromCapeGracias a Dios to Wouhnta, which the Judgment considerstobeof sufficient length toaccountproperly for thecoastalconfigurationinthedisputedarea .Thebisectoroftheangleformedbythesetwocoastalfrontshasanazimuthof70°14’41 .25” .ThisistheazimuthofthebisectorintheJudgment .

72 .JudgeTorresBernárdezcomparesthisazimuthintheJudgmentwiththatofaprovisionalequidistanceline(approx-imately78°48’)drawn frombasepoints situated northandsouthofthemouthoftheRiverCoco,notingthatthediffer-encebetweenthetwoazimuthsismorethan8° .Forthejudge,this isahugedisparity .Hecannotaccept itas theequitablesolutionadvocatedbythe1982ConventionontheLawoftheSea .Choosingamethod toovercome thephysicalproblemsthataresharedbybothParties’coastalfrontscannotjustifyadelimitationthatisinequitableforoneoftheParties .

5. Application of equidistance to the delimitation around the islands

73 .HavingrejectedNicaragua’sclaimthatwouldenclosetheislandsattributedtoHonduraswithinaterritorialseaof3nauticalmiles,theCourtthenturnstodelimitingtheterrito-rialseaaroundtheislands,inaccordancewithArticles3,15and21ofthe1982UnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea,whichisthelawapplicablebetweentheParties .JudgeTorresBernárdezentirelyagrees with the Court’s decisions,andthereforewiththecourseofthatsectionofthemaritimeboundarywhicheffectsthedelimitationaroundtheislands .

74 . Each of the islands concerned—Bobel Cay, SavannaCay,PortRoyalCayandSouthCayforHondurasandEdin-burgh Cay for Nicaragua—is accorded a 12-mile territorialsea,and theoverlappingareasbetween these territorial seasof Honduras and Nicaragua, both north and south of the15thparallel,aredelimitedbyapplicationoftheequidistancemethod .TheCourtfirstdrewaprovisionalequidistanceline,usingtheco-ordinatesfortheseislandsasthebasepointsfortheir territorial seas, and then constructed the median lineintheoverlappingareas .Lastly,havingestablishedthattherewere no special circumstances warranting an adjustment, itadoptedthisprovisionallineasthelineofdelimitation(para-graph304oftheJudgment) .

75 .Asaresultoftheapplicationofequidistance,thecourseofthedelimitationlinearoundtheislandsliespartlysouthofthe15thparallel .Thisisnotsurprising,astheexistenceofanykindofmaritimeboundaryalongthatparallel,basedonthetacitagreementoftheParties,hadalreadybeenrejectedbythemajorityoftheCourt(seeabove) .

6. The demarcation by the Mixed Commission of 1962 and the starting-point of the single maritime boundary

76 .ThetwoPartieslefttheCourtthetaskofestablishingthe starting-pointof the singlemaritimeboundary,and theJudgmentsetsit3milesouttoseafromthepointidentifiedintheRiverCocobytheMixedCommissionin1962,asHondu-raswished,butthemajorityhasplaceditalongtheazimuthof thebisector,asproposedbyNicaragua (paragraph311ofthe Judgment) . The co-ordinates of the starting-point thus

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decidedbytheCourtare15°00’52”oflatitudenorthand83°05’ 58” of longitude west (subparagraph (2) of the operativeclauseoftheJudgment) .

77 . JudgeTorresBernárdezdisagreeswiththe locationofthis point as decided by the Judgment because, in his view,itshouldhavebeenapointequidistantfromthebasepointssituatednorthandsouthofthemouthoftheRiverCoco .ThepointchosenbythemajorityisnotaneutraloneinrelationtotheprincipalclaimsoftheParties,whichisthereasonwhyhehasvotedagainstsubparagraph(2)oftheoperativeclauseoftheJudgment .

78 . On the other hand, Judge Torres Bernárdez endorsesthe Court’s finding that the Parties must negotiate in goodfaithwithaview toagreeingon thecourseof thedelimita-tionlineintheterritorialseabetweentheendpointofthelandboundaryasestablishedbythe1906ArbitralAwardandthestarting-point of the maritime delimitation in the presentJudgment .

7. The endpoint of the single maritime boundary, bilateral treaties and third States

79 . In paragraphs 314 to 319 of the Judgment, the Courtconsiders the various possibilities open to it as regards thequestionof theendpointof the lineandanalysesthepoten-tial third-State interests beyond the 82nd meridian, namelythose of Colombia and Jamaica . Following this analysis, itarrives at the conclusion that it cannot draw a delimitationlinethatwouldintersectwiththelineestablishedbythe1993Treaty between Colombia and Jamaica, but that it can statethatthemaritimedelimitationbetweenHondurasandNica-raguaextendsbeyondthe82ndmeridianwithoutprejudicingColombia’srightsunderitstreatywithNicaraguaof1928andwithHondurasof1986 .

80 .HencetheJudgmentstatesthattheCourtmay,withoutspecifying a precise endpoint, delimit the maritime bound-ary beyond the 82nd meridian without affecting third-Staterights (paragraph 319 of the Judgment and sketch-map No .7) .Unfortunately, JudgeTorresBernárdezdoesnothavethesamecertaintyas the Judgmentasregards thisfinding . It istrue that, in its reasoning, the Judgmentaddsan importantdetail,namelythat“[theCourt’s]considerationoftheseinter-ests is without prejudice to any other legitimate third partyinterests which may also exist in the area” (paragraph 318) .ThelegitimateinterestsofthirdStates“inthearea”delimitedby the Judgmentwould thus seemdulyprotected .However,thereremainsthequestionoftherightsandlegitimateinter-estsofthirdStatesinthemaritimeareasadjacenttotheareathathasbeendelimited .

81 .InJudgeTorresBernárdez’sview,thepresenceofNica-raguanorthofthe15thparallelandeastofthe82ndmerid-iancanonlyprejudice the rightsand interestsofColombia,sincethelatterisnolongerprotectedbythedelimitationlineofthe1986TreatywithHondurasandisthereforeexposedtoclaimsfromNicaraguatothesouthandeastofthatline .ThisisthefirstreasonwhyJudgeTorresBernárdezisopposedtothedelimitationeastof the82ndmeridianthat iscontainedintheJudgment .

82 .Thereisasecondreason,however,sincethedelimita-tion effected by the present Judgment takes no account ofthemaritimedelimitationtreatyconcludedin1986betweenHondurasandColombia,eventhoughthisisatreatyinforcebetweenthetwoStates,registeredwiththeSecretariatoftheUnitedNationsandinvokedbyHondurasinthepresentcase .JudgeTorresBernárdezfinds this surprising .Whyshould itbe so? Because the dispute that exists regarding this treatybetween theParties to thepresentcasewasnot includedbytheApplicant,Nicaragua,withinthesubjectofthedisputeasdefinedinitsApplicationinstitutingproceedings,andnordiditasktheCourt,initsfinalsubmissions,toruleonanylegalaspectofthedisputebetweenthePartiesconcerningthattrea-ty .YetthisraisesajurisdictionalissuedeservingofparticularconsiderationwhichisabsentfromtheJudgment .

83 . Inotherwords, thestatusof the treaty instrument inquestion should have been determined beforehand, since amaritime delimitation line cannot settle a dispute concern-ing the treaty-makingpowerofStatesand/or thevalidityofthe treaties thusconcluded, just as it couldnot settle in thepresentcasethedisputebetweenthePartiesconcerningsover-eigntyoverthecontestedislands .Inthisrespect,JudgeTorresBernárdezrecallsthat,accordingtoArticles74and83ofthe1982UnitedNationsConventionontheLawof theSea, thedelimitationoftheexclusiveeconomiczoneandoftheconti-nentalshelfmustbeeffected“onthebasisofinternationallaw,asreferredtoinArticle38oftheStatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJustice,inordertoachieveanequitablesolution” .

8. Conclusion

84 . Judge Torres Bernárdez has voted against subpara-graphs(2)and(3)oftheJudgment’soperativeclausebecausehebelievesthatthelineofsinglemaritimedelimitationcon-tained in the Judgment does not entirely comply with therelevantrequirementsofthe1982UnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea,exceptasregardsthesectionaroundtheislands(thesecondsectionoftheline) .

85 .Forthefirstsection,whichbeginsbydelimitingforacertain distance the Parties’ mainland territorial seas, it isobvious that the general rule of equidistance contained inArticle15ofthe1982Conventionhasnotbeenapplied .Thishas been rejected for the first time in the Court’s jurispru-denceinrelationtotheterritorialsea,andfromthestartofthedelimitationexercise,infavourofabisectorwhichisunableto secure the principle of non-encroachment with regard toHonduras’s mainland coasts . In the Judgment, the bisectormethodchosenisjustifiedonthegroundsthattheconfigura-tionofthemainlandcoastsinquestionandtheinstabilityofthe mouth of the River Coco are said to constitute “specialcircumstances”withinthemeaningofthesecondsentenceoftheabove-mentionedArticle15 .JudgeTorresBernárdezcan-notacceptthisjustification,sincetheremedyforsuchsitua-tionsunderthe1982Conventionisnotthebisectormethod,butthatofstraightbaselines(Art .7,para .2,andArt .9oftheConvention) .Thatbeingso,andtheJudgmenthavingrejectedthehistorictitles(uti possidetis juris)relieduponbyHondu-ras,JudgeTorresBernárdezdoesnotfinditinanyway“neces-sary”todelimittheterritorialseaotherthanbythemedian

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line (equidistancemethod)provided for inArticle15of the1982Convention .

86 . As regards the third section, which delimits only theexclusiveeconomiczoneandthecontinentalshelf,thebisectorintheJudgmentislikewiseunable,inJudgeTorresBernárdez’sview,toachieveanequitablesolution .Firstly,theconstructionofthebisectormakesitnecessarytobringintoplayaHondu-rancoast(fromCapeFalsotoPuntaPatuca)whichdoesnotdirectlyadjointheareaofdelimitation .Secondly,andaboveall, theazimuthof theangleof the Judgment’sbisector lineisnotjustifiedbytherelationshipbetweenthecoastsdirectlyinvolved in the delimitation, nor by the historical circum-stancesofthedispute .AbisectorlinewheretheazimuthofitsanglefavoursoneofthePartiesbyadifferenceof8°comparedwiththeazimuthoftheangleoftheprovisionalequidistancelinedrawnfrombasepointssituatednorthandsouthoftheRiverCocoisnotanequitableresult,sinceinthepresentcase,theJudgmentinvokesno“relevantcircumstance”thatwouldwarrantadjustingtheprovisionalequidistancelineonsuchascale .Thisisparticularlytruewhenonebearsinmindthatthecircumstanceofthecoastsandrivermouthreferredtoabove

is common to the coastal fronts of both States . Finally, thefactthatthelinedelimitingthethirdsectionextendsbeyondthe82ndmeridianraisesjurisdictionalquestionsconcerningthetreatyconcludedin1986betweenHondurasandColom-bia, and as regards Colombia’s rights and legal interests inthe maritime areas lying south and east of the delimitationeffectedbythattreaty .

Declaration of Judge Gaja

Judge ad hoc Gaja declared that, while he was in agree-mentwiththerestoftheoperativepartoftheJudgmentandwithmostofthereasonsgiven,hedidnotsharetheviewthatmaritimeareaslyingsouthofthe14°59 .8’NparallelshouldbeattributedtoHondurasaspartofitsterritorialsea .UnderArticle3oftheUnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea, every State has the right to establish the breadth of itsterritorial seaup toa limitnotexceeding12nauticalmiles .Honduras constantly considered—also in its final submis-sions—that the territorial sea pertaining to the cays in theMedia Luna group did not extend in a southerly directionbeyondthe14°59 .8’Nparallel .

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167. teRRItoRIALAnDMARItIMeDIsPUte(nICARAGUAv. CoLoMBIA)(PReLIMInARYoBJeCtIons)


In the case concerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v . Colombia), the Court delivered its judgmentin respect of preliminary objections to its jurisdiction on13December 2007 . The Court found that it has jurisdictionoverthecase .

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The Court was composed as follows: President Higgins;Vice-President Al-Khasawneh;Judges Ranjeva,Shi,Koroma,Parra-Aranguren, Buergenthal, Owada, Simma, Tomka,Abraham,Keith,Sepúlveda-Amor,BennounaandSkotnikov;Judges ad hocFortierandGaja;Registrar Couvreur .

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Paragraph142ofthejudgmentreadsasfollows:

“ . . .

TheCourt,

(1)AsregardsthefirstpreliminaryobjectiontojurisdictionraisedbytheRepublicofColombiaonthebasisofArticlesVIandxxxIVofthePactofBogotá:

(a)Bythirteenvotestofour,Upholdstheobjectiontoitsjurisdictioninsofarasitcon-cernssovereigntyovertheislandsofSanAndrés,Providen-ciaandSantaCatalina;infavour:PresidentHiggins;JudgesShi,Koroma,Parra-Aranguren, Buergenthal, Owada, Simma, Tomka, Keith,Sepúlveda-Amor,Skotnikov;Judgesad hocFortier,Gaja;against: Vice-President Al-Khasawneh; Judges Ranjeva,Abraham,Bennouna;(b)Unanimously,Rejectstheobjectiontoitsjurisdictioninsofarasitcon-cernssovereigntyovertheothermaritimefeaturesindis-putebetweentheParties;(c)Unanimously,Rejectstheobjectiontoitsjurisdictioninsofarasitcon-cernsthemaritimedelimitationbetweentheParties;(2)Asregardsthesecondpreliminaryobjectiontojurisdic-tionraisedbytheRepublicofColombiarelatingtothedec-larationsmadebythePartiesrecognizingthecompulsoryjurisdictionoftheCourt:(a)Byfourteenvotestothree,Upholdstheobjectiontoitsjurisdictioninsofarasitcon-cernssovereigntyovertheislandsofSanAndrés,Providen-ciaandSantaCatalina;

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infavour:PresidentHiggins;JudgesShi,Koroma,Parra-Aranguren, Buergenthal, Owada, Simma, Tomka, Abra-ham, Keith, Sepúlveda-Amor, Skotnikov; Judges ad hocFortier,Gaja;against: Vice-President Al-Khasawneh; Judges Ranjeva,Bennouna;(b)Bysixteenvotestoone,Findsthat it isnotnecessarytoexaminetheobjectiontoitsjurisdictioninsofarasitconcernssovereigntyovertheothermaritimefeaturesindisputebetweenthePartiesandthemaritimedelimitationbetweentheParties;in favour: President Higgins; Vice-President Al-Kha-sawneh; Judges Ranjeva, Shi, Koroma, Parra-Aranguren,Buergenthal,Owada,Tomka,Abraham,Keith,Sepúlveda-Amor,Bennouna,Skotnikov;Judgesad hocFortier,Gaja;against:JudgeSimma;(3)AsregardsthejurisdictionoftheCourt,(a)Unanimously,Findsthatithasjurisdiction,onthebasisofArticlexxxIofthePactofBogotá,toadjudicateuponthedisputecon-cerningsovereigntyoverthemaritimefeaturesclaimedbythePartiesotherthantheislandsofSanAndrés,Providen-ciaandSantaCatalina;(b)Unanimously,Findsthatithasjurisdiction,onthebasisofArticlexxxIofthePactofBogotá,toadjudicateuponthedisputecon-cerningthemaritimedelimitationbetweentheParties .

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Vice-President Al-Khasawnehappendedadissentingopin-iontotheJudgmentoftheCourt;Judge Ranjevaappendedaseparateopinion;Judges Parra-Aranguren,SimmaandTomkaappendeddeclarations;Judge Abrahamappendedaseparateopinion;Judge Keithappendedadeclaration;Judge Bennounaappendedadissentingopinion;Judge ad hocGajaappendedadeclaration .

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Chronology of the procedure and submissions of the Parties(paras .1–14)

On6December2001,NicaraguafiledintheRegistryoftheCourtanApplicationinstitutingproceedingsagainstColom-bia in respect of a dispute consisting of “a group of relatedlegal issues subsisting” between the two States “concerningtitle to territory and maritime delimitation” in the westernCaribbean .

InitsApplication,Nicaraguasoughttofoundthejurisdic-tion of the Court on the provisions of Article xxxI of theAmericanTreatyonPacificSettlement,officiallyknownasthe“PactofBogotá”,aswellasonthedeclarationsmadebythePartiesunderArticle36oftheStatuteofthePermanentCourtof International Justice, which are deemed, for the periodwhichtheystillhavetorun,tobeacceptancesofthecompul-

soryjurisdictionofthepresentCourtpursuanttoArticle36,paragraph5,ofitsStatute .

SincetheCourtincludedupontheBenchnojudgeofthenationality of either of the Parties, each Party proceeded toexerciseitsrightconferredbyArticle31,paragraph3,oftheStatutetochooseajudgead hoctositinthecase .NicaraguafirstchoseMr .MohammedBedjaoui,whoresignedon2May2006,andsubsequentlyMr .GiorgioGaja .ColombiachoseMr .YvesFortier .

ByanOrderdated26February2002, theCourtfixed28April2003asthetime-limitforthefilingoftheMemorialofNicaragua and 28 June 2004 as the time-limit for the filingof the Counter-Memorial of Colombia . Nicaragua filed itsMemorialwithinthetime-limitsoprescribed .

On 21 July 2003, within the time-limit set by Article 79,paragraph1,oftheRulesofCourt,asamendedon5Decem-ber 2000, Colombia raised preliminary objections to thejurisdictionoftheCourt .Consequently,byanOrderdated24September 2003, the Court, noting that by virtue of Article79,paragraph5,oftheRulesofCourt,theproceedingsonthemeritsweresuspended,fixed26January2004asthetime-limitforthepresentationbyNicaraguaofawrittenstatementofitsobservationsandsubmissionsonthepreliminaryobjectionsmadebyColombia .Nicaraguafiledsuchastatementwithinthetime-limitsoprescribed,andthecasethusbecamereadyforhearinginrespectofthepreliminaryobjections .

Publichearingswereheldbetween4Juneand8June2007 .Attheconclusionoftheoralproceedings,thePartiespresent-edthefollowingfinalsubmissionstotheCourt:

OnbehalfoftheGovernmentofColombia,“PursuanttoArticle60oftheRulesoftheCourt,havingregardtoColombia’spleadings,writtenandoral,ColombiarespectfullyrequeststheCourttoadjudgeanddeclarethat(1)under thePactofBogotá,and inparticular inpursu-anceofArticlesVIandxxxIV,theCourtdeclaresitselftobewithoutjurisdictiontohearthecontroversysubmittedtoitbyNicaraguaunderArticlexxxI,anddeclaresthatcontroversyended;(2) under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of theCourt, theCourthasnojurisdictiontoentertainNicara-gua’sApplication;andthat(3)Nicaragua’sApplicationisdismissed .”OnbehalfoftheGovernmentofNicaragua,“In accordance with Article 60 of the Rules of Courtandhavingregardto thepleadings,writtenandoral, theRepublicofNicaraguarespectfullyrequeststheCourt, toadjudgeanddeclarethat:1 .ThePreliminaryObjectionssubmittedby theRepublicofColombia,bothinrespectofthejurisdictionbaseduponthePactofBogotá,andinrespectofthejurisdictionbaseduponArticle36,paragraph2,oftheStatuteoftheCourt,areinvalid .2 . In the alternative, the Court is requested to adjudgeanddeclare, inaccordancewith theprovisionsofArticle79,paragraph9,oftheRulesofCourtthattheobjections

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submitted by the Republic of Colombia do not have anexclusivelypreliminarycharacter .3 . In addition, the Republic of Nicaragua requests theCourttorejecttherequestoftheRepublicofColombiatodeclarethecontroversysubmittedtoitbyNicaraguaunderArticlexxxIofthePactofBogotá‘ended’,inaccordancewithArticlesVIandxxxIVofthesameinstrument .4 .Anyothermattersnotexplicitlydealtwithinthefore-goingWrittenStatementandoralpleadings,areexpresslyreservedforthemeritsphaseofthisproceeding .”


TheCourtgivesabriefaccountofthehistorywhichformsthebackgroundofthedisputebetweentheParties(onlypartsofwhicharereferredtobelow) .

Itnotesthaton24March1928,a“TreatyconcerningTer-ritorialQuestionsatIssuebetweenColombiaandNicaragua”was signed at Managua (hereinafter the “1928 Treaty”), inwhichbothcountriesexpressedtheirdesiretoput“anendtotheterritorialdisputebetweenthem” .ArticleIofthatTreatyprovidedasfollows:

“TheRepublicofColombiarecognises the fullandentiresovereigntyoftheRepublicofNicaraguaovertheMosquitoCoastbetweenCapeGraciasaDiosandtheSanJuanRiver,andoverMangleGrandeandMangleChicoIslandsintheAtlanticOcean(GreatCornIslandandLittleCornIsland) .The Republic of Nicaragua recognises the full and entiresovereignty of the Republic of Colombia over the islandsof San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina and overtheotherislands, isletsandreefsformingpartoftheSanAndrésArchipelago .ThepresentTreatydoesnotapplytothereefsofRoncador,QuitasueñoandSerrana,sovereigntyoverwhichisindis-putebetweenColombiaandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica .”[TranslationbytheSecretariatoftheLeagueofNations,forinformation .]The instruments of ratification of the 1928 Treaty were

exchangedatManaguaon5May1930 .ThePartiessignedonthatoccasionaProtocolofExchangeofRatifications(herein-after the“1930Protocol”) .TheProtocolnoted that the1928TreatywasconcludedbetweenColombiaandNicaragua“withaviewtoputtinganendtothedisputebetweenbothRepublicsconcerningtheSanAndrésArchipelagoandtheNicaraguanMosquitoCoast” .TheProtocolstipulatedasfollows:

“Theundersigned,invirtueofthefullpowerswhichhavebeen granted to them and on the instructions of theirrespective Governments, hereby declare that the SanAndrésandProvidenciaArchipelagomentionedinthefirstArticleofthesaidTreatydoesnotextendwestofthe82nddegreeoflongitudewestofGreenwich .”[TranslationbytheSecretariatoftheLeagueofNations,forinformation .]InadiplomaticNotedated4June1969,Colombiaprotested

against the granting of certain oil exploration concessionsand reconnaissance permits by Nicaragua, which allegedlycoveredQuitasueñoandthewaterssurroundingitaswellasmaritimezonesthatsurpassedthe82ndmeridiantotheeast .

With respect to Quitasueño, Colombia pointed out that the1928TreatyexplicitlydeclaredthattheRoncador,QuitasueñoandSerranacayswereindisputebetweenColombiaandtheUnitedStates .Colombiaalsomade“aformalreservation . . .of itsrightsover thereferencedterritory,aswellasover theadjacentmaritimezone” .Withrespecttothemaritimezonesover which oil exploration concessions had been granted,Colombiaobservedthatthe82ndmeridianhadbeennotedinthe1930ProtocolasthewesternboundaryoftheArchipelagoofSanAndrésandProvidencia .

InadiplomaticNotedated12June1969,Nicaraguaassert-ed, with respect to the oil exploration concessions, that theareas concerned were part of its continental shelf and thatthe concessions had therefore been granted “in use of thesovereignrights[Nicaragua]fullyandeffectivelyexercisesinaccordance with the norms of international law” . As to thereferencetothe82ndmeridianinthe1930Protocol,Nicara-guaasserted that “[a] simple readingof the . . . textsmakesit clear that the objective of this provision is to clearly andspecificallyestablishinarestrictivemanner,theextensionofthe Archipelago of San Andrés, and by no valid means canitbeinterpretedasaboundaryofNicaraguanrightsorcrea-torofaborderbetweenthetwocountries .Onthecontrary,itacknowledgesandconfirmsthesovereigntyandfulldomainofNicaraguaovernationalterritoryinthatzone” .

InaNoteinresponsedated22September1969,Colombiainter alia made a “formal declaration of sovereignty in themaritime areas located East of Meridian 82 of Greenwich”,relyingonthe1928Treatyand1930Protocol .Colombiaalsopointedtotheexclusioninthe1928TreatyoftheRoncador,QuitasueñoandSerranacays“fromanynegotiationsbetweenColombiaandNicaragua” .

On 23 June 1971, Nicaragua sent a memorandum to theDepartmentofStateof theUnitedStates formally reservingits rights over its continental shelf in the area around Ron-cador,QuitasueñoandSerranaandnotingthatitconsideredthosebankstobepartofitscontinentalshelf .ItfurtherstatedthatitcouldnotacceptColombia’scontentionthatthe82ndmeridianreferredtointhe1930ProtocolsetthedividinglinebetweentherespectivemaritimezonesofthetwoStatessinceitonlyconstitutedthelimitoftheSanAndrésArchipelago .

On 8 September 1972, Colombia and the United StatessignedtheTreatyconcerningthestatusofQuitasueño,Ron-cadorandSerrana(alsoknownastheVásquez-SaccioTreaty) .Article1oftheTreatyprovidedthat“theGovernmentoftheUnitedStatesherebyrenouncesanyandallclaims tosover-eigntyoverQuitaSueño,RoncadorandSerrana” .Onthesameday,therewasanExchangeofNotesbetweenColombiaandtheUnitedStatesconcerningtheir“legalpositionrespectingArticle1of[the]Treaty” .TheUnitedStatesaffirmedthatitslegalpositionwas,inter alia,that“QuitaSueño,beingperma-nentlysubmergedathightide,isatthepresenttimenotsub-jecttotheexerciseofsovereignty”andthatthe1928TreatydidnotapplytoRoncador,QuitasueñoandSerrana .Foritspart,Colombiastatedthatitspositionwasthatthe“[t]hephysicalstatusofQuitaSueñoisnotincompatiblewiththeexerciseofsovereignty”andthat“withtherenunciationofsovereigntybytheUnitedStatesoverQuitaSueño,Roncador,andSerrana,

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theRepublicofColombiaistheonlylegitimatetitleholderonthosebanksorcays,inaccordancewiththe[1928Treatyand1930Protocol]andinternationallaw” .

On 4 October 1972, the National Assembly of Nicara-gua adopted a formal declaration proclaiming Nicaraguansovereignty over Roncador, Quitasueño and Serrana . On 7October 1972, Nicaragua formally protested, in diplomaticNotestoColombiaandtheUnitedStates,againstthesigningoftheVásquez-SaccioTreatyandmaintainedthat“thebankslocatedinthatzone . . .[were]partof[Nicaragua’s]territoryandthereforesubjecttoitssovereignty” .Itaddedthatitcouldnot accept Colombia’s contention that the 82nd meridianreferredtointhe1930ProtocolconstitutedtheboundarylineoftherespectivemaritimeareasofthetwoStatessinceitdidnotcoincidewiththeletterorspiritoftheProtocol,theclearintentionofwhichwastospecifythattheSanAndrésArchi-pelagodidnotextendwestfurtherthanthe82ndmeridian .

In July 1979 the Sandinista Government came to powerinNicaragua .On4February1980, theMinisterforForeignAffairs of Nicaragua published an official declaration and a“LibroBlanco”(hereinafter“WhitePaper”)inwhichNicara-guadeclared

“thenullityandlackofvalidityoftheBárcenas-Meneses-EsguerraTreaty[the1928Treaty] . . .[concluded]inahis-toricalcontextwhichincapacitatedasrulersthepresidentsimposedbytheAmericanforcesofinterventioninNicara-guaandwhichinfringed . . .theprinciplesoftheNationalConstitutioninforce . . .” .

InadiplomaticNotesenttoNicaraguaon5February1980,Colombiarejectedthedeclarationof4February1980as“anunfoundedclaimthatcountershistoricalrealityandbreachesthe most elementary principles of public international law” .In theviewof theColombianGovernment, the1928Treaty“[was]avalid,perpetualinstrument,andinfullforceinlightoftheuniversallyrecognizedlegalnorms” .

Thenewgovernmentwhichcame topower inNicaraguain1990andsubsequentgovernmentsmaintainedthepositionwithregardtothemeaningofcertainprovisionsofthe1928Treaty and 1930 Protocol which had been stated from 1969onwardsandthepositionwithregardtotheinvalidityofthe1928Treatywhichhadbeensetoutinthe1980WhitePaper .

Subject-matter of the dispute(paras .33–42)

The Court initially notes that the Parties have presenteddifferent views about whether there is an extant disputebetween them and, if so, the subject-matter of that dispute .Consequently, before addressing Colombia’s preliminaryobjections,itneedstoexaminetheseissues .

The Court recalls that according to Nicaragua, the dis-putesubmittedtotheCourtconcerned(i)thevalidityofthe1928 Treaty and its termination due to material breach; (ii)the interpretation of the 1928 Treaty, particularly regardingthe geographical scope of the San Andrés Archipelago; (iii)thelegalconsequencesoftheexclusionfromthescopeofthe1928TreatyofRoncador,QuitasueñoandSerrana;and(iv)the

maritimedelimitationbetweenthePartiesincludingthelegalsignificanceofthereferencetothe82ndmeridianinthe1930Protocol . InNicaragua’sview, the fourthelement“implie[d]andencompasse[d]alltheothers” .Inthisregard,Nicaraguacontendedthatthequestionofsovereigntyoverthemaritimefeatureswasbothaccessoryandpreliminarytothatofmari-timedelimitation .Finally,Nicaraguaalsosubmittedthatthequestion whether the 1928 Treaty has settled all questionsbetweenthePartiesis“theveryobjectofthedispute”and“thesubstanceofthecase” .

Colombia,foritspart,deniedthattherewasanextantdis-puteoverwhichtheCourtcouldhavejurisdiction,claimingthatthemattersinissuehadalreadybeensettledbythe1928Treaty .ItfurthercontendedthattherealpurposebehindNic-aragua’s Application was maritime delimitation rather thanthedeterminationofsovereigntyoverthemaritimefeatures .

The Court notes that, while the Applicant must presentitsviewofthe“subjectofthedispute”pursuanttoArticle40,paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court, it is for the Courtitself to determine the subject-matter of the dispute beforeit,takingaccountofthesubmissionsoftheParties .Asapre-liminarypoint,theCourtrecallsthatthePartiesdisagreeonwhetherornotthedisputebetweenthemhadbeen“settled”by the 1928 Treaty within the meaning of Article VI of thePactofBogotá .TheCourtfirstnotesthatArticleVIofthePactprovides that the dispute settlement procedures in the Pact“maynotbeappliedtomattersalreadysettledbyarrangementbetweentheparties,orbyarbitralawardorbydecisionofaninternationalcourt,orwhicharegovernedbyagreementsortreaties in forceonthedateof theconclusionof thepresentTreaty”(emphasisadded) .TheCourtalsonotesthataccord-ingtoArticlexxxIVofthePactcontroversiesovermatterswhicharegovernedbyagreementsortreatiesshallbedeclared“ended”inthesamewayascontroversiesovermatterssettledbyarrangementbetween theparties,arbitralawardordeci-sion of an international court . The Court considers that, inthespecificcircumstancesofthecase,thereisnodifferenceinlegaleffect,forthepurposeofapplyingArticleVIofthePact,betweenagivenmatterbeing“settled”bythe1928Treatyandbeing“governed”bythatTreaty .Inlightoftheforegoing,theCourtdecidestousetheword“settled”initsJudgment .

After having examined Nicaragua’s arguments, the Courtconsidersthatthequestionwhetherthe1928Treatyand1930ProtocolsettledthemattersindisputebetweenthePartiescon-cerningsovereigntyovertheislandsandmaritimefeaturesandthecourseof themaritimeboundarydoesnot formthesub-ject-matterofthedisputebetweenthePartiesandthat,inthecircumstancesofthecase,thequestionisapreliminaryone .

With respect to Colombia’s contention that Nicaragua’strue interest lay inthemaritimedelimitationrather thaninsovereigntyoverthemaritimefeatures,theCourtnotesthatnonetheless“theclaimofoneparty ispositivelyopposedbytheother”astosovereigntyoverthemaritimefeatures .

The Court thus concludes that the questions which con-stitute the subject-matterof thedisputebetween thePartiesonthemeritsare,first,sovereigntyoverterritory(namelytheislands and other maritime features claimed by the Parties)

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and, second, the course of the maritime boundary betweentheParties .

First preliminary objection(paras .43–120)

General overview of the arguments of the Parties

The Court recalls that in its first preliminary objection,ColombiaclaimsthatpursuanttoArticlesVIandxxxIVofthe Pact of Bogotá, the Court is without jurisdiction underArticlexxxIof thePact tohear thecontroversy submittedtoitbyNicaraguaandshoulddeclarethecontroversyended .Inthisregard,Colombia,referringtoArticleVIofthePact,arguesthatthemattersraisedbyNicaraguaweresettledbyatreatyinforceonthedateonwhichthePactwasconcluded,namelythe1928Treatyandthe1930Protocol .Colombiaaddsthatthisquestioncanandmustbeconsideredattheprelimi-naryobjectionsstage .

Nicaragua claims that the Court has jurisdiction underArticlexxxIofthePactofBogotá .Inthisregard,Nicaraguaarguesthatthe1928Treatyandits1930Protocoldidnotset-tle thedisputebetweenNicaraguaandColombiawithinthemeaningofArticleVIofthePactofBogotábecausethe1928Treatywas invalidorhadbeen terminatedand that,even ifthat was not the case, the 1928 Treaty did not cover all themattersnowindisputebetweentheParties .Moreover,Nica-raguacontendsthattheCourtmaynotpronounceupontheseissuesatthisstageoftheproceedingssincethatwouldrequireanexaminationofthemeritsofthecase .

The appropriate stage of proceedings for examination of the preliminary objection

The Court recalls that, under Article 79, paragraph 9, oftheRulesofCourt,therearethreewaysinwhichitmaydis-poseofapreliminaryobjection:theCourt“shalleitherupholdtheobjection,rejectit,ordeclarethattheobjectiondoesnotpossess,inthecircumstancesofthecase,anexclusivelypre-liminary character” . The Court further recalls that, in theNuclearTestscases(albeitinslightlydifferentcircumstances),itemphasizedthatwhileexaminingquestionsofjurisdictionand admissibility, it is entitled, and in some circumstancesmayberequired,togointootherquestionswhichmaynotbestrictly capableof classificationasmattersof jurisdictionoradmissibilitybutareofsuchanatureastorequireexamina-tionbeforethosematters .

TheCourtbelievesthatitisnotintheinterestofthegoodadministrationofjusticeforittolimititselfatthatjuncturetostatingmerelythatthereisadisagreementbetweenthePar-tiesastowhetherthe1928Treatyand1930Protocolsettledthe matters which are the subject of the controversy withinthemeaningofArticleVIofthePactofBogotá,leavingeveryaspectthereoftoberesolvedonthemerits .

Inprinciple,apartyraisingpreliminaryobjectionsisenti-tledtohavetheseobjectionsansweredatthepreliminarystageoftheproceedingsunlesstheCourtdoesnothavebeforeitallfactsnecessarytodecidethequestionsraisedorifansweringthe preliminary objection would determine the dispute, orsomeelementsthereof,onthemerits .TheCourtfindsitselfin

neitherofthesesituationsinthecaseathand .Thedetermina-tionbytheCourtofits jurisdictionmaytouchuponcertainaspects of the merits of the case . Moreover, the Court hasalready found that the question of whether the 1928 Treatyandthe1930Protocolsettledthemattersindisputedoesnotconstitutethesubject-matterofthedisputeonthemerits .Itisratherapreliminaryquestiontobedecidedinordertoascer-tainwhethertheCourthasjurisdiction .

Inlightoftheforegoing,theCourtfindsthat it isunableto uphold Nicaragua’s contention that it is precluded fromaddressingColombia’sfirstpreliminaryobjectionatthisstageoftheproceedings .

Jurisdictional system of the Pact of Bogotá

The Court makes mention of the relevant provisions ofthePactofBogotáinthecase,beginningwithArticlexxxI,whichreadsasfollows:

“InconformitywithArticle36,paragraph2,oftheStatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJustice,theHighContractingPartiesdeclarethattheyrecognize,inrelationtoanyotherAmericanState,thejurisdictionoftheCourtascompulso-ryipso facto,withoutthenecessityofanyspecialagreementsolongasthepresentTreatyisinforce,inalldisputesofajuridicalnaturethatariseamongthemconcerning:(a)Theinterpretationofatreaty;(b)Anyquestionofinternationallaw;(c) The existence of any fact which, if established, wouldconstitutethebreachofaninternationalobligation;or(d)Thenatureorextentof thereparationtobemade forthebreachofaninternationalobligation .”TheotherrelevantprovisionsareArticlesVIandxxxIV

ofthePact .ArticleVIprovidesthat:“Theaforesaidprocedures,furthermore,maynotbeappliedtomattersalreadysettledbyarrangementbetweenthepar-ties,orbyarbitralawardorbydecisionofaninternationalcourt,orwhicharegovernedbyagreementsortreatiesinforceonthedateoftheconclusionofthepresentTreaty .”ArticlexxxIVreadsasfollows:“IftheCourt,forthereasonssetforthinArticlesV,VIandVIIofthisTreaty,declaresitselftobewithoutjurisdictiontohearthecontroversy,suchcontroversyshallbedeclaredended .”TheseprovisionsindicatethatiftheCourtweretofindthat

the matters referred to it by Nicaragua pursuant to ArticlexxxIofthePactofBogotáhadpreviouslybeensettledbyoneofthemethodsspelledoutinArticleVIthereof,itwouldlacktherequisitejurisdictionunderthePacttodecidethecase .

The question whether the 1928 Treaty and 1930 Protocol settled the matters in dispute between the Parties

The Court considers the arguments of the Parties andexaminesthefactualbackgroundoftheconclusionofthe1928Treatyandthesignatureofthe1930Protocol .Itstatesthat,inordertoascertainwhetherithasjurisdiction,ithastodecidethe question whether, on the date of the conclusion of the

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PactofBogotáin1948,themattersraisedbyNicaraguawere,pursuant to Article VI thereof, “governed by agreements ortreatiesinforce” .Forthispurpose,thefirstpointfortheCourttoconsider iswhether the treaty,whichColombiaalleges tohavesettledthemattersconstitutingthesubject-matterofthedispute,wasinforcein1948 .

The Court notes that, with respect to the validity of the1928 Treaty, Nicaragua first contends that the Treaty was“concludedinmanifestviolationoftheNicaraguanConstitu-tionof1911thatwasinforcein1928”and,secondly,thatatthetimetheTreatywasconcluded,Nicaraguawasundermili-taryoccupationbytheUnitedStatesandwasprecludedfromconcluding treaties that ran contrary to the interests of theUnitedStatesandfromrejectingtheconclusionoftreatiesthattheUnitedStatesdemandedittoconclude .NicaraguasubmitsinthisrespectthatColombiawasawareofthissituationand“tookadvantageoftheUSoccupationofNicaraguatoextortfromhertheconclusionofthe1928Treaty” .NicaraguaclaimsthatitremainedundertheinfluenceoftheUnitedStatesevenafter the withdrawal of the last United States troops at thebeginningof1933 .

Colombia,foritspart,maintainsthatNicaragua’sassertionrelatingtotheinvalidityofthe1928Treatyisunfounded .Itobservesthat,evenassumingthatthe1928Treatywasincom-patiblewithNicaragua’s1911ConstitutionorthatNicaragualackedcompetencetofreelyconcludetreatiesduetooccupa-tionby theUnitedStates, these claimswerenot raiseddur-ing the ratification process in the Nicaraguan Congress in1930,nor for some50years thereafter . Itpointsout that, infact, these arguments were raised for the first time in 1980 .Colombiafurthernotesthatin1948,whenthePactofBogotáwasconcluded,Nicaraguamadenoreservationwithregardtothe1928Treaty,despitethefactthatNicaraguaknewthatithadtherighttomakesuchareservationandmadeareserva-tionwithregardtothevalidityofanarbitralaward .Finally,Colombiacontendsthat,asaconsequence,Nicaraguaisnowprecluded from raising the question of validity of the 1928Treatyandits1930Protocol .

The Court recalls that the clear purpose of Article VI ofthePactofBogotáwastoprecludethepossibilityofusingtheprocedures provided for in the Pact, and in particular judi-cialremedies,inordertoreopensuchmattersasweresettledbetween the parties to the Pact, because they had been theobjectofaninternationaljudicialdecisionoratreaty .WhenratifyingthePact,Statesenvisagedbringingwithinitsproce-duresmattersnotyetsosettled .

StatespartiestothePactofBogotáwouldhaveconsideredthatmatterssettledbyatreatyorinternationaljudicialdeci-sionhadbeendefinitivelyresolvedunlessaspecificreserva-tionrelatingtheretowasmadeunderArticlesLIVandLVofthePact .Nicaraguadidnotenteranyreservationregardingthe1928TreatywhenitbecameapartytothePactofBogotá,thetreaty itnowinvokesasabasisof jurisdiction,althoughitdidenterareservationwithregardtoarbitraldecisionsthevalidityofwhichitcontested .TheCourtnotesthatthereisnoevidencethattheStatespartiestothePactofBogotáof1948,includingNicaragua,consideredthe1928Treatytobeinvalid .On25May1932,NicaraguaregisteredtheTreatyandProtocol

withtheLeagueofNationsasabindingagreement,pursuanttoArticle18oftheCovenantoftheLeague,ColombiahavingalreadyregisteredtheTreatyon16August1930 .

The Court recalls that Nicaragua advanced “the nullityand lackofvalidity”of the1928Treaty for thefirst time inanofficialdeclarationandWhitePaperpublishedon4Febru-ary1980 .TheCourtthusnotesthat,formorethan50years,Nicaragua has treated the 1928 Treaty as valid and nevercontendedthatitwasnotboundbytheTreaty,evenafterthewithdrawalof the lastUnitedStatestroopsat thebeginningof1933 .Atnotimeinthose50years,evenafteritbecameaMemberoftheUnitedNationsin1945andevenafteritjoinedtheOrganizationofAmericanStatesin1948,didNicaraguacontend that the Treaty was invalid for whatever reason,includingthatithadbeenconcludedinviolationofitsConsti-tutionorunderforeigncoercion .Onthecontrary,Nicaraguahas,insignificantways,actedasifthe1928Treatywasvalid .Thus,in1969,whenNicaraguarespondedtoColombia’sclaimthatthe82ndmeridian,referredtointhe1930Protocol,con-stitutedthemaritimeboundarybetweenthetwoStates,Nica-raguadidnotinvoketheinvalidityoftheTreatybutarguedinsteadthatthe1928Treatyand1930Protocoldidnoteffecta maritime delimitation . Similarly, in 1971 when NicaraguamaderepresentationstotheUnitedStatesreservingitsrightsoverRoncador, QuitasueñoandSerrana, itdidnot call intoquestionthevalidityofthe1928Treaty .TheCourtthusfindsthatNicaraguacannottodaybeheardtoassertthatthe1928Treatywasnotinforcein1948 .

TheCourtaccordinglyfindsthatthe1928TreatywasvalidandinforceonthedateoftheconclusionofthePactofBogotáin1948,thedatebyreferencetowhichtheCourtmustdecideontheapplicabilityoftheprovisionsofArticleVIofthePactofBogotásettingoutanexceptiontotheCourt’sjurisdictionunderArticlexxxIthereof .

TheCourt recalls thatNicaraguaargues that, even if the1928Treatywasvalid,ithasbeenterminatedduetoColom-bia’s interpretation of the Treaty in 1969, which Nicaraguacharacterizedasamaterialbreachthereof .Thiscontentionisdenied by Colombia . The Court considers that the questionwhethertheTreatywasterminatedin1969isnotrelevanttothe question of its jurisdiction since what is determinative,underArticleVIof thePactofBogotá, iswhether the1928TreatywasinforceonthedateoftheconclusionofthePact,i .e .in1948,andnotin1969 .Accordingly,thereisnoneedfortheCourttoaddressthequestionofthepurportedtermina-tionofthe1928Treatyin1969forthepurposesoftheascer-tainmentofitsjurisdiction .

TheCourt thenturns to thequestionwhether theTreatyandits1930Protocolsettledthematters indisputebetweenthe Parties and consequently whether the Court has juris-dictioninthecaseunderArticlexxxIofthePact .ItrecallsthatithasalreadyconcludedthattherearetwoquestionsindisputebetweenthePartiesonthemerits:first,territorialsov-ereigntyoverislandsandothermaritimefeaturesand,second,thecourseofthemaritimeboundarybetweentheParties .TheCourtnotes that thePartiesdisagreeaboutwhethervariousmattersrelatingtoterritorialsovereigntyweresettledbythe1928Treaty,namelysovereigntyoverthethreeislandsofthe

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San Andrés Archipelago expressly named in the Treaty, thescopeandcompositionoftherestoftheSanAndrésArchipel-agoandsovereigntyoverRoncador,QuitasueñoandSerrana .The Parties also disagree about whether the 1930 Protocoleffectedamaritimedelimitationbetweenthem .

Withrespecttothequestionof its jurisdictionasregardsthe issue of sovereignty over the named islands of the SanAndrésArchipelago,theCourtconsidersthatitisclearonthefaceofthetextofArticleIthatthematterofsovereigntyovertheislandsofSanAndrés,ProvidenciaandSantaCatalinahasbeensettledbythe1928TreatywithinthemeaningofArticleVIofthePactofBogotá .IntheCourt’sviewthereisnoneedto go further into the interpretation of the Treaty to reachthatconclusionandthereisnothingrelatingtothisissuethatcouldbeascertainedonlyonthemerits .

Nicaragua’s contention that the 1928 Treaty is invalid hasalreadybeendealtwithbytheCourt .WithregardtoNicara-gua’sfurtherassertionthatthe1928TreatyhasbeenterminatedbymaterialbreachduetotheinterpretationadoptedbyColom-bia from1969onwards, that issuehasnotbeenaddressedbytheCourtatthisstagesinceitisnotrelevanttothequestionofitsjurisdictionbyreferencetoArticleVIofthePactofBogotá .Even if theCourtwere tofind that the1928Treatyhasbeenterminated,asclaimedbyNicaragua,thiswouldnotaffectthesovereigntyofColombiaovertheislandsofSanAndrés,Provi-denciaandSantaCatalina .TheCourtrecallsthatitisaprin-ciple of international law that a territorial régime establishedby treaty“achievesapermanencewhich the treaty itselfdoesnotnecessarilyenjoy”andthatthecontinuedexistenceofthatrégimeisnotdependentuponthecontinuinglifeofthetreatyunderwhichtherégimeisagreed .

In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that it candispose of the issue of the three islands of the San AndrésArchipelagoexpresslynamedinthefirstparagraphofArticleIof the1928Treatyat thecurrent stageof theproceedings .That matter has been settled by the Treaty . Consequently,ArticleVIofthePactisapplicableonthispointandthereforetheCourtdoesnothave jurisdictionunderArticlexxxIofthePactofBogotáover thequestionofsovereigntyover thethree named islands . Accordingly, the Court upholds thefirstpreliminaryobjectionraisedbyColombiainsofarasitconcerns the Court’s jurisdiction as regards the question ofsovereigntyovertheislandsofSanAndrés,ProvidenciaandSantaCatalina .

As regards the question of the scope and composition oftherestoftheSanAndrésArchipelago,theCourtrecallsthatthere is agreement between theParties that theSanAndrésArchipelagoincludestheislandsofSanAndrés,ProvidenciaandSantaCatalinaaswellasadjacent isletsandcays .How-ever,thePartiesdisagreeastowhichmaritimefeaturesotherthanthosenamedislandsformpartoftheArchipelago .

TheCourtconsidersthatitisclearonthefaceofthetextof thefirstparagraphofArticle Iof the1928Treaty that itstermsdonotprovidetheanswertothequestionastowhichmaritimefeaturesapartfromtheislandsofSanAndrés,Provi-denciaandSantaCatalinaformpartoftheSanAndrésArchi-pelagooverwhichColombiahas sovereignty .Thatbeing so,thismatterhasnotbeensettledwithinthemeaningofArticle

VIofthePactofBogotáandtheCourthasjurisdictionunderArticlexxxIofthePactofBogotá .Therefore,theCourtcan-notupholdthefirstpreliminaryobjectionraisedbyColombiainsofarasitconcernstheCourt’sjurisdictionasregardsthequestion of sovereignty over the maritime features formingpartoftheSanAndrésArchipelago,savefortheislandsofSanAndrés,ProvidenciaandSantaCatalina .

WithrespecttothequestionofitsjurisdictionasregardsthematterofsovereigntyoverRoncador,QuitasueñoandSerrana,theCourtobservesthatthemeaningofthesecondparagraphofArticleIofthe1928Treatyisclear:thistreatydoesnotapplytothethreemaritimefeaturesinquestion .Therefore,thelimita-tionscontainedinArticleVIofthePactofBogotádonotapplytothequestionofsovereigntyoverRoncador,QuitasueñoandSerrana .TheCourtthushasjurisdictionoverthisissueunderArticlexxxIofthePactofBogotáandcannotupholdthefirstpreliminaryobjectionraisedbyColombia inso faras itcon-cernstheCourt’sjurisdictionasregardsthequestionofsover-eigntyoverRoncador,QuitasueñoandSerrana .

Withrespecttothequestionof its jurisdictionasregardstheissueofthemaritimedelimitation,theCourt,afterexam-ining theargumentspresentedby thePartiesandthemate-rialsubmittedtoit,concludesthatthe1928Treatyand1930Protocoldidnoteffectageneraldelimitationofthemaritimeboundary between Colombia and Nicaragua . Since the dis-pute concerning maritime delimitation has not been settledbythe1928Treatyand1930ProtocolwithinthemeaningofArticle VI of the Pact of Bogotá, the Court has jurisdictionunderArticlexxxIofthePact .Therefore,theCourtcannotupholdColombia’sfirstpreliminaryobjection in so faras itconcerns the Court’s jurisdiction as regards the question ofthemaritimedelimitationbetweentheParties .

Second preliminary objection(paras .121–140)

InadditiontoArticlexxxIofthePactofBogotá,Nicara-guainvokedasabasisoftheCourt’sjurisdictionthedeclara-tionsmadebythePartiesunderArticle36oftheStatuteofthePermanentCourtofInternationalJustice,whicharedeemed,for theperiodforwhichtheystillhavetorun, tobeaccept-ances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the present CourtpursuanttoArticle36,paragraph5,ofitsStatute .

Initssecondpreliminaryobjection,Colombiaassertsthatthe Court has no jurisdiction on this basis . It claims thatjurisdictionunderthePactofBogotáisgoverningandhenceexclusive .Initsview,sincetheCourthasjurisdictionunderArticlexxxIVofthePact todeclarethecontroversyendedandmustdosointhecaseathand,theCourtmaynotproceedfurthertoconsiderwhetheritmighthavejurisdictionundertheoptionalclause .Insupportofitsclaim,ColombiareliesontheCourt’sJudgmentintheBorderandTransborderArmedActions (Nicaragua v . Honduras) case, in which NicaraguaalsoassertedjurisdictiononthebasisofArticlexxxIofthePactofBogotáandonthebasisofoptionalclausedeclarations .Colombia notes that, in the Armed Actions case, the Courtdeclared that “in relations between the States parties to thePactofBogotá,thatPactisgoverning”andthat

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“thecommitment inArticlexxxI . . . isanautonomouscommitment,independentofanyotherwhichthepartiesmay have undertaken or may undertake by depositingwith the United Nations Secretary-General a declarationofacceptanceofcompulsoryjurisdictionunderArticle36,paragraphs2and4,oftheStatute”(Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v . Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1988,p .82,para .27andp .85,para .36) .ColombiaconsidersthattheCourtthuslaiddowntheprin-

cipleofprimacyofthetitleofjurisdictionunderthePactofBogotá .Itconcludesthat,whenanApplicantinvokesboththePactofBogotáandoptionalclausedeclarations,itisthePactofBogotá,aslex specialis,whichgovernsor,inotherwords,isdeterminativeandconclusive .

ColombiaclaimsthatintheArmedActionscase,theCourtheldthatthetitleofjurisdictionunderthePactofBogotápre-vailedoversubsequentoptionalclausedeclarations .Colombiapointsoutthat,inthecaseathand,theargumentthatthePactofBogotátakesprecedenceisevenstrongersincetheoptionalclause declarations of Nicaragua and Colombia were madebeforetheentryintoforceofthePactofBogotá .Therefore,thePactofBogotáisnotonlylex specialisbutalsolex posterior .

In Colombia’s view, “it is the Pact of Bogotá which con-stitutestheCourt’stitleofjurisdictioninourcase”andwerethe Court to conclude that it had no jurisdiction to adjudi-cate upon the dispute, the application of the Pact wouldrequiretheCourttodeclarethecontroversyendedpursuanttoArticlexxxIVthereof,“notonly for thepurposesof theCourt’s jurisdictionunderthePact,butforallpurposes” .Inthisregard,Colombiaclaimsthatadisputecannotbesettledandendedandyet at the same timebeadisputecapableofadjudicationbytheCourtpursuant to jurisdictionaccordedunder the optional clause . Consequently, once the contro-versybetweenthePartieshasbeendeclaredbytheCourttobe ended under thePact ofBogotá, therewouldbenocon-troversyoutstandingtowhichjurisdictioncouldattachunderanyothertitle,includingthedeclarationsofthePartiesundertheoptionalclause .

Colombia further argues that, in any event, the CourtwouldhavenojurisdictiononthebasisoftheParties’optionalclause declarations since Colombia’s declaration had beenwithdrawn(December2001)bythedateofthefilingofNica-ragua’sApplication .ColombiafinallycontendsthatevenifitsdeclarationwerefoundtobeinforceatthetimewhenNicara-guafileditsApplication,theallegeddisputewouldfalloutsidethescopeofthedeclarationasaresultofareservationwhichexcludeddisputesarisingoutoffactspriorto6January1932 .

Nicaragua, for its part, submits that although the CourtstatedinitsJudgmentintheArmedActionscasethat“inrela-tionsbetweentheStatespartiestothePactofBogotá,thatPactisgoverning”,thiscannot“destroythevalueoftheOptionalClause declarations as an independent basis of jurisdiction”sincethey“haveanintrinsicvalueinandofthemselves,andtheiroperationisnotpredeterminedbyothertitlesofjurisdic-tion” .ItconsidersthattheprimacyofthePactdoesnotsignifyexclusiveness . Nicaragua contends that this was recognizedbytheCourtitselfintheArmedActionscasewhenitstated

thatthecommitmentunderthePactofBogotáis“independ-ent of any other which the parties may have undertaken . . . by depositing . . . a declaration of acceptance of compul-soryjurisdiction”(emphasisadded) .ItpointsoutthatintheArmedActionscase,theCourtdidnotruleoutthepossibilitythatitalsohadjurisdictionundertheParties’optionalclausedeclarations but simply concluded that it “[did] not need toconsider”thatquestionsinceithadalreadyfoundthatithadjurisdictionunderthePactofBogotá .

InNicaragua’sview,iftheCourtweretodeclarethecon-troversyendedpursuant toArticlexxxIVof thePact, thatfindingwouldhave tobeunderstoodwithin the frameworkofthePact itself .ThusthecontroversywouldbeendedonlytotheextentthatitwouldnolongerbepossibletoinvokethePactasabasisofjurisdiction .ItunderlinesthatsuchafindingpursuanttoArticlexxxIVofthePactdoesnotexcludetheexistence of other bases of jurisdiction such as the declara-tionsbythePartiesundertheoptionalclause .

Nicaraguaarguesthatthetwobasesofjurisdiction,namelyArticlexxxIofthePactofBogotáandthedeclarationsmadeby thePartiesunder theoptionalclausearecomplementaryandthatitisfortheCourttodecidewhethertorelyupononlyoneofthemortocombinethem .ItpointsoutthattheStatesparties to thePact ofBogotá intended tobroaden the juris-dictionoftheCourtnottolimitexistingobligationsderivingfromother instruments .Inthiscontext,NicaraguareferstothestatementofthePermanentCourtofInternationalJusticeintheElectricityofSofiaandBulgariacaseregardingmultipleagreementsacceptingcompulsoryjurisdiction .

Nicaragua denies that Colombia’s declaration was not inforceatthetimeofthefilingoftheApplication .Itcontendsthatreasonablenoticeisrequiredforthewithdrawalofdec-larations and that this condition was not complied with byColombia .NicaraguadoesnotdisputethatColombia’sdecla-rationappliedonlytodisputesarisingfromfactssubsequentto6January1932;itargues,however,thatthegeneratingfactof the dispute,namely the interpretationof the 1928 Treatyand1930ProtocoladoptedbyColombiafrom1969onwards,aroseafter6 January1932 .Finally,Nicaraguaasserts, refer-ringtotheprovisionsofArticle79,paragraph9,oftheRulesofCourt,thatinanyeventtheobjectionsubmittedbyColom-biadoesnothaveanexclusivelypreliminarycharacter .

TheCourtnotesinitiallythatthequestionofwhethertheoptionalclausedeclarationsofthePartiescanprovideadis-tinctandsufficientbasisofjurisdictioninthecasenowonlyarises in respect of that part of the dispute relating to thesovereignty over the three islands expressly named in Arti-cle Iof the1928Treaty:SanAndrés,ProvidenciaandSantaCatalina . Having first examined the preliminary objectionraisedbyColombiatojurisdictionunderthePactofBogotá,theCourthasconcludedthatithasjurisdictiononthebasisofArticlexxxIofthePacttodealwithalltheotheraspectsofthedispute .Consequently,nopurposeisservedbyexaminingwhether, inrelation to thoseaspects, thedeclarationsof thePartiesundertheoptionalclausecouldalsoprovideabasisoftheCourt’sjurisdiction .

TheCourtrecallsthatintheArmedActionscaseitstatedthat“[s]ince,inrelationsbetweentheStatespartiestothePact

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ofBogotá,thatPactisgoverning,theCourtwillfirstexaminethequestionwhetherithasjurisdictionunderArticlexxxIofthePact”(emphasisadded) .However,thiscannotbeinter-preted inanywayotherthanthat theCourt, facedwiththetwo titles of jurisdiction invoked, could not deal with themsimultaneouslyanddecidedtoproceedfromtheparticulartothemoregeneral,without thereby implying that thePactofBogotáprevailedoverandexcludedthesecondtitleofjuris-diction,namelytheoptionalclausedeclarations .

TheCourtthusconsidersthattheprovisionsofthePactofBogotáandthedeclarationsmadeundertheoptionalclauserepresenttwodistinctbasesoftheCourt’sjurisdictionwhicharenotmutuallyexclusive .Itnotesthatthescopeofitsjuris-dictioncouldbewiderundertheoptionalclausethanunderthePactofBogotá .

TheCourtobservesthatneitherColombianorNicaraguahasmadeareservationtotheirrespectiveoptionalclausedec-larations identical or similar to the restriction contained inArticleVIofthePactofBogotá .Accordingly,thelimitationimposedbyArticleVIofthePactwouldnotbeapplicabletojurisdictionundertheoptionalclause .

TheCourtnotes that itsacknowledgmentof the fact thatsovereigntyovertheislandsofSanAndrés,ProvidenciaandSanta Catalina was attributed to Colombia under the 1928TreatywasmadeforthepurposesofascertainingwhetherornottheCourthadjurisdictionoverthematterunderthePactofBogotá .However,itisequallyrelevantforthepurposesofdeterminingwhethertheCourthasjurisdictiononthebasisoftheoptionalclausedeclarations .Inthisregard,theCourtnotes that Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute expresslyrequires that, inorder for theCourt tohave jurisdictiononthe basis of optional clause declarations, there must exist a“legaldispute”betweentheParties .

GiventheCourt’sfindingthatthereisnoextantlegaldis-putebetweenthePartiesonthequestionofsovereigntyoverthethreeislands,theCourtcannothavejurisdictionoverthisquestioneitherunderthePactofBogotáoronthebasisoftheoptionalclausedeclarations .

Inthelightoftheforegoing,theCourtfindsthatnopracti-calpurposewouldbeservedbyproceedingfurtherwiththeothermattersraisedinthesecondpreliminaryobjectionfiledbyColombia .TheCourtthusupholdsthesecondpreliminaryobjection relating to jurisdiction under the optional clausedeclarations raisedbyColombia in so faras it concerns theCourt’s jurisdiction as regards the question of sovereigntyovertheislandsofSanAndrés,ProvidenciaandSantaCata-lina,andfindsthatitisnotnecessarytoexaminetheobjectionin so faras it concerns sovereigntyover theothermaritimefeatures in dispute between the Parties and the maritimedelimitationbetweentheParties .

Subsequent procedure(para .141)

In accordance with Article 79, paragraph 9, of the RulesofCourt,time-limitsforthefurtherproceedingsshallsubse-quentlybefixedbyOrderoftheCourt .

** *

Dissenting opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh

Vice-President Al-Khasawneh found himself unable toconcur with the arguments and findings in the JudgmentupholdingColombia’spreliminaryobjections to jurisdictioninsofarastheyconcernsovereigntyovertheislandsofSanAndrés,ProvidenciaandSantaCatalina .Whileacknowledg-ingthattheCourtmayneedtotouchonthemeritsofacaseinordertoascertainitsjurisdictionatthepreliminaryobjec-tionsphaseofproceedings,Vice-PresidentAl-Khasawneh isoftheviewthatthecircumstancesofthiscaseweresuchthatadecisiononjurisdictionunderthePactofBogotáandunderArticle 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court did notpossess anexclusivelypreliminarycharacter (seeArticle79,paragraph9) .

The particular circumstances of the case leading to thisconclusionareasfollows:inordertodeterminewhethertheCourthasjurisdictionunderthePactofBogotáinrespectofthedisputerelatingtothethreeabove-mentionedislands,theCourtmustdecideuponthevalidityofthe1928Treatyandthe1930Protocol(whichvalidityiscontestedbyNicaragua) .ThisanalysisisrequiredbecauseArticleVIofthePactofBogotáexcludesthejurisdictionoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeinrespectofmatters“governedbyagreementsor treaties inforceonthedateoftheconclusionofthepresentTreaty” .Thevalidityofthe1928Treatyandofthe1930Protocolare,how-ever,alsocentraltoresolving,onthemerits,thedisputewithrespecttosovereigntyoverthethreenamedislandsoftheSanAndrésArchipelago .Thus, thefinding in theJudgment thattheCourtlacksjurisdictionunderthePactofBogotá,becausethe1928Treatyand1930Protocolarevalid,hastheeffectofprejudgingan importantaspectof themeritsof thedisputebeforethishasbeenfullyargued .

The finding also has the effect of disposing of a range ofcomplexfactualandlegalissuesraisedbyNicaragua,viaherallegationthatthe1928Treatyand1930Protocolareinvalidbecause procured by coercion, without allowing the PartiestheopportunitytofullyarguethecasebeforetheCourt,andwithout adequately setting out the reasons for the decisionreached .

Vice-President Al-Khasawneh does not agree with theCourtthatArticle79,paragraph9,oftheRulesoftheCourtincludesapresumptioninfavourofthepartymakingapre-liminaryobjection .

Finally, Vice-President Al-Khasawneh considers that theCourt was only able to reach the position that deciding thequestionofthevalidityofthe1928Treatyandthe1930Proto-col“wouldnotdeterminethedisputeonthemerits”bydefin-ingthedisputenarrowlyandcreatinganartificialdistinctionbetween the subject-matterof thedisputeand thequestionsindispute .WhileacknowledgingthattheCourtretainsfree-domtodefinethesubject-matterofthedisputeonthebasisofthe submissions of the parties, the Vice-President considersthatinthiscasetheCourthasactedbeyondthelimitsofthatfreedom;limitsimposedbyconsiderationsoflegitimacyandcommonsense .

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The first preliminary objection raised by Colombia doesnotpossessanexclusivelypreliminarycharacter,statesJudgeRanjevainhisopinion .TheargumentspresentedbythePar-tiesconfirmtheintimateconnectionsbetweentheproceduralissues . Indeed,bydeclaringthat the1928Treatyputanendto the dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia when itattributed the three islands of San Andrés, Providencia andSantaCatalina,theCourtintheJudgmentadjudicatestwooftheApplicant’ssubmissionsonthemerits:theclaimtosover-eigntyoverthoseislandsandthenullityofthetreatyowingtosubstantivedefectsresultingfromcoercionandinfringementofinternalconstitutionalprovisions .JudgeRanjevaholdsthatthe Judgment confuses enforceability of the Treaty againstNicaraguaandnullityasasanction for the invalidityof theTreaty .Asidefromfailingtorespecttheadversaryprinciple,the Judgment contains a lacuna: a statement of reasons forchoosingArticleVIofthePactofBogotáasthebasisforjuris-dictionratherthantheoptionalclause .

Declaration of Judge Parra-Aranguren

1 . Notwithstanding his vote in favour of the operativeclauseoftheJudgment,JudgeParra-Arangurendoesnotagreewith paragraph 136 which states: “the Court considers thattheprovisionsofthePactofBogotáandthedeclarationsmadeundertheoptionalclauserepresenttwodistinctbasesoftheCourt’sjurisdictionwhicharenotmutuallyexclusive” .

2 . The conclusion reached in paragraph 136 is supportedbymakingreferencetotheJudgmentinthecaseBorderandTransborderArmedActions(Nicaraguav .Honduras),Juris-dictionandAdmissibility(I.C.J. Reports 1988,p .85,para .36)andtoaquotationfromthe1939JudgmentofthePermanentCourtinthecaseElectricityCompanyofSofiaandBulgaria(Belgiumv .Bulgaria)(P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 77,p .76) .

3 . However, Judge Parra-Aranguren considers that theArmedActionsdecisiondoesnotsupportthisconclusioninthe present Judgment, because as is indicated in paragraph134, “theCourtwasmerely responding toandrejecting thearguments by Honduras”; and the quotation from the Elec-tricityCompanyofSofiaandBulgaria(Belgiumv .Bulgaria)Judgmentof1939isnotapplicable,becauseinthepresentcasethere is no “multiplicity of agreements concluded acceptingthecompulsoryjurisdiction”oftheCourt .

4 . JudgeParra-Arangurenobserves,as indicated inpara-graph 122 of the Judgment, that Nicaragua and Colombiamadedeclarationson24September1929and30October1937respectively,underArticle36oftheStatuteofthePermanentCourtofInternationalJustice,whicharedeemedtobeaccept-ancesofthecompulsoryjurisdictionofthisCourtunderArti-cle36,paragraph5,ofitsStatute;theythenmadenewdeclara-tionsunderArticle36,paragraph2,oftheStatuteoftheCourtasprescribedinArticlexxxIofthePactofBogotáwhentheyratifiedthelatterin1950and1968respectively .Inhisopinion,itisnotpossiblefortwodifferentdeclarationstocontinuetobesimultaneouslyinforceintherelationsbetweenNicaraguaand Colombia, because the second declaration necessarilyreplacedthefirstoneintheirreciprocalrelations .

5 . Therefore Judge Parra-Aranguren considers that theoptionalclausedeclarationsmadebyNicaraguaandColombiain1929and1937respectivelyarenolongerinforce,andforthisreasontheycannotbeinvokedasabasisforthejurisdic-tionoftheCourt .

Declaration of Judge Simma

WhileJudgeSimmaconsidersthepresentJudgmentgener-ally satisfactory, he expresses doubts whether the Court hasapplied Article VI of the Pact of Bogotá to the 1928 TreatybetweenNicaraguaandColombiainacorrectway .Inthesamecontext, Judge Simma has considerable difficulties with theCourt’sreadingoftherelationshipbetween,ontheonehand,thenotionofamatterbeing“governedby . . .treatiesinforce”at the time of the conclusion of the Pact in 1948 and that ofthecontinuedexistenceofa“legaldispute”asapreconditionforthejurisdictionoftheCourtonthebasisofadeclarationofacceptanceundertheoptionalclauseontheother .

Thematter turnson thequestionof sovereigntyover theislands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina . TheCourtconcludesthatthe1928Treatyhasresolvedthisques-tion definitively, whereas Nicaragua had argued, inter alia,theinvalidityofthisTreatyab initio .However,accordingtotheJudgment,Nicaragua,throughitsbehaviourtowardstheTreatyforover50years,losttherighttoinvokesuchinvalid-ity;thereforetheTreatyistoberegardedashavingbeen“validand in force” in 1948, with the consequence that the CourtdoesnothavejurisdictionunderthePactofBogotá .InJudgeSimma’sview,thelossoftherighttoasserttheTreaty’sinva-lidity according to the conditions of thePact ofBogotá canonlybe the end of thematterwithin the frameworkof thatPact; if a second, independent, basis of jurisdiction existedandactuallyyieldedthejurisdictionoftheCourt,theissueoftheinvalidityofthe1928Treatywouldremainopenandcouldbe re-argued, this time fully, by Nicaragua . In the presentinstance,thiscouldpossiblyhavebeenthecase,inviewoftheArticle36,paragraph2,declarationsofacceptancesubmittedbybothParties .AccordingtotheCourt,however,itsconclu-sionthatthereisnojurisdictionunderthePactofBogotáatthesametimealsodisposesofjurisdictionundertheoptionalclausesystem,eventhoughtheCourtrecognizesthatweareinpresenceoftwodistinctbasesofjurisdictionwhicharenotmutuallyexclusive .JudgeSimmathereforeconsidersthattheCourt should have continued the examination of its juris-dictionbyturningto theoptionalclausedeclarationsof thePartiesandscrutinizing theeffectof thereservationratione temporis made to the Colombian declaration as well as thatofColombia’sdenunciationof thatdeclaration . If theCourthadfollowedthiscourse,eithertheissueofjurisdictionwouldhave been decided in the negative once and for all, or theNicaraguanlawoftreatiesargumentswouldhaveexperiencedtheirduefateatthemeritsstageofthecase .

Declaration of Judge Tomka

JudgeTomkaconcurswiththeviewoftheCourtthatNica-raguahas treated the1928Treatyasvalid formore than50years and thus acquiesced in its validity . Therefore, Nicara-gua’sfirstargumentallegingthatthe1928Treatywasinvalid

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becauseitwasconcludedinviolationofitsConstitutiontheninforcecannotbeaccepted .

Nicaraguaalsosubmittedthatitwasdeprivedofitsinter-national capacity during the pertinent period since it couldnot freely express its consent to be bound by internationaltreaties . It seems that the majority has treated this secondargument like the first, but Judge Tomka considers that itrequiresadistinctresponse .

Thesecondgroundof invalidity invokedbyNicaragua isnotwithoutdifficulty .Ifitistobeunderstoodbroadly,thenitwouldruncountertotheotherbasisoftheCourt’sjurisdictioninvokedbyNicaragua:theoptionalclausedeclarationunderArticle 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute . Indeed, Nicaraguamadesuchdeclarationin1929,exactlyinthepertinentperiodwhen its government was allegedly deprived of its interna-tionalcapacity .Nicaraguahoweveradmitsthatitwasnotpre-ventedfromconcludinginternationaltreatiesingeneral .ButthenitisdifficulttoacceptitscontentionthattheNicaraguanGovernmentwasdeprivedofitsinternationalcapacityduringtherelevantperiod .NicaraguathereforespecifiesthatwhileitwasunderoccupationbytheUnitedStates,itwaspreventedfromconcluding treaties that ranagainst the interestof theUnitedStatesandfromrejectingtheconclusionoftreatiesthatthe United States demanded it to conclude . The interests ordemandsofathirdStatearenothoweversufficientgroundstorenderatreatynullandvoidab initio .Furthermore,theCourtwouldnothavebeenabletoreachadecisionabouttheallegedcoercionwithoutexaminingthelawfulnessoftheconductoftheUnitedStateswhichisnotapartytotheseproceedings .

JudgeTomkathereforeagreeswiththeconclusionsoftheCourt that the issue of sovereignty over the islands of SanAndrés,ProvidenciaandSantaCatalina isnot tobeadjudi-catedatthemeritsstage .

Separate opinion of Judge Abraham

Judge Abraham expresses his agreement with the sub-stanceofthesolutionsadoptedintheJudgmentinrespectofallaspectsofthedisputeotherthansovereigntyoverthethreeislands referred to by name in Article I of the 1928 Treaty(SanAndrés,ProvidenciaandSantaCatalina) .Astoallsuchaspects,heapprovesoftheCourt’sdecisionthatthequestionsraisedbyNicaragua’sclaimwerenotsettledbythe1928Trea-ty,thattheCourtthereforehasjurisdictionoverthempursu-anttoArticlexxxIofthePactofBogotá,andthatthereisnoneed for theCourt todeterminewhether itmightalsohavejurisdictionpursuanttothetwoParties’optionaldeclarationsrecognizingthecompulsoryjurisdictionoftheCourt .

Ontheotherhand,JudgeAbrahamdistanceshimselffromthewayinwhichtheCourthastreatedthequestionofsover-eigntyoverthethreeislandsreferredtoabove .

First,inhisviewtheCourtshouldhavefoundthatColom-bia’s first objection—challenging the Court’s jurisdictionunderthePactofBogotá—didnot,inthisregard,possessanexclusively preliminary character, and that the examinationofitshouldbedeferredtothelaterphaseoftheproceedings,after the debate on the merits . Indeed, to rule thoroughlyon this objection, the Court has had to take a position onNicaragua’s argumentbasedon thealleged invalidityof the

1928Treaty,specificallyonthegroundthatitwasconcludedundercoercion .AccordingtoJudgeAbraham,theCourtdidnotatthisstagehavebeforeitall theinformationnecessarytodecidethisquestion,andthemannerinwhichitresolvedtheissuecreatesasmanydifficultiesasitsolves .Specifically,JudgeAbrahamregretsthat,alreadyatthepreliminarystage,the Court, needlessly and without adequately explaining itsreasoning, addressed the delicate question whether a Stateclaiming to have been coerced through the unlawful use orthreatofforcecanrelyonthatcoercionasacauseforthenul-lity of a treaty, when, by its conduct after conclusion of thetreaty,itmanifesteditsacquiescenceoveraperiodoftimeinthevalidityofthetreaty .

Secondly, in respect of Colombia’s second preliminaryobjection—challenging the Court’s jurisdiction under theoptionaldeclarations—JudgeAbrahamapprovesoftheCourt’sdecisionthatitiswithoutjurisdictiononthisbasisoverthatpartofthedisputeconcerningthethreeislands,butnotofthegroundsonwhichtheCourtjustifieditsdecision .

AccordingtoJudgeAbraham,thePactofBogotáisthesolebasis for jurisdictionapplicable in the relationsbetween theStatespartiestoit,andtheoptionaldeclarationsareineffec-tive .Ontheotherhand, inhisview it is incorrect tosay,astheJudgmentdoes,thatthereisnoextantdisputebetweenthePartiesoverthethreeislands,anydisputehavingbeensettledbythe1928Treaty .InJudgeAbraham’sopinion,thisreason-ingoriginates inaworryingconfoundingof thesubstantiveissues—the1928Treatymayperhapsleadtodecidingthedis-puteinfavourofColombia—andtheissuesofjurisdictionandadmissibility—theforegoingobservationshouldnot,byitself,preventtheCourtfromexercisingitsjurisdictionoveraveryrealdispute .

Declaration of Judge Keith

JudgeKeithemphasizedthat,inaccordancewiththeprin-cipleofthegoodadministrationofjustice,theCourtshoulddecide at a preliminary stage a matter in dispute if it mayproperlybedecidedatthatstageandifdecidingthatmatterwouldfacilitate theresolutionof thecase . Inexercisingthatpower and responsibility the Court must have before it thematerialitneedstodecidethatmatteranditmustaccordtoeachpartyequalrightstopresentitscaseandrebutthecaseagainstit .

Inthecircumstancesofthiscase,inJudgeKeith’sopinion,theCourtcouldproperlydecide,asithas,thatthematterofsovereigntyoverthethreenamedislandshasbeensettledinfavourofColombia .ThereisnownodisputeinrespectofthatmatterandtheCourtaccordinglydoesnothavejurisdictioninrespectofit .

Dissenting opinion of Judge Bennouna

Judge Bennouna voted against the first decision of theCourt, whereby it upheld the preliminary objection to itsjurisdiction raised by Colombia on the basis of the Pact ofBogotá,insofarasitconcernssovereigntyovertheislandsofSanAndrés,ProvidenciaandSantaCatalina(operativeclause,sub-paragraph(1)(a)) .Inhisview,thisobjectiondoesnotpos-sess,inthecircumstancesofthecase,anexclusivelyprelimi-

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narycharacterwithin themeaningofArticle79,paragraph9, of the Rules of Court . While the Pact of Bogotá excludesfromtheCourt’sjurisdictionissues“governedbyagreementsortreatiesinforce”,NicaraguahasdisputedthevalidityoftheTreatysignedwithColombiain1928andratifiedin1930,onwhichthelatterreliesasthebasisofitssovereigntyoverthethreeislands .

InsofarasNicaraguareliesonthecoerciontowhichitissaidtohavebeensubjectedwhenitwasunderoccupationbytheUnitedStatesinordertocontendthatthe1928Treatywasinvalid ab initio, Judge Bennouna considers that the Courtcouldnotat this stage investigatesuchcoercionof theStateand its consequences on the capacity of Nicaragua to enterintoatreatywithoutaddressingthemeritsofthedispute .

JudgeBennounaalsovotedagainstsub-paragraph(2)(a),oftheoperativeclause,accordingtowhichtheCourtsimilarlylacksjurisdictiononthebasisoftheoptionaldeclarationsofthe Parties recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of theCourt(Statute,Art .36,para .2) .Inupholdingthisobjection,theCourtagaindeclinedtoexerciseitsjurisdictionconcern-ing the three islands . JudgeBennounanotes that theCourt,afterholdingthatitwasbefore“twodistinctbasesof . . .juris-

diction which are not mutually exclusive”, has nonethelessmanagedtorejectthesecondofthese,basedontheoptionaldeclarations,byreferencetoanexaminationofthefirst,basedonthePactofBogotá,byconcludingthatthereisnodisputebetweentheParties .

For Judge Bennouna, the optional declarations must beappreciatedper se,andcanonlybelimitedbythespecificres-ervationsmadetothembytheParties .Onthatbasis,thereisindeed,inhisopinion,adispute,aconflictoflegalargumentbetweenthePartiesregardingthevalidityofthe1928Treaty .

Declaration of Judge Gaja

InhisdeclarationJudgead hocGajacriticizedtheCourt’sfindingthat ithadno jurisdictionundertheoptionalclausedeclarations because there was no “extant dispute” on thequestion of sovereignty over the islands that were expresslyattributedtoColombiabythe1928Treaty .However,hecon-curredwiththeCourt’sconclusionsalsoonthispointinviewoftheColombianreservationtotheeffectthatitsdeclarationapplied“onlytodisputesarisingoutoffactssubsequentto6January1932” .Heconsideredthatallthefactsrelatingtothecontentandvalidityofthe1928Treatypredated1932 .

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